THEORETICAL REASONS FOR VARIATIONS IN THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKING DISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

by

LAWRENCE J. LAMANNA

(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation proposes new theoretical explanations for observed differences in the policymaker–intelligence-provider relationship in the United States and the United Kingdom. Despite historically close integration between the two intelligence systems, scholars of intelligence studies have observed that this relationship is much closer in the United Kingdom than in the United States. Up until now, the only explanation offered has been based mainly on perceived cultural differences. This dissertation suggests that less secrecy, less centralization of the political system, and larger government and intelligence organizations lead to greater incentives to politicize intelligence and therefore result in more distance between policymakers and intelligence providers in order to reduce the opportunity to politicize.

INDEX WORDS: Intelligence, United Kingdom, United States, Policymaker, Politicization, Assessment, Analysis, Estimate, Theory

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Dick and Mary Ann Lamanna. They first taught me to be curious about the world. They also gave me a realistic introduction to the work of research and scholarship, but I eventually decided to pursue it anyway.

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There are many people who supported or assisted me during the past nine years of educational pursuits, including specifically with this dissertation. I would like to thank them all. There are so many, though, that the most difficult thing about writing this part is deciding who to mention by name.

My interest in intelligence was first encouraged by Art Hulnick and Mark Lowenthal as I tried to find a master's program somewhere in which to study it. Wayne Bartholomew, Walt Nicgorski, and Kerry Koller wrote letters of recommendation for me. When I finally left my employer of sixteen years and returned to school, Mike and Nora Zusi, Chris Vieck, Michelle Herrli, Dan and Linda DeCelles, Tom Finke, Jim and Gerry Sgroi, and Bob and Mary Kerby were each a source of great encouragement in the face of the unknown. Chris Meehan even drove with us from Indiana to Connecticut to help get us settled in.

At Yale, lunches with Bill Foltz added a personal dimension to my reading on intelligence. My classmates in the International Relations program were all interesting people from different parts of the world and it was a real pleasure to learn with and from them. Likewise, spending time with the Grand Strategy crowd and the Gang of Three (John Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charlie Hill) was not just enlightening, but also fun. Ted Bromund and Minh Luong put in a lot of work to make that program work and I'm glad to have developed friendships with them while I was there. Cheryl Doss and Doug Gollin and Pierre-Henri and Stéphanie Multon provided much-needed social breaks with people my own age. Thanksgiving dinners with the Doss-Gollins are a fond memory.

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I want to thank the other members of my dissertation committee—Gary Bertsch, Brock Tessman, and Hal Rainey—for agreeing to serve in this capacity, too. Their encouragement and comments at the beginning of the process helped set me in the right direction and their reviews of the final product only served to refine and improve it. Needless to say, any omissions, errors of fact, comprehension, or interpretation are solely my responsibility.

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together the intelligence portion of the *International Studies Encyclopedia* (aka "the project that would not die"). I learned a lot about writing and editing from my time working with Tom Noe at Greenlawn Press. I am especially grateful to Michael Herman, without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. In addition to taking me on a delightful hike through the hills overlooking Cheltenham, Michael made introductions for me that paved the way for key interviews during my research. In the personal crisis (which he did not know about) that followed after my visit to England, I disappointed him by not responding to a request for some information. I hope to win his forgiveness by presenting him with a copy of the final outcome of his generosity.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States and the United Kingdom have worked closely together on intelligence matters since at least the Second World War. During this time, they have often shared information, personnel, institutional arrangements, equipment, techniques, and even missions. Nevertheless, they have maintained a number of differences in their approaches to intelligence work, including a difference in the accepted level of commingling between policymakers and intelligence producers. In the United Kingdom, policymakers and intelligence producers rub elbows on a regular basis and work together to produce assessments of the outside world.[1] In the United States, the two groups are kept farther apart and cries of corruption and scandal are heard if they attempt to work together closely to produce assessments.

In this dissertation I add to our understanding of why these two countries have different sensibilities and practices regarding the proper distance between policymakers and intelligence providers at the highest levels of government. Specifically, I theorize that previously ignored structural variables play an important part in determining these sensibilities and the resulting organization of the relationship between policymakers and intelligence providers. I do this primarily through deductive and abductive reasoning, drawing on publically known facts and various social science theories to argue that we should expect variables such as the system of government, the size of government, and the degree of secrecy—or more precisely, the degree of privacy—in the relationship to have an effect on the national variation of this sense of proper

[1] By policymakers, I mean those who are in a position to determine and set government policy, whether or not they are formally assigned this responsibility. By intelligence producers or providers, I mean those who supply intelligence information and analysis to the government for use in making or implementing policy.

distance and the corresponding organizational arrangements that exist in the two countries. These variables all affect the level of incentive a policymaker has to politicize intelligence analysis. Specifically, less secrecy, less centralization of the political system, and larger government and intelligence organizations lead to greater incentives to politicize intelligence and therefore result in more distance between policymakers and intelligence providers in order to reduce the opportunity to politicize. There is no reason to think that the effects of these variables are limited to the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus the theory outlined here should be applicable to the policy-intelligence relationship in other states, too.

I use the words *theory* and *theoretical* mainly to make clear that the present study is not an empirical one. By theory I mean a way of explaining or relating a set of facts or variables. In this case, the variable to be explained is the distance between policymakers and intelligence providers. This is the dependent variable. As will be seen in chapters six, I propose a set of independent variables and a theoretical relationship to explain the dependent variable. Before that, I use chapter four to outline the theoretical explanation and independent variables offered by two other researchers.

A limited number of elite interviews serve as a "reality check" for the plausibility of these theoretical deductions and also as a source of new insights and ideas, primarily regarding the British system. As explained in greater detail in chapter five, I did not have any previous experience in conducting interviews. Consequently, there was a bit of a learning curve involved. Further, I was advised not to make an audio recording for fear of constraining the interviewees. Therefore, although I learned a great deal from the interviews, they did not result in a great number of usable quotations and since they were unstructured by choice, they do not provide comparable or generalizable data. Nevertheless, they served their primary purpose.

I first became curious about these varying institutional arrangements while studying the crisis surrounding intelligence and Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (Lamanna 2007a). In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, both the United States and the United Kingdom publically released information about their intelligence on Iraq. Both governments argued that Iraq had ongoing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. After the invasion, it became fairly clear these programs had been closed for some time and that the intelligence estimates had been incorrect. Both governments then began official inquiries into the mistaken intelligence. Large portions of those inquiries were also released to the public. This created an almost unique opportunity for a student of intelligence: the opportunity to examine and compare parallel sets of intelligence documents and investigations from two different countries almost immediately after their creation. Typically, information and documents such as these remain classified and unavailable to scholars for years, if not for decades. My earlier study was configurative-idiographic in nature (see Levy 2002). Among my results, I found that in the American system, intelligence agencies come together to produce the most important intelligence estimations of the outside world. However, in the British system, intelligence agencies *and* other government departments—*policy* departments—come together to collaboratively assess the outside world.

Subsequently, I found that the *existence* of a national difference in the relative closeness of intelligence and policy between the United States and the United Kingdom is already established in the literature (for example, see Herman 1996, 2003; Johnson 1996; Lowenthal 2006). It is generally accepted that the relationship is closer in the British system than in the American. Further, the British institution of the Joint Intelligence Committee is frequently mentioned as the example par excellence of this. An adequate *explanation* for this difference, however, has not been articulated. Indeed, only one explanation has been offered and, as I will

show in chapter four, it is lacking. The issue is, therefore, under-theorized, and this dissertation is an attempt to address that shortfall. Thus, it is primarily an example of what Stephen Van Evera (1997) calls a "theory-proposing" dissertation.

My current study, while largely theoretical, is nevertheless comparative and therefore brings some of the advantages that comparative research has over single-country studies. In particular, the structural factors that influence policy-intelligence relations are made more salient. In a single-country study, these factors are hard to detect. Nation-states do not frequently change their system of government, legal provisions regarding state secrets and national security, or size of government apparatus. This situation would leave the researcher with no variation in the independent variables. Although the present study is by no means an empirical test and therefore does not require the data one would need for such a test, some variation in variables is still necessary to at least stimulate the imagination and make likely explanatory variables identifiable. Examining the United States alone or the United Kingdom alone would handicap the researcher and allow some variables to disappear into the background of "that's just the way the world is." Looking to at least a couple of cases for inspiration makes clear that the world is heterogeneous and that the variations found in it might have interesting effects. Unfortunately, sufficient data for an empirical test—let alone a rigorous one—is simply unavailable at this time. Lack of publicly available data is one of the pitfalls of doing research on intelligence and government intelligence agencies.

Nevertheless, having examined these two systems and theorized about these variables, the resulting theoretical conclusions could then be subjected to peer review and one could then go on to formulate some hypotheses which might be tested on other states. The current project, then, opens up a whole new research program, step by step, although there are serious hurdles to

overcome in order to implement it. These obstacles include differences in language and, as just noted, the ubiquitous problem of research in intelligence studies: governments usually want to keep the relevant data secret.

All researchers have to address the "so what?" issue. Why is it important to find an answer to this particular research question? Ian Shapiro argues that political scientists have a "particular responsibility" to examine and correct accepted accounts when "they are both faulty and widely influential outside the academy" (Shapiro 2005, 68). Some issues have "wide" or significant influence because of potentially far-reaching consequences, despite the fact that such issues are not faced directly by a great number of individuals. National security issues are like this. Only a handful of people are actually in a position to make policy decisions about national security—the president of the United States, for instance—but the decisions those individuals make can have enormous consequences for the state and for society. Decisions about how policymakers access intelligence and relate to intelligence producers are extremely important because national security decisions are often substantially based on intelligence and these decisions can be matters of life and death and can determine the prosperity of the nation. Any arrangements that would improve or degrade the development of intelligence analysis and its accurate transmission to the policymaker are therefore consequential.

Of course, the importance of the intelligence-policy relationship has not gone unnoticed. Even centuries ago, institutional designers were concerned about the relationship between intelligence and policy. Nizam al-Mulk, the Persian wazir of the Seljuk Empire from 1063 until his death in 1092, wrote that domestic intelligence agents and informers "must be directly responsible to the king and not to anyone else…and nobody but the king should know what they report" (Nizam Al-Mulk 1978 [ca 1090], 64). In more modern times, Walter Lipmann (1922)

saw the function of intelligence as to present otherwise unobservable facts and understandings to the policymaker who will make his decision with that information while also taking into account other factors, such as domestic political interests and realities. The important thing for Lipmann was that the information presented by intelligence be a fair representation of the reality of the situation, so that the decision-maker could draw valid inferences from it. Lippmann argued that the only way to ensure this fair representation was to *separate* the expert (intelligence provider) from the maker of policy and from the executor of policy. "It is no accident that the best diplomatic service in the world is the one in which the divorce between the assembling of knowledge and the control of policy is most perfect" (Lippmann 1922, 381).

In recent history, there has been no consensus about how to manage the relationship and the topic has become a matter of public controversy. At the beginning of the first Nixon administration, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the president's chief intelligence provider, was required to leave the room once he finished presenting and the discussion turned to policy (Kissinger 2007; Garthoff 2005; but see also Powers 1979, 256-7). This proved unworkable because of the ongoing need for intelligence input during the policy discussion. Robert Gates, who worked at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an analyst and rose through the ranks to eventually become the DCI, famously argued that intelligence producers need to be close to policymakers in order to ensure the production of "actionable" intelligence (Gates 1992a; Wirtz 2007b; Westerfield 1996/97, 1997).

As recent world events have demonstrated, intelligence plays an important part in the foreign policy decisions of major states. Some of the key debates regarding the legitimacy and wisdom of the 2003 invasion of Iraq hinge on the matter of intelligence: its accuracy, its inputs, and its appropriate use. How intelligence interacts with policymaking is therefore an important

issue. If intelligence provides inaccurate or biased estimates to policymakers, then we can expect those policymakers to produce less-than-optimal decisions, even if they are free from other pressures. There are several reasons that intelligence might fail to provide good estimates, but bias introduced because of flaws in the intelligence-producer–policymaker relationship is the one that is of concern here. Because this relationship can and does change, there is great potential for unintended—and negative—consequences when the relationship is deliberately configured or altered without a good understanding of its dynamics.

Two recently proposed changes in practice made these issues more salient for me. First, in the awkward period between when Tony Blair announced he would step down as prime minister and when Gordon Brown assumed that position, Brown visited Iraq and made a statement that caught my attention. According to a 12 June 2007 article in the *New York Times*,

> Speaking to reporters in Baghdad, Mr. Brown said he had asked a senior civil servant, Sir Gus O'Donnell, to make 'all security and intelligence analysis independent of the political process.' At the same time, he said he wanted greater parliamentary oversight of intelligence, in order to 'reassure people both about the information and the use of information' (Cowell 2007).

This struck me as an odd combination of things to say. Brown wanted to make intelligence analysis "independent of the political process" and yet he wanted to increase parliament's supervision of it. It seemed to me that there might be a contradiction contained within these sentences. I had some reason to think that increasing parliamentary oversight might actually *increase* the political pressure on analysis, not reduce it. Let me be clear here, I do not argue against legislative oversight of intelligence. Rather, my concern is that changes in the institutional relationship between the legislature and intelligence analysis will be made with an

incomplete understanding of the dynamics involved and will therefore have unintended and unexpected consequences. Appreciating these dynamics and their consequences allows one to design the best overall arrangement. Failing to appreciate them can lead to poor design, further (catastrophic?) problems, and possibly a degradation in intelligence quality and therefore in national security.

The second example of a recently contemplated change in practice that may have unintended consequences is found in the United States. In 2008, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published *Vision 2015*, which looks a few years into the future to anticipate the requirements that will be placed on the U.S. intelligence community and the challenges that U.S. national security will face. Among other things, this document suggests that Americans will expect more intelligence information to be available *to the public* in the future. (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008) If more intelligence estimates are written for public consumption rather than for the private use of government policymakers, what effects might that have on the content of those estimates? Will they be more or less subject to the pressures of politics?

It was just these sorts of contemplated changes that caused me to think that exploring this topic would ultimately have practical benefits for the organization and use of intelligence. As I stated, the first step is to theorize where theory is mostly absent. After subjecting my theoretical findings to the scrutiny of other scholars, the research can be taken further with hypotheses formation and, some day, with empirical testing.

On at least one point, my research yielded a surprising result that will be valuable for other lines of research: the relationships between the legislatures and intelligence in the United States and the United Kingdom are radically different. I will explain how so in the pages ahead,

but for now I just want to comment that as an American, I always assumed that the British version of this relationship was similar to the American version; with perhaps some typically British eccentric twists. In fact, the relationship is essentially different at its core. As far as I can tell, the British version of this relationship is not well understood in the United States. There is an assumption here that the relationship of Parliament to British intelligence must be something like the relationship of Congress to the American intelligence community. In fact, they are quite different, but that is not apparent in much of the literature.

In addition to shedding some light on these institutional arrangements, this dissertation contributes to the academic literature by improving our understanding of the probable causes of the difference between the two national systems and, in the process, a better understanding of each of the systems.

The rest of the dissertation has the following structure. First, I provide some background and basic information about the U.S. and British intelligence systems. Second, I explain the puzzle in more detail. Third, I review the existing literature that addresses the causes of the variation in policymaker–intelligence-provider distance. Fourth, I describe and explain the methodology that I am using: how I conducted the research and how I drew conclusions. Fifth, I present my findings and theoretical proposals. Sixth, I offer some conclusions and a discussion of the policy implications of my theoretical proposals. These are not quite policy proposals, because the theoretical proposals are only theoretical, not empirically-tested findings. Nevertheless, if the theory is compelling, this should give the reader reason to revise the assessment of risk in various policy options. If the theory *might* be correct and the consequences of a particular policy choice would be grave and negative under that theory, the policymaker

should weigh this risk against the expected benefits of the policy choice before finalizing a choice. This last section will also suggest ways to further this research in subsequent projects.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND: INTELLIGENCE CONCEPTS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The purpose of this brief chapter is to provide some background on intelligence and the intelligence systems in the United States and the United Kingdom. Because intelligence studies is a relatively small subfield of political science, many political scientists are unfamiliar with the institutions and histories discussed in this dissertation. Reviewing some of this information first will help the reader to understand and appreciate the discussion later on, including the description of the main problem this dissertation addresses and the literature review proper.[2]

INTELLIGENCE

First of all, what do we mean when we talk about intelligence? Intelligence can be defined in a number of different ways. For example, Jennifer Sims, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Intelligence Coordination and currently the director of intelligence studies in the security studies program at Georgetown University, defines intelligence as the collection and analysis of information for the purpose of providing advantage to decision makers (Sims 1995, 2009). According to this definition, intelligence is all about information and understanding. The information might be secret or privileged, but it might also be out in the open and easily available to anyone with an interest in the topic or place.

Another commonly used definition is based on the existence and unique capabilities of intelligence *organizations*. In a sense, this definition is less abstract and more empirical and

[2] For more extensive overviews of intelligence and intelligence organizations, see Lowenthal (2006) or Richelson (1999). For a short history of American intelligence, see McNeil (2008).

historical. It emphasizes secrecy because that is a distinguishing characteristic of how intelligence organizations operate, the information they collect, and the things they produce. It defines intelligence to include all of the functions that actual intelligence organizations typically perform (see Warner 2009). With regards to the collection and analysis of information mentioned above, this second definition narrows the type of information that is considered to be intelligence. It only includes information that was meant to be kept secret, that is, information that could not be easily collected by other organizations or the public. Operations to collect this information are usually clandestine, that is, themselves secret. Because this definition includes all of the actual functions of intelligence organizations, it also includes covert action, which is a distinctly different activity than gathering and processing information. The U.S. National Security Act of 1947, as amended, defines covert action as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly" (As quoted in Lowenthal 2003, 124).[3] Like military action and diplomacy, covert action is an instrument for implementing policy. However, unlike military action or diplomacy, covert action and espionage both consistently require secrecy. "Whereas in clandestine collection the emphasis is on keeping the activity secret, in covert action it is on keeping the sponsorship secret" (Richelson 1999, 3). Because of the common need to operate in secret, both activities require similar skills and resources and are typically carried out by the same organization.

From a policy point of view, the definition used has enormous implications for management, resource use, and budgeting. One might therefore argue about which definition is the "correct" or best one. However, from an academic point of view, each of these definitions

[3] For more on covert action, see Kibbe (2010), Johnson (1996), and volume three of Johnson (2007d).

has value and is useful, depending on the research question being asked.[4] For the purposes of this dissertation, which is focused on the relationship of analysis and policy, the first definition is more useful because it focuses on the incoming information to be used by policymakers. For the purposes of this background chapter, it is sufficient to understand that there is not a single, accepted definition of intelligence and that these are two of the most commonly used ones.

Spies and espionage organizations have existed for all of recorded history (Dvornik 1974; Sheldon 2003). Specialized intelligence organizations have usually developed from either the diplomatic or the military services. One of the routine functions of diplomatic services is to gather information about the host country and its leaders for the use of policymakers back home. The line between this less muscular information collection and espionage is sometimes thin or nonexistent, as the recent controversy regarding U.S. diplomats gathering personal and financial information from foreign government officials and employees illustrates. Despite the brouhaha (e.g., Mazzetti 2010), diplomatic work has always involved the collection of information, and not just information that the host country would gladly share. Intelligence organizations spawned by military services are created to collect information for the purpose of adjusting military strategy and tactics to prepare for, and win, armed conflicts.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION[5]

The British use of intelligence is probably as old as the kingdom. Histories usually point to the sixteenth-century efforts of Francis Walsingham, principal secretary to Elizabeth I, as the

[4] This is a simplification of the differences and disputes over the definition of intelligence. For example, Johnson (1996) arranges the meaning of intelligence around four aspects: information, process, mission, and organization. For a collection of additional definitions and further discussion, see Warner (2002). For a short argument on the need to distinguish intelligence analysis from other kinds of information processing and analysis, see Agrell (2002).
[5] In addition to works cited, this section draws on the public websites of the intelligence services of the United Kingdom: www.sis.gov.uk; www.mi5.gov.uk; and www.gchq.gov.uk. For a more complete history of British intelligence, see Andrew (1986).

first organization of an intelligence service separate from the normal diplomatic service (e.g., Andrew 1986; Richelson 1988). The modern British civilian intelligence services began life in 1909 as the Secret Service Bureau, organized within the armed forces. "The original [British] Secret Service Bureau was to act as a sort of institutional 'cut out' between the Service intelligence departments and their sources in the field" (Davies 1995, 117; see also Richelson 1988). In other words, the War and Navy departments had developed clandestine sources through their existing intelligence services, but they did not want those informants to meet directly with War and Admiralty personnel and thus expose themselves. So, they created a civilian service to act as a go-between. The Secret Service Bureau quickly evolved into a two-pronged organization with a Home Section for countering foreign (mostly German) espionage in the United Kingdom and a Foreign Section for collecting secret information from abroad.

Secret Intelligence Service

The Foreign Section was soon integrated into the Military Intelligence Directorate of the War Office as MI1(c) for the duration of the First World War. After the war, the Foreign Section was removed from the War Office and placed under control of the Foreign Office. During the interwar years, it was increasingly referred to as the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). During the Second World War, the SIS was also given the designation "MI-6" as a sort of placeholder in the military organizational chart for the purpose of liaison with the armed forces intelligence organizations and foreign allied organizations. Given that the government did not officially acknowledge the SIS to exist and that it had no statutory basis, this additional designation was a practical necessity during a time when the SIS needed to interact with so many other parties. Today, the SIS collects foreign intelligence by both human and technical means, but its expertise

within the British system is mainly with human intelligence (HUMINT). The SIS was given a statutory basis in the Intelligence Services Act of 1994 and comes under the authority of the foreign secretary in the government of the United Kingdom.

Security Service

By the time of the First World War, the Home Section of the original Secret Service Bureau was designated MI-5 and continues to be referred to that way today, although its official name since 1931 is the Security Service.[6] MI-5 is responsible for counterintelligence and counterespionage work and the protection of British national security interests (Ransom 1970). There is no service in the United States that precisely corresponds with MI-5, but it is often compared to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). One important difference is that MI-5 is strictly an intelligence service and does not exercise police powers. In other words, when it identifies a situation that requires law enforcement action, it presents the relevant information to the police, who then make any arrests that are warranted. MI-5 is also empowered to perform much more extensive domestic surveillance than the FBI is normally allowed. MI-5 was given a statutory basis in the Security Service Act of 1989 and comes under the authority of the home secretary in the government of the United Kingdom.

Government Communications Headquarters

The third of the United Kingdom's three national-level intelligence services is the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). GCHQ collects and processes what is known as signals intelligence or SIGINT. SIGINT is intelligence collected from

[6] The obvious acronymic designation "SS" is unappealing due to its use by the Nazis for the paramilitary organization which committed crimes against humanity in both its domestic and foreign roles. Consequently, the designation "MI-5" is used by everyone whenever a shorter reference is desired.

communications systems and other electronic sources, including telephone conversations, internet traffic, radio communications, radar systems, and weapons systems. Breaking codes and decrypting this information is part of the processing that GCHQ performs. Both the collection and the processing of this information are highly specialized functions requiring particular technical skills, equipment, and other resources. GCHQ is also responsible for the security of government communications, that is, it designs the equipment, procedures, and encryptions that the government of the United Kingdom uses to protect its own communications. GCHQ began life as a cryptanalytic bureau during the First World War and was more substantially established in 1919 as the Government Code and Cypher School. The present name was adopted in 1946. The communication-security role of GCHQ has been publically acknowledged since 1919, but the SIGINT function was not officially acknowledged until 1983 and GCHQ was not put on a statutory basis until the Intelligence Services Act of 1994. GCHQ falls under the authority of the foreign secretary.

Each of the three main intelligence agencies—the SIS, MI-5, and GCHQ—is headed by a director who reports to either the foreign or the home secretary. In one way or another, all of the machinery of government in the United Kingdom must be accountable to ministers, who then represent that machinery to Parliament when necessary. Nevertheless, these agencies are considered independent and not actually a part of the Foreign or Home Office.

In addition to these civilian agencies, Defence Intelligence provides intelligence services for the armed forces. Prior to 2009, this organization was called the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS). "This staff replaced the Joint Intelligence Bureau, created at the end of World War II to make national estimates. Like its American counterpart (the Defense Intelligence Agency), British military intelligence has undergone an increasing amount of centralization in recent

years" (Ransom 1970, 191). In fact, the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) was set up after the Second World War simply to coordinate the work of the separate *service* intelligence offices. National-level intelligence coordination for the *government* was already being handled by another group, the Joint Intelligence Committee. In 1964, the armed forces of the United Kingdom were reorganized into a single Ministry of Defence (similar to the consolidation of the U.S. armed forces in the Department of Defense in 1947) and the JIB absorbed the service intelligence agencies, becoming the DIS (Richelson 1988). Today, Defence Intelligence provides intelligence products to the Ministry of Defence "to guide decisions on policy and commitment and employment of UK's armed forces; to inform defence procurement decisions; and to support military operations" (*Defence intelligence* 2009).

Finally, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) is a key institution in British intelligence organization. The JIC is today the institution that coordinates and draws together resources from across the government to produce intelligence assessments (estimates, in American parlance) for the prime minister and the Cabinet. The origins of this institution go back to just before the Second World War. At the time of its creation, "joint" indicated that both the military (War Office) and the navy (Admiralty) were involved.[7]

Michael Herman, a former secretary of the JIC, states that the role of the JIC is to produce "high-powered reports for high-powered people" (As quoted in Davies 1995, 113). Philip Davies goes on to argue that British intelligence is not overall as centralized as is commonly thought, but that for the purposes of national policy it is. "To be sure, the JIC performs a 'central' coordinating and tasking function, at the level of *national* policy, that of

[7] In American military usage, "joint" means operations or organizations that involve more than one of the armed services of the same country and "combined" indicates the involvement of more than one country. The British have been less consistent, sometimes using "joint" for multi-service, single-country operations and sometimes using "combined."

ministers of the Crown. However, for shorter-range *departmental* policy concerns, the producer-consumer relationship effectively 'short circuits' the JIC mechanism" (Davies 1995, 113, emphasis in original). In other words, intelligence producers provide analysis directly to many policymakers and decision-makers at lower levels of government, but the JIC is the clearinghouse and final authority for national intelligence from all sources to the top policymakers. The JIC meets weekly and is composed of the heads of the intelligence services and high-level representatives of various policy departments, especially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, but also departments such as Trade and Industry and the Treasury. Attendance varies somewhat, according to the topics to be discussed, but it is not unusual for JIC meetings to include British ambassadors and other diplomats, representatives of the Department for International Development, and even representatives of closely allied governments.

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION[8]

Although American intelligence efforts go back all the way to the revolutionary war, they did not result in sustained organizational structures at the national level until the twentieth century (O'Toole 1991). During a crisis, the government would create organizations and develop methods for intelligence work, but then they were disbanded and lost once the crisis was over. To a large extent, the wheel was reinvented with each new crisis. This ad hoc approach began to change as the United States became more involved in world affairs in the twentieth century,

[8] In addition to works cited, this section draws on the public websites of some of the intelligence organizations of the United States: www.odni.gov; www.cia.gov; www.nic.gov. There are many printed works on American intelligence. For two accessible and general histories, see O'Toole (1991) and Andrew (1996). For a more organizational overview, see Richelson (1999).

although intelligence was still viewed as mainly a military endeavor and thus tied to the likelihood or reality of war.

Beginning with the First World War, Britain and America began to develop a relationship of trust and commonality (despite a resurgence of anti-British sentiment in the United States after the war) that included close intelligence cooperation (Beach 2007). After the war, the American side once again dismantled much of its intelligence machinery. With the advent of the Second World War, the United States found itself without any sort of national intelligence organization and with very slim service (army and navy) organizations. Of course, the event that precipitated America's entry into the war was the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which was widely seen as an intelligence failure. Because of this particular circumstance, America's need for an expanded intelligence apparatus took on an even greater urgency than in past crises. It was natural to look to Britain for a ready model, especially on the military side of things, and the British did everything they could to encourage this.

Copying the British model not only expedited standing up the necessary organizations and systems, it also facilitated "combined" (involving forces from more than one nation) operations and planning for the common war effort. During the war, British and American armed forces and intelligence organizations worked hand and glove to defeat the Axis powers. Besides the military intelligence organizations proper, the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—both of which were clandestine, largely civilian, and only operational during the war—played important parts. Areas of British and American intelligence cooperation included signals intelligence, cryptology, analysis, counter-intelligence, propaganda campaigns, espionage, and other clandestine operations (Stephenson 1998 [1945]; Troy 1996).

During and after the war, there was considerable effort put into determining how intelligence and government had failed at the beginning and how the United States could prevent another Pearl Harbor.[9] Among other problems, various investigations found that there was insufficient coordination of intelligence across the government: no one was in a position to put all of the information together and determine if it added up to something significant. After the war, the United States government undertook a major reorganization through the National Security Act of 1947. The Act separated the air force from the army and collected all of the armed forces into a single cabinet department headed by a Secretary of Defense. It also created the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The former ultimately shifted the center of the foreign policy process from the State Department to the White House (Inderfurth and Johnson 2004). The creation of the CIA gave the already existing Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) an agency that could centrally analyze and coordinate the information collected by both it and the preexisting intelligence units in the armed forces and the State Department, the latter unit being a remnant of the wartime OSS. The CIA was created as an independent agency, not a part of any cabinet department, and through the DCI it was to report directly to the National Security Council and to the President. It was the first permanent and civilian all-source intelligence agency in the United States.

Currently, the U.S. intelligence community is made up of 17 member agencies and organizations. Some of these exist to perform highly specialized and technical collection functions. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) is primarily a collection agency that specializes in intercepting and decrypting communications and other electronic signals. It analyzes them and passes the information on to other parts of the intelligence community and the government. Similarly, the National Reconnaissance Office designs, builds, and operates

[9] For the best account of the Pearl Harbor failure, see Wohlstetter (1962).

satellites that view and photograph the earth from above. The imagery is then passed to other agencies, primarily the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, whose job it is to analyze it. That analysis is then itself passed on to other agencies for their use.

Some agencies or organizations perform special collection and analysis for the departments to which they belong. The army, navy, air force, and Marine Corps intelligence agencies fall into this category, as does the Treasury Department's Office of Intelligence and Research. The Defense Intelligence Agency collects intelligence, aggregates intelligence from other agencies, and produces analysis for the Department of Defense as a whole.

Most of these agencies and their missions have evolved over time. The NSA began life as the Armed Forces Security Agency. While from a technical point of view the NSA still collects the same type of information as it always has, that type of information has become less eclectic over time as modern communications has developed. Today, commerce, personal relations, financial management, and most long-distance communications take place through the electronic media that are the NSA's speciality. As that has happened, the NSA has become increasingly important to U.S. intelligence efforts (Bamford 1983, 2001). This and certain intelligence failures of the past few decades have spawned a recurring debate regarding the distribution of government spending between human intelligence and technical collection methods (Johnson 2002).

As mentioned earlier, the CIA was created to be the central and principal all-source intelligence producer for the president and the National Security Council. As such, it is the capstone of the intelligence community, having a pride of place, if not of budget. The CIA today has four major directorates: Intelligence, the National Clandestine Service (NCS), Science & Technology, and Support. Support provides administrative services like human resources,

security, financial and property management, etc. Science & Technology is the department that develops equipment and gadgets for espionage and covert action. The NCS (formerly the Directorate of Operations) consists of the spies and operators who collect information and carry out operations abroad. The Directorate of Intelligence (DI) is the department that analyzes and assesses the information collected by the NCS and the other agencies throughout the government.

From 1947 until 2004, the CIA and the U.S. intelligence community as a whole were headed by the Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI had three major roles: he was the principal intelligence advisor to the president, he was the head of the CIA, and he was to coordinate and manage—to some degree—the entire U.S. intelligence community. In 2004, with a view towards strengthening the central coordination of the intelligence community, the position was split into the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA). There is quite a lot of debate regarding the wisdom and effectiveness of this development. General Michael Hayden (ret), who served as director of the NSA (1999-2005), principal deputy director of National Intelligence (2005-2006), and D/CIA (2006-2009), believes that in losing the CIA portfolio, the DNI has less authority and command of the IC than his DCI predecessors did (interview with author, Washington, 7 March 2011). Regardless of this, the DNI is now the principal intelligence provider and advisor to the president. Interestingly, the DCI position was created with this role in mind. Coordinating or managing the work of the other intelligence agencies (as opposed to consolidating the results of their work) was a subsequent addition to his responsibilities (Garthoff 2005, see esp. 13). The DNI typically sees the president on a daily basis and gives final approval to all intelligence products that represent the concerted efforts of the entire intelligence community.

Working under the DNI, but separate from any other intelligence agency, is the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC was created in 1979 and was originally part of the Directorate of Intelligence in the CIA. However, the relationship of the NIC to the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community has varied over its life and the life of its predecessor, the Office of National Estimates (ONE). [10] Today, the NIC still operates out of the CIA's headquarters building in Langley, VA, but it is organizationally separate from the CIA. The NIC has a chair and vice chair and is composed of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) and staff. The NIC draws analytic staff from all parts of the intelligence community. The NIOs, on the other hand, are often drawn from outside the intelligence community and the government. After serving, these NIOs return to academia and the private sector, rather than to the halls of some other intelligence agency. Normally, each NIO has a specific geographical or functional area of responsibility. For example, there are NIOs for Africa, East Asia, Economic Issues, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Transnational Threats. NIOs are chosen for their personal expertise in these areas rather than as representatives of other intelligence agencies or other departments of government. If they did come from elsewhere in the government, they may or may not return to their previous department after serving as an NIO. Many have already moved from one department to another during their government careers.

Historically, the NIC and its predecessors have been dominated by the CIA. ONE and its Board of National Estimates (BNE) were part of the CIA.[11] When originally instituted in 1973 by DCI William Colby, the NIOs were largely, but not entirely, drawn from the CIA.

[10] ONE existed from 1950 to 1973. In 1973, ONE was replaced by individual National Intelligence Officers with specific regional or functional portfolios, but they were not formally organized into the NIC until 1979. For more on the history of NIE production in the United States, see Ford (1993) and Freedman (1986).

[11] From 1965 until its dissolution in 1973, ONE was formally part of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, rather than the CIA proper. However, ONE was still housed at CIA and largely staffed by CIA. Today's NIC is independent of the CIA in a significantly more meaningful way, despite its location.

Nevertheless, each NIO was tasked with collecting and reflecting the considered views of the whole intelligence community regarding his area of responsibility. As a unit, this top group of assessors has at times been part of the CIA and the DI, and at other times outside of the DI, but reporting to the DCI (Best 2011; Richelson 1999). William Casey, DCI during most of the Reagan administration, was known for appointing a large percentage of "outsiders" to the NIC (Gates 1996). From 1982 to 1986 Robert Gates was simultaneously the head of the DI and the chairman of the NIC. Congress has at times expressed interest in the organizational independence of the NIC. In 1993, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed a requirement that one of two deputy chairmen of the NIC be drawn from the private sector. This provision was dropped in conference, but the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 did give statutory authority to the NIC for the first time.

Lastly, the National Intelligence Board (NIB, formerly the National Foreign Intelligence Board and before that, the United States Intelligence Board) consists of the directors of the agencies and organizations that make up the intelligence community. The final word on representing each agency's point of view in top-level analytical products rests with the members of this board. Each member has an opportunity to ensure that the point of view of his or her agency has been fairly presented. According to Hayden, some additional steps were added to this process after the intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was deemed to have been wrong (interview with author, Washington, 7 March 2011). First, each collection agency must provide an exhaustive list of all of its input and sources for the product being worked on. Second, each program manager (agency heads who have some responsibility for a particular type of collection throughout the intelligence community; for instance, the director of the CIA is the program manager for HUMINT) must go through the product and provide his opinion on what

conclusions his program supports, what it does not support, and how its information was used (see also Best 2011). Until this is completed, the product is not finalized or delivered to the policymaker.

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

In the United States, a great variety of analytical products are produced by the agencies that make up the intelligence community. Many of these are tailored for particular "customers" with narrow interests and concerns and do not reflect the work and views of the entire intelligence community. For example, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan may want an analysis of the distribution of weapons among Taliban fighters or of the likely effect of weather on the level of Taliban activity in the next several months. These products are routinely managed by mid-level managers and are often requested and produced within the same government department.

Several products, however, are produced for the top level of national policymakers and reflect the efforts and viewpoint of the whole intelligence community. The two most important of these are the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Both are considered "all-source" products, meaning that they incorporate information from all relevant sources—secret and open—collected by any of the agencies in the intelligence community. The President's Daily Brief is compiled and written by the CIA, but again, it draws on the resources of the whole intelligence community. Distribution of the PDB is limited, and receiving a copy is considered a mark of high status. The PDB, as its name suggests, is a daily product that is heavy on news and current events. At a conference on the Carter administration held at the University of Georgia, Howard Baker, former senator and White House chief of staff under President Reagan, described the PDB as "more like reading current events than it was like giving analysis

of what they meant or where they would lead" (Baker 2007). Loch Johnson refers to the PDB as "current intelligence" and the NIE as "research intelligence" (Johnson 2008).

"A National Intelligence Estimate is an appraisal of a foreign country or international situation, authorized by the DCI (or, since 2005, the DNI) and reflecting the coordinated judgment of the entire intelligence community" (Johnson 2008, 344). NIEs are produced by the National Intelligence Council, normally over the course of several months (Special NIEs on urgent issues are produced more quickly). Usually one or two of the NIOs is the lead author, although much of the drafting is done by staff assigned to the NIC by the various agencies in the intelligence community.

Despite the fact that they are meant to represent the considered views of all the agencies that make up the intelligence community, the DNI (formerly the DCI) has the final say on the estimates an NIE makes. There is a bit of ambiguity in this that is frequently glossed over. Does the NIE represent the community's view or the DNI's view? According to Harold Ford (1993), who joined the CIA in 1950 and served as vice chairman of the NIC in the 1980s, different DCIs handled NIEs in different ways. Most have made their views known to the officers drafting the estimate, but then allowed the process to continue without interference. If the DCI disagreed with the final product, he communicated that to the President separately, allowing the community to maintain its view in the NIE. Some DCIs, however, have insisted that the NIE reflect his own view. Typically, the community reaches consensus over most of the content, but, if there is a serious disagreement or dissension on an issue, there is some indication of which agency dissents and over what issue. That information may be in the text or it may be in notes.

As noted above, the National Intelligence Board also plays a role. When NIEs are nearing completion, the draft is sent around to the NIB members for their comments and

approval, as described above. Finally, the NIE is approved and commented on by the DNI and sent to, or presented to, the top-level policymakers who requested it or are interested in it.

In the United Kingdom, the intelligence product that corresponds to an NIE is an assessment prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee for the prime minister and the Cabinet. The JIC assessments are worked on by the JIC Assessments Staff through Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs). CIGs are more or less ad hoc working groups of experts from the assessments staff and from relevant parts of the government, organized around a topic for which an assessment is being prepared. Some CIGS are semi-permanent because some topics are treated regularly, others are more transitory. The assessments staff usually does the actual drafting while utilizing the outside members of the CIGs for expert opinion and debate about the details. Assignments, progress, drafts, and results are considered, modified, and approved by the JIC itself in its weekly meeting. Final products are the consensus view of the members of the JIC. If the JIC cannot reach consensus on an issue, then it is omitted from the assessment.

Just what is an estimate, or as the British call it, an assessment? The CIA's World Factbook describes three types of finished (ready for delivery to the policymaker) intelligence: basic, current, and estimative. "Basic intelligence provides the fundamental and factual reference material on a country or issue. Current intelligence reports on new developments. Estimative intelligence judges probable outcomes" (CIA 1997). Sherman Kent, longtime chairman of the Board of National Estimates and often considered the father of American intelligence analysis, used the term "speculative-evaluative" to describe estimative intelligence (Kent 1949). He also wrote that "estimating is what you do when you do not know" (Kent 1969, 17). Sims (1995, 5) states that "analysis becomes estimative when it renders judgments about the implications of the findings."

Estimates are matters of probability and are statements about things that are not known and may not even be knowable. Estimates try to answer questions like, is the government of Iran trying to develop a nuclear weapons capability? If so, how long will it take? Will Lebanese society disintegrate into another civil war? Will the Muslim Brotherhood become politically dominant in Egypt? These are all questions which cannot be answered with certainty. Yet, the answers have important implications for national policy. Intelligence estimates attempt to make educated, informed, objective, and analytical responses to these types of questions, indicating some degree of likelihood and confidence, ideally expressed in explicit terms.

Because of the uncertainty involved and its speculative nature, estimative intelligence is the type of intelligence *most* open to dispute, distortion, bias, misuse, and abuse. Different individuals can honestly—and, even more so, dishonestly—come to different judgments about the questions posed. Therefore, the question of who does estimative intelligence and under what circumstances and organizational model has been a topic of considerable debate in modern government. At times, some intelligence organizations have even refused to engage in estimation (Montague 1972). As will be seen in the next chapter, the issues of who estimates and under what circumstances are central to this dissertation and the theory it develops.

CHAPTER 3

THE PUZZLE

The central question addressed by this dissertation is, why is the relationship between intelligence and policy closer in the United Kingdom than in the United States? The question has barely been addressed in the literature on intelligence, and the answers provided so far are unsatisfying. But before examining those answers, we must first ask the question, why is this difference in national organization puzzling at all? In a nutshell, the answer is that there is and has been a great deal of intertwining and collaboration between the American and British governments regarding intelligence, and yet there has not been convergence on the fairly fundamental issue of the appropriate relationship of intelligence production to policymaking. A more complete answer requires a partial review of the history and relationship between the top estimating bodies of the two countries.

COOPERATION AND INTERTWINING

Harry Howe Ransom, a pioneer in the academic study of intelligence, noted that Britain's intelligence system "influenced the American system in its formative years" (Ransom 1970, 180). Mark Lowenthal, former vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council, calls the intelligence relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States "extremely close" (Lowenthal 2003, 236). The late political scientist H. Bradford Westerfield, a longtime scholar of intelligence studies, wrote that "Almost certainly no intelligence collaboration between major countries has ever been so stable, so long-lasting, so nearly comprehensive, and so nearly co-

equal as that between the US and the UK" (Westerfield 1996, 528). The closeness of this relationship—both historically and currently—was also universally attested to by the current and former government officials interviewed for this dissertation in both the United States and the United Kingdom (see also Crawford 2010).

As mentioned in chapter two, the intelligence working-relationship between Britain and America goes back to at least the Second World War. Recent historical work finds evidence of the roots of that relationship in 1917, with the entry of the United States into the First World War (Beach 2007). Despite a general policy of keeping the British at arm's length due to the perception of Anglophobic sentiment at home, General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force, "approved the intelligence regulations [of the American force] on a British model without amendment" (Beach 2007, 234). Further, "American intelligence officers were attached to British intelligence staffs to learn how their allies conducted their business" and "places were offered for American students at the British intelligence school" (235). The British subsequently provided a permanent instructor to the American intelligence school in France, once it was established, as well as a series of visiting lecturers. According to Beach, there were definite tensions between the British and the Americans regarding the war effort. However, among the intelligence staffs and during intelligence operations, the relationship was generally close, friendly, and productive, especially with regards to human and signals intelligence. After the war, relations between the two nations experienced a great deal of stress. Nevertheless, Beach notes that both the United States Army and the British Army based their inter-war intelligence doctrine on the same set of regulations and procedures developed initially by the British in the First World War. This common foundation and history paved the

way—and provided a precedent—for cooperation and inter-operation when the Second World War broke out.

More typical and abundant in the scholarly literature are references to the very strong connections between American and British intelligence formed during the Second World War (e.g. Andrew 1986, 1996; Andrew and Dilks 1984; Bamford 1983; Hinsley 1993b; Hyde 1962; Smith 1992, 1996). Before America's entry into the war, President Franklin Roosevelt and others who thought America should be involved pursued a policy of supporting the British war effort against Nazi Germany. This involved both military and economic aid within (and perhaps beyond) the limits of existing law. It also involved intelligence cooperation through the establishment of the British Security Coordination (BSC) organization in the United States. BSC was established with the approval of President Roosevelt and served as the North American office of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). In addition to its own intelligence activities, BSC served as the liaison between the British and American security and intelligence organizations and, in 1940, began training FBI personnel in intelligence methods (Stephenson 1998 [1945]). The fall of 1940 also saw the beginnings of new British and American agreements on signals intelligence cooperation (Bamford 1983; Richelson 1999). In July of 1941, the head of BSC, William Stephenson, was instrumental in convincing Roosevelt to create the position of Coordinator of Information (COI) and to install his American friend, William Donovan, in the post (Troy 1996). The COI and his office were the immediate precursor to the more well-known Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which Donovan also headed.

After the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United States, America commenced major military action in multiple theaters. The United States coordinated strategy with the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and operations were

frequently combined with British forces and under combined command. All of this provided a larger context and an even more persuasive rationale for intense intelligence cooperation during the war.

As noted earlier, areas of wartime intelligence cooperation included signals intelligence, cryptology, analysis, counter-intelligence, propaganda campaigns, espionage, and other clandestine operations (Hinsley 1993a; Stephenson 1998 [1945]; Winks 1996). Herman states (1995, 16) that "many of the wartime British [intelligence] bodies became combined Anglo-American entities or were duplicated in American versions….Under British pressure the interdepartmental JIC model was also adopted, and interlocking committees in Washington and London produced agreed intelligence inputs to the two countries' Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee."

SIGINT COOPERATION

In May of 1943, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the BRUSA agreement which effectively integrated their SIGINT systems, providing for "the exchange of personnel, joint regulations for the handling of the supersensitive material, and methods for its distribution" (Bamford 1983, 397). The agreement required both countries to adopt common security regulations, terminology, and code words. Before the war was over, less extensive intelligence-sharing arrangements were also made with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

After the war, American and British intelligence cooperation continued, with the Soviet Union becoming the major target of interest.[12] Initially, this interest was focused on Soviet activities in Europe, but soon the development of nuclear weapons and other Cold War issues

[12] The development of the post-war American intelligence system was motivated by two concerns: for the executive branch, the Soviet Union was the main concern, for the Congress, it was the memory of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (Jeffreys-Jones 1997).

emerged. Anglo-American cooperation was and is closest in the area of SIGINT. On 12 September 1945, President Harry S Truman signed a memorandum authorizing the continued "collaboration in the field of communications intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British" (quoted in Andrew 1995, 99). This collaboration developed into a new agreement, the general outline of which was fairly clear by March 1946, but was not finalized and signed until June 1948. This agreement, now known as the UKUSA agreement, was refined several times in subsequent decades and is still in force today, although it was not officially and publically acknowledged until 2005 (White 2010). The UKUSA agreement also includes Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as secondary partners and approximately ten other countries as tertiary partners. The agreement specifies that the exchange of information among the main parties—including information about methods, equipment, communication intercepts, and analysis—will be "unrestricted…except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other" (National Security Agency 2010, 6). Among the five Anglophone countries, the agreement has created a system that allows their communications and signals intelligence agencies to function almost as divisions of the same organization with a true division of labor and sharing of resources (Richelson and Ball 1990; Kahn 1996; Bamford 1983).

SIGINT is by no means the only area of intelligence collaboration and copying between the United States and the United Kingdom, but it has been the most intense. Indeed, Andrew (1998) argues that the role of SIGINT in the Cold War has been seriously underreported by historians and that it is much more central to the international relations of that period. In any case, cooperation also includes non-SIGINT analysis and the production of national-level estimates, though not without disagreement and greater complication due to the greater number

of departments and offices involved. Aldrich notes that during the Cold War, "organizations such as the British SIS and American CIA cooperated closely over the exchange of both raw intelligence and finished estimates concerning Eastern Bloc capabilities and intentions" (Aldrich 1998, 337). He also states that by the early 1950s, "representatives of the CIA's Office of National Estimates worked with British Joint Intelligence Staff on a daily basis. Not only was a great volume of papers formally exchanged, but British and American officials achieved a certain amount of input into each other's papers before they were finished." There were also papers called "Agreed British-American Intelligence" estimates. Still later, NATO provided another organizational context for agreed estimates (346).

In terms of the organization and structure of intelligence apparatus, as noted above, there was significant copying of the British by the Americans prior to and during the Second World War. Nevertheless, there were always differences between the two national systems in agency size, domestic inter-connections, division of labor, and mission. Many of these differences are due to fairly clear historical accidents. For instance, the creation of MI-5 as a sanctioned, dedicated, domestic intelligence service was clearly due to the proximate German threat that the United Kingdom perceived. America, though it was also the subject of German espionage and sabotage efforts, was never in as vulnerable a position as Britain. Thus, while the FBI developed a counter-espionage role, it was a minor addition to its law-enforcement role and FBI domestic intelligence surveillance was never as powerful or extensive as that of MI-5.

Both countries did, however, make great and repeated efforts to create some sort of structure at the top which would consolidate and collate intelligence information and perform assessment for top-level, national policymakers. In the face of war and other existential threats, policymakers are greatly concerned with receiving coherent and organized information that aids

them in preparing strategy and avoiding surprise. In the United Kingdom, the growing Nazi threat from the continent was the main motivation at first; in the United States, it was the failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. These threats, and later the common threat from a nuclear-armed and expansive Soviet Union, stimulated the search for more centralized and effective national intelligence mechanisms to support presidents and prime ministers.

CENTRALIZED ASSESSMENT

In the United Kingdom, an important step towards centralized, national, all-source intelligence assessment occurred in 1936 with the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) (Thomas 1987; Goodman 2008). At this point, the JIC was *joint* in the sense of bringing together the intelligence units of the three armed services: military, naval, and air. It operated under the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and advised the Joint Planning Committee. The JIC did not really begin to function effectively until a few months before the outbreak of war in 1939, when its mandate was expanded and the Foreign Office not only joined it, but sat as its chair (Herman 1996, 260). This development paved the way for new terms of reference in May 1940 which finally brought military and political intelligence together for comprehensive assessment by one organization (Thomas 1987). The chiefs of MI5 and SIS, the civilian domestic and foreign intelligence agencies, also joined the JIC at this time. By May 1941, the JIC had absorbed the Axis Planning Staff (APS) and begun meeting weekly with the Chiefs of Staff. Now renamed the Joint Intelligence Staff, the APS had been responsible for estimating enemy *intentions*, as opposed to simply reporting on enemy movements or strength. This is significant because it put the JIC squarely in the business of doing estimative intelligence, which is the sort of intelligence analysis with which this dissertation is most concerned. At this point,

and for the remainder of the war, the JIC "represented the highest point in the intelligence food-chain" (Goodman 2008, 51).

In 1957, the JIC was transferred from the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Office. Goodman (2008) attributes this change to the Cold War, which was mainly a political contest rather than a military one. This relocation placed the JIC in the service of the highest echelon of government decision making—in peace and wartime. Although there have been additional administrative changes since, the JIC has remained under the Cabinet Office. "The Committee is composed of the heads of the various intelligence agencies, together with senior representatives from the 'customer' departments….The JIC therefore sits in a unique position within Whitehall because it crosses the intelligence/consumer divide – it is, in the words of one previous Chairman, the 'final arbiter of intelligence'" (Goodman 2007, 530). The combination of this "unique position" and the JIC's role as the "final arbiter" is the distinctive quality that makes it so very different than anything in the American intelligence system.

Things developed differently in America. In July 1941, when the United States was trying to quickly improve its intelligence apparatus and also ensure interoperability with the British system, an American Joint Intelligence Committee was created. The creation of the American JIC was not without controversy. The War Department had initially resisted the idea (Valero 2000). However, once William Donovan was appointed as President Roosevelt's Coordinator of Information (COI), the War Department decided that it needed to back the plan for copying the British JIC because in that model the intelligence units of the services were under the control of the Chiefs of Staffs. This was seen as a way of heading off the possibility that the COI would assert control over all U.S. intelligence (Montague 1972; Troy 1996, 119).

Initially, the American JIC was expressly forbidden from doing estimative intelligence because U.S. Navy doctrine specified that estimating was to be done by command personnel, not intelligence personnel. Naval intelligence was simply to report what facts it could ascertain and let naval operational personnel decide what the facts meant and what the enemy was likely to do. The Army, on the other hand, did assign estimating to intelligence personnel. Once the war started, the Army representative on the JIC was promoted to a higher rank than the Navy representative. He consequently became the JIC chairman and immediately ordered an estimate regarding the strategic implications of Japanese control of the Netherlands East Indies. The Navy acquiesced to this because the policy implications of this particular estimate suited it. The prohibition in the JIC's charter against doing estimative intelligence was henceforth ignored (Montague 1972).

It should be noted that there is no record suggesting this first American JIC estimate was altered to suit the policy preferences of the Navy, but the incident does illustrate one of the problems of bringing policy preferences into intelligence assessment. If the estimate had not harmonized with the Navy's policy preferences, would the Navy have objected and therefore suppressed it? That outcome would not represent the best judgment of the JIC (including the other members, apparently) about Japan and the East Indies, but rather the preexisting policy preferences of one member.

After the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization (i.e., British and American) was created, along with its Combined Intelligence Committee, the American JIC was "enlarged to include representatives of the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of Strategic Services" in order to match the British JIC (Montague 1972, 65).

Although the departmental representatives on the American JIC could be contentious, the supporting Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS)—drawn from the individual departments—managed to forge a sense of common identity and worked to develop truly joint estimates and "obtain the concurrence" of their bosses on the JIC (Montague 1972, 66). Like the British JIC, the American JIC required the consensus of its members in order to approve an estimate. Serious disagreements could only be resolved if one party backed down or if "someone could devise an ambiguous formulation acceptable to both sides" (67). The system did not allow for formal dissent within the text of the estimates. Thus, in addition to the possibility of being dead wrong, estimates could also fail by not reflecting the true range of views held or by not expressing any specific view at all.

The members of the American JIS eventually argued for a reform of the system that would maintain its interdepartmental nature, but add "an independent chairman, appointed by the President and responsible only to him" (Montague 1972, 67). The chairman would have the final say on the content of estimates, but any departmental chief could note a dissenting opinion. At approximately the same time, William Donovan proposed a different plan to President Roosevelt for the organization of post-war national intelligence. The Donovan plan would create an independent agency housed in the Executive Office of the President and reporting to the president only. Other, departmental intelligence units would continue to provide operational intelligence for their own departments, but they would now also be required to provide information, resources, and personnel to the new central intelligence agency. Although these resources would be used by the authors of national estimates in the new central agency, the plan

did not allow for other departments to actually participate in deciding—let alone vetoing or formally noting dissent from—the estimates.[13]

On 1 January 1945, the JIC formalized the JIS recommendation as JIC 239/5. "In that paper the JIC recommended the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency which, among other things, would produce national intelligence estimates. With regard to such estimates, however, the Director of Central Intelligence was required to consult with a board composed of the heads of the departmental intelligence agencies and to report their individual concurrence or dissent" (Montague 1972, 68). This proposal was at least minimally interdepartmental in that it required consultation and ensured that the president and other consumers of the estimates would be aware of the dissent of individual departments. The proposal was unexpectedly withdrawn after it was leaked to the press, and President Roosevelt subsequently died before any reorganization of intelligence was decided upon (Thorne and Patterson 1996).

In the fall of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed JCS 1181/5, which was really JIC 239/5 with minor changes (reprinted as "Appendix" in Memorandum from William D. Leahy, document 2 in Warner 1994, 8-10). The State Department and the Bureau of the Budget also proposed a plan for intelligence reorganization. This plan was similar to the Donovan plan, except that the new organization would be housed within the State Department rather than the Executive Office of the President. Through the end of the year, the future of intelligence was the subject of intense debate between the armed forces, the State Department, the Bureau of the Budget, the FBI, and other interested parties. Finally, on 22 January 1946, President Truman ordered the established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, not to be confused with Current Intelligence Groups in the British system) along the lines of the JIC 239/5 plan (Truman's order is document 7 in Warner 1994, 29-32). In the next year, the organization gained a statutory basis

[13] For more complete accounts of this period, see Troy (1981), Darling (1990 [1953]), and Warner (1996).

in the National Security Act of 1947 and became the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIG, the CIA, and the reorganization of intelligence in the United States were largely based on the general outlines of the JIC proposal and resulted in an organization that was independent of the traditional Cabinet and policy departments.

From at least this point onward, the British and American systems for producing national estimative intelligence diverge. In the United Kingdom, the JIC continued to develop, moving to the top of the intelligence process, but developing a composition that reflected the whole government. Although they are gathered to evaluate intelligence information, JIC members are still a part of, and indeed primarily members of, their various departments, including policy departments. The final assessment is a consensus document. Therefore, each department represented in the JIC—including the policy departments—has effective veto power over the assessment.

In the American system, the CIA established the Office of National Estimates, which gave way to the National Intelligence Officers system, and finally the National Intelligence Council. However, unlike the British JIC, the NIC does not represent the whole government, rather only the intelligence community. Estimating is done by the intelligence community exclusive of the regular policy departments. Further, the preparation of the estimates and their final approval by the National Intelligence Board (NIB) do not require unanimity. Rather than having a veto, individual intelligence departments may note their dissent. In terms of the overall estimate produced, this is a considerably weaker position for the individual intelligence units, some of which are housed in, and service, policy departments. If those units were at all tempted to base their views on a departmental policy preference, they would not be able to coerce the others to go along. They are, however, guaranteed to make their views known, if only in a

dissenting footnote (see Herman 1996, 265). Additionally, these departmental units that are part of the U.S. intelligence community are explicitly intelligence units within their home departments. Their directors are directors of these sub-units. In the British system, the representatives from the policy departments come to the JIC representing their whole department, not a special intelligence unit within the department. They are usually senior civil servants, working directly for ministers. As Michael Herman notes (1996, 274), they present what is "essentially a departmental view, not that of its research unit."

Herman suggests that the difference between the systems for estimating be characterized in this way: the American system produces "intelligence assessment," whereas the British system produces "government assessment" (1996, 275). In other words, in America, the intelligence community produces estimates about the world based on intelligence information gathered by its member agencies. These estimates are produced for the use of policymakers. In the United Kingdom, estimates about the world are produced by the government as a whole (including the intelligence services), based on intelligence information gathered by the intelligence agencies and whatever information and perspectives the representatives of other departments personally bring to the table. Johnson observes that "the British end product is a much broader assessment that blends the judgments of policy *and* intelligence officers" and that "the culture of American intelligence is wary of commingling between the two, fearful that policy considerations might contaminate the crystal purity of intelligence judgments" (1996, 129, emphasis in original).

In response to Herman's characterization, Sir David Omand, former director of GCHQ and former permanent secretary and security and intelligence coordinator in the Cabinet Office, points out that the matter for assessment in the United Kingdom is still primarily secret intelligence (interview with author, London, 17 September 2008). Nevertheless, the members of

the policy departments who are at the JIC are there to represent their home departments and because of their perspectives and knowledge gained from their regular departmental work. Therefore, although the JIC is not gathered to review and approve papers from a policy department, there is more information available for evaluating or approving JIC assessments than what is in the intelligence reports. In any case, Herman's point is not about *what* is being assessed, but rather *who* is doing the assessing. The *whole government* is doing the assessing, not just the intelligence community. The main effect of the JIC membership is "to make policy officials participants in the assessment process" (Herman 1996, 274). And yet the end product is considered the pinnacle of *intelligence*, not policy analysis.

In the United States, intelligence products, including National Intelligence Estimates, are the product of the intelligence community and any suggestion that policymakers should be, or have been, involved in producing them is met with accusations of politicization, bias, and corruption. In 1991, Roberts Gates was nominated by President George H.W. Bush to serve as Director of Central Intelligence. The confirmation hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee were contentious. They were expected to be so over the question of Gates' knowledge or involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan administration (Reagan had nominated Gates for the same post in 1987, but Gates had withdrawn due to the scandal), but he was also questioned about the proper relationship between intelligence producers and policymakers (see Westerfield 1996/97, 1997). This was because Gates was an advocate for "actionable" intelligence during his time as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. "The core assumption behind actionable intelligence is that analysts must be aware of the needs of policy makers and that intelligence managers have an obligation to task analysts so that they produce useful intelligence for their clientele" (Wirtz 2007b, 142). This requires intelligence personnel to

interact closely with policymakers. Critics within and without the intelligence community charge that this leads analysts to bias their work in favor of the policy preferences of the policymakers they interact with. Some argued that Gates confused advocacy of policymaker preferences with his legitimate managerial role and personal expertise on Soviet topics. Those favoring "objective" intelligence saw keeping distance between policymakers and intelligence analysts as key.

Despite strong feelings, neither side in this debate—then or now—fails to appreciate the other's concerns. For many, it is a matter of striking the right balance or the right distance between the two functions. But in the United States, even the most passionate advocates for actionable intelligence stop short of having policymakers actually participate in writing the intelligence assessments.

Former CIA analyst Paul Pillar, who served as national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, illustrated the strength of feeling about the policymaker–intelligence-provider relationship. Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, Pillar argued that to avoid biasing and politicizing intelligence, the intelligence community "needs to remain in the executive branch but be given greater independence and a greater ability to communicate with [Congress and the American people]" (Pillar 2006, 27). Pillar went on to state that "an appropriate model is the Federal Reserve, which is structured as a quasi-autonomous body overseen by a board of governors with long fixed terms."

There are, of course, a number of problems with this proposal. The analogy to the Federal Reserve Board is poor: the Fed is a policy-making body, not an advisory one. It is autonomous so that it can make and execute policy independent of political pressure. To pick

the most obviously problematic task, would anyone really want the intelligence community to make its own independent decisions about covert action around the world?

But even in the realm of analysis there are problems with an independent intelligence community that has a "greater ability to communicate." First of all, there is the ivory tower problem. Critics argue intelligence analysis that is far removed from policymakers can become irrelevant and unhelpful, focusing on issues of interest to the analyst, but not on issues with which policymakers need assistance. This is part of the debate in which Robert Gates found himself. In the extreme, analysts end up producing reports which no one reads.

Second, Pillar assumes that enough of the intelligence findings can be shared (despite protecting sources and methods) with Congress and the public to effectively force the executive branch to behave itself and not make policy choices based on false or deceptive articulations of the international environment. Implicit in this idea is the further assumption that intelligence is relatively clear and definitive. Pillar is not naïve enough to think that intelligence estimates will point the way to the "correct" public policy, but he does not seem to allow for the fact that estimates are uncertain by nature and leave room for interpretation by the policymaker. Unlike other sorts of data that the government publishes—for instance, economic data—intelligence estimates represent judgments, not just facts. Making this information public will bring to bear pressure from all corners, as most of the public—including the mass media—is ill-equipped to understand and interpret it. This is likely to make it harder for policymakers to choose some policy options among the full, legitimate range.

Further, estimates are only one input to hard policy choices. Another critical input is tolerance for risk. For instance, an estimate may judge that there is only a twenty percent chance that a hostile country possesses a nuclear weapon, a means to deliver it, and a willingness to use

it. Conversely, there is an eighty percent chance that the country does not pose this threat. From this, one might argue that the correct policy choice is to not take aggressive, preemptive action because the intelligence suggests that there is not a threat. However, intelligence does not address the question of what level of risk is acceptable. That is a question for policymakers. Policymakers have to decide whether a one-in-five chance is an acceptable risk, given the harm the hostile country could potentially do. It is certainly conceivable that a policymaker might choose to explain this calculus to the public, but it is also easy to imagine that one would not wish to open that can of worms, assuming, again, that this information could even be made public without compromising sources and methods.

Finally, publicizing intelligence or making it as available to Congress as to the executive branch (which, in fact, it more or less already is) could actually bring on more pressure to politicize the intelligence, not less. I will develop this idea further in chapter six, but the core of it is that private intelligence cannot be used to justify a policy to someone who does not have access to it. Therefore, there is little incentive to bias or skew it. Only intelligence that will be shared is worth politicizing in the first place.

Nevertheless, for someone with Pillar's experience and stature (currently a visiting professor at Georgetown University) to propose something like this, despite the problems with it, illustrates the depth of feeling in the American establishment regarding the need to keep policymakers and intelligence providers separate. Pillar's article was a reaction to what he believed were violations of this separation by the George W. Bush administration in the preparation of intelligence on Iraq. Pillar is not unique in this belief or in the depth of his feeling, nor is this feeling absent from the United Kingdom. Controversy also erupted there regarding the possible politicization of intelligence leading up to the invasion of Iraq. Certainly

there is an awareness in both countries that policy preferences could bias intelligence assessments.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the close intelligence cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom continues to this day. In spite of this current and historical close collaboration and the recognition of the potential problem of politicization, the relationship between intelligence and policy is closer in the United Kingdom than in the United States. This is particularly noticeable in the acceptance of an institution like the JIC in the United Kingdom and its absence in the United States. And yet, in only one of these countries are general representatives from policy departments (as opposed to special intelligence subunits) involved in the creation of intelligence assessments, even having effective veto power over them. As Herman (1995, 28) states, "American meetings in the NIE process are of 'intelligence' people, while their British JIC and CIG equivalents are mixtures of intelligence practitioners and policymakers". The United States and the United Kingdom take starkly different approaches to the same task: *intelligence community* assessment versus *government* assessment. Has anyone explained this difference? Two scholars have tried, and their attempts will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

IS CULTURE THE ANSWER?

While there is quite a lot of literature—both scholarly and popular—on either the American or the British intelligence system, there is only a small (but growing) body of literature that makes many direct comparisons between them. Some authors have made general comparisons of the overall structure and workings of the two systems. For instance, Ransom (1970) and Lowenthal (2006) each have books that are primarily about the American system with a comparative chapter or section on the British system. Richelson (1988) has written a book that compares several national, non-American intelligence systems, including the British system. Andrew (1977), Davies (2002), and Herman (1995) each have work that tends to compare specific aspects of the American and British systems. Herman also has two books on intelligence in general that draw from both the American and British experience (Herman 1996, 2001). Finally, there are a few edited books that collect articles on either system in one volume, such as *British and American Approaches to Intelligence* (Robertson 1987b). Some chapters make direct comparisons between the two systems, but many are just about one system or the other and only comparative by virtue of being in the same book, lacking in actual comparative analysis. Finally, many texts are historical accounts of one system during a specific period without a corresponding account from the perspective of another nation, such as "British Military Intelligence Following World War I" (Jeffery 1987). There is also a growing body of literature on the relationship between intelligence and policy, but most of this is either descriptive or normative and, in any case, not comparative or explanatory.

As noted previously, there is general acknowledgement that the British and American systems differ with regard to the closeness of policymakers and intelligence producers. Nevertheless, almost no one has addressed the questions of *why* this difference exists or persists. In part, this is symptomatic of the stage of growth of intelligence studies as a subfield. It is hampered by the difficulty of gaining access to data, and comparative work has awaited the accumulation of a critical mass of single-nation studies. The development of theory has also lagged. Johnson observes that "theories have been difficult to construct in the intelligence field because the empirical data base for constructing and testing theories still remains relatively thin" (Johnson 2007a, 3; but see also Johnson 2003; and Gill et al. 2008). This is not to suggest that good work has not been going on for some time, but rather that the topic has not received consistent and sustained attention.[14] It is a rare scholar whose institutional home is willing to support intelligence studies as his or her main research agenda (Zegart 2007). Intelligence as a subject is "one that to some scholars seems not quite academically respectable" (Garthoff 2004, 21). Consequently, graduate students have not been attracted to the subfield in great numbers. When they have, it is usually seen as a sideline rather than something upon which a career can be built.

A note about format: in dissertations that test theories, the literature review section would typically lay out the theory to be tested along with a review of any relevant tests and findings already performed by other researchers. However, since this dissertation aims to propose new theory for a phenomenon that is under-theorized and untested, the literature review is focused on what little has been written on this very specific research question. The discussion of theory beyond that properly belongs in the main body of the work, not in the preliminaries. The theory

[14] For a brief critique of the field see Lamanna and Marrin (2010). Two more in-depth works which both evaluate the field and illustrate the best of it are Johnson (2007c) and Treverton and Agrell (2009).

being proposed is therefore outlined in the findings, along with supporting concepts, ideas, and information.

There appear to be only two researchers who have tackled the specific question of why the Americans and British have different degrees of separation between policy and intelligence. Philip Davies, a British sociologist, and Stephen Marrin, an American political scientist, have both taken what is essentially a sociological approach that emphasizes culture as the determinant of policy-intelligence separation (Davies 1995, 2002, 2004; Marrin 2007). Most recently, they have collaborated on an article that also relates to this topic (Marrin and Davies 2009). Herman has also acknowledged that the difference needs explaining, without quite offering a solution himself. Regarding the British arrangement, he has noted that to foreigners it may "seem a Gilbertian comedy" where a policy official goes to a JIC meeting to help determine an assessment and then returns to his office and "waits for the intelligence assessment to arrive as the 'objective' input to his policy recommendations and decisions" (Herman 1996, 275).

TWO PRELIMINARY POINTS

Before going further, there are two issues that Davies has raised that potentially undercut all explanations, including his own, of the policymaker–intelligence-provider differences between the United States and the United Kingdom.

First, despite the consensus in the literature on both sides of the Atlantic, Davies asserts that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) does not truly represent the meeting of intelligence and policymaking in the United Kingdom. His argument is that the representatives of the policymaking departments who serve on the JIC are not genuinely policymakers, but rather high-ranking civil servants who, in Britain's strong tradition of professional, non-partisan civil

service, are policy-neutral. "Under the British parliamentary model, policymaking is the constitutional preserve of those who can be held accountable in parliament for those policies—ministers. The two main functions of the civil service are to *advise* ministers, that is to inform them and apprise them of the various policy options before them, and to execute the policies for which ministers opt" (Marrin and Davies 2009, 656, emphasis in original).[15] In this model, these policy-department representatives only provide objective, policy-free input and judgment based on their professional knowledge of the world. They do not advocate in any way for their own policy preferences or for those of their departmental ministers. According to this model, in their regular work outside of the JIC (they have ordinary responsibilities as leaders of their departments) they do not take policy positions of their own, but rather they dutifully implement the policies of the ministers who are their political masters.

This assertion by Davies is significant because, if true, it means that the policy-department representatives who sit on the JIC are not as objectionable from an American perspective. To be sure, this is the model held up in British codes of conduct for civil servants and it represents a popular ideal image of government officials.[16] Even if true, these policy-department civil servants are still unlike anyone who participates in the American estimating process, but possibly not so different as to trigger alarm bells. But does this model represent reality?

When presented with the ideas that civil servants participating on the JIC are policy-neutral and that they are therefore not policy *makers*, Sir Richard Mottram, former chairman of the JIC, replied without hesitation, "Rubbish!" (interview with author, London, 19 September

[15] Davies previously suggested this to me in a personal conversation on 11 June 2007 in McLean, VA. I subsequently mentioned it to Marrin, who was unfamiliar with the model. I therefore assume that this assertion is primarily from Davies, despite the joint authorship.

[16] In British usage, a government *official* is a civil service employee of the government, as opposed to a minister or other political actor.

2008). It is important to appreciate the authority and experience with which Mottram speaks. Mottram, now retired from public service, had a long career as a civil servant beginning in 1968. In 1992, he was appointed permanent secretary of the Office of Public Service and Science in the Cabinet Office. Permanent Secretary is the highest civil service position in each department, falling just below the corresponding (political) minister. In 1995, he became permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defence. In 1998, he was appointed permanent secretary of the Department of Environment, Transport, and the Regions. In 2002, he was appointed permanent secretary of the Department of Work and Pensions. Finally, in 2005, he was appointed permanent secretary for Security, Intelligence, and Resilience and also chairman of the JIC. Prior to past practice, these last two positions were held simultaneously by Mottram. Subsequent to his retirement, they were re-divided. Mottram was assigned this role because of the perception that intelligence had been botched and misused in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The post-invasion investigation into intelligence on weapons of mass destruction that was led by Lord Butler concluded, "We see a strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post" (Butler 2004, 144). Thus Mottram, viewed as the consummate professional civil servant who could restore credibility to the office, was recruited and the position was elevated to the level of Permanent Secretary.

Therefore, Mottram's comment carries the weight of someone who not only chaired the JIC itself, but held no less than five different permanent secretary positions in the machinery of British government. In testimony to Parliament, Mottram also stated, "What the Civil Service wants, and I always compare it to a rather stupid dog, it wants to do what its master wants and it wants to be loyal to its master and above all it wants to be loved for doing that" (Select

Committee on Public Administration 2002).[17] One interpretation of this statement is that top civil servants act as extensions of their ministers, adopting and pursuing their policies while the present government stands. This would mean that they are policy-neutral only in the sense that they are just as willing to pursue the policies of the present government as the previous or the next; they do pursue policy preferences, but they live in the present moment and they accept the preferences of their ministers. Under this model, their participation in the assessment process still presents a problem from an American perspective.

In another possible model, top civil servants pursue their own policy preferences, regardless of the present government. To further elaborate his characterization of the neutral, advise-and-execute role of civil servants, Davies (Marrin and Davies 2009, 656n53) refers his readers to a book published in 1953, *British Government* (Stout). However, thirty years later the Economist magazine could casually label the idea that civil servants merely implement policy without preferring or advocating it as an "archaic thesis" (Economist 1982, 27). Further, the magazine noted that "successive governments of both parties" regarded the British diplomatic service as "obsessed with the continuity of *its* policies" (Economist 1982, 26, emphasis added). A close reading of the article yields ample evidence that Foreign Office personnel are perceived to have their own policy preferences and to attempt to make them prevail, regardless of the current government in power. Of course, even in the older, neutral model, civil servants expend effort to develop the policy options that they present to ministers who will choose from among them. These presentations include "listing all the likely consequences of the options available" (Ridley 1983, 29). It is not hard to imagine that civil servants favor or become invested in some policy options more than others, especially considering that ministers come and go, but the career civil servants remain and continue to deal with many of the same issues.

[17] Mottram immediately clarified, "When I said 'stupid dog' of course I meant a superbly well-educated dog."

The difference between the ideal or traditional model that Davies puts forward and the more realistic model acknowledged by the Economist article is similar to the difference between an American civics lesson taught to younger children and the more realistic picture that is painted for college students. In the simpler lesson, Congress makes the laws and the President executes them. In the more sophisticated and true-to-life version, presidents, administrators, bureaucrats, and courts also make law, if not formal statutes. Even the state police are found to make law, when one considers who decides what the real speed limit (the speed you can travel without being ticketed) is on a major highway. The weakness in Davies' analysis here and, as will be noted later, in his understanding of the American system is that he puts too much faith in formal organizational charts and idealized notions of institutions and fails to acknowledge that real human interactions and relationships are not so disciplined or tidy.[18]

In either case, whether the policy-department representatives who sit on the JIC spend their energies attempting to implement the policy preferences of their ministers or their own, there is a clear difference from the American arrangement and American sensibilities. The policy department representatives on the JIC are people who work right at the top of the policy world and are very different than the intelligence professionals who serve on the American National Intelligence Council (NIC).

The last comment that Davies makes that is relevant to the question of whether policymaking and intelligence truly meet in the JIC is his description of the intelligence community as existing to provide information to civil servants that they cannot obtain through normal means (Marrin and Davies 2009, 656-7). It is then properly the role of the civil servants (as opposed to the intelligence community) to provide the full picture to their ministers. This is

[18] Nevertheless, the British civil service ideal of impartiality is probably not without some effect. Further investigation of this would probably require a full empirical study. For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to realize that it is the *perception* that civil servants have policy preferences that is important, regardless of the reality.

true, but it is incomplete. Certainly, there is a great deal of information that follows this route, including information that travels directly from the intelligence services to the policy departments and information that policy department representatives absorb during their meetings in the JIC. However, passing information to the policy departments through their representatives is not the purpose of the JIC. The primary purpose of the JIC is to *assess* information *from* all of the sources, including the policy departments, and provide the assessments to the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet for use in making *national* policy. Assessments are also distributed to other ministers and officials (top civil servants). Again, the significant thing for the present inquiry is that policy department representatives—policymakers—are part of the group that is doing the assessing.

Former DCI Allen Dulles outlined the American perspective neatly. In prepared testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1947 when it was considering the reorganization of the nation's military establishment and the creation of a central intelligence agency, Dulles stated,

> The State Department, irrespective of the form in which the Central Intelligence Agency is cast, will collect and process its own information as a basis for the day-by-day conduct of its work. The armed services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy

faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. (Dulles 1947; as reprinted in Ransom 1970, 261)

The second issue that Davies—with Marrin—raises is the question of exactly what components of the American and British systems to compare. Typically, the British JIC is compared to the American NIC. Davies argues that the NIC is more like the Assessments Staff which serves the JIC, rather than the JIC itself (Marrin and Davies 2009). He says this because the JIC includes the heads of the intelligence services and the JIC makes the final decision about the assessments, whereas the Assessments Staff researches and drafts the assessments. On the other hand, the NIC does not include the agency heads and it does not make the final decision on the estimates that it writes. Davies argues that the JIC is more properly compared to the U.S. National Intelligence Board (NIB), which is composed of the heads of the intelligence agencies and the Director of National Intelligence. The NIB approves and comments on the final draft of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and the DNI has the last word on it. Therefore, according to Davies, the NIB and the JIC are similar in that they both have the last word and they include thee directors of the intelligence agencies. The NIC and the Assessments Staff are similar in that they both do the drafting.

However, the NIB does not review drafts and make revisions to draft estimates with the frequency that the JIC routinely does. The JIC meets weekly and in person to review assessments, drafts, requirements, and tasking. Although the Assessments Staff prepares the drafts, the JIC is the author of the assessments in a very meaningful sense. On the other hand, the NIB only meets in person about NIEs when the NIC is unable to resolve interagency disputes (Michael Hayden, pers. comm., 3 September 2011). Sometimes, only the deputies meet. Substantial agency input and opinions have already been gathered by the NIC and individual

National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).[19] There should be no surprises at the end of the process when the NIB approves the estimate. The one or two NIOs with responsibility for leading the writing of any given NIE draw on the expertise of the intelligence agencies in two ways. First, analysts from the different agencies are seconded to the NIC for tours of duty. These analysts each have their particular expertise, but they also maintain contact with their home agencies and serve as one of several conduits of information and perspective from those agencies. Second, the NIOs directly contact individuals or units from the agencies (and from academia) as needed for a given topic or problem. These ad hoc or semi-regular teams of analysts working on special or chronic issues are somewhat analogous to the Current Intelligence Groups (CIGs) which the British Assessments Staff assemble to research and analyze the objects of their assessments. The major difference is that in the American system the teams are led by NIOs who have a more formal, prominent, and persistent position than the leaders of the British CIGs.

The best comparison between the two systems might be to consider the JIC and the Assessments Staff together on the British side and the NIC and its staff on the American side. As a group, the NIC produces assessments (NIEs) like the JIC. On their own, the individual NIOs function more like the Assessments Staff in researching and drafting the assessments. One could also include the NIB on the American side, as Davies and Marrin would have it. In any case, the important distinction between the American and British systems is that policy department leaders do not sit on either the NIC or the NIB, and they do sit on the JIC.

CULTURE

After carefully parsing the distinctions between collectors of information, analyzers of that information, decision makers, independent intelligence agencies, and intelligence units

[19] Recall that the NIC is composed of the NIOs, a chairman, and a vice chairman.

housed within policymaking departments, Stephen Marrin notes that "the British practice of intelligence assessment tends to be closer to actual decisionmaking [*sic*] than is U.S. intelligence analysis, regardless of whether the analysis or assessment-producing entity is affiliated with policymaking departments or independent of them" (Marrin 2007, 403). Marrin refers to this variation in distance as "proximity," which he defines as "the relative distance between intelligence analysis and national security decisionmaking" (402). He argues that variations in proximity "can be attributable to variations in the decisionmaking cultures" (405).

Marrin is mainly interested in the American system, but he uses the British case for contrast and as a source of ideas for improving American intelligence. Marrin defines culture as "the unwritten incentive structure that shapes behavior by implicitly defining norms and expectations" (Marrin 2007, 404). He draws on Davies to assert that intelligence practices can vary by country, despite their similar tasks, because of variations in culture. He further notes that intelligence is imbedded in both its own culture and a broader, national decision-making culture. Marrin argues that "in the United States, the distance between intelligence and decisionmaking has been legitimized and reinforced by a myth that is embedded in intelligence culture" (Marrin 2007, 408). In this myth, "the distance between intelligence analysts and decisionmakers is in fact a protective mechanism to prevent decisionmakers from politicizing finished intelligence" (Marrin 2007, 409). It is a myth, according to Marrin, because it depends on an idealistic notion of objectivity in the intelligence process that can never really exist. Maintaining the distance is also contrary to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the work of using intelligence for decision making (Marrin 2007, 413-4n30).

Described in the previous chapter, the strength of this American belief in the need for distance was also confirmed by interviews conducted with congressional staffers for this

dissertation. When asked what they thought of the idea of having congressional staff or executive branch policymakers participate in writing National Intelligence Estimates, professional staff members on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) universally responded negatively with expressions and tones that the interviewer understood to indicate that the idea was ridiculous and probably only suggested because of the ignorance of the interviewer. "That's just not how intelligence works" one elaborated. Another would not answer the question, but repeatedly tried to explain the basics of how the U.S. intelligence community is organized, seeming to not grasp that the interviewer already understood that but was nevertheless asking her to imagine a different arrangement. When the interviewer described the composition of the British JIC, he was mostly faced with puzzlement and awkward moments that he interpreted as indicating that the interviewee thought he really must not know what he is talking about (interviews with SSCI staff members, Washington, DC, fall of 2008).

Marrin believes that the greater distance found in the United States is counterproductive for good decision making because it tends to marginalize intelligence as an input and push it towards irrelevance. Marrin states that the British "may have found a mechanism based on their more collaborative culture that enables them to deliver intelligence products that are not just relevant because of close proximity to decisionmaking but accurate as well" (Marrin 2007, 411). In his view, British intelligence culture does not contain the myth for reinforcing distance.

One problem with Marrin's use of culture as an explanation for the national variation in policymaker-intelligence distance is that it is largely descriptive rather than explanatory. Essentially, he says that British culture is one way and American culture is another way. This is not much better than saying it is like *this* in Britain and like *that* in America and that, therefore, is why they are different. In his discussion, it is difficult to separate the cultural myth of distance

from the actual practice of distance. Further, it begs the question, why does this myth exist in American intelligence culture and not in British intelligence culture?

The history of the use of political culture as a variable in modern political science dates to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's seminal *The Civic Culture* (1963). The concepts involved and their interrelations have been refined and become more sophisticated since then. However, there is always a temptation to use culture—political or otherwise—as a "mere residual variable" (Lane 1992). The cultural approach to explaining the divergence between two nations is often less than satisfying. Lucian Pye wrote that Verba "graciously acknowledged that culture is often treated as the explanation of last resort: if there is no other way of accounting for differences, then just say these are due to culture" (Pye 1991, 504). Again, one must ask, why is there a difference in culture? Is the cause of the cultural difference sufficient to overcome the forces that might lead to convergence? In the present case, similar tasks, intertwined histories and operations, and other aspects of culture held in common would raise expectations that the nations would converge in practice, perhaps even explicitly in an effort to adopt "best practices." The use of culture raises additional questions, too. Might there be forces that account for both the difference in culture and the variation in distance? Are there any specifically political forces at work here?

The problems with culture—when there are problems—are often that there is no causal mechanism to connect the culture to specifically political activity and there is no rationale for why the culture is different. It tends to ignore political explanations founded on power and it overlooks or underestimates important and divergent structural and circumstantial factors. For example, in some neighborhoods of large cities, it is not unusual for people to carry small weapons. One could say that this is an aspect of the prevailing culture, but it may also be a

perfectly rational and deliberate choice based on the level of personal danger there. While not untrue, it may not be very illuminating to simply say that it is part of the culture of that neighborhood to carry weapons. Even if a coherent (but untested) explanation based on culture is put forward, a structural explanation may, in fact, be more persuasive.

In a cogent analysis, Elkins and Simeon (1979) lay out the proper use of political culture as a variable. They define political culture as a "shorthand expression for a 'mind set' which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems, and solutions which are logically possible" (128). Further, they explain,

> the most significant feature of our approach is its sharp distinction between political culture as a descriptive category and as an explanation. Political culture as descriptive of a collectivity entails only that the group exhibits a given range and distribution of (largely unconscious) assumptions about its political life. Cultural *explanations*, on the other hand, utilize this information in conjunction with structural features to account for the *differences between collectivities* on certain dependent variables. The use of culture for explanation, therefore, must always be comparative." (131, emphasis in original)

Elkins and Simeon argue that "explanation based on national cultures can be persuasive only after we have ruled out some structural and institutional explanations" (1979, 129-30). Structure may refer to either the "distribution of individuals across social, economic, or demographic categories" or to political institutions (130).

A simple thought experiment illustrates the relevant points of their approach. Imagine that you are in a foreign country where the British and the American embassies happen to be right next door to each other. A major earthquake has caused widespread damage and many

British and American tourists are arriving at their respective embassies to seek assistance. You approach the embassies and, from your vantage point across the street, you can see through the property fences into their yards. From news reports, you know that each embassy has set up a make-shift outdoor processing center to help its citizens. Looking first at the British yard and then at the American yard, you notice a striking difference between them. In the British yard, the tourists have formed a neat, easily-discernible, single line as they await assistance. In the American yard, people seem to be facing and moving in many different directions and there is no discernible line, just a crowd. The American group of tourists looks chaotic compared to the British group. Why are the British and American tourists behaving so differently?

You might theorize that the difference is somehow due to culture. The British are believed to have a stronger sense of social status and social order and are probably more disciplined and patient. Americans are known for their individualism, impatience, and free expression. Some explanation along these lines might seem very plausible. Until, that is, you discover that in the British courtyard there is a single desk set up for assisting tourists and there are large signs posted that instruct tourists to form a single line. In the American courtyard, there are no large signs and there are multiple assistance stations set up around the perimeter of the courtyard, each specializing in a particular service. The stations have small signs designating their purposes, but they are too small to read unless you approach the station first. In the face of structural differences, the cultural explanation seems superfluous.

Now, imagine that the British and American tourists had arrived at their embassies to find the arrangements the other way around, with large, clear signs directing the formation of a single line for the single assistance station at the American embassy. Would the results be different? Would the Americans line up neatly, like the British in the original example? At the least, you

might expect the Americans to become *more* orderly than in the first example and for the British yard to look more like the original American example. If you think so, then you find structure to be a compelling and powerful explanation relative to culture. Still, whatever difference is left between the second-example Americans and the first-example British may be due to culture. Of course, if the British line up neatly in the second example and the Americans are still chaotic, then culture would seem to have the upper hand.

To be fair, in this hypothetical situation one could ask why the organization of the embassy services was different in the first place. Could culture explain why the British assistance is structured in a way that produces more order? Perhaps, but it could also be that meeting the needs of the Americans is more complicated (e.g., there are more of them, they travel home to widely separated regions served by different airports, etc.) and so a different structure is a rational choice rather than a cultural predisposition or limitation. In any case, that is a different question than the one about why the people are behaving differently.

In the cases of the United States and the United Kingdom, it is also arguable that differences in political culture are due to differences in structures, particularly institutional arrangements, but also the composition of the two societies at the time of their political divergence. The fundamental political structures of the United States—federal government, separated branches of government, etc.—were deliberately chosen at the founding of the country. At that time, the bulk of the population was made up of British subjects who were distinct from their fellow subjects in Britain in several ways. The American colonists were relatively educated, driven, and entrepreneurial (they left home and crossed the ocean, after all), but they were mostly not from the nobility with land holdings in England and a tangible and real investment in that place. They had the same sense of rights, law, and due process as their fellow

subjects in England, but they experienced life in a colony where those expectations were frustrated. It is not hard to imagine how these qualities might lead eventually to a difference in political culture. So, even differences in political culture at the time of the American founding were likely the result of structural differences.

In any case, Marrin's cultural explanation is not very satisfying. In chapter six, structural factors will be proposed to explain the national difference in the intelligence-policymaking relationship. These factors are more compelling than the cultural explanation, which may itself be explained by them.

Marrin also forwards a more structurally-based argument for the difference in decision-making culture between the two nations. The argument is that the British system is more collegial because of the decentralized power in a cabinet system (Marrin 2007, 407-8). This leads to more departmental analysis and less central analysis, and ultimately to more cooperation and collegiality between department leaders who need each other's cooperation to develop and implement broad national policies. Representatives from the policy departments arrive at joint tables, including the JIC, with more of their own analysis in hand and they are predisposed to make collaborative decisions regarding intelligence just as with everything else. The American executive branch of government is more hierarchical with the president able to override any interdepartmental disagreements and simply dictate what the national policy will be. The foundation of this line of reasoning is largely, if not entirely, taken from Davies (Davies 1995, 2002), and so it will be addressed along with the rest of the arguments put forward by Davies.

CULTURE AND STRUCTURE

Davies has authored a number of studies that examine and compare different aspects of American and British intelligence. More broadly, his work has focused on describing and explaining the functions and institutional arrangements of the British intelligence apparatus. In general, he has taken a sociological approach but also draws on organization theory and political science.

On the question of the relative distance between policymaking and intelligence in the United Kingdom and the United States, Davies' recognition of the role of properly political variables—related to power and the ability to advance a political agenda—is problematic. For instance, in an early article touching on these matters, Davies lays out a somewhat confusing comparison of assessment in the United States and the United Kingdom. Drawing on an exposition of American intelligence by Hulnick (1986), Davies asserts that the American system is one of centralized analysis. He suggests a contrast with the British system where "it is precisely the *centralization* of British government under Parliament and the Cabinet system which has led to the creation of a *de*centralized intelligence community" (Davies 1995, 114; emphasis in original unless otherwise noted). In a later article, he states more clearly that the "decentralization of power in the British cabinet system is undoubtedly a factor in the decentralization of all-source analysis, much as executive centralization under the US presidency influenced the centralization of analysis—except that the impetus toward central collation and analysis in the United States came from the US Congress while the decentralized power interests of the British system opted for centralized, covert collection" (Davies 2002, 65-6).[20] By the time

[20] Davies mischaracterizes the historical role of the U.S. Congress in the creation of "central collation and analysis in the United States." As described in the previous two chapters, the creation of the Coordinator of Information, the OSS, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Group were all presidential initiatives and

of this later article, Davies is arguing that the decentralized (cabinet) executive of the British system leads to decentralized analysis and the centralized (presidential) executive of the American system leads to centralized analysis. British centralization of covert collection activities is mainly a bow to the practical and budgetary realities of doing such work.

This sounds like an interesting theory which attempts to explain differences by pointing to the different political systems, but his argument breaks down and is unsupported in the details. Davies states, "To be sure, the JIC performs a 'central' coordinating and tasking function, at the level of *national* policy, that of ministers of the Crown. However, for shorter-range *departmental* policy concerns, the producer-consumer relationship effectively 'short circuits' the JIC mechanism" (Davies 1995, 113; see also Davies 2000). Davies also notes that "the security and intelligence agencies lie near the hub of a highly centralized power structure" (Davies 1995, 114-5). He then goes on to note that the other departments of state are outside of that hub like the other ends of the spokes on a wheel. He describes the effect of this geography as being to pull the intelligence services away from the hub and therefore to decentralize analysis in the British system. Again, he puts this in contrast to the American system which he suggests is highly centralized.

What Davies seems to be suggesting in these articles is that the relative power and autonomy of ministers in a cabinet-type government leads to more departmental analysis and assessment, independent of any central assessment mechanism. Civil servants routinely assess the options available to their department based on information from all available sources, both open and secret. Since ministers in a cabinet government make substantial policy decisions of their own, they require that their departments provide them with significant assessment.

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acts. The creation of the Central Intelligence Agency by Congress was simply statutory confirmation and implementation of the general direction in which the executive branch was already leading.

However, as Davies has noted, the intelligence services are still situated at the hub and they do provide intelligence assessment for national policy through the JIC to the Cabinet as a group and to the prime minister within the hub. The fact that they pass on their information to other departments for departmental assessment may at most mean that a large percentage of actual analytic output is happening at the periphery rather than the hub. For national purposes, the system is still highly centralized, even with the participation of policy departments in the analytical process. In the JIC, the policy departments are gathered primarily to provide input into the hub for making national policy, not the other way around.

Davies seems unaware of similar departmental intelligence activities in the United States. In the American system, there is also a great deal of departmental-level intelligence analysis and assessment that "short-circuits" the centralizing institutions. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all provide a great deal of data and analysis to the Department of Defense in support of military operations and preparedness (Richelson 1999; Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2009). There are also the Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence units and the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis in the Department of the Treasury. Each of these units is a member of the U.S. intelligence community, supplies information to the central machinery of intelligence, and participates in the community-wide estimation process. But it is also true that most of their work lies in supplying intelligence to their home departments for their own use and that this flow of information is direct, without passing through the central machinery. This flow of information does not go through a national consolidation process at the

NIC as do NIEs. Thus, American intelligence below the national policy level is really no more centralized than British intelligence.

In the end, Davies' assertion that British intelligence is less centralized than American intelligence is weak. The basic flaw is that he compares *all* British intelligence—national and departmental—with only American *national* intelligence. It is also unclear that a system with a parliament, prime minister, and a real cabinet government is more centralized than the American system with a separated congress and president. The unity of governmental (executive) and parliamentary control is certainly a more central consolidation of power. The American system also has a cabinet, but the cabinet members in the modern era function more as delegates of the president, not as independent powers as in a true cabinet form of government. In the British system, ministers may function with a certain independence over their own departments, although less so than in systems more prone to coalition governments. However, for major national policy decisions, the Cabinet functions as a group under the leadership of the prime minister. In the American system, the president makes the major decisions and the cabinet members simply advise him and then implement policies on his behalf. In the British system, the Cabinet does make real, substantial, national policy decisions as a group. It is primarily for this national-decision, group setting that the JIC prepares assessments. The effect is that for major national policies, the process is fairly centralized.

This is roughly the same point that Marrin made (based on Davies) in the last section about the decentralized power in a cabinet system requiring collegiality. But here the cabinet itself is primarily working with a common, national assessment from the JIC rather than departmental analyzes. Herman has pointed out regarding the role of the JIC, "The principle is the same as that once declared for the British Government Statistical Service: 'to make sure that

the Cabinet need never argue about statistics'" (1996, 257, quoting John Boreham, former director of the Central Statistical Office). The idea is that one of the purposes of the JIC is to settle disputes about intelligence and arrive at a common, agreed assessment. The comparison with statistics is problematic because estimative intelligence is never that certain: it can always be argued over. It is about judgment, not just facts. By its nature it is open to second guessing. If it were possible to achieve objective certainty, it would no longer be estimative intelligence. It would be current intelligence or reporting. Nevertheless, the description of the *goal* is accurate: to have a common, agreed assessment produced by the full government machinery to present to the Cabinet for its use in deciding policy. In terms of centralization and collegiality, this does not seem too different than the American NIC producing NIEs for use by the president and the National Security Council. Nevertheless, the American system excludes policymakers from that production process and the British system includes them. The most significant difference may be the ability of American agencies to note their dissent from the majority view. The goal, however, is to arrive at a consensus view. In the British system, irreconcilable differences result in dropping the issue from the assessment.

In a more recent work examining intelligence failure in the United Kingdom and the United States, Davies (2004) returns to the cultural orientation. In this article, Davies is mainly trying to explain differences in collegiality within the intelligence systems of the two nations, rather than differences in the intelligence-policymaking relationship. Nevertheless, he grazes the topic somewhat. He notes that intelligence "provides a setting in which one can realistically expect to see through different implementations of the common tasks of 'doing' intelligence the role of culture providing influences, orientations and expectations that cannot be reduced to the internal logic of those tasks" (496). He refers to the United States and the United Kingdom as

having “cognate systems” with “very common methods, technologies and resources,” and yet still possessing profound and consistent differences” (497). Regarding American and British intelligence assessment systems, Davies concludes, “Despite the existence of similar joint bodies for collating similar raw information, and with a common combined assessment as the goal, the two systems can be seen as moving in different directions because of essentially cultural rather than structural or circumstantial reasons” (Davies 2004, 518). He argues that American and British intelligence systems tend to fail in different patterns, each according to its particular cultural predispositions: either in a lack of integration for the former or groupthink for the latter.

Davies identifies two different cultural factors that he thinks lead to these different failures. The first is a high capacity for collegial institutions in the British system and a low capacity in the American system. The second is a difference in how intelligence is conceptualized: as special and secret information to be added to open-source information in the British system and as the assessment of information—secret and open—in the American system.

In earlier work, Davies attributes the different conceptualizations of intelligence (collection of secret information vs. analysis of all information) and therefore the different institutional design (JIC vs. CIA) to the different external shocks that brought the systems into being: pre-WWI German spy scares and the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (Davies 2002). The British needed more information in their crisis. The Americans needed more analysis and coordination of the information that they already had in theirs. Davies acknowledges that “it can probably be argued that the US usage of the term was closer to the British one prior to World War II” (Davies 2002, 64). However, beyond this, Davies gets it wrong. From here Davies argues that these different *ideas* of intelligence have fundamentally shaped the outlines of the two systems (Davies 2004, 501-2; 2002, 65). It is much more

reasonable to think the opposite: that the creation and modification of American intelligence organizations in response to the Pearl Harbor failure led to a change in the *idea* of intelligence to match the real activities of those institutions.

Davies also overstates the sense in which the JIC brings together all of the information in the British government, taking intelligence information as only one input. This is true to a certain degree, but not entirely. It is not enough to move the JIC out of the intelligence side of things into the policy side of things, as Davies seems to hint at, which would eliminate the disparity between the American and British systems. If it were really true, then the JIC could be considered more of a policy-analysis committee that was merely using intelligence rather than producing it.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sir David Omand objected to Herman's notion that JIC assessments are "government assessments" rather than "intelligence assessments" because he thought the comment referred to the material being assessed, rather than the identity of the assessors (interview with author, London, 17 September 2008). His point was, the material that the JIC is assessing is secret intelligence—intelligence in the British sense. It is true that the JIC members do their work in the context of the rest of their knowledge, but they are assessing intelligence, not the London Times. In fact, Hibbert (1990) notes that, in their investigative report on the Falkland Islands conflict of 1982, the Franks Committee recommended that the JIC improve its access to information other than intelligence reports (see Franks 1983, par. 319). Further, they are clearly producing intelligence estimates, not policy papers. Therefore, Davies' attempt to relocate the JIC out of the intelligence sphere into the policy sphere as a way of distancing policy and intelligence does not hold water.

Davies does make passing mention of other structural variables, noting that "governmental, institutional, and even constitutional factors come into play," but his only example is the effect of cabinet government on British departmental assessment, something that was shown above to be not too different than the American arrangement (Davies 2002, 65).

Finally, in a recent article, Marrin and Davies (2009) write about a development in American government beginning in the Nixon administration and ending with the Carter administration in which the National Security Council (NSC) staff performed mixed intelligence and policy analysis. The NSC is principally composed of the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense. Other members vary based on the current president's preferences. Marrin and Davies liken this National Security Study Memorandums (NSSM) arrangement to the British JIC system and argue for its superiority and its feasibility in the American setting. They repeat Marrin's assertion (2007) that the need for distance between policy and intelligence may be a myth and that this is demonstrated by the success of the NSSM system, just like the success of the JIC system. They assert that the myth is rooted in a fear of bias or politicization, but they do not explain why this fear is translated into distance in the United States and not in the United Kingdom. They suggest that "something in the [NSSM] context, therefore, disposed participants to behave more like [policy-neutral] officials than [political] appointees" (Marrin and Davies 2009, 671).[21]

On the one hand, the NSSM process produced analyzes of intelligence and policy options that top policymakers found useful (Betts 1980). On the other hand, the system was discontinued. Further, the NSSM system was never quite like the British JIC. While it is true that the NSC staff received raw intelligence from the intelligence community and made their

[21] Interestingly, nowhere in their description of the history of the NSSM process do the authors mention the U.S. Congress. Most likely, the NSSM was an executive branch product available only to the NSC. The relationship of Congress to this product, both in terms of access and attitude, would be worth investigating.

own assessments, they and their superiors never stopped receiving NIEs (assessments) and other analysis from the intelligence community to consider as they wrote their own assessments. Further, what they produced were documents that laid out the pros and cons of the main policy options, with intelligence as an input. It is not clear from the available evidence what aspect of the NSSMs policymakers found useful: an intelligence assessment from a different perspective, an intelligence estimate that considered U.S. policy (net assessment), the convenience of having the assessment integrated into the same document as the policy discussion, etc. It may simply have been that the NSSMs laid out clear policy options and scenarios with the relevant intelligence presented conveniently alongside. In this arrangement, intelligence assessment may have benefited from better presentation and better focus on policymaker questions, but it is not clear that the intelligence assessments themselves were very different from, or independent of, the assessments produced by the intelligence community. If they were not, then the NSSM system was not really like the British JIC system, because the intelligence community was still the guiding light for understanding the likely course of events around the world. Whatever the details, the system did not survive, despite the fact that much of the intelligence community itself was in mortal danger during this period (Johnson 1988). If there were an attractive alternative available, it would have stood a good chance of being considered or at least widely discussed.

In sum, Marrin and Davies both posit culture as an explanation for the American and British policy-intelligence differences. They both also mention the British cabinet government as a contributing factor. Neither of these explanations amounts to a very strong argument for the difference in intelligence-producer–policymaker proximity. Marrin argues that proximity is really not a problem, despite the American belief that it is. Perhaps, though, it is only a problem under certain circumstances and those circumstances exist in the United States, but not in the

United Kingdom. In that case, it is not so much a cultural myth as a reasonable response to a different environment. The possibility that other structural factors determine whether or not proximity is a problem will be addressed in chapter six. In fact, I will propose that what makes the policy-intelligence relationship found in the JIC possible is not culture, but rather the structural context in which the JIC exists. The American structural environment is different, and an arrangement like the JIC could never survive in the United States.

CHAPTER 5

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND APPROACH

The purpose of this chapter is to outline and discuss the methods, approach, and challenges of conducting the present research project. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the sources of information pursued at the beginning of the project were not always the ones that bore fruit or were even accessible by the end. Government archives contained documents that were, in general, too scattered over time and organizational perspective or were simply irrelevant to the question at hand. Interviews were always envisioned as being part of the research, but some of the original, planned interviewees became inaccessible: for instance, one died unexpectedly, one suddenly took up a government position overseas, and another retired and, ironically, became busier and unavailable. Fortunately, other, but differently-experienced, individuals did become available for interviewing.

As noted in the introduction, this is what Van Evera (1997) refers to as a "theory-proposing" dissertation. Consequently, the method of research and analysis is different than what one would find in the more common theory-testing dissertation. The methods and approach are also shaped by the nature of the topic and the state of its development as a field of study. In this case, intelligence studies is a somewhat uneven, but generally less-developed field, especially as a subfield of political science.[22] Doing research in the field of intelligence presents a number of serious challenges, both conceptually and in terms of finding data. While

[22] Intelligence studies can easily be characterized as a sub-field of history, political science, security studies, or military studies. There is also some work that falls into the realm of organizational studies, but this is probably the least cogent as an area of study and more aptly considered a handful of case studies that happen to have intelligence organizations as their setting.

advocating the application of comparative analysis to the study of intelligence systems, Gill notes that "for now, we are left with little choice but to conduct relatively small-scale qualitative analyses since the large data sets … simply do not exist" (Gill 2007c, 84).

APPROACH FOR THIS PROJECT

There is always an element of conjecture and speculation when proposing new theory, what Karl Popper called "creative intuition" (quoted in King et al. 1994, 14). If the matter was self-evident or amenable to pure deduction, then there would be neither a puzzle nor a controversy. Testing is what one does when theories already exist and data is available. Along with deduction, the findings in this dissertation will contain some degree of opinion and speculation. The first rule of Sir Isaac Newton's "Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy" states that "No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and sufficient to explain their phenomena" (Newton 1999 [1726], 794). This is essentially the same as Occam's razor, which is often misrepresented as asserting that simpler explanations are always preferred. Despite being simpler, some explanations are insufficient. In any case, the problematic part that applies to the current project is the phrase "sufficient to explain." Sufficiency of explanation is a difficult thing to measure, especially in qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, work. It is even more difficult when the phenomenon under study is human behavior. In the preceding chapter, there was a discussion of the relative strength of cultural versus structural explanations in the abstract. The hypothetical example of the tourists at the two embassies was offered as an illustration. But why, exactly, are structural explanations more compelling when juxtaposed with cultural ones, everything else being equal?

The problem resembles the concept of the legal test of the "reasonable man." This test, which may be applied to a case of negligence or to the question of the existence and terms of a contract between two parties, asks the court to decide what a hypothetical, reasonable person would do or believe in the place of the defendant. But, how do you prove what a reasonable person would do or think? In considering a single case or an abstraction, the scientific method is not applicable. There is insufficient data for statistical inference, which would be another entryway for a scientific approach. In reality, "proof" amounts to judgment—either as a consensus among those considering an issue or as the pronouncement of an accepted authority, such as a judge in a court of law. Resolving this epistemological issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation and more properly lies in the fields of philosophy and, perhaps, the study of the human brain. However, inasmuch as this dissertation proposes one theory to compete with another theory, neither of which can be tested at this time, it falls into this domain of reasonableness, subject to the judgment of the readers. Within political science, this puts the project towards the end of the methodological spectrum that overlaps with professional history, as opposed to the typically more quantitative end of the spectrum that comes closer to actually using the scientific method.[23]

More explicitly, the state of the question which is the topic of this dissertation—why is the distance between policymaking and intelligence different in the United Kingdom compared to the United States—is that there is no accepted theory. The only explanation proposed so far, the cultural one, is theoretical and not based on an empirical study. Essentially, there is one theory on the table for consideration and there is unlikely to be a way to test any theory for quite some time. So, although an empirical study involving many cases would provide stronger

[23] This is not to suggest that the scientific method requires research to be quantitative, only that it is more common to see the method rigorously applied in quantitative studies. There is certainly qualitative work that is rigorously scientific, too.

evidence for or against any theory, the explanation presented in this dissertation is neither stronger nor weaker than the competing explanation on that score. Perhaps, though, structural explanations trump cultural ones because we tend to believe in the rationality of human beings and that there are practical reasons for the choices people make, even when they are obscured by time and permeate the environment, becoming the stuff of culture. Therefore, the strategy of this dissertation is to show that a reasonable and plausible case can be made for structural causes for the variation in intelligence-policymaker distance. Political scientists, unlike historians (or sociologists or anthropologists), are particularly interested in finding explanations that involve power and the relative power in various relationships and interactions. Having constructed an argument for structural causes, it is the hoped that the cultural explanation will seem superfluous, as in the hypothetical embassy example.

The national cases for this study were chosen, in part, because of the way in which the researcher became aware of the issue. But it is also true that much more data is available—both texts and knowledgeable persons—for these two countries, especially to an English-speaker.[24] The United Kingdom and the United States also present a convenient combination of similarities (e.g., language, general culture and history, military and intelligence operations during and after the Second World War) and differences (e.g., political system, particular culture, hard power after the World Wars, laws and practice regarding secrecy, size of government) thus satisfying some of the key criteria for Mill's Method of Difference (Mill 2002 [1843])[25]. More to the point, they provide variation on the dependent variable (intelligence-policymaking distance) and a number of independent variables, some of which are similar and some of which differ. These

[24] Hopefully, this is not too much like the man found down on all fours on the sidewalk late at night near a streetlight. When asked if he dropped his car keys there, he answered, "No, but there isn't any light across the street where I did drop them."

[25] For a discussion of Mill's methods, their limitations, and controversies about their usefulness and application, see George and Bennett (2004, 153-60).

cases are also important because the United States and the United Kingdom have two of the most active intelligence services in the world and they are both in the process of considering and making structural changes related to those services. Therefore, having a better theoretical grasp of the relationship between intelligence producers and policymakers in these two countries is timely. Two cases are insufficient for proving or settling anything, but they are sufficient for generating ideas and possibly a strong notion of what is plausible.

The situation is a bit like being on a mountain ridge, looking ahead to find the way to hike. You may be able to discern the general terrain—there's a mountain over there and a river over there—without being able to see the details on the ground because of the forest. You have to get around the mountain, but should you go to the left or the right? Will you encounter more difficult underbrush if you go one way rather than the other? You simply cannot see well enough from this position to tell. Nevertheless, you can see the larger features and the general shape of things.

RESEARCH SOURCES

Unfortunately, it is impossible for an outside researcher to simply show up and observe the operation of government intelligence systems. "Intelligence officer careers are … endemically secret things" (Davies 2001, 76). Governments place a shroud of secrecy around not only collected intelligence information and analysis, but also the manner of handling and evaluating that information. Even in the recent past, only the most basic of descriptions were put forward and there were usually severe limits to what leaked out unofficially. [26] While there are important and ongoing debates about over-classification and abuse of government secrecy in the

[26] For further discussions of U.S. government and primary sources for historical work on intelligence and the differences between working as an inside, official historian and as an outside historian along with the potential biases of each, see Warner (2007a, 2007b).

United States, it is unreasonable to expect governments to reveal all of their secrets. Secrecy serves a legitimate purpose in protecting the sources of valuable information and protecting tactical and strategic advantages gained through effective methods of collection and analysis. Keeping the findings of intelligence secret can also be useful for the practice of diplomacy and economic negotiations: it is sometimes better to not let your competitor know what you know.

Today, several countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, provide some organizational and descriptive information about their intelligence services on official government websites. Also, the United States government occasionally sponsors texts such as *Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence* (Snider 1997) or *Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community 1946-2005* (Garthoff 2005), both written by former government employees and published by the Central Intelligence Agency's in-house think tank, the Center for the Study of Intelligence. My own interest in the American and British variance in the intelligence-policymaker relationship began with an examination (Lamanna 2007b) of British and American official reports on investigations into the pre-war intelligence on Iraq (e.g., Butler 2004; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2004). Recent years have also seen increasing numbers of actual intelligence documents being declassified and made available to the public in government archives. However, most intelligence material, especially from recent decades, remains classified and unavailable to the public. Wirtz has noted, though, that the United States exhibits a "relative openness" (compared to other nations) that "provides a sufficient historical record to support serious scholarship on intelligence matters in the United States" (Wirtz 2007a, 31).

Additional secondary text sources include memoirs by those who have been involved in policy and intelligence (e.g., Cradock 1997, 2002; Gates 1996; Moynihan 1998) and journalistic

accounts—including current news reporting—that describe relevant actors, incidents, periods, or organizations (e.g., Kessler 1992; Powers 1979; Woodward 1987). These offer insight into the thinking, motivations, and actions of intelligence producers and consumers. However, memories are not always accurate, and even when they are, authors often have an agenda that skews their depiction of events. Sometimes this is as simple as not wanting to appear to have made mistakes. Sometimes it involves supporting one side or another in a current controversy. Journalists, too, sometimes get things wrong, have an axe to grind, or present things in a skewed manner. Errors are often due simply to the haste of meeting a deadline. It is probably not quite as bad as historian John Ferris once lamented. "There can be no conventional review of the writings on American intelligence since 1945 because there are no conventional writings to review. They begin in a literature of leaks, move toward works of fantasy and studies in paranoia, and culminate in articles as unreadable as the most demanding of scholars could wish" (Ferris 1995, 88). Johnson, though, also warns that the "reader and researcher have to be especially wary about books and articles claiming to understand the secret machinations of government agencies hidden behind guarded buildings and barbed-wire fences" (Johnson 2007a, 2).

Finally, there are scholarly works that examine policymakers, intelligence services, and sometimes their interactions.[27] These range from the largely descriptive (e.g., Andrew 1986; Richelson 1999) to the more analytical and critical (e.g., Johnson 1996; Zegart 1999). These provide still more insight into the behavior of intelligence producers and consumers, especially those works that bring a theoretical perspective with them.

Once the fundamental puzzle was identified, this research project began with a search of text sources for relevant material, including all of the types of texts mentioned above. All of

[27] For a more complete overview of the intelligence studies literature, see Johnson (2007a).

these textual sources were of some value. Interspersed with these readings were numerous informal conversations with current and former employees of the U.S. intelligence community and with American, Canadian, and British academics who had at one time or another studied the intelligence communities of these countries, though generally not with this particular research question in mind.

In the summer of 2007, I visited the U.S. National Archives facility in College Park, MD, to use the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) to search declassified CIA documents. CREST, which at the time was only accessible on site (not over the internet), was not terribly helpful. The reliability of the indexing of documents was inconsistent, many had unknown dates, and the documents did not represent consistent or coherent collections like, for example, the Department of State's series, *Foreign Relations of the United States*.

Archival records can be important resources for establishing or verifying dates, actors, and statements. However, even when they are organized and coherent, they do have limitations. Davies draws on the work of historians Sean Glynn and Alan Booth to note three limitations of archival research: "1) Cabinet papers are incomplete and thereby potentially misleading; 2) they draw one's attention to the formal 'administrative process' of policy-making rather than the substantive causes and effects of policy; 3) finally, much like memoirs, Cabinet, departmental and 'other political papers' tend to have what Glynn and Booth call a 'self-justificatory element'" (Davies 2001, 74). Davies also notes that "the minutes of committee meetings…often tend to mask over the political process of debate and discussion and record only that which was or could be agreed upon. This is particularly true of the papers of the Joint Intelligence Committee, a body with an explicit ethos of seeking joint consensus" (Davies 2001, 75). However, while this might apply to JIC reports, John Morrison, former Deputy Chief of Defence

Intelligence and Head of the Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff and subsequently the first investigator for the Intelligence and Security Committee of members of Parliament, suggests that the JIC committee minutes varied significantly on this point, depending on who was the secretary at the time (interview with author, Canterbury, UK, 22 September 2008).

Besides text sources and informal consultations, interviews were another useful source of information. When it comes to doing historical or political science research on intelligence, "it continues to be necessary to substitute interviews for official documents in many areas" (Davies 2001, 74). Interviews proved especially important for filling in gaps regarding the British experience.

INTERVIEWS

To supplement the text sources, unstandardized and semistandardized interviews were conducted with individuals who had first-hand experience working with either the British or American intelligence systems. A semistandardized interview falls between a formally structured, standardized interview and a completely unstandardized interview, the latter having no pre-determined schedule of questions (Berg 2001). Standardized or structured interviews are typically used in survey work or whenever the goal is to have comparable data drawn from a sample group so that inferences can be made about a larger population. The structure essentially means that all interviewees are asked the same questions and it frequently means that they are selecting from the same set of possible answers. This allows for generalizability. In a semistandardized interview, there are some consistent question-areas and possibly a systematic order to them, but the interviewer is expected to digress from those questions in response to the answers the subject provides and according to the subject's individual experience and expertise.

Further, even the prepared questions may be tailored for the individual subject. "Researchers thus approach the world from the subject's perspective. Researchers can accomplish this through unscheduled probes…that arise from the interview process itself" (Berg 2001, 70). Also, "unstructured interviews, sometimes referred to as 'in-depth' interviews or 'guided conversations' rely less on a fixed schedule than a series of topics to be covered and/or prompts intended to direct the respondent in particular directions of interest to the researcher" (Davies 2001, 76).

The men and women interviewed for this dissertation fall into the category of elite subjects. *Elite* in this context refers to the interviewee's status as an expert on some topic, rather than his or her socioeconomic position (Leech 2002b). Tansey (2007, 766) notes four uses for elite interviews:

1. Corroborate what has been established from other sources,
2. Establish what a set of people think,
3. Make inferences about a larger population's characteristics/decisions,
4. Reconstruct an event or set of events.

Goldstein (2002, 669) also notes that one of the purposes of elite interviews is "informing or guiding work that uses other sources of data." In this project, the goal of the interviews was to corroborate what was established from other sources (use number one) and to reveal more information about an organization or system (similar to use number four). Random sampling is not required for these two purposes, which do not involve generalizing findings to a wider population of elites. Non-probability sampling may, in fact, have important advantages. In particular, it allows the researcher to select interviewees best suited to aid in uses number one, two, and four listed above (Tansey 2007).

Interviewing rank and file intelligence workers in any significant numbers is difficult because outside of their agencies they are mostly anonymous and unavailable. Higher-ranking officials are easier to identify, but hard to gain access to. As mentioned above, some prospective interviewees—mainly Americans—became unavailable by the time the project was ready to proceed. Fortunately, several individuals who formerly held high positions in intelligence were available to interview. In the end, it was the British system that was less familiar and less clear from the text accounts, at least from the perspective of an American researcher. Therefore, arrangements were made to spend a week in the United Kingdom fleshing out the nature of British system, with particular emphasis on the Joint Intelligence Committee, through interviews with intelligence elites and also through informal conversations with other academics.

The focus of the interviews was on the experience and observations of the interviewee in the intelligence-producer–policymaker relationship: the nuts and bolts of it, but also their impressions of the problems of politicization and separation and their sense of what pressures or incentives were operative. For each interview, the questions were designed to elicit relevant responses without leading the interviewee to a preferred answer. There was also a danger that an interviewee would describe his or her intellectual idea of the relationship rather than the actual experience of it. Although their experience was the main target, their reflective thoughts on the relationship were also valuable, as long as the two could be distinguished. Interviews have the potential to capture realities that neatly prepared, official organization charts and statements of formal rules do not. "The informal organization…can involve norms and standards that are just as forceful influences on the worker as formal requirements" (Rainey 2003, 33).

For the most part, interviews were not audio-recorded for fear of making the interviewees reticent to speak candidly (Woliver 2002). Instead, I took written notes. I also recorded my own

recollections of the interview and other thoughts on an audio recording device in private as soon after the interview as possible. Further, congressional staffers to a person wanted to remain anonymous. Even though they were not being asked anything classified, nor revealing anything classified, they seemed concerned that they might say something politically unwise or unwelcome and that their positions could be endangered. These restrictions—along with a very few number of "off the record" comments—were tolerable because one of the purposes of the interviews was simply to confirm what was in text sources. Further, the highest priority was to gain a better understanding of the intelligence-policymaker relationship, especially in the British setting, rather than to provide quotations, which were, of course, also desirable.

The interviews often employed open-ended questions. Open-ended questions "maximize response validity" and "provide a greater opportunity of respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks," which is best for "exploratory and in-depth work" (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). With open-ended questions, the researcher must "make decisions about what additional questions to ask as the session progresses," either to probe for more depth or to determine the value of an "unanticipated path" that the subject has offered (Berry 2002, 681). Some possible probes were prepared ahead of time in anticipation of various answers to the main questions. These anticipated directions tended to vary from interviewee to interviewee.

One methodological issue raised by this approach is repeatability in that different researchers will probe at different times and in different directions and even the same researcher is not guaranteed to probe in the same way twice, even under the same circumstances. Nevertheless, this style of interviewing provides a great opportunity to gain new information and to learn about a situation from a participant's point of view. Most of all, it affords the "flexibility to explore unanticipated answers" (Berry 2002, 682). It may also create more goodwill and

cooperation from the interviewees. "Elites especially … do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining why they think what they think" (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). Berry notes (2002, 680) that "subjects have a purpose in the interview too: they have something they want to say." Each of the interviews ended on friendly terms with a willingness to accommodate follow-up questions and provide additional help. Most of the interviewees seemed to have genuinely enjoyed the interview, which usually lasted for more than one hour. Leech (2002a, 665) notes that "unstructured interviews … are really more conversations than interviews, with even the topic of conversation subject to change as the interview progresses" and that unstructured interviews are best used as a source of insight, not for hypothesis testing." Berry also characterizes elite, unstructured interviewing in the same way. "Excellent interviewers are excellent conversationalists. They make interviews seem like a good talk among old friends" (Berry 2002, 679).

ESTABLISHING AN IDENTITY AND GAINING RAPPORT

One of the keys to doing successful elite interviews is establishing a suitable identity in the mind of the subject and gaining rapport. An appropriate identity, in this case, is one that is "safe" from the point of view of intelligence insiders (Rivera et al. 2002). This is not to suggest that the interviewer adopt a false or deceitful identity. Rather, there are usually a variety of ways that one can present oneself, mentioning or emphasizing some characteristics over others. Some textbooks advise that the interviewer feign ignorance and a lack of sophistication so that the subjects "do not feel threatened and are not worried that they will lose face in the interview. The danger here is that –especially when dealing with highly educated, highly placed respondents—

they will feel that they are wasting their time with an idiot, or at least will dumb-down their answers and subject interviewers to a Politics 101 lecture" (Leech 2002a, 665). Other researchers note the additional problem of "losing the ability to control the direction and scope of the interview" if the interviewer is "overly deferential and concerned with establishing rapport" (Rivera et al. 2002, 685). They recommend demonstrating knowledge and that you have "'done your homework' on [the interviewees] so that the extent of the preparation for the interview causes respondents to take you seriously" (685). Leech recommends that the "interviewer should seem professional and generally knowledgeable, but less knowledgeable than the respondent on the particular topic of the interview" (Leech 2002a, 665).

In written and telephone contacts before each interview, I established my identity as a student and an academic researcher with an institutional home at a university. I frequently mentioned my major professor and other academics in intelligence studies that I know personally. I also mentioned my editorial experience with *Intelligence and National Security*, which is an academic journal having editorial offices in both the United States and the United Kingdom. "Student" was intended to convey "non-threatening." The other information was intended to convey "serious and competent." The goal, of course, was to get the subject to agree to the interview and to talk at a serious and sophisticated level.

At or near the beginning of each interview, I repeated some of this information, along with information about the interviewee, as a way of establishing rapport. "Rapport means more than putting people at ease. It means convincing people that you are listening, that you understand and are interested in what they are talking about, and that they should continue talking" (Leech 2002a, 665). I would usually find some biographical question to ask that demonstrated that I knew enough about the person to ask a question that required a little

reflection on his or her part. People usually respond well to questions about their lives, interests, and experiences. I usually did not explain the precise focus of my research, for fear of biasing the answers I would get during the interview.

Curiously, this approach to identity and rapport seemed to work well with higher-level executives, but not with congressional staffers. Executives commented that I seemed "very well-informed" and some actually said "you've really done your homework." Staffers tried to teach me "Politics 101" (or rather, Intelligence 101). I can think of two possible reasons for the failure of this approach with staffers. First, they were generally younger and not too far from being students themselves. For example, one young woman who was on the SSCI staff mentioned that she was considering leaving her position and returning to school to pursue a degree in law. If they identified with me as a student, they may have assumed that my knowledge of the world of intelligence was like their own before they began their current jobs. The other possibility is that, despite being competent in their own work, they were relatively ignorant about intelligence more broadly, intelligence history, and intelligence studies and so they were unable to appreciate the clues that I dropped for them about my own knowledge. In other words, they simply did not know enough to catch on that I knew a lot.

CHALLENGES

Even if one can overcome the ordinary dearth of information, intelligence studies also presents conceptual and measurement challenges. For example, a common topic of interest is the question of intelligence failure. But what is an intelligence failure? Is it when an enemy launches a successful surprise attack? When is an apparent intelligence failure really a policy failure? There are at least two types of policy failures related to intelligence that can be hard to

distinguish from intelligence failures. First, there is the failure to set effective intelligence policy. This is not the same as a failure of intelligence personnel to perform their jobs well. The failure to "connect the dots" and prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks is often described as an intelligence failure. But perhaps, if intelligence agencies were constrained by the law from sharing information with domestic law enforcement agencies, or at least constrained by the prevailing policy of their political masters, then the success of the attacks was really due to a failure of the policies governing intelligence agencies, rather than a failure attributable to the agencies themselves.

The second type of policy failure occurs when policymakers fail to act on the intelligence information that is provided to them. Unfortunately for the intelligence providers, the policymakers then have an incentive to blame intelligence for this type of failure in order to avoid being blamed themselves. When this happens, intelligence agencies are likely constrained from defending themselves before the public because of the need to maintain secrecy.[28]

It can be even more difficult to identify, count, or measure an intelligence success. Was it a day when no terrorist attacks happened? That could simply be because no terrorist attempted anything on that day. On the other hand, some "non-attempts" may, in fact, be due to intelligence success. Given that the goal of intelligence is typically to prevent an attack or act of violence rather than to successfully prosecute someone for breaking the law, it is sometimes enough to alert the enemy that you are aware of his plans or intentions to get him to abandon those plans. If he thinks he has lost the element of surprise, he may decide that his chances of success are too small. Consequently, he does not make the attempt and there is no incident. It is difficult to distinguish this scenario from one in which the enemy was not going to make an attempt in the first place (in which case, the original intelligence may have been wrong).

[28] For more on the confusion of intelligence and policy failures, see Betts (1978) and Gill (2007d).

The challenges encountered while writing this dissertation include the lack of direct information about the inner workings of the intelligence-policymaker relationship, contradictory information about the true nature and functioning of the British Joint Intelligence Committee, the inherent difficulty in determining causes for human institutions that are not the direct result of conscious choices by the individuals engaged in them, and the general secrecy surrounding government intelligence organizations.

Primary sources that focus on the intelligence-policymaker relationship are not plentiful, especially regarding the British experience[29]. "The British government is one of the most secretive democratic governments, and the notorious section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, retaining documents indefinitely, affects many other areas besides the study of intelligence and security services" (Davies 2001, 74).

Regarding the interviews, it must be born in mind that government elites often have their own agendas for such interactions and in particular do not want to be seen as being influenced by political pressures or anything other than virtue and rationality. Therefore the researcher might not be able to ask about an issue of interest directly and might not be able to trust that some answers are not calculated to serve the purposes of the interviewee rather than the interviewer.

Finally, it is not as if any of the individual actors available today personally made the decisions about how to broadly or particularly structure the intelligence-policymaker relationships in either country. Further, those decisions were made by presidents and prime ministers, a class of elites that was, unfortunately, not available for these interviews. Therefore, this study is tentative, exploratory, and limited. The inclusion of other national cases beyond the United States and the United Kingdom could increase the explanatory power and come closer to

[29] For three perspectives on the study of intelligence in the United Kingdom, see Andrew (1988), Scott (2007), and Gibbs (2007).

providing an empirical test of the results, but it is not feasible to examine more cases at this time. To widely expand the cases available for study would probably take years of additional research and facility in a great many additional languages.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND PROPOSALS

Why are intelligence producers and policymakers brought together to produce intelligence assessments in the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) while they are kept far apart in the United States system, despite the shared history and continued close working relationship between the intelligence establishments of the two countries? I propose that this national difference is conditioned mainly by the following three factors: the degree of secrecy (or privacy) in the intelligence-policymaker relationship, the structure of the political system, and the size of the government apparatus. Specifically, greater secrecy, a more centralized political system, and smaller government all increase the likelihood that intelligence will be close to policymaking, everything else being equal. Although secrecy in particular may be difficult to measure for all cases, in the United Kingdom all three of these factors are clearly more towards the end of the spectrum that results in a closer relationship between intelligence producers and policymakers than they are in the United States.

To some extent, the effects of political system and size of government are indirect and a result of their direct effect on secrecy. Nevertheless, they probably have some direct effects, too. The apparent "cultural" difference in attitude about the intelligence-policymaker distance is really only the result of reasonable concerns about politicization which vary according the different circumstances in the two nations. In order to understand how this is so, a brief discussion of the concept of politicization is in order first. [30]

[30] Some of the material in this chapter was previously presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in February 2007.

POLITICIZATION

The problem of politicization of intelligence analysis has been publically raised and debated for decades (e.g., Lippmann 1922; Kent 1949, esp. pp. 198-206; 1969; Licklider 1970; Gates 1987, 1992b; Wirtz 1991; Betts 2004). Typical headlines are "Juggling on Missile Data Charged by Symington" (Raymond 1960) and "Byrd Seeks Senate Probe of Charges of Report-Altering at CIA" (Omang 1984). Public and private debates have centered on such issues as the post-World War II bomber gap, the missile gap, the outlook for the Vietnam War, and recently, the pre-invasion intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (Hersh 2003a, 2003b).

General treatments of the intelligence-producer–policymaker relationship written by people inside the intelligence community include Kent (1949, 1969), Davis (1992, 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2003) and Ford (1993). Foundational, but older, works on politicization include Ransom (1985, 1987), Hulnick (1986, 1987), Godson (1986), Betts (1988), and a careful examination by Westerfield (1996/97, 1997) of the controversy surrounding estimates on the Soviet Union and Robert Gates' senate nomination hearings to become Director of Central Intelligence. Three of the best recent examinations of intelligence-provider–policymaker relations are contained in Betts (2007; see also 2003), Davis (2007), and Wirtz (2007b).[31]

Various definitions and conceptualizations of politicization have been offered by academics, government officials, and journalists, although Rovner notes that, at least in the case of journalists, the term is used frequently but "usually lacks a precise definition" (Rovner 2010, 5540). James Wirtz defines politicization as "the effort of policy makers to shape intelligence to conform to their policy or political preferences," but he also notes that "intelligence professionals

[31] While at first it may seem promising to look at the extensive literature on public administration for additional insight into the issue of politicization, most of that literature seems to be focused on the problems elected officials and political appointees face in trying to control bureaucrats in order to implement policy. Although it may involve some of the same actors, this is really a different set of problems than are encountered in the politicization of intelligence, which is about eliciting impartial judgments and analysis.

can themselves politicize intelligence when they allow bureaucratic or personal incentives to influence their estimates and reports" (Wirtz 2007b, 144). Ransom lists several types of politicization, including "when intelligence estimates are influenced by imbedded policy positions" or "overt or subtle pressures are applied on intelligence systems, resulting in self-fulfilling intelligence prophecies, or in 'intelligence to please' that distorts reality" (Ransom 1987, 26). Speaking to CIA analysts soon after his confirmation as DCI, Robert Gates stated that "almost all agree that [politicization] involves deliberately distorting analysis or judgments to favor a preferred line of thinking irrespective of evidence," although some would include additional modes of politicization, too (Gates 1992a, 5). Johnson states that "the danger of politicization rises as the analyst is tempted to bend intelligence in support of policy objectives" (Johnson 2008, 349). Betts suggests that politicization is a "complicated phenomenon" that can have "benefits as well as costs" (Betts 2007, 67). "The prevalent concept is that politicization is the top-down dictation of analytical conclusions to support preferred policy….The more forgiving view sees politicization as a subtle contamination of analysis by policy predispositions" (76).

This "subtle contamination" might work something like this. Policymakers—without any intention of applying pressure—may signal or otherwise communicate their preferences to analysts if they have sufficiently close contact. Regardless of whether the analysts view policymakers as superiors (in the chain of command) or as customers, they may consciously or unconsciously attempt to please them by working harder to produce analysis that supports the preferences of the policymakers with whom they are acquainted. They may do this for a range of reasons including expectations of career advancement, a sense of loyalty (partisan or otherwise), or even a feeling of personal friendship for the policymaker. Even with the best of intentions and

honest effort, there is the possibility of subtle, unconscious influence. Analysts affected by this may work harder to search for evidence to support a favored policy or theory instead of testing the theory against all of the available evidence. This is a problem that scholars in the academy wrestle with, too (King et al. 1994). The closeness between George Tenet and the White House during his service as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) is often cited as an example of this. Tenet's reported ability and apparent desire to build friendships with colleagues may have made it harder for him to present impartial (and disappointing) analysis to the president, even if the president did not pressure him in any way (Frontline 2006).

The common notion in these various definitions is that analysts should not be swayed to a particular assessment of the world because of a preference for a particular policy, whether that preference is their own or someone else's. In addition, analysts should not advocate particular policies. As former DCI Stansfield Turner stated, "The basic ethic of American intelligence is that you don't make recommendations, you don't take positions, because then people will suspect that your interpretation of the intelligence is slanted to your position or your recommendation" (Turner 2007).

For the purposes of this dissertation, politicization of intelligence occurs when policy preferences cause changes to intelligence assessments, regardless of whether the mechanism is crass and direct pressure by policymakers or unconscious pandering by intelligence producers. Additionally, the problem focused on is not what policymakers eventually do (if anything) with the intelligence assessments they receive, but whether they cause those assessments to change for reasons other than new information or convincing argument.

The questions, then, are what causes politicization and how to prevent it? Rovner notes that the "best-known cause" for politicization "has to do with the relative proximity between

intelligence producers and intelligence consumers" (Rovner 2010, 5541). Most American writers respond with discussions about proximity and achieving psychological, organizational, and even physical distance between policymakers and analysts, as did Pillar and Marrin in earlier chapters. Sherman Kent strongly stated and restated the need for distance between the policymakers and analysts in order to protect analysis from being biased by preferences of the policymaker.

> If intelligence under the best of conditions finds itself guilty of hasty and unsound conclusion, is it likely to find itself doing more of this sort of thing when it is under the administrative control of its consumers in plans or operations? My answer is, yes. I do not see how, in terms of human nature, it can be otherwise. I do not see how intelligence can escape, every once in so often, from swinging into line behind the policy of the employing unit and prostituting itself in the production of what the Nazis used to call *kämpfende Wissenschaft*. Nor do I see how, if the unexpected occurred, and intelligence invariably came up with findings at variance with the policy of the employing unit, intelligence could expect to draw its pay over an indefinite period. I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst (Kent 1949, 199-200).

Kent then goes on to quote from Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922) wherein Lippmann also argues that the only way to ensure impartiality and objectivity in the analytic component of any government department of concern is "to separate as absolutely as it is possible to do so the staff which executes from the staff which investigates" (as quoted in Kent 1949). Johnson notes

that Americans are wary of the commingling (where the British encourage it) of policy and intelligence officers, “fearful that policy considerations might contaminate the crystal purity of intelligence judgments” (Johnson 1996, 129) .

The British are not unaware of the potential problems of proximity. Percy Cradock, chairman of the JIC in the nineteen eighties and ultimate foreign policy insider within the British government, wryly commented that “the best arrangement is intelligence and policy in separate but adjoining rooms, with communicating doors and thin partition walls, as in cheap hotels” (Cradock 2002, 296). Nevertheless, they do not respond by adding distance. Marrin (chapter four) is correct in noting a difference between the two countries regarding the belief in the need for distance. He is wrong in thinking that the American belief that proximity will result in politicization is just a myth. It is not a myth. The difference in belief regarding the need for distance is in both cases a rational reaction to the different national circumstances which alter the incentives for politicization of intelligence. In other words, in the American system, it is rational to anticipate a greater likelihood of politicization and therefore take additional measures—such as distance—to protect against it. In the British system, the incentive for politicization is lower and therefore there is not as much need to maintain intelligence-policymaking distance. Variation in the incentives for politicization is not given much attention in the current literature. Generally, the incentive to politicize is simply assumed to exist and apparently assumed to be a constant across actors and situations. This is probably due, in part, to the relative dearth of comparative studies. The most highly studied situation is that of the United States at the level of national intelligence. Even here, there could be variations in incentives, but they are probably small enough to evade scrutiny, especially when no one is specifically looking for them.

The incentives are largely determined by the level of privacy (secrecy), the political system (parliamentary versus presidential), and the size of government (small versus large). An example of a low-incentive situation is a military field commander in a dangerous situation, wondering from which direction the enemy will attack. His life and the lives of his troops may depend on correctly determining this. He has no reason to cause his intelligence officer to skew his analysis. Working closely together may put them in danger of groupthink, but it is not likely to lead to politicization. An example of a high incentive situation is when a threat assessment is going to determine which of several weapons systems the Department of Defense is going to spend billions of dollars on. At the very least, military contractors and members of congress whose businesses and constituents could be greatly benefited by one outcome rather than another will have an incentive to use whatever influence they have to affect the assessment. This is not to say that they *will* attempt to influence the outcome, only that they have a large incentive to.

Incentive, however, is not enough. To politicize intelligence also requires opportunity, which is where proximity comes in. Without proximity, the policymaker will not have the opportunity to influence the analyst. This, then, is the major difference between how the American and British systems interact with the danger of politicization. In the face of high *incentives* to politicize intelligence, the American system reduces the *opportunity* for politicization to occur: it tries to keep policymakers and intelligence analysts away from each other. Greater secrecy, the system of government, and a smaller intelligence apparatus have all made the incentives to politicize intelligence lower in the British system: intelligence and policy can therefore work more closely together even though this presents more opportunity to politicize.

SECRECY

The most important structural factor that reduces the fear of politicization in the United Kingdom, as compared to the United States, is the level of secrecy (or privacy, meaning not just obscured from the public, but confidential between provider and a single consumer or unified group of consumers) maintained regarding intelligence. Although it would be difficult to measure the level of secrecy in all societies, there are some clear differences between the United Kingdom and the United States that allow them to at least be placed on a spectrum relative to each other. In fact, the difference in secrecy is not limited to intelligence information, but is characteristic of British and American government in general. It is hard to overstate the difference between the two nations in this regard, and Americans in general probably fail to realize how powerful the laws and traditions are regarding British government secrecy. At the time I began this research project, I had been pursuing intelligence as a research interest for about eight years, during which time I read about the British intelligence system and had contact with British scholars of intelligence. Yet, it was not until I traveled to England and interviewed former intelligence practitioners and government officials that I truly appreciated the extent of the secrecy in that system.

But first, why does secrecy matter? Secrecy matters because it is one of the factors that can change the incentive structure for politicization. Another unstated assumption running through the discussions of politicization, both in the paragraphs above and in the literature generally, is that multiple actors with conflicting agendas or policy preferences will have access to the information and analyses produced by the intelligence agencies. This is a very important assumption. Without it, much of the conventional thinking about politicization of intelligence falls apart. The reason can be seen in this hypothetical situation proposed by Westerfield:

> Observe that when a given analysis product has multiple and diverse prospective consumers, the autonomy of the analyst is prima facie enhanced, but not entirely so. A generic audience does relieve most of his/her anxieties about "politicization" from above; however, the multiplication of fellow prospective consumers is largely what can rouse one or more of them to attempt this very "politicization"—because, if the product arrives unwelcome over A's transom, A may fear to dismiss it as simply a nuisance not worth bothering about (consumer B might pick it up and use it against A). (Westerfield 1996/97, 424, n7)

What Westerfield is noting is that rival policymakers may have access to analytical products that could be used to persuade others to their own point of view. When this is the case, each policymaker has an incentive to do what he can to make sure those analytical products support his view and not his rival's. The policymaker has a motive to pressure or influence the analyst. However, when analysis is kept secret and only available privately to A, A no longer need fear that B will exploit it and therefore A no longer has an incentive to politicize it.

In the quoted passage, Westerfield also states that the condition of having "multiple and diverse" consumers for the analysis will increase the autonomy of the analyst and protect him or her from politicization. When he was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Robert Gates wrote something similar. "In my opinion, the sharing of intelligence with Congress—where members of both parties, with a wide range of views and philosophy all see the information—is one of the surest guarantees of the CIA's independence and objectivity" (Gates 1987, 229). While the existence of multiple, rival consumers increases the incentive of each consumer to politicize intelligence as Westerfield suggests, what Westerfield and Gates also seem to be saying is that it will decrease the opportunity to do so: if one party succeeds in biasing the

intelligence, another will cry foul. But this assumes that the other parties (1) can detect the politicization, (2) have similar levels of power over the analyst, and (3) are similar in other factors affecting opportunity. Although Congress has a great deal of power over the U.S. intelligence community today, it is probably still not as operationally close to it as policymakers from the executive branch. That difference gives the executive branch an advantage in opportunity, and possibly advantages in detection and fine-grained power (power over individual analysts and analytical groups as opposed to an agency as a whole).

Other scholars seem to agree with the propositions that policymakers view shared intelligence as a potential weapon and that secrecy reduces the chances of politicization. "Intelligence in other nations is rarely subject to the degree of political harassment that besets U.S. intelligence. Internal bureaucratic intelligence conflicts undoubtedly exist in other nations, shrouded by strict rules of secrecy that tend to protect the intelligence agencies from partisan or public interference in their operations" (Ransom 1985, 38). "The decisionmakers will conclude that intelligence not only constricts their room for maneuver but arms their political opponents as well" (Heyman 1985, 62). In an opinion piece for the *Boston Globe*, political scientist Joshua Rovner wrote, "When policy makers know that estimates are going to influence the public debate over foreign policy, they will be strongly tempted to force intelligence officials to change their views. Releasing intelligence on controversial issues is a recipe for politicization" (Rovner 2006; see also Shulsky 1995, 27).

Policymakers and intelligence practitioners also agree. According to Paul Wolfowitz, who had served in several high-ranking government positions by the time of this interview with Jack Davis, "absent the evidence on which analysts' judgments are based, the policymaker has only a bureaucratic interest in intelligence judgments, and that only because other policymakers

may ‘appeal to the authority’ of intelligence opinion to lever policy debates when they are short of evidence to make their case” (Davis 1996, 38). Former deputy director and former acting director of the CIA John McLaughlin has complained that policy critics use intelligence estimates that become public like “evidence in a courtroom trial” and as a “domestic political weapon” (McLaughlin 2007). One of the findings of the Butler Commission, which investigated the United Kingdom’s pre-invasion intelligence on Iraqi WMD, was that the public citing of intelligence produced by the JIC was a mistake and should be avoided in the future (Butler 2004, 154).

In response to a reporter asking about whether there were national intelligence estimates on Iraq and Afghanistan and whether the public would see key judgments from them, Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, responded that he believed these products are more useful if they do not “become [objects] of public debate”(Fingar and Burrows 2008, 15) . He also said that he “hope[s] there are no public releases of future products, whatever those products might be.” Finally, Mark Lowenthal, a former vice chair of the National Intelligence Council wrote, “if we are going to be serious about improving intelligence analysis, we have to stop publishing the end products,” noting that “the certainty that internal assessments will wind up on public display stifles the vibrant, edgy, out-of-the-box analysis that everyone says they want—until it disagrees with their political point of view, of course” (Lowenthal 2008).

One occasion when intelligence was not made public illustrates how powerful and tempting a tool it can be. In the run-up to the 1960 presidential election, John F. Kennedy, a democrat senator, repeatedly criticized the Eisenhower administration, which of course included his opponent, Vice President Richard Nixon, for being “soft” on the Soviet Union, particularly

regarding a perceived "missile gap." The Soviets had publically boasted of their rate of missile production ("like sausages") and the American public believed that the United States was falling behind and in danger. Democrats saw this as an opportunity to appear tougher than republicans on a security issue. Eisenhower, however, was reasonably certain that the Soviet comments were exaggerations and that there was not a serious missile gap. The problem was, he knew this because of secret intelligence gathered clandestinely through U2 overflights and through the first successful Corona spy satellite mission (Hall 1997; Preble 2003). Although he consistently and publically denied that there was a missile gap, Eisenhower could not use the best argument he had and was not able to sway public opinion. In this case, intelligence was not used publically and Nixon believed that this issue cost him the election (Powers 1979).

Finally, political scientist Glenn Hastedt has argued that the "intelligence-estimating process is and always has been politicized" and that the "very act of laying out collection priorities and terms of reference for the analyst politicizes the intelligence process" (Hastedt 1987, 48-9). Nevertheless, the intelligence process is not always corrupt. He writes that "politicization is a necessary but not sufficient condition for improper conduct" (49). Rather, it is the "publicizing of intelligence" that presents a "corrupting influence on the policy maker-analyst relationship" by "altering the incentive structure for each party" (50).

In sum, the incentive to politicize intelligence is greatly dependent on political rivals and an audience having access to the intelligence. If the intelligence is private and secret, then it is not politically useful to distort it. Therefore, the level of secrecy present in a system will have a strong effect on whether or not politicization is a concern and whether or not other measures—such as putting distance between policymakers and intelligence producers—need to be taken.

In fact, the levels of secrecy in the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are very different. As Johnson notes, the British "place the highest value on secrecy" rather than "checking power" (1996, 132). Jervis (2010, 1169) refers to Britain as "generally more secretive than the United States." Len Scott writes that North American students "may find it difficult to comprehend the culture of secrecy that pervaded all aspects of British intelligence" and that "until the late 1980s, British governments, both Conservative and Labour, resolutely sought to preserve the convention of all-embracing secrecy in matters of security and intelligence" (Scott 2007, 90). Expressing an attitude that persisted for decades, foreign minister Austen Chamberlain said to Parliament in 1924, "It is of the essence of a Secret Service that it must be secret, and if you once begin disclosure it is perfectly obvious…that there is no longer any Secret Service and that you must do without it" (Quoted in Andrew 1979, 185). In the mid-1980s, British academics could still complain that their government did not even acknowledge the existence of their intelligence services (MI-6 was not acknowledged until 1994), let alone report on their activities, release any of their records, or publish any elements of their assessments (Andrew 1988; Robertson 1987a). In contrast, American intelligence and government is much more open. Indeed, according to Westerfield, "British scholars, journalists, and freelancers have found how to circumvent security restrictions about their own country's intelligence services by studying them in tandem with the somewhat less secrecy-bound American services" (Westerfield 1996, 526).

Regarding the head of MI-6, "the post was so secret that it did not exist on any table of organization of the British government and was protected by a fortress of laws, rules, regulations, and customs to ensure that the identity of 'C' was preserved as a secret of state" (Brown 1987, 13-4). It is hard to imagine the American public of the 1980s accepting the idea of

an anonymous director of an unacknowledged CIA. Similarly, the first press interview of a director of MI-5 did not occur until the year 2009 (Burns 2009). Further, the British intelligence services lacked a statutory basis until the 1989 (MI-5) and 1994 (MI-6 and GCHQ).

Another significant legal feature of the United Kingdom are the Official Secrets Acts, which "virtually seal off intelligence policy completely from the British citizenry" (Johnson 1989, 8). The latest, the Official Secrets Act of 1989, is really a modification of the 1911 Act. The Acts protect government information to a degree far beyond the laws of the United States. Indeed, if passed in the United States they would probably be ruled as unconstitutional violations of the U.S. Constitution's guarantees of free speech and freedom of the press. In addition to making it a crime for government officials and employees to pass on protected information without proper authorization, the Act makes it a crime for anyone else, including the press, to pass on the same information (Griffith 1989; Maer and Gay 2008).[32] So, for instance, newspaper reporters can be successfully prosecuted for publishing the information that was leaked to them by government insiders. For certain categories of information, damages are assumed and the state does not have to prove that there were actual damages. In the United States, leaks are rarely prosecuted and when they are it is only the government employee who leaked the information who is in danger. Although the U.S. Espionage Act of 1917 is poorly worded and somewhat vague, it has not been generally understood to allow for the prosecution of those who merely publish the leaked information. The effect of the legal difference has been to reinforce the United Kingdom's already stronger government secrecy.

Related to the Official Secrets Act is what is known as a "DA-Notice." Originally "Defence Notice" and then "D-Notice," these are letters sent confidentially to press editors about

[32] For more information on British Official Secrets Acts, especially from the point of view scholars of intelligence studies, see Andrew (1988), Robertson (1987a), and Scott (2007).

information that, for reasons of national security, should not be published. The system is voluntary, but has generally been adhered to. In 1971 all previous D-Notices were canceled and the system was reoriented from one that was more ad hoc and incident-based to the present system based on five standing DA-Notices (Defence Press & Broadcasting Advisory Commitee 2011). The restricted information is likely to be information that is also covered under one of the sections of the Official Secrets Act. The system provides for a method of negotiating details between editors and the government as to what, exactly should and should not be published. In times of war and during its earlier days the system was more aggressive and carried an implied threat of prosecution under the Official Secrets Act for non-compliance. Even in its present form today, though, it keeps information about government intelligence out of the public media to a much greater degree than any ad hoc and usually unsuccessful efforts to restrain the American press. The United Kingdom's relative control of intelligence and defence information makes the following incident all the more remarkable.

When the British government released a public dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction in the fall of 2002, it was the first time the JIC had ever been cited publicly in support of any government position (Butler 2004). Writing in 2003, Michael Herman commented on this development.

> This in dramatic contrast with the past. I recently noticed a JIC minute of 1966, on the release of Second World War papers, that "The Committee's existence today and present functions could not be disclosed." This remained the case until about twenty years ago. And even since then I can recall no precedent for the present government's explicit quotation of intelligence reports to justify controversial military action (Herman 2003, 3).

In comparison, the United States government leaks intelligence analysis like a sieve, despite the charges of over-classification. Besides the publicly-sanctioned release of analysis to support policy, elected officials and government employees often leak information to the media and for a variety of reasons, including the swaying of public opinion, battling with rivals over policy goals, and as a way to enhance one's own stature (Hastedt 2005).

In sum, when policymakers expect intelligence analysis to be made public or made available to their political rivals, they have an incentive to see to it that the analysis supports their policy position. Because they affect this incentive, American openness and British secrecy go a long way towards explaining the difference in distance between intelligence providers and policymakers in the two countries. It should be noted, however, that this incentive is only strongly related to the top-down type of politicization that is activated by the desire of the policymaker, regardless of whether he or she makes overt demands on intelligence providers. It is less strongly related to politicization that results from pandering by analysts, even when policymakers do not desire it.

Although secrecy may be the most powerful factor contributing to the British ability to bring intelligence and policy close together, it is not the only factor and it is itself partly a result of the political system. The level of secrecy and privacy in the British system would be impossible to achieve in the United States because of the different structure of government and so the next section will explore this factor.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

As any American student of government or political science knows, the United States has a presidential system of government with separation of powers whereas the United Kingdom has

a parliamentary system known as the Westminster system. In the American system, the powers of government are divided between three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. The head of the executive branch—the president—is normally elected in a process that is independent of the legislature. The executive and legislative branches may be controlled by the same or different political parties. The legislature consists of two houses, elected independently of each other, which may also be controlled by different political parties. The relationship between the president and the Congress is frequently contentious, even when they are both controlled by the same party. They are designed as co-equal branches of government with different powers and responsibilities. They are meant to keep each other in check and each is limited in its ability to exercise power without the cooperation of the other. Congress organizes itself into committees with jurisdiction over various issues, parts of government, and national activities and it uses these committees to oversee the executive branch, to investigate issues and problems, and to deliberate about and propose legislation.

The British institutions include the sovereign, Parliament, and the "government," which refers to the prime minister and other ministers who are selected from the members of Parliament to exercise the executive power of government. Parliament consists of the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and, technically, the sovereign. Ordinarily, the leader of whichever party controls the democratically-elected House of Commons is chosen to be prime minister. The prime minister then forms a government by appointing other members of Parliament to specific ministerial departments. Thus, in the British system, there is not a separation between the legislative and executive powers. The party that controls the legislature also exercises the executive functions and the leader of both is the prime minister.

It is common to depict the British government as flowing or emerging from the legislature, noting that the government holds power only so long as the legislature supports it. This is true, but it does not tell the whole story. In reality, as long as the government has a majority in the House of Commons, "it is in a more important sense master of the House. The Government drafts, introduces, and puts through all major bills, including the Budget" (Walker 1974, 43). Thus, rather than being pitted against the legislature contentiously as in the American system, the British executive exercises enormous control over the legislature. Further, committees in Parliament mainly serve the purpose of speeding up legislation, rather than investigating the government or developing new ideas for legislation. "No British Parliamentary committee has inquisitorial powers" (Walker 1974, 43).

Additionally, in the British system foreign affairs were traditionally seen as a Crown prerogative, one of the last practical governing powers held on to by British monarchs. Because of this, the government's authority in the area of foreign affairs is seen as legally coming from the Crown rather than Parliament (Ransom 1970, 194). In reality, of course, the government does account to Parliament through the prime minister for its conduct of foreign affairs, but not completely and not until fairly recently. This is why, for example, the British intelligence services could be created and exist for so long without a statutory basis.

It turns out that these constitutional differences have huge consequences for how intelligence functions and relates to government. In the British system, the executive has exclusive access to, and complete control over, intelligence products. Parliament has no access to them. When I asked David Omand about Parliament's access to intelligence reports, he looked at me with genuine surprise and said, "That's none of their business. They aren't part of the government" (interview with author, London, 17 September 2008). Pauline Neville-Jones, a

former chair of the JIC and current member of the House of Lords, also emphasized that intelligence information is not public, and therefore Parliament does not have access to it (telephone interview with author, London, 18 September 2008). This denial of Parliamentary access to government documents is not peculiar to intelligence, but is part of a general tradition of governments maintaining control of information (Ridley 1983).

Neville-Jones also pointed out that there is "no right of access for the opposition." She did speculate, though, that

> if the leader of the opposition were taking a trip somewhere—say Pakistan—he could ask the services for a briefing. They would probably give it to him, but they might not include everything … but it would probably be a pretty good briefing. It's understood that the government would prefer that even members of the opposition who are taking a trip like that do so with good information rather than bad. They should be informed and reflect well on the nation, because even if they are from the opposition, the locals will perceive them as representing the U.K. (telephone interview with author, London, 18 September 2008)

In the United States, the situation is completely different. Snider reports that "while the CIA had always shared intelligence analysis with the Congress, the scope and scale of such sharing reached new heights after the select intelligence committees came on the scene in the mid-1970s" (Snider 2008, 117). In fact, the Intelligence Organization Act of 1992 added a new legal responsibility for the intelligence community to provide national intelligence to the Congress, even though the community had already considered supporting Congress as part of its mission (Snider 2008, 69). Even in the 1950s, however, intelligence briefings and testimony from the DCI were provided to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, in addition to the small Appropriations and Armed Services subcommittees that oversaw the CIA (Barrett 2005). Today, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) receive almost all finished intelligence produced by the intelligence community for circulation in the executive branch (Snider 1997, 2008; Best 2006, and also interview with SSCI staff member, Washington, DC, 10 September 2008). Other committees and individual members can also get briefed on particular topics, although sources and methods are not disclosed (Ransom 1970, 162; Snider 1997, 2008). Gates reported in 1987 that in addition to most CIA assessments going to the two intelligence committees, "most go also to the appropriations, foreign relations and armed services committees. Eight congressional committees get the CIA's daily national intelligence report. In 1986, the CIA sent some 5,000 intelligence reports to Congress and gave many hundreds of briefings" (Gates 1987, 224).

It should be noted that giving Congress access to intelligence products means not just providing them to an institutional rival, but also to members of a rival party. Regardless of which party controls them at any given time, congressional committees are made up of members from both parties and information cannot be shared with one without sharing it with the other. This is very different from the British situation where there is almost no chance for members of the opposition to gain access to intelligence information. Even when governments change and a rival party takes over, the new government does not have access to its predecessor's papers, including intelligence reports. According to Omand, the incoming government must request entirely new intelligence assessments (interview with author, London, 17 September 2008). If the previous ones were recent and covered the same topics, then they are not likely to differ

much. Nevertheless, the principle is that the old ones are the private records of the previous government.

The only opposition members who have any access to intelligence products are those that sit on the Intelligence and Security Committee. This committee, which is not a committee of Parliament, is not like the oversight committees in the United States. It was created in 1994 and is composed of members of Parliament, but they are selected by the prime minister and are accountable to him. They also fall within the "ring of secrecy," which means they have access to government information, but are bound not to share it without permission. Although they produce an annual report, it is submitted to the prime minister, who then decides what information can be passed on to Parliament. The committee initially began serving as a sort of managerial and accounting overseer for the intelligence services, without access to any actual intelligence information. This is because the traditional theory of intelligence accountability is that "accountability must be to Ministers rather than to Parliament, and [Parliament] trusts Ministers to discharge that responsibility faithfully" (Andrew 1979, 185). Andrew observes that this argument is "no longer capable of inspiring public confidence." Over time, though, the committee has managed to widen its net and play a role in evaluating the effectiveness of the services, too. Nevertheless, its powers are very restricted and mostly subject to the government. In no way does it act as a competing center of power to the executive like the U.S. Congress and its committees do. In the last few years, since it has passed the ten-year mark, a number of scholars have begun to review its history and evaluate its performance (Glees et al. 2006; Gill 2007a; Phythian 2007a, 2007b).

In the United States, it is an entirely different story. Although congressional oversight of intelligence is criticized as being "far less effective than reformers had hoped" and for being

inconsistently attentive to its task (Johnson 2007b, 343; see also Nolan 2007), in comparison to British legislative oversight it is positively robust. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Congress has had standing committees dedicated to intelligence oversight (Johnson 1988). This relationship, unlike the Congress-as-customer relationship described above, is about accountability and control. Oversight involves evaluations of performance, appropriate use of funds, budgeting and resource allocation, compliance with laws and ethics (Johnson 1989, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Born et al. 2005; Nolan 2010). Oversight brings to the intelligence committees even more access to secret information (sources and methods) along with real and independent (of the executive branch) power in the form of funding control, the granting or denial of statutory authorities, and the possibility of holding embarrassing investigative hearings.

When he was negotiating with congressional leaders over proposed intelligence legislation in 2007, former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell reportedly said "I've spent 40 years of my life in this business, and I've been shot at during war … I've never felt so much pressure in my life" (Mazzetti 2007). Michael Hayden has also expressed an appreciation for the strength of political pressure on intelligence in the U.S. system. Based on his observation of the British process, he believes that producing an NIE in the United States is much more difficult than producing an assessment in the United Kingdom because the writers here are aware that partisan advantage will be taken if there is any erroneous or even non-erroneous element that does not have documented support (personal communication, 3 March 2011). This results in a tedious and extreme level of caution because intelligence employees are afraid of the wildly out-of-proportion consequences of anything in an NIE that could be exploited.

Robert Gates observed that "the CIA today finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly equidistant between the executive and legislative branches" (Gates 1987, 225). Both in terms of access to information and in terms of power, the U.S. Congress plays a remarkably different role in the life of the intelligence community than does the British parliament. American intelligence has two taskmasters where the British have only one. And Congress is just as capable of using its access and power to politicize intelligence as is the executive branch. During the start of what turned out to be the overthrow of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, testified to Congress that, under the current circumstances, the rebels would falter and Gadhafi would prevail. Clapper was immediately criticized by senators for "making the situation more difficult for those opposing Gadhafi" and at least one senator called for his resignation (Condon 2011). Of course, Clapper did what he is paid to do, offer his objective assessment of the situation without regard for a preferred policy. The senate made the error of taking their intelligence in public and then not liking what they heard. They then proceeded to use threats to try to elicit the "correct" intelligence, intelligence that would support everyone's preferred outcome.

The last difference of note is that, despite the current situation, the United Kingdom rarely has coalition governments. Before the current Conservative-Liberal government, the last coalition government was 70 years ago under Winston Churchill (1940-45), and that was during an existential threat (Lijphart 1999, 10-1). By definition, coalition governments include leaders with significantly different policy preferences. If their preferences were the same, they would not need to form separate parties; indeed, it would lower their effectiveness to do so. Having different preferences, each coalition partner has an incentive to get intelligence assessments that supports its preference. Being in the government, each has access to the intelligence assessments

and the assessment process, access that is not available to an opposition party. This means that neither partner can completely control the use and publication of that information. Despite the fact that they are coalition partners, they are still rivals and will seek advantage when they can find it. Typically, though, this situation does not arise in the United Kingdom and there is only one majority party with access to intelligence.

Together, the differences in political structure outlined above have a strong effect on incentives to politicize. Executive control of Parliament, the history of Crown prerogatives for foreign affairs, the Official Secrets Acts and DA-Notices, the complete control of intelligence information that the government has—even keeping it from Parliament—, and the extremely weak oversight committee, all contribute to reducing the incentive for politicization by increasing secrecy and the private nature of intelligence. Further, the legislature in the British system does not represent a second, rival task master of any sort for the intelligence community or the assessments machinery. Consequently, policymakers are free to work closely with their intelligence counterparts, confident that their assessments, even if unpleasant, will not be used as ammunition in a battle for national policy.

SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Another factor that is clearly different between the United States and the United Kingdom is size: the size of government and the size of the respective intelligence communities. In 1996, Johnson estimated that the CIA was five times the size of MI-6 (Johnson 1996, 122). That period, after the fall of the Soviet Union, probably saw declines in intelligence budgets. In October of 2001, just after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, *Time* magazine estimated the size of the U.S. intelligence community as 80,000 employees with a budget of $30 billion and the size of

the CIA as 17,000 employees with a budget of $3 billion. Those numbers have most likely changed in the ten years since, but probably not by an order of magnitude. According to the website for MI-6, the combined budget for all three British intelligence services in fiscal year 2010/2011 is about $3.6 billion (Secret Intelligence Service 2011).

In 1996, it was estimated that the JIC had a "small Assessments Staff (perhaps about twenty people)" (Herman 1996, 262). The number of attendees at the weekly JIC meeting varies, but there are perhaps twelve to fifteen primary members. The National Intelligence Council has had as many as eighteen members and currently has fifteen, in addition to the chairman and vice chairman (National Intelligence Council 2011). The size of the permanent staff working for the NIC is unknown, but the website does list a counselor, a chief of staff, a director of the Strategic Futures Group, and a Senior Advisor for Global Health Security. In addition to permanent staff, staff from the various intelligence agencies are routinely seconded to the NIC.

The obvious way in which size indirectly, but significantly, affects the incentive to politicize intelligence is that when a great many more people are involved, it is harder to keep secrets. The sheer size and distribution of the U.S. intelligence community implies that leaks—deliberate or otherwise—are going to occur. In the summer of 2010, the *Washington Post* estimated that the number of people with security clearances at the top-secret level was 854,000 (Priest and Arkin 2010). Of course, these include a great many people who do not work for the intelligence agencies. But whether an individual is an analyst, an intelligence consumer, or even just an IT worker who maintains classified systems, there is an additional possibility of information getting out. Even if only a small percentage of employees are careless, unscrupulous, or disgruntled, there are bound to be a greater absolute number of them in the

American system. With this reality come the reality of less secrecy and a greater expectation of publicized intelligence, which, as seen in the last section, eventually leads to greater worries about politicization.

Size may also have a more direct effect. Because of its smaller size, the British system is much more conducive to building personal relationship with most, if not all, of the government officials and experts interested in a given issue. Marrin and Davies both mentioned greater British collegiality, but neither mentioned the size of government in connection with this. Size may explain greater collegiality as well as culture or anything else.

While working on the NSC staff at an earlier point in his career, former ambassador Robert Blackwill arranged for his own, direct support from CIA analysts because he found the standard reports he was receiving to be irrelevant to his needs. "I would argue that at least in my experience close professional relationships encouraged frankness—not politicization" (Blackwill and Davis 2004, 123). In his comments about his experience he also emphasized mutual trust and an ability to keep secrets between himself and the analysts he worked closely with.

Certainly a smaller organization is more conducive to keeping secrets, but it may also be more conducive for building the trust that Blackwill experienced. It may also mean that policymakers and intelligence providers can say what they really think without fear of it being twisted or misused or without negative personal repercussions. And in such a small, familiar working group, there may be a natural social check on unprofessional politicization. "There is no doubt that a teamwork approach to drafting makes it less likely that a departmental representative who tries to tailor the evidence to suit his department's policy, or has a bee in his bonnet, will be allowed to get away with it" (Thomas 1987, 233). Because of the trust,

frankness, and personal service in the support relationships that Blackwill developed, these interactions may have been private enough to reduce the incentive for politicization.

To sum this chapter up, the reason that British intelligence providers and policymakers are closer to one another than are their American counterparts is that the greater secrecy of British government, the more unified political structure of British government, and the smaller size of British government all tend to lower the incentives for politicization to occur and therefore create an environment that is "safer" for intelligence providers and policymakers to be close. In the face of the greater incentives of the American system, intelligence and policy must maintain more distance in order to reduce the opportunity for politicization.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND CAUTIONS

In this dissertation I have shown that variations in the level of secrecy, political system, and size of government are all reasonable explanations for the difference between the intelligence-policymaking relationship in the United Kingdom and the United States. This difference, widely acknowledged in the intelligence studies literature and manifest most clearly in the existence of the British Joint Intelligence Committee and the lack of a similar American arrangement, is puzzling because of their intense cooperation, shared history, shared goals and tasks, and otherwise similar methods. Although two other researchers have addressed this issue, their explanations for the national variation in intelligence-producer–policymaker relations are mainly based on the idea of cultural differences. I found this basis to be less persuasive and instead suggest that the variation is explained by the different levels of government secrecy, the different political systems, and the difference in organization size.

In part, my interest in this started with the comment of the former British prime minister, Gordon Brown, who said he wanted to have more parliamentary oversight and less politicization. To me, greater involvement of parliament in overseeing intelligence seemed likely to contribute to *more* politicization, not less, everything else being equal. I only became more convinced of this as my research progressed. As I said in the introduction, this is not an argument against legislative oversight of intelligence, but it is a warning against making institutional changes without considering all of the possible side effects. Legislative oversight has obvious benefits, but it has costs, too. One of those costs may be to increase the incentives for politicization. The

solution, then, is to not keep "everything else equal," but to simultaneously change other features of the system in order to compensate for the effect of greater parliamentary access to intelligence. One possibility is to introduce greater distance between policymakers and intelligence producers, as in the American system. This does not necessarily mean greater physical distance. It could mean greater formality or more rules and regulations in the assessment process to lessen the opportunities for skewing assessments.

Recently, both the United States and the United Kingdom have made or considered changes that may affect the policymaker-intelligence relationship. Some of these changes affect the level of secrecy and some affect the political system. Any or all of these changes could unintentionally change the incentive structure for the politicization of intelligence. If that should happen, institutional designers and governments would be wise to anticipate such changes with additional adjustments to guard against consequent problems. What follows is a sketch of some of the relevant changes or potential changes.

There is reason to think that the public use of intelligence might increase in both the United States and the United Kingdom. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the Iraqi WMD incident was the first time that British intelligence had ever been publicly cited in support of a government policy. Although the experience was sufficiently negative to induce some fear of ever doing it again, some observers think greater public use of intelligence is a secular trend. Wesley Wark suggests we may be entering an age of "public intelligence" (Wark 2003). In the summer of 2008, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued *Vision 2015*, which laid out a vision for American intelligence over the next few years. "We also anticipate a growing public demand for intelligence. Most intelligence work will remain classified and limited in distribution to ensure it produces the desired decision advantage for our U.S.

government clients. However, the Intelligence Community must adapt to the growing requirement for its analysis to inform the American public" (Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008). Robert Jervis has also noted that "leaders at least in the US and UK now need to justify their foreign policies as being based on the findings of intelligence professionals" (Jervis 2006, 37).

As mentioned in chapter three, Paul Pillar has advocated that the intelligence community provide more direct service to the American public and the Congress. Robert Gates also said that when he testified before Congress as the Director of Central Intelligence. He said he testified often "in the belief that it is important for the American people to be as well informed on key issues as they can be" (Gates 1992b). Finally, Peter Gill has offered a sobering analysis of the current strategic environment and its implications for public use of intelligence that expands on the idea mentioned by Jervis.

> Intelligence has always been central to states' efforts to protect themselves, but the new doctrine embraced by the administrations of both U.S. president George W. Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair gave it a new, and, crucially, heightened public significance. Governments of states finding themselves under military attack from outside do not need intelligence to tell them, and their publics would not need persuasion, that defense is required. However, if states are to preempt those who are perceived to threaten them, then intelligence is much more crucial. First, it is central to the process by which the seriousness of the threat is assessed, and second, it will have to provide the basis for some process of convincing skeptical publics that preemptive war is required. In the case of the Iraq invasion, these new circumstances have led in the United Kingdom to

hitherto unheard levels of exposure of intelligence and policymaking processes. (Gill 2007b, 96)

Despite the fact that neither Bush nor Blair holds office any longer, these realities may be here to stay. Whether it is action against states that sponsor terrorism or against the terrorists themselves, public intelligence support may be politically required in order to take some necessary actions.

The general secrecy regime in the United Kingdom is also changing, not just the use of intelligence. Restrictions on the press seem to have lessened in the past couple of decades, freedom of information laws have been passed, and government records are released on regular schedules in the national archives. Over the past thirty years, there have been enormous changes for the intelligence services, including their official acknowledgement and establishment on a statutory basis. They even have websites now; the MI-6 website features a photo of the current director, John Sawyers.

In general, of course, more information for the public and greater transparency of government are admirable goals and certainly well-intentioned, but is the intelligence community ready for the powerful winds of political pressure that will buffet it from all side if its analysis is regularly made public? Will the president, the Congress, and the intelligence community itself be able to draw and hold the line when needed? Or will the pressure be like water breaking through cracks in a dam, constantly making them larger and larger until the structure collapses?

In the United Kingdom, constitutional changes have been made and continue to be considered. Hereditary seats in the House of Lords have been reduced (to 92 seats in 1999) and in 2009 an independent supreme court was created. The United Kingdom has a coalition government for the first time since 1945. Whether this is just a fluke or it represents a trend

cannot yet be determined. But in May 2011, voters defeated a referendum effort that would have changed the voting system to a proportional one. If the United Kingdom were to adopt this, coalition governments would probably become much more common. The measure was defeated by more than 2 to 1 with heavy turnout. Nevertheless, it was significant that it was even brought to a vote: it was the first time citizens nationwide had ever voted on a domestic legislative matter that did not involve the European Union. The government also established in 2011 a National Security Council and a Prime Minister's National Security Advisor to bring together in a weekly meeting all of the departments having to do with national security.

For intelligence, though, the most significant change in the United Kingdom is the growing role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) made up of members of Parliament. As this committee takes on a greater role with more access and more power, and as Parliament increases its expectations of accountability, the experience of the British intelligence community will come to resemble that of the American community more, with all of the benefits of oversight. If the theoretical proposals in this dissertation are correct, these developments will also bring new incentives to politicize the intelligence-provider–policymaker relationship.

In 2008 I interviewed Pauline Neville-Jones, a member of the House of Lords and former chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, when she was the Shadow Security Minister in the Conservative Party opposition. She was very much in favor of beefing up the ISC. Her view was that it should become a parliamentary committee chaired by a member of the opposition, which is the arrangement traditionally used for the Public Accounts Committee (telephone interview with author, London, 18 September 2008). Of course, this sort of arrangement always appears more attractive to the opposition (Neville-Jones would have become the chair had this plan been implemented then). Since the Conservative-Liberal government came to power, the

committee's status has not changed. Nevertheless, there is an expectation among British academics and other intelligence-watchers that the committee will continue to develop into a more powerful oversight body with greater access to British intelligence. If the current arrangement of accountability only to ministers really is "no longer capable of inspiring public confidence" (Andrew 1979, 185), then there is bound to be public pressure to eventually change it.

Another slow change in the United Kingdom that plays into this has been the increase (perhaps stabilized, for now) in the use of "special" or "political" advisors (Eichbaum and Shaw 2008). Special advisors are essentially political appointees who work for ministers along with the traditional civil servants. Special advisors are not subject to civil service rules regarding political advocacy and activity and are seen by some as a threat to the civil service. In a study of a similar phenomenon, Delmer Dunn (1997) shows that as the government in Australia's cabinet system has taken more direct control of what were civil-service responsibilities at the top level of the bureaucracies, the parliament has responded by demanding more of an oversight role. This has created more complicated accountability lines for the bureaucrats, made the bureaucracy a greater object of political contestation, and empowered minority-party members of the parliament who were shut out of the government, but do find access to information and power through parliamentary committees. If this phenomenon develops further in the United Kingdom, it could have a similar effect on intelligence, again increasing the incentives for politicization.

There are definite advantages to all of these changes, both in terms of increasing the effectiveness of government (and intelligence) and in making all of government accountable within a democratic system. Nevertheless, some of these changes appear to move the United Kingdom towards an American-style system. With this may come American-style problems. If

the intelligence-provider–policymaker relationship is less protected by secrecy and unity of governmental control, then intelligence may become something worth contending over. An increase in the incentives to politicize may require the governments to rethink the traditionally close relationship between intelligence and policymaking.

Although the nature of the dynamics of the intelligence-policymaker relationship is unproven, the theories offered are worthy of attention because they are plausible and have different and important implications for those who would design or alter government institutions. Further research should be done to try to determine the actual distribution of explanatory power between cultural and structural factors. This research will probably involve the study of additional systems, starting with the other closely-related Anglophone nations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but also including other developed nations in Europe and Asia. Besides the usual problems with doing research on intelligence, obstacles will include language, culture, and the difficulty of finding sufficient variation on some of the structural variables. Once the theoretical ideas are available in the intelligence literature, though, I suspect that interested researchers will come up with creative ways to divide up and accomplish the necessary empirical work, including efforts to falsify the theories. The proposals made in this dissertation can be falsified by showing that the fear of politicization is lower and the relationship between intelligence and policy is closer in nations where there is less secrecy, or government power over intelligence is less concentrated, or where the size of government is larger, everything else being equal.

Another line of research would be to more closely examine the founding era of the U.S. intelligence community. American intelligence appears to have started out more like the British model—consciously, to a great degree—but at some point diverged. It is possible that American

intelligence and policy were close together by design at the beginning, but quickly distanced themselves as they experienced the reality of different and stronger pressures than their British counterparts. Collaboration with an interested historian would greatly improve the prospects for a project such as this.

Choices about the design of government systems, like the choices about policies that those systems are meant to develop and execute, are made with imperfect knowledge and a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, choices have to be made. If uncertainty must exist, then it should be minimized as much as possible. Beyond that, designers should at least have full information about the possible effects their choices may have under different theories of the institutional dynamics involved. The goal here is to avoid unexpected (unintended) negative consequences. A choice that is made with full knowledge of the negative consequences or costs is better than a choice made in ignorance which leads to an unpleasant surprise. Most choices have costs and benefits, but these cannot be carefully weighed if the costs are not known. With awareness and proper planning, other adjustments can be made to accommodate the costs or negative consequences.

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