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Abstract
Intraparty faction membership in the House has grown tremendously since the mid-1990s. Factions cultivate distinct political brands to appeal to niche sets of partisans, but the pursuit of ideological differentiation through the roll call record places faction members on a collision course with party leadership. While the pervasiveness and organizational strength of modern factions suggest that they might successfully challenge leadership for policymaking influence, evidence pointing to their legislative effectiveness through the traditional bill-to-law format is limited. If faction members are no more legislatively effective than non-faction members, why do lawmakers increasingly affiliate with these organizations? This research explores various non-traditional means of policy influence. Specifically, I examine the procedural advantage held by nine intraparty factions, across both parties and ideological strengths, in the House from 1995 to 2018 using data on suspension of the rules, structured rules amendments, and legislative hitchhikers.