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Abstract
States are often referred to as laboratories of experimentation. The manner in which state supreme court judges are selected is a prime example of this. Throughout the history of the United States, states have utilized a variety of methods to staff state courts of last resort. The selection of state supreme court justices has been and continues to be the subject of much controversy. Debates over what methods should be utilized to select state high court judges and the consequences of these selection schemes are prevalent. However, only partially explored are the reasons specific selection systems are chosen in the first place. This dissertation uses diffusion theory to explain the spread of judicial selection procedures. A unified model of diffusion incorporating internal and external influences is constructed to explain the spread of judicial selection systems across states over time. The three specific selection procedures analyzed in this analysis are partisan judicial elections, nonpartisan judicial elections, and the merit plan. Using data from 1832 through 2014, a series of Cox proportional hazard modes are estimated to explain the factors that influence the adoption of each of these selection systems. The results indicate that both internal and external factors influence judicial selection procedures. The variables measuring conditions internal to a state do not perform consistently across the three selection procedures analyzed. This suggests that decisions to adopt specific judicial selection procedures are not influenced by the same internal factors. Strikingly, the variable measuring the influence of neighboring states is a significant predictor across all three judicial selection procedures analyzed. Ultimately, this dissertation provides results on a rarely studied aspect of judicial selection. Additionally, this analysis provides strong support for the inclusion of external variables when measuring the spread of judicial selection procedures.