Files
Abstract
When discussing how it is that we persist through time, most philosophers have, at best, an incidental place for things like moral character traits; if these traits have any part to play in determining whether one of us persists at all, it is as just one among a whole host of mental features. However, there is a tension between the sparse constitutive role of the moral and the fact that moral concerns are nonetheless regularly invoked both as motivating factors in formulating persistence theories and as practical implications that result from those theories. In other words, persistence thinkers find themselves in a strange position whereby the moral is inextricably connected to the project of persistence but is not a part of the actual metaphysics of persisting. In this dissertation, I investigate if and how a moral persistence condition might be possible. Based on empirical evidence that non-philosophers tend to intuitively prioritize moral features in determining when one of us persists, I argue that a necessary moral persistence condition is plausible. I then propose a novel ontological foundation that could support a moral persistence condition and posit a modification of Parfits Narrow Psychological View of persistence that takes continuity of moral features as a necessary condition for persistence.