

COMPOSING A DIONYSIAN MACHINE:
THE LOGIC OF RESONANCE IN POST-QUALITATIVE INQUIRY

by

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(Under the Direction of Elli Lester Roushanzamir)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation process is a Dionysian machine opening space for the yet to come through a logic of resonance. It aims to highlight the potential in resonance, sound, and music to create more open meanings than those found in language's conventional binary logic. Focusing on resonance as something real and abstract that is useful for the questioning of systems of thought led to a method of new empirical paradoxical composition that calls for a post-representational conversion functioning before any determined ontology. Therefore, this document is a multi-layered narrative, or composition, constructed to incite a creative activity of thought through a logic of resonance, rather than provide specific findings within an established regime of truth. Conventional humanist qualitative inquiry and its confining standards of validity are brought into question and playfully ruptured, replacing judgment that relies on a logic of specialization with a valorization of creativity and wonder. This machine works to make room for art and philosophy in the discipline of mass communication. A proposal for an ontogenetic communication, that breaks from the binary sender-receiver model and uses the constitutive potential of an aesthetic and musical approach, is composed. Also, a design for a Dionysian instrument is presented, and a story about a black bag floating in the waves.

INDEX WORDS: Affirmation, Immanence, Mass Communication, Music, Narrative, New
Empiricism, Nomadic Composition, Paradox, Pataphysics, Post-
representation, Post-qualitative, Process Philosophy, Resonance

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In an attempt to obtain a doctorate in the discipline of mass communication, the following dissertation was composed under specific guidelines of the presiding institution. Few limitations held, however, this document's position as a dissertation written for a specific credential enters it into a particular power relation worth noting in a traditional beginning.

One of the immediately visible differences from other dissertations is found in the extravagant use of block quotations. My hope is that a new rhythm and logic emerges with the reordering of meanings and breaking of contexts. Instead of providing concrete information within a specific system of knowledge, the aim is to compose a paradoxical piece that resonates intensely, inciting creativity and thought more than proving a specific point to be true. Instead of using the logic of mutual exclusion that comes with the contradictions of information and truth, this composition uses a logic of resonance that mutually includes; a logic of the And zoomed out from the either/or. While language inherently involves the double-sided in opposition, the logic of the binary always has more room for play than realized.

This dissertation explores music, noise, and resonance as more open forms of communication that break from the enlightenment humanist model that assumes a sender and a receiver. It calls for the concept of communication to be decentered and opened up to a new frame functioning in a space before any determined subject. The concept of resonance applied to language and communication calls for something less concerned with communicating specific meanings and information, and more concerned with inciting an activity of thought and lines of

flight. The argument is for a logic that makes space for wonder and the yet to come. Decentering language's dominant binary logic and piecing it back together more resonantly, where new understandings can emerge differently. Communicating with a new logic that is always already echoing back. The inevitable return of what never was.

This composition could also be understood as a narrative. While not starting in the traditional humanist space that assumes the Cartesian subject, the cogito, this narrative has no specific storyteller or narrator. This narrative starts somewhere and nowhere. Zoomed out, not as a satellite floating in space looking down at Earth, but zoomed out from the concrete subject/object that is being constituted through the binary logic of language. Zoomed out before anything comes together. This narrative is always becoming rather than a retrospective processing of information, or reflection of a memory. A narrative of the bare experience of the event, the resonance of becoming experience. Massumi (2011/2013) explained:

It's artificial to talk about this only in relation to single things. Every thing appears in a situation, along with others. The situation itself is a life-drop. A bigger drop, with its own ripples of potential that overlap with those of its constituent things but can also diverge from them, subtract them from itself or alloy them in other configurations. Every appearance is at the crossroads of life. At the limit, what appears isn't just a drop or a pool, but a whole ocean, with calm stretches and turbulence, ripples that cancel each other out and others that combine and amplify, with crests and troughs, killer surf-breaks and gentle lappings at the shores of other situations. For James, the fact that experiences comes in drops doesn't mean it can't also come with "oceanic" feeling. (p. 52)

This is a narrative of the ocean and the drop.

This narrative does not progress linearly, the conceptual personae, and other concepts that it connects and creates, emerge through a becoming that always already resonates differently. However, this narrative does tell a story. Always a different story. Deleuze (1969/1990) described this form of narrative:

This new image is already closely linked to the paradoxical constitution of the theory of sense. Thus to each series there correspond figures which are not only historical but topological and logical as well. As on a pure surface, certain points of one figure in a series refer to the points of another figure: an entire galaxy of problems with their corresponding dice throws, stories, and places, a complex place; a “convoluted story.”

This book is an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel. (p. xiv)

This composition might be more effectively listened to, rather than understood. Dr. St. Pierre always encourages her students to keep reading when a text feels too difficult to understand. Let the rhythm of the text wash over you. The reader immersed with an oceanic feeling, but only a drop of experience.

This process is a Dionysian machine. Let it work without predicting results. Breaking from common sense valuations of right and wrong, a different, simultaneously conjunctive and disjunctive, logic involving resonance and paradox is employed to make space for things yet to come, wonder over certainty. Deleuze (1969/1990) described this difference, “Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (*sens*); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time.” (pg. 1)

This work plays on the limit of language.

In the first chapter, the conventional standards of validity for academic research are brought into question, and a call for new logics, and their resulting methods that allow for a more

open and experimental space for inquiry, are explored. Inciting activity of thought through a logic of resonance becomes a new standard of validity that is not only for friends of wisdom from friends of wisdom, but also creates friends of wisdom. It is an argument for a more creative approach to mass communication research.

In the second chapter, an attempt to describe post-qualitative inquiry as a new space for thought and creativity is presented, again using a logic of resonance to connect existing theories and inject them with a new order and context. A call for a subjectless subject is presented, and a method of new empirical paradoxical composition is introduced.

In the third chapter, the design for a Dionysian machine is proposed, and the importance of interactivity is balanced against the dangers of instrumentality. A Dionysian machine is related to a Dionysian instrument, and a focus on process emerges. The machine's solvency is discussed.

In the fourth chapter, a new ontogenetic communication is proposed to help make space for wonder and the yet to come. The theory of the Sign and the image and their relation to the logic of resonance leads into a call for a resonant nervous system and the transmutation of the self through a conversion of science and technology through aesthetics.

Finally, a short narrative about a black bag in the waves.

Resonating with Nietzsche's (1872/2003) thoughts on his first book:

[T]he book in which my youthful courage and suspicion were then given vent—what an *impossible* book had to grow out of a task so unfavourable to youth! Constructed solely from precocious, excessively personal experiences, all close to the boundaries of communication, and presented within the context of *art*—given that the problem of science cannot be recognized within the context of science—a book, perhaps, for artists

who also enjoy analytic and retrospective abilities (an exceptional kind of artist, then, who is not easy to find, but whom one has no great wish to find...), full of psychological innovations and artists' secrets' against the background of an artist's metaphysics; a youthful work full of youthful courage and youthful melancholy, independent defiantly self-reliant even where it seems to yield to authority and respect of its own, in short, a 'first book', even in the worst senses of the term, racked with every youthful defect for all its old man's problems, terribly protracted and excitably portentous... (p. 4-5)

CHAPTER 2

WRITING FRIENDS OF WISDOM

Introduction

My friends, if you come seeking an answer to a well-understood problem, luckily you have not yet come too far, but if you proceed, you may find yourself further from the depths you pursue. Simultaneously, deep and superficial, always in the middle of things.

If you come desiring a push forward, extra fuel to hasten your arrival at the conclusion, save your time as the end lies in the beginning. My friends, if this infinite ride around the Möbius strip impels nausea and disoriented thought we are here for you, or we are not.

My friends, who see the difference in the same, wander in the midst of a foggy arcade while the others are quick to clear the air and lay their foundations. In the three hundred and eighty first aphorism of *The Gay Science*, using his dynamic and oppositional style, Nietzsche (1887/1974) addressed this distinction between writing difference in the relatable and excluding the exclusionary:

On the question of being understandable.—One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely *not* to be understood. It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention—he did not want to be understood by just “anybody.” All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against “the others.” All the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time

keep away, create a distance, forbid “entrance,” understanding, as said above—while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours.

And let me say this among ourselves and about my own case: I don’t want either my ignorance or the liveliness of my temperament to keep me from being understandable for *you*, my friends—not the liveliness, however much it compels me to tackle a matter swiftly to tackle it all. For I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and quickly out again. That one does not get to the depths that way, not deep enough down, is the superstition of those afraid of the water, the enemies of cold water; they speak without experience. The freezing cold makes one swift. (p. 343-344)

The current academic practice of writing for a specific audience is informed by a logic of specialization that divides and compartmentalizes knowledge, Foucault (1975/1995) discussed some of the implications to this shift in education:

The organization of serial space was one of the great technical mutations of elementary education. It made it possible to supersede the traditional system (a pupil working for a few minutes with the master, while the rest of the heterogeneous group remained idle and unattended). By assigning individual places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the simultaneous work of all. It organized a new economy of the time of apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchizing, rewarding. (p. 147)

Writing friends of wisdom disrupts this exclusionary and disciplinary practice. It brings the inevitable exclusion of the other, that is rooted in language’s concrete binaries, into question by creating a more fluid distinction, friends of wisdom, which works to only exclude the exclusionary.

The relation between disciplinary logic and inquiry is a confining one. The way inquiry is practiced in academia is becoming increasingly over specified as traditional methods are being taken up and taught as valid, encouraging replicability. These static research methods are obsessed with an order rooted in standards of predictability and control. They are methods for ordering experience into a tidy confined grid of intelligibility. Instead of making space for something surprising that has yet to come, it works to keep the new and unpredictable out. When we talk about the genius of science in helping humanity reach the goal of understanding the universe it is as if we forgot that we invented it. Nietzsche (1887/1974) argued:

[D]oes a matter necessarily remain understood and unfathomed merely because it has been touched only in flight, glanced at, in a flash? Is it absolutely imperative that one settles down on it? That one has brooded over it as over an egg? *Diu noctuque incubando*, as Newton said of himself? At least there are truths that are singularly shy and ticklish and cannot be caught except suddenly—that must be *surprised* or left alone. (p. 344-345)

My friends, let us not be confined by the conventional standards of validity found in academic writing today. What use is this centered burden of proof in the activity of creation? Let us forget about diving deep to uncover the missing truths in a specific discipline. These gaps in knowledge are no different from footsteps left in the sand along the shore, quickly filled and flattened then repeated differently. The depths are not static.

The Law of Entropy (or The Second Law of Thermodynamics) states that the state of entropy of the entire universe, as an isolated system, will always increase over time. The second law also states that the changes in the entropy in the universe can never be negative.¹ To ignore or attempt to negate active disorder and wonder in thought and to only actively work to solidify

understanding by filling gaps in some knowable foundation of a specified discipline requires a positivist logic, it requires a faith in something static and concrete that can be progressively discovered by humans as rational logical individuals. It is useful in any discipline (and life) to continually engage disorder through an ontological level of thinking and expression that philosophy and art can incite more intensely and openly (but still more abstractly) than the social sciences.

Nietzsche (1887/1974) explained this predicament:

So much regarding brevity. Matters stand worse with my ignorance which I do not try to conceal from myself. There are hours when I feel ashamed of it—to be sure, also hours when I feel ashamed of feeling ashamed. Perhaps all of us philosophers are in a bad position nowadays regarding knowledge: science keeps growing, and the most scholarly among us are close to discovering that they know too little. But it would be still worse if it were different—and we knew *too much*; our task is and remains above all not to mistake ourselves for others. We *are* something different from scholars, although it is unavoidable for us to be also, among other things, scholarly. We have different needs, grow differently, and also have a different digestion: we need more, we also need less. How much a spirit needs for its nourishment, for this there is no formula; but if its taste is for independence, for quick coming and going, for roaming, perhaps for adventures for which only the swiftest are a match, it is better for such a spirit to live in freedom with little to eat than unfree and stuffed. It is not fat but the greatest possible suppleness and strength that a good dancer desires from his nourishment—and I would not know what the spirit of a philosopher might wish more to be than a good dancer. For the dance is his ideal, also his art, and finally also his only piety, his “service of God.” (p. 345-346)

The other, in opposition to the friend, is who we must not mistake ourselves for (the excluded exclusionary). Part of this is to say, we not only meet friends, we make them too. Excluding the exclusionary makes room for affirmation. Instead of finding ourselves in the periphery as the other, us free spirits move together (and apart) affirmatively. Deleuze (1964/2000) explained:

In the “philosopher” there is the “friend.” It is important that Proust offers the same critique of philosophy as of friendship. Friends are, in relation to one another, like minds of goodwill who are in agreement as to the signification of things and words; they communicate under the effect of a mutual goodwill. Philosophy is like the expression of a Universal Mind that is in agreement with itself in order to determine explicit and communicable significations. Proust’s critique touches the essential point: truths remain arbitrary and abstract so long as they are based on the goodwill of thinking. Only the conventional is explicit. This is because philosophy, like friendship, is ignorant of the dark regions in which are elaborated the effective forces that act on thought, the determinations that *force* us to think; a friend is not enough for us to approach the truth. Minds communicate to each other only the conventional; the mind engenders only the possible. The truths of philosophy are lacking in necessity and the mark of necessity. As a matter of fact, the truth is not revealed, it is betrayed; it is not communicated, it is interpreted; it is not willed, it is involuntary. (p. 94-95)

The sender-receiver model of communication is limited to the possible. A more expansive concept of communication is necessary to zoom out from this humanist starting point and to make room for wonder and the yet to come. The friend and the other are part of a tragic drama, two conceptual personae² eternally playing their part in relation to one another. But we

are not stuck to any of these conceptual personae, the subject is always becoming. My friends, we are not limited to the distinction of scholar, we are free spirits, quick to continue our wandering, nomads dancing to a different rhythm. We are in no hurry, but let us keep moving, for inevitably this drama will return to our thoughts again. In the six hundred and thirty-eighth aphorism of *Human, All Too Human* Nietzsche (1878/1996) described this conceptual persona of the wanderer:

The wanderer. He who has come only in part to a freedom of reason cannot feel on earth otherwise than as a wanderer—though not as a traveler *towards* a final goal, for this does not exist. But he does want to observe, and keep his eyes open for everything that actually occurs in the world; therefore he must not attach his heart too firmly to any individual thing; there must be something wandering within him, which takes its joy in change and transitoriness. (p. 266)

Friends of wisdom, this dissertation is written for us. It is writing as a friend of wisdom to friends of wisdom, and simultaneously an activity constituting friends of wisdom. Writing for no audience in particular, but writing for those yet to come. Writing space for the inevitable return of what never was.

My friends, those who delight in questions more than answers, those who see contradiction³ not exclusively as an invalid standard for thought, but also as a useful tool for inciting an activity of thought and lines of flight. My friends who judge not as specialists working efficiently to fill the gaps of their discipline, but as rivals motivating critique and experimentation as motors toward something unexpected, something surprising. The change will not come gradually; it emerges subtly. The conclusions emerging through a philosophy of immanence are always already true, but never found. Friends of wisdom, we wander not to meet

a final goal, but to think and to play. We observe, not to reflect upon and then represent an exterior occurrence, but to listen for the difference in the repetition. As Salvador Dali (1948/1992) argued, “[t]he true painter must be able, with the most usual things to have the most unusual ideas.” (p. 120) The same is true for friends of wisdom. We seek difference in the repetitive, the strange inevitable in the normal.

In Nietzsche’s (1878/1996) *Human, All Too Human* the poem Among Friends: An Epilogue reads:

1

Fine, with one another silent,
 Finer, with one another laughing—
 Under heaven’s silky cloth
 Leaning over books and moss
 With friends lightly, loudly laughing
 Each one showing white teeth shining.

If I did well, let us be silent,
 If I did badly, let us laugh
 And do it bad again by half,
 More badly done, more badly laugh,
 Until the grave, when down we climb.

Friends! Well! What do you Say?

Amen! Until we meet again!

2

Don't excuse it! Don't forgive!
 You happy, heart-free people, give
 This unreasonable book of mine
 Ear and heart and sheltering!
 Truly, friends, my own unreason
 Did not grow to earn a curse!

What *I* find, what *I* am seeking—
 Was that ever in a book?
 Honor one from the fools' legion!
 Learn from out of this fool's book
 How reason can be brought-- "to reason"!

So then, friends, what do you say?
 Amen! Until we meet again. (p. 268)

Friends of Wisdom and Wonder

Wisdom is not something we possess, but a mutual desire that motivates us. Writing friends of wisdom is an opening activity interested in pure difference over the confines of conventional binary logic. It is a practice that uses a logic of resonance to bring the disciplinary logic of specialization into question. It is a practice that zooms out with a logic of mutual inclusion, addressing and even encapsulating the logic of mutual exclusion found in the concrete meanings of positivism. Specific applications to neoliberalism in the educational system in

America, and more specifically the social sciences, are explored, but a larger question of subjectivity is also included in this inquiry.

Again, let's not get bogged down in matters of judgment and policing, for you are my friends, and it is inevitable with such a critical bunch that we will repeatedly return to these questions of validity and discipline. But we will not let our desire for wisdom be stymied by this mad rush to concretely distinguish truth from falsehood. Instead of decreeing how things are stuck, we listen for what is different, and silently we wonder how the next can come. Derrida (1994) explained, "The same question had already *sounded*. The same, to be sure, but in an altogether different way. And the difference in the sound, that is what is echoing this evening." (p. 15)

Instead of focusing on the author's intent in a text, let us focus on new concepts and ideas. The authors are conceptual personae as well, always changing in relation to the others. They are all tied up in a fluid network of relations, an image of thought. As friends of wisdom, let us make them groan, let us act as rivals of thought pushing each other to the dangerous limit of understanding, finding new relations between concepts using our mutual desire for new questions, new answers, new thoughts, *wonder*. Let us reorganize systems of thought, looking for the difference in the fragments, the relations of the wholly fragmentary multiplicity. When Deleuze (2004) discussed Axelos's Planetarism in relation to Jarry's Pataphysics⁴ he argued:

find the *fragment* represented by each object in such a way that thought makes up the always open sum (and subtraction) of all the other fragments subsisting as such. Axelos opens an irreducible dialogue between the fragment and the whole. No other totality than that of Dionysos, but Dionysos dismembered. In this new pluralism, the One can be said only of the multiple and must be said of the multiple; Being is said only of becoming and

time; Necessity, only of chance; and the Whole, only of fragments... “being in the process of becoming the fragmentary and fragmented totality.” (p. 75-76)

Rajchman (1991), quoting Deleuze, further described this multiplicity:

A “virtual multiplicity” is a disparate set of things of which we cannot yet have have concept; and its “actualization” therefore involves the invention of something which, by the lights of our concepts, is impossible. “These lines of differentiation are therefore truly creative; they actualize by inventing.” An event for Deleuze is not a history or a drama with beginning and end; it is creative or inventive actualization of a virtual multiplicity. (p. 160)

Is this not a prescribed method? Is this not a statement declaring a correct path, a means to an end? Yes and no (Yein). For friends of wisdom, this is a springboard (motivator, inciter, lightning rod) for an activity of thought, for the judge, it is a nonsensical and useless method only capable of destabilizing the regime of truth that they require to discipline and punish effectively. Rajchman (2000) explained Deleuze’s conception of philosophy in relation to the conventional standards of validity, “To learn, to impart philosophy was then to be brought to have this experience, to engage in this experimentation, for which there exists no method, no doctrine, no School, only a kind of ‘friendship.’” (p. 27-28)

These new standards of validity are no longer caught up in representation. Instead of attempting to correspond with and truthfully represent another’s voice, a different form of inquiry, that zooms out from this determined humanist frame, brings the system of thought that prescribes standards of validity and other limits of inquiry into question. Lather (1993) explained, “It is not a matter of looking harder or more closely, but of seeing what frames our seeing— spaces of constructed visibility and incitements to see which constitute

power/knowledge... Such post-epistemic concerns reframe validity as multiple, partial, endlessly deferred.” (p. 675) Lather (1993) continued through Derrida and Rajchman:

My strategy has been to move from what Derrida refers to as “ ‘a novelty of the same’ “ which invents” ‘the possible from the possible’ “ to “an architecture of ‘the impossible’, the ‘altogether-other’ of our invention, the surprise of what is not yet possible in the histories of the spaces in which we find ourselves” (Rajchman 1991, p. 162-163). (p. 687)

Friends of Wisdom and Academic Writing

This strategic analysis uses a new skepticism, a logic of pure difference, to make space for new experimental practices that value wonder over predictability, activity over efficiency. Not a dialectical logic of binary oppositions rooted in the the conventional enlightenment humanist subject, but a logic of mutual inclusion that connects through heterogeneity, that zooms out and blurs distinctions, that makes abstract. A logic that transmutes the real through a philosophy of immanence. Nietzsche (1910) addressed this preference for activity without the confines of efficiency:

This book is intended for calm readers,—for men who have not yet been drawn into the mad headlong rush of our hurry-skurrying age, and who do not experience any idolatrous delight in throwing themselves beneath its chariot-wheels. It is for men, therefore, who are not accustomed to estimate the value of everything according to the amount of time it either saves or wastes. In short, it is for the few. These, we believe, "still have time."

Without any qualms of conscience they may improve the most fruitful and vigorous hours of their day in meditating on the future of our education; they may even believe when the evening has come that they have used their day in the most dignified and useful way, namely, in the meditatio generis futuri. (Preface, 2nd ¶)

Nietzsche (1910) continued:

Should any reader demur and suggest that all that is required is prompt and bold reform; should he imagine that a new "organisation" introduced by the State, were all that is necessary, then we fear he would have misunderstood not only the author but the very nature of the problem under consideration. (Preface, 2nd ¶)

While many blame governmental bodies and understand social movements to cause an effective change that moves us closer to liberty and justice, it is friends of wisdom that listen for things to emerge differently, nomads interested in the yet to come. Nietzsche (1910) continued:

Let it suffice that they are our institutions, that they have not become a part of ourselves by mere accident, and were not laid upon us like a garment; but that they are living monuments of important steps in the progress of civilisation, in some respects even the furniture of a bygone age, and as such link us with the past of our people, and are such a sacred and venerable legacy that I can only undertake to speak of the future of our educational institutions in the sense of their being a most probable approximation to the ideal spirit which gave them birth. (Introduction, 1st ¶)

The origin and the predictable future of our educational institutions is established in the event. Its past, present, and future are all constituted simultaneously. What has been, what is, and what will be is determined at once. Rajchman (1991) used Foucault's concept of the actual to address this form of invention:

Foucault would be asking how to "inhabit" those moments of "actuality" in which we are becoming something else than what our history has constructed us to be, those heterotopic moments of our current historical "impossibility," the moments of invention.

In sum: we always become something other than who we are in the space we construct for ourselves to inhabit. It is the event of this *devenir-autre* that lets us see what is “uninhabitable” in those constructions, and so exposes them to our invention. And yet it does so without projecting a new order, or providing a new program of living. The necessity that compels us to interrupt our historical ways of habitation and to invent others is not a programmatic one. It is the point of disengagement from what we take for granted [that] is required for us to be together in a proper time and place: *le point de folie*. It is from such points of folly that we may analyze the genealogy of the places assigned to our own self-constructions in those ways of inhabiting things we take as self-evident; and it is from them that we may start again the inventive task of constructing ourselves without arranging a mode of living, the task of our freedom. To diagnose what is happening to us is to trace, from the points of folly in our time and place, the lines of our actuality, of this Other we are becoming. (p. 161-162)

Derrida spoke of a people and time yet to come in Kofman, Ziering, and Dick’s (2002) film *Derrida*:

In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and “l’avenir.”

The future is that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be.

There’s a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable.

But there is a future l’avenir (to come), which refers to who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it’s l’avenir in that it’s the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival. (00:29-1:48)

Both futures are of interest, but it is future l'avenir that is surprising, that occurs through immanence, that remains indeterminate and open. It is future l'avenir where the impossible is made possible.

Paraphrasing Proust, Deleuze (2004) further addressed the creative power of writing and theorization over grounded reform:

[U]se my book, he says, like a pair of glasses to view the outside, and if it isn't to your liking, find another pair, or invent your own, and your device will necessarily be a device you can fight with. A theory won't be totalized, it multiplies. It's rather in the nature of power to totalize, and you say it exactly: theory is by nature opposed to power. As soon as a theory takes hold at this point or that it runs up against the impossibility of having the least practical consequence without there being an explosion, at some distant point if necessary. That's why the idea of reform is so stupid and hypocritical. Either the reform is undertaken by those who claim to be representatives, whose business is to speak for others, in their name, and this is how power adjusts, distributing itself along reinforced lines of repression. Or else the reform is demanded by those who have a stake in it, and then it is no longer a reform but a revolution. A revolutionary action, by virtue of its partial character, is determined to call into question the totality of power and its hierarchy. (p. 208)

Deleuze (2004) continued discussing this relation between theory and praxis:

In the first place, a theory is always local, related to a limited domain, though it can be applied in another domain that is more or less distant. The rule of application is never one of resemblance. In the second place, as soon as a theory takes hold in its own domain, it encounters obstacles, walls, collisions, and these impediments create a need

for the theory to be relayed by another kind of discourse (it is this other discourse which eventually causes the theory to migrate from one domain to another). Praxis is a network of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory relays one praxis to another. A theory cannot be developed without encountering a wall, and a praxis is needed to break through...For us, the intellectual and theorist have ceased to be a subject, a consciousness, that represents or is representative. And those involved in political struggle have ceased to be represented, whether by a party or a union that would in turn claim for itself the right to be their conscience. Who speaks and who acts? It's always a multiplicity, even in the person that speaks or acts. We are all groupuscles. There is no more representation. There is only action, the action of theory, the action of praxis, in the relations of relays and networks. (p. 206-207)

There is no doer before the deed⁵. This different understanding of subjectivity related to multiplicity without representation makes space for conceptual personae to overwhelm the static Cartesian conception of subjectivity that involves rational thinking individual's concretely tied to a specific mind and body experiencing a stable exterior reality.

Writing friends of wisdom is a strategic choice that rejects methodolatry⁶. Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994) argued that, "Only friends can set out a plane of immanence as a ground from which idols have been cleared." (p. 43) Instead of writing as a mass communication specialist working efficiently to fill a gap in humanity's progressive understanding of the discipline, writing as friend of wisdom opens space to think differently. The hope is not to convince another of a truth, but to incite radical thoughts that the regime of truth has made impossible. Clare O'Farrell (2005) quoted Foucault:

‘I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area... I would like the little volume that I want to write on disciplinary systems to be useful to an educator, a warden, a magistrate, a conscientious objector. I don't write for an audience, I write for users, not readers.’ (p. 50)

Gilles Deleuze (1986/2012) commented on this intense resonance in his friend’s writing, “Foucault never looked on writing as an aim or an end in itself. This is precisely what makes him a great writer and imbues everything he writes with an increasing sense of joy and gaiety.” (p. 23)

Further discussing the freedom and difference in Foucault’s writing Rajchman (1985) stated:

Foucault directs our attention to the very concrete freedom of writing, thinking, and living in a permanent questioning of those systems of thought and problematic forms of experience in which we find ourselves. Foucault’s freedom is not liberation, a process with an end. It is not liberty, a possession of each individual person. It is the motor and principle of his skepticism: the endless questioning of constituted experience. Foucault reinvents skepticism in our time through a new kind of historical analysis. It is the skepticism of our modernity; it is the question of our freedom. (p. 6-7)

This is not to argue that we should write like Foucault. If anything it calls for using Foucault in ways that he could not have foreseen. ‘Foucauldian’ is just as much a disciplinary label informed by a logic of specialization as ‘Mass Communication scholar’.⁷ However, we retain, and rupture, the term validity to make space for friends of wisdom in academic writing.

Friends of Wisdom and the Storyteller

In Kafka's (1983) *A Report to an Academy* he told the story of the life he formerly led as an ape:

Honored members of the Academy! You have done me the honor of inviting me to give your Academy an account of the life I formerly led as an ape. I regret that I cannot comply with your request to the extent you desire. It is now nearly five years since I was an ape, a short space of time, perhaps, according to the calendar, but an infinitely long time to gallop through at full speed, as I have done, more or less accompanied by excellent mentors, good advice, applause, and orchestral music, and yet essentially alone, since all my escorts, to keep the image, kept well off the course. I could never have achieved what I have done had I been stubbornly set on clinging to my origins, to the remembrances of my youth. In fact, to give up being stubborn was the supreme commandment I laid upon myself; free ape as I was, I submitted myself to that yoke. In revenge, however, my memory of the past has closed the door against me more and more. I could have returned at first, had human being allowed it, through an archway as wide as the space of heaven over the earth, but as I spurred myself on in my forced career, the opening narrowed and shrank behind me; I felt more comfortable in the world of men and fitted it better; the strong wind that blew after me out of my past began to slacken; today it is only a gentle puff of air that plays around my heels; and the opening in the distance, through which it comes and through which I once came myself, has grown so small that, even if my strength and my will power sufficed to get me back to it, I should have to scrape the very skin from my body to crawl through. (p. 250)

The three hundred and seventh aphorism of Nietzsche's (1887/1974) *The Gay Science* stated:

In favor of criticism. —Now something that you formerly loved as a truth or probability strikes you as an error; you shed it and fancy that this represents a victory for your reason. But perhaps this error was as necessary for you then, when you were still a different person—you are always a different person—as are all your present “truths,” being a skin, as it were, that concealed and covered a great deal that you were not yet permitted to see. What killed that opinion for you was your new life and not your reason: *you no longer need it*, and now it collapses and unreason crawls out of it into the light like a worm. When we criticize something, this is no arbitrary and impersonal event; it is, at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm—something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet.-- This is said in favor of criticism. (p. 245-246)

Kafka (1983) continued:

What I have to tell the Academy will contribute nothing essentially new, and will fall far behind what you have asked of me and what with the best will in the world I cannot communicate—nonetheless, it should indicate the line an erstwhile ape has had to follow in entering and establishing himself in the world of men. (p. 251)

Nietzsche (1872/2003) found a more favorable conceptual persona for the future of humanity in the satyr:

The satyr, like the idyllic shepherd of our own more recent age, is the product of a longing for the primal and the natural; but how firmly and fearlessly did the Greeks hold

on to this man of the woods, and how effeminately and timidly has modern man dallied with the flattering image of a dainty, flute-playing, sentimental shepherd! Nature, still unaffected by knowledge, the bolts of culture still unforced—that is what the Greeks saw in their satyr, and for that reason they did not conflate him with the apes. On the contrary—he was the archetype of man, the expression of his highest and most intense emotions, an inspired reveller enraptured by the closeness of his god, a sympathetic companion in whom god’s suffering is repeated, the harbinger of wisdom from the very breast of nature, a symbol of nature’s sexual omnipotence, which the Greeks were accustomed to considering with respectful astonishment. The satyr was something divine and sublime; he must have seemed particularly so to the painfully broken gaze of Dionysiac man. He would have been insulted by the dressed-up, meretricious ‘shepherd: his eye rested in sublime satisfaction on the undisguised, untroubled and wondrous traits of nature; here, the illusion of culture had been erased from the archetype of man—it was here that the true man revealed himself, the bearded satyr celebrating his god. Before him, the man of culture shriveled up into the mendacious caricature. Schiller was right in his appraisal of these origins of tragic art: the chorus is a living wall against encroaching reality because it—the satyr chorus—depicts existence more truly, more authentically, more completely than the man of culture who sees himself as the sole reality. The realm of poetry does not lie outside the world, a fantastic impossibility, the product of a poet’s mind; it wishes to be precisely the opposite of this, the unadorned expression of truth, and must for that very reason cast off the mendacious finery of the supposed reality of the man of culture. The contrast between this authentic, natural truth and the lie of culture masquerading as the sole reality is like the constant between the eternal core of things,

the thing in itself and the entire world of phenomena; and just as tragedy, with its metaphysical consolation, points to the eternal life of that core and the constant destruction of phenomena, the symbolism of the satyr chorus analogously expresses the primal relationship between the thing in itself and the world of appearances. Modern man's idyllic shepherd is nothing but a counterfeit of the sum of cultural illusions that he takes to be nature; the Dionysiac Greek wanted truth and nature at the summit of their power—and saw himself transformed into a satyr. (p. 40-41)

This drama of the disciplined ape, and the transformation into the satyr, may seem tragic and grim, but, like any narrative, something more resonates from the story. Even academic writing relies on the nature of the narrative to express meanings that factual information cannot.

Deleuze (1968/1994) explained:

A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction. By detective novel we mean that concepts, with their zones of presence, should intervene to resolve local situations. They themselves change along with the problems. They have spheres of influence where, as we shall see, they operate in relation to 'dramas' and by means of a certain 'cruelty'. They must have a coherence among themselves, but that coherence must not come from themselves. They must receive their coherence from elsewhere. (p. xx)

Concepts receive their coherence from a plane of immanence, a plane of resonance, a network (or web) of changing relations connecting through difference and repetition.

Deleuze (1968/1994) continued:

Science fiction in yet another sense, one in which the weaknesses become manifest. How else can one write but of those things which one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is

precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow - or rather, to make it impossible. Perhaps writing has a relation to silence altogether more threatening than that which it is supposed to entertain with death. We are therefore well aware, unfortunately, that we have spoken about science in a manner which was not scientific. (p. xxi)

Scholarly council of friends, these ideas we pursue are too subtle, slippery, and dangerous to discuss directly and clearly. The narrative (story, dramatization) is a useful tool for expressing ideas not clearly but abstractly. It facilitates the constitution of the impossible. The method of dramatization found in the narrative form allows ideas to remain in movement, to be differentiated but also remain fully differential. The story makes space for a pure difference but also constitutes a local situation that is distinct yet obscure. Deleuze (2004) argued:

Through dramatization, the Idea is incarnated or actualized, *it differentiates itself*, Nevertheless, the Idea in its proper content must already present characteristics that correspond with the two aspects of its differentiation. The Idea is in itself a system of *differential* relations and the result of a distribution of remarkable or singular points (ideal events). In other words, the Idea is fully differential in itself, before even *differentiating* itself in the actual. This status of the Idea explains its logical value, which is not the clear and distinct, but rather as Leibniz sensed, the distinct-obscure. The method of dramatization as a whole is represented in the complex concept of differentiation (differential / differentiation)... (p. 94)

The communication of information is overwhelming the more open and expressive form of communication found in the narrative. Narrative's role in scholarship has been limited and sometimes dismissed largely due to its creative potential, its potential to make new connections and incite new thoughts outside of a specific disciplinary logic. Traditional scholarship relies on a predictable and valid language (which Deleuze and Guattari would call a master language) that works to fill gaps in the accumulation of knowledge, but this limits inquiry to a specific system of knowledge that only works to reinscribe itself.

Deleuze and Guattari (1975/1986), in their book on Kafka, argued for a minor literature as a tool for the absolute deterritorialization of a master language:

The three characteristics of minor literature are the deterritorialization of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation. We might as well say that the minor no longer designates specific literatures but the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart of what is called great (or established) literature. Even he who has the misfortune of being born in the country of a great literature must write in its language, just as a Czech Jew writes in German, or an Ouzbekian writes in Russian. Writing like a dog digging a hole, a rat digging its burrow. And to do that, finding his own point of underdevelopment, his own *patois*, his own third world, his own desert. There has been much discussion of the questions "What is a marginal literature?" and "What is a popular literature, a proletarian literature?" The criteria are obviously difficult to establish if one doesn't start with a more objective concept—that of minor literature. Only the possibility of setting up a minor practice of major language from within allows one to define popular literature,

marginal literature, and so on. Only in this way can literature really become a collective machine of expression and really be able to treat and develop its contents. (p. 18-19)

Derrida spoke of something similar when he called for a use of language that puts its traditional (major) use under erasure⁸. He argued for a new use of language that deconstructs its traditional grammar and operation through a new subversive use. Minor literature calls for the same thing. Minor literature is used to provide an escape for language.

Therefore, the argument that storytelling may undermine the value of scholarship itself is not wholly false or negative as it brings traditional uses of language, and the system of thought that legitimizes those meanings, into question. The system of thought that defines the standards of validity is decentered through this minor use. The value system of a major language (Deleuze and Guattari give the example of the language of psychoanalysis⁹) is confining and in need of subversion to make space for new thoughts, new connections.

Relating the dilemma of the erstwhile ape to this crisis of communication, Benjamin (1955/1968) described the emergence of a different type of narrative:

But if today “having counsel” is beginning to have an old-fashioned ring, this is because the communicability of experience is decreasing. In consequence, we have no counsel either for ourselves or for others. After all, counsel is less an answer to a question than a proposal concerning the continuation of a story which is just unfolding. To seek this counsel one would first have to be able to tell a story. (Quite apart from the fact that a man is receptive to counsel only to the extent that he allows his situation to speak.)

Counsel woven into the fabric of real life is wisdom. (p. 86-87)

Instead of reading this dissertation as a document which must be ruled as legitimate or illegitimate by a council of specialist judges, it is a minor literature for friends of wisdom who

offer counsel through the continuation of a story, we make space for different forms of expression and wonder in anticipation of the yet to come. Benjamin (1955/1968) continued:

The art of storytelling is reaching its end because the epic side of truth, wisdom, is dying out. This, however, is a process that has been going on for a long time. And nothing would be more fatuous than to want to see in it merely a “symptom of decay,” let alone a “modern” symptom. It is, rather, only a concomitant that has quite gradually removed narrative from the realm of living speech and at the same time is making it possible to see a new beauty in what is vanishing. (p. 86-87)

We are always in the middle of things. We do not seek a solution to the decline in the art of storytelling, but reconstitute this decay in the true untimely style of the philosopher, reterritorializing a space for the inevitable return of the storyteller that never was. The decaying echo of the storyteller feeds back through an inevitable return of the storyteller that never was. The feedback holds the same rhythm but differently. The conceptual persona of the storyteller takes on a double existence.

Instead of searching through the major literature of an academic discipline with its problems of hierarchy and individuation, Benjamin (1955/1968) located the minor story and the storyteller elsewhere:

The storytelling that thrives for a long time in the milieu of work—the rural, the maritime, and the urban—is itself an artisan form of communication, as it were. It does not aim to convey the pure essence of the thing, like information or a report. It sinks the thing into the life of a storytelling, in order to bring it out of him again. Thus traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel. (p. 91-92)

Still discussing the implications of information on validity and narrative, Benjamin (1955/1968) argued:

The intelligence that came from afar—whether the spatial kind from foreign countries or the temporal kind of tradition—possessed an authority which gave it validity, even when it was not subject to verification. Information, however, lays claim to prompt verifiability. The prime requirement is that it appear “understandable in itself.” Often it is no more exact than the intelligence of earlier centuries was. But while the latter was inclined to borrow from the miraculous, it is indispensable for information to sound plausible. Because of this it proves incompatible with the spirit of storytelling. If the art of storytelling has become rare, the dissemination of information has had a decisive share in this state of affairs.

Every morning brings us the news of the globe, and yet we are poor in noteworthy stories. This is because no event any longer comes to us without already being shot through with explanation. In other words, by now almost nothing that happens benefits storytelling; almost everything benefits information. Actually, it is half the art of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one reproduces it. Leskov is a master at this (compare pieces like “The Deception” and “The White Eagle”). The most extraordinary things, marvelous things, are related with the greatest accuracy, but the psychological connection of the events is not forced on the reader. It is left up to him to interpret things the way he understands them, and thus the narrative achieves an amplitude that information lacks. (p. 89)

My friends, I ask that we listen to this as a different type of narrative that reorders meanings, experience, and ideas into a story free from explanation, an inciter of connections

stripped of its positivist authority. Activity of thought and consistency replace the conventional standards of validity that differentiate between fact and fiction. This is not a call for the measurement of activity of thought, but instead a call for friends of wisdom to constitute meanings and take lines of flight that spring from the inevitable interpretation of a story.

"Improvement
makes straight
roads; but the
crooked roads
without improve-
ment are the roads
of Genius."
(W. Blake,
*Marriage of Heaven
and Hell*, 1793)

Ph. O. Runge,
*Perspektivische
Konstruktion einer
Wendeltreppe*




Figure 1: Ph. O. Runge, *Perspektivische Konstruktion einer Wendeltreppe* (Roob, 2014).

"I want! I want!"

W. Blake, *The Gates
of Paradise*, 1793




Figure 2: W. Blake, *The Gates of Paradise*, 1793 (Roob, 2014).

Friends of Wisdom and a New Mass Communication

Narratives and inquiries into questions that don't necessitate a determined ontology are losing room in the discipline of mass communication as it becomes more compartmentalized and routinized. At least partially through folly, this inquiry finds its nest in the discipline of mass communication. However, mass communication still remains jumbled, making it an attractive

environment for nomadic inquiry, an inquiry that pledges allegiance to nothing but pure difference.¹⁰

Marcus and Fischer (1986) argued, “In periods when fields are without secure foundations, practice becomes the engine of innovation” (p. 166).

Nietzsche (1910) described journalism before the discipline of mass communication had emerged:

It is precisely in journalism that the two tendencies combine and become one. The expansion and the diminution of education here join hands. The newspaper actually steps into the place of culture, and he who, even as a scholar, wishes to voice any claim for education, must avail himself of this viscous stratum of communication which cements the seams between all forms of life, all classes, all arts, and all sciences, and which is as firm and reliable as news paper is, as a rule. In the newspaper the peculiar educational aims of the present culminate, just as the journalist, the servant of the moment, has stepped into the place of the genius, of the leader for all time, of the deliverer from the tyranny of the moment. (p. 14)

Understood broadly, the discipline of mass communication centers around inquiry into the affect of communication on mass and therefore necessarily the affect of mass on communication. Once mass is determined as being composed of humans, social groups, or any other material, a new ontological limit is constituted. As mass communication becomes more established and specialized within academia it also becomes increasingly compartmentalized and limited. This dissertation problematizes the logic of specialization and focuses on breaking these limits open.

The logic of specialization valorizes standards of predictability and efficiency overwhelming the yet to come, the potential for something different. These stories shot full of information construct and confine the future as something predictable and knowable while the tyranny of the moment, the tragedy of humanity, provides a tension (intensity) that powers creative activity opening space for something new.

Benjamin (1955/1968) addressed the importance of storytelling to the creative moment (the event, listening) and the distractions of efficiency and production:

Boredom is the dream bird that hatches the egg of experience. A rustling in the leaves drives him away. His nesting places—the activities that are intimately associated with boredom—are already extinct in the cities and are declining in the country as well. With this the great gift for listening is lost and the community of listeners disappears. For storytelling is always the art of repeating stories, and this art is lost when the stories are no longer retained. It is lost because there is no more weaving and spinning to go on while they are being listened to. The more self-forgetful the listener is, the more deeply is what he listens to impressed upon his memory. When the rhythm of the work has seized him, he listens to the tales in such a way that the gift of retelling them comes to him all by itself. (p. 91)

In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Geertz (1973) explained a shift in the understanding of culture in this open and interpretive frame, “Once human behavior is seen as symbolic action--action which, like phonation in speech, pigment in painting, line in writing, or sonance in music, signifies--the question as to whether culture is patterned conduct or a frame of mind, or even the two somehow mixed together, loses sense.” (p. 10)

So let us find a new beauty in the disappearing art of storytelling by constituting new narratives, stories retold differently. Leaving space for interpretation, leaving space for the yet to come, leaving space for wonder. My friends, let us break from conventional validity's standards of prompt verifiability and plausibility to make space for the miraculous and the impossible.

Let us reorder information and its concrete meanings, constituting new connections that bring the authority of information and its tightly constructed facts into question. Instead of always diving deep to fill the gap in our specific discipline's knowledge, why not also flatten the discipline allowing its fragments to find new relations?

Friends of Wisdom and Neo-liberalism in Education

Building on a statement made by Michel Foucault in a 1977 interview, John Rajchman (1985) argued “[t]he writer-intellectual is disappearing. In his place there is the university and the ‘specific’ intellectual—specific to the particular political struggles that involve his knowledge and expertise.” (p. 10) This logic of specialization individualizes and categorizes making it a useful disciplinary tool. When describing the concept of discipline Michel Foucault (1975/1995) argued, “[d]iscipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individuates bodies by a location that does not give them fixed position, but distributes them in a network of relations.” (p. 146) For academic writing to break from its current disciplinary limits it is necessary to question the logic behind these dividing practices.

Writing for a specific audience is a practice that guarantees differentiation. It distinctly separates the writer from the reader, putting the writer under the gaze of an opposed disciplinary audience whose expertise define the limit. The writer is brought into a power relation that creates a disciplinary space. The writer as the subject of judgment before the court. The

individual in the face of the institution. The owner of ideas representing their competitive value.

Foucault (1975/1995) explained this disciplinary practice:

In a disciplinary regime...individualization is 'descending': as power becomes more anonymous and more functional, those on whom it is exercised tend to be more strongly individualized; it is exercised by surveillance rather than ceremonies, by observation rather than commemorative accounts, by comparative measures that have the 'norm' as reference rather than genealogies giving ancestors as points of reference; by 'gaps' rather than by deeds. In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of these pairs that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when one wishes to individualize the healthy, normal and law-abiding adult, it is always by asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what fundamental crime he has dreamt of committing. (p. 193)

American neo-liberalism always values the creation of competitive products over an activity without a predefined end.¹¹ It applies an economic logic to the non-economic. While discussing American neo-liberalism Foucault (2008) argued:

[T]he generalization of the economic form of the market beyond monetary exchanges functions in American neo-liberalism as a principle of intelligibility, and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behavior. This means that analysis in terms of the market economy, or in other words, of supply and demand, can function as schema which is applicable in non-economic domains. (p. 243)

Nietzsche (1910) expanded on the implications of this neoliberalism:

For centuries it has been an understood thing that one alluded to scholars alone when one spoke of cultured men; but experience tells us that it would be difficult to find any necessary relation between the two classes today. For at present the exploitation of a man for the purpose of science is accepted everywhere without the slightest scruple. (p. 13-14)

Nietzsche (1910) continued describing neo-liberalism in education and its implications:

The greater the number of such men, the happier a nation will be; and this precisely is the purpose of our modern educational institutions: to help every one, as far as his nature will allow, to become 'current'; to develop him so that his particular degree of knowledge and science may yield him the greatest possible amount of happiness and pecuniary gain.

Every one must be able to form some sort of estimate of himself; he must know how much he may reasonably expect from life. The 'bond between intelligence and property' which this point of view postulates has almost the force of a moral principle. In this quarter all culture is loathed which isolates, which sets goals beyond gold and gain, and which requires time: it is customary to dispose of such eccentric tendencies in education as systems of 'Higher Egotism,' or of 'Immoral Culture—Epicureanism.' According to the morality reigning here, the demands are quite different; what is required above all is 'rapid education,' so that a money-earning creature may be produced with all speed; there is even a desire to make this education so thorough that a creature may be reared that will be able to earn a great deal of money. (p. 12)

Nietzsche (1910) continued with a more specific critique of the logic of specialization:

[O]wing to the present frantic exploitation of the scholar in the service of his science, his education becomes every day more accidental and more uncertain. For the study of science has been extended to such interminable lengths that he who, though not

exceptionally gifted, yet possesses fair abilities, will need to devote himself exclusively to one branch and ignore all others if he ever wish to achieve anything in his work.

Should he then elevate himself above the herd by means of his specialty, he still remains one of them in regard to all else,—that is to say, in regard to all the most important things in life. Thus, a specialist in science gets to resemble nothing so much as a factory workman who spends his whole life in turning one particular screw or handle on a certain instrument or machine, at which occupation he acquires the most consummate skill. (p. 13)

Friends of Wisdom and Power

Conceptions of power that rely on this logic of representation and specialization doom every subject to rely on established values, to work within the confines of a grid of intelligibility defined by a specific regime of truth. This conception of power solidifies and individualizes. Deleuze (1962/1983) further discussed this disciplinary conception of power relating it to Nietzsche's will to power:

What the wills in Hegel want is to have their power *recognized*, to *represent* their power. According to Nietzsche we have here a wholly erroneous conception of the will to power and its nature. This is the slave's conception, it is the image that the man of *ressentiment* has of power. *The slave only conceives of power as the object of recognition, the content of a representation, the stake in competition, and therefore makes it depend, at the end of a fight, on a simple attribution of established values.* If the master-slave relationship can easily take on the dialectical form, to the point where it has become an archetype or a school-exercise for every young Hegelian, it is because the portrait of the master that Hegel offers us is, from the start, a portrait which represents the slave, at least as he is in

his dreams, as at best a successful slave. Underneath the Hegelian image of the master we always find the slave. (p. 9-10)

Kafka's (1946/2015) twenty ninth aphorism stated, "The animal twists the whip out of its master's grip and whips itself to become its own master—not knowing that this is only a fantasy, produced by a new knot in the master's whiplash." (p. 29)

There still remains an inevitability of specialization in scholarly work, however a minor use inseparable from the craft works to decenter this oppression. In the three hundred and sixty-sixth aphorism of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche (1882/1974) explained:

Faced with a scholarly book.—We do not belong to those who have ideas only among books, when stimulated by books. It is our habit to think outdoors—walking, leaping, climbing, dancing, preferably on lonely mountains or near the sea where even the trails become thoughtful. Our first questions about the value of a book, of a human being, or a musical composition are: Can they walk? Even more, can they dance?

We read rarely, but not worse on that account. How quickly we guess how someone has come by his ideas; whether it was while sitting in front of his inkwell, with a pinched belly, his head bowed low over the paper—in which case we are quickly finished with his book, too! Cramped intestines betray themselves—you can bet on that—no less than closet air, closet ceilings, close narrowness.—This was what I felt just now as I closed a very decent scholarly book—gratefully, very gratefully, but also with a sense of relief.

Almost always the books of scholars are somehow oppressive, oppressed; the "specialist" emerges somewhere—his zeal, his seriousness, his fury, his overestimation of the nook in which he sits and spins, his hunched back; every specialist has his hunched

back. Every scholarly book also mirrors a soul that has become crooked; every craft makes crooked.

You see the friends of your youth again after they have taken possession of their specialty—and always the opposite has happened, too! Always they themselves are now possessed by it and obsessed with it. Grown into their nook, crumpled beyond recognition, unfree, deprived of their balance, emaciated and angular all over except for one place where they are downright rotund—one feels moved and falls silent when one sees them again this way. Every craft, even if it should have a golden floor, has a leaden ceiling over it that presses and presses down upon the soul until that becomes queer and crooked. Nothing can be done about that. Let nobody suppose that one could possibly avoid such crippling by some artifice of education. On this earth one pays dearly for every kind of *mastery*, and perhaps one pays too dearly for everything. For having a specialty one pays by also being the victim of this specialty. But you would have it otherwise—cheaper and fairer and above all more comfortable—isn't that right, my dear contemporaries? Well then, but in that case you also immediately get something else: instead of the craftsman and master, the “man of letters,” the dexterous, “polydexterous” man of letters who, to be sure, lacks the hunched back—not counting the posture he assumes before you, being the salesman of the spirit and the “carrier” of culture—the man of letters who really *is* nothing but “represents” almost everything, playing and “substituting” for the expert, and taking it upon himself in all modesty to get himself paid, honored, and celebrated in place of the expert.

No, my scholarly friends, I bless you even for your hunched backs. And for despising, as I do, the “men of letters” and culture parasites. And for not knowing how to

make a business of the spirit. And for having opinions that cannot be translated into financial values. And for not representing anything that you are not. And because your sole aim is to become masters of your craft, with reverence for every kind of mastery and competence, and with uncompromising opposition to everything that is semblance, half-genuine, dressed up, virtuosolike, demagogical, or histrionic in *litteris et artibus*—to everything that cannot prove to you its unconditional *probity* in discipline and prior training. (p. 322-323)

Writing for a specific audience is a dividing practice that individualizes the writer. It reinscribes a specific relation between the writer, the text, and the reader that distinguishes them as disparate. It confines the writer to become a competitive producer whose value rests on their capacity to efficiently fill a certain gap in the knowledge of a specific regime of truth. It is a normalizing practice. A strategic logic needs to be employed to break from the dialectical logic of the market that relies on competition for activity. Foucault (2008) described this strategic logic:

When I say two routes, two ways, two conceptions of freedom and law, I do not mean two separate, distinct, incompatible, contradictory, and mutually exclusive systems, but two heterogeneous procedures, forms of coherence, and ways of doing things. We should keep in mind that heterogeneity is never a principle of exclusion; it never prevents coexistence, conjunction, or connection. And it is precisely in this case, in this kind of analysis, that we emphasize, and must emphasize a non-dialectical logic if want to avoid being simplistic. For what is dialectical logic? Dialectical logic puts to work contradictory terms within the homogeneous. I suggest replacing this dialectical logic with what I would call a strategic logic. A logic of strategy does not stress in a unity.

The function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate. The logic of strategy is the logic of connections between the heterogeneous and not the logic of the homogenization of the contradictory. (p. 42)

Nietzsche's will to power and Foucault's power relations argue that power is fluid, never stationary, always moving, always constituting new relations. Power produces knowledge.¹² But this concept of power is different from other more traditional conceptions. Power is not possessed by an individual, it is always involved in relations. Foucault (2008) explained:

[P]ower can in no way be considered either as a principle in itself, or as having explanatory value which functions from the outset. The term itself, power, does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed, and what I have proposed to call governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a proposed analytical grid for these relations of power. (p. 186)

Writing power differently is simultaneously dangerous and freeing, it constitutes and questions. It also emphasizes the importance in writing friends of wisdom. It allows the formation of a strategic power relation within a more open grid of intelligibility, a grid that connects the foggy space between I and Me with the friend of wisdom. Deleuze (1962/1983) described this friend of wisdom:

The friend of wisdom is the one who appeals to wisdom, but in the way that one appeals to a mask without which one would not survive, the one who makes use of wisdom for new, bizarre and dangerous ends- ends which are, in fact, hardly wise at all. He wants wisdom to overcome itself and to be overcome. (p. 5-6)

CHAPTER 3

POST-QUALITATIVE INQUIRY IN MASS COMMUNICATION

In his report to an academy, Kafka (1971/1983) explained:

After theory came practice. Was I not already quite exhausted by my theoretical instruction? Indeed I was; utterly exhausted. That was part of my destiny. And yet I would take hold of the proffered bottle as well as I was able; uncork it, trembling; this successful action would gradually inspire me with new energy; I would lift the bottle, already following my original model almost exactly; put it to my lips and—and then throw it down in disgust, utter disgust, although it was empty and filled only with the smell of the spirit, throw it down on the floor in disgust. To the sorrow of my teacher, to the greater sorrow of myself; neither of us being really comforted by the fact that I did not forget, even though I had thrown away the bottle, to rub my belly most admirably and to grin.

Far too often my lesson ended in that way. And to the credit of my teacher, he was not angry; sometimes indeed he would hold his burning pipe against my fur, until it began to smolder in some place I could not easily reach, but then he would himself extinguish it with his own kind, enormous hand; he was not angry with me, he perceived that we were both fighting on the same side against the nature of apes and that I had the more difficult task. (p. 256-257)

Introduction

As I quest further into my role as a mass communication researcher, the tension between my image of thought and the limits of conventional humanist qualitative inquiry intensifies. Facing the gatekeeper's task of proving the validity of my accumulation of knowledge in an area of specialization through a prescribed method, while I simultaneously attempt to bring those standards of judgment into question, requires a strategic and paradoxical approach to inquiry. Specializing in the questioning and opening up of systems of thought may be taken as the work of a cynic offering no alternative, no interest in truth or knowledge. However, truth and knowledge are two of the most emphasized concepts in this limits work. Instead of a linear progressive discovering of external truths in a static external reality, this work questions how truth is determined and how knowledge is accumulated. It works processually¹³ to break open the limits of conventional humanist qualitative inquiry to make space for new connections, new thoughts. It allows for an emergence of thoughts previously unthinkable. It is a philosophy of immanence. This work values a wondering activity of thought over the standards of predictability and efficiency valued by conventional humanist qualitative inquiry.

As I would argue with any "post-" concept, post-qualitative inquiry does not need any stable definition to be useful, in fact quite the opposite is the case. "Post-" concepts are used to bring dominant concepts into question, to break the limits of those entrenched concepts through questioning, to constitute lines of flight to previously unthinkable ideas. St. Pierre (2014) described her approach to her dissertation work:

Here I used a *concept as method*. But this "method" was not a prescriptive step-by-step procedure (e.g., interview, participant observation) described in advance of my study in some textbook that I could easily implement during "fieldwork." Instead, the concept

slowed down and reoriented my thinking about everything. That work was my first post qualitative inquiry, and there was no going back. As Deleuze and Parnet (1977/1987) put it, “It might be thought that nothing has changed and nevertheless everything has changed” (p. 127).“ (p. 7)

“Post-“ concepts are used to constitute connections with a new logic. Although this paper will not provide any specific replicable methods to replace the conventional methods of qualitative humanist inquiry, my hope is that it will be useful for the emergence of a post-qualitative logic whose methods are no longer limited by a determined humanist ontology. Deleuze (1975/1992) described this more open methodology as “ontologically one, formally diverse.” (p. 67)

Although the ontological/epistemological divide is blurred in a logic of mutual inclusion (discussed further in the following section), the ontological turn can still be useful to illustrate the expansion of inquiry from its conventional limits. Forms of inquiry that are invalid and impossible in a determined humanist ontology become possible when ontology can be considered indeterminate, in motion.

From this zoomed out perspective of the ontological turn, mass communication can be thought differently. Mass is no longer confined to a large crowd of individual human bodies, and communication is no longer tied to human-to-human interaction occurring through a medium. The field of potential expands. Recognizing the value of ontological questioning Massumi (2002) argued for a model based on movement and stasis instead of literal and figurative meaning:

Integrating movement slips us directly into what Michel Foucault called *incorporeal materialism*. This movement-slip gives new urgency to questions of ontology, of

ontological difference, inextricably linked to concepts of potential and process and, by extension, event-- in a way that bumps “being” straight into becoming. Paraphrasing Deleuze again, the problem with the dominant models in cultural and literary theory is not that they are too abstract to grasp the concreteness of the real. The problem is that they are not *abstract enough* to grasp the real incorporeality of the concrete. (p. 5)

This ontological urgency is what post-qualitative inquiry attends to.

Critique of the valorization of presence

The Cartesian *cogito*, the rational thinking individual, established in Descartes’ (1637/1998) famous statement “*I think, therefore I am,*” (p. 18) has been the source of academic criticism for decades. Yet its determined humanist ontology remains our most common starting point in social science research. Inquiry that constitutes a break from the determined traditional enlightenment humanist ontology enables a zooming out that illustrates ontological questions of subjectivity and reality as always already necessary.

The exclusion of this type of philosophical questioning limits inquiry to an epistemological level of meaning. Starting with a determined humanist ontology sets science above philosophy in a hierarchy of knowledge, reinscribing the limit of a stable exterior with an inherent nature that can progressively be known through logical positivist methods. This bans wonder from inquiry. It values predictability and presence, and rejects surprise. Massumi (2002) commented on philosophy’s expansive nature in relation to inquiry:

Philosophy engages with history to attain its *nature*: the reserve of surprise lurking inhumanly in history’s gaps of renewal. Philosophy is nature philosophy by vocation. It is *nature philosophy* when it is doing what no other knowledge practice cares to do, when it goes where no other can go due to the self-policed limits it processually observes. It

was just asserted that nature is as a matter of fact the immanent limit of scientific knowledge. Philosophy operates at that immanent limit. It continues where science turns back. (p. 240)

This is not an argument opposing the use of science; it is an argument for the denaturalization of science. Many of the problems with a naturalized science can be related to traditional empiricism, a form of knowledge rooted in the experience and presence of the rational knowing individual. Massumi (2002) discussed the limits of this traditional empirical approach to knowledge:

“Social” or “human” sciences that aspire to be quantitative or, even if they describe themselves as “qualitative,” that claim any form of predictive validity for their results; that claim to produce verifiable truths about actual contexts; that operate with notions of causality privileging part-to-part interaction between ingredient elements; that think of their elementary units of description as having determinate properties prior to the event of their coming-together; that see themselves as usefully expressing what is necessary to the world; that consider thought to begin with conscious object-recognition; in short, that adopt a classically empirical view of reality, whether implicitly or explicitly—these are included. Philosophy wonderingly parts company with them all. (p. 240)

Conventional humanist qualitative inquiry valorizes traditional empiricism over other theories of knowledge. It privileges face-to-face interaction and experience out in the field as standards of validity that help guarantee an accurate representation of an object of knowledge in a static knowable external reality. Nietzsche (1968) explained, “Our “outer world” as we project it every moment is indissolubly tied to the old error of the ground: we interpret it by means of the schematism of “things,” etc.” (p. 266)

Deleuze (1969/1990) argued for a new approach to communication and empiricism: Such systems, constituted by placing disparate elements or heterogeneous series in communication, are in a sense quite common. They are signal-sign systems. The signal is a structure in which differences of potential are distributed, assuring the communication of disparate components: the sign is what flashes across the boundary of two levels, between two communicating series. Indeed, it seems that all phenomena respond to these conditions inasmuch as they find their ground in a constitutive dissymmetry, difference, or inequality. All physical systems are signals; all qualities are signs. It is true, however, that the series which border them remain external. By the same token, the conditions of their reproduction remain external to phenomena. In order to speak of simulacra, it is necessary for the heterogeneous series to be really internalized in the system, comprised or complicated in the chaos. Their differences must be *inclusive*. There is always, no doubt, a resemblance between resonating series, but this is not the problem. The problem is rather in the status and the position of this resemblance. Let us consider the two formulas: “only that which resembles differs” and “only differences can resemble each other.” These are two distinct readings of the world: one invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity as the product of a deep disparity. The first reading precisely defines the world of copies or representations; it posits the world as icon. The second, contrary to the first, defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as phantasm. From the point of view of this second formula, therefore, it matters little whether the original disparity, upon which the simulacrum is built, is great or small; it may happen that the basic series have only a slight difference between them. It suffices that the constitutive disparity be judged in

itself, not prejudging any previous identity, and that the *disparate (le dispars)* be the unity of measure and communication. Resemblance then can be thought only as the product of this internal difference. It matters little whether the system has great external and slight internal difference, or whether the opposite is the case, provided that resemblance be produced on a curve, and that difference, whether great or small, always occupy the center of the thus decentered system. (p. 261-262)

Conventional humanist qualitative inquiry relies on a regime of truth that also privileges a chronological conception of time. Hein (2013) argued this conception is still caught up in the logic of representation:

Chronological time can be lived, recollected, and described. Conceived as a series of presents, it is the time of representation, grounded in a philosophy of representation or identity, where each present that has passed away can be more or less accurately represented. (p. 493)

In 1885, Nietzsche (1968) wrote the five hundred and twentieth section of *The Will to Power* relating Massumi and Hein's arguments:

Continual transition forbids us to speak of "individuals," etc; the "number" of beings is itself in flux. We would know nothing of time and motion if we did not, in a coarse fashion, believe we see what is at "rest" beside what is in motion. The same applies to cause and effect, and without the erroneous conception of "empty space" we should certainly not have acquired the conception of space. The principle of identity has behind it the "apparent fact" of things that are the same. A world in a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be "comprehended" or "known"; only to the extent that the

”comprehending” and “knowing” intellect encounters a coarse, already-created world, fabricated out of mere appearances but become firm to the extent that this kind of appearance has preserved life—only to this extent is there anything like ”knowledge”; i.e., a measuring of earlier and later errors by one another. (p. 281)

Ontological time zooms out from chronological time, no longer linear or experiential. The valorization of presence requires a chronological conception of time that assumes a steady quantifiable progression while ontological time takes a step back to inquire into how chronological time is constituted. This different conception of time functions in motion before any determined subject.

Hein (2013), referencing Marrati, defined Ontological time:

Ontological time defies thought and definition, and to think it requires a discourse of excess, which in Deleuzian (1969/1990) terms involves the thought of a radical outside. Ontological time is a time without the present, one that includes both an absolute past and an absolute future. Unlike chronological time (i.e., the time of historical unfolding), ontological time consists of a past that never took place, one that was never lived through (i.e., one that was never present at a particular stage in history) and a future that can never arrive or be lived through. As Marrati (2005) makes clear, “What is in question in the deconstruction of the privilege of the present is also, and perhaps above all, the classical idea of time as a *homogeneous and successive* modification of the present” (p. 125). (p. 493-494)

Relating Kant and Bergson, Rajchman (2000) explained how certain ontological questions in philosophy break the limits of traditional empiricism expanding the empirical field past its classic scope of possibility:

The problem was to overcome a basic difficulty Kant had introduced into philosophy: that the transcendental conditions of thought or the determination of the “I think” were in fact always modeled on the “empirical” domains they were supposed to found. The solution to such “transcendental-empirical doubling” was to invent an experimentalism, which, instead of asking for conditions of possible experience, would look for the conditions under which something new, as yet unthought, arises. Bergson would introduce a conception of such “difference” into the formation of subject and object, finding in the words of William James an empiricism “not of things made but of things in the making.” Philosophy would then cease to be correction of error, and turn to what in experience, or in life, is prior to subjects and the objects to which they refer. (p. 17)

A new empiricism could then address being as becoming.

Not claiming to be free from limits or structure, this paper is still the product of a particular image of thought. However, this image of thought uses a logic of mutual inclusion (resonance, heterogeneity) that breaks from the static closed meanings reinscribed through a logic of opposition. While a logic of opposition constitutes binaries to concretize meaning, a logic of mutual inclusion constitutes dynamic unities to create connections and lines of flight. It allows new thoughts to emerge. In further support for the replacement of literal/figurative meaning with movement and stasis, Massumi (2002) described the difference between binaries and dynamic unities:

Another way of putting it is that positionality is an emergent quality of movement. The distinction between stasis and movement that replaces the opposition between literal and figurative from this perspective is not a logical binarism. It follows the modes by which realities pass into each other. “Passing into” is not a binarism. “Emerging” is not a binarism. They are dynamic unities. The kinds of distinction suggested here pertain to continuities under qualitative transformation. They are directly processural (and derivatively signifying and codifying). They can only be approached by a logic that is abstract enough to grasp the self-disjunctive coincidence of a thing’s immediacy to its own variation. (p. 8)

This logic plays with the traditionally oppositional nature of language to make space for a new language and a new subject yet to come. Channeling Derrida through Spivak (1976) a relation is made between the logic of mutual inclusion and the delimitation of language, “It is the strategy of using the only available language while not subscribing to its premises, or “operat[ing] according to the vocabulary of the very thing that one delimits.” (MP 18, SP 147).” (p. xviii)

This logic of mutual inclusion is a logic of the And. It is a logic of connections, not just concrete connections being discovered, but the constitution of vibrating resonances. Activity of thought is what is valued here, activity for the emergence of the yet to come. Rajchman (2000) explained this logic:

We must thus *make* connections, ever more connections. But this pragmatism—this And—is not an instrumentalism, and it supposes another sense of machine. It is not determined by given outcomes, not based in predictive expertise. On the contrary, its

motto is “not to predict, but to remain attentive to the unknown knocking at the door.” (p. 7)

In his final work, *The Red Book*, Jung (2009) discussed ontological time and the necessity for new standards of validity in writing for the yet to come:

If I speak in the spirit of this time, I must say: no one and nothing can justify what I must proclaim to you. Justification is superfluous to me, since I have no choice, but I must. I have learned that in addition to the spirit of this time there is still another spirit at work, namely that which rules the depths of everything contemporary. The spirit of this time would like to hear of use and value. I also thought this way, and my humanity still thinks this way. But that other spirit forces me nevertheless to speak, beyond justification, use, and meaning. Filled with human pride and blinded by the presumptuous spirit of the times, I long sought to hold that other spirit away from me. But I did not consider that the spirit of the depths from time immemorial and for all the future possesses a greater power than the spirit of this time, who changes with the generations. The spirit of the depths has subjugated all pride and arrogance to the power of judgment. He took away my belief in science, he robbed me of the joy of explaining and ordering things, and he let devotion to the ideals of this time die out in me. He forced me down to the last and simplest things.

The spirit of the depths took my understanding and all my knowledge and placed them at the service of the inexplicable and the paradoxical. He robbed me of speech and writing for everything that was not in his service, namely the melting together of sense and nonsense, which produces the supreme meaning.

But the supreme meaning is the path, the way and the bridge to what is to come. That is the God yet to come. It is not the coming God himself, but his image which appears in the supreme meaning. God is an image, and those who worship him must worship him in the image of the supreme meaning.

The supreme meaning is not a meaning and not an absurdity, it is image and force in one, magnificence and force together.

The supreme meaning is the beginning and the end. It is the bridge of going across and fulfillment.

The other Gods died of their temporality, yet the supreme meaning never dies, it turns into meaning and then into absurdity, and out of the fire and blood of their collision the supreme meaning rises up rejuvenated anew.

The image of God has a shadow. The supreme meaning is real and casts a shadow. For what can be actual and corporeal and have no shadow? The shadow is nonsense. It lacks force and has no continued existence through itself. But nonsense is the inseparable and undying brother of the supreme meaning.

Like plants, so men also grow, some in the light, others in the shadows. There are many who need the shadows and not the light.

The image of God throws a shadow that is just as great as itself.

The supreme meaning is great and small, it is wide as the space of the starry Heaven and as narrow as the cell of the living body. (p. 119-120)

Post-Qualitative Inquiry

“Instead of putting answers inside the school, why not put the questions inside?”

(McLuhan, 1970, p. 8)

Post-Qualitative inquiry puts wonder back into academic inquiry. It breaks from the confines of a determined traditional enlightenment humanist ontology opening space for inquiry that addresses both an ontological and epistemological level of questioning. St. Pierre (2011) located this traditional enlightenment humanist subject as the starting point in conventional humanist qualitative inquiry and called for its dispersal:

In sum, a particular description of human being is at the center of what I call “conventional humanist qualitative inquiry,” whether it employs positivist, interpretive, critical, or other approaches in the social sciences; and that description, that assumption, that belief, enables descriptions of other linked concepts—e.g., truth, reality, experience, freedom—that form a “grid of intelligibility” (Foucault, [1976] 1978, p.93) that organizes and structures a certain way of understanding the world. To rethink that understanding, we must rethink and disperse that central figure, human being. (p. 45)

Post-Qualitative inquiry asks how knowledge accumulates and how truths are determined. It recognizes that there is no doer before the deed, and that the constitution of subjects and objects depends upon the determination of a particular image of thought, or grid of intelligibility. Conventional humanist qualitative inquiry’s reliance on traditional empiricism is exemplified through its valorization of presence in its predominant methods of interview and observation. Post-Qualitative inquiry calls for a new empiricism, a superior empiricism, a radical empiricism that expands the field of experience to include possibilities of experience before any determined subject or object. An expanded empirical field that leaves space for the yet to come. With everything determinate comes a whole range of potential from what is made indeterminate, its shadow. These zones of indetermination are where qualitative change emerges. Rajchman (2000) described this process of determination and indetermination:

Deleuze's basic principle is that society is always *en fuite* (leaking, fleeing) and may be understood in terms of the manner in which it deals with its *fuites* (leaks, lines of flight). It says there is no determination of ourselves that does not at the same time create zones of indetermination—indetermination with respect to our individualizations as persons, sexes or genders, classes or strata, even as members of the human species. Such zones are then the ones from which original “connections” may come...Minority is thus not the same as ethnic identity. On the contrary, it is a matter of this “people to come” to which Kafka appealed when he wrote to Max Brod that he couldn't write in German, in Czech, or in Yiddish, and yet could not *not* write. (Rajchman, p. 11-12)

Writing with a language yet to come for a people yet to come is not the same as being ahead of your time. This common phrase “they were ahead of their time,” often used in reference to genius thinkers and artists, assumes a traditional linear causality where individuals create change that society slowly picks up as an effect. Instead of assuming this linear cause-effect in a linear space-time, breaking from the humanist subject allows a reconstitution that views those “ahead of their time” as returning at the exact right time; the inevitable return of what never was. Speaking against the traditional linear conception of cause and effect Nietzsche (1989) argued:

For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an *action*, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was *free* to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything. The popular mind in fact

doubles the deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as its effect. Scientists do no better when they say “force moves,” “force causes,” and the like—all its coolness, its freedom from emotion notwithstanding, our entire science still lies under the misleading influence of language and has not disposed of that little changeling, the “subject” (the atom, for example, is such a changeling, as is the Kantian “thing-in-itself”); no wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of vengeance and hatred exploit this belief for their own ends and in fact maintain no belief more ardently than the belief that *the strong man is free* to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey *accountable* for being a bird of prey. (p. 45)

Still critiquing linear causation, Nietzsche (1968) continued in the five hundred and fiftieth entry in *The Will to Power* written 1885-1886:

That which gives the extraordinary firmness to our belief in causality is not the great habit of seeing one occurrence following another but our inability to interpret events otherwise than as events caused by intentions. It is belief in the living and thinking as the only effective force—in will, in intention—it is belief that every event is a deed, that every deed presupposes a doer, it is belief in the “subject.” Is the belief in the concept of subject and attribute not a great stupidity?

Question: is intention the cause of an event? Or is that also illusion?

Is it not the event itself? (p. 295)

Many concepts attempt to illuminate this philosophy of immanence that subsumes any determined subject and focuses on pure event. The sort of change that occurs in this frame is not something that happens over time. It isn’t something that we remember changing or can really

put our finger on. It is a reconstitution of the past-present-future emerging within the moment. It could be understood as a change on the molecular level. Derrida's specter, Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, Deleuze and Guattari's refrain, and Foucault's genealogy all attempt to approach this timeliness.

"A question of repetition: a specter is always a *revenant*. One cannot control its comings and going because it *begins by coming back*." (Derrida, 1994, p. 11)

Play in Language and Logic

Another idea I relate to post-qualitative inquiry is that language and logic constitute reality. This can be seen not in the specific act of speaking something or writing something, but in the ordering and concretization of meaning that occurs through the logic of contradiction dominant in conventional language. The logic of contradiction is what stops the fluidity of thought and allows subject/object distinctions to emerge. Nietzsche (1968) explained:

In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to *create* reality, the concept "reality," for ourselves?—To affirm the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous knowledge of being—which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains no *criterion of truth*, but an *imperative* concerning that which *should* count as true.

Supposing there were no self-identical "*A*", such as is presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of mathematics), and the "*A*" were already mere appearance, then logic would have a merely apparent world as its condition. In fact, we believe in this proposition under the influence of ceaseless experience which seems continually to confirm it. The "thing"—that is the real substratum of "*A*"; *our belief in things* is the precondition of our belief in logic. The "*A*" of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of

true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those hypostases: substance, attribute, object, subject, action, etc.: that is, to conceiving a metaphysical world, that is, a “real world” (*--this, however, is the apparent world once more--*).

The very first acts of thought, affirmation and denial, holding true and holding not true, are, in as much as they presuppose, not only the habit of holdings things true and holding them not true, but a right to do this, already dominated by the belief that we can gain possession of knowledge, that judgments really can hit upon the truth;-- in short, logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, that it *cannot* have opposite attributes).

Here reigns the coarse sensualistic prejudice that sensations teach us truths about things—that I cannot say at the same time of one and the same thing that it is hard and that it is soft. (The instinctive proof “I cannot have two opposite sensations at the same time” – quite coarse and false.)

The conceptual ban on contradiction proceeds from the belief that we are *able* to form concepts, that the concept not only designates the essence of a thing but *comprehends* it—In fact, logic (like geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us-- ” (p. 279-280)

Lather and St. Pierre (2013) applied this crisis of representation to our role as academics and asked what comes next:

What would we do at the end of our studies if we academics who are charged with publication really, truly, no longer believed in the language/reality binary that presumes a

structure of depth – that language (secondary) can stand in for the real (primary)? Would the goal of our work continue to be “to represent,” to tell it like it really is out there in rich, thick description? Why else would we inquire if not to find and know and then represent? Of course, the theory of representation used in humanist qualitative inquiry was not always thinkable (see, e.g. Foucault, 1966/1970), so there is a precedent for thinking other theories. (p. 630-631)

What is called for is a strategic use of language, the use of new logics that decenter conventional systems of thought. Spivak (1976) explained this strategy in her preface to Derrida’s *Of Grammatology*:

Derrida, then, is asking us to change certain habits of mind: the authority of the text is provisional, the origin is a trace; contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our language at the same time...Derrida in particular is acutely aware that it is a question of strategy. It is the strategy of using the only available language while not subscribing to its premises, or “operat[ing] according to the vocabulary of the very thing that one delimits.” (MP 18, SP 147). (p. xviii)

Derrida (1978) argued that decentering dominant systems of thought (structures) and constituting room for play in different structures is key to transform the unthinkable to thinkable:

Nevertheless, up to the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin. The function of this center was not only to orient, balance, and organize the structure—one cannot in fact conceive of an unorganized structure—but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would

limit what we might call the *play* of the structure. By orienting and organizing the coherence of the system, the center of a structure permits the play of its elements inside the total form. And even today the notion of a structure lacking any center represents the unthinkable itself. (p. 278-279)

Linking Nietzsche's comments on logic as what confines and constitutes reality with Derrida's concept of play, Spivak (1976) argued, "Indeed, the notion of play is important here. Knowledge is not a systematic tracking down of a truth that is hidden but may be found. It is rather the field "of *freeplay*, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions in the closure of a finite ensemble." (ED 423, SC 260)." (p. xix)

Derrida (1978) discussed the concept of play and how it makes space for a more open and strategic logic that rejects totalization:

Totalization can be judged impossible in the classical style: one then refers to the empirical endeavor of either a subject or a finite richness which it can never master. There is too much, more than one can say. But nontotalization can also be determined in another way: no longer from the standpoint of a concept of finitude as relegation to the empirical, but from the standpoint of the concept of *play*. If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the field—that is, language and a finite language—excludes totalization. This field is in effect that of *play*, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions. One could say—rigorously using that word whose scandalous signification

is always obliterated in French—that this movement of play, permitted by the lack or absence of a center or origin, is the movement of *supplementarity*. One cannot determine the center and exhaust totalization because the sign which replaces the center, which supplements it, taking the center's place in its absence—this sign is added, occurs as a surplus, as a *supplement*. The movement of signification adds something, which results in the fact that there is always more, but this addition is a floating part of the signified. (p. 289)

Play disrupts the rational humanist grid of intelligibility with its logic of mutual inclusion that is before any determined subject or object, before meaning is made static. Derrida (1978) explained:

Besides the tension between play and history, there is also the tension between play and presence. Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence. Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around. (p. 292)

Once we accept this constitutive power of language in connection with the material, social justice work that distinguishes between groups in need and groups with power comes into question. This emancipatory work that claims to represent the voice of those groups in need now illuminates the reinscription of a violent dividing practice. Massumi (2002) described a post-representational productivism in his call for new affirmative methods:

To think productivism, you have to allow that even your own logical efforts feedback and add to reality, in some small, probably microscopic way. But still. Once you have allowed that, you have accepted that activities dedicated to thought and writing are inventive. Critical thinking disavows its own inventiveness as much as possible.

Because it sees itself as uncovering something it claims was hidden or as debunking something it desires to subtract from the world, it clings to a basically descriptive and justificatory *modus operandi*. However strenuously it might debunk concepts like “representation,” it carries on as if it mirrored something outside itself with which it had no complicity, no unmediated processual involvement, and thus could justifiably oppose. Prolonging the thought-path of movement, as suggested here, requires that techniques of negative critique be used sparingly. The balance has to shift to *affirmative* methods: techniques which embrace their own inventiveness and are not afraid to own up to the fact that they add (if so meagerly) to reality. (p. 12-13)

This is not to argue against resistance or radical movements. It is not an argument against civil rights. It is an argument for a different frame that comes before any determined subject. It is real but abstract. Philosophical work in an indeterminate ontological field catalyzes change just as usefully as science without relying on a logic of mutual exclusion. Still writing with a logic of linear causality, Massumi (2002) described this processual activity:

Philosophical speculation has just as much a claim to empirical truth as science does. It just has a different claim to it. A philosophical concept is true to the extent that it can help catalyze change in a movement of ceasing to be its useless self. Its truth is in giving itself up—something science will never countenance for its own part. The real issue between philosophy and science is not the relativity of truth. It is the *plurality of*

absolute truths. By “absolute” is meant simply “without resemblance, comparable only to itself.”... There is no neutral outside of shared empirical reality in which to stand in final judgment of its divergent coursings. (p. 246)

Scientific knowledge and philosophical knowledge may find themselves operating in the same empirical realm, yet neither may lay claim to a higher understanding of it. They are not mutually exclusive systems of thought working to expose the one truth. They are competing systems of thought that play with and against each other in the plurality of absolute truths. The affirmative philosophy that Massumi calls for does not replace or disprove science, it creates space for an activity of thought that values difference, movement, wonder, and experimentation in all thought. A response to Massumi through an earlier Massumi (1987) illuminated a new timeliness, “The question is not: is it true? But: does it work? What new thoughts does it make it possible to think? What new emotions does it make it possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?” (p. xv)

Disciplines related to cultural studies, such as mass communication, limit themselves by defining and categorizing specific experiences and phenomena tied to a determined collective. The qualitative excess that spills from every event is unthinkable in a determined humanist ontology. Massumi (2002) described this shortcoming:

As it is widely practiced, cultural studies falls short of singularity at both limits because it clings to the notion that *expression is of a particularity*. It realizes that expression is always collective. But it takes the collectivity as already constituted, as a determinate set of actually existing persons (in common parlance, a constituency). This contains expression: it restricts its movement to the manifestation of a content considered to be generally applicable to a collection of particular persons, to an established category or

class of human. It treats expressed qualities as general attributes or properties shared by the members of a class by pregiven “right” (in principle if not in fact). This misses surplus-giving relation and the qualitative excesses of liveliness overspilling every determinate expression. It misses the relational comingness of the community and the qualitative contagion of collective life-movement. It misses the impersonal or overpersonal excesses of ongoing transformation. It generally-particularly misses change: hence the obsession with change that has haunted cultural studies from the beginning. (p. 253)

Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual personae offer an alternative to this determined humanist ontology that confines expression to concrete individuals. Conceptual personae make space for affirmation, for new modes of existence. Conceptual personae as proliferating parts of the same or different planes of immanence uses a logic of resonance to make space for the yet to come, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) explained:

There are innumerable planes, each with a variable curve, and they group together or separate themselves according to the points of view constituted by personae. Each persona has several features that may give rise to other personae, on the same or a different plane: conceptual personae proliferate. There is an infinity of possible concepts on a plane: they resonate and connect up with mobile bridges, but it is impossible to foresee the appearance they take on as a function of variations of curvature. They are created in bursts and constantly bifurcate. The game is all the more complex because on each plane *negative* movements are enveloped within positive movements, expressing the risks and dangers confronted by thought, the false perceptions and bad feelings that surround it. There are also *antipathetic* conceptual personae who cling to sympathetic

personae and from whom the latter do not manage to free themselves (it is not only Zarathustra who is haunted by “his” ape or clown, or Dionysus who does not separate himself from Christ; but Socrates who never manages to distinguish himself from “his” sophist, and the critical philosopher who is always warding off his bad doubles). Finally, there are *repulsive* concepts locked within attractive ones but that outlines regions of low or empty intensity on the plane and that continually cut themselves off, create discordancies, and sever connections (does not transcendence itself have “its” concepts?). But even more than a vectorial distribution, the signs, personae, and concepts of planes are ambiguous because they are folded within one another, embrace or lie alongside one another. That is why philosophy always works blow by blow. (p. 76)

Post-qualitative inquiry does not offer an alternative or a solution to a specific problem whose success we can track and measure, instead it works in the plane of immanence, it works with a language yet to come for a people yet to come. The transformation is always already immanent. Therefore, the human being is not a subject that is inherent or stuck, but instead a socially constituted subject that emerges from a determined humanist image of thought. St. Pierre and Lather (2013) related this need to rethink human being to conventional humanist qualitative inquiry:

[R]ethinking humanist ontology is key in what comes after humanist qualitative methodology. If we cease to privilege knowing over being; if we refuse positivist and phenomenological assumptions about the nature of lived experience and the world; if we give up representational and binary logics; if we see language, the human, and the material not as separate entities mixed together but as completely imbricated “on the

surface” – if we do all that and the “more” it will open up – will qualitative inquiry as we know it be possible? Perhaps not. (p. 629-630)

Deleuze and Guattari (1994) described this empiricist conversion from a representational realm to a creative and inventive expanded empirical realm:

But, on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost the world, worse than a fiancée or a god). The problem has indeed changed. (p. 74-75)

Refusing human being for a subjectless subject

Post-Qualitative inquiry rejects the traditional enlightenment humanist subject by playing within its zones of indetermination. Foucault, Nietzsche, Deleuze, Guattari, Kafka, Derrida and many others have written for a people yet to come, a subject built from the refusal of human being. But conventional humanist qualitative inquiry relies on a stable description of human being centered around Descartes’ *cogito*. St. Pierre (2011) argued for the potential of a different description of human being:

We do organize and reorganize human being during different historical periods in different cultures using theories and practices laden with politics, power relations, values, and desire—not necessarily evil or mistaken, but surely in need of interrogation. The

point is that the description of human being we live now is not the same as past descriptions nor must it continue in the future. (p. 44-45)

Not only does this involve a questioning of what we are, it involves a reimagining of what is. We are always in the middle of things. The new subjects that we build up are always tied to what they are not, what they could be, what they always already are. We need a becoming-subject, a subjectless subject. Massumi (2011/2013) described this process:

The simple gesture of starting again from the beginning—that is, in the midst—has led to a rapid cascade of concepts. From something doing to the bare fact of activity; from there to event and change; then on to potential and the production of the new; coming to process as becoming. Then a major twist. The straight run encounters turbulence: process as becoming is not just creative activity, it turns out. It is *self-creation*. More than that, the self-creation is “enjoyed.” The principle of unrest eddies into something we would be forgiven for suspecting is not unlike an aesthetic appreciation: an enjoyment of creativity. How is this “at no remove”? How is this immediate? Doesn’t it imply self-reflection? Doesn’t self-reflection imply the luxury of the contemplative distance on the world? Isn’t that exactly what is excluded by the bare activist fact that we always find ourselves smack in the middle of its unrest? The paradox of an immediate “self-enjoyment” of experience, “belonging to the very essence” of its every occasion, is the complicating knot around which this approach to philosophy ties its concepts. It inscribes a certain duplicity into the very heart of its thinking and of the world.

The duplicity is in fact an artifact of the immediacy. It is simply that each occasion of experience comes into itself amid activities that are not its own, already going on. (p. 2)

The human being is always determined in retrospect. There is no doer before the deed. Always a feeding back, a stop-motion. How might we emerge differently? How might we always already not be human? Discussing Nietzsche's Overman, Deleuze (1969/1990) described a subjectless subject:

The new discourse is no longer that of the form, but neither is it that of the formless: it is rather that of the pure unformed. To the charge "You shall be a monster, a shapeless mass," Nietzsche responds: "We have realized this prophecy." As for the subject of this new discourse (except that there is no longer any subject), it is not man or God, and even less man in the place of God. The subject is this free, anonymous, and nomadic singularity which traverses men as well as plants and animals independently of the matter of their individuation and the forms of their personality. "Overman" means nothing other than this—the superior type of *everything that is*. This is a strange discourse, which ought to have renewed philosophy, and which finally deals with sense not as predicate or property but as an event. (p. 107)

Subjectivity becomes problematic, and opens up, as we move to a plane of immanence that comes prior to subjects and objects, Rajchman (2000) explained:

The "problem of subjectivity" Deleuze finds in his early study of Hume is that the self is not given, but formed through habit from an indeterminate world, and is itself a strange kind of "fiction" difficult to dissipate, since it is precisely the fiction of ourselves and our world. This "artifice," the determination of self, would then already be deepened in Kant, the indetermination in the formation of the "I think" would find an original relation to temporality, which Bergson or James would later try to free from the idea of extension or of "the block universe." One arrives in this way at the possibility of constructions in

experience prior to subjects and objects—what Deleuze would come to call a “plane of immanence.” Sartre would approach it in formulating a “transcendence of the ego”; Foucault would rediscover it in his attempt to work out an impersonality or anonymity of discourse, prior to the specification of subjects and referents, as condition of “events” of thought. In each case Deleuze would see a “superior empiricism” prior to any transcendental subjectivity or intersubjectivity—a sort of philosophy experimentalism that would suppose a “pure immanence,” with no first or transcendental elements, or which would not be immanent *to* anything prior, either subjective or objective. (p. 17)

However, the concept of subjectivity is still useful, it just must be reconstituted as something fluid and processual, not a stuck ontological determination. The subject as a becoming, rather than a static being. Conceptual personae and dynamic unities rather than rational knowing individuals.

New Empirical Paradoxical Composition

New empirical paradoxical composition is a method that uses the logic of resonance and paradox to incite thought differently from conventional language’s binary logic. It is post-representational in that it starts from a plane of immanence, where the subject is becoming. Words are ordered to incite thought rather than present specific meanings. It is used to express intensity and resonance without the distractions of specific information or findings. It is a process of a new communication that is experimental and creative. An ontogenetic communication that plays for the yet to come.

As we hear the rise of sampling in music, writing lags behind silently, weighted by the conventional standards of validity and legitimation. Plagiarism is still considered one of the most serious academic crimes despite decades of post-representational texts. A strategic name

game still needs to be played to successfully navigate the current disciplinary neoliberal landscape of academia. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) discussed this:

We have assigned clever pseudonyms to prevent recognition. Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. To make ourselves unrecognizable in turn. To render imperceptible, not ourselves, but what makes us act, feel, and think. Also because it's nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it's only a matter of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired, multiplied. (p. 3)

The hierarchy of individualism relies on a neoliberal logic focused on intent, efficiency, and discipline. This humanist logic of production confines our thought while music, intensely and abstractly, plows forward (not without its own resistance). Rajchman (1985) described Foucault's post-representational approach against neoliberalism:

For it is this freedom from dogmatic unity, and from the self-evidence of concrete systems of thought, which lies at the heart of Foucault's project and the difficulties peculiar to it. Foucault's skepticism is historical; it is directed against dogmatism that derives from turning a dispersed historical process into something unified and unchanging. Our unities of authorship, oeuvre, and discipline present themselves as natural or grounded; yet they are historically constituted. Freedom from dogmatic unity thus leads Foucault to freedom from a unique disciplinary starting point or a single correct method. Foucault finds his skeptical freedom in belonging to no single tradition, while trying to provoke new thinking in and about many different ones. His work would begin with allegiance to no one constituted school or movement. In his singular ethic of

writing without a single community, name, or following, without a fixed identity or ‘authorial face,’ it is this question of skeptical freedom that is at stake. (p. 4-5)

To make room outside of American neoliberalism’s cult of individuality for these lines of flight and new relations to work it is useful to inquire and experiment in relation to an unforeseen and unpredictable future, not the foreseeable and predictable future that logical positivism confines us to. This inquiry aims to serve a future yet to come and a people yet to come. Therefore, any traditional method that valorizes predictability, such as data collection and analysis, is problematized by this project.

Furthermore, this project aims to highlight the potential in resonance, sound, and music to create more open meanings than those found in language’s conventional binary logic, while simultaneously bringing all meaning into question; resonance as something real and abstract that is useful for the questioning of systems of thought.¹⁴ New empirical paradoxical composition plays with the old logic of contradiction while simultaneously using a different logic of resonance. Writing from a neo-Marxist frame Attali (1977/2011) argued:

It is the advent of a radically new form of the insertion of music into communication, one that is overturning all of the concepts of political economy and giving new meaning to the political project. The only radically different course open for knowledge and social reality. The only dimension permitting the escape from ritual dictatorship, the illusion of representation, and the silence of repetition. Music, the ultimate form of production, gives voice to this new emergence, suggesting that we designate it *composition*. (p. 134)

Therefore, the methods of this dissertation might be distinguished as new empirical paradoxical composition. New empirical because it draws from an expanded empirical field no longer confined to the experience of the *cogito*, paradoxical because we are working at the limit

of language where no clear answers are given only more lines of flight (the logic of contradiction is broken open), and composition because the text is an assemblage of ideas decentered from their historical contexts and reordered using a different logic, a logic of resonance. Deleuze (1968/1994) described this method:

The search for new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other acts... In this context, we can now raise the question of the utilization of the history of philosophy. It seems to us that the history of philosophy should play a role roughly analogous to that of *collage* in painting. The history of philosophy is the reproduction of philosophy itself. In the history of philosophy, a commentary should act as a veritable double and bear the maximal modification appropriate to a double. (One imagines a *philosophically* bearded Hegel, a *philosophically* clean-shaven Marx, in the same way as a moustached Mona Lisa.) It should be possible to recount a real book of past philosophy as if it were an imaginary and feigned book. Borges, we know, excelled in recounting imaginary books. But he goes further when he considers a real book, such as *Don Quixote*, as though it were an imaginary book, itself reproduced by an imaginary author, Pierre Menard, who in turn he considers to be real. In this case, the most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of difference ('The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer...'). Commentaries in the history of philosophy should represent a kind of slow motion, a congelation or immobilisation of the text: *not only* of the text to which they relate, *but also* of the text in which they are inserted – so much so that they have a double existence and a corresponding ideal: the pure repetition of the former text and the present text *in one*

another. It is in order to approach this double existence that we have sometimes had to integrate historical notes into the present text. (p. xxi-xxii)

Derrida (1978) referencing Levi-Strauss related this double existence to musical composition:

This statement is repeated a little farther on: “As the myths themselves are based on secondary codes (the primary codes being those that provide the substance of language), the present work is put forward as a tentative draft of a tertiary code, why it would not be wrong to consider this book itself as a myth: it is, as it were, the myth of mythology.”

The absence of a center is here the absence of a subject and the absence of an author:

“Thus the myth and the musical work are like conductors of an orchestra, whose audience becomes the silent performers. If it is now asked where the real center of the work is to be found, the answer is that this is impossible to determine. Music and mythology bring man face to face with potential objects of which only the shadows are actualized... Myths are anonymous.” The musical model chosen by Levi-Strauss for the composition of his book is apparently justified by this absence of any real and fixed center of the mythical or mythological discourse.

Thus it is at this point that ethnographic *bricolage* deliberately assumes its mythopoetic function. But by the same token, this function makes the philosophical or epistemological requirement of a center appear as mythological, that is to say, as a historical illusion. (p. 287)

Instead of using passages from philosophical texts to fill gaps in the history of philosophy we work as the *bricoleur*¹⁵ composing something new from found materials. As a sample-based song reorganizes and transforms pieces of other works to create something new, we reorder and

transmute passages from a variety of texts to create something different without being limited by the logic of representation and intent¹⁶. We play to compose the text through difference, giving it a double existence¹⁷ and opening space for different meanings to emerge. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) discussed the solvency mechanism of this paradoxical approach:

If philosophy is paradoxical by nature, this is not because it sides with the least plausible opinion or because it maintains contradictory opinions but rather because it uses sentences of a standard language to express something that does not belong to the order of opinion or even of the proposition. The concept is indeed a solution, but the problem to which it corresponds lies in its intensional conditions of consistency and not, as in science, in the conditions of reference of extensional propositions. If the concept is a solution, the conditions of the philosophical problem are found on the plane of immanence presupposed by the concept (to what infinite movement does it refer in the image of thought?), and the unknowns of the problem are found in the conceptual personae that it calls up (what persona exactly?). A concept like knowledge has meaning only in relation to an image of thought to which it refers and to a conceptual persona that it needs; a different image and a different persona call for other concepts (belief, for example, and the Investigator). (p. 80-81)

Massumi (2011/2013) continued describing the creative advantage to using paradox at the limits of language:

As a limit-concept, the virtual cannot be thought without the paradox—and without working to make the paradox conceptually productive. There are a number of key junctures at which activist philosophy, like any metaphysics, must affirmatively make do with paradox. This is an essential moment in a philosophy's self-formation. It is the

moment a philosophical thought process verges upon the limit of what it can think. To make that limit-experience productive the thinking must then turn back before it breaks apart like a spaceship entering a black hole. It must inscribe that self-saving inflection in itself, in the form of new concepts or new variations on old concepts. This must be done in a way that does *not* try to resolve or dismiss the paradox. It is done by taking the paradox seriously as a limit, turning back from it, and taking the necessity of turning back constructively to heart. The limit-experience of paradox turns around into an impulse for continuing the philosophy's self-creative advance. It has been taken-in as a self-modulation of the thinking-process. It is no longer worried over as a logical contradiction. It has been actively converted into a creative factor that is liminally immanent to the process. It has become a positive factor. This affirmation of *noncontradiction* as a self-formative necessity is an essential feature of a creative philosophy's signature activity." (p. 18-19)

Our task is to strategically compose our image of thought as intensely, fluidly, and openly as possible, always becoming. This is a call for nomadic composition, the composition of a wandering image of thought that strives to constantly question regimes of truth and decenter its own systems as they progressively build up with depths of habit. It is a call for a composition that pushes us to the limits of understanding and then turns around affirmatively. Attali (1977/2011) described this new composition still using a neo-Marxist discourse:

There is no communication possible between men any longer, now that the codes have been destroyed, including even the code of exchange in repetition. We are all condemned to silence—unless we create our own relation with the world and try to tie other people into the meaning we thus create. That is what composing is. Doing solely for the sake of

doing, without trying artificially to recreate the old codes in order to reinsert communication into them. Inventing new codes, inventing the message at the same time as the language. Playing for one's own pleasure, which alone can create the conditions for new communication. A concept such as this seems natural in the context of music. But it reaches far beyond that; it relates to the emergence of the free act, self-transcendence, pleasure in being instead of having. I will show that it is at the same time the inevitable result of the pulverization of the networks, without which it cannot come to pass, and a herald of a new form of socialization, for which self-management is only a very partial designation. (p. 134)

The expansion of the empirical field allows for experimentalism in experience, opening space for something new to happen. Instead of describing what has already become in the field, it zooms out to an indeterminate ontological field that allows process to come before determination. It allows movement to continue to flow. It allows for an expanded sense-experience that might be understood as a resonance-experience. Deleuze (1969/1990) explained:

The question is as follows: is there something, *aliquid*, which merges neither with the proposition or with the terms of the proposition, nor with the object or with the state of affairs which the proposition denotes, neither with the "lived," or representation or the mental activity of the person who expresses herself in the proposition, nor with concepts or even signified essences? If there is, sense, or that which is expressed by the proposition, would be irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts. The Stoics said it all: neither word nor body, neither sensible representation nor *rational representation*. Better yet, perhaps sense would be "neutral," altogether indifferent to both particular and general, singular

and universal, personal and impersonal. It would be of an entirely different nature. But is it necessary to recognize such a supplementary instance? Or must we indeed manage to get along with what we already have: denotation, manifestation, and signification? In each period the controversy is taken up anew (Andre de Neufchateau and Pierre d'Ailly against Rimini, Brentano and Russell against Meinong). In truth, the attempt to make this fourth dimension evident is a little like Carroll's Snark hunt. Perhaps the dimension is the hunt itself, and sense is the Snark. It is difficult to respond to those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, images, and ideas. For we may not even say that sense exists either in things or in the mind; it has neither physical nor mental existence. Shall we at least say that it is useful, and that it is necessary to admit it for its utility? Not even this, since it is endowed with an inefficacious, impassive, and sterile splendor. This is why we said that *in fact* we can only infer it indirectly, on the basis of the circle where the ordinary dimensions of the proposition lead us. It is only by breaking open the circle, as in the case of the Mobius strip, by unfolding and untwisting it, that the dimension of sense appears for itself, in its irreducibility, and also in its genetic power as it animates an a priori internal model of the proposition. The logic of sense is inspired in its entirety by empiricism. Only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimensions of the visible without falling into Ideas, and how to track down, invoke, and perhaps produce a phantom at the limit of a lengthened or unfolded experience. (p. 19-20)

This dissertation uses paradox to write with a more open meaning, to express a logic of resonance in writing.¹⁸ Sound is not necessary for resonance, everything is vibrating, everything is in movement, but resonance has neither physical nor mental existence. Therefore this dissertation might also be understood to be a composition.¹⁹ Composing a relation zoomed out

before any determination of self or world. This is what a new mass communication calls for.

Composition as a constitutive practice. In the twenty fifth aphorism of *The Gay Science*

Nietzsche (1887/1974) argued:

Request

The minds of others I know well;

But who *I* am, I cannot tell:

My eye is much too close to me,

I am not what I saw and see.

It would be quite a benefit

If only I could sometimes sit

Farther away; but my foes are

Too distant; close friends, still too far;

Between my friends and me, the middle

Would do. My wish? *You* guess my riddle. (p. 49-51)

CHAPTER 4

FOR A DIONYSIAN MACHINE

Introduction

Nietzsche (1872/2003) called for an inquiry into music and sound when revisiting his first book:

[A]part, of course, from all the impetuous hopes and applications to contemporary issues with which I spoiled my first book, the great Dionysiac question mark remains, also as regards music how would a music be that was not romantic in origin, as German music is—but *Dionysiac*?... (p. 10)

In this chapter, a design for a Dionysian machine is proposed. The design itself is meant to incite an activity of thought and to function using the earlier described new empirical paradoxical composition. Instead of designing a machine for participants, and then data collection, this machine is designed for everyone and no one. It is a process, always becoming. Record of its existence and use come as an afterthought with little bearing on its success. While the machine may incite thought about language, resonance, subjectivity, communication, and reality, it also may not. Communicating a specific message or pattern of thought is not the

measure of utility for this machine. Its usefulness can be found elsewhere, more abstractly. The music of the machine is yet to come and always already present.

The Dionysian instrument connects a tanpura with a patch created in Max/MSP. The patch responds to audio input received from a contact microphone attached to the body of the tanpura, underneath the strings just above the bridge. Another microphone is used to record a duration of human speech before the instrument is played. This audio clip may come from the player or elsewhere, in fact, the microphone is not required, as experimenting with many different sound sources could create more diverse lines of flight. The hope for this open design is that it leaves space not only for unpredictable results but also for unpredictable malfunctions and breakdowns. Most importantly, an open design that creates a new music.

The tanpura is a classical Indian drone instrument that has been used for centuries to provide a bed of resonance that connects and interacts harmonically with other sounds. The tanpura never takes any lead, but instead provides the connections for melodic structures to form in relation to its pulsing drone. It often accompanies tabla, sitar, and other classical Indian instruments, but it is also often played in connection with the human voice.

Max/MSP is a visual programming language that is increasingly used for explorations into sound composition and performance. Within the instrument, this digital language connects the acoustic resonance of the tanpura with the increasing digitization of communication. It uses multiple forms of communication in tandem to express something unexpected.

Connecting these forms of communication that demonstrate a different constitutive power and using them to rupture and reorder spoken language's meanings into a resonant aleatory composition allows a different logic to emerge that is consistent with the logic of resonance and the method of new empirical paradoxical composition, however, certain concerns of

instrumentality and new forms of dominance come into question. Attali (1977/2011) described music's constitutive power:

It is a mirror, because as a mode of immaterial production it relates to the structuring of theoretical paradigms, far ahead of concrete production... But it reflects a fluid reality. The only thing that primitive polyphony, classical counterpoint, tonal harmony, twelve-tone serial music, and electronic music have in common is the principle of giving form to noise in accordance with changing syntactic structures. The history of music is the 'Odyssey of a wandering, the adventure of its absences.' (p. 9)

Music, language, and reality

Language constitutes reality. The logics of language not only shape the way we communicate in a determined concrete reality, but also shape the way that reality comes together. The binary logic of language situates subjects and objects in a determined space, but resonance and other forms of communication also play in to the determination of reality, just more openly and abstractly. Music can be used to radically question and decenter the rigid oppositions of binary logic used in conventional language. Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) argued that music is a smooth space with an open resonance and fluid form appropriate for nomadic thought:

Music has always sent out lines of flight, like so many 'transformational multiplicities,' even overturning the very codes that structure or arborify it; that is why musical form, right down to its ruptures and proliferations is comparable to a weed, a rhizome. (p. 11-12)

Not only does music incite an activity of thought through lines of flight, music also offers a different form of communication before any determined sender or receiver. Despite being

written within a structuralist neo-marxist frame, Attali (1977/2011) argued music remains fluid, never holding any meaning, it is always becoming:

Listening to music is to receive a message. Nevertheless music cannot be equated with a language. Quite unlike the words of a language – which refer to a signified—music, though it has a precise operationality, never has a stable reference to a code of a linguistic type. It is not a ‘myth coded in sounds instead of words,’ but rather a ‘language without meaning.’ It has neither meaning nor finality...there is no convincing theory of music as language... The musical message has no meaning, even if one artificially assigns a (necessarily rudimentary) signification to certain sounds, a move that is almost always associated with a hierarchical discourse. In fact, the signification of music is far more complex. Although the value of a sound, like that of a phoneme, is determined by its relations with other sounds, it is, more than that, a relation embedded in a specific culture; the ‘meaning’ of the musical message is expressed in a global fashion, in its operationality, and not in the juxtaposed signification of each sound element. (p. 25)

Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained this power of music as expressing something before any determined subject or reality, a form zoomed out from binary language, an ontogenetic form of communication:

[T]he world-symbolism of music cannot be exhaustively interpreted through language, because it symbolically refers to the primal contradiction and the primal suffering within the primal Oneness, and thus symbolizes a sphere beyond and prior to all phenomena. In comparison with this, all phenomena are mere symbols: hence *language*, as the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never uncover the innermost core of music but, once it attempts to imitate music, always remains in superficial contact with it, and no amount of

lyrical eloquence can bring its deepest meaning a step closer. (p. 35)

The tanpura and resonance

This project finds the acoustic tanpura as a consistent theoretical tool for this Dionysian instrument. Although the tanpura's primary role is to provide a bed of tones for other lead instruments to establish melody over, the drone itself is made up of a multiplicity of tones whose order and harmony are unpredictable. The drone is one and many. Spaink (2011) described a subtle difference in expression heard in the tone of each tanpura performance:

[T]here is not only one "right" way of tuning in PssS (or MssS, NssS) as it is possible to adjust the finer resonances in function of a particular raga. A tanpura with this kind of subtle tuning can inspire both the musicians and the audience with its animated presence...In daily use, the word "jivari" has different meanings: the word translates as "soul" or "live-giving" but also refers to the threads and the carefully filed sloping curve of the bridge which "animate" the tone of the tanpura.

The jivari of the tanpura determines the resonance. The resonance determines reality and experience. When discussing the findings from his scientific study that analyzed the tanpura's resonance Paritosh Pandya (2004) claimed, "[o]ur experiment shows that the rich harmonic structure of tanpura sound indeed leads to the perception of several notes as the musicians have claimed." (p. 8) The pool of resonance, made up of a multiplicity of pitches, provides a sense for melodic propositions or lines of flight. The tanpura's resonance lies on the fold between propositions and things.

Art, performance, interactivity, and the problem of instrumentality



Figure 3: A Dionysian Instrument (Lewis, 2017)

For this project, participation must be thought of differently. Not dissimilar from the drone created by the tanpura in preparation for a melody, Massumi (2013) explained a new approach to participation, causality, and relation all rooted in the conditions of the event:

The notion of non-connective relation encapsulated in the phrase relation-of-nonrelation

changes the meaning of “participation.” While at first sight participation may seem to have evaporated, it has actually redoubled. It comes once in the fielding of the multiplicity of contributory elements. The multitude of atmospheric particles—each of which can be considered an occasion of experience in its own right—create the conditions for the strike of lightning by entering into a commotion of mutual interference and resonance. Each actively participates in the production of the whole-field effects that energize the night sky for the coming event. The whole-field effects are a dynamic expression of each contributory element’s remote participation in every other’s activity. The singularity of each element’s activity is fused in the general field of activity whose tension potentiates the event, and against which the added novelty of the flash stands out, in the contrasting brightness of its own special activity. The participation of the conditioning of elements occurs *at a distance*: between the elements; across the intervals actually separating them. The event comes strikingly into itself against the background of what has now become its contrasting field of emergence. It sheers off from its field of emergence, into its own absolute individuality of occurrence. The event has partaken of the potential bequeathed it by the general background activity. This sheer partaking of potential is the second participation involved in the concept of the relation-of-nonrelation. Here, participation is partitive (disjunctive or separative), in occurrent answer to the fusional participation of the fielding (which is conjunctive in the envelopmental sense of a dynamic mutual inclusion). The event, seen in this striking light, is doubly participatory—but nowhere else connective. It is nonlocal. Its conditions are fielded at a distance, and the dazzle of its culmination distances itself from the field of its emergence, in striking contrast to it...

The concept of the relation-of-nonrelation is that of *nonlocality* of relation. Relation is nonlocal in two co-implicated senses, corresponding to the two modes of participation involved: 1) the fielding of potential comes of the intervals between elements and 2), the sheering away of the event into the unity of its own occurrence asserts a parturitional interval between itself, as extra-effective being, and the background of potential creating the conditions for its birth. What participation means must be rearticulated in light of the double nonlocality of relation. One of the stakes in that rearticulation will be the notion of causality. The flash of lightning is *conditioned*, more than it is *caused*. It self-causes, given its conditions. To say that it is caused would imply a genetic passivity. The paradigm of the relation-of-nonrelation finds activity everywhere, in different modes (in fielding and striking; in general activity and special activity; and most especially, in the bare activity hinging them). (p. 22-23)

The Dionysian machine might be understood as a tool for questioning and reorganizing causality. The determination of the lightning bolt distracts from the non-visual ontogenetic background of the event. The entirety of the event is virtual, but the lightning bolt gives focus and zooms in. A melody from a sitar or a voice also distracts from the whole field of the tanpura's drone (and jivari), the multiplicitous pool of resonance providing the background for the determined individual melody. Massumi (2013) continued to explain this more expansive and abstract event:

The visibility of the lightning brought the commotion of elemental activity filling the night sky into vision, without it actually showing. It got into the act, but was lost in the show. The flashiness of the lightning was the brilliant tip of an atmospheric iceberg full of both oneness and manyness, whose field respects showily disappeared into the

ontogenetic background. The lightning is the appearing tip of a more expansive event that never shows in its entirety. The fullness of the event's conditioning and occurrence is perceptually felt, in the dynamic form of how what actually appears steals the show. Even if the event's conditioning elements and culmination are actual, the *entirety* of the event is virtual: doubly nonlocal, nonsensuously present, registering only in effect, and on all three counts really abstract. (p. 24)

Inquiry into mass communication should not be limited to a humanist sender-receiver model. Communication and its participants are not all human and it cannot all be seen. Mass communication takes on new meanings in the expanded empirical field without a determined subject, it opens up to what might be more appropriately labeled ontogenetic communication. To inquire into the virtual and abstract forms and effects of communication we must make room for art and philosophy in research. Experimentation without quantifiable results. Creativity without predictability as a guiding standard. Art experimentation makes room for wonder. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy's section on Deleuze, Daniel Smith and John Protevi (2013) explained some of the advantages of art in inquiry:

For Deleuze, the task of art is to produce "signs" that will push us out of our habits of perception into the conditions of creation. When we perceive via the re-cognition of the properties of substances, we see with a stale eye pre-loaded with clichés; we order the world in what Deleuze calls "representation."... Art however cannot be recognized, but can only be sensed; in other words, art splits perceptual processing, forbidding the move to conceptual ordering... You have to be forced to think, starting with an art encounter in which intensity is transmitted in signs or sensation. Rather than a "common sense" in which all the faculties agree in recognizing the "same" object, we find in this

communicated violence a “discordant harmony” (compare the Kantian sublime) that tears apart the subject (here we find the notion of “cruelty” Deleuze picks up from Artaud).”

The conventional academic approach to mass communication is limited by the rational humanist regime of truth that uses a logic of representation and the individual rational knowing subject as its starting point. This leads to research focused on exposing truths found in a concrete exterior. Breaking from this limited starting point makes room for art and other experimental approaches to communication that don’t rely on those confining standards that determine the subject so narrowly. It’s a move from a retrospective processing of information that leads to findings, to a more creative activity focusing on process and the event. The conventional standards of validity judging academic work are no longer applicable to this creative, active, and affirmative research. Art activates thought before any determined memory, Deleuze (1964/2000) explained:

The adventure of the involuntary recurs on the level of each faculty. In two different ways, the world signs and the signs of love are interpreted by the intelligence. But this is no longer that abstract and voluntary intelligence, which claims to find logical truths by itself, to have its own order, and to anticipate pressures from the outside world. This is an involuntary intelligence, the intelligence that undergoes the pressure of signs and comes to life only in order to interpret them, in order thus to exorcise the void in which it chokes, the suffering that submerges it. In science and in philosophy, the intelligence always “comes before,” but characteristic of signs is their appeal to the intelligence insofar as it comes after, insofar as it must come after (III, 880). The same is true of memory; the sensuous signs force us to seek the truth, but thereby mobilize an involuntary memory (or an involuntary imagination born of desire). Finally the signs of

art force us to think; they mobilize pure thought as a faculty of essences. They release within thought what depends least on its goodwill: the act of thinking itself. The signs mobilize, constrain a faculty: intelligence, memory, or imagination. This faculty, in its turn, mobilizes thought, forces it to conceive essences. Under the signs of art, we learn what pure thought is as a faculty of essences and how the intelligence, the memory, or the imagination diversify it in relation to the other kinds of signs. (p. 98-99)

Although we are friends of wisdom, it is art that blurs the division of friends of wisdom and the excluded exclusionary (discussed in chapter 1) and incites pure thought without prescribed meaning. A major concern is that this dissertation takes too many steps to designate certain limitations on pure thought. However, the goal of inciting pure or creative thought remains essential. Making space for creative experimentation in mass communication that strives to incite thought, rather than presenting results about a supposedly concrete and representable phenomenon, not only transforms mass communication but also transforms the subject and reality itself. Carroll (1872) wrote:

'It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, 'but it's *rather* hard to understand!' (You see she didn't like to confess, even to herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.) 'Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don't exactly know what they are! However, somebody killed something: that's clear, at any rate.' (p. 24)

Art allows for several stories to be told at once. Art, no longer tied to the logic of representation, forms a dynamic unity between possible experience and real experience using a logic of resonance to guide its experimentation. Art as a tool of affirmation. Art as a multiplicitous narrative full of an infinite number of stories and realities, multiple pitches

sounding simultaneously. Deleuze (1969/1990) explained:

Aesthetics suffer from a wrenching duality. On one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of art as the reflection of real experience. For these two meanings to be tied together, the conditions of experience in general must become conditions of real experience; in this case, the work of art would really appear as experimentation. We know, for example, that certain literary procedures (the same holds for other arts) permit several stories to be told at once. This is, without doubt, the essential characteristic of the modern work of art. It is not at all a question of different points of view on one story supposedly the same; for points of view would still be submitted to a rule of convergence. It is rather a question of different and divergent stories, as if an absolutely distinct landscape corresponded to each point of view. There is indeed a unity of divergent series insofar as they are divergent, but it is always a chaos perpetually thrown off center which becomes one only in the Great Work. This unformed chaos, the great letter of *Finnegans Wake*, is not just any chaos: it is the power of affirmation, the power to affirm all the heterogeneous series—it “complicates” within itself all the series (hence the interest of Joyce in Bruno as the theoretician of the *complication*). Between these basic series, a sort of *internal resonance* is produced; and this resonance induces a *forced movement*, which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the characteristics of the simulacrum, when it breaks its chains and rises to the surface: it then affirms its phantasmatic power, that is, its repressed power. Freud has already shown how the phantasm results from at least two series, one infantile and the other post-pubescent. The affective charge associated with the phantasm is explained by the internal resonance whose bearers are the simulacra. The

impression of death, of the rupture or dismembering of life, is explained by the amplitude of the forced movement which carries them along. Thus the conditions of real experience and the structures of the work of art are reunited: divergence of series, decentering of circles, constitution of the chaos which envelops them, internal resonance and movement of amplitude, aggression of the simulacra. (p. 260-261)

The simulacra are simultaneously real and illusion, but they also enable action (in themselves and through their rupture). The Dionysian machine is a simulacrum device that breaks the chains of concrete reality. A machine that produces an internal resonance that affirms all the heterogeneous series connected to it, forcing movement that goes beyond the series themselves. The Dionysian works to constitute the subject differently. It zooms us out, taking us above, and then we are returned below, but it is different, the inevitable return of what never was. Everything is flattened. The dread of this abyss (or desert) can immobilize and overwhelm, but it is in our understanding of the simulacra that we artists can return to action. Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained:

The ecstasy of the Dionysiac state, abolishing the habitual barriers and boundaries of existence, actually contains, for its duration, a lethargic element into which all past personal experience is plunged. Thus, through this gulf of oblivion, the worlds of everyday and Dionysiac reality become separated. But when one once more becomes aware of this everyday reality, it becomes repellent; this leads to a mood of asceticism, of denial of the will. This is something that Dionysiac man shares with Hamlet: both have truly seen to the essence of things, they consider it ludicrous or shameful that they should be expected to restore order to the chaotic world. Understanding kills action, action depends on a veil of illusion—this is what Hamlet teaches us, not the stock interpretation

of Hamlet as a John-a-dreams who, from too much reflection, from an excess of possibilities, so to speak, fails to act. Not reflection, not that!—True understanding, insight into the terrible truth, outweighs every motive for action, for Hamlet and Dionysiac man alike. No consolidation will be of any use from now on, longing passes over the world towards death, beyond the gods themselves, existence, radiantly reflected in the gods or in an immortal ‘Beyond’, is denied. Aware of truth from a single glimpse of it, all man can now see is the horror and absurdity of existence; now he understands the symbolism of Ophelia’s fate, now he understands the wisdom of Silenus, the god of the woods: it repels him.

Here, in this supreme menace to the will, there approaches a redeeming, healing enchantress—*art*. She alone can turn these thoughts of repulsion at the horror and absurdity of existence into ideas compatible with life: these are the *sublime*—the taming of horror through art; and *comedy*—the artistic release from the repellence of the absurd. The satyr chorus of the dithyramb is the salvation of Greek art; the frenzies described above were exhausted in the middle world of these Dionysiac attendants. (p. 39-40)

While the sciences feel increasingly slow and retrospective as they exponentially accelerate in their production of information, art slows down that humanist drive to outdate itself. Instead of a linear progressive humanist activity pushing humanity to its climax (conceptualized in the instantaneous age of information²⁰ or the singularity²¹), art allows subjectivity and reality to emerge differently. Instead of a scientific doom-laden rush to preserve humanity, we focus on activity to affirmatively emerge differently; to wonder and to simultaneously make space for the inevitable return of what never was. Nietzsche (1998), through Heraclitus, discussed the creative power of art in relation to reality and affirmation:

Do guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in this world?

They do, proclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited human mind which sees things apart but not connected, not for the con-tuitive god. For him all contradictions run into harmony, invisible to the common human eye, yet understandable to one who, like Heraclitus, is related to the contemplative god. Before his fire-gaze not a drop of injustice remains in the world poured all around him; even that cardinal impulse that allows pure fire to inhabit such impure forms is mastered by him with a sublime metaphor. In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming-to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in forever equal innocence. And as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living fire. It constructs and destroys, all in innocence. Such is the game that the Aeon plays with itself. Transforming itself into water and earth, it builds towers of sand like a child at the seashore, piles them up and tramples them down. From time to time it starts the game anew. An instant of satiety—and again it is seized by its need, as the artist is seized by his need to create. Not hybris but the ever self-renewing, impulse to play calls new worlds into being. The child throws its toys away from time to time—and starts again, in innocent caprice. But when it does build, it combines and joins and forms its structures regularly, conforming to inner laws.

Only aesthetic man can look thus at the world, a man who has experienced in artists and in the birth of art objects how the struggle of the many can yet carry rules and laws inherent in itself, how the artist stands contemplatively above and at the same time actively within his work, how necessity and random play, oppositional tension and harmony, must pair to create a work of art. (p. 61-62)

Instead of a scientific humanist linear progressive work to explain what has, is, and will occur, art works on an ontogenetic level of activity that makes space for what has, is, and will be to form differently. Art is a process for the yet to come while science limits itself to retrospect and representation. Moving away from Nietzsche's oppositional discourse describing the aesthetic man, Massumi (2011/2013) described creative techniques of existence in relation to the art and politics of event formation:

In what follows, the question of how the makeup of an occasion of experience effectively and constructively includes its own beyond is approached through the concept of *techniques of existence*. A technique of existence is a technique that takes as its "object" process itself, as the speculative-pragmatic production of oriented events of change. Techniques of existence are dedicated to ontogenesis as such. They operate immediately qualitatively-relationally. They make no gesture of claiming "objectivity," nor do they pride themselves on their grasp of common sense. At the same time, they reject being characterized as "merely" subjective. They are *inventive* of subjective forms in the activist sense: dynamic unities of events unfolding. So implicated are they with the politicality of event-formation that they qualify whatever domain in which their creativity is operative as an *occurrent art*. (p. 14)

Techniques of existence are not limited to techniques employed by a concrete subject, in fact, they reject it. They are zoomed out, focused on the ontogenetic constitutive power of the always becoming process. The formation of a domain through a philosophy of immanence qualifies that domain as an *occurrent art*. Not art as a product but art as living, art as creation, art as affirmation. Massumi (2011/2013) related the affirmative powers of art and new empirical paradoxical composition:

To compose, we must deal with the “constituent parts”—contributory factors of activity—in great detail. But the more detail with which we grasp them, the more apt they are to fade into a remoteness where they recede into nonrelation. Yet they may also advance into new experiential dimensions, forwarding experience into new directions for composition. The diagram, as explained above, is a word that activist philosophy uses to name a speculative-pragmatic procedure for navigating this complexity of experience’s passing, taking special aim on the “critical” moments. These are the junctures where one moment of experience’s passing passes into another, informing it of (in-forming it with) the potential to become again: technique of existence. Klee’s reference to art *and* nature in this connection implies that they are both compositional realities, that their compositions involve a diagrammatic experience of becoming, and that this becoming of experience is aesthetic in its multidimensionality.

This brings us to the final question, that of experience in nonhuman forms of life, and in nonliving matter itself. It was already asserted that the world was made of expression. In this context, this is the same as saying that the world is made of experience. If the world is made of experience, there is perception everywhere in it. For activist philosophy, the question of the nonhuman revolves around the question of nonhuman perception. In what way can we say that what we have a tendency to separate out as “dumb matter” in fact perceives and is therefore, by the precepts of activist philosophy, experientially self-creative? (p. 25)

Massumi (2011/2013) explained art’s ability to highlight different dimensions of experience besides the everyday subject/object binary dimension, a focus on the becoming:

It is the feeling in this chair that life goes on. It presents, in the object, the object's *relation* to the flow not of action but of life itself, its dynamic unfolding, the fact that it is always passing through its own potential. It's how life feels when you see it can seat you. In Antonio Damasio's terms, it's the "feeling of what happens," that background feeling of what it's "like" to be alive, here and now, but having been many elsewhere and with times to come. Art brings that vitality affect to the fore.

All of this suggests a way of bringing art and "natural" perception together while still having a way of distinguishing them. In art, we see life dynamics "with and through" actual form. Or rather, we always see relationally and processurally in this way, but art makes us see that we see this way. It is the technique of making vitality affect felt. Of making an explicit experience of what otherwise slips behind the flow of action and is only implicitly felt. Of making the imperceptible appear. In everyday perception, the same thing occurs. There is an artfulness in every experience. Art and everyday perception are in continuity with one another. But in everyday experience, the emphasis is different. It is all a question of emphasis, an economy of foregrounding and backgrounding of dimensions of experience that always occur together and absolutely need each other. Art foregrounds the dynamic, ongoingly relational pole. Everyday experience foregrounds the object-oriented, action-reaction, instrumental pole. That pole comes across as stable because it offers our action perches—"affordances" in J.J. Gibson's vocabulary (1986, 36, 137-138). We attend to the perchiness, and let the other side of that same coin, the passing-relation side, slip behind the use we can extract from the perception. Art brings back out the fact that all form is a full-spectrum *dynamic form* of life. There is really no such thing as fixed form—which is another way of saying that

the object of vision is virtual. Art is the technique for making that necessary but normally unperceived fact perceptible, in a qualitative perception that is as much about life itself as it is about the things we live by. Art is the technique of living life *in*—experiencing the virtuality of it more fully. Living it more intensely. Technique of existence. (p. 45)

Jivari helps highlight that all form is a full-spectrum dynamic form of life. Resonance precedes determined relation. But What implications might this machine activate? One difficulty that deserves thought and criticism is the instrumentality of this Dionysian machine. Is its technical use and predictable interaction too calculated and thus too hierarchical? Is there enough room left in its design for malfunctions and wonder? Again, Massumi (2011/2013) addressed these concerns when discussing instrumentalism in art and performance based research objects:

It is the form of the technical object that is emphasized, for what it affords. The emphasis is on the perches it offers for a relaying from action to reaction and back again. It is supposed to be all about social relation, but the dynamic form of the experience tends to get reduced to the instrumental affordance as concretized in the actual form of the technical object. It gets reified in an objective function. The technical object is action-packed. But the sense of action is constrained, subordinated to functional circuits of action-reaction that are to a large extent predetermined to respond to what are taken to be existing needs or wants.

Interaction is just that: a going back and forth between actions, largely reduced to instrumental function. The lesson of the semblance is that lived reality of what is

happening is so much more, qualitatively. It includes an “uncanny” moreness to life as an unfolding lived relation in a world whose every moment is intensely suffused with virtuality—an abstractly felt “backside,” or voluminousness, of life itself. When what is concentrated on are instrumentalized action-reaction circuits, what gets foregrounded is the element of nextness in the flow of action. The voluminousness of the experience, its all-aroundness and going-for-moreness, shrinks from feeling.

That is why I make a distinction between interactivity and relation. I use the word *interactivity* to designate an instrumentally contracted dynamic form that tends to shrink to the parameters of its objectively embodied instrumental function. I use the word *relation* to refer to the full spectrum of vitality that the dynamic form really includes, potentially, abstractly self-expressed in its semblance. Interactivity backgrounds its own artistic dimension when it concentrates on the function of the instrument to the detriment of the semblant expression. That’s what has happened when we hear the comment, all too common, from interactive art participants that the experience felt like a video game. You often feel there’s a trick you need to find and master, and once you’ve done that, you lose interest because you’ve got the feel of it and know how it “works.” When something loses intensity instead of becoming more compelling when you get the feel of it, it is a sure sign that it is operating more on a level of predefined objective function than fully lived relation.

I’m not saying that all interactive art does this. It’s just that this is the trap that is automatically laid for it, the problem it has to grapple with by its very nature. The problem is: in what way is this different from a game? Is this doing something that mainstream informational capitalism isn’t already doing, ever so profitably, by

generalizing the gaming paradigm? What's new or different or intensely feeling or vitally voluminous or virtually freeing about it? Paradoxically, the intensity of the dynamic form of the experience comes out most effectively when action-reaction circuits are artfully suspended or (even better in this context) when the action line itself is accompanied by a continuous semblance of itself, an ongoing perception of its singular eventfulness doubling the functional perception of perception suspending or abstractly doubling action-reaction is an idea that Deleuze develops at length in connection to an older dynamic form in his *Cinema* books (1986, 1989) (p. 46-47)

The Dionysian machine is much more than the instrument itself. As stated above, it is composed of design, theory, concepts, and practice. Its material existence and function are secondary, even paradoxical. Its material interactive existence is found in the instrument, its semblant expression is described as the machine. Massumi (2011/2013) continued:

What interactive art can do, what its strength is in my opinion, is to take the *situation* as its "object." Not a function, not a use, not a need, not a behavior, exploratory or otherwise, not an action-reaction. But a situation, with its own little ocean of complexity. It can take a situation and "open" the interactions it affords. The question for interactive art is, how do you cleave an interaction asunder? Setting up an interaction is easy. We have any number of templates for that. But how do you set it up so you sunder it, dynamically smudge it, so that the relational potential it tends-toward appears? So that the situation's objectivity creatively self-abstracts, making a self-tending life-movement, a life-subject and not just a setup. How, in short, do you make a semblance of a situation? These are technical questions, essentially about framing, about what it means to frame an event situationally or house a dispositional life-subject. You can get there

technically—in fact whatever the nature of the object involved, it is always a question of technique—but when you do it's not because you've built a better-functioning machine. It's because you've built into the operation shifts in emphasis from interaction to lived relation. You're operating on the qualitative level of thinking-feeling, where you are pooling styles of being and becoming, not just eliciting behaviors. (p. 52)

Is the dissertation process a situation? Are we cleaving it asunder? Is this whole situation a Dionysian machine? Friends of wisdom frame the dissertation process differently, forming a relational semblance instead of just an instrumental action-reaction circuit (write, defend, receive). We attempt to double the perception of the dissertation process. It is vital to the Dionysian machine that no data be taken and few guidelines given. The function of the machine should remain open to new techniques. The measure of its success comes not from the reactions of its users, but from the situation itself, from an ongoing incitement or unsettling. Massumi (1987) explained:

In Deleuze and Guattari, a plateau is reached when circumstances combine to bring an activity to a pitch of intensity that is not automatically dissipated in a climax. The heightening of energies is sustained long enough to leave a kind of afterimage of its dynamism that can be reactivated or injected into other activities, creating a fabric of intensive states between which any number of connecting routes could exist. (p. xiv)

Following what Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) suggested I attempted to, "[w]rite, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency." (p. 11)

Still describing the rhizome Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987) explained:

The rhizome is an anti-genealogy.

The same applies to the book and the world: contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms a rhizome with the world, there is an aparallel evolution of the book and the world; the book assures the deterritorialization of the world, but the world effects a reterritorialization of the book, which in turn deterritorializes itself in the world (if it is capable, if it can). (p. 11)

This dissertation process as a machine, the dissertation as a composition, and the described instrument all use the logic of resonance to create a pitch of intensity. They are techniques of relation, part of an open relational architecture, Massumi (2011/2013) explained:

A practice that pries open existing practices, of whatever category, scale, siting, or distribution, in a way that makes their potential reappear at a self-abstracting and self-differing distance from routine functioning, in a potentialized semblance of themselves—variational practice of that kind could be called (to borrow the felicitous term Rafael Lozano-Hemmer applies to his own approach to interactive art) a *relational architecture* (Massumi 2000). A relational architecture is oriented toward the disseminating end of things, toward potential expansion, but is anti-institutional. It unsettles. It pushes the dispositional envelope of the processual continuum just mentioned.

That's the angle from which I would encourage a rethinking of interactive art—from the premise that its vocation is to construct a situation or go into an existing situation, and open it into a relational architecture. Ways of doing that, the nuts and bolts of making potential reappear, are what Erin Manning and I in our collaborative work call *techniques of relation* (Manning 2009b, 42, 86-93, 105; Manning and Massumi, forthcoming b). The techniques of existence discussed throughout this book are techniques of relation. We use the word technique in a sense inspired by Gilbert

Simondon, whose account of technical invention is couched in similar terms of emergent relational potential and becoming, in a way that places the technical object and art in the same orbit without reducing one to the other (Simondon 1989, 179-201). The difference, of course, is that the regulatory principles of the technical process in the narrow sense are utility and salability, profit-generating ability. Art claims the right to have no manifest utility, no use-value, and in many cases even no exchange-value. At its best, it has *event-value*.

This is precisely what makes art political, in its own way. It can push further to the indeterminate but relationally potentialized fringes of existing situations, beyond the limits of current framings or regulatory principles. Aesthetic politics is an exploratory politics of invention, unbound, unsubordinated to external finalities. It is the suspensive aspect of it that gives it this freedom. The suspension of the most available potentials, that potentials already most comfortably embodied, well housed and usefully institutionalized gives a chance for more far-fetched potentials to ripple up. Aesthetic politics is “autonomous” in the sense that it has its own momentum, it isn’t beholden to external finalities. It bootstraps itself on its own in-built tendencies. It creates its own motive force in the dynamic form in which it appears. Practices that explicitly define themselves as political and do not claim the artistic label can be characterized as aesthetic politics to the extent that they similarly strive to bootstrap far-fetching event-value and make it really, tendentially appear in a present situation. This kind of practice has been with us, not continuously but in drops and smudges, since at least the Situationists, and it gained new momentum in our own time in the anti-globalization movement post-Seattle.

Artistic practices that explicitly attempt to be political often fail at it, because they

construe being political as having political content, when what counts is the dynamic form. An art practice can be aesthetically political, inventive of new life potentials, of new potential forms of life, and have no overtly political content. I would go so far as to say that it is the exception that art with overtly political content is political in the sense I'm talking about here. When it is, it's because care has been taken not only to make sense but to make semblance, to make the making-sense experientially appear, in a dynamic form that takes a potential-pushing distance on its own particular content. (p. 53-54)

The Dionysian machine, as the dissertation's compositional process, works to deterritorialize and reterritorialize the situation openly, aesthetically, and politically. Understanding kills action. We artists embrace simulacra and take action. Thought and imagination are vital for the practice of experimental activist philosophy. Masumi (2011/2013) described this philosophy through Whitehead:

Whitehead's term for his own activist philosophy at no remove from life's immediacy is "process philosophy." For Whitehead, activity, as event or change synonymous with life, entails a further concept. The notion of *potentiality* is fundamental for the understanding of existence, as soon as the notion of process is admitted... "Immediacy is the realization of the potentialities of the past, and is the storehouse of the potentialities of the future" (Whitehead 1968, 99-100; emphasis added). To be at all is to be active in a "production of novelty" consisting in the "transformation of the potential into the actual" (Whitehead 1968, 151). The "principle of unrest" from which an activist philosophy departs requires a concept of potential qualifying process as the production of the new: in a word, "becoming" (Whitehead 1978, 28).

“‘Creativity’ is the principle of novelty” (Whitehead 1978, 21). To be at all is to become, actively creative. “Process for its intelligibility involves the notion of a creative activity belonging to the very essence of the occasion .” The transformation of the potential into the actual is a “process of self-creation.” “Such transformation includes the immediacy of self-enjoyment” (Whitehead 1968, 151).” (Massumi, SaE, p. 1-2)

Nietzsche (1968) described this experimental affirmative philosophy, and its political value, differently:

My new path to a “Yes”.—Philosophy as I have hitherto understood and lived it, is a voluntary quest for even the most detested and notorious sides of existence. From the long experience I gained from such a wandering through ice and wilderness, I learned to view differently all that had hitherto philosophized: the *hidden* history of philosophy, the psychology of its great names, came to light for me. “How much truth can a spirit *endure*, how much truth does a spirit *dare*?”—this became for me the real standard of value. Error is *cowardice*—every achievement of knowledge is a consequence of courage, of severity toward oneself, of cleanliness toward oneself—Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates experimentally even the possibilities of the most fundamental nihilism; but this does not mean that it must halt at a negation, a No, a will to negation. It wants rather to cross over to the opposite of this—to a Dionysian affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection—it wants the eternal circulation:-- the same things, the same logic and illogic of entanglements. The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence—my formula for this is *amor fati*. (p. 536)

Nietzsche's work is often understood as an elitist excuse for inaction, but this project does not call for a selfish endorsement of nihilism. It is not asking that we accept things as they are. It is a reimagining that functions on an ontogenetic level to open space for the yet to come. Amor fati, a love of fate that is based in a philosophy of immanence. Massumi (2011/2013) explained:

This sundering of things is what I meant by "suspension." It's the opposite of "disinterestedness," if you interpret that to mean neutrality or a subjective posture of noncommittal. The semblance is not subjective. As I tried to explain, it makes the object an object. There is no subject, apart from the singular aliveness appearing in the object's generic wake. The subject is life. *This* life. "A" life, as Deleuze would say (Deleuze 2007, 384-89). So the process I'm talking about can't ever be contained by any elitism because it always potentially exceeds, at very least on its outermost fringes, any standard of taste or coolness that a particular social grouping might succeed in imposing on it. It's the opposite of all that. It's intensifying. Enlivening. Potentializing. (p. 51)

An open exploratory practice that values thought, creativity, potential, and imagination over understanding and representation opens space for new real and abstract experiences, it helps push different potentialities into the actual. Massumi (2011/2013) explained through James:

At any rate, thought and imagination are the leading edges of this exploratory expansion of potential, because they can wander from the particular present posture even without actually leaving it. And without being limited to the potential next steps that it most presents, that it makes most available or automatic. They raise the smudge factor

exponentially. A thing felt is fringed by an expanding thought-pool of potential that shades off in all directions. It's like a drop in the pool of life making ripples that expand infinitely around. William James spoke in those terms. He said experience comes in "drops" (James 1996b, 231-232)." (p. 50-51)

As an example of interactive art that doesn't overprescribe a certain action-reaction and leaves space for thought and its potential, Massumi (2011/2013) described a project by Natalie Jeremijenko and the Bureau of Inverse Technology:

In recent interactive projects, Jermijenko has attempted to not only to encourage participants to reflect on environmental issues, focusing in this case on human-animal relations, but she has used the interactions to slip participants into perceiving, in one case, like a fish. The ideational content was doubled by a perceptual becoming. The thinking-feeling-like-a-fish was the semblance in the situation, pointing beyond it. A quality of experience was built in that could potentially lead to thoughts, sensations, and further perceptions that might fold out, toward follow-on in other situations that neither the participants nor the artist could foresee (never having been an environmentally aware fish before).

An aesthetic politics defies the law of the conservation of energy. It can get more creative energy out of a situation than it puts into it. It's inventive in a more radical way than a technical invention in the usual narrow sense. It's not the gadgetry or setup that's creative, even if nothing like it has ever been seen before. The setup is creative to the extent that an emergent experience takes off from it that has its own distinctive lived quality, and because of that its own self-differing momentum. (p. 54)

The Dionysian instrument works to incite an emergent experience that is resonant with the emergent experience of the Dionysian machine. Similar thoughts and concepts go into both processes. The worry comes in with an overprescription, attempting to incite too specific of an experience. Do we overlimit what is felt, or does the instrument act as a lightning rod that incites different thoughts? Is it too specific of an example? The Dionysian instrument attempts to create an example of series where the original meaning is fractured, but the new aleatory orders field a new event, connected through disconnection. Being careful not to fall back into linear causality, Massumi (2011/2013) reminds us that, with this new empirical approach, art comes before instrumentalism or functionalism, a conversion of technology and science through aesthetics²²:

The radically empirical point is that the all-around lived medium, or experienced envelope of relation, is a ready-to-be (virtual) coexistence of terms held in a nondecomposable unity of movement that determines what they will have been in passing. That translates into the conceptual rule of thumb that the terms in relation belong to a different order than their relation. Terms in relation, parts of the whole, serially unfold over the course of events. But they do so by virtue of an infolding, or implicate, order holding them, wholing them, fielding them in the same event. *The logic of coexistence is different from the logic of separation. The logic of belonging is different from the logic of being a part.*

This means that to get the whole picture (including the real, suspended ways it doesn't appear), you have to operate with both logics simultaneously: the conjunctive and the disjunctive. "Radical empiricism is fair to both the unity and the disconnection" (James 1996a, 47). It translates metaphysical issues of truth and illusion, subject-object

correspondence into issues of *continuity* and *discontinuity*.

These are basically pragmatic issues: when and how to make a break, and in making a break field of relation, and to what really-next-effect. (You can never take back a gift. It incorporeally binds you to another, and in so doing irreversibly cuts into your having been apart.)

Together, radical empiricism and the pragmatic theory of truth leads to an odd constructivism in which experience is at the same time self-standing and self-contained, and always to be invented according to passing logics of break and relation. For it is always only in passing that things prove useful: as provisionally as ether waves, as ephemerally as your anger, as corruptibly as a gift. Things' only a priori function is of *becoming*.

Approaching things this way saves you fussing over the cognitive status of your experience. Disbelieving, are you? Feeling a tad illusionary? Don't worry. Everything is as real as its next-effect. Just concentrate on the break and relation that will make a next-effect really felt. In any such event, as you always are, you are already redundantly implicated in the world of experience.

You do not run purposively through the world because you believe in it. The world, surprisingly, already runs you through. And that, really felt, is your belief in it. Virtual participation, really brinking on truly, precedes actual cognition. This is what James means when he says "we live on *speculative* investments" (James 1996a, 88; emphasis added). We find ourselves "invested" in the world's running through our lives because at every conscious moment our participation in it has just come to us newly

enacted, already and again, defying disbelief with the unrefusable feeling of a life's momentum. The "speculation" is the thinking-feeling of our active implication in the ever-rolling-on in the world to really-next-effects.

Break-and-relate to make felt an effect: a definition of *art*. Pragmatism, as augmented by radical empiricism's virtual friendly relationism, ends up allying not with instrumentalism or any vulgar functionalism, but with art (living art, arts of life). It has no less to do with end-use than with transitional expression: creative philosophy. The truth is not "out there." It is in the making." (p. 36-37)

Machine Solvency

By now it might be hard to understand exactly what the Dionysian machine is. Do we look to the physical instrument, this dissertation, the entire process? Luckily, there is no clear answer.

The following section addresses the machine's solvency. The machine does not capture a conventional solvency working to produce specific findings that further a scientific claim, but instead its solvency comes from the design itself. The solvency does not come from participant observation or surveys, but from the design's consistency with the theory. Instead of describing this machine's music and its linear causal effects on participant's and society, this machine's success is judged by its failure, by the unexpected, by the wonder that its design makes space for. Its solvency is figured through an ontogenetic philosophy of immanence rather than a logic of efficiency. Referencing Simondon, Massumi (2011/2013) argued for a shift from ontological to ontogenetic:

It is here that the constructive questioning begins. It consists in finding ways to

understand any given mode of activity in these experiential terms, starting from an ontological primacy of the relational-qualitative and respecting the singularity of the activity's unfolding—although the word “ontological” no longer fits. Process is only perishingly about being. But it is everywhere and always about powers of existence in becoming. The concerns of activist philosophy are *ontogenetic* more than ontological (Simondon 2005, p. 24-26 and passim). (p. 13)

The Dionysian instrument is an object that is immanent to its own occurrence, an inherency created within the ontogenetic process of the Dionysian machine. Massumi (2011/2013) described this paradox of existence through Deleuze and Whitehead:

Experience always invents. Every perception is a creative culminating in the production of an event of change. A perception is its own event. Its “content” is one with the dynamic form of its coming to fulfillment. What a perception invents is essentially itself. It is self-creative. There is nothing “outside” to which it corresponds or that it reflects or represents. All perception is immanent—in the case of animal life, to the bodily milieu of its own becoming. When we see an “object” “out there” we are seeing a semblance of our own life's passing, immanent to its own occurrence. If we focus exclusively on the chunkiness of the object as it slothfully presents itself in the flow of change, we are living the abstraction that the world comes in fundamentally inertial chunks of what we are habitually tempted to call matter *as opposed to* life, or what we like to think of as the concrete as opposed to the abstract (Manning and Massumi, forthcoming a). This is Whitehead's “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which he considers the bane not only of most approaches to philosophy, but also of classical science, not to mention common sense (Whitehead 1967b, 51-52, 58). Deleuze restates it in the following way: “The

opposite of the concrete is not the abstract, it is the discrete” (Deleuze, 1978a). The discrete: the slothful just-being-there of an inactive chunk of matter.

“In truth the notion of the self-contained particle of matter, self-sufficient within its local habitation, is an abstraction.” (Whitehead 1968, 138). There is, in bare matter of fact, “no possibility of a detached, self-contained local existence.” (ibid.). (p. 26-27)

Nothing resonates by itself.

This Dionysian machine embraces simulacra and reconstitutes them differently. This is not a direct result from the instrument being played (listened to, read), but a simultaneous action that forms with the event, something that emerges ontogenetically. Deleuze (1969/1990) described the resonant function of a Dionysian machine:

So ‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This distinction operates completely within the world of representation. Rather, it has to do with undertaking the subversion of this world – the ‘twilight of the idols.’ The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies *the original* and *the copy*, *the model* and *the reproduction*. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum – neither can be assigned as the original, neither as the copy. It is not even enough to invoke a model of the Other, for no model can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum. There is no longer any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of view. There is no possible hierarchy, no second, no third... Resemblance subsists, but it is produced as the external effect of the simulacrum, inasmuch as it is built upon divergent series and makes them

resonate. Identity subsists, but it is produced as the law which complicates all the series and makes them all return to each one in the course of the forced movement. In the reversal of Platonism, resemblance is said of internalized difference, and identity of the Different as primary power. The same and the similar no longer have an essence except as *simulated*, that is as expressing the functioning of the simulacrum. There is no longer any possible selection. The non-hierarchized work is a condensation of coexistences and a simultaneity of events. It is the triumph of the false pretender. It simulates at once the father, the pretender, and the fiancé in a superimposition of masks. But the false pretender cannot be called false in relation to a presupposed model of truth, no more than simulation can be called an appearance or an illusion. Simulation is the phantasm itself, that is, the effect of the functioning of the simulacrum as machinery – a Dionysian machine. It involves the false as power, *Pseudos*, in the sense in which Nietzsche speaks of the highest power of the false. By rising to the surface, the simulacrum makes the Same and the Similar, the model and the copy, fall under the power of the false (phantasm). It renders the order of participation, the fixity of distribution, the determination of the hierarchy impossible. It establishes the world of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies. Far from being a new foundation, it engulfs all foundations, it assures a universal breakdown (*effondrement*), but as a joyful and positive event, as an un-founding (*effondement*): ‘behind each cave another that opens still more deeply, and beyond each surface a subterranean world yet more vast, more strange. Richer still... and under all foundations, under every ground, a subsoil still more profound.’” (p. 262-263)

The machine should not be judged using a logic of representation. It is not the physical

instrument that causes subjectivity and reality to emerge differently, it is the event and the process, there is no one thing that causes change. The machine resonates a difference that highlights entanglement, a different distribution from the conventional humanist frame. Deleuze (1969/1990) explained:

Yet, what is more intimate or essential to bodies than events such as growing, becoming smaller, or being cut? What do the Stoics mean when they contrast the thickness of bodies with these incorporeal events which would play only on the surface, like a mist over the prairie (even less than a mist, since a mist is after all a body)? Mixtures are in bodies, and in the depth of bodies: a body penetrates another and coexists with it in all of its parts, like a drop of wine in the ocean, or fire in iron. One body withdraws from another, like liquid from a vase. Mixtures in general determine the quantitative and qualitative states of affairs: the dimensions of the ensemble—the red of iron, the green of a tree. But what we mean by “to grow,” “to diminish,” “to become red,” “to become green,” “to cut,” and “to be cut,” etc., is something entirely different. These are no longer states of affairs—mixtures deep inside bodies—but incorporeal events at the surface which are the results of these mixtures. The tree “greens.”... The genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts. The Stoics are in the process of tracing out and of forming a frontier where there had not been one before. In this sense they displace all reflection. (p. 5-6)

Deleuze (1969/1990) continued explaining this process solvency mechanism and its transformative approach to effects:

Everything now returns to the surface. This is the result of the Stoic operation: the

unlimited returns. Becoming-mad, becoming unlimited is no longer a ground which rumbles. It climbs to the surface of things and becomes impassive. It is no longer a question of simulacra which elude the ground and insinuate themselves everywhere, but rather a question of effects which manifest themselves and act in their place. These are effects in the causal sense, but also sonorous, optical, or linguistic “effects”—and even less, or much more, since they are no longer corporeal entities, but rather form the entire Idea. What was eluding the Idea climbed up to the surface, that is, the incorporeal limit, and represents now all possible *ideality*, the latter being stripped of its causal and spiritual efficacy. The Stoics discovered surface effects. Simulacra cease to be subterranean rebels and make the most of their effects (that is, what might be called “phantasms,” independently of the Stoic terminology). The most concealed become the most manifest. All the old paradoxes of becoming must again take shape in a new youthfulness—transmutation. (p. 7-8)

Disrupting the binary logic of language by using paradox also functions as a solvency mechanism for the Dionysian machine. Paradox not just inciting thought as a riddle does, but inciting creative affirmation that constitutes the real (simulacrum, phantasm) differently. A flattening that decenters the hierarchical divisions of binary logic. Referencing Lewis Carroll’s novel *Sylvie and Bruno*, and the concept of flattening, Deleuze (1969/1990) argued:

The admirable conclusion of the first part is to the glory of the East, from which comes all that is good, “the substance of things hoped for, and the existence of things not seen.” Here even the barometer neither rises nor falls, but goes lengthwise, sideways, and gives a horizontal weather. A stretching machine even lengthens songs. And Fortunatus’ purse, presented as a Mobius strip; is made of handkerchiefs sewn *in the wrong way*, in

such a manner that its outer surface is continuous with its inner surface: it envelops the entire world, and makes that which is inside be on the outside and vice versa. In *Sylvie and Bruno*, the technique of passing from reality to dream, and from bodies to the incorporeal, is multiplied, completely renewed, and carried out to perfection. It is, however, still by skirting the surface, or the border, that one passes to the other side, by virtue of the strip. The continuity between reverse and right side replaces all the levels of depth; and the surface effects in one and the same Event, which would hold for all events, bring to language becoming and its paradoxes. As Carroll says in an article entitled *The Dynamics of a Particle*: “Plain Superficiality is the character of a speech....” (p. 10-11)

Paradox, in this way, is a method for pushing language to its limit, making language creative and felt more than understood. Deleuze (1997), while discussing exhaustion, described Samuel Beckett’s different uses of language highlighting the ontogenetic potential of *language III*, the language of images over voices or names:

The exhausted, is the exhaustive, the dried up, the extenuated, and the dissipated. The last two ways are united in language III, the language of images and spaces. It maintains a relationship with language in its entirety, but rises up or stretches out in its holes, its gaps, or its silences. Sometimes it operates in silence, sometimes it presents itself through the use of a recorded voice; moreover, it forces speech to become image, movement, song, poem. (p. 162)

While paradox activates expression through a decentering of binary logic, music constitutes things more openly from a transformative and less determined space. Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained how connecting music and the word allows for more intense and open expression:

In the pre-established harmony that obtains between the consummate drama and its music, the drama achieves a supreme degree of vividness that verbal drama alone cannot achieve. All the living characters on the stage are simplified before us, in the independently moving lines of the melody, into the clarity of a single curved line, and the mingling of those lines resounds to us in a series of harmonic transitions most delicately in sympathy with the moving events on stage. The relationships between things are thus made available to the senses in a way that is far from abstract, and we also realize that only through those relationships are the essence of a character and a melodic line made apparent. And while music forces us to see more and more deeply than we otherwise would, and spreads the events on the stage before us like a delicate gossamer, to our spiritualized inner vision the world on the stage is both infinitely expanded and illuminated from within. How could the verbal poet supply anything analogous, striving as he does to achieve the internal expansion and illumination of the visible stage-world indirectly, with the much more imperfect mechanism of words and concepts? Although musical tragedy makes use of the word, it can at the same time set beside it its substratum and its place of birth, and clarify the development of the word from within. (p. 103)

Deleuze (1997), while discussing Beckett's approach to language, explained music's transformative potential in relation to word's stuck meanings:

Beckett became less and less tolerant of words. And he knew from the outset the reason he became increasingly intolerant of them: the exceptional difficulty of "boring holes" in the surface of language so that "what lurks behind it" might at last appear. This can be done on the surface of a painted canvas, as in Rembrandt, Cezanne, or van Velde; or on the surface of sound, as in Beethoven or Schubert, so as to allow for the emergence of the

void or the visible in itself, the silence or the audible in itself; but “is there any reason why that terrible materiality of the word surface should not be capable of being dissolved...?” It is not only that words lie; they are so burdened with calculations and significations, with intentions and personal memories, with old habits that cement them together, that one can scarcely bore into the surface before it closes up again. It sticks together. It imprisons and suffocates us. Music succeeds in transforming the death of *this* young girl into *a young girls dies*; it brings about this extreme determination of the indefinite like a pure intensity that pierces the surface, as in the “Concerto in Memory of an Angel.” But words are unable to do this, given the adhesions that keep them bound to the general or the particular. They lack that “punctuation of dehiscence,” that “disconnection” that comes from a groundswell peculiar to art. (p. 172-173)

With music causality shifts. Resonance emerges, not necessarily from within a determined subject, but in the process, in the event. Addressing this new causality and the problem of how to work for change in the future Massumi (2011/2013) described the shift from a logical humanist questioning to an expressive ontogenetic questioning:

But are there still ways in which an experience can *orient* what comes? In what way can an event constructively include formative potential for what lies beyond in its own constitution?

The question of how the beyond of an occasion’s self-enjoyment is effectively included in its constitution is the question of *importance* so central to Whitehead’s philosophy (Whitehead 1968, 1-19). The question of importance is also the question of *expression*, or what is effectively passed on by an occasion’s passing (Whitehead 1968, 20-41). Importance and expression are not add-ons to experience. They are not

“merely” subjective. They are what bridge the subjective and objective aspects of the world, in its rolling effectively on. They are fundamental categories of the world’s becoming. They are ontogenetic factors, constitutive of politicality of process.” (p. 14)

The Dionysian machine is an ontogenetic process that transmutes creatively. It fragments and reconnects language and ideas in new compositions, making space for things to always emerge differently. Subjectivity is taken as an active and eternal process. The I is becoming. Deleuze (1969/1990) described this paradox of infinite identity:

The paradox of this pure becoming, with its capacity to elude the present, is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both directions or senses at the same time—of future and past, of the day before and the day after, of more and less, of too much and not enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect). It is language which fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excess begins), but it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming (“A red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and... if you cut your finger *very* deeply with a knife, it usually bleeds”). Hence the reversals which constitute Alice’s adventures: the reversal of becoming larger and becoming smaller—“which way, which way?” asks Alice, sensing that it is always in both directions at the same time, so that for once she stays the same, through an optical illusion; the reversal of the day before and the day after, the present always being eluded—“jam tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam *to-day*”; the reversal of more and less: five nights are five times hotter than a single one, “but they must be five times as cold for the same reason”; the reversal of active and passive: “do cats eat bats?” is as good as “do bats eat cats?”; the reversal of cause and effect: to be punished before having committed a fault, to cry before having

pricked oneself, to serve before having divided up the servings.

All these reversals as they appear in infinite identity have one consequence: the contesting of Alice's personal identity and the loss of her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the adventure which is repeated throughout all Alice's adventures. For the proper or singular name is guaranteed by the permanence of *savoir*. The latter is embodied in general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and adjectives, with which the proper name maintains a constant connection. Thus the personal self requires God and the world in general. But pause and rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide into the language of events, all identity disappears from the self, the world, and God. This is the test of *savoir* and recitation which strips Alice of her identity. In it words may go awry, being obliquely swept away by the verbs. It is as if events enjoyed an irreality which is communicated through language to the *savoir* and to persons. For personal uncertainty is not a doubt foreign to what is happening, but rather an objective structure of the event itself, insofar as it moves in two directions at once, and insofar as it fragments the subject following this double direction. Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense as the assignation of fixed identities. (p. 2-3)

The Dionysian instrument's drone and the aleatory composition of words work to incite this paradoxical instance that creates an activity of thought with more questions than answers. Deleuze (1969/1990) explained:

[B]lank words, or, rather, words denoting the blank word are inseparable from a question which is enveloped and displaced throughout the series. It belongs to this element which

is always absent from its proper place, proper resemblance, and proper identity to be the object of a fundamental question which is displaced along with it: what is the Snark? what is the Phlizz? what is It (Ca)? Being the refrain of a song, whose verses from the many series through which the element circulates, being the magic word, in whose case all the names by which it is “called” do not fill in the “blank,” the paradoxical instance has precisely this singular being, this “objective,” which corresponds to the question as such, and corresponds without ever answering it. (p. 57)

Sense is a creative logic similar to signification without anything to be signified. It is an ontogenetic logic that still finds use in the I. Deleuze (1969/1990) continued:

To identify sense with manifestation has better chance of success, since the designators themselves have sense only in virtue of an I which manifests itself in the proposition. This I is indeed primary, since it allows speech to begin; as Alice says, “if you only spoke when you were spoken to, and the other person always waited for *you* to begin, you see nobody would ever say anything...” It shall be concluded from this that sense resides in the beliefs (or desires) of the person who expresses herself. “ ‘When *I* use a word,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘ it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less... The question is... which is to be master—that’s all.’ ” We have, however seen that the order of beliefs and desires was founded on the order of the conceptual implications of signification, and that even the identity of the self which speaks, or says “I,” was guaranteed only by the permanence of certain signifieds (the concepts of God, the world...). The I is primary and sufficient in the order of speech only insofar as it envelops significations which must be developed for themselves in the order of language (*langue*). If these significations collapse, or are not established in themselves, personal

identity is lost, as Alice painfully experiences, in conditions where God, the world, and the self become the blurred characters of the dream of someone who is poorly determined. This is why the last recourse seems to be identifying sense with signification. (p. 17-18)

This Dionysian process that infinitely constitutes simulacra, allows for transformation through enchantment, through a zooming out that forgets the self as something stuck. A drama that deterritorializes and reterritorializes the subject differently, eternally. Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained this ontogenetic communication through Greek tragedy still using a transcendental and humanist discourse:

Dionysiac excitement is capable of communicating to a whole crowd of people the artistic gift of seeing itself surrounded by a host of spirits with which it knows itself to be profoundly united. This process is the primal dramatic phenomenon in the tragic chorus: seeing oneself transformed and acting as though one had truly entered another body, another character. This process is the start of the evolution of drama. This is a different matter from the rhapsodist who does not fuse with his images but rather, like the painter, sees them outside himself with a contemplative eye; it is an abandonment of individuality by entering another character. And this phenomenon appears with epidemic frequency: a whole host of people can be cast under this spell...

Enchantment, is the precondition of all dramatic art. In this enchantment the Dionysiac reveller sees himself as a satyr, *and it is as a satyr that he looks upon the god*: in his transformation he sees a new vision outside himself, the Apolline complement of his state. With this new vision the drama is complete.

In the light of this insight, we must see Greek tragedy as the Dionysiac chorus, continuously discharging itself in an Apolline world of images. (p. 43)

The individual and the binary are overwhelmed by this Dionysian zooming-out, this Dionysian chaos of becoming. The major language of Apollo becoming infused with the minor language of Dionysus. Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained this resonant language of the image:

If our analysis has shown that the Apolline in tragedy has by means of its deception carried off a complete victory over the Dionysiac essence of music, using it for its own purpose—namely a supreme clarification of drama—we might certainly add one very important reservation: at its most significant point that Apolline deception has been broken and destroyed. The drama that spreads out before us, all its movements and characters illuminated from within by music, as though we were watching the movement of the shuttle as it weaves the fabric, has an effect as a whole that goes *beyond all Apolline artifice*. In the overall effect of tragedy the Dionysiac predominates once again; its final note could never echo from the Apolline realm. And in this process Apolline deception is revealed for what it is, a veiling of the true Dionysiac effect, which lasts for the duration of the tragedy. Such is its power that it finally forces the Apolline drama itself into a sphere where it begins to speak with Dionysiac wisdom, and where it denies itself and its Apolline clarity. Thus the difficult relationship of the Apolline and the Dionysiac in tragedy could really be symbolized by a fraternal bond between the two deities. Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo, but Apollo finally speaks the language of Dionysus, and thus is attained the supreme goal of tragedy and of art in general. (p. 104)

CHAPTER 5

ONTOGENETIC COMMUNICATION AND THE YET TO COME

Introduction

I is Becoming. Once humans are here experience is retrospective (always already); tied up in representation. Focused on reflections not as signs or images but as information. This is not now. Now is always happening. Active. Ontogenetic.

The conventional approach to mass communication research in America limits itself by starting with the logical rational thinking human subject communicating with other beings exterior to its concrete self. This sender-receiver model acts in retrospect, and relies on a logic of representation to create information that feeds an established regime of truth. Mass communication research needs to break from this confining starting point and work to experiment, to play, to make room for wonder, to make the impossible possible. Rajchman (2000) explained:

To extract sensation from representation is then to take space and time and their roles as “forms of intuition” that make possible the “I think” that accompanies all representation, and make them instead part of an aesthetic “experimentation.” Our relation to space and time—our spatiality or temporality—changes; and the work shows the change—as it were, it exposes what in space and time is then to be “experimented with. (p. 130)

Derrida described two types of future when he spoke of a people and time yet to come in Kofman, Ziering, and Dick’s (2002) film *Derrida*:

In general, I try to distinguish between what one calls the future and "l'avenir."

The future is that which—tomorrow, later, next century—will be.

There's a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable.

But there is a future l'avenir (to come), which refers to who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The

Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it's l'avenir in that it's the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival. (00:29-1:48)

Both futures are of interest, but it is future l'avenir that is surprising, that occurs through immanence, that remains indeterminate and open. It is future l'avenir where the impossible is made possible. This different future also calls for an experimental form of communication.

Art is communication, the determination of a simulacrum is communication, feeling is communication, mass communication. Ontogenetic communication is a communication whose subject is always becoming, a creative communication that leaves room for something surprising. However, from a linear humanist standpoint, what may seem impossible and surprising looking forward always seems obvious in retrospect, it appears as if it was always-already true. Some of the most reality shifting (radical) scientific discoveries throughout history now appear as dull gray fact. McLuhan (1970) explained:

Why is it that this person, one in a million, says there is no problem? Inevitably, this person has not been taught and is ignorant of science and all scientific procedures. The scientist has great trouble looking forward past his problem because his knowledge gets in the way. It is only the very ignorant person who can get past that problem because he is not fogged over by knowledge. When you're looking for new answers to new

questions, it is knowledge itself that blocks progress. It is knowledge that creates real ignorance, just as wealth creates poverty. Every time a new discovery is made, enormous new areas of ignorance are opened up...Only an ignorant kid who wanted to play could see such things. The greatest discoveries in human history are of that kind. (p. 9)

This highlights the implications of starting with the rational individual thinking human subject existing in a concrete linear space and time acting within certain regimes of truth. Rajchman (2000) described the limited conventional approach to communication and called for something more experimental:

Thus Deleuze will say that in all art, for all art, the people is never given and must be invented anew, and we must thus be wary, for example, of the ways in which conceptual art serves simply to “bring the concept back to the doxa of social body or of the great American metropolis.” As a presupposition of a “becoming-art,” the people that is not yet there is not to be confused with “the public,” or with transcendental intersubjective norms supposed by “the public”—on the contrary, it helps show why art (and thought) is never a matter of “communication,” why for them there is always too much “communication,” For what it supposes is a condition of another kind, not transcendental, but experimental. We thus discover a second feature of “artistic volition,” or a second principle in the aesthetic that tries to isolate it. If art, or the “will to art,” supposes a people that is missing, that is yet to come, it is because there arises in a peculiar condition—the condition in which something new may arise. One problem in Deleuze’s aesthetic is then to say what this condition is and how it contrasts with the attempt to find transcendental conditions for judgment. For “novelty” in this is not to be confused with known or visible “fashions” and the manner in which they are manipulated

and promoted, but on the contrary, is something we do not or cannot yet see is happening to us, indeed something that we ourselves need to become “imperceptible” in order to see. In Deleuze’s aesthetic, a “will to art” is always concerned with the emergence of something new and singular, which precedes us and requires us to “invent” ourselves as another people. (p. 122-123)

In this age of instantaneous information, communication has shifted from the slow linear information transfer we conventionally define as communication to something immediate, something that establishes connections and disconnections simultaneously. McLuhan argues that this is a shift back from a visually mediated world to an acoustically mediated one. However, this return is not a step backward but instead the return of what never was. The return of the inevitable, something familiar but different. A spiraling movement that comes around again differently. An ontogenetic communication that deterritorializes and reterritorializes the subject. A Dionysian machine that determines the individual Apolline dream scene. The subject of ontogenetic communication is always becoming. Ontogenetic communication uses a logic of resonance that simultaneously creates continuity and discontinuity through its relation of non-relation, its logic of mutual inclusion. Like the acoustic drone of the tanpura, a sound that connects without connection. Without the determined order of melody, a chaotic resonance that simultaneously interferes and facilitates the constitution of space and time. An expression and feeling of becoming that is resonating.

Many consider it nihilistic to believe that humanity is coming to an end, but life is more expansive than this human frame. The tragedy of humanity is an eternal drama rooted in binary logic that makes out any alternate imagining of subjectivity as heresy, but there are affirmative approaches outside of the conventional enlightenment humanist subject that can be felt in every

moment, every event. Rajchman (2000) addressed this nihilistic sadness and described an alternative affirmative approach, “Considered in philosophico-aesthetic terms, melancholy might then be said to be the sensation of an unhappy idealization, and the real antidote to it is to be found not in memorization and identification, but in active forgetting and affirmative experimentation with what is yet to come.” (133) The coming to be of a future yet to come and a people yet to come is not a passive process but an affirmative and active process that is always becoming, always creative. This philosophy of freedom is a philosophy of immanence, an affirmative activist philosophy whose imminence is immanent, always-already interested in the yet to come, inherently fluid.

This philosophy calls for a radical expansion of the traditional empirical field. A new empiricism whose field comes before any determined subject or object, before any determined concrete reality, allows for this experimentation and wonder. A new empiricism that uses a logic of resonance to ontogenetically communicate becoming. Rajchman (2000), through Deleuze, explained the importance of aesthetics and experimentation for this empirical conversion:

He says that it is in fact “religious thinkers” like Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Peguy who have spoken best of this “time to come,” and the way it differs from the eternal or transient. But we must “empirically convert” this still religious sense of time, making it a matter of sensation and experimentation, and so of “aesthesis” and aesthetics, in this world that is not yet “our” world. For when there is no such belief, no such “aesthesis,” we find nihilism, formulated by Nietzsche, introduced into cinema by Orson Welles or into literature by Herman Melville—it is only despair that we say “the people is missing, the people is not there”; then there arises a sense that all identities are “counterfeit,” and a

tendency to fall back on some “myth of a past people” as the source of original identity.
(p. 140)

Nietzsche’s glorification of Greek culture might be understood to be this nihilism that falls back on a myth of a past people, but there can still be an affirmative and experimental approach that creates and plays with myths of the past. We find this affirmative and playful approach in St. EOM’s Pasaquan, an art that reconstituted the past and self differently using a new composition of old symbols for a people yet to come²³. Art as a life that brings about the inevitable return of what never was.

The age of instantaneous information reinstates the transcendent limit on thought and becoming as control in society becomes more subtle. A quicker communication, a normalizing technology, focused on a linear progress informed by a logic of efficiency and predictability that eliminates difference, play, creativity, and wonder. A subtle disciplinary process is working to limit potentiality. Rajchman (2000) described this function of communication and the need for a new process:

We find a retreat of thought back into transcendence, reformulated as “communication” or “information,” so that, confronted with the new “stupidity” and “automatism” of our information-societies, the violence of those excluded from them, as well as the new “becomings” they might yet unleash, we are presented with philosophies of consensus, at once naïve and self-assured. Thus we were entering an impoverished time for the creation of philosophy, as if one had to cross the desert to be able to carry it on anew; and what we require is a new Ariadne, adapted to societies of control, working in and with the electronic brain-city, capable of saying “yes” to what is strange and singular in our existence, inciting an art and will to art, a taste for fresh sensations and constructions of

sensation. For what we lack is not communication (we have too much of that), but rather this belief in what we may yet become, and in the peculiar time and logic of its effectuation in ourselves and in our relations with one another. That may make fools laugh, said Deleuze—the whole problem is to believe in a world that includes them. (p. 141-142)

The Theory of the Sign

The conventional communication of information and our description of a new ontogenetic communication are not a problem and its solution, this new ontogenetic communication does not overwhelm and replace conventional communication, it zooms out from it, it incites the inevitable return of what communication always already is, it converts the actors of communication from clear visual concrete rigid data to something acoustic, something becoming. It plays instead of defines, it declares its unintelligibility resonantly. The more intense the feeling of understanding the more intense the inexplicability. It is an art of the sign where being is always already becoming Other. Deleuze (1997) described this new mass communication when discussing Heidegger's metaphysical approach in relation to Jarry's pataphysics:

Being shows itself, but only inasmuch as it never ceases to withdraw (the past); *the More and Less than Being occurs*, but only by ceaselessly receding, by possibilizing itself (the future). In other words, Being does not merely show itself in beings, but in something that shows its inevitable withdrawal; and the more and less than Being, in something that shows its inexhaustible possibility. This something, or the Thing, is the *Sign*. For if it is true that science or technology already contain a possibility for salvation, they remain incapable of deploying it, and must give way to the Beautiful and Art, which sometimes

extend technology by crowning it, as with the Greeks, and sometimes transmute or convert it. According to Heidegger, the technical being (the machine) was already more than an object, since it made the ground appear; but the poetic being (the Thing, the Sign) went even further, because it brought into being a world that was groundless. In this transition from science to art, in this reversion of science into art, Heidegger perhaps rediscovers a problem familiar to the late nineteenth century, one that would be encountered in a different manner by Renan (another Breton precursor to Heidegger), by neoimpressionism, and by Jarry himself. Jarry would follow a similar path when he developed his strange thesis on anarchy: by making-disappear, anarchy could only operate technically, with machines, whereas Jarry prefers the aesthetic stage of crime, and ranks Quincy above Vaillant. More generally, according to Jarry, the technical machine makes virtual lines emerge, which bring together the atomic components of beings, whereas the poetic sign deploys all the possibilities or capabilities of Being that, when brought together in their original unity, constitute “the thing.” We know that Heidegger will identify this grandiose nature of the sign with the *Quadriparti*, the mirror-play of the world, the ringing of the ring, the “Fourfold” [*das Geviert*]. But Jarry had already deployed the great heraldic Act of the four heralds, with the coat of arms as the mirror, and the organization of the world, *Perhinderion*, as the Cross of Christ, or the Frame of the original Bicycle, which ensures the transition from technology to the Poetic—which is what Heidegger failed to recognize in the play of the world and its four paths. This was also the case with the “physick-stick”: from the machine or engine, it becomes the thing that bears the artistic sign, when it forms a cross with itself “in each quarter of every one of its revolutions. (p. 95-96)

Jarry calls for a conversion of technology and science through aesthetics. Understanding machines poetically, instead of machines operating purely technically for change. A technology not created by humans, but as a force bigger than humanity; technology from an ontogenetic perspective. Instead of a scientific technology (the machine) that made the ground appear, a converted technology as part of the sign that opens, that is the process of a groundless becoming-world. Converting the machine related to science, technology, and Apollo into a machine related to aesthetics, the sign, and Dionysus. Here we see Heidegger's metaphysics, with its transcendent finite limit, decentered by Jarry's pataphysics, with its aesthetic infinite openness. Deleuze (1997) further explained Jarry's approach to the Sign and language:

Jarry's thought is above all a theory of the Sign: the sign neither designates nor signifies, but shows... It is the same as the thing, but is not identical to it; it shows the thing. The question is knowing how and why the sign thus understood is necessarily linguistic, or rather under what conditions it becomes language. The first condition is that we must form a poetic conception of language, and not a technical or scientific one. Science presupposes the idea of diversity, a *tower of Babel of languages*, in which order would have to be introduced by grasping their virtual relations. But we, on the contrary, will consider only two languages in principle, as if they were the only languages in the world, a living language and a dead language, the latter being put to work in the former—agglutinations in the second inspiring new emergences or reemergences in the first. The dead language seems to create anagrams in the living language. Heidegger kept rather strictly to German and Greek (or to High German): he put an ancient Greek or an old German to work within contemporary German, but precisely in order to obtain a new

German... The old language *affects* the present language, which under this condition produces a language still to come: the three exstases.” (p. 96-97)

While the sign incites thought to show the thing through a poetic approach to language, the image loosens the grip of the thing and focuses thought on the process. Referencing Beckett, Deleuze (1997) describes *language III*, a language of images that no longer refers to concrete things but to the process itself:

The image is not defined by the sublimity of its content but by its form, that is by its “internal tension,” or by the force it mobilizes to create a void or to bore holes, to loosen the grip of words, to dry up the oozing of voices, so as to free itself from memory and reason: a small, alogical, amnesiac, and almost aphasic image, sometimes standing in the void, sometimes shivering in the open. The image is not an object but a “process.” We do not know the power of such images, so simple do they appear from the point of view of the object. This is *language III*, which is no longer a language of names or voices but a language of images, resounding and coloring images... Sometimes, finally, the voice manages to overcome its repugnances, its loyalties, its ill will, and, carried along by the music, it becomes speech, capable in turn of making a verbal image, as in a lied, or of itself making the music and color of an image, as in a poem. Language III, then, can bring together words and voices in images, but in accordance with a special combination: language I was that of novels, and culminates in *Watt*; language II marks out its multiple paths throughout the novels (*The Unnamable*), suffuses the works for theater, and blares forth in the radio pieces. But *language III*, born in the novel (*How It Is*), passing through the theater (*Happy Days*, *Act Without Words*, *Catastrophe*), finds the secret of its

assemblage in television: a prerecorded voice for an image that in each case is in the process of taking form. (p 159)

While this may link with McLuhan's medium theory, it does not necessitate a conventional humanist approach, instead, it feeds the argument that language plays a part in the constitution of reality, it's becoming. Therefore, intensifying the need for a new approach to communication that focuses on process more than the transmission of concrete information. An opening from specific meanings to the sign and the image. A resonant language that incites thought as process instead of understanding. A resonant and ontogenetic form of communication that makes room for a language yet to come. Deleuze (1997) described this use of the sign for a new more poetic language:

Such is the response: language does not have signs at its disposal, but acquires them by creating them, when a language acts within a language, so as to produce in it a language an unheard of and almost foreign language. The first injects, the second stammers, the third suddenly starts with a fit. Then language has become Sign or poetry, and one can no longer distinguish between language, speech, or word. And a language is never made to produce a new language within itself without language as whole in turn being taken to a limit. The limit of language is the Thing in its muteness—vision. The thing is the limit of language, as the sign is the language of the thing. When a language is hollowed out by its turning within language, it finally completes its mission: the Sign shows the Thing, and effectuates the nth power of language, for

“where word breaks off no thing may be.” (p. 98)

For a resonant nervous system and the transmutation of self

A new more resonant ontogenetic form of communication requires an aesthetic and poetic approach to language that incorporates the sign and the image. An artful communication that is not the product of determined subjects transferring information, but instead a resonant material that flows in the new empirical realm where experiences are becoming. It is experimental and open; no specific meanings tie it down. No inherent limit preexists it.

Rajchman (2000) describes the transformative potential of art:

Artworks are composed of sensations, prelinguistic and presubjective, brought together in an expressive material through a construct with an anorganized plan, with which we have peculiar relations. They are not there to save us or perfect us (or to damn or corrupt us), but rather to complicate things, to create more complex nervous systems no longer subservient to the debilitating effects of clichés, to show and release the possibilities of a life. (p. 138)

This is not a job accomplished by a rational thinking individual human, the self cannot complete this task. The image is presubjective. Deleuze (1997) explained:

We will not invent an entity that would be Art, capable of making the image endure: the image lasts only as long as the furtive moment of our pleasure, our gaze (“I stood for three minutes before Professor Pater’s smile, to look at it.”) There is a time for images, a right moment when they can appear or insinuate themselves, breaking the combination of words and the flow of voices. There is a time for images, as when Winnie feels that she can sing *L’heure exquise*, but it is a moment very near the end, an hour close to the last. The rocking chair is a motor ritornello that tends toward its own end, pushing all the possible toward it, going “faster and faster,” “shorter and shorter,” until, quite suddenly,

it abruptly stops. The energy of the image is dissipative. The image quickly ends and dissipates because it is itself the means of having done with itself. It captures all the possible in order to make it explode. When one says, “I’ve done the image,” it is because this time it is finished, *there is no more possibility*. The only uncertainty that makes us continue is that even painters, even musicians, are never sure they have succeeded in making the image. What great painter has not said to himself, on his deathbed, that he had failed to make a single image, even a small or simple one? It is, rather, the end, the end of all possibility, that teaches us that we have made it, that we have just made the image. And it is the same with space: if the image, by its very nature, has a very short duration, then space perhaps has a very restricted place, as restricted as the one that cramps Winnie, when she says, “la terre est juste” [“the earth is tight”] and Godard, “juste une image” [“just an image”]. No sooner is the space made than it contracts into a “pinhole,” just as the image contracts into a microfraction of time: a singular darkness, “again that certain dark that alone certain ashes can,” “ping silence ping over.” (p. 161)

This work is an act of transformation, not a linear measurable transformation that can be remembered, but an imminent movement of immanence, a forgetting of forgetfulness. If we can remember that things were once different that is beside the point. But how can one feel refreshed without remembering their exhaustion? How can an image be made complete without an end? Rajchman (2000) described this energizing use of the image found in art:

Art not only extracts such “sensations.” It also puts them in a kind of construction; and every work has an architecture, even if askew or non-Euclidean. Thus art is less the incarnation of a lifeworld than a strange construct we inhabit only through transmutation

or self-experimentation, or from which we emerge refreshed as if endowed with a new optic or nervous system. (p. 135)

Artistic will is presubjective. It is playful creation without the limits of determined systems of thought. Its energy comes before any specific image of thought. The self is invented from this will, as is everything that is a thing. Rajchman (2000) explained how this work comes before any established limit and uses play to make space for the yet to come:

Yet no one could have predicted—or even fully explain in retrospect—such “becomings-art”; indeed that is just why the intervention of “artistic will” was needed. For the “will” in question was neither a sum of subjective intentions nor the expression of a collective program; it has another sense and other effects. Indeed the “I” and “we” don’t come before such a “becoming-art,” but on the contrary form part of its invention, its experimentation. An “artistic volition” thus starts with no given public, obeys no established “intersubjective norms” of judgment, reduces to no sociological or institutional definition, and can be contained or directed by no avant-garde with its pope-master—such is precisely its force and its promise. (p. 120-121)

The implications of such work may appear to be cruel or self-destructive, but we playful academics deserve no pity or praise. We have given ourselves an absurd and fruitless task that only a child would remember to find joy in. Scientists exhausted without efficient and measurable success. Specialists in exhaustion without progress. Specializing against specialty. Deleuze (1997) described this exhausted person:

Many authors are too polite, and are content to announce the total work and the death of the self. But this remains an abstraction as long as one does not show “how it is”: how one makes an “inventory,” errors included, and how the self decomposes, stench and

agony included, in the manner of *Malone Dies*. A double innocence, for as the exhausted person says, “the art of combining is not my fault. It’s a curse from above. For the rest I would suggest not guilty.”

More than an art, this is a science that demands long study. The combiner is seated at his school desk: “In learned school/ Till the wreck of body/ Slow decay of blood/ Testy delirium/ Or dull decrepitude...” Not that the decrepitude or the wreck interrupts one’s studies; on the contrary, they complete them, as much as they condition and accompany them: the exhausted person remains seated at his school desk, “bowed head resting on hands,” hands sitting on the table and head sitting on the hands, the head level with the table. (p. 154-155)

After finishing his business with the tailor, the Professor, narrator and guide in Carroll’s (1904/1980) *Sylvie and Bruno*, took us to visit the Other Professor who cannot escape the exhaustion of his specialization:

“Will you ever have to pay him that four thousand pounds?” Sylvie asked as the door closed on the departing creditor.

“Never, my child!” the Professor replied emphatically. “He’ll go on doubling it, till he dies. You see it’s always worth while waiting another year, to get twice as much money! And now what would you like to do, my little friends? Shall I take you to see the Other Professor? This would be an excellent opportunity for a visit,” he said to himself, glancing at his watch: “he generally takes a short rest —of fourteen minutes and a half— about this time.”

Bruno hastily went round to Sylvie, who was standing at the other side of the Professor, and put his hand into hers. “I think we’d like to go,” he said doubtfully: “only please

let's go all together. It's best to be on the safe side, oo know!"

"Why, you talk as if you were Sylvie!" exclaimed the Professor.

"I know I did," Bruno replied very humbly. "I quite forgotted I wasn't Sylvie. Only I fought he might be rarver fierce!"

The Professor laughed a jolly laugh. "Oh, he's quite tame!" he said. "He never bites. He's only a little—a little dreamy, you know." He took hold of Bruno's other hand; and led the children down a long passage I had never noticed before—not that there was anything remarkable in that: I was constantly coming on new rooms and passages in that mysterious Palace, and very seldom succeeded in finding the old ones again.

Near the end of the passage the Professor stopped. "This is his room," he said, pointing to the solid wall.

"We ca'n't get in through there!" Bruno exclaimed.

Sylvie said nothing, till she had carefully examined whether the wall opened anywhere.

Then she laughed merrily. "You're playing us a trick, you dear old thing!" she said.

"There's no door here!"

"There isn't any door to the room," said the Professor. "We shall have to climb in at the window."

So we went into the garden, and soon found the window of the Other Professor's room. It was a ground-floor window, and stood invitingly open: the Professor first lifted the two children in, and then he and I climbed in after them.

The Other Professor was seated at a table, with a large book open before him, on which his forehead was resting: he had clasped his arms round the book, and was snoring heavily. "He usually reads like that," the Professor remarked, "when the book's very

interesting: and then sometimes it's very difficult to get him to attend!"

This seemed to be one of the difficult times: the Professor lifted him up, once or twice, and shook him violently: but he always returned to his book the moment he was let go of, and showed by his heavy breathing that the book was as interesting as ever.

"How dreamy he is!" the Professor exclaimed. "He must have got to a very interesting part of the book!" And he rained quite a shower of thumps on the Other Professor's back, shouting "Hoy! Hoy!" all the time. "Isn't it wonderful that he should be so dreamy?" he said to Bruno. (p. 38-44)

If I have lost you here, return my friends. An inevitable return of what never was. Friends of wisdom making room for wonder and experimentation without progress or specialty. Rejecting discipline for play without losing sight of the disciplines. Rajchman (2000) explained this transformative process that is always yet to come:

In studying the successive "regimes" of movement and time images in cinema in this way, Deleuze may then be said to work out two larger principles in his aesthetic. The first says that those who are involved in the "becoming-art" of an expressive material—who are drawn to it and transformed by it, or who invent ways to see and say new things through it—do not preexist it, but are rather invented in the process. If there is "will" in art, it does not belong to a known or identifiable "agency"; rather it is many different people and disciplines talking and seeing in new ways at once, interfering and resonating with one another, thanks to same-as-yet unformed or uncoded material of expression. (p. 121)

CHAPTER 6

THE TALE OF A BLACK BAG IN THE WAVES

A black leather briefcase, that could also be taken to be a suitcase, must have just landed in this sea. Massumi (2011/2013) explained, “[A] situation, with its own little ocean of complexity.” (p. 52) From up above, ripples still rolling off mixing into the surrounding waves. Which ripples came from the bag and which come from the sea? There is too much movement for one to clearly tell. Where do the ripples break? What is their limit? Recognizable, Nietzsche (1872/2003) explained, “only because of its rhythm, as regular as the sound of waves crashing against the shore...” (p. 20)

From down below we ask, was this bag tossed or blown? Naturally, the bag is wet. How moist are its contents? If it were full of water it would surely have sunk by now. However, its surface is becoming blacker, wetter and darker. Deleuze (1969/1990) asked, “[H]ow are we to stay at the surface without staying on the shore?” (p.158)

Massumi (2011/2013) explained:

It’s artificial to talk about this only in relation to single things. Everything appears in a situation, along with others. The situation itself is a life-drop. A bigger drop, with its own ripples of potential that overlap with those of its constituent things but can also diverge from them, subtract them from itself or alloy them in other configurations. Every appearance is at the crossroads of life. At the limit, what appears isn’t just a drop or a pool, but a whole ocean, with calm stretches and turbulence, ripples that cancel each other out and others that combine and amplify, with crests and troughs, killer surf-breaks

and gentle lappings at the shores of other situations. For James, the fact that experience comes in drops doesn't mean it can't also come with "oceanic" feeling. (p 52)

If it is a briefcase the documents must be illegible by now, and if they aren't yet saturated, ink bled into blotches, they couldn't have remained in their original order. How can I interpret this artifact's purpose correctly? How can I represent its content truthfully and authentically? How can I fulfill my obligation to the people and their judges of truth? How can I use this discovery to contribute to what is known about things? As a researcher, as a student, isn't that what I am supposed to do with such a mysterious finding? Isn't it my disciplinary duty to clarify this bag's purpose to clarify my own purpose?

I stripped off all my coverings and jumped into the sea. Ripples from my body now adding to the mixture of drops. After resurfacing and climbing back to the shore with the black bag I removed the damp documents one by one and scattered them across the surface. I then placed the bag over my head and danced.

Jarry (1895/1996) declared:

And behold, the wallpaper of Faustroll's body was unrolled by the saliva and teeth of the water.

Like a musical score, all art and all science were written in the curves of the limbs of the ultrasexagenarian ephebe, and their progression to an infinite degree was prophesized therein. For, just as Professor Cayley recorded the past in the two dimensions of a black surface, so the progress of the solid future entwined the body in spirals. The Morgue harbored for two days on its slab the book revealed by God

concerning the glorious truth spread out through the three (four or n for some people) directions of space.

Meanwhile, Faustroll, finding his soul to be abstract and naked, donned the realm of the unknown dimension. (p 98-99)

¹ For more on the Second Law of Thermodynamics see

http://chemwiki.ucdavis.edu/Physical_Chemistry/Thermodynamics/Laws_of_Thermodynamics/Second_Law_of_Thermodynamics

² Deleuze and Guattari (1994) explained: “*The role of conceptual personae is to show thought’s territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations.* Conceptual personae are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us. For example, if we say that a conceptual persona stammers, it is no longer a type who stammers in a particular language but a thinker who makes the whole of language stammer: the interesting question then is “What is this thought that can only stammer?” Or again, if we say that a conceptual persona is the Friend, or that he is the Judge, or the Legislator, we are no longer concerned with private, public, or legal status but with that which belongs by right to thought and only to thought. Stammerer, friend, or judge do not lose their concrete existence but, on the contrary, take on a new one as thought’s internal conditions for its real exercise with this or that conceptual persona. This is not two friends who engage in thought; rather, it is thought itself that requires the thinker to be a friend so that thought is divided up within itself and can be exercised. It is thought itself which requires this division of thought between friends. These are no longer empirical, psychological, and social determinations, still less abstractions, but intercessors, crystals, or seeds of thought.” (p. 69)

³ Nietzsche (1968) argued: “The subjective compulsion not to contradict here is a biological compulsion: the instinct for the utility of inferring as we do infer is part of us, we almost *are* this instinct—But what naiveté to extract from this a proof that we are therewith in possession of a “truth in itself”!—Not being able to contradict is proof of an incapacity, not of “truth.”” (p. 278-279)

⁴ See Jarry, A. (1895/1996).

⁵ See Nietzsche (1967/1989) p. 45.

⁶ Methodolatry is a portmanteau word coined by Mary Daly (1973) combining methodology and idolatry. See Hein (2013) for more references and discussion.

⁷ Rajchman (1985), on Foucault’s rejection of allegiance to a unity, stated: “Our unities of authorship, oeuvre, and discipline present themselves as natural or grounded; yet they are historically constituted. Freedom from dogmatic unity thus leads Foucault to freedom from a unique disciplinary starting point or a single correct method. Foucault finds his skeptical freedom in belonging to no single tradition, while trying to provoke new thinking in and about many different ones. His work would begin with allegiance to no one constituted school or movement. In his singular ethic of writing without a single community, name, or following, without a fixed identity or ‘authorial face,’ it is this question of skeptical freedom that is at stake.” (p. 4-5)

⁸ Spivak (1976) explained erasure: “At once inside and outside a certain Hegelian and Heideggerian tradition, Derrida, then, is asking us to change certain habits of mind: the authority of the text is provisional, the origin is a trace, contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our language at the same time.” (p. xviii)

⁹ Deleuze and Guattari (1975/1986) argued: “How many styles or genres or literary movements, even very small ones, have only one single dream: to assume a major function in language, to offer themselves as a sort of state language, an official language (for example, psychoanalysis today, which would like to be a master of the signifier, of metaphor, of wordplay). Create the

opposite dream: know how to create a becoming-minor. (Is there a hope for philosophy, which for a long time has been an official, referential genre? Let us profit from this moment in which antiphilosophy is trying to be a language of power.)” (p. 27)

¹⁰ Deleuze and Guattari address this open approach to ontological inquiry in their concept of nomad thought, Massumi (1987) explained: “Nomad thought” does not immure itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority; it moves freely in an element of exteriority. It does not repose on identity; it rides difference. It does not respect the artificial division between the three domains of representation, subject, concept, and being; it replaces restrictive analogy with a conductivity that knows no bounds. The concepts it creates do not merely reflect the eternal form of a legislating subject, but are defined by a communicable force in relation to which their subject, to the extent that they can be said to have one, is only secondary. They do not reflect upon the world but are immersed in a changing state of things. (xii) For more on nomadic inquiry see St. Pierre (1997).

¹¹ Foucault (2008) on American neo-liberalism: “American neo-liberalism still involves, in fact, the generalization of the economic form of the market. It involves generalizing it throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges. This is, as it were, absolute generalization...” (p. 243)

¹² Foucault (1975/1995) discusses their power’s productive aspect: “We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.” (p. 194)

¹³ Massumi (2011): “There is an inaugural moment of indecision between the already-going-on-around and the taking-in-to-new-effect, before the culmination of this occurrence has sorted out just what occasion it will have been. This “primary phase” of the occasion of experience is the middling moment of bare activity with which process philosophy is pivotally concerned. *Bare activity*: the just-beginning-to-stir of the event coming into its newness out of the soon to be prior background activity it will have left creatively behind. The just-beginning is on the cusp of the “more” of the general activity of the world-ongoing turning into the singularity of the coming event. Every event is singular. It has an arc that carries it through its phases to a culmination all its own: a dynamic unity no other event can have in just this way. The unity of the occasion is the just-this-way in which the phases of the arced unfolding hold together as belonging to the same event.

All this is fest. Both the coming-into-its-own out of a prior moreness of the world’s general always-going-on, and the unity of the holding-together of phases arcing to a culmination in just this singular way, are felt. The general feeling of the world’s more-than of activity going on, and the singular feeling of that activity specifically coming to this, just so, are immediate dimensions of experience’s occurring. They are dual immediacies of process.” (p. 2-3)

¹⁴ For more on real but abstract see Massumi (2002) and Rajchman (2000).

¹⁵ Derrida (1978) referencing Levi-Strauss describes this bricoleur: “*On the other hand*, still in *The Savage Mind*, he presents as what he calls *bricolage* what might be called the discourse of this method. The *bricoleur*, says Levi-Strauss, is someone who uses “the means at hand,” that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to

which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogeneous—and so forth. There is therefore, a critique of language in the form of *bricolage*, and it has even been said that *bricolage* is critical language itself.” (p. 285)

¹⁶ Derrida (1978), referencing Levi-Strauss, discusses this method of exposing old concepts through a new use: “The other choice (which I believe corresponds more closely to Levi-Strauss’s manner), in order to avoid the possibly sterilizing effects of the first one, consists in conserving all these old concepts within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, treating them as tools which can still be used. No longer is any truth value attributed to them; there is a readiness to abandon them, if necessary, should other instruments appear more useful. In the meantime, their relative efficacy is exploited, and they are employed to destroy the old machinery to which they belong and of which they themselves are pieces. This is how the language of the social sciences criticizes *itself*. Levi-Strauss thinks that in this way he can separate *method* from *truth*, the instruments of the method and the objective significations envisaged by it. One could almost say that this is the primary affirmation of Levi-Strauss; in any event, the first words of the *Elementary Structures* are: “Above all, it is beginning to emerge that this distinction between nature and society (‘nature’ and ‘culture’ seem preferable to us today), while of no acceptable historical significance, does contain a logic, fully justifying its use by modern sociology as a methodological tool.” Levi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention: to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value he criticizes. (p. 284)

¹⁷ Describing this double existence Derrida (1978): “There are these two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology—in other words, throughout his entire history—has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of play. The second interpretation of interpretation, to which Nietzsche pointed the way, does not seek in ethnography, as Levi-Strauss does, the “inspiration of a new humanism” (again citing the “Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss”).

There are more than enough indications today to suggest we might perceive that these two interpretations of interpretation—which are absolutely irreconcilable even if we live them simultaneously and reconcile them in an obscure economy—together share the field which we call, in such a problematic fashion, the social sciences.

For my part, although these two interpretations must acknowledge and accentuate their difference and define their irreducibility, I do not believe that today there is any question of *choosing*—in the first place because here we are in a region (let us say, provisionally, a region of historicity) where the category of choice seems particularly trivial; and in the second, because we must first try to conceive of the common ground, and the *différance* of this irreducible difference. Here there is a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose *conception, formation, gestation, and labor* we are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity.” (p. 292-293)

¹⁸ Deleuze (1969/1990) argued that language can also remain open through the paradox: “Dialectics is, indeed, the art of *conjugation* (see the confatalia or series of events which depend on one another). But it is the task of language both to establish limits and to go beyond them. Therefore language includes terms which do not cease to displace their extension and which make possible a reversal of the connection in a given series (thus too much and not enough, few and many). The event is coextensive with becoming, and becoming is itself coextensive with language; the paradox is thus essentially a “sorites,” that is a series of interrogative propositions which, following becoming, proceed through successive additions and retrenchments. Everything happens at the boundary between things and propositions.” (p. 8)

¹⁹ For more on composition see Attali (1985) Chapter Five.

²⁰ For more on the instantaneous age of information see McLuhan’s 3 eras of communication in McLuhan, M. (1964). *Understanding media: the extensions of man*. United Kingdom: Routledge.

²¹ For more on the singularity see Kurzweil, R. (2005). *The singularity is near: when humans transcend biology*. New York: Penguin.

²² The idea of converting science and technology through aesthetics is discussed further in chapter 4’s section “The theory of the Sign”.

²³ See Lewis, W.A. (2015). The Resonance of Pasaquan.

<http://www.riggonia.com/LewisPquanStory.htm>

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