DANGER IN THE GRAY ZONE:

DEMOCRATIZATION AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

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(Under the Direction of Howard J. Wiarda)

ABSTRACT

Policymakers frequently make sweeping generalizations about the positive relationship between the democracy agenda and U.S. national security. These generalizations are buttressed by important assumptions about the effects the spread of democracy has on national security priorities. This study examines the degree to which political science research to date substantiates these assumptions. A content analysis of each official White House *National Security Strategy* from 1986-2001 reveals four primary assumptions: the spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict and increases stability, human rights, and economic development. A review of the literature finds that several of these assumptions are only justified by mature democracies that have passed through the gray zone of transition to democratic consolidation. In contrast, those democracies that occupy the intermediate or gray zone actually pose a threat to U.S. national security. It is consequently recommended that the democracy agenda prioritize democratic consolidation of the gray zone above all else.

INDEX WORDS: The United States, foreign policy, national security, democracy, democratization, democracy agenda, democracy promotion, human rights, stability, civil war, interstate conflict, economic development

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B.A., University of California Los Angeles, 1998

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2005

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August 2005

DEDICATION

To Dr. Wiarda. Thank you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis is the culmination of two years of work under the amazing tutelage of the International Affairs faculty at the University of Georgia. I thank all of them for a commitment to graduate students and teaching that surpassed my highest expectations. In particular, I would like to acknowledge Jaroslav Tir, Marcus Crepaz, and Chris Allen, whose graduate seminars all contributed to the genesis of this idea and whose love for the field is contagious. I would especially like to thank my committee. For two years, Jeffrey Berejikian helped tease out my unending new ideas until a thesis took shape. I thank Loch Johnson for encouraging me to apply my research on democratization to U.S. national security. Foremost, I would like to thank Howard J. Wiarda, my major professor and the best mentor one could imagine. My work as his research assistant inspired this thesis. I am so grateful for his invaluable open door and guidance. Finally, I thank Kathleen, Nate, Jen, and my parents, whose support made this possible and who make life continually wonderful.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands."

--President G. W. Bush, Inaugural Speech 2005

President G.W. Bush's words resonate deep in the hearts of those who live in freedom. After all, the freest states live in prosperity and seldom, if at all, war with each other. The president further proclaimed in his 2005 inaugural speech that there is now a union between the security interests and core democratic beliefs of the United States. He contended that the advancement of democratic ideals has been the "mission" of our nation since its founding. Further, the spread of democracy is now an imperative for U.S. national security and the "calling of our time." Based on this line of reasoning, he proceeded to outline a foreign policy that promotes the emergence of democracy and the building of democratic institutions in every country and in every culture. He announced that his ultimate goal is to end tyranny throughout the world (G. W. Bush 2005, 1-2). The president's sentiments are intuitive. However, political science has shown time and again that reality is often counterintuitive. This paper thus seeks to determine whether the spread of democracy worldwide is empirically in the interests of U.S. national security.

President G. W. Bush is certainly not the first to advocate this position. Immanuel Kant predicted in 1795 the spread of republican governance and the consequent emergence of pacific relations between democracies. The U.S. aided the development of democracies in Europe and Asia in the wake of World War II, succeeding most notably in Japan, Germany, and Austria. Following the work of Lipset and W.W. Rostow, the Alliance for Progress worked toward economic development in the Latin American third world, in the belief that democratic governance would consequently emerge. Throughout the Cold War, the spread of democracy was encouraged as a means toward communist containment. Further, President Reagan established the National Endowment for Democracy in order to institutionalize the U.S. role in the promotion of democracy abroad (Cavell 2002). Although the Reagan administration's support for anti anti-Communist guerilla forces was presented in the context of a democracy agenda, the spread of democracy was but a secondary goal. The primary aim was to strengthen national security and the hand of the U.S. in the Cold War (Muravchik 1991).

The end of the Cold War marked a turning point in the role democracy promotion played in U.S. foreign policy. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, all three American presidents framed their foreign policy with the rhetoric of a democracy agenda (Carothers 2004). This is due in part to the appeal democracy promotion has to both idealists and realists. Idealists view the spread of democracy as a moral imperative, one that will improve the lives of the afflicted and generally make the world a better place. Realists view the spread of democracy as an effective means to pursue security interests. Thus, inserting the promotion of democracy abroad into the foreign policy agenda is a sure way to appeal to both ends of the political spectrum.

President G. H. W. Bush did not devote much attention to democracy promotion until the fall of the Soviet Union, when democracy emerged in Eastern Europe and spread throughout

the continent of Africa. President G. H. W. Bush then rhetorically supported the advance of democracy, going so far as to make it a cornerstone of his foreign policy agenda. However, his emphasis on the promotion of democracy was inconsistent. It varied by region, was shaped by the particular interests of the U.S. at a given time, and depended on the degree of local pro-democracy activism (Carothers 2004). This strategy of rhetorical devotion but variance of emphasis in practice continued throughout the Clinton administration and has reached new heights under President G. W. Bush.[1]

Democracy promotion has thus been a central component of U.S. national security agendas for decades. Some would say it goes all the way back to Woodrow Wilson or even to the founding fathers. However, inadequate attention has been paid in the literature to the relationship between the promotion of democracy abroad and U.S. national security. This is especially disconcerting given the findings of several scholars, expressed here by Wiarda, "Greater democracy is not always an unmixed blessing. Some countries may not want it, or want it all that badly, or want it in our precise form; and in several…cases…democracy has proved or has the potential to prove destructive of both stability, economic growth, *and* American interests" (Wiarda 1997, 80; see also Zakaria 2004; Snyder 2000; Carothers 2004; and Chua, 2003). Indeed, extensive research has been conducted on the relationships between democracy or democratization and many other variables, such as peace, economic development, civil war, nationalist violence, human rights, gender relations, education, trade, genocide, environmental protection, and still others.

Despite all of this attention that both democracy and democratization have received from the field of political science, there is a very important gap in the literature. American policymakers have long espoused the national security benefits of spreading democracy. Yet,

[1] For a detailed comparison of democracy promotion by these three administrations, see Carothers, 2004.

little, if any attention has been given to the empirical evidence of this claim. This lack of attention is most likely due to the immense definitional, operationalization, and measurement challenges posed by the concept of national security. Granted, these challenges are great. However, the prominence given to democracy promotion in the name of national security demands an assessment of its empirical implications. This is a daunting task. This study is but the first step in a much larger research agenda that seeks to answer the question: Does the spread of democracy increase U.S. national security?

A review of the literature that follows reveals that political science has not reached a consensus on a measurable conception of national security. In this regard, policymakers indirectly offer a solution. American presidents routinely outline a strikingly consistent (albeit very slowly evolving) set of specific and measurable national security goals. Those goals are expressed in terms of combined physical, societal, and economic security. Physical security refers to the absence of physical threats to the territory, resources, and citizens of the U.S. and its allies. Societal security includes the preservation of American values, culture, and institutions. Economic security includes the financial well being of the U.S. government, industry and citizens; the maintenance of domestic and international financial institutions; as well as the preservation of access to key resources abroad. However, presidents also consistently justify the means to achieve these national security goals with many unsubstantiated assumptions. Of particular interest for this study, they justify the promotion of democracy abroad with multiple assumptions.

Fortunately, the academic literature has much to contribute regarding the relationship between developing democracy and various physical, societal, and economic indicators of the security goals presidents identify. When considered collectively, the findings in the literature

provide the basis for an effective preliminary assessment of the contribution that democracy promotion abroad makes to national security. Therefore, this paper will consider the assumptions that several U.S. presidents have made to justify the promotion of democracy abroad. It will then evaluate whether those assumptions are empirically supported by the existing findings of political scientists. Specifically it will test this hypothesis: **The spread of democracy abroad increases U.S. national security.**[2]

To that end, chapter two defines key terms and details the methodology employed herein. Chapter three analyzes the content of the official National Security Strategies of Presidents Reagan through G. W. Bush. It then turns the presidents' assumptions into four testable hypotheses. Chapters four through seven look to the existing academic literature to test these four hypotheses. One chapter is devoted to each of four primary assumptions about the relationship between democracy and: peace, stability, human rights, and economic development. Finally, the conclusion offers a preliminary assessment of the primary hypothesis regarding the relationship between the spread of democracy and U.S. national security.

[2] An important alternative hypothesis is: U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad increase U.S. national security. Logically, if the spread of democracy does not increase U.S. national security, then efforts to promote democracy abroad have no chance of increasing national security at home. Therefore, the starting point must be an evaluation of the relationship between democracy at the systemic level and U.S. national security. If indeed this relationship is positive, then future research on the alternative hypothesis is warranted.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

This chapter will provide a brief review of the literature's conceptualization of the dependent and independent variables of the primary hypothesis, national security and democracy. It will then discuss the research method of this study. In so doing, it will propose four hypotheses and a plan to test them.

Definitions

Dependent Variable: National Security

Since Word War II, political scientists have debated the meaning of security. However, there has been little agreement. Some have gone so far as to deem it an essentially contested concept, or a topic about which no amount of theoretical discussion nor evidence will ever yield a conceptual consensus (Buzan 1984 and 1991). In contrast, this study contends that national security is not an essentially contested concept. Although agreement has yet to be reached, there is utility in continued efforts to refine the concept. As Wolfers noted in his classic consideration of national security, the concept must be properly specified. It is only underspecification that yields more confusion than scientific utility (Wolfers 1952).

Baldwin argues that scholars must not use the excuse that national security is an essentially contested concept in order to escape specific and clear articulation of term (Baldwin 1997). This is especially true given that an entire discipline is devoted to "security studies." Further, the foundational theories of realism and neorealism site security as the primary aim of states in international relations. As one of the founding fathers of neorealism contends, "In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquility, profit and power." (Waltz 1979, 126). In response to Waltz, Baldwin contends that this definition is not useful, because it is so broad that it contributes little to assessments of policy goals (Baldwin 1997, 21).

There are definitions offered for security that go beyond survival. Wolfers argues that "Security, after all is nothing but the absence of the evil of insecurity" (Wolfers 1952, 488). He further contends that the concept includes too wide a spectrum of goals. As a consequence the term can be used to justify the formulation of incongruent policies. Wolfers proceeds to define security in terms of the protection of values (Wolfers 1952). Herander and Nye similarly define national security as the absence of threat to core social values (Herander 1993; Nye 2003). Although these definitions seem to find some degree of agreement, they do not get us very far. They define "national security" and "security" so broadly that the concept loses its utility.

Alternatively, attempts to consider narrower definitions of security at first glance appear to yield little agreement. But a closer examination reveals that these attempts are not in disagreement at all; they merely underspecify either the level of analysis or the specific components of security that apply to their particular research aims.

First, it is necessary to recognize that security applies at multiple levels: individual security, family security, community security, national security, international security, regional

security, or global security. The inclusion of all levels of security in a singular broad definition yields a concept of little use for policymakers and political scientists alike.

The issue is not that the concept itself is too unwieldy. The problem is that the concept is often carelessly used. If scholars would take care to specify the level of security under consideration in a given study, the author suspects that they could avoid entirely this contentious issue and employ the concept with great utility. Scholars do not have to consider all levels at once. For example, within the context of international relations, the sub-state levels of security are only relevant insofar as they affect interstate and super-state relations. Consideration of particular levels individually and interactively does not adulterate the overarching concept of security. To the contrary, underspecification is the adulterator.

Second, it is necessary to specify the different components of security, on any level under consideration. On the multiple levels that are assessed within the field of international relations, these include physical security, territorial security, military security, ideological security, social security, political security, economic security, psychological security, environmental security, ecological security, resource security, border security, and so on. Especially since the end of the Cold War, attempts to redefine security have focused on broadening the concept to include elements of low politics, such as economics, the environment, and migration. (Dyer 2001; and Rudolph 2003).

Although each of these are certainly components of security and should be factored into a far reaching analysis of such, they can be organized into three basic categories: physical security, economic security and societal security.[3] As noted in the preceding introduction, physical

[3] This categorization has been reformulated from Rudolph's consideration of "national interest," in which he develops "three dimensions of security." He writes, "the 'national interest' of states can be defined largely along three dimensions: (1) geopolitical security, (2) the production and accumulation of material wealth, and (3) social

security refers to the absence of physical threats to the territory, resources, and citizens of the U.S. and its allies. This category includes: territorial security, military security, environmental security, ecological security, border security, human security, oil security, etc. Societal security refers to the preservation of American values, culture, and institutions. This category includes: ideological security, political security, psychological security, cultural security, etc. Economic security refers to the financial well being of the U.S. government, industry and citizens; the maintenance of domestic and international financial institutions; as well as the preservation of access to key resources abroad. This category includes issues related to trade, domestic economic growth, foreign direct investment, and fiscal stability, as well as resource security.[4]

We shall now consider empirical analyses that attempt to quantify security. Within the field of security studies, traditional scholarship on security has been dominated by studies of physical security, and therefore of conflict. This is because, as Lippman notes, "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war" (Lippman 1943, 51). Scholars such as Maoz, Oneal, Russet, Geller and Singer restrict their studies to the onset of militarized disputes (Oneal, et. al. 1996; Geller and Singer 1998). They do not purport to define or measure security in this limited sense but their studies also do not specify that they are concerned with but one particular category of security: physical.

These scholars find that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the onset of militarized disputes are twofold: willingness and capability to engage in conflict. They consider willingness qualitatively and measure capability in terms of power. Anderson notes that the standard definition of power in the literature combines several components (Anderson, et. al.

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stability and cohesion. Grand strategy can then be defined as the mix of policies that provide aggregate maximization along these three facets of security." (Rudolph 2003, 605)

[4] Resource security fits into two categories: physical security and economic security.

2000). Data sets typically include economic, military, political, social and geographical indicators. In particular, the most commonly used data is that collected by the Correlates of War project. This data measures power as a composite of capabilities that include: total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure (Singer, et. al. 1972). It is important to note here that economic capability is considered one of several tools, not an end in itself.

The willingness condition has also been considered in terms of aggressive intentions. Wolfers argues that security is dependent on the aggressive intentions of others. He contends that states seeking security should attempt to influence the attitudes and behaviors of potential aggressors. Further, he suggests that the most effective and cost-efficient security policy is that which seeks to persuade an enemy to relinquish aggressive intent (Wolfers 1952).

Next, liberalist studies find that economic interdependence yields the absence of militarized disputes. Liberalism argues that economic cooperation will diminish insecurity (implying, although not specifying, physical insecurity). As Herander argues, actions of a military, economic, or political nature can threaten national security, but there is a solution. The degree of a state's economic interdependence determines how external actions will affect its national security. This is because economic interdependence increases the costs of hostility (Herander 1993). However, Anderson et. al. counter this argument with the contention that increasing interdependence will not mitigate tension between major powers over scarce resources and territory (Anderson et. al. 2000).

In addition to this focus on economic cooperation, there is a growing body of literature on the effectiveness of the pursuit of security as a general concept through economic tactics. Long gone are the days when economics was relegated to low politics as Wolfers suggested over fifty

years ago (Wolfers 1952). Contemporary literature considers the role economic means play in the pursuit of security ends (physical, societal, and economic). Nue, for example, contends that "The economic consequences of national security have two components: first, the ways in which military instruments may be used to generate economic effects and second, ways in which economic instruments can be used to substitute for, or to complement, military instruments in pursuit of security objectives" (Nue 1994, xix).

Alternatively, DeSouza acknowledges the impact foreign economic crises have on threats to physical security and cites the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, and the 1997-1998 Russian and Brazilian economic declines. De Souza also acknowledges that a state's own economic policy can itself cause national security threats. Specifically, he cites the instance in which the Clinton Administration licensed American corporations to launch commercial satellites on Chinese rockets (DeSouza 2000).

Finally, perception has been found to play a significant role in the conception of security. Wolfers discusses perception in terms of fear. He argues that "security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers 1952, 485). More recently, game theorists have acknowledged that perceived threats to security, real or not, contribute to the onset of conflict. Constructivists additionally acknowledge that the way states perceive their position, in terms of having suffered losses or achieved gains, impacts their willingness to take risks and engage in conflict.

In sum, political science has often defined security so broadly in terms of values and survival as to render the concept useless. Further, the empirical study of international relations has used the term loosely without adequate specification of distinct levels and categories of

security. Most notable are the multiple studies that analyze the causes of militarized disputes and the pacific affects of economic cooperation. The former find that conflict decreases international security while the latter find that cooperation increases international security, but neither specify what exactly is meant by international security beyond the absence of militarized disputes. Despite this, the literature has progressed insofar as it has sought to redefine the overarching concept of security to include the relevant issues of migration, the environment, perception, and economics. Most notably, there has been a departure from the traditional consideration of security as the absence of physical conflict.

Independent Variable: Democracy

Democracy can be defined based on its Greek roots as rule by the people. However, this definition has many variants. Locke argues that people have natural rights to life, liberty, and property in the state of nature. Legitimate government must be created by consent of the people through a social contract in order to ensure protection of those rights (Locke 2003). Rousseau, similarly, contends, “Man is born free.” Yet, he completes that famous line with, “and everywhere he is in chains.” He contends that renunciation of freedom is incompatible with human nature and that morality is not possible in the absence of freedom. Therefore, he proposes that the only way man can break free from his chains is to subject himself to the "general will" of the community (Rousseau 1978, 53). Rousseau asserts that each individual should yield freedom to a sovereign who will rule on behalf of the general will for the good of the community. This assertion, widely adhered to throughout Latin America, is in contrast to Locke’s participatory social contract and proposal that government can protect rights by effective institutional design.

Conceptions of democracy have evolved over time. More recently, Dahl has offered a widely used definition (Dahl 1989). He asserts that democracy is a system of open and inclusive government, comprised of several components: 1) effective participation based on organized contestation through fair and free elections as well as freedom of speech and assembly; 2) voting equality; 3) enlightened understanding; and 4) the right of virtually all adults to vote and run for office.

In the tradition of Schumpeter and in contrast to Locke, Rousseau and Dahl , Huntington offers a procedural definition (Shumpeter 1950). He defines a system as democratic to the extent that leaders are elected through fair and competitive nearly universal elections (Huntington 1991).

Diamond identifies two different types of democracy: electoral democracy in accordance with Schumpeter and Huntington, and liberal democracy in accordance with Dahl. Diamond argues that electoral democracies select leaders via universal popular vote in multiparty elections that are both regular and competitive. In contrast, liberal democracy goes further, to include vertical and horizontal accountability, spheres of civil society and private life that are insulated from state control, provisions for civic and political pluralism, and the rule of law with a supreme constitution (Diamond 1999).

Diamond echoes the widespread normative view that democracy is the best system of government, but he goes farther by identifying the democratic systems that lie in between electoral and liberal democracy. He cautions that the third wave of democracy has ushered in increasingly shallow political liberalization in countries such as Egypt, Cambodia, Haiti, Kazakhstan, and now Afghanistan and Iraq. These states were transitioning to democracy but seem to have settled into “electoral authoritarian regimes.” They feature elections and some

liberal institutions, but opposition candidates have no chance of winning. In addition, he contends that a growing number of semi-democratic regimes fail to provide effective governance, protect civil liberties or uphold the objective rule of law. Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East are full of such partial or semi-democratic regimes. Indeed, such mixed systems are the majority in the third world.

Several other concepts closely related to democracy should be defined here. The "gray zone" refers to regimes that are somewhere in the middle between autocracies and consolidated democracies. As Carothers explains, the majority of third wave countries have yet to build the strong institutions that are essential for effective democratic governance. In countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Togo, the beginning phases of democracy failed and gave way to renewed authoritarianism. "Most of the transitional countries, however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered a political gray zone" (Carothers 2004, 171-172).

This zone is one in which some conditions associated with democracy have been met, yet key democratic institutions are absent or function poorly. Civil society exists in some form and a degree of electoral competition is allowed. However, civic engagement is limited to voting, authorities are not subject to the rule of law, civil rights are not protected, the public has little confidence in government institutions, and elections are frequently deemed illegitimate (Carothers 2004). The gray zone includes states that are in the beginning stages of democratization through to those that are approaching consolidation (thus those states that receive a Polity score between -9 and +9; and those that that are categorized as Partly Free on the Freedom House scale).[5]

[5] Polity scores provide measures of autocracy and democracy based on a composite index of indicators of competitiveness of political participation, regulation of participation, openness and competativeness of executive

A definition of democratization is derived here from the work of Snyder. He uses the term to distinguish between democracies that are mature and those that are on the path toward maturity. A mature democracy is one in which power is consolidated in the hands of elected officials. However, the elections must be "free, fair and periodic." A "substantial proportion of the adult population" is allowed to vote in competitive elections, civil liberties are protected, and authorities are subject to the rule of law. Further, citizens are free to organize and contest elections. Freedom of speech exists, as does a free media. Like Snyder, this study defines states as democratizing if at least one of these democratic conditions has *recently* been established (Snyder 2000, 25-26).

It is important to distinguish between democratizing states and semi-democracies, otherwise termed anocracies. This category can include those states that are democratizing, but also includes those that are stuck somewhere in between autocracy and mature democracy and not moving toward consolidation, such as Diamond's "electoral authoritarian regimes." It includes those mixed regimes that have settled into a system with both components of autocracy and democracy. Rather than moving toward democracy and freedom, they are stuck in a seemingly permanent limbo between democracy and authoritarianism. Such mixed or transitional states carry enormous implications for U.S. policy. For it is neither the mature, or consolidated, democracies, nor the stable authoritarian regimes that cause most difficulties for U.S. policy. Instead, it is the states stuck in between.

Finally, consolidated democracy refers to states that have built mature democratic institutions and govern effectively. They score a +10, and possibly include +9, on the Polity

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recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. A Polity score of "-10" identifies a state that is strongly autocratic and "+10" identifies state that is strongly democratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Freedom House scores provide measures of freedom based on a composite index of political rights, comprised of degrees of freedom of expression, assembly, association, education and religion. A Freedom House score of "1" identifies a state that is most free and a "7" identifies a state that is least free (Freedom House 2005).

scale. They are categorized by Freedom House as Free. In consolidated democracies, power has typically been transferred between opposing parties at least twice through free and fair elections. There is no other means through which authorities seek to attain power. More specifically effective governance is carried out through strong democratic institutions that guarantee most of the conditions of maturity specified above.

Research Design

This study is designed to take the first important step toward testing the hypothesis: **The spread of democracy abroad increases U.S. national security**. As was evidenced by the preceding literature review, the first challenge is to develop a measurable conceptualization of U.S. national security. Van Evera offers sound direction for this task,

> Theories can often be inferred from policy debates. Proponents of given policies frame specific cause-effect statements ('If communism triumphs in Vietnam, it will triumph in Thailand, Malaysia, and elsewhere') that can be framed as general theories ('Communist victories are contagious: communist victory in one state raises the odds of communist victory in others'; or, more generally, 'Revolution is contagious; revolution in one state raises the odds on revolution in others'). We can test these general theories. Such tests can in turn help resolve the policy debate. Theories inferred in this fashion are sure to have policy relevance, and they merit close attention for this reason (Van Evera, 1991, 26).

Van Evera's comments are not pertinent only to the development of theory, but also to the development of measurable conceptualizations of the major components of that theory. American Presidents not only make sweeping generalizations about the causative implications of the spread of democracy, they also have voiced time and again the assumptions that form the basis of those generalizations. One medium in which they have done so is the official White House *National Security Strategy*.

The official *National Security Strategy* as we now know it was first published in 1986 by President Reagan in response to the Nichols-Goldwater Act. Since then, the strategies have spanned four distinctive global environments in a relatively short period of time. President Reagan's strategy was created for the Cold War. President G. H. W. Bush's strategy was devised for the immediate hopeful post-Cold War era and was formulated both before and after the spectacular military defeat of Iraq in Desert Storm. President Clinton's strategy was written for a period of unparalleled economic growth, drastically increasing globalization, and minimal imminent threats to national security. Lastly, President G. W. Bush's strategy was formed in the wake of September 11, in the midst of an economic slowdown, and at the beginning of the War on Terror.

Despite this divergence of context, the conceptualizations of national security as well as the objectives and means employed to pursue them are, for the most part, consistent. All of them acknowledge the need to consider national security in terms beyond protection from external attack, or in Reagan's words, "military defenses against military threats." All of them cite the need to preserve American independence, institutions, values, and territory. In addition they consider economic and security interests indivisible.

Each president builds on the foundation laid by the preceding formulation. Little is dropped, but something new is added by each successor. Notably, Reagan's focus on the promotion of democracy abroad is aimed at combating the communist threat, while his successors seek to promote democracy abroad in order to secure international peace, increase cooperation and spread American values. President G. H. W. Bush adds the objectives of protecting the environment, ensuring the security of resource supplies, and combating terrorism. President Clinton increases the focus on cooperation and domestic economic "revitalization."

While G. H. W. Bush and Clinton take a more offensive tone in the absence of the imminent threats posed by the Cold War and the War on Terror, President G. W. Bush returns to the more defensive tone of President Reagan, as he seeks to "strongly resist aggression" and of course pursue the war on terrorism.

Each president methodically outlines what he considers to be the distinct and interactive components of national security. These components include the various subsets of economic, societal, and physical security factors that have been evaluated individually by political scientists, as discussed in the preceding chapter. The author proposes that national security can be measured as an index of these multiple components. The development of such an index is a monumental task that is beyond the scope of this paper, but should certainly be the aim of future research. This study will take one step in that direction, and consequently make an original contribution to the academic literature, as follows.

All four presidents assume that the spread of democracy will advance many of the national security components just mentioned. This study will conduct a content analysis of each official White House *National Security Strategy* published by the Reagan, G. H. W. Bush, Clinton, and G. W. Bush administrations. It will identify the specific assumptions made by each president about the national security ramifications of the spread of democracy abroad. It will turn the most frequently iterated and consistent assumptions across administrations into testable hypotheses. This study will then look to the literature to determine if political science research offers evidence in support of these hypotheses.

The literature considered here will be limited primarily to cross-national, large-N, quantitative studies. The reason being that the end goal is a sweeping assessment of the system-wide implications of the spread of democracy. That is not to say that comparative case studies

are of little value. In fact, various cases will be noted throughout for the sake of reference points and clarification of findings. However, the scope and space constraints of this study prevent in depth consideration of comparative cases studies. That will be the subject of future research.

Finally, this paper will contribute further to the academic literature as follows. It will consider the collective findings for all of the hypotheses. In so doing, it will seek to determine if U.S. policy assumptions about the spread of democracy are justified. It will subsequently provide a first pass assessment of the evidence in support of the primary hypothesis: the spread of democracy increases U.S. national security. It will conclude with suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER 3

POLICY ASSUMPTIONS

As noted earlier, policymakers have reached a conceptual consensus of national security insofar as they have established a set of specific national security goals. Those goals are expressed in terms of combined physical, societal and economic factors. A content analysis of each official *National Security Strategy* from 1987 through 2002 reveals many consistent assumptions about the relationship between the spread of democracy and factors that comprise national security. These assumptions are worded in various ways throughout the strategies analyzed. Those iterated by multiple administrations are done so with varied degrees of emphasis and causative implications. There are seventeen assumptions in all, as detailed in Table 3.1 on the following page.

Table 3.1 National Security Assumptions About Democracy

1. the spread of democracy will yield international peace
2. the spread of democracy will increase state, regional, and global stability
3. the spread of democracy will improve human rights
4. the spread of democracy will spread prosperity (and visa versa)
5. the spread of democracy will make the U.S. safer
6. the spread of democracy will make the U.S. more secure
7. the spread of democracy will increase international security
8. the spread of democracy will increase the security of a specific foreign state
9. the spread of democracy will protect the freedom of the U.S.
10. pluralist societies work
11. democracies make natural allies
12. the spread of democracy best serves U.S. interests
13. the spread of democracy reduces refugee flows
14. the spread of democracy decreases ethnic violence
15. democracies are more likely to uphold the rule of law
16. the spread of democracy reduces corruption throughout the world
17. the spread of democracy will increase social progress

As is shown in Figure 3.1, on the following page, the quantity of assumptions about the causative implications of the spread of democracy increased over time, reached a pinnacle under Clinton in 1999, and then declined sharply under G. W. Bush This is substantively significant, because it shows that each president added to the assumptions of his predecessor, with the exception of G. W. Bush[6] Although there is a decline in the quantity of assumptions in G. W. Bush's *National Security Strategy*, the number is still three higher than the first year analyzed under Reagan. Therefore, the iteration of assumptions about the spread of democracy is consistent across all four administrations in both substance and quantity (insofar as the numbers never drop below Reagan's initial eight).

[6] It is however expected, given the current G.W. Bush democracy agenda, that the next *National Security Strategy* President Bush publishes will feature another significant increase in the number of assumptions about democracy's effects.



Figure 3.1 Democracy Assumptions by Presidential Term

Although these assumptions are all stated at least once in at least one *National Security Strategy*, the first four are repeated most frequently by all four presidents in each of the strategies analyzed, as is shown in Table 3.2, on the following page.

Table 3.2 Frequency of Each Democracy Assumption

	Reagan 1987	Reagan 1988	GHWB 1990	GHWB 1991	GHWB 1993	Clinton 1994	Clinton 1995	Clinton 1999	Clinton 2000	GWB 2002	TOTAL BY ISSUE
Int'l. Peace/Less Conflinct	2	3	2	2	6	3	3	7	5	2	35
Stability	1	2	3	0	2	2	1	5	5	1	22
Human Rights	2	1	1	3	3	1	2	7	2	1	23
Prosperity/Econ. Development	0	1	2	4	2	4	5	9	2	5	34
US Safer	2	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	5
US Security	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	4	2	0	14
Social Progress	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
US Freedom	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Pluralist Societies Work	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Natural Allies	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	5
US Interests Best Served	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
Reduce Refugee Flows	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	0	5
Decrease Ethnic Violence	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	4
Uphold Rule of Law	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Reduce Corruption	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	4
International Security	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	11
Other Foreign State Security	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
TOTAL BY YEAR	8	11	13	14	17	17	18	42	20	11	

The assumption that the spread of democracy will yield international peace was stated in each *National Security Strategy* one way or another by Reagan five times total (in the 1987 and 1988 Strategies combined), by G. H. W. Bush ten times total (in the 1990, 1991, and 1993 Strategies combined), by Clinton eighteen times total (in the 1994, 1995, 1999, and 2000 Strategies combined), and by G. W. Bush twice (in the 2001 Strategy).[7] The assumption that the spread of democracy will increase stability was stated by Reagan three times, G. H. W. Bush five times, Clinton thirteen times, and G. W. Bush once. The assumption that the spread of democracy will improve human rights was stated by Reagan three times, G. H. W. Bush seven times, Clinton seven times, and G. W. Bush once. The assumption that the spread of democracy will spread prosperity/economic development was stated by Reagan once, G. H. W. Bush eight times, Clinton twenty times, and G. W. Bush five times. In contrast, for example, the assumption that the spread of democracy will decrease refugee flows was stated only four times by Clinton, once by G. H. W. Bush, and not at all by the others.

[7] The missing years here are explained by the inconsistent publication of the official *National Security Strategy*. Presidents have *not* published one every year.

In sum, all four presidents repeatedly make the assumptions that the spread of democracy abroad will increase stability, the protection of human rights, and economic development. They also all assume that democracy promotion will decrease interstate conflict. These assumptions can be turned into the following testable hypotheses:

H1: The spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict.

H2: The spread of democracy increases stability.

H3: The spread of democracy increases the protection of human rights.

H4: The spread of democracy increases economic development.

The following chapters will review the political science literature to determine the degree to which the findings therein support these four hypotheses.

CHAPTER 4

H1: THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY DECREASES INTERSTATE CONFLICT

"Perpetual peace, Kant says, is the end point of the hard journey his republics will take. The promise of perpetual peace, the violent lessons of war, and the experience of a partial peace are proof of the need for and the possibility of world peace. They are also the grounds for moral citizens and statesmen to assume the duty of striving for peace" (Doyle 1986, 1163).

Democracies do not fight each other. The evidence for the "democratic peace" is so robust that it is nearly considered a universal law (Bremer 1992; Levy 1998; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz 1998; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995; Russett 1995). Over one hundred articles have been published on the topic and, with few dissenters, the field is almost unanimous on the issue. Despite the relative consensus that surrounds the democratic peace, policymakers often draw erroneous conclusions related to it. Empirical evidence shows it is not the cure-all for conflict that it is often portrayed to be. This chapter will provide a brief summary of the literature on the relationship between democratic regimes and international conflict. It will then evaluate whether the evidence contained therein supports the hypothesis that that spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict.

Scholars have yet to agree on the reason for the democratic peace. The main debate is between three views: 1) democratic regimes share norms that yield cooperation and preclude

conflict between them; 2) democratic regimes are structurally constrained by their domestic institutions from engaging in conflict with each other; and 3) democracies make unattractive targets.

For example, Bueno de Mequita et. al., argue that democratic leaders looking forward to future re-election are reluctant to engage in interstate conflict, so are driven by self interest to pursue other means such as diplomacy or sanctions to resolve disputes (Bueno de Mesquita, et al 1999). Owen contends that liberal ideas themselves prevent democracies from going to war against one another. He suggests that a commitment to freedom creates the ideology and institutions that subject government decisions to the will of the people. The consequence of this commitment to freedom is peace between democracies (Owen 1994). Further, Gelpi and Griesdorf contend that the structures of democratic political systems create electoral costs that make leaders credible to external opponents. This credibility is believed to promote increased cooperation and negotiation. These structures consequently affect interstate behavior and prevent conflict between democracies (Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001).

Finally, Bueno de Mesquita, et. al. find that democracies invest more in war than autocracies, because the political survival of democratic leaders is more dependent on war outcomes. Further, democracies do not engage in militarized disputes unless they are confident they will win. Therefore, democracies are "unappealing targets" (Bueno de Mesquita, et al 1999, 804).

The arguments against the democratic peace are few. Some contend that too few democracies have had both the willingness and capabilities (or at least too few in the sample have been contiguous) for war between them to even be an option. Therefore, the universe of cases is so small that the importance of possible exceptions is greatly increased. (Layne 1994).

Because of this and the fact that there is so little agreement on the mechanism behind the peace, Spiro argues that random chance is a better predictor of war between democracies than is liberal peace theory. He contends that the absence of war is insufficient confirmation of the democratic peace (Spiro 1994).

However, the possible exceptions to the democratic peace are so few and debatable, that this argument has little significance. As Russett shows in his defense of the democratic peace, each of the alleged wars between democracies can be discounted on at least one of three grounds. First, it was not a war between sovereign states (e.g. it was a colonial or civil war). Second, the conflict resulted in less than 1000 casualties, and cannot, therefore, be classified as a war (as is the field's standard casualty threshold for "war"). Third, one or both participants does not qualify as a democracy (Russet, 1993). Table 4.1 below identifies each of the most commonly cited exceptions to the democratic peace and classifies them according to Russets' criteria.

Table 4.1 Faulty Exceptions to the Democratic Peace

Not an Inter-State War:	Did not reach 1000 casualties:	One or both participants fails the test for democracy:
War of 1812, U.S. vs. Great Britain	World War II, Finland vs. western democracies 1941	Roman Republic (Papal States) vs. France, 1849
American Civil War, 1861	Lebanon vs. Israel, 1967	Ecuador-Colombia, 1863
Second Philippine War, 1899		Franco-Prussian War, 1870
Boer War, 1899, South African Republic and the Orange Free State vs. UK		World War 1, Imperial Germany vs. western democracies 1914/17
		Lebanon vs. Israel, 1948
		Spanish-American War, 1898

In addition to the democratic peace, studies on the relationship between interstate conflict and democracy reveal that democracies do fight nondemocracies (Maoz and Abdolali 1989). In fact, democracies are no less likely to fight wars than nondemocracies (Gleditsch, et al 1997). As Doyle contends in one of the most widely cited accounts of the democratic peace,

> Kant's republics—including our own—remain in a state of war with nonrepublics [e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, et. al.]. Liberal republics see themselves as threatened by aggression from nonrepublics that are not constrained by representation. Even though wars often cost more than the economic return they generate, liberal republics also are prepared to protect and promote—sometimes forcibly—democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics, which, because they do not authentically represent the rights of individuals, have no rights of interference. These wars may liberate oppressed individuals. (Doyle 1986, 162)

Although, it is also argued that democracies only appear to be more conflict-prone because they tend to ally more in war. Gleditsch, et. al., contend that democracies may very well be less aggressive than other regime types. (Gleditsch, et al 1997).

Further, Democracies are less likely to be invaded not only by other democracies but also by nondemocracies (Hermann 1996). Democracies are more likely to win wars as both initiators and targets (Reiter and Stam 1998, 387*).* Autocracies are more likely to initiate war against democracies, than visa versa. (Bennett and Stam 1998). The wars democracies initiate tend to be shorter than those initiated by nondemocracies. Democracies also suffer fewer casualties in war than do nondemocracies (Bennett and Stam 1996; Siverson 1995).

Others find that regardless of regime type, economic interdependence decreases the probability of war (Oneal, et al 1996, 11). In addition, the democratic peace is conditioned on economic development. Mousseau, et. al., find that joint democracy is only correlated with peace when at least one state in the dyad has a per capita GDP of 1400 USD; however, they also note that less than ten percent of their sample fail to meet this income threshold (Mousseau, et.

al. 2003). They conclude that "the strength of democracy's pacifying effect varies with the level of development. Peace is more secure among the economically advanced democracies" (Mousseau, et al 2003, 300).

Contrary to the hypothesis of this chapter, Mansfield and Snyder find that the probability of interstate conflict is highest during democratization. Their findings are both substantively and statistically significant, and especially so within the first ten years after regime change. They find that states that jump directly from autocracy to "mass democracy," e.g. Russia in the early 1990s, are two times as likely to engage in interstate disputes within ten years than states that remain autocratic. (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 6). They also find that attempts to reverse the democratization process after it begins do not decrease the risk of war. Further, states transitioning toward autocracy are also more likely to engage in interstate conflict than are regimes not in transition (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). This study is confirmed for the most part by Gleditsch, et al, who find that, "At the system level…for most of the period under study, democratization was associated with increasing violence between states, whereas most recently democratization occurs simultaneously with decreasing violence" (Gleditsch, et al 1997, 307). However, this tendency toward conflict is mitigated by evidence that democratizing states are only more prone to war when they share borders with autocracies. If a democratizing state is surrounded by democracies, then it is far less likely to engage in interstate dispute (Snyder 2000).

Mansfield and Snyder further argue that most great powers "go on the war path" in the beginning phase of democratization (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 6). They cite examples that include Mid-Victorian Britain and the Crimean War, France and several wars under Napoleon

III, as well as Wilhelmine Germany and World War I.[8] They contend that each of these wars ensued when the early stages of great power democratization increased nationalism and aggressive hostility (Mansfield and Snyder 1995).

They suggest that democratizing states are war-prone, because elites compete for power in the new regime and they appeal to nationalist sentiments for support. "However, like the sorcerer's apprentice, these elites typically find that their mass allies, once mobilized, are difficult to control. When this happens, war can result from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions" (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 6-7). In a later book, Snyder notes that, "The three most nearly successful attempts to overturn the global balance of power through aggression—those of Napoleonic France in 1803-15, Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany in 1914-18 and Adolf Hitler's Germany in 1939-45—all came on the heels of failed attempts to democratize" (Snyder 2000, 20-21).

It should also be noted here that freeing the press compounds the problem, as it often amplifies and disseminates nationalist appeals (Snyder 2000). In addition, incipient participatory society often fails to take the shape of de Tocqueville style civil society (deToqueville, 1988). Snyder argues that uncivil society takes shape amidst weak democratic institutions (Snyder 2000). Wiarda agrees with this line of reasoning and adds that a history of authoritarian political culture sans Tocquevillian civil society compounds the challenge of generating new traditions of civil participation (Wiarda 2003).

[8] More specifically: "Mid-Victorian Britain, poised between the partial democracy of the First Reform Bill of 1832 and the full-fledged democracy of the later Gladstone era, was carried into the Crimean War by a groundswell of belligerent public opinion. Napoleon III's France, drifting from plebiscitary toward parliamentary rule, fought a series of wars designed to establish its credentials as a liberal, popular, nationalist type of empire. The ruling elite of Wilhelmine Germany, facing universal suffrage but limited governmental accountability, was pushed toward World War I by its escalating competition with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of German nationalism. Japan's 'Taisho democracy' of the 1920s brought an era of mass politics that led the Japanese army to devise and sell an imperial ideology with broad-based appeal" (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 6-7).

Some scholars debate the statistical methodology employed by Mansfield and Snyder (Thompson and Tucker 1997a and 1997b; Oneal and Russett 1997, 267). However, those that do so offer no theoretical counterargument and no sufficient explanation for the qualitative case studies that Snyder presents as evidence in support of the war-proneness of democratizing states. The counter findings of Oneal and Russett (1997) are based on a study that excludes the 1990s wave of democratization. By only analyzing the 1950-1985 Cold War system, their findings fail to incorporate a host of democratic transitions that factor significantly into Mansfield and Snyders' analysis. Despite continued debate, the probability that democratizing states are more war-prone cannot yet be rejected.

One dissenter concedes that autocratization frequently follows the disintegration of semi-democracies. Rarely, does it follow the fall of consolidated democracies. He therefore suggests that democratization and interstate conflict may be linked, but only indirectly. He reasons that the probability of conflict may increase as semi-democracies fail or revert to authoritarian practices. (Enterline 1998).

Finally, mixed regimes, commonly labeled "anocracies," that combine varying levels of democratic and autocratic elements are found to be the most conflict prone of all. (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997). This point has encountered little, if any debate.

In short, the literature offers robust evidence that mature democracies do not fight each other and that mixed regimes are more likely to engage in militarized disputes than other regime types. There is substantial evidence that states in democratic transitions are also more conflict prone than states undergoing no change. Therefore the hypothesis is only partially supported. It is correct to assume that the spread of mature democracy will decrease interstate conflict, although one must not forget that the supporting evidence is mitigated by the reality that

democratic states still fight non-democracies. In contrast, it cannot be assumed that the spread of democracy in general will decrease interstate conflict. In fact, attempts to spread democracy are likely to create a host of new conflict-prone transitioning regimes. It would be a mistake to ignore the evidence and pursue a democracy agenda that creates a host of transitions and mixed regimes without a plan to minimize the conflict that is likely to result.

CHAPTER 5

H2: THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY INCREASES STABILITY

Mature democracies are on the whole stable, but not necessarily more stable than authoritarian regimes. Semi-democracies and states in transition toward democracy are the most instable of all regimes. This is because transition to democracy increases the likelihood of violence and even civil war. A review of the literature reveals little, if any, debate over these conclusions.

Some studies show that democracies are the most stable of all regime types. Gurr finds that mature democracies are not likely to exhibit political violence. This is because ethnopolitical groups in democratic states are more likely to express discontent via peaceful protest than rebellion. In contrast, ethnopolitical groups in other regime types are more like to rebel (Gurr, 2000). Elbadawi and Sambanis find that the more democratic a state is, the less it is likely to suffer civil war (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; 2002). They contend that this result is explained by the effectiveness of democratic institutions in settling conflicts without violence (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Sambanis finds that democracy has a significant negative relationship with ethnic conflict. He also finds that the relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict is stronger than that between ethnic conflict and economic development (Sambanis 2002, 233).

Other studies have shown that *both* democracies and autocracies are more likely to be stable and devoid of violent protest or civil war. As Sambanis asserts, "The major economic studies on civil war have argued that there is no significant relationship between lack of democracy—which approximates political grievance—and the likelihood of civil war onset or prevalence" (Sambanis 2002, 233). Hegre, et. al. find that both mature democracies and authoritarian regimes rarely engage in civil war (Hegre, et. al. 2001, 33). This finding is confirmed by Francisco as well as Muller and Weede (Francisco 1995; Muller and Weede 1990).

Further, several scholars have found that countries in transition toward or away from democracy are the most likely to suffer political violence and even civil war. Bryman finds transitions toward democracy to be particularly instable. His notes that there is a strong correlation between democratization and instability. As examples, he cites violent conflict in Azerbaijan-Armenia, Georgia, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. In each of these cases, the transition began in the midst of great ethnic division. He concludes that democratization is likely to yield increased instability (Bryman 2003, 59).

Similarly, Hegre, et. al. find that political change is frequently accompanied by intrastate violence. This is the case regardless of the direction of that change, toward or away from democracy (Hegre, et. al. 2001). In explanation, they assert that autocratic regimes take time to transition and in many cases that transition is all but smooth. This is because "mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way" (Hegre, et. al. 2001, 34). Further, he finds that the risk of civil war is increased as the transition initially weakens existing institutions (Hegre, et. al. 2001, 34).

Bryman finds likewise that regimes often falter during the transition to democracy. He argues that this is the case because "minority mistrust, dominant group resentment, and the elite

exploitation of freedoms" exacerbate tension between ethnic groups (Bryman 2003, 61). This tension has on many occasions given way to violent conflict. He further contends that the likelihood of conflict increases when the government becomes weak in transition and is unable to stem the activities of radical groups and uphold political agreements. Therefore democratization is "impractical" in the midst of ethnic tension (Bryman 2003, 61).

Reilly cites as an example the case of Indonesia, in which domestic conflict has resulted from both the secession of East Timor and the process of democratization. He explains, "This is because the logic of democratization is also the logic of self-determination: both are based on the idea of people freely choosing their political status and form of government, of basic freedoms of movement, speech and assembly, as well as the freedom of journalists to report on events" (Reilly 2002, 12). Further, he argues that democratic reform allows independence movements to organize and spread their message in a way that authoritarian rule would have forbidden. Consequently, democratization has created increased demands by some regions to secede (Reilly 2002).

Finally, it appears that consolidated semi-democracies tend toward instability. Hegre et. al. find that the onset of civil war is most likely in semi-democratic states. In contrast, they find that consolidated democracies and strong autocracies are about equally likely to engage in civil war. Further, regime change increases the short run probability of civil war; but, change itself is not a sufficient explanation. When time since regime change is controlled, democratization is still correlated with civil war. This is because incomplete transitions yield semi-democratic regimes that are the most conflict prone of all, regardless of level of economic development (Hegre, et. al. 2001). In contrast to states beginning transition, they find that semi-democracies are most likely to engage in civil war, even when enough time has passed to stabilize in the wake

of transition (Hegre, et. al. 2001, 33). They conclude that the stability of states is ordered by regime type from least to greatest as follows: mixed regimes, autocracies, then democracies (Hegre, et. al. 2001). Other studies that confirm this finding include those by Lichbach and Moore. (Lichbach 1987, 1995; Moore 1998).

Reilly cites several Asian cases where "in putatively ‘democratic’ states of the region, minorities have often eschewed the ballot box as a route to self-determination, choosing the force of arms instead." In particular, he cites the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Indian Kashmiris, the Bangladeshi Jammus, the Philippine Moros, and the Papua New Guinea Bougainvilleans (Reilly 2002, 12).

In conclusion, mature democracies are likely to be stable, but not necessarily more so than authoritarian regimes. Instability occurs most in semi-democracies and in states that are transitioning toward democracy. It is in the transition that political violence and civil war occur most frequently. Although there is little debate over these conclusions, scholars appear to agree that the spread of democracy is still the best means toward stability in the long term. Sambanis, for example, contends that the overall benefits of democracy are greater than the risks of violent conflict during democratization (Sambanis 2002). Likewise, Hegre, et. al. argue that totalitarian states may tend toward domestic peace, but the civil peace of democratic regimes is far more "just" and "durable" (Hegre, et. al. 2001, 44).

CHAPTER 6

H3: THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY INCREASES HUMAN RIGHTS

Democracy itself is frequently measured by the degree to which a state protects human rights. As expected, mature democracies best protect human rights. Autocracies, on the other hand, tend to violate human rights more, but decreasingly over time. Counter intuitively, several studies find that democratization either has no effect on human rights or that it actually increases violations. Finally, there is consensus surrounding the evidence that semi-democracies are generally the worst human rights violators of all. This is because semi-democracies have weaker institutions than authoritarian regimes. Semi-free people engage in public debate, but do so without strong institutions through which to channel their voices. Because the state is semi-democratic it must allow some civic engagement, but institutions are not in place to protect protesters from the retribution of leaders who feel threatened. This is compounded by the fact that institutional weakness increases the likelihood that leaders will be toppled from power by disenchanted citizens. Consequently, leaders of semi-democratic regimes respond to protest with severity. The evidence shows that semi-democracies violate human rights even more than authoritarian regimes.

There is no debate over the positive relationship between consolidated democracy and the protection of human rights. As Davenport notes, "All quantitative studies investigating the subject have identified that political systems with democratic institutions have lower rates…as

well as lower levels of repressive behavior…" (Davenport 2004, 540). Further, "The implications of this work are clear: if one wants to decrease human rights violations, then they should democratize in some manner…" (Davenport 2004, 540). He explains in an earlier study that two factors account for this relationship. The first is that democratic leaders are held accountable to citizens and are therefore unwilling to insight public protest that could lead to the loss of power. The second is that "coercive agents" in democratic states prefer discourse, negotiation and voting to repression. (Davenport 1999).

As expected, autocracies violate human rights more than democracies. However, it has also been found that violations decrease over time as power is consolidated and institutions for repression mature. Davenport finds that autocratization increases violations of human rights. In addition, this increase in human rights violations continues for up to ten years following the initial stages of transition (Davenport 1999, 108).

In contrast, Goldstein notes that "being" and "becoming" democratic are not the same in terms of human rights (Goldstein 1983). In other words, states that are already democratic best protect human rights, whereas states in transition to democracy do not. Davenport similarly finds that democratization does not improve the extent of political repression (Davenport 2004). Likewise, Fein finds that the beginning stages of transition toward democracy yield both greater internal conflict and more political repression, that is until the consolidation of institutions. She dubs this phenomena, "more murder in the middle" (Fein 1995, 170).

One of the earliest steps in the democratization process is usually national elections. However, Richards contends that the presence of national elections does not affect the degree to which a government upholds human rights. He controls for population size, level of economic development, who votes, and conflict (inter- and intra-state). His findings reveal that when all of

these indicators are controlled, elections alone do not correlate with decreased human rights violations (Richards 1999).

Gurr's 1994 study goes even further to find that transfers of power within democratic transitions often yield violent conflict. As Krain explains, "New elites taking power or old elites trying to hold onto power can and must reconsolidate power quickly and efficiently. Major structural changes such as wars, civil wars, extraconstitutional changes, or decolonization create 'windows of political opportunity' during which the elites may and must more freely act to consolidate power and eliminate the opposition" (Krain 1997, 21). Further, it is throughout this time of consolidation, following the initial regime change, that new elites brutally suppress the opposition and those who are perceived to threaten their new hold on power (Krain 1997).

Even states that have passed through the initial phases of democratization toward a semi-democratic system fail to protect human rights more than authoritarian states. This is counterintuitive. As Armstrong and Davenport explain, mature democracies have continually decreased "political bans, censorship, torture, disappearances, and mass killing" (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 538). These findings are consistent throughout time and space, regardless of methodology and context. It is no wonder then that policymakers assume that each step toward democracy will increase stability, or the probability of internal peace. However, Davenport and Armstrong find that low and middle levels of democracy have no affect on the protection of human rights. It is not until democracy begins to approach consolidation that repression systematically decreases (Davenport and Armstrong 2004). They "conclude that there are essentially three different categories of democracy, each with a different impact on state repression: one that has no effect (values 0-7), an intermediate category with some negative

impact on repressive behavior (8-9) and another category with a strong negative effect on state repression (value 10)" (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 548).

Likewise, Fein finds that semi-democratic states are not better protectors of human rights than authoritarian states. In fact, they tend to be even worse violators. Specifically, she finds the majority of both mixed and authoritarian regimes are bad or terrible violators of human rights. Further, twice as many mixed regimes as democracies and autocracies engage in massacre and "indiscriminate mass killing." She concludes that the evidence does not support the expectation that human rights violations will decrease to the degree that freedom expands. She also confirms that human rights violations occur more in transitioning and semi-democratic states (Fein 1995, 176).

Further, Fein finds that there is minimal difference in violations between mixed regimes and autocracies. The majority of both are "bad or terrible violators." However, mixed regimes are more likely to engage in massacres than are autocracies (Fein 1995, 184). She explains that increased freedom in previously authoritarian states yields a more active and vocal opposition. This incites more state repression and even goes so far as to provoke extreme degrees of such in the form of "massacres, calculated murders, and torture" (Fein 1995, 184).

Regan and Henderson confirm this evidence. Their results indicate that semi-democracies are more repressive than other regime types. They also find that threat best predicts the level of repression -- more so than the type of regime (Regan and Henderson 2002). They contend that semi-democracies face "competing pressures" that compound their perceptions of threats. Semi-democratic leaders perceive threats from competitors as more dangerous than do leaders of democratic and autocratic regimes. Regan and Henderson attribute this to an undeveloped institutional infrastructure that cannot "efficiently channel the demands of

the opposition into the political arena" (Regan and Henderson 2002, 123). Subsequently, the response options of semi-democratic leaders are also limited by weak institutions. Further, since these leaders perceive public demands as threats to their already questionable legitimacy, they tend to respond with repression instead of non-violent cooperation. They conclude that, "the relative fragility of the institutions of government and the limited range of options available to semi-democratic leaders encourage them to respond harshly to opposition threats out of fear of political usurpation." (Regan and Henderson 2002, 123-124).

Davenport also finds that, the duration of a regime is not significant. Further, his study indicates that the time a regime persists at a given level of democracy does not affect state repression. It makes no difference if a state remains a certain level for several decades or a couple of years. (Davenport 1999).[9]

In sum, democratic states are the best protectors of human rights, but only once they pass through to maturity. Surprisingly, transitioning and semi-democracies are worse violators than authoritarian regimes. As Davenport notes, "the findings compel us to ask what it means to achieve full democracy when the path toward this end (democratization) is covered in bloodshed and curfews" (Davenport 2004, 556). Or at least, the findings compel us to acknowledge the danger zone that emerges as more states begin democratization and semi-democracies work

[9] Of interest, but not particular relevance to this study, 1. Poe, et. al. find that" leftist countries are actually less repressive of these basic human rights than non-leftists countries" (Poe, et. al. 1999, 291); and 2. Zanger suggests that "…it is also important to keep in mind other elements that affect the use of repression. For example, utilizing economic sanctions to force a government to allow political participation might not improve the country's human rights record, but rather worsen the situation, since cutting economic resources could hinder the country's economic development and put pressure on the national governments. It can also increase domestic pressure and even lead to domestic unrest and violence. Both elements, less economic development and rising domestic unrest, change the leader's perception of his or her strength in relation to the threat they face and are likely to increase the government's use of repression (Poe, 1997)" (Zanger 2000, 229).

toward consolidation or get stuck somewhere in the middle: human rights are likely to pass through a darkness of increased violation before reaching the light of full democratic protection.

CHAPTER 7

H4: THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY INCREASES ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The foundations of liberalism are built inseparably on both democratic and economic principles. As Bagchi notes, "For the liberal theorists tracing their genealogy from Locke through Jefferson to John Stuart Mill, democracy implied a right to property including the property of the individual person, and this democracy was linked to the growth of a commercial and then an industrial society—that is, of a capitalist society." (Bagchi 1995, xvii). Further, "A system of democracy or at least republicanism (which in fact implied the absence of a monarch or an absolute ruler, but would be consistent with rule by a select group), coupled with the institution of private property was supposed to provide the facilities for the fullest development of the capabilities of a human being." (Bagchi 1995, xvii) Perhaps that is why political science has not been able to reach a consensus on the direction of the causal arrow between democracy and economic development.

This chapter seeks to determine if there is evidence in support of the hypothesis that the spread of democracy increases economic development abroad. A review of the literature reveals that there is little, if any agreement in this regard. No consensus has been reached on the degree to which democracy causes economic development. In contrast, there is an abundance of theoretical work and much evidence in support of the reverse: economic development fosters democracy.

The following analysis is divided into four sections. In order to provide context, the chapter begins with a review of the early theoretical work on economic preconditions for democracy. Second, it discusses more recent theoretical work regarding democratic preconditions for economic development. Third, it reviews quantitative studies on the relationship between economic development and democracy, with an analysis of both causal directions. This review reveals a lack of support for the hypothesis of this chapter, that democracy increases economic development; but, there is significant support for the reverse. Consequently, the fourth section concludes that policymakers should not assume that democracy increases economic development.

Early Work: Economic Preconditions for Democracy

The modern forefather of the argument that economic development is a precondition for democracy is Rostow. He contends that democracy emerges as states progress along five stages of economic growth. "The break-up of traditional societies is based on the convergence of motives of private profit with a new sense of affronted nationhood and of enlarged human horizons." (Rostow 1959, 152). In contrast to the stages of Marxism (feudalism, bourgeois capitalism, socialism and finally communism), Democracy emerges as a state progresses along Rostow's stages of development: Traditional Society, Preconditions for Takeoff, Takeoff, Drive to Maturity, the Age of Mass Consumerism, and Beyond Consumption. To Rostow, the key is how choices are made. Balancing interests of profit and welfare is made possible through "one man, one vote." He argues that the concept of equality emerges and the foundations for democratic governance are laid in the Preconditions for Takeoff phase.

Rostow contends that there are two kinds of cases. Europe, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Mid East require(d) fundamental political, social and production changes in a well-established traditional society. U.S, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were, in Louis Hartz' words, "born free," consequently they underwent a primarily economic and technical transition to modern growth. Rostow argues that given the choice, most people would choose democracy. However, societies in transition from traditional to modern states are particularly vulnerable to seizure of power as a means to control a deeply divided country and consolidate the preconditions to launch take-off. Finally, if these six phases are interrupted by war or depression, democracy may not emerge. (Rostow 1959)

Similarly, Karl Deutsch posits that social mobilization occurs in the transition from traditional to modern ways of life through various stages of economic development.
Social mobilization includes the uprooting of traditional society and urbanization as people begin to move to where the jobs are. Consequently, there are increased demands for public services that yield increased political participation and association as well as require the emergence of a central government. This is accompanied by an increased preoccupation with internal affairs and a growing sense of nationalism (Deutsch 1961).

Seymour Martin Lipset finds that the stability of a democratic system is sustained by legitimacy, development and effectiveness. He argues that a stable democracy requires relatively moderate tension among the contending forces, which is facilitated by conditions of the growth of urbanization, education, communications media, and increased wealth. The most important of these is education. Further, variations in systems of government are less important for stability than social structure/economic development. He argues that general income level affects a nation's receptivity to democratic political tolerance norms that make power transfers between

parties and efficient bureaucracies possible. This is because a large middle class mitigates conflict by rewarding moderate policies and penalizing extremists. A higher national wealth is also associated with the presence of many relatively independent organizations and associations that help to sustain democracy. He concludes that even if there are conditions such as these in which democracy is most commonly sustained, it has existed in a variety of circumstances (Lipset 1959).

Philip Coulter argues that liberal democracy is, at least in part, one consequence of urbanization, education, communication, industrialization and economic development, or in Deutch's words, "social mobilization." This is because social mobilization is related to each of three components of liberal democracy (competitiveness, participation and liberties) in varying degrees. Mobilization yields an uprooting of traditional society and increased urbanization as people move to where the jobs are. Yet, if the uprooting/breaking from tradition phase is completed before the stage of commitment to democratic institutions takes off or if there is disequilibria between levels of mobilization (i.e.: between urbanization and industrialization), instability and repression will manifest (Coulter 1975).

Along a similar vein, Dankwart Rustow contends that country-specific factors accompany democratization. Examples include the USSR's over-extension; deaths of dictators in Portugal, Tunisia, and Paraguay; lost wars (Argentina's Falkland Islands war led to the exit of military dictatorship); Chinese students study abroad only to return promoting democracy; democratic preconditions for international loans; a pro-democracy Catholic Church that helps to crystallize anti-regime sentiment; international sports; and intensifying international communication and economic integration that provide a challenge to dictators pursuing isolation.

He suggests that there is a Catch-22 in which Third World Dictatorships find themselves. If the economy declines under heavy burdens of rising prices, unemployment or foreign debt, the rulers will face growing opposition or violent unrest. If the economy expands with a thriving middle class and growing export sector, pressure mounts for political liberalization and change of regime. Authoritarian rulers often adopt limited moves toward liberalization to appease the opposition or strengthen support for their own regimes, thereby setting off a process of change that cannot be halted.

Huntington wrote in 1991 that, "Few relationships between social, economic, and political phenomena are stronger than that between level of economic development and existence of democratic politics As we have seen, shifts from authoritarianism to democracy between 1974 and 1990 were heavily concentrated in a 'transition zone' at the upper-middle levels of economic development." He believes that the implications are clear, "Poverty is a principal and probably the principal obstacle to democratic development. The future of democracy depends on the future of economic development Obstacles to economic development are obstacles to the expansion of democracy" (Huntington 1991, 311).

The Causal Direction Reversed: Perhaps Democracy Yields Economic Development

Terry Lynn Karl alternatively contends that the search for preconditions for democracy is futile. There are different types of democracy and it is no longer appropriate to examine regime transitions in a general sense. Throughout the 1980s the Latin American experience challenged the belief in preconditions for democracy. For example, Argentina sustained high levels of per capita GDP under authoritarian rule and Peru transitioned to democracy despite stagnant growth rates and extreme foreign debt. She argues that the search for causes of democratization that are

rooted in economic, social, cultural/psychological, or international factors has not yielded a general law of democratization. There is no set of identical preconditions. Instead, *preconditions* may actually be outcomes of democracy (Karl, 1990).

Diamond and Sen also suggest that causation does not flow only in one direction. Diamond contends that economic development produces or facilitates democracy only insofar as it alters favorably four crucial intervening variables: political culture, class structure, state-society relations, and civil society. The causal trend can be reversed, with democracy leading to development. Poor countries can maintain democracy, but only if they deliver broad and sustained socioeconomic development, especially if priority is given to basic human needs. Development policy should try to encourage the institutionalization of as many parts or features of democracy as possible, as early as possible (Diamond 1992).

Amartya Sen suggests that expansion of freedom is both the primary end and the principal means of development. Freedom is central to the process of economic development, because individuals acting as free agents are more likely to contribute positively to it. He concludes that democratic institutions aid the process of economic development precisely through their effects on enhancing and sustaining individual freedoms. (Sen 1999).

Quinn and Woolley summarize nicely theories that expect democracy to yield economic development: 1."democratic competition is inherently effective as a mechanism for revealing information;" 2. "The more developed the democracy, the more highly developed the institutions that guarantee transparency of policy and policy-making processes. This enables citizens to monitor elected officials more effectively and reduces the probability of purely rent-seeking or self-serving policies. Transparency makes democracy a system of moderation and constraint, with equilibrium properties;" 3. "institutions critical to growth (especially property rights) are

enhanced in democracy, thereby encouraging growth;" 4. "private sector actors are more likely to undertake investment in settings where property rights are better protected, and they find that higher rates of investment are correlated with democratic regimes;" and finally, 5. "elections serve to select competent leaders and that, over time, democracy should be correlated with higher output."

Despite the great breadth of theory that suggests democracy yields economic development, several developing nations in recent decades failed to meet expectations. Consequently, many scholars have questioned both the developmentalist approach and the belief in the economic benefits of democracy. As Diamond and Plattner note, the experiences of Pinochet's Chile and Deng Xiaoping's China led to increased skepticism about the superior conditions democracy provides for economic development (Diamond and Plattner 1995). In both cases, authoritarian regimes successfully implemented economic reform that yielded significant progress in development. Likewise, Bagchi notes the countries in East Asia (e.g. the Taiwan Province of China) that have industrialized in the absence of strong democratic institutions. There are also states such as Costa Rica, India and Sri Lanka that have sustained democracy for several decades without making great strides toward economic development (Bagchi 1995).

The Quantitative Evidence

The results of large scale quantitative studies are equally mixed. Ersson, et. al. contend that this is because the concept of development is under specified. Accordingly, they identify three dimensions of development: economic development, human development and income distribution. They test the relationship between democracy and each of the dimensions of

development. They find that although democracy appears to correlate with development, the causal direction is yet to be determined. It could very well be that development yields democracy, but not visa versa. However, they do conclude that democracy does not hinder economic growth or fair distribution of income (Ersson, et. al. 1996).

Olson responds to skepticism about the ability of democracy to foster economic development and the belief by many that authoritarian regimes may actually be more effective in this regard. He contends that autocrats have a greater incentive to use state funds for personal gain than do democratic leaders who have to participate in competitive elections. He consequently concludes that democratic systems are most compatible with economic growth. (Olson 1993)

Geddes agrees, as she finds that the evidence does not support the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes better implement economic reform than do democracies (Geddes 1995). Halperin, et. al. go further to find that over the last four decades, low-income democracies experienced greater economic development than low-income authoritarian states (Halperin, et. al. 2005). They do not, however, adequately explain the recent economic development success stories of non-democratic regimes in East Asia. In addition, a careful look at their methodology reveals that they only include mature democracies in their analysis. They purposefully analyze only democracies that have achieved a high level of consolidation. They thus exclude the large number of states that are transitioning toward democracy or have mixed regimes. Consequently, they leave unanswered the question of whether states en route to democratic consolidation are compatible with economic development.

In contrast, Leftwich finds that semi-democracies, or what he terms "democratic developmental states," are most effective in implementing the economic reform necessary for

development because they mix centralized (and even repressive) authority with some democratic institutions (Leftwich 1996, 281).

Przworski and Limongi suggest that, "the critics and defenders of democracy talk past each other" (Przeworski and Limongi 1995, 11). They find that the critics espouse that dictators best promote economic development while the defenders espouse that democracies best promote development. However, both sides support their arguments with inconclusive statistical evidence. Przworski and Limongi further contend that all of the studies on both sides suffer from methodological flaws. (Przeworski and Limongi 1995).

Buckhart and Lewis-Beck point out that well designed quantitative analyses have consistently provided evidence in support of the hypothesis that economic development is necessary for democratic development. However, they also note that a further review of the literature reveals insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that democracy causes economic development. They subsequently conclude that although economic development does cause democracy, democracy does not cause economic development. Therefore, they argue that democratic reform should not be expected to yield economic development. Further, Helliwell finds that research on the effects of democracy on subsequent economic growth show no significant patterns (Helliwell 1994). Quinn and Woolley confirm this result and also find, a strong and robust relationship between democracy and decreased economic volatility (Quinn and Woolley 2001).

Two separate studies, one by Przeworski and Limongi and another by Sirowy and Inkeles, explore the vast body of large scale quantitative studies on the relationship between regime type and economic development. Both agree that the results are inconclusive. Przeworski and Limongi examined eighteen studies with twenty-one findings. Of those, eight

show evidence in support of democracy, eight show evidence in support of authoritarian regimes. Five studies find that neither is more conducive than the other to economic development. (Przeworski and Limongi 1995). Sirowy and Inkeles similarly note that studies are equally divided between support of 1) a negative relationship between democracy and economic growth, and 2) no relationship at all. They conclude that nearly twenty years of research on this topic have failed to provide much in the way of robust conclusions. The one exception is robust support for the assertion that democratic regimes are not better facilitators of economic growth (Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).

Further, Przeworski and Limongi conclude, "The simple answer to the question with which we began is that we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. All we can offer at this moment are some educated guesses" (Przeworski and Limongi 1995, 15). They suggest that politics do matter, but that regime type is less important. Economic success stories following World War II include both democracies and military dictatorships. Although, many democratic states in Latin America failed to achieve economic development throughout the 1980s, many authoritarian regimes were just as unsuccessful. Therefore, it appears as though something other than regime type determines the degree to which a state experiences economic development (Przeworski and Limongi 1995).

The Assumption Is Not Justified

In short, there has been extensive analyses and debate over the relationship between economic development and regime type. Although the results are largely inconclusive, there appears to be a consensus emerging that democracy does not negatively affect economic development. Further, it was found that democratization benefits from economic development.

The hypothesis of this chapter, that the spread of democracy increases economic development, was not confirmed. However, it can be concluded that an assumption that this is the case does not adversely affect intended policy goals. In other words, policymakers should not assume that democracy increases economic development. However, they should feel free to promote the spread of democracy abroad without fear that it will detract from economic development in target states.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Policymakers conceptualize national security as a set of economic, societal and physical security goals. Further, it is expected that the United States will become more secure as these goals are reached. A review of each *National Security Strategy* published since 1986 revealed that the spread of democracy has figured prominently in presidential security priorities. This is the case because of the national security benefits believed to result from more democracy in the world. The primary hypothesis of this study was: The spread of democracy increases national security.

A review of the literature showed that there is little consensus on a quantifiable conceptualization of how to measure security. It was consequently suggested that one way around this challenge is to consider collectively the specific national security goals that are expected to be achieved by the democracy agenda. If the evidence indicates that the spread of democracy achieves those goals, then the primary hypothesis is supported.

Content analysis of each *National Security Strategy* revealed that four assumptions about the affects of more democracy are most consistently and frequently made. Those assumptions were then transformed into testable hypotheses:

H1: The spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict.

H2: The spread of democracy increases stability.

H3: The spread of democracy increases the protection of human rights.

H4: The spread of democracy increases economic development.

Large scale quantitative studies that test these or relevant hypotheses were analyzed to determine whether the findings therein support these four hypotheses. The results were as follows.

H1 was only partially supported. Although there is nothing closer to a universal law in politics than that democracies do not fight each other, democracies still fight non-democracies. Most disturbing is the evidence that semi-democracies or mixed regimes are more likely to engage in interstate conflict than all other regime types. In addition, states in transition are more conflict prone than states who are not.

H2 was also only partially supported. While it was found that mature democracies are stable, they are not more so than authoritarian regimes. Most instability lies in between the two, as semi-democracies and states in transition toward democracy are the most instable of all regimes. Transition to democracy increases the likelihood of political violence and even civil war. Witness, in spades, Iraq.

H3 was only partially supported as well. Democratic states are definitively the best protectors of human rights. However, this is the case only in those that have passed through to maturity. Counter intuitively, it was found that transitioning and semi-democracies violate human rights more than authoritarian regimes. This is due to semi-democratic leaders' heightened perceptions of threat as well as the absence of institutions through which citizens' civil rights are ensured.

Finally, H4 was not supported. There is not sufficient, consistent or robust enough evidence to conclude that democracy causes economic development. Studies that find a positive relationship between democracy and economic development are contradicted by an equal

number of studies indicating otherwise. There are, however two important results around which a consensus has emerged. First, democracy does not have a negative affect on economic development. Second, economic development has a positive affect on transitions toward democracy and the sustainability of democratic regimes. Therefore, the spread of democracy and economic development do have a positive relationship, albeit not necessarily one that flows in the causal direction of H4.

When considered collectively, the evidence partially supports the primary hypothesis. The spread of *mature* democracy increases national security in the long run. In sharp contrast, the more states there are that are transitioning toward democracy or stuck in the middle between autocracy and consolidated democracy, the greater the threat to U.S. national security. Time and again, the evidence points to a dangerous "gray zone" comprised of transitioning and semi-



Figure 8.1. Freedom in the World by State as of 2004



Figure 8.2. Freedom in the World by Population as of 2004

Table 8.1. Progress Toward Freedom in the World

Year	Free	Partly Free	Not Free
1974	41 (27%)	48 (32%)	63 (41%)
1984	53 (32%)	59 (35%)	55 (33%)
1994	76 (40%)	61 (32%)	54 (28%)
2004	89 (46%)	54 (28%)	49 (26%)

democracies that are most likely to engage in interstate conflict, erupt in civil war, and violate human rights.

Unfortunately, that gray zone is very large (albeit decreasing) as indicated above in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 as well as Table 8.1 (Freedom House 2005). A wave of democratic transitions changed the political landscape of virtually every continent in the 1980s and 1990s. However, very few of those states counted in the third wave of democracy have actually

transitioned through to democratic consolidation. Most of them are stuck between democracy and autocracy. They are nominally democratic, but have yet to develop the institutions that guarantee civil rights, effective rule of law, competitive elections, etc. Several have regressed completely to authoritarianism. Included in this list of failed transitions are Tunisia, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Cote d'Ivoire (Carothers 2004).

Where does this leave us? For starters, this study finds that the route through the democratic gray zone to freedom may be paved with bloodshed. Sharansky contends, "There is a universal desire among all peoples not to live in fear. Indeed, given a choice, the *vast majority* of people will always prefer a *free* society over a *fear society*[10]" (Sharansky 2004, 18). However, this study has revealed that people striving toward a free society are likely to live in a fear society until the transition is complete. This transition, like Rostow's stages of development, is likely to take decades.

It could be generations before fear gives way to freedom, if at all. Although Sharansky is on the right track in his belief that, "…all free societies will guarantee security and peace" (Sharansky 2004, xxv), increased security and peace will only emerge as democracies complete the long process of maturity. Given the results of this study, it is no wonder that the citizens of many semi-democratic states throughout the world are increasingly skeptical about the benefits of democratic institutions.

This paper began with a quote by President G. W. Bush that pinned the success of liberty in the United States on the success of liberty abroad. It appears that he is right. A greater number of successful democracies abroad will increase U.S. national security. However, policy should seek *not only* to spread democracy, but to push transitions all the way through to

[10] Emphasis in original.

consolidation. Policymakers must be attuned to the reality that the transition is dangerous and that semi-democracy is *not* an acceptable stopping point.

Elections alone are not enough. A thriving civil society is not enough. A free press is not enough. Spreading democracy will actually threaten U.S. national security until most states have completed the transition. Only an increase in the number of states that rank in the top levels of most democratic indicators will increase U.S. national security. Snyder suggests that building institutions should be prioritized in the beginning over civil liberties and elections. He also suggests that outgoing authoritarian elites should not be punished, but instead given a "golden parachute" as incentive to complete the transition (Snyder 2000). As noted earlier, the economic development literature shows that economic development aids peaceful transition and fosters stability. Finally, Steves suggests regional economic integration may facilitate progression toward democratic consolidation, as has been the case in the Latin America Southern Cone (Steves 2001).

Although more research is necessary to determine how best to minimize the dangerous gray zone, policymakers should make it a top national security priority. That may mean allowing some states to remain authoritarian while we invest solely in the consolidation of states that have already begun the transition toward democracy or those that are stuck somewhere in the middle. Democratization is far from an antidote to conflict, instability, human rights violations, and poverty. At the same time, a world dominated by mature democracies is likely to be by far more peaceful, stable, and protective of human rights. It is in such a world that the United States will be most secure.

This study has taken the first step in a larger research agenda that seeks to fully understand the relationship between the promotion of democracy abroad and U.S. national

security. There remains much work to be done. First, a broader analysis of the assumptions policymakers make regarding the security benefits of the spread of democracy must be conducted. A look at each *National Security Strategy* is but a start. Speeches, legislation, interviews, debates and more should be incorporated into the analysis. This should include the assumptions of other senior officials, in addition to U.S. presidents. Second, in depth case studies are necessary to further explore the validity of policymakers' assumptions. Third, it would be useful for the sake of policymaking to determine the point in transition or consolidation at which each specific assumption becomes justified. Perhaps the presence of certain institutions over others will be more likely to ensure stability, human rights, or peace. It could very well be different institutions and varying degrees of institutional strength that ensure each. Fourth, the development of a national security index that is a composite of physical, societal and economic security indicators, would enable future studies to test the effectiveness of particular policies in making the U.S. more secure. Finally, and of utmost urgency, research must be conducted to determine, 1) how to best minimize the dangerous semi-democratic gray zone, and 2) how U.S. democracy promotion efforts can help push states through to consolidation.

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