ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AND PLACE-BASED FOOD ETHICS

by

ANNE PORTMAN

(Under the Direction of Victoria Davion)

ABSTRACT

In this dissertation I will clarify the meanings of respect, care, and solidarity within an ecological feminist ethical framework in order to demonstrate how the increasingly prominent "good food movement" benefits from thoughtful engagement with critical ecological feminist perspectives. Using the work of philosopher Val Plumwood as my starting point, I will elaborate on respect, care, and solidarity as ecological feminist modes of moral response— that is, as both moral attitudes and grounding concepts for situated ethical practices and behaviors. I argue that only by clarifying the meaning of these concepts can we appreciate the counterhegemonic possibilities of their application in particular ways and in particular contexts. My emphasis is on the idea that while these crucial modes of moral response are integrated – meaning that they cannot be fully understood or employed without each other – they are not interchangeable, contrary to the impression left by Plumwood's writing. The theoretical work of clarifying these concepts' meanings is foundational for determining how they can be instructive in the context of food production and consumption. I argue that arguments for specific understandings of ethical food production and consumption will not be adequate unless they are sufficiently attentive to the intersections of gender,

race, class, and species oppressions that ecological feminist frameworks highlight. I provide detailed ecological feminist critiques of two visions of "good food": contemporary American agrarianism and the global food sovereignty movement. In these critiques I strive to purposefully locate the key modes of moral response: respect, care, and solidarity. Doing so indicates whether specific positions on ethical agriculture are indeed consistent with my preferred understanding of ecological feminist ethics, and helps to indicate areas for rhetorical or practical improvement.

INDEX WORDS: Ecofeminism, Ecological feminism, Val Plumwood, Food justice, Food sovereignty, Agrarianism, Place, Respect, Care, Solidarity

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AND PLACE-BASED FOOD ETHICS

by

ANNE PORTMAN

B.A., Luther College, 2004

M.A., Cardiff University, 2008

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2016

ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM AND PLACE-BASED FOOD ETHICS

by

ANNE PORTMAN

Major Professor:	Victoria Davion
Committee:	Chris Cuomo
	Piers Stephens

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe certain individuals many thanks for their intellectual and/or emotional support as I undertook this project. My advisors: Victoria Davion, Chris Cuomo, and Piers Stephens. My fellow graduate students at UGA, in particular: Tess Varner, Tony Chackal, Anthony Shiver, and Emre Ebeturk. I thank the participants in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 Workshops on Food Justice and Peace at Michigan State University for valuable feedback on the ideas presented here. John, Calvin, and Everett, you are my heart. Thank you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION

The Project

In this dissertation I will clarify the meanings of respect, care, and solidarity on an ecological feminist ethical framework in order to demonstrate how the increasingly prominent "good food movement" benefits from thoughtful engagement with critical ecological feminist perspectives. This introduction provides an overview of the project and its general aims, followed by a brief description of each of the four chapters. Using the work of philosopher Val Plumwood as my starting point, I will elaborate on respect, care, and solidarity as modes of moral response— that is, as both moral attitudes and grounding concepts for situated ethical practices and behaviors. My emphasis is on the idea that while these crucial modes of moral response are integrated – meaning that they cannot be fully understood or employed without each other – they are not interchangeable, contrary to the impression left by Plumwood's writing. I argue that only by clarifying the meaning of these concepts can we appreciate the counterhegemonic possibilities of their application. Moreover, the failure to recognize important distinctions between these concepts can lead to undesirable attitudes and practices. For example, to attempts at caretaking that reflect an assimilated understanding of needs, due to a lack of respectful attention to difference. The theoretical work of clarifying these concepts' meanings is foundational for determining how they can be instructive in the context of food production and consumption. I use the phrase "good food movement" here as an umbrella term meant to cover a wide range of efforts, from localized farm-to-fork

community supported agricultural practices, to the advocacy of slow, organic, and whole foods, to global coalition building around resistance to industrialized agribusiness. On my view, arguments for specific understandings of "good" (ethical) food production and consumption will not be adequate unless they are sufficiently attentive to the intersections of gender, race, class and species oppressions that ecological feminist frameworks highlight. This project provides detailed ecological feminist critiques of two visions of "good food": contemporary American agrarianism and the global food sovereignty movement. I explore whether and how these visions of good food are sufficiently attentive to ecofeminist concerns by attempting to purposefully locate the ecological feminist modes of moral response in their rhetoric, structure, motivation, and practices.

Ecological feminism emerges from the idea that there are important historical, conceptual, and material connections between the dominations of both women and nature. It offers us a context-sensitive ethic that is well suited for application in the wide range of situations and relationships that we find ourselves. This explicitly includes relationships to nonhumans and to "places," broadly construed. Ecological feminism is committed to the acknowledgment that human beings are ecological beings and nonhuman beings are subjects of moral concern. If one of the fundamental ways that human beings are in relationship with nonhuman beings is by consuming them (and less obviously for most of us, being consumed *by* them), then the way that these relationships are recognized or not will have a direct bearing on how food is conceptualized, produced, consumed, and distributed. One of the major projects of ecological feminism has been to demonstrate that a "logic of domination" (Warren 1990) renders dichotomous conceptual pairs – like human/nature, masculine/feminine – rigidly oppositional and hierarchically

ordered, allowing for the subjugation of the inferiorized groups. This logic of domination pervades our most fundamental relationships, including our relationships to what we eat. Yet to me it is obvious that food is inherently and blatantly dichotomy-bending, disrupting any presumption of rigid distinctions between nature and culture, private and public, human and nonhuman. As Plumwood has said, "any form of human eating (and many forms of nonhuman eating) is situated in both nature and culture – in nature as a biologically necessary determinable and in a specific culture as a determinate form subject to individual and social choice and practice" (2000, 309). In other words, nature requires consumption for bodily sustenance but culture provides various, determinate methods/practices for meeting that need. Nature requires that we recognize some other beings as edible, but culture determines where we draw that line and what that means for our perceptions of other beings. One culture's delicacy is regarded as inedible by other cultural standards. Once consumed, the dividing line between natural objects and the human is blurred in the bodily reality of digestion and growth. Moreover, the private acts of provisioning family meals take on public, political significance when the practices are evaluated against standards of social justice. Thus food is a fantastic subject for ecological feminists to engage, precisely because it illuminates the deficiencies in traditional dualistic frameworks so clearly. Many prominent ecofeminists have engaged the subject of food, most often the question of whether feminists ought to be vegetarian (Adams 1991, 1994; Curtin 1991; Gaard 1993; Plumwood 2000; Warren 2000; Kheel 2004; Gruen 2007). I regard my work as taking this important conversation in new, critical directions – away from the narrow question of vegetarianism and toward the question of a broader vision of an ecological feminist food justice.

My work is motivated by the desire to understand what a context-sensitive, communicative ethic looks like when we try to make daily decisions, like what to have for breakfast, and when we try to build (or rebuild) basic systems of relationship, like food networks. An ecological feminist ethic requires an appropriate understanding of ourselves, and our food relationships, and moral responses that are themselves appropriate to such an understanding. The problem, of course, is in clarifying what is contextually appropriate. If one's identity as an ecological self includes the commitment to regard and interact with others with respect, care, and solidarity, what does that really mean? What does it mean for a white female academic in the urban South who just wants to figure out what to eat for lunch? This dissertation reflects my work toward theoretically addressing these questions. My work in practically engaging these questions takes place in the dairy section of Publix as I tentatively reach from one gallon of milk to the other, and on Saturday mornings at the Morningside Farmers' Market. And in tending my own unruly backyard kitchen garden while mosquitoes feast on me, leaving itchy reminders that we are all ultimately both consumers and consumed.

My own thinking on ethics generally and on environmental ethics specifically is most deeply indebted to the work of Val Plumwood. Due to its philosophical rigor and explanatory power, I regard Plumwood's work as a preeminent example of ecological feminist theory and an excellent model on which to expand and demonstrate the potential of ecological feminism for evaluating and transforming situated, or place-based, food ethics. I begin by contextualizing Plumwood's work within feminist and environmental ethics, and within the spectrum of ecofeminist perspectives. I align Plumwood's view with the ecofeminist claim that there are conceptual and material connections between

gender oppression and the destruction of nature, but I also distinguish her explicitly postcolonial approach to understanding the centrist structure of oppression and the connections between various forms of oppression. Providing this context serves to highlight Plumwood's significant contributions to ethical thinking about human-human and human-nonhuman relationship.

Plumwood's (1993) critical work has shown that a dualistic rationalism has dominated western philosophy since the time of Plato, characterizing the fundamental assumptions of western science and capitalist economics as well. Rationalism takes conscious reason to be definitive of the human and tends to deny nature mind-like qualities, while simultaneously assuming that reason is the source of moral value. In elevating reason, the mental is detached from the bodily, and the dependence on the material world is backgrounded or denied. The upshot, according to Plumwood, is that rationalism fails both to situate human beings ecologically and nonhuman beings ethically. The current ecological crises are the devastating effect of these twin failures, and evidence that while hyper-separation from nature gave rationalism its hegemonic power, it is also a tragic flaw. By denying dependence on nature, the very conditions that allowed for its mastery will be the source of its own destruction. Thus traditional rationalism is "ecologically irrational" (Plumwood 2002). I will provide a more detailed overview of Plumwood's critique of the conceptual structure that rationalism relies on, and the self-destructive blindspots that render rationalism irrational, in chapter one of this work.

As an alternative to the egoist self of traditional rationalism, Plumwood advocates an ecological self realized through relationships of mutuality with human and nonhuman

others. As an alternative to the colonizing view of the non-rational as an undifferentiated resource, Plumwood (1993, 2002) prescribes the adoption of the "intentional recognition stance" which recognizes the nonhuman other as agentic, as a source of striving, and as potentially communicative. This "new" understanding of human self, and of self's connection to complex human and nonhuman others, provides the ground for ecological rationality.

This understanding of ecological identity, predicated on the openness of the intentional recognition stance, grounds certain ethical attitudes and responses: respect, care, solidarity, partnership, reciprocity, friendship and so on. In Plumwood's framework, these are "determinable" ethical concepts, purposefully left open for application in a wide variety of contexts. But they are also appealed to very loosely, often grouped together in a list, and not often engaged on their own. This leaves the misleading impression that they are interchangeable; just various labels that can all stand in for "virtuous moral response" in any case. But on my view respect, care, and solidarity have different emphases that make them distinct moral responses. My analysis will "close" these concepts up just a bit in order to recognize the important distinctions between respect, care, and solidarity. For me this renders the concepts more meaningful, and ultimately more useful, while still flexible enough to maintain the context-sensitivity that is the hallmark of ecological feminist ethics. I intend this theorizing to contribute to the development of our ethical sensitivity, or practical wisdom. My analysis leaves us better equipped to evaluate the justificatory arguments for the goodness of the diverse aims and practices of the good food movement.

The Chapters

This dissertation is divided into four chapters. In *chapter one* I introduce and contextualize Plumwood's philosophical work within environmental ethics and within the range of ecofeminist positions. I will then expand on Plumwood's limited description of the determinable concepts of respect, care and solidarity, suggesting that they are integrated modes of moral response that, importantly, cannot be contained to limited spheres of human experience. I will explore what distinguishes and connects respect and care by clarifying their roles in Plumwood's anti-dualistic ethical framework. I embrace Plumwood's assertion that a counterhegemonic stance toward others requires attentiveness to both continuity and difference. I then argue that attentiveness to continuity is the wellspring of care while attentiveness to difference is the wellspring of respect. In solidarity, respect and care are integrated for political purposes. The result of chapter one should be a better conceptual understanding of these crucial modes of moral response, yet a maintenance of their determinable character, such that they can be interpreted and applied in a wide variety of contexts. In the remaining chapters I go on to consider how to make these concepts more determinate with regard to situated food ethics.

Plumwood insists that in adopting the intentional recognition stance the ecological self is lead to an interspecies ethic that is more egalitarian than the prominent alternatives based on frameworks of utility or rights. In *chapter two* I address two apparent problems that arise in applying Plumwood's egalitarian ethic in the context of agriculture, what I will call the problem of equality and the problem of incorporation (or relational definition). I first address the objection that a more egalitarian relationship with

nonhumans is simply incompatible with the agricultural project of cultivating nonhumans for human consumption. As Plumwood suggests, we might think of two entities as equal not because they occupy the same position along a scalar measure of value, but because they are incommensurable and ought not be ranked against each other along such a scale. Thus, although for most of us the idea of equality connotes something like equal rank, a counterhegemonic reinterpretation opens up new possibilities for the concept. To me it is plausible that a high degree of avoidance of ranking is possible in agricultural practices that are authentically dialogical. I will suggest that when practical ranking is unavoidable, then dialogical relationships allow for responsible ranking. I support these claims by appealing to farming practices that are grounded in agroecological principles, the application of knowledge of ecological processes to the design and management of agroecosystems (Altieri 1987). This indicates that a (redefined) egalitarian interspecies justice can be compatible with agriculture.

But even assuming this possibility, there is still the apparent problem that the very existence of the nonhuman beings in question is defined by reference to the human ends they will serve, and the meaning of such beings is *incorporated* into human meaning. Plumwood uses the term "incorporation" to describe a hegemonic form of relational definition wherein the subordinated group is defined only by reference to the dominant groups' traits and projects, and most often as lacking what the master has (1993, 52). One might again object that the problem of incorporation makes agriculture fundamentally incompatible with the proposed theory of interspecies ethics. In response, I suggest that defining *ourselves* in terms of our relationship to the nonhumans that we raise and consume goes a long way toward addressing the problem of incorporation. In the process,

the fundamental definition of agriculture and its role in human and nonhuman life also changes. The agricultural project becomes one of building flourishing human and nonhuman communities in interrelationship.

In *chapter three* I expand on the nature and importance of place-sensitivity in Plumwood's ethics with a critique of traditional American agrarianism, which assumes a direct connection between the agrarian life and political and ecological virtue. I advance the claim that place-sensitivity must be central to an adequate environmental ethic, and consequently an adequate food ethic. Sensitivity and relationship to particular places is central to understanding the mutuality of selfhood in an ecological way. Thus the ethical attitudes and practices of care, respect, and solidarity that are generated by ecological selfhood cannot really be separated from place-sensitivity. Moreover, place-sensitivity is required to address the problem of spatial, epistemic, and consequential "remoteness," or distance from the effects of our attitudes and behaviors, a problem central to our ecological irrationality (Plumwood 2002, 72). The agrarian philosophy of thinkers such as Wendell Berry[1] is an alternative potential source of a response to this problem. I read Berry's *The Unsettling of America* (1978) as focused on understanding and addressing the problem of remoteness as well. I will suggest that he, like Plumwood, sees remoteness as the product of a certain kind of irrational rationalism. Agrarian values – like relationship, restraint, and resilience – are replaced with rationalist values that further the mechanization of agricultural processes – efficiency, maximization, and reductionist economic valuation. Berry understands the "unsettling" remoteness from our places of

[1] I am taking Berry as he is often taken, that is, as a paradigmatic agrarian voice. For other relevantly similar articulations of the agrarian philosophy see the work of Wes Jackson (1980), Gene Logsdon (2000), Eric Freyfogle (2001), and Norman Wirzba (2003).

dwelling and our metaphorical place in the so-called "order of things" as a crisis of character that is ultimately culturally and ecologically destructive. His agrarian response involves a kind of forgotten place-sensitivity that has had a profound influence on the contemporary rhetoric of the good food movement in the United States.

At the same time, I insist that one's sensitivity to place must include sensitivity to (racialized and gendered) power relations, and to injustices within and between places. This multidimensional place-sensitivity is notably absent in American agrarian philosophy, rendering it susceptible to justifying an unreflexive localism that takes the local sphere to be inherently better, and/or more just, than wider spheres of interaction. Assuming a direct connection between scale and morality carries the danger of perpetuating inequality and maintaining existing forms of power that are exploitative, problematic or contradictory (DuPuis and Goodman 2005). Returning to the complexities of respect, care, and solidarity will remind us that there is nothing at all unreflexive about the ecological feminist framework. The requirement of simultaneous recognition of continuity and difference prevents unconditional attachment to the local. Berry's work tends to maintain assumptions of ecological holism and local cultural unity that reflect a lack of critical engagement with the structure of dualism. I suggest that, as a consequence, it is difficult to purposefully locate respect and solidarity (understood as ecological feminist modes of moral response) within Berry's agrarian understanding of good food. I suggest that the view might be fruitfully amended so as to emphasize responsiveness to questions of social justice.

In *chapter four* I engage the concept of food sovereignty as particularly capable of reflecting ecological feminist insights, and the practice of food sovereignty as potentially

manifesting the modes of moral response that I've described. As an ethical and political concept, food sovereignty was first prominently invoked by the transnational activist organization La Vía Campesina. It declared and organized around the right of peoples to healthy, culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound methods. As a political response to the power of multinational agricultural corporations, its members declared the importance of self-determination in the structuring of food systems, and the general goal of social relations free of oppression (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007). I will argue that food sovereignty is place-sensitive in a way that is attentive to relations of power, not in a way that relies heavily on a local/global value dualism. One of the problems of globalization that food sovereignty efforts aim to resist is the concentration of power that erases differences in local needs, but these efforts need not rely on the simplistic claims of unreflexive localism in order to do so. Food sovereignty explicitly connects the issue of food provisioning to social justice and questions of power disparity, including disparities based on gender, race and ethnicity (Declaration of Nyéléni 2007). In food sovereignty efforts, solidarity, the integration of respect and care for political purposes, comes to the fore. I will demonstrate that the ecological feminist modes of moral response can be purposefully located in food sovereignty activism by groups like La Vía Campesina. This activism provides models of respect, care, and solidarity through subversive practices. On my view, ecological feminism can add to the concept of food sovereignty by further illuminating the connections between social justice and environmental justice; it can also attend to questions of interspecies justice, an underexplored topic in food sovereignty discourse. I will argue that being in

communicative relationships of care, respect and solidarity with nonhuman others allows those others to be a nontrivial part of the "sovereign" structuring of food systems.

Finally, I conclude the project with a general vision of a place-based ecological feminist food justice. I lay out its cornerstones: 1) the recognition of biological, ecological, social, and political continuity and difference; 2) the understanding of interspecies justice as its political achievement; 3) the reflection of a multidimensional place-sensitivity that engages the entanglements of ecological flourishing and social justice; and 4) advocacy for dialogical communication and democratic control, or ecological self-determination, in the structuring of food systems. I will indicate how the theory offered here leaves us well equipped to continue to evaluate arguments that a given method of food production, distribution, or consumption is good. And in the end I will point to just a few of the questions and future research projects that we are prepared to thoughtfully engage in light of the theory of ecological feminist food justice presented here.

CHAPTER 1

ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST MODES OF MORAL RESPONSE

The aim of this chapter is to expand on Val Plumwood's limited description of the ethical concepts of respect, care and solidarity. I will suggest that they are integrated modes of moral response that, importantly, cannot be contained to limited spheres of human experience. This theoretical clarification is helpful in recognizing and enacting appropriate moral responses. It is also necessary for understanding the subversive nature of particular moral responses in particular contexts. Specifically I have in mind the subversive positioning of moral responses in arenas from which they have been historically excluded. For example, the public, political invocations of caretaking through food movement activism, or the insistence on respect for individual and community autonomy in determining how one's private food needs are best met.

I begin by demonstrating the general use of these ethical terms in Plumwood's work. In the subsequent section, I briefly describe the emergence of ecological feminism as a theoretical position in order to contextualize Plumwood's work and highlight her significant contributions to ethical thinking on human-human and human-nonhuman relationships. I then provide a reading of Plumwood's positive ethical framework. Finally I take up the task of elaborating on the roles and meanings of respect, care, and solidarity in a counterhegemonic ecological feminist framework. In doing so I will provide a theoretical foundation for exploring how these concepts might be translated into moral responses that function in counterhegemonic ways.

In Plumwood's writings, the various ethical concepts under consideration are appealed to very loosely, often in a list that is read in a single breath. For example:

> The relational self gives an account of the non-instrumental mode, *which includes respect, benevolence, care, friendship and solidarity*, where we not only do not place the other among our secondary or instrumental goals but treat at least the general goals of the other's well-being, ends or *telos* as among our primary ends (Plumwood 1993, 155, *emphasis mine*).

And:

> He or she stands in particular relations, *which may be those of care, custodianship, friendship, or various diverse virtue concepts*, to that other, who is treated as deserving of concern for its own sake, and hence as intrinsically worthy or valuable (Plumwood 1993, 185, *emphasis mine*).

Excerpts like these give the impression that the ethical concepts in question are interchangeable, or that they ultimately collapse into a single idea of the virtuous moral response and are thus only superficially distinct. Plumwood often refers to respect and care in particular as connected in an appropriate ethical framework, without explicitly attending to how they are connected or any relevant distinctions between the concepts. For example, "Enlightened self-interest is only as good as the assurance that the actor will remain enlightened, and there is a major question about what can guarantee that regularly in the absence of a *dispositional ethical base of a nonegoist kind such as care or respect*" (Plumwood 2002, 116). And again, "Ultimately, a durable relationship between we humans and our planetary partners must be built on the minds of perceptual, epistemic and emotional sensitivities which *are best founded on respect, care and love*"

(Plumwood 2002, 142). The inclusion of both respect and care in these passages indicates that there *is* a distinction between them, but what it is and why it is important is not an explicit focus of Plumwood's work. How to understand the distinction in the context of the broader ethical framework is worthy of investigation. And given that these ethical concepts have contested philosophical meanings, I argue that it is crucial to clarify what connects and distinguishes these concepts on an ecological feminist view. For Plumwood, these concepts are determinable: purposefully left open to interpretation in a wide variety of cultural and ethical contexts. With my analysis, I want to close the concepts again, just a little bit, in a way that will make them more meaningful. I want to recognize the necessary integration between the concepts, but resist the temptation to portray them as interchangeable. My proposed clarification and elaboration at the determinable level will help us to identify actual, or determined attitudes, statements, and behaviors that are consistent with the understanding of ethical ecological identity that Plumwood advances. My analysis is necessary for fully understanding the counterhegemonic force of the ecological feminist view. It situates the concepts meaningfully within the anti-dualistic framework while maintaining context-sensitivity; this allows for a robust evaluation of particular moral responses.

Contextualizing Val Plumwood's Work

Thinkers and activists from a variety of backgrounds have identified themselves as "ecofeminist." Ecofeminism emerged in the latter third of the twentieth century as a radical environmentalism explicitly informed by feminist theory and practice. It was originally identified with the view that women and nature are connected because both are associated with, and/or possess, feminine characteristics that are degraded in patriarchal

contexts (Warren 2000). Ecofeminists insisted that women and nature are morally valuable, but the institutions and narratives of patriarchal culture justify and perpetuate their devaluation. Liberation would require the rejection of both patriarchy and human chauvinism because of the conceptual and material ways that they reinforce each other.

Of course, just as feminism is not a monolith, neither is ecofeminism. There are ecofeminisms that are most closely linked with liberal feminism, cultural feminism, postmodern or poststructuralist feminism, and with feminist political activisms (Gaard 1998). Nevertheless we can identify two fundamental claims that ecofeminisms share: (1) that there are significant connections between gender oppression and the systemic destruction of nature, and (2) that those committed to addressing one of these injustices ought be aware of these connections and committed to addressing the other as well. Different scholars and activists have theorized differently the nature of these connections and what is required to redress the oppression and destruction.[1] Following Cuomo (1998), I distinguish "ecological feminism" from the broader "ecofeminism" to signal my understanding of these connections as historical/conceptual and socially constructed rather than as essential/natural/biologically determined, as some ecofeminists have suggested (Griffin 1978; Diamond and Orenstein 1990; Mellor 1992; Kheel 1993; Mies and Shiva 1993) and all ecofeminists have been wrongly accused of suggesting (Biehl 1991; Callicott 1993). As a theoretical position, ecological feminism acknowledges that marginalization and exploitation on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, and species are conceptually grounded in a common "logic of domination" (Warren 1990 & 2000; Plumwood 1993; Gruen 1996). The structure of the relationship between dominant and

[1] See Warren (2000, 21-41) for an overview of various ecofeminist positions on the nature of human other-nonhuman other connections.

subordinated groups is characterized by exclusion and hierarchical valuation, as I will describe in greater detail below. The logic of domination uses this structure to justify the oppression of the inferior group that it constructs.

The explanatory power of ecological feminism should not be underestimated. It can be used to analyze the shared structure of various forms of oppression. It can demonstrate how oppressions can be mutually reinforcing, without either having to create a hierarchy of oppressions or having to collapse any differences between particular occurrences of oppression. This theory also has the potential for grounding political solidarity and coalition building on the basis of a shared opposition to oppression. This remains compatible with recognizing the complexity of social relations that produce distinct immediate needs and goals that stem from specific injustices and social vulnerabilities (hooks 1984). Unfortunately, ecofeminism has been rightly criticized in the past for failing to build strong political coalitions, especially across race and class (Sturgeon 1997; Taylor 1997).[2] I want to note that despite the theoretical and practical power of ecological feminism it is certainly not the only available, or perhaps necessary, analytical framework. For example, engaging critical race theories and activisms that attend to the racialization of environmental issues helps to make ecological feminist understandings of the connections between race and gender oppressions more robust (Cuomo 1998, 37; Taylor 1997**,** 68; Sturgeon 1997, 260; Warren 2000, 57-65). Likewise, race-focused efforts in environmental justice are strengthened by feminist critiques (Taylor 1997).

[2] Emphasizing the need and opportunity for coalition building in activism will figure strongly in the discussion of food sovereignty in the final chapter of this work.

It is worth reiterating that, despite significant differences between the various theories identified as ecofeminist, gender is crucial for all ecofeminist analyses. This is what most distinguishes ecofeminism, broadly, from other environmental philosophies. For example, utility- or rights-based approaches to environmental philosophy, as in the animal welfare projects of thinkers like Peter Singer (2002) and Tom Regan (1986), focus on extending previously articulated ethical claims into the realm of the nonhuman. Nonhuman animals are afforded moral considerability on the basis of their sentience or subjectivity, but no attention is given to how these approaches reproduce rationalist patriarchal assumptions regarding the presumed basis for considerability and the nature of moral concern more generally. Likewise, the Deep Ecology approach to environmental philosophy of thinkers like Arne Naess (1993) and Warwick Fox (1990) extends consideration to the nonhuman on the basis of humanity's ultimate indisguishability from nature. The concerns of the individual self are replaced with the concerns of an expanded Self but no attention is given to the fundamental feminist concern regarding the patriarchal construction of the egoist self concept (see Held 1990).

Val Plumwood (1991, 1993, 1999, 2002) has explicitly and forcefully criticized utility-, rights-, or egoist-based environmental philosophies for maintaining a human-centered conceptual framework while appearing to be more inclusive of the nonhuman.[3] Drawing on Hartsock (1990), Plumwood (1996) describes centrism as a conceptual structure that places the universal master subject at the center and constructs peripheral others as sets of negative qualities. Following Hartsock, and influenced by the feminist

[3] I will engage the specifics of Plumwood's critiques later on in this chapter, in the subsection on ethical respect, and again in chapter two, in connection to an appropriate ecological feminist understanding of equality.

work of Marilyn Frye (1983) and the critiques of eurocenrtism of Edward Said (1978), Plumwood argues that the shared logical characteristics of the centric structure underlie various forms of sexism, racism, and colonialism (1996; 2002, 101). Each case sets up one term (Masculine, White, European, for example) as the normative center and defines marginal others as secondary, derivative, or deficient in relation to it. In working from these critiques, Plumwood has made significant positive contributions to ethical-political thinking about human-human and human-nonhuman relationships. As I will demonstrate below, Plumwood consistently argues that the androcentrism, eurocentrism, and anthropocentrism that have characterized dominant western culture are connected and mutually-reinforcing by being reason-centered, "where reason is treated…as the characteristic which sums up and is common to the privileged side of all these contrasts and whose absence characterises the Other" (Plumwood 2002, 101). In the remainder of this section, I will describe the structure of centrism, its foundation of value dualism, and its key logical characteristics. Then I will turn to Plumwood's critique of rationalism as a pervasive form of hegemonic centrism, and her claim that maintaining rationalism is ecologically irrational.

A hegemonic centrist conceptual structure is built on a foundation of value dualism. As distinct from a mere difference or dichotomy, dualism creates a radical separation, an ontological discontinuity, between the group identified as the privileged center and the groups that are consequently marginalized (Plumwood 1993, 47). Dualized frameworks are dangerous not just because they misconstrue reality by manufacturing ontological divisions, but because, in so doing, they justify exploitative ethical norms.

Informed by the work of feminists and ecofeminists[4], and especially the theorists of colonization Albert Memmi and Edward Said, Plumwood provides a thorough description of the key features of the colonizing logic of dualism (1993, 47-55; 2002, 101-106). The radically exclusionary nature of the relationship between pair members is the hallmark of value dualism. Through *hyperseparation* master and other are radically polarized and understood to be essentially different in kind. The characteristics of master and other are constructed as mutually exclusive such that there can be no overlap in qualities between dualistic pairs. Moreover, the qualities of the other are habitually described in terms of a lack of some quality possessed by the master through an unequal *relational definition*. Through *backgrounding* the other is treated as the background to the master's foreground, while any dependence of the master on the other for the completion of his projects is denied. Simultaneously, the ends or projects of the other are defined in terms of the master's ends, often through *instrumentalism*, that is, merely in terms of the usefulness of the other to the master. Finally, through *homogenization* the other is understood to unvaryingly conform to its "nature." Taken together, all of these characteristics provide the necessary framework within which value hierarchy can be justified and domination naturalized. Plumwood writes, "The overall effect of the hegemonic centric structure is not only to justify oppression by making it seem natural but also to make it invisible, by creating a false universalism in culture in which the experiences of the dominant 'centre' are represented as universal, and the experiences of

[4] Plumwood specifically references feminist thinkers Simone de Beauvoir, Marilyn Frye, Seyla Benhabib, Allison Jaggar, and Nancy Hartsock, when describing the logic of colonization; and ecofeminists Ynestra King, Rosemary Reuther, and Karen Warren are also referenced in this discussion.

those subordinated in the structure are rendered secondary or are not visible at all" (Plumwood 1996, 134).

That dualistic conceptual frameworks enable hierarchical ranking and exploitation is a familiar feminist claim. The following list of dichotomous pairs is familiar in feminist and ecofeminist literature: Culture/Nature, Reason/Nature, Male/Female, Human/Nature, Mind/Body, Public/Private, Self/Other, and so on. Plumwood (1991,1993, 2002) provides a notably rigorous analysis of these dualized conceptual pairs as functioning within hegemonic rationalism. For Plumwood, a gendered Reason/Nature dualism plays the key role in building and maintaining the mutually reinforcing structure of dualisms in traditional western conceptual frameworks. Plumwood (1993) traces the narrative of rational (human and masculine) supremacy through the history of ideas in western philosophy, from Plato to Descartes to modern science and technology, to capitalist economic theory. From this narrative we can discern an emergent picture of reason, and by extension of full humanity. Reason is a cognitive expression of human freedom that separates humanity from the natural realm of necessity or contingency. Humanity is conferred with dignity by virtue of that freedom and thus morally superior to the realm of nature. The rational mind seeks knowledge of natural objects so as to better understand how to control nature in service of its own ends. This mind is egoistic, seeking the maximization of satisfaction and recognizing social dependence only in terms of its necessity for securing one's desires. Plumwood's narrative maps the supremacy of reason onto human supremacy via the identification of humanity with active, individualized mind and reason, and of non-humans with passive, interchangeable bodies.

The reason/nature division represents how to divide up the world from the perspective of power. It constructs an idealized rational ego at the center and constructs others by exclusion or deviation from this center, "as some form of nature in contrast to the subject, the master, who claims for himself both full humanity and reason" (Plumwood 1993, 44). Plumwood observes that in the contrast set, nearly everything on the "superior" side can be represented as a form of reason, or is linked to reason by some implicit assumption, while nearly everything on the "inferior" side can be represented as or linked to forms of nature. The dichotomous sets are linked by assumptions implicit in the cultural background, or sometimes made explicit by particular thinkers, such that the dualized pairs mutually reinforce one another (Plumwood 1993, 45). For example, the assumption that all and only humans possess culture links the culture/nature pair with the human/nature pair. And the assumption that the sphere of the human is essentially characterized by intellect maps the mind/body pair onto the human/nature pair. The alignment of the rational with patriarchal social formations maps the mind/body pair onto the masculine/feminine pair. And because mind/body is mapped onto human/nature, so too can masculine/feminine be mapped onto the human/nature division. Because of the implicit links between rationality, humanity, and masculinity, the whole set of dualisms can be mobilized in service of inferiorizing and exploiting nature and those humans who are counted as a part of nature, like women. Rationalist centrism facilitates and justifies instrumentalist exploitation insofar as others are defined in relation to the self and regarded as interchangeable if they produce equivalent satisfactions. "The interchangeability of others as means enables denial of dependence on any particular

other, so that others are encountered as homogenised, as members of an already instrumentalised class or category" (Plumwood 1993, 145).

However, centrism and the key characteristics of value dualism that maintain the centrist structure, create "blindspots" that are damaging to both the dominating and subordinate parties (Plumwood 1993, 194; 2002, 25-26, 98). As we have seen, the agency and productivity of Others is assumed and relied upon, but simultaneously denied or backgrounded. Thus the productive energy and material resources of the other can be "colonized," or appropriated for use in the master subject's projects while the master subject is himself conceptualized as disembedded from the material sphere. Together, backgrounding and homogenization of the other render rationalism blind to an understanding of human ecological embeddedness and an understanding of nature's fantastic diversity. If reason defines nature in reductive terms, as ontologically distinct from (full) humanity due to its lack of mind, then reason is unable to encounter the fullness of nonhuman life. This precludes interaction with nonhumans "on their own terms," rather than just on ours (Plumwood 2002, 112), and thus precludes access to valuable knowledge of the other. Thus rationalist reason is less powerful than it presumes because the logical structure of centrism prohibits certain kinds of knowledge, "especially self-knowledge, knowledge of its own limits, and certain knowledges of the other" (Plumwood 2002, 29). These blindspots render rationalism self-defeating; it identifies specific aims and ends for reason that it cannot possibly achieve – objectivity, detachment, and total control.

Yet, despite these many blindspots, rationalism is hubristic. The hegemonic construction of rational agency allows for appropriation of the contributions of natural

Others to human projects and survival. The aims of mastery and maximization are pursued to the point of self-destruction when material connections in real contexts of interdependence cannot be recognized (Plumwood 2002, 33). Plumwood cautions, "we should not mistake rationalism for reason – rather it is a cult of reason that elevates to extreme supremacy a particular narrow form of reason and correspondingly devalues the contrasted reduced sphere of nature and embodiment" (2002, 4). Hyperseparation means that rationalism cannot see humans as ecological beings. Backgrounding, homogenization, and incorporation means that rationalism cannot see nonhumans as ethically relevant independent of human use. From the master perspective detachment and the maximization of self-interest is "rational," but there is much that the master perspective does not or cannot see. "The master's denial of dependency and his self-deception with respect to the conditions of his own life carry grave dangers, which include, of course, self-destruction" (Plumwood 1993, 195).

Ultimately, Plumwood (2002) charges rationalism with producing twin ethical failures – the failure to situate human beings ecologically and nonhuman beings ethically. The devastating nature of these failures is evidence that while hyper-separation from nature gave rationalism its hegemonic power, it is also a tragic flaw; by denying dependence on nature, the very conditions that allowed for its mastery will be the source of its own destruction. In order to respond to these failures – without at the same time reproducing gender, race or other oppressions – the structure of dualism and the master's centrist understanding of the world will need to be dismantled and alternatives built up in their stead.

Plumwood is committed to the idea that an adequate environmental philosophy, and ethical framework generally, must reflect an explicit rejection of centrism and its logic of colonization. Thus, under the umbrella of ecofeminism, Plumwood's work is easily distinguished from those views that would valorize and leave unquestioned the concepts of nature and the feminine as they have been historically constructed within a dualistic/centrist framework. As Victoria Davion (1994) has pointed out, there is reason to question whether ecofeminist views that embrace "the feminine" uncritically ought to be considered *feminist* at all. She argues that ecofeminist views that aim to critique masculinity by valorizing femininity, without acknowledging that the concept of femininity in question was constructed in patriarchal contexts, are more appropriately dubbed eco*feminine*. Davion highlights the philosophical work of Plumwood, along with Karen J. Warren, as examples of truly eco*feminist* theorizing insofar as they acknowledge that resistance to patriarchy and response to ecological crises must bring the conceptual significance of the woman-nature connection under patriarchy to the fore (1994, 16). Ecofeminism as a whole was dismissed early on by some prominent environmental philosophers, such as J. Baird Callicott (1993, 333), as anti-theoretical and gender essentialist.[5] But even a cursory reading of the work of ecological feminist philosophers – like Val Plumwood, but also Karen J. Warren, Jim Cheney, Chris J. Cuomo, for example – reveals the opposite. I regard Plumwood's work as a preeminent example of ecological feminist theory that further develops established feminist and political theories in the realm of human-nonhuman relationship.

[5] For many, the stigma of gender essentialism is still attached to the term "ecofeminism," hence the desire to distinguish and rename our approaches (Cuomo 1998; Gaard 2011).

I turn to Plumwood's alternative ethical vision in the following section of this chapter. As an alternative to the egoist self of traditional rationalism, Plumwood advocates an ecological self realized through relationships of mutuality with human and nonhuman others. As an alternative to the colonizing view of the non-rational as an undifferentiated resource, Plumwood prescribes the adoption of the "intentional recognition stance" which recognizes the nonhuman other as agentic, as a source of striving, and as potentially communicative.

Plumwood's Ethical Ecological Self

Like other feminist and ecofeminist theorists,[6] Plumwood rejects the idea of the human self as autonomous and disembedded in favor of a view of self as "self-in-relationship." On the relational view, selves are co-constituting and interdependent rather than atomized. The formation of the self's identity involves interaction with the other who is relatable, "non-alien," but also different, other (Plumwood 1993, 156). For Plumwood the human self is bound to human and nonhuman others by ties of co-constituting mutuality and material dependence. The reality of this interspecies interdependence and relationality grounds Plumwood's conceptualization of human ecological selfhood. She laments that modern humans, focused as we are on our "mastery" of nature, rarely acknowledge the factual, descriptive ecological self. The fact of ecological relationality motivates the idea of ethical ecological selfhood that dominates Plumwood's work. Throughout this dissertation I will tend to refer to this normative understanding of the ecological self. Plumwood's is a virtue-based framework insofar as

[6] Plumwood explicitly draws on the work of Jessica Benjamin, Karen Warren and Seyla Benhabib in articulating her own understanding of ecological relational identity (see Plumwood 1993, 154-160).

ethical attitudes and commitments are understood as inherent to a particular kind of motivating identity. The mutuality emphasized by Plumwood's understanding of identity requires non-instrumental relationship between self and other, that is, a fundamental valuing of others and their ends (Plumwood 1993, 154-155). The ethical ecological self, as an expansive relational self, is in co-constituting, non-instrumental relationship with human and with earth others, or nature. Plumwood writes, "The ecological self can be viewed as a type of relational self, one which includes the goal of the flourishing of earth others and the earth community among its own primary ends, and hence respects or cares for these others for their own sake" (1993, 154). The identity of ecological selfhood grounds the commitment to non-instrumental relationship with others insofar as the ecological self recognizes others in mutual, or reciprocal, interrelationship.

Adopting what Plumwood calls the "intentional recognition stance" (1993, 136-141; 2002, 176-186) facilitates the ethical and political implications of the recognition of mutuality. For Plumwood "intentionality" serves as a non-reductive basis for the continuity between mind and nature, which simultaneously allows for complex patterns of difference (1993, 131-134). She argues that the failure of science to establish a conclusive delineation between the human-psychological and nonhuman physical realms is actually evidence of a need for a more comprehensive "mark of the mental" (Plumwood 1993, 131). Traditionally, consciousness is taken to be the special activity of mind, accompanying all and only mental activity (Plumwood 1993, 131). Intentionality includes but does not reduce mind to this special activity. Rather than identifying a singular, essential characteristic, intentionality refers to forms of "directedness" that may or may not be conscious, sentient, or individualized. The concept of intentionality leads

to the thesis that "mindlike qualities are to be found in nature, that there is no basis for an absolute break or an unbridgeable gulf marking humans as mind-havers off from the rest of the universe" (Plumwood 1993, 133). At the same time, intentionality can refer to a rich set of distinctions among mindlike properties: awareness, sentience, choice, consciousness, goal-directedness, as well as sensory and intentional capacities that humans do not possess. These distinctions are in terms of kind rather than degree, allowing intentionality to provide a way to recognize continuity without assimilation and to represent the complex heterogeneity of nature (Plumwood 1993, 134-135).

Plumwood insists that we should aim to find cultural ways to recognize, celebrate, and engage with "the play of intentionality and agency in the world" (1993, 136). Adopting the intentional recognition stance is a practice of openness to the "agentic and dialogical potentialities of earth others," a counterhegemonic response to the exclusionary structure of dualistic conceptions of mind (Plumwood 2002, 177). In order to include the flourishing of others among one's own primary ends, and for their own sakes, one must conceive of others as intentional (in the broadest sense), and as potentially communicative ethical subjects. For understanding oneself as an ecological being, in relationship with earth others who are intentional and communicative beings with their own ends, makes it possible to conceive of those relationships in ethical and political terms (Plumwood 1993, 138; 2002, 177). Thus, this understanding of ecological identity, predicated on the openness of the intentional recognition stance, grounds certain attitudes and commitments towards the others with whom one is in relationship. Plumwood characterizes these attitudes as being fundamentally dialogical rather than monological, meaning that they are genuinely informed by the other and not prescribed

"top-down." Beyond that, these ethical commitments remain generic, or determinable, until applied in particular contexts. Thus, as would be expected of a virtue-based approach, knowing when and how to manifest these attitudes appropriately requires wisdom, or "a well-developed ethical sensitivity" (Plumwood 2002, 188).

This "new" understanding of self, of self's connection to complex others, and of the commitments these connections generate, provides the ground for ecological rationality. Plumwood argues that ecological rationality "draws on both organismic rationality and critical rationality" (2002, 68). It reconceives rationality as "a matter of balance, harmony, or reconcilability among an organism's identities, faculties and ends, a harmony that has regard to the kind of being it is" (Plumwood 2002, 67). At the same time, it maintains the value of reason's ability to critically relate human social and individual goals to ecological realities, in ways that recognize human knowledge of those realities as politically situated. Plumwood writes,

> We can realign reason not with the master formations of elite control and the rational egoism which fails to acknowledge the other as a limiting principle, but with social formations built on radical democracy, co-operation and mutuality. We can explore the rationality of the mutual self, the self which can take joy in the flourishing of others, which can acknowledge kinship but also feast on the other's resistance and grow strong on their difference (Plumwood 1993, 196).

In contrast rationalist frameworks, ecological rationality situates human beings as embodied and human projects as embedded in complex ecological systems. It does not limit rationality to the determination of the most efficient means to the end of maximizing self-interest. It does not limit the set of interests to be considered to an isolable set, for in

a world of interconnection and interdependence, no such set can be delineated. Ecological rationality serves as a critique of the rationalist framework that denies social and ecological dependence, the conditions of its own production and continuation (Plumwood 2002, 69). Ecological rationality informs the undertaking of dialogical interspecies ethics that produce a range of context-sensitive moral responses. I will articulate an ecological feminist understanding of three such responses in the following section.

Respect, Care, and Solidarity: Determinable Ethical Concepts

In *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* Plumwood briefly describes an "environmental ethic of care" (1993, 166, 185) and in *Environmental Culture* she fleshes out her articulation of the intentional recognition stance as the well-spring of more fully developed "dialogical interspecies ethics," as I have briefly outlined above. By her own account, Plumwood's counterhegemonic strategies lead to "a rich variety of contextually specific ethics that are applicable to interspecies relationships" (2002, 169). These ethics are variously described in terms of sympathy or sensitivity, care, respect, friendship, communication, partnership, justice, political solidarity and more. The loose use of the ethical terms in her description of her own view may certainly be intentional, as one of Plumwood's goals is to reject the need for a "universalist" ethic that would identify some principle or moral response that is generalizable to every context (2002, 188). But, as I have indicated, these terms warrant more focused attention than Plumwood gives them in her own writing. In this section I will elaborate on what distinguishes and connects respect, care, and solidarity in particular, in order to prepare the way for building structural and/or habitual practices on these moral responses.

I have chosen to focus my analysis on respect, care, and solidarity because these concepts reflect the necessity and the tension within one of Plumwood's most significant and most often reiterated claims: that an appropriate ethical position will recognize both continuity with and difference from others. The need for a simultaneous recognition of continuity and difference is a key position in Plumwood's work, which is aimed at a counterhegemonic alternative to centrist conceptual frameworks and political structures. While it might seem that efforts aimed at stressing similarities between self and other and efforts aimed at stressing differences between self and other are incompatible, Plumwood's work shows us that both are needed and are appropriate responses to different parts of the overall problem of dualized conceptual frameworks. Resisting the hyperseparation, or radical exclusion, that characterizes value dualistic frameworks requires the recognition of overlap, of continuity between dichotomous classes. And resisting incorporation, or relational definition, and homogenization requires the recognition of difference between and among groups. Plumwood meets this need in marking intentionality as a non-reductive basis for recognizing continuity with a rich variety of beings and systems. The intentional recognition stance and the dialogical ethics it prompts, are expressions of the resistance of centrist frameworks. My analysis will show how the different applications and emphases of the moral responses of respect, care, and solidarity work to negotiate the tensions inherent in the simultaneous recognition of continuity and difference.

I am labeling respect, care and solidarity as *modes of moral response*[7] in order to highlight the idea that, being grounded in the intentional recognition stance, these

[7] I am indebted to Ronald L. Sandler (2007) for inspiring this phrase.

concepts are properly understood as requiring authentic and responsive engagement with others. Identifying them as independent modes indicates that, while they ought not be understood as totally separable from one another, respect, care and solidarity have different emphases that render them more or less suitable, and/or subversive, in different contexts. What respect, care, and solidarity look like will be determined by the particular places and contexts in which they are manifested, but clarifying just a little bit about the as yet determinable concepts will help us to identify actual attitudes, statements, and behaviors that are consistent with ecological selfhood. In the following sections I will provide an ecological feminist understanding of these concepts that is consistent with Plumwood's counterhegemonic framework. I articulate normative accounts of the concepts, not descriptive or observational ones. Clarifying their meaning in ecological contexts broadens our understanding of their roles in ethical life. In short, this theoretical work will help us cultivate our ethical sensitivities.

Plumwood writes, "the ecological self recognizes the earth other as a centre of agency or intentionality having its origin and place like mine in the community of the earth, but as a different centre of agency, which limits mine" (1993, 159). I suggest that respect and care put different kinds of "limits" on me as an agent. The constraints of respect come from the recognition of difference, while the obligations of care come from the recognition of kinship. As I mentioned above, Plumwood insists that counterhegemonic responses to centrism require recognition of both difference and continuity (or kinship); so I understand respect and care as capturing the multiple responses required in order to navigate the tension of simultaneously recognizing both. I

will suggest that solidarity negotiates and integrates these responses in an overtly political way.

Respect

Here I will suggest that ecological feminist respect is best understood as emerging from the recognition of difference. Modes of moral response indicate one's general orientation toward others and the world, an orientation that has epistemological, ethical, and political dimensions. Plumwood prefers the word "stance" to indicate that what is under consideration is the general posture one takes in inhabiting the world. In adopting the open stance of a dialogical orientation toward the world, we expect our attitudes and behaviors to be informed by and responsive to others, whose own goals and activity are recognized as valuable. Although self and other are understood to be in co-constituting relationship, we must acknowledge the differences between self and other that do exist, for example with regard to subjectivity or to what is necessary for well-being. Failure to do so reflects a monological, rather than a dialogical, orientation toward others; without explicit attention to difference, one is free to impose or assimilate meaning. Plumwood writes, "There is an arrogance in failing to respect boundaries and to acknowledge difference which can amount to an imposition of self" (Plumwood 1993, 178). On this view, acknowledging the other's fullness of being and the boundaries that exist between self and other is critical to respecting the other.

This position may seem counterintuitive. For we might think that respect is the product of acknowledging that the other is in all relevant moral ways *the same* as oneself. First, one recognizes one's own moral value as derived from meeting some non-arbitrary criterion. Then, one acknowledges that the other, indeed, meets the same criterion

(whether this has been historically recognized or not). This underlying sameness, despite superficial and morally irrelevant difference, is what grounds respect for the other. In some ways, this is the story of moral progress – the ever-expanding circle of moral consideration to include those beings, human and nonhuman, that have been previously excluded. As pioneering American environmentalist Aldo Leopold puts it, the extension of ethics is akin to an ecological evolution in complexity; early forms dealt with the relation between individuals and subsequent forms with the relation between individuals and society, and future forms must be further extended to attend to humanity's relation to the land (Leopold 1989, 203).

Environmental ethics has provided a series of examples of a moral expansion formula. I'll briefly mention two such arguments here, that of Tom Regan (1986) and of Paul Taylor (1986), both of which derive respect for nonhumans on the basis of a similarity to human moral subjects. The critical question for both thinkers is what criterion must be met such that an individual being can be objectively identified as having inherent value.

For Regan (1986) the "subject-of-a-life criterion" is used to motivate and defend the concept of inherent value. Those beings that are subjects-of-a-life possess a range of conscious experiences[8] that render them inherently valuable and thus unfit to be "viewed or treated as mere receptacles" (Regan 1986, 243). So inherent value justifies respectful

[8] He writes, "Individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals, a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests" (Regan 1983, 243).

treatment; respectful treatment implies a prohibition against deliberate harm. The respect and harm principles are used to defend the claim that all inherently valuable individuals have a *moral right* to be treated in ways that respect this value and a *prima facie* moral right not to be harmed (Regan 1986, 278). Regan writes, "All individuals *like me in the relevant respects* must also have this right [to respectful treatment], have it equally, and have it independently of its recognition by the laws of this or that nation" (1986, 278, *my emphasis*). So it is on the basis of nonhumans' similarity to humans with regard to their conscious experience of life that nonhumans are recognized as worthy of moral respect.

Likewise, Taylor (1986) argues for respect for nature on the basis of nature's inherent value. Whereas Regan's focus is on individual beings with "high-order" consciousness as rights-bearing moral subjects, Taylor takes a "biocentric outlook." This includes the belief that all organisms are "teleological centers of life," and humans are members of the Earth's Community of Life in the same sense that other living things are members of that community (Taylor 1986, 99-100). Taylor writes,

> Our duties toward the Earth's nonhuman forms of life are grounded on their status as entities possessing inherent worth. They have a kind of value that belongs to them by their very nature, and it is this value that makes it wrong to treat them as if they existed as mere means to human ends. It is for *their* sake that their good should be promoted or protected. Just as humans should be treated with respect, so should they (1986, 13).

Here Taylor's biocentric view sounds consonant with the ecological feminist call to respect nonhumans as an acknowledgment of their directional striving and fullness of being. However, his general approach can be read as maintaining the formula of

extending the criterion that makes human beings morally valuable into the nonhuman realm. He writes, "A living plant or animal…has a good of its own *in the same sense that a human being has a good of its own*. It is, independently of anything else in the universe, itself a center of goal-oriented activity" (Taylor 1986, 124, *my emphasis*). While the result is a more inclusive environmental ethic, the criticism is methodological. Taylor's orientation remains focused on human moral experience as the normative standard and other life forms as similar or dissimilar. It also feels reductive to characterize moral goods in this way, given the incredible variety of biological life under consideration, including the variety of human experience.

While the prohibition against treating morally valuable nonhuman others as a mere means to human ends will be helpful in distinguishing between respectful and disrespectful use, Plumwood (1993, 166-167) includes a critique of Taylor's view as reproducing many of the problematic rationalist elements of a Kantian framework. On Taylor's account, actions do not express moral respect unless they are done as a matter of moral principle and not inclination (1986, 85-86). So his account treats respect as essentially a cognitive matter – of holding a rational belief and recognizing the universal principles that fall out of it – treating feelings of care, concern, love, or desire as irrelevant to morality. In privileging moral cognition Taylor's biocentric ethic remains distinctly monological rather than dialogical.

Ecological feminists forcefully critique this general approach to grounding respect for nature. Karen Warren (1990, 2000) call this approach to animal/environmental ethics "moral extensionism," a term that Plumwood also adopts in her critiques of rationalism (1991; 1993, 171-173) and of utility- and welfare-based animal ethics (1999, 2000,

2002). The fundamental problem is that the approach cannot escape the framework of center-periphery thinking; indeed, the "expanding circle" imagery explicitly maintains it. Expansion on the basis of sameness leaves key characteristics of value dualistic conceptual frameworks intact. It maintains a hyperseparation between those welcomed into the expanded moral realm and those who remain excluded. On Tom Regan's view, for example, those individual beings that are "subjects-of-a-life" are regarded as radically different in kind from those who are not. The possession of a robust conscious life grounds their moral status, and other nonhumans are defined relationally, as lacking what those privileged moral beings have. So whereas traditional ethics draws a dividing line between humans and all nonhumans, Regan's view shifts some specific nonhuman animals into the moral category while drawing a dividing line between conscious animal life and plant life. Relational definition allows for the homogenization of those beings in the subordinated group; on this picture plants can be regarded as interchangeable in a way that animal "subjects-of-a-life" are not.

Extensionist approaches adapt a concept of respect that was formulated within patriarchal, human-centered theoretical frameworks without questioning the structure of those frameworks themselves. This concern can be understood as a result of the feminist commitment to challenge male gender bias in ethics. Virginia Held (1990) argues that dominant western ethical frameworks portray themselves as gender neutral but in fact are not, because they place more value on culturally-coded masculine traits (like autonomy, rationality, impartiality) and undervalue or devalue feminine-coded traits (like dependence, emotionality, and partiality). The associations have deeply affected moral theory and its emphasis on the public, transcendent, rational domain as the appropriate

arena for morality, to the exclusion of the private, intimate domain of the household (the arena to which women have historically been confined). Plumwood's own thorough critique of rationalism amplifies Held's arguments; both demonstrate the alignment of dominant forms of reason, and egoist conceptions of self, with elite, gendered social formations. Held argues that an appropriate moral view would not be able to exclude so much of the experience of actual human beings from its moral concepts. She writes, "the associations between the philosophical concepts and gender cannot be merely dropped, and the concepts retained regardless of gender, because gender has been built into them in such a way that without it, they will have to be different concepts" (1990, 323). [9] The maintenance of value dualistic frameworks in environmental ethics is thus inconsistent with feminist liberatory aims. Insofar as these frameworks are implicated in the patriarchal devaluation of women and "the feminine," they must be resisted.

While the prominent arguments in environmental ethics described above are concerned with establishing respect on the basis of sameness, some feminist contemporary approaches are concerned with negotiating respect in relation to biological, historical, and social difference. It is often the case that we are made aware of the importance of respect by noticing the consequences of its lack. Iris Marion Young (2011) discusses the lack of respect afforded to individuals on the basis of their group

[9] Alison Jaggar (1991) grounds the commitment to challenge male gender bias in ethics on two assumptions: 1) that the subordination of women in morally wrong, and 2) that the moral experience of women ought to be treated with as much value as the moral experience of men. This prompts some thinkers to take a naturalist turn toward developing a distinctively feminine ethics (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984). But Jaggar acknowledges the complications of identifying and generalizing on "men's" or "women's" experience (1991, 90). She notes that understandings of masculine and feminine are varied and sometimes it is unclear whether or not associations are normative or symbolic. They are also complicated by additional associations with class and race (Jaggar 1991, 90; hooks 1984).

membership in her analysis of the characteristic "five faces" of oppression. One of these faces she calls "powerlessness," a lack of status, authority, and sense of self that privileged groups tend to have (Young 2011, 56-58). On her view, respectability is a way of life that members of oppressed groups lack in relation to their privileged counterparts. The example she uses to illustrate powerlessness is the lack of status of the nonprofessional (manual work) class in relation to the professional (mental work) class (Young 2011, 56-57). "To treat people with respect is to be prepared to listen to what they have to say or to do what they request because they have some authority, experience, or influence" (Young 2011 57). Marilyn Frye (1983) explores the question of women's anger and why and how it is dismissed as irrational or unfounded. She determines that, "to get angry is to claim implicitly that one is a certain sort of being, a being which can (and in this case does) stand in a certain relation and position a propos the being one is angry at. One claims that one is in certain ways and dimensions respectable. One makes claims upon respect" (1983, 90). This claim need not be based on a particular shared characteristic, instead it can be asserted as a demand that one's experiential authority or claim to justice be recognized. But in a context of powerlessness, the anger that expresses a demand for respect is often dismissed as crazy, does not get "uptake," or is just plain incomprehensible to members of the dominant group (Frye 1983, 88-90).

Young (2011) approaches the negotiation of respect across difference as a radically democratic political process. In contrast to advocating a humanist or assimilationist ideal of social unity, Young promotes a vision of the good society where "there is equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences" (163). The achievement

of this vision requires the assertion of positive group specificity, that undermines universalist claims and "introduces the possibility of understanding the relation between groups as merely difference, instead of exclusion, opposition, and dominance" (Young 2011, 166). To be successful, the assertion of positive group specificity will avoid homogenizing group experiences, and will avoid reducing individuals to their group membership.

Feminist critiques in moral/political theory and the ecological feminist critique of environmental ethics prompt a rethinking of respect in the context of relationship and across nontrivial difference. Respect emerges from the recognition of difference that is constituted by an acknowledgment of the other's fullness of being and the humility of the limits of one's own knowledge and experience. Acknowledgement of the other's fullness of being is a crucial part of dismantling value dualism insofar as it disrupts relational definition by no longer allowing for the other to be defined only by reference to the master's identity and ends. Respect is focused on recognizing the other as agentic, as a center of striving, whose immediate goals may be very different than one's own.

Respect responds to difference by putting constraints on our interactions with the other. An attitude of respect recognizes the other as distinct, as self-directed, or potentially intentional. This constrains one's ability to regard the other as, say, a mere background to one's own projects, or as a resource to service one's own ends. Active moral responses that are respectful will put constraints on our interactions with others, for example by prohibiting particular kinds of instrumental use. Instrumentalism implies that there are no constraints imposed by the being or the independent ends of the instrumentalized group. Frameworks of value dualism that deny agentic qualities to the

subordinated group can justify subjecting it to arbitrary use. Recognizing, at a minimum, the directional striving of others, requires recognizing their independent ends. In practical terms, doing so will result in careful use where there is use, and sometimes in no use at all (Plumwood 1993, 211-212). Respect alters our perceptions of nonhumans and puts real constraints on our behavior as it impacts nonhumans. For example, recognition of the fullness of being and independent ends of certain sea mammals may result in preventing their being kept in captivity for human entertainment. Obviously the question of when use is appropriate and what careful, respectful use looks like is crucially relevant to the question of ethical agricultural relationship. Respect for nonhumans in agricultural contexts will require first, that they are put "on the moral agenda" on their own terms, not by virtue of their use value or by virtue of some similarity to human beings. Second, it will require that human methods of nonhuman cultivation acknowledge the agency of nature through practices grounded in partnership. I will return to this topic in chapters two and three.

Care

In a counterhegemonic ecological feminist ethical framework, care can be understood as emerging from the recognition of continuity, or kinship. As with respect, here I am articulating a normative conception of ethical care, not observing or describing inherent qualities of caretaking. All beings participate in and are dependent on finite ecological systems such that they (and their limitations) are constituted relationally. This interdependence provides one basis for continuity between human and nonhuman life, culture and nature. Intentionality, as described above, provides another basis for continuity between mind and nature, human and nature. Despite differences in

subjectivity and perhaps in immediate goals, all beings share an orientation toward their own flourishing. At the same time, we maintain attention to the heterogeneity of nature by allowing a rich variety of intentional forms of life (Plumwood 1993, 134). By invoking a kind of commonality here I do not mean to suggest that the interests, ends, or directionality of all entities are ultimately the same, or that they always converge. As Plumwood reminds us, assumptions about unified interests are especially susceptible to hegemonic interpretations (2002, 202-204). Rather, recognition of continuity is a way of resisting the hyperseparation of value dualism by acknowledging shared attributes and dependencies.

In embracing continuity and mutuality, ethical care takes our relationships to be sites of responsibility. While acknowledgement of difference might provide us motivation not to infringe on the independent projects of others, on its own, it might not provide the moral motivation to advance those projects. For that, the recognition of continuity and mutual dependence with others indicates relationship as a site of responsibility. Care limits us by requiring the active promotion of the ends of others, usually requiring some sacrifice on our own part. In ethical caring, one takes the flourishing of others to be among one's own primary ends, but for the others' own sake. Care responds to the responsibility of kinship by motivating care-taking practices that promote flourishing – perhaps of nurture, stewardship, protection, and so on. As care theorist Joan Tronto puts it,

> On the most general level, we suggest that caring be viewed as a *species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 'world' so that we can live in it as well as possible*. That world includes our bodies, our

> selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web (1993, 103).

In Tronto's influential four phases of caring, the ethical standard of care involves (1) recognizing that care is necessary, i.e. *caring about*; (2) assuming some responsibility for the identified need and determining how to meet it, i.e. *taking care of*; (3) meeting the need for care, or *care-giving*; and finally (4) recognizing that the object of care will respond to the care it receives and seeking feedback, i.e. *care-receiving* (Tronto 1993, 106-108). All four elements are critical to care as a distinct mode of moral response. An attitude of care recognizes mutual dependence and that care is necessary, and it assumes a level of responsibility for the identified need. Active moral responses that are caring are sensitively responsive and competently executed. You have to actually "take good care of" in order to *be* caring (Tronto 1993, 133).

Care connotes a fundamental attachment to others that fosters sensitivity to their needs. But that attachment need not be understood as primarily emotional; having positive feelings for the other, or "caring for," is not a necessary condition for "caring about" the other (Warren 2000, 110). However, as with all of the ethical concepts that I am attempting to describe, care has an important dispositional element. As Tronto puts it, "it seems that one can perform caring work without a caring disposition and one can perform other activities toward a caring end" (1993, 105). For care to be virtuous both the activity and disposition are present. And despite emerging from the recognition of continuity and dependence, care does not necessarily require reciprocity. As Karen Warren points out, "one can care about infants, wild animals, trees, forests, and ecosystems even if they do not or cannot reciprocate the care" (2000, 141). To be clear,

in saying that reciprocity is not required for care I do not mean to imply that care is predominantly one-directional in the way Nel Noddings (1984) has seemed to have described it: that the care-receiver always and only participates in caring by receiving.[10] Noddings' own understanding of the reciprocity involved in taking good care requires that the cared-for be responsive to the care (1984, 150). I agree, but her understanding of what counts as a reciprocal response is limited to a human-centered view of response such that she excludes most nonhumans from care relations. Clearly this is another element of Noddings' influential theorization of care that I cannot accept.[11]

Here I should reiterate the point that while these modes of moral response, respect and care, need to be understood as having a level of conceptual independence, they ought not be understood as radically separable. They are connected by the essential and noninstrumental regard for others for their own sakes, and they are integrated in the virtuous agent. The philosophical debate regarding the relationship between justice and care highlighted the fact that respect for autonomy cannot come at the expense of the recognition of social and material bonds, and ethical care responses cannot minimize the independent value and ends of caretakers.[12] For me it is crucial to emphasize the dangers of caring without a healthy dose of respect. Caring that is motivated *only* by the recognition of sameness or kinship lends itself to the assimilation of the perceived needs

[10] For critiques of Noddings on this point see Davion (1993) and Hoagland (1990).
[11] For a brief discussion of this exclusion see Curtin (1991, 67-68).
[12] The justice/care debate includes an extensive body of literature and I cannot cite all of it here. So, briefly, for divergent examples of articulations of ethical care see: Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1989; Tronto 1993. For an overview of the debate around gender and moral development see Larrabee's (1993) anthology. For critical engagements with the relationship between justice and care, with particular attention to the gendered nature of the concepts see, for example: Baier 1987; Benhabib 1987; Held 1990 &1995.

of the cared-for to those of the caretaker. Assimilation assumes that the needs of others are the same as or converge with one's own, but such an assumption prevents a genuine attentiveness to the needs of distinct others. Thus in order to maintain an appropriate and open ethical stance, one must care for the other *as an other*, through a respectful recognition of difference. At the same time, caretakers cannot be reduced to this role to the point where their own flourishing is sacrificed. Respect must also be involved in the politicization of care such that questions regarding the distribution of care work and receipt can be addressed (Curtin 1991; MacGregor 2007).

Solidarity

As I described it in the previous section, care is crucial to moral motivation and the generation of practices that promote flourishing. If care begins with attentiveness to the particular needs of particular others, how does one care for (geographically or epistemically) distant others? How is care integrated into wider concerns of social justice? A context-sensitive ethical theory like Plumwood's attends to "universal" or broad ethical concerns, not by devaluing the personal in the context of the political, but by highlighting *solidarity* as a political mode of moral response. Plumwood defines solidarity as "standing with the other in a supportive relationship in the political sense" (Plumwood 2002, 202), and identifies solidarity as the fundamental concept required for ethical activism. However, she does not provide a sharply focused theoretical account of the concept. We can better understand solidarity as a mode of moral response and its role in a counterhegemonic ethical framework by attending to 1) what makes solidarity *political*, and 2) what constitutes a "supportive relationship" (such that political solidarity facilitates or entails ethical activism).

A more thorough theoretical account of solidarity is crucial insofar as an unmodified "solidarity" can be and has been used to indicate multiple kinds of collective responsibilities (Scholz 2008). For example, "solidarity" might represent unity based on shared experience, or it might represent unity for a specific oppositional purpose. This difference is incredibly important, for, as bell hooks argues (1984), the idea of solidarity (or "sisterhood") as a response to shared experiences of oppression belies the complexity of women's social realities. She writes, "women are divided by sexist attitudes, racism, class privilege, and a host of other prejudices" (hooks 1984, 44). Because of these complexities, the feminist movement is limited when its solidary activism is limited to unity based on shared experience. Instead, "women must learn to accept responsibility for fighting oppressions that may not directly affect us as individuals" (hooks 1984, 62). Solidary sisterhood, then, is ultimately based on a shared commitment to dismantling patriarchy, rather than on the idea that all women share common experiences of oppression.

Sally J. Scholz's own theory of political solidarity helps to flesh out our understanding of the kind of role solidarity might play in an ecological feminist ethical framework (Mallory 2009). Solidarity must be distinguished from other forms of motivating collective relations, like association, community, or camaraderie, for example. Scholz argues that all species of solidarity are forms of unity that mediate between the community and the individual, and that entail positive moral obligations (2008, 18-19, 41-42). Drawing on and augmenting Bayertz's (1999) taxonomy of solidarity, Scholz argues that there are critical distinctions to be made between the social solidarity, civic solidarity, and political solidarity with regard to the kinds of relationships that they imply

and the kind of moral obligations that they entail. Scholz describes *social solidarity* as a measure of the interdependence between socially connected individuals. The cohesion of the group dictates the type of moral obligations entailed, and because those obligations accrue with group membership, they may be externally imposed (Scholz 2008, 20-21). *Civic solidarity* likewise begins with group membership, in this case, membership in the citizenry of a political state. It is primarily concerned with the obligations that the state has to each citizen by virtue of this membership, and "targets those vulnerabilities that would inhibit or prevent a person from participation in the civic public" (Scholz 2008, 27).

In social and civic solidarity, the bonds of relationship determine the moral obligations. By contrast, *political solidarity*, arises *in response* to a situation of injustice, oppression, or social vulnerability. Political solidarity begins with individual commitments to a cause, out of which a collective forms. As hooks argues with regard to feminist solidarity, "to experience solidarity, we must have a community of interests, shared beliefs and goals around which to unite, to build Sisterhood" (1984, 64). In political solidarity, the initial commitment to liberation, broadly, and/or to the end of a specific injustice, entails the formation of solidary bonds. So, "what distinguishes these [three types of solidarity] is not so much the particular type of unity but rather the logic of the moral obligations and the solidary bonds" (Scholz 2008, 20). The moral relations created by the bonds of political solidarity bring their own corresponding positive moral obligations. Scholz argues that the bond among members of the solidary group implies cooperation and mutuality (2008, 83-94). The relation between the individuals/the collective and the cause implies social and self criticism (Scholz 2008, 94-100). And the

moral relation between the solidary group and broader society implies multiple, varied means of oppositional activism.

Though her theoretical account of solidarity may be limited, it is clear that Plumwood intends the concept to do ethical-political work of the kind that characterizes Scholz's "political solidarity." On Plumwood's view, the colonizing logic of centrist conceptual frameworks is an injustice in itself as well as allowing unjust treatment of particular "others" (Plumwood 2002, 114). Solidarity involves being allied with others in response to this and other more particular injustices. At the same time one must recognize the complexity of human relational selfhood, and the fact that the human self is sometimes positioned as both oppressor and oppressed, a being with multiple commitments and caring relations that may come into conflict. This indicates the need for a justice-oriented virtue by which one negotiates those conflicts in dialogue and community with others. For Plumwood, as for Scholz, solidarity is political because in resisting injustice it aims to achieve mutuality without hegemonic assimilation.

Recall, Plumwood defines solidarity as "standing with the other in a supportive relationship in the political sense" (Plumwood 2002, 202). As for what constitutes a "supportive relationship," I find it helpful conceptualize solidarity as the integration of respect and care for political purposes. Here the particular attachments of care inform and motivate one to care about the parallel or entangled struggles of others. Solidary care helps to close the epistemological and/or consequential distance between self and other, yet the differences between self and other, the particularities of how injustice and oppression are manifest in different contexts and between difference subjects, remain salient. Plumwood is clear that we cannot attain solidarity through a caring attachment

that has mutated into an assimilating identification with the other. Assimilating identification assumes that one's needs, interests, projects, and challenges are identical with or necessarily converge with those of others. The requirement or assumption of unity leaves little space for communication, negotiation, and mutual adjustment. Without that space, it is impossible to maintain an ethical orientation toward others, if we take the basis for ethical engagement to be the responsive recognition of others' agency and value.[13] Care motivates sensitivity to the needs of others; respect requires that we stand not *as* the other, but *with* the other "in their difference" (Plumwood 2002, 200). Solidarity recognizes the material and historical connections between particular relationships and local situations and those of distant others, while maintaining the appropriate constraints set by respect. It politically unites those committed to redressing injustice through reflective, dialogical, cooperative activity.

Chaone Mallory (2009) puts the work of Plumwood and Scholz into conversation, directly addressing the question of how to understand interspecies solidarity. Scholz's is a human-centered political theory while Plumwood insists on understanding interspecies relations as mutual and political. Mallory reports that on Scholz's view, humans cannot be in political solidarity with nonhuamns primarily because nonhumans lack the deliberative capacities to engage in political choice and action (Mallory 2009, 5-6). For

[13] This point comes out most clearly in Plumwood's critique of Deep Ecology's philosophy of unity. Deep Ecology relies on human beings' ability to overcome anthropocentrism by understanding the human self as inseparable from, unified with, the whole of nature. Rather than providing a basis for respect in recognition of others' fullness of being, such an approach attempts to derive ethical motivation from the egoism of an expanded self. Such egoism would be consistent with a centrist approach to ethics rather than providing a subversive alternative. The relational self avoids the problem of appropriation inherent in the concept of an expanded self that assimilates through identification. For Plumwood's criticism of Deep Ecology's accounts of the self, see: 1991, 11-16; 1993, 173-182; 2002, 196-203.

Scholz the solidarity group is distinct from the oppressed group, because the solidarity group is united by a shared explicit commitment to resisting an injustice (Scholz 2008, 202; Mallory 2009, 11). Members of the solidary group may not share the experience of the injustice, and those who do experience injustice may not share the explicit commitment to ending it. Scholz does think that humans can, and should, be in (human) solidarity *on behalf* of nonhuman well-being, but to describe this as being in political solidarity *with* nonhumans is mistaken. When Plumwood describes standing with the other she emphasizes the human ability to imaginatively draw parallels between systems of women's oppression, animal oppression, and colonial oppression, through an intellectual and emotional grasp of the logic of centrism (Plumwood 2002, 205). But contrary to Scholz's view, Plumwood's account of political solidarity allows for the possibility of nonhuman membership in the solidary group. We need not confine our understanding of "resistance" to that of conscious political choice; to do so would risk undervaluing the agency of (nonhuman and human) oppressed groups. Actions can be directed toward righting a wrong even if one has not made an explicit and conscious political choice. Acting in solidarity should involve an acknowledgment of and a willingness to assist in the other's own resistances. There is no reason to bar the kind of dialogical engagement this requires from occurring across species if we orient the discussion of the possibilities for ethical-political interlocution around intentionality rather than conscious choice. Thus, as Mallory puts it, "humans can stand in solidarity with the natural other if by 'stand with' one means to act politically and oppositionally to change conditions of oppression in a way that does not conflate the identities of the actors and the oppressed" (Mallory 2009, 15). For both Scholz and Plumwood, solidarity does

the important political work of integrating an attention to the legitimate needs of others, a willingness to take action to address those needs, and a respect for the other as a distinct center of striving, agency, and potentially resistance.

Context and Containment

Consistent with Plumwood's insistence that "none of this is universal, in the sense that it offers a complete ethic generalizable to every context" (2002, 188), the commitments to respect, care for, and stand in solidarity with others might be understood as what Karen Warren calls "situated universals." Such commitments " are 'situated' in that they grow out of and reflect historically particular, real-life experiences and practices…[and] 'universal' in that they express generalizations common to and reflective of lives of diverse peoples situated in different historical circumstances" (Warren 2000, 114). We manifest our ethical commitments, attempting to cultivate virtuous attitudes and practices, in response to the context in which we are living. For Warren (2000, 108-110), the physical and psychological "ability to care" is both causally necessary and desirable for moral reasoning and motivation. For Plumwood the ability to care would be a prerequisite to recognizing others as intentional and potentially communicative beings; this recognition, rather than the mere psychological and physical ability, is morally basic.[14] The modes of moral response under consideration here are

[14] In the language of Warren's own well known metaphorical "ethics in a fruit bowl," the fruit bowl represents the basic condition that any truly ethical commitment must meet. As I indicated above, for Warren, this is merely the "ability to care" whereas for Plumwood the intentional recognition stance performs this kind of role. So Plumwood is giving us a more robust understanding of what defines the ethical fruit bowl, and also puts more qualification on what really counts as fruit. The kinds of ethical commitments, or virtues, that are appropriate content for the bowl, are those attitudes, behaviors and practices that are genuinely informed by dialogical engagement with others. The difficulty with Warren's fruit bowl metaphor is that we really don't choose completely isolated fruits for

grounded in the intentional recognition stance and so meet the condition for being appropriate ethical commitments. Some modes of moral response are especially well suited to certain moral contexts. Sometimes modes of moral response are especially subversive due to their historical exclusion from certain contexts. For example, invoking the partiality of particular attachments of care, and fore-grounding care-taking projects in the context of political action, subverts the traditional exclusion of this mode from the public/political arena (Tronto 1993). At the same time, to care for another well requires appreciation for the other *as an other*; respect is integrated into good caretaking.

One problem with the idea of choosing ethical responses according to our understanding of contextual needs is the possibility of certain moral attitudes and practices being contained to particular spheres of experience. Containment is the logical consequence of drawing rigid boundaries around the moral sphere itself and/or the categories of difference within the moral sphere. So, on the value dualistic framework, if moral value is limited to the fully rational, then respect can be contained within the sphere of interaction between fully rational agents (or better, between those who are regarded as fully rational from a centrist standpoint). Moreover, respect and care are traditionally understood as operating very differently and in distinct contexts, and producing very different kinds of activities. Joan Tronto (1993) has described the problem of the containment of care to the private sphere at the expense of integrating care into political life. Containment is a significant problem, and one might object that my articulation of how respect, care, and solidarity emerge from ecological selfhood leaves

---

isolated consumption. The metaphor is unable to portray the moral responses as simultaneously independent and integrated. So Plumwood's framework and my own understanding of the modes of moral response cannot fit nicely into Warren's metaphorical picture.

open the possibility that these concepts are only appropriate to certain spheres of ethical relationship. For example, I addressed the question of whether and how solidarity is contained to the sphere of human-human relations in the previous section. One might argue that interspecies conflicts are not appropriately understood as questions of justice; while humans may subordinate nonhumans, they are not oppressing them since nonhumans are not political creatures. However, on my view, once we adopt an intentional recognition stance that requires an openness to communication with nonhuman others, we must describe our relationship to those others in ethical and political terms. Then it is a small step to acknowledging that the exclusion of nonhumans from the sphere of justice is an injustice itself. Generally speaking, in response to the problem of containment, I reiterate the idea that respect, care and solidarity must be understood not as radically different but as integrated and constantly negotiated in ethical activity. The modes of moral response are connected by the essential and noninstrumental regard for others for their own sake. So while respect emphasizes constraint and care emphasizes attachment, they do not do so to the exclusion of the other so long as we bear in mind the underlying commitment to the simultaneous recognition of difference and continuity.

In sum, I have provided a reading of Val Plumwood's ecological feminist ethical framework that highlights its counterhegemonic force as an alternative to dualistic conceptual frameworks. This force is dependent on a robust understanding of how respect, care, and solidarity function as modes of moral response. I have argued that despite their seeming interchangeability in Plumwood's work, these moral responses are distinct though interdependent. Attending to the interaction and integration between the

modes of moral response allows us to avoid problems of apathy, assimilation, and containment. My analysis of respect, care, and solidarity will leave us better equipped to evaluate and enact responsible food relationships. With a more robust understanding of these moral responses and how they function, we should be able to purposefully locate them in conceptualizations of good food and in the practices aimed at producing it. I demonstrate how by engaging two alternative conceptions of good food: American agrarianism in chapter three and the global movement for food sovereignty in chapter four. But first, in chapter two, I turn to the question of whether a respectful, responsible relationship with nonhumans is compatible with agriculture at all.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROBLEMS OF EQUALITY AND INCORPORATION

In this chapter I will address two important objections that concern the very possibility of manifesting the modes of moral response that I defend in chapter one in agricultural contexts: the problem of equality and the problem of incorporation. For reasons that I will describe below, Plumwood (2000, 2002) insists that adopting the intentional recognition stance – the dialogical orientation toward others in the world that underlies one's moral response to those others – leads the ecological self to an egalitarian interspecies ethic. The *problem of equality* expresses the objection that an egalitarian relationship with nonhumans is simply incompatible with the agricultural project. After all, one might say, agriculture is about cultivating and directing nonhuman life under human terms of use and ownership. It might seem that regarding nonhuman life with equal respect and care in such contexts would be nearly impossible. In response I will argue that, although for most of us the idea of equality connotes something like equal rank, a counterhegemonic reinterpretation opens up new possibilities for the concept. As Plumwood (1998, 2002) suggests, we might think of two entities as equal not because they occupy the same position along a scalar measure of value, but because they are incommensurable and ought not be ranked against each other along such a scale. I will argue for the plausibility of a high degree of avoidance of ranking in agricultural practices that are authentically dialogical.

Even assuming this possibility, there is still the apparent problem that the very existence of the nonhuman beings in question is defined by reference to the human ends they will serve, and the meaning of such beings is *incorporated* into human meaning. Plumwood uses the term "incorporation" to describe a hegemonic form of relational definition wherein the subordinated group is defined only by reference to the dominant group's traits and projects, and most often merely seen as lacking what the master has (1993, 52). One might again object that the *problem of incorporation* makes agriculture fundamentally incompatible with the proposed theory of interspecies ethics. In response, I suggest that defining ourselves in terms of our relationship to the nonhumans that we raise and consume goes a long way toward addressing the problem. The responses that I provide to these important objections are intended to alleviate their severity, if not fully refute them. What remains of the objections will be the product of some remaining fundamental disagreement regarding the role of human beings in the ecosphere, and role of agriculture in human and nonhuman life.

The Problem of Equality

In chapter one I argued that respect, care, and solidarity represent integrated but distinct modes of moral response in a counterhegemonic ethical framework. As commitments of ecological selfhood, these responses must be understood as applicable across not just social boundaries but species boundaries as well. This is not a difficult proposition to embrace when these virtues are understood as the byproducts of the posture of recognition that the moral agent adopts in inhabiting the world. Limiting or enclosing the predisposition to be open to communication from others on the basis of species could only be arbitrary. To draw such a boundary is fundamentally inconsistent

with the recognition of ecological selfhood, the recognition that one is in co-constituting relationship with earth others. Here we can see why Plumwood (2000, 2002) argues that ecological feminism prompts a more robust interspecies egalitarianism than utility- or rights-based accounts of interspecies justice. Dismantling the dualistic framework allows for the rebuilding of conceptual structures that no longer rigidly divide the world into human and other, rational and non-rational, allowing for a robust communicative interspecies politics and ethics. Plumwood (2002, 171) provides the example of thinking through the respectful way to handle a potentially dangerous other that has settled on one's front porch; in one case the other is a human vagrant, and in the second the other is a venomous snake. She suggests that in either case an excessively punitive reaction would be unjust. The species of the other can be framed as one of the least relevant factors in making a decision about how to handle the situation. More relevant on Plumwood's view are questions about the context. Is the other on the porch because of an emergency or temporary situation like a flood? Did you have any part in the other's homelessness? Might you be able to find alternative accommodation? And so on. Thus, she writes:

> Often we don't need to resort to major human/nature contrasts or hierarchies to illuminate such cases, and the same sorts of general ethical approaches can be applied in each case. If concepts of justice have an application in a comparable human case… there is no good reason to refuse them application in the interspecies case (Plumwood 2002, 171).

Of central importance for my project is the implication that a new egalitarian ethical framework will prompt us to rethink the way nonhumans are cultivated for

consumption with an eye toward interspecies justice. Plumwood herself engages this question in the paper "Integrating Ethical Frameworks for Animals, Humans, and Nature" (2000). In it she criticizes a position held by some ecofeminists, notably Carol Adams (1994), that she calls "ontological vegetarianism." It asserts that nothing morally considerable should ever be ontologized as edible or as available for use, and so feminists committed to the moral recognition of nonhuman animals ought to be vegan (Adams 1993; Plumwood 2000, 287). Plumwood articulates and rejects the position's grounding claim, the "exclusion assumption": "that because food is inevitably a site of domination, degradation, and exclusion, ethical food practice consists in ensuring that nothing that is morally considerable can ever become our food or be ontologized as edible" (2000, 295). In other words, the claim asserts that if a being is regarded as food, that being is ontologized as edible and nothing more; appropriate for consumption and use but as a result excluded from moral consideration.

Animal welfare oriented approaches, feminist or not, that seek to extend the sanctity of human life to nonhuman animal life by employing this assumption, are well meaning but misguided. Plumwood argues that the exclusion claim *assumes* that if a being is ontologized as edible it cannot, at the same time, be respectfully ontologized as more-than-food. Thus the exclusion assumption begs the question regarding whether or not we can produce and consume anything and remain ethical by assuming at the outset that food is a site of domination rather than reciprocity. It does so by relying on a reductive understanding of eater as subject and food as object that maintains dualistic conceptual frameworks. For the ontological vegetarian will have to ontologize some

beings as edible in order to survive, it will just be the beings that are less like us: plants and fungi. So for Plumwood,

> To the extent that ontological vegetarianism involves a deep rejection of embodiment and of animal life itself, to the extent that it involves a moral dualism which endorses reductionist assumptions about food, denies evolutionary and ethical continuity, and establishes a lower order below moral consideration we need in order to eat, it is deeply incompatible with any ecological or species-egalitarian outlook (2000, 292).

The maintenance of the dualistic understanding of the relationship between consumer and consumed implies a rejection of human embodiment. Ultimately, the exclusion assumption denies human beings' own position in the food chain as both eaters and edible. Some of Plumwood's most powerful writing (1995), in her description of her own experience as crocodile prey, serves as a reminder that we fail to ontologize ourselves as edible at our own risk. It has the effect of reorienting our perspective, from that of the master to that of the "meat," and this reorientation reveals the fact that complex, morally valuable beings (humans included) are edible food for others. In articulating the narrative meaning of her experience as prey, Plumwood writes:

> I glimpsed a shockingly indifferent world in which I had no more significance than any other edible being. The thought, 'This can't be happening to me, I'm a human being. I am more than just food!' was one component of my terminal incredulity. It was a shocking reduction, from a complex human being to a mere piece of meat. Reflection has persuaded me that not just humans but any creature can make the same claim to be more than just food. We are edible, but we are also

> much more than edible. Respectful, ecological eating must recognize both of these things (Plumwood 1995).

It is worth reminding ourselves of less extreme examples of human edibility as well: the mosquitos, fleas, ticks, and leaches of the world, not to mention the variety of parasitic worms that make human beings their home.[1] It may be the case that under industrialization, animals raised for food are in fact excluded from moral consideration apart from their use value. But Plumwood argues that this is the result of the instrumentalist character of factory farming; the problem is not making use of the other, but the treatment of the other as nothing more than a use object (2000, 297). The exclusion from moral consideration accompanies instrumentalism, but does not necessarily follow from the fact that some animals, including humans, are food for others.

As an alternative to understanding food relationships as a dichotomy between unedible/edible, Plumwood suggests a "reciprocity model" as the appropriate model for ethical consumption relationships. She turns to indigenous sources of knowledge on relational hunting and gathering as a resource for thinking about reciprocal food relationships. Non-dominant cultural traditions serve as alternative models for food relationship, "which see the food chain in terms of reciprocity rather than domination or alienation…in which all ultimately participate as food for others, and the 'moreness' of all beings is recognized" (Plumwood 2000, 299). On such models all beings are indebted to others for their survival and no beings are reduced to their usefulness as food for other beings. Such frameworks and practices are respectful of animals' individuality and

[1] I thank Lisa Heldke for reminding me of these smaller examples. As she puts it, we are always chomping and being chomped on. Remembering parasites is a way to rethink the false dichotomy between the chompers and the chomped.

species life, as well as compatible with an egalitarian ethic of honesty, gratitude and reciprocal ecological benefit (Plumwood 2000, 300).

As I mentioned, Plumwood reminds us that animal welfare oriented arguments for veganism that rest on the exclusion assumption will always require that a line be drawn between what is morally considerable and what is not. For at the end of the day, we all have to eat something! Either we maintain the exclusion assumption, draw a line of inedibility between animals and plants, and ignore "the continuity of planetary life" (Plumwood 2000, 301), *or* we take account of those morally considerable beings who are our food and attempt to build ethical structures around our consumption. The "sacred eating" framework of relational hunting and gathering may provide a model for how to "take account." We can identify the ethical commitments of reciprocity that underlie such practices: that a good human life acknowledges *kinship* with nonhuman life while at the same time *respecting* the other as independent, different, and always "more than food."

Plumwood is not alone in appealing to the practice of hunting in order to illustrate an alternative human-animal relationship.[2] As Kheel (1995) points out, there are distinct categories of hunting practice that rely on distinct forms of ethical justification. She presents a typology of hunting discourse that includes, but is not limited to, the "happy hunter," the "holist hunter," and the "holy hunter."[3] The happy hunter freely admits to

[2] See Leopold (1966), Snyder (1969), and Rolston (1988) to take just a few prominent, and disparate, examples.

[3] These ethical environmental perspectives on hunting can be distinguished from three additional types of hunter that Kheel only mentions briefly: the "hired hunter," who hunts for commercial profit, the "hungry hunter," who hunts merely for food, and the "hostile hunter," who hunts to eradicate "villainous" species (1995, 87). She argues that any implicit moral code underlying these three perspectives was not developed into "an explicit environmental discourse…Nor was it wed to an ideology of ethical restraint" (Kheel 1995, 87).

taking pleasure in hunting and regards it as a form of recreation (Kheel 1995, 92-93). The happy hunt is justified by the ethic of the "good sportsman" who plays by rules that give the animals a "fair chance" and exercises emotional self-restraint (Kheel 1995, 94). The holist hunter downplays the thrill of the hunt in favor of emphasizing other benefits like the knowledge gained by immersion in the natural world, and the ecological service of culling excess animals (Kheel 1995, 95). The holist justifies hunting, in part, by conceptualizing the hunter as an instrument of nature, aiding in maintaining a natural ecological balance (Kheel 1995, 98). The holy hunt, or what Carol Adams (1994, 103) calls the "relational hunt," remains undefined in most invocations, but is presumed to involve respect, a sense of sacred identification, and to be primarily based on spiritual and physical need (Kheel 1995, 99-102). This approach to hunting is characterized by relationship and reflects reciprocity between humans and hunted nonhuman animals (Adams 1994, 103). Support for the possibility of such a hunting practice and for a reciprocal moral orientation is frequently garnered from illustrations of Native American or other indigenous hunting cultures.

There are two problems here. First, I share the concern that such illustrations tend toward the appropriation and homogenization of non-dominant cultures (Adams 1994, 105; Kheel 1995, 101). Adams worries that environmentalists further only their own self-interest when appealing to indigenous hunting cultures, for the focus tends to be on hunting to the exclusion of other aspects of indigenous food culture. Variation in population density, settlement, and reliance on agricultural production between indigenous cultures tend to be overlooked, and the narratives of Native relational hunting appropriated to suit the argument's needs. I think this worry can be alleviated by more

careful description of the contexts in which relational hunting was/is practiced and the additional contexts in which it may be appropriate (Warren 2000, pg 134-137; Plumwood 2000). It is also necessary to open a space in the conversation for advocacy of indigenous rights (Adams 1994, 105). But, second, one can still ask, as feminist vegetarian Adams does (1994, 104), "what does the animal who dies receive in this exchange?" Does the hunter's victim care what the attitude of the hunter is at the moment of slaughter? For Kheel the "holy hunt" concept is nothing but a romanticized "legitimization of violence and biocide" (1995, 88).

In response to such objections Plumwood's view (2000, 319) prompts us to think about reciprocity in the context of existing within the exchange cycle of the food chain. What the animal received is life and the condition of life is embodiment and all of its strengths and vulnerabilities. The objection presumes that we are justified in radically reducing the context of the action in order to judge it. Adams' questions ask us to focus telescopically on the moment of the animal's death at the expense of a wider picture of the conditions of animal life. Maybe it is true that "it doesn't matter to the animals" whether they are killed by a relational hunter, or sport hunter. But it likely does matter for the conditions of life that the animal leads up until that moment, and that its progeny will lead in the future. The sport hunter has little reason to attend to the broader ecological context of his hunting or the conditions of life of the animals so long as there remain populations to hunt. But it is not just in death and consumption that the relational orientation is manifest. The orientation itself prompts a consideration of the wider conditions of ecological stability and resilience, of the kind that is the focus of holist hunters, while maintaining an ability to oscillate readily between care for ecological

system health and respect for individual animal beings. I agree that the relational hunt can be invoked inappropriately. But the practice captures a relationship, not just between hunter and hunted, but between the hunter and the broader ecological reality of mutual exchange.[4] Thus I dismiss Adam's point, but don't want to go so far as to assume that how and why you die are unimportant to one's conscious experience of death. Plumwood reminds us that at least in the human case this is plainly wrong: "As political activists have long recognized, it can make a big difference whether you die in struggle or in submission, for yourself or in solidarity with others, in changing the world or uselessly" (Plumwood 2000, 319).

Insofar as we are able to discern the virtues of care and respect in particular attitudes and practices, like the "relational hunt," we can at least see the possibility of ethical *eating*. But, even while highly critical of current factory farming methods, Plumwood does not fully address the question of the possibility of ethical *agriculture*. On the basis of what she does provide, it is tempting to construct an analogy. Relational hunting : sport hunting :: relational agriculture : industrial agriculture. But we ought not accept this analogy too hastily. For here we encounter the *problem of equality*, that is, the seeming incompatibility between interspecies egalitarianism and the agricultural project. While the objector might concede that the exclusion assumption is wrong insofar as it assumes that *food* is always a site of domination, it still seems the case that *agriculture* is an obvious site of domination. The objector may appeal to definitional support for the

[4] Truly embracing a reciprocal framework would require major adjustments in our practices connected to human death. The law and our own squeamishness prevent dead human bodies being accessible to other animals as food. In many ways the question of our response to our own death is a necessary corollary to the question of how we can responsibly feed ourselves.

claim, as in Paul Thompson's: "Agriculture is a human activity aimed at producing usable food and fiber goods from land-based renewable natural resources" (1995, 47). But the partnership model of agriculture, that I will provide examples of below, calls the limiting of agriculture to a "human activity" into question. And some will be tempted to cite examples of nonhuman cultivators, like colonies of ants that manage large herds of aphids or cultivate fungi (Cossins 2015). Alternatively, the objector might appeal to anthropological support, for example by citing Tim Ingold's influential work "From Trust to Domination" (2000) in which he describes the move from hunting/gathering to domestication/pastoralism as a change in the "terms of engagement," from the recognition of the autonomy of nature to the exercise of mastery and control.[5] In the end, the objector might say, agriculture is about cultivating and directing nonhuman life under human terms of use and ownership. It depends on the rational control of human beings and, in so doing, asserts human superiority. This assumption is either unjustified, in which case agriculture will always be a site of domination, or it is justified, making the appeal to reciprocity unnecessary. To the skeptic this would suggest that attempting to use egalitarian reciprocity to guide the structure of our agricultural food systems is futile.

My response to the *problem of equality* is to suggest that the seeming incompatibility between interspecies equality and agriculture is due to a misreading of what equality means, or rather what it ought to mean if we are seriously engaged with the project of deconstructing value dualism in relationships with various Earth beings and systems. Plumwood (2002, 173) concedes that "true" interspecies egalitarianism, under

[5] Ingold reminds us that his work is descriptive rather than normative, but there is a strong temptation to use the work to support a normative claim given the loaded terms he employs.

which all natural entities, including humans, carry the same moral weight, is both implausible and unworkable. I agree with her on that point for the reason that, even in the human case, having to give exactly the same weight to each person's needs and interests requires us to ignore particularistic claims and responsibilities. This runs contrary to the fundamental notion that appropriate ethical responses must be context-sensitive. But for my purposes here, the more important problem with an equality based on sameness is that many interests and qualities are incommensurable, so to attempt to rank them along a scalar axis in order to determine their value is irresponsible.

Because resisting the structure of value dualism requires recognition of both continuity and difference, we cannot premise egalitarianism on a simple understanding of sameness. So we are not looking for the kind of framework that many environmental ethicists seem to seek, where we identify some criterion of value (maybe rationality, or sentience) and then rank beings on a scale according to their possession of the criterion trait, the result being the equality of the humans and nonhumans that occupy the same position along that scale. For example Peter Singer's (1974; 2002) utilitarian ethical framework prompts the ranking of all individual beings on a scale according to their capacity to experience pleasure and pain. For Singer, moral consideration is the consideration of "interests," and sentience is the prerequisite for having interests at all. So sentience, not species, is the relevant criterion of moral value. The interests of those nonhumans who experience pleasure and pain comparable to that of humans ought to rank equally in humans' moral considerations. Singer characterizes the denial of equality of interests on the basis of species as a kind of bias akin to sexism and racism.

But this utilitarian version of equality is not counterhegemonic; it is a reproduction of center/periphery thinking. Singer's approach is another clear example of what Warren and Plumwood call "moral extensionism." I discussed the formula and shortcomings of moral extensionism in chapter one. Rather than undermining the conceptual framework of exclusion, the utilitarian account extends moral consideration to include those species whose conscious experience is most like our own, while simultaneously excluding the majority of nonhuman life. With the performance of this "double gesture" (Plumwood 2002, 151) of inclusion and exclusion, the structure of value dualism is maintained. A counterhegemonic response to species bias requires the recognition of both continuity and difference across species life, but scalar equality requires only the recognition of sameness. Truly recognizing difference requires recognizing that the attempt to rank incommensurable qualities is inappropriate.

The virtue of non-ranking is an important part of the content of equality and respect in the human case. Familiar democratic struggles remind us that ranking is morally problematic when it is unnecessary, invariant, and context-insensitive; "the more generalised a ranking is, and the more direct the connection made with moral significance, the more reason we have to suspect it of carrying unacceptable hegemonic agendas" (Plumwood 2002, 173). And at the personal level, we don't regard two humans as morally equal because they are factually equal with regard to some criterion; we regard them as morally equal because we refuse to rank them in such a manner. Despite its clarity in the human case, this conception of equality runs contrary to the way we tend to think about interspecies equality. The most prominent attempts to include nonhuman interests in our moral deliberations, such as the utilitarian efforts of Peter Singer (1974;

2002), and the rights-based theory of Tom Regan (1986) that I outlined in chapter one, do rely on a conception of scalar equality. But counterintuitiveness or unfamiliarity from the point of view of tradition cannot be good reasons to reject the reconceptualization of equality. As Plumwood insists,

> Between categories of very different beings, many of whose capacities the ranker may not be in a position to know, insistence on ranking (on a scale of superior/inferior which includes the case of equality) is both poor methodology and symptomatic of an arrogant stance of closure which is impoverishing and limiting for both human self and non-human other (2002, 173).

Once we reject the stance of closure toward nonhumans by adopting the intentional recognition stance, the avoidance of ranking becomes as important a virtue for an ecological ethic as it is for human-human ethics.

Perhaps it is the case that the process of decision-making necessarily involves the ranking of possible benefits, harms, consequences, commitments, and so on. The attempt to make context-sensitive decisions may even require us to engage in ranking more frequently than we would if a scale of value was set and consistently recognized. It might even seem like context-sensitivity requires the ranking of contexts themselves, from morally optimal to morally stifling. If so, it would seem that non-ranking is an impossible virtue to uphold both practically and meta-ethically. Plumwood does use the term non-ranking to identify the commitment to recognize incommensurability across species, and hence moral equality. But on my view these concerns prompt a change in emphasis from Plumwood's virtue of non-ranking to the need to develop the ethical

sensitivity to apply ranking wisely/responsibly. This is compatible with continuing to avoid a fixed scalar ranking at the level of fundamental moral value.

As I described it in chapter one, the ecological feminist ethical framework that I am working with should be regarded as virtue-based insofar as ethical commitments are understood as inherent to a particular kind of motivating identity, in this case one's identity as an ecological self. Yet these commitments remain determinable until applied in particular contexts. Thus knowing when and how to manifest these commitments appropriately requires wisdom, or a "well-developed ethical sensitivity" (Plumwood 2002, 188). The virtue of non-ranking is a generic virtue that may not be appropriate in all contexts. For example, in a triage situation, the needs of individuals must be ranked in order to provide good care, and this may result in great harm befalling some individuals. When faced with the fact that I will destroy something in order to feed myself, I must at the very least rank my options for meeting my needs. But even in contexts of conflict or scarcity where ranking seems inevitable and/or necessary, one can proceed in context-sensitive ways that avoid generalizations of rank (Plumwood 2002, 174).

Plumwood insists that "there are many interspecies contexts for which ranking can be avoided, can be structured out, is irrelevant, does not arise, and in which its introduction across species would be gratuitous, ugly, limiting and impoverishing, blinding us to certain possibilities of interaction and exchange with others" (2002, 174). Unfortunately the passage quoted here does not go on to describe specific examples of such interspecies contexts or new possibilities for interaction. She urges her readers to identify and create such interspecies contexts (Plumwood 2002, 174). Taking inspiration from Plumwood's life's work, I would suggest that efforts toward nonhuman species and

habitat conservation, the rethinking of human death practices/rituals, and responses to climate change that prioritize nonhuman flourishing alongside human survival are potential examples of sites for exploration of new possibilities for non-hierarchical interaction and exchange across species. And what about agriculture?

Contrary to the problem of equality objection under consideration, I argue that agriculture is a context in which it is possible to reflect a responsible ranking, and perhaps, in some cases, non-ranking. Despite some of the conceptual shortcomings of the perspective that I will go on to describe in the following chapter, the agrarian wisdom of Wendell Berry and his contemporary disciples offers plenty of examples of agricultural practices that reflect this virtue. Agrarianism has been described as a comprehensive worldview that is grounded in a "synoptic vision of the health of land and culture" (Wirzba 2003, 5). It provides a normative vision of the good life as rooted in land and tradition, while simultaneously providing a discursive context for sharing the practical knowledge of healthy farming techniques. Such techniques include, for example, diversification of crops and rotations, small-scale production, radically reduced chemical use, waste-minimization, and, in general, farm practices that are carefully tailored to suit the particular characteristics of the land in a given place (Berry 1978; Jackson 1980, 1994; Kline 2001; Logsdon 2000). The "good farmer" as Berry calls him [sic] does not rank himself and his own short-term needs or desires as more valuable than the long-term health of the land, crops, and animals that he works with. And "with" is the proper word for the good farmer whose "kindly use depends upon intimate knowledge, the most sensitive responsiveness and responsibility" (Berry 1978, 31).

The Ohio farmer and writer Gene Logsdon has taken up the role of giving voice to the "good farmer" in the American agrarian tradition.[6] Logsdon doesn't actually label himself the "good" farmer, but rather the "contrary" farmer, a figure who offers place-specific advice on organic gardening, pasture farming, and other homesteading skills from a perspective that is largely critical of dominant consumer culture and industrial agriculture.[7] Logsdon's many essays (2000; 2001) reflect the difficulties, pleasures, limitations and possibilities of living and farming "at nature's pace." Logsdon's approach to pasture farming provides an example of interspecies "dialogue" producing a responsive practice (2001; 2004). In pasture farming, animals are let out on pasture to forage and graze rather than confined and fed a diet of harvested grains. The success of the pasture farming enterprise depends on careful attention— to the growth cycles, nutritional requirements, and response to grazing of the ground cover crops in a given place— and on adjusting one's practices in response to the information this careful attention provides.[8] This kind of pasture farming reflects the intentional recognition stance at work. The pasture's plant and insect species, the grazing animals, and even the watershed must all be recognized as capable of flourishing and as potentially

[6] See also the work of Wendell Berry, David Kline, Joel Salatin, Maurice Telleen and the many contributors to the periodicals *The Whole Earth Review* and *Organic Gardening.* For "early" and influential instruction in agrarian agricultural practices and principles, see the work of Masanobu Fukuoka and Sir Albert Howard.

[7] Logsdon contributes weekly musings on farming and pasture farming, gardening, homesteading, and rural life to a weekly blog, also entitled "The Contrary Farmer." Find it at: https://thecontraryfarmer.wordpress.com.

[8] For example, Logsdon writes, "I then learned that I could make a crop of hay from a stand of oats before it went to head and, when the oats regrew and headed out, pasture it as a grain supplement. And then, to my utter amazement, a third crop emerged from the oat grains that the sheep missed. This third crop provided green pasture even into early January" (2001, 167-168).

communicative in order for the farmer to develop authentically responsive, place-based pasturing practices.

Logsdon invokes the biblical phrase "all flesh is grass" as the title of one of his essays (2001) and subsequent books (2004). The phrase is typically uttered to emphasize the transitory nature of human life. In Logsdon's work it has the effect of highlighting both the continuity of human and planetary life, and the reliance of the ruminant herbivore on healthy pasture for their flourishing. Logsdon's understanding of "all flesh [as] grass" provides a particularly interesting example of non-ranking. Not only does Logsdon avoid ranking his own aims over or against the long-term health of his land or the health of the animals in his care, but he also avoids making a rigid animal-plant moral distinction of the sort that remains common in arguments for the moral equality of animals. As we have seen, Singer and Regan exclude much animal and all plant life from moral consideration by identifying sentience or subjective conscious experience, respectively, as necessary for that consideration. Logsdon's perspective on interspecies mutual dependence in the pasture farming ecosystem does not allow for the drawing of a dividing line of moral significance between humans and animals, or animals and plants.

Such agricultural practices are recognized as, largely, human-driven, and there is no shortage of argument for the "practical" economic benefits of pasture farming (Logsdon 2001, 155). When the economic benefits are outlined, the nonhumans raised for consumption are often included in strictly economic terms (Logsdon 2001, 162). By no means am I suggesting that Logsdon's perspective reflects a perfect avoidance of ranking, for in many of his essays, the human-focused reasons for upholding agrarian values dominate. Neither am I suggesting that one can always attain a perfect avoidance

of ranking, as my shift to the concept of responsible ranking above indicates. Yet, in his work Logsdon's language often does reflect a sense of partnership and an ever-present recognition of the human as one amongst many species that contribute fundamentally to the character of a given place. Take, for example, the following description:

> Walk with me over our little farm where biological diversity is our first order of business…On this farm lives a human family along with several families of corn, oats, wheat, orchard trees, grasses, legumes, berries, and garden vegetables, the whole domestic tribe living in a sort of hostile harmony with the wild food chain: animals, insects, and plants in such diversity that I have not been able to name them all. On our little farm, I have identified 130 species of birds, 40 species of wild animals (not counting coonhunters), over 50 species of wildflowers, at least 45 tree species, a myriad of gorgeous butterflies, moths, spiders, beetles, etc., and about 593,455,780 weeds (Logsdon 1995, 7).

And more directly:

> Pasture farming… requires a humble dependence on forces beyond tillage machines, and a recognition that humans are not really in control, no matter what. Pasture farming recognizes that our survival depends upon our ability to stand by patiently and *work in partnership with nature, not in domination over nature* (Logsdon 2004, 5-6, *emphasis mine*).

Here Logsdon's writing reflects his posture of openness toward his nonhuman partners and their independent projects. The humility inherent in this posture is a reflection of the refusal to rank the human farmer as always above and in control of the others.

Additionally, the work of the agroecologist and crop scientist Wes Jackson, and his pioneering colleagues at The Land Institute in Salina, Kansas, provides another illustration of the intentional recognition stance at work in an agricultural context. Agroecology is the application of knowledge of ecological processes to the design and management of agroecosystems (Altieri 1987). The aim is a whole-systems approach to agriculture and food systems development. That agroecology exists as a legitimate field of study and practice reflects the idea that many agriculturalists adopt a posture of openness to knowledge from agentic nonhuman sources. The Land Institute's central project is to develop agricultural systems that mimic the perennial polyculture of the native prairie as a viable alternative to the soil-depleting, annual monocultures of the dominant farming techniques in the United States (Jackson 1980).[9] The Land Institute's work takes "nature as a standard" and looks to prairie wisdom over "human cleverness" in developing cultivation techniques (Sanders 2001, 11). It regards appropriate agriculture as "community ecology in which human-directed arrangements are featured" but those arrangements mimic as much as possible a so-called "natural ecosystem" (Jackson 1994, 49). Nonhuman species (plants, insects, birds, microbes) and systems (the native prairie ecosystem) are understood as sources of knowledge, knowledge that is only available to us if we adopt the openness to interspecies communication of the intentional recognition stance. Like pasture farming, agroecology provides an interesting example of

[9] An annual is a plant that performs its entire lifecycle from seed to flower to seed within a single growing season. All of the roots, stems, and leaves of the plant die annually and the dormant seed bridges the gap between growing seasons. Perennial plants maintain a viable root system even if the plant dies back after the growing season. Monoculture farming produces a single crop in a given space while polyculture imitates other ecosystems by integrating multiple crops in a given space.

non-ranking insofar as the general importance of soil retention and fertility is emphasized as strongly as the productivity of any individual plant species.

So, despite the conceptual criticisms of American agrarianism that I will detail in chapter three, I do want to suggest that the *practices* of small-scale sustainable farming and pasturing provide opportunities to develop the kinds of activity that would be consistent with reciprocity and responsible ranking. Yet, some objectors will remind us that the animals raised for grazing provide not just wool or dairy products, but are killed for food. Is agriculture rightly regarded as a partnership when one partner gets eaten? Certainly. I have already gestured to my answer to this important question above and I will return to it below. Recognizing that one will have to eat other morally valuable beings, including (perhaps preferably) those that one is close to, is central to acknowledging one's embodiment and ecological embeddedness. In an agricultural context, the good farmer would develop the ethical sensitivity to apply ranking wisely in determining how to farm and what to eat. Presumably this ranking would not occur universally or forever after, and would not be a fixed scalar ranking of moral value across time and place.

The Problem of Incorporation

Assuming that it is possible to structure agricultural practices to reflect a high degree of interspecies equality, there is still the apparent problem that the very *purpose* of agriculture must be understood in terms of human ends. The *problem of incorporation* has an appropriate double meaning in the context of agricultural food relationship. First, the nonhuman other is being cultivated and raised with the explicit purpose of being (literally) incorporated into a human body. Second, on Plumwood's theory,

"incorporation" is a technical term used to describe a hegemonic form of relational definition wherein the subordinated group is defined only by reference to the dominant group's traits and projects (1993, 52). A structure or practice that relies on such a dualistic relational definition cannot possibly be counterhegemonic. Thus, one might object that because the ultimate end of agriculture is to kill and consume nonhuman beings (animal or plant), the existence of the nonhuman beings in question is defined by reference to the human ends they will serve, and their meaning is incorporated into human meaning. The *problem of incorporation* thus suggests that agriculture is fundamentally incompatible with respect.

Any problem that is tied to literal incorporation has already been addressed with the rejection of the exclusion assumption as discussed in the previous section. The physical incorporation of others' bodies through consumption is only necessarily unjust if we are forbidden to conceive of morally valuable entities as ultimately consumable. As I've already noted, this assumption must be rejected if the truth of our ecological selfhood is to be fully embraced. Thus the literal incorporation of morally significant others is only a problem when ecological selfhood is denied.

The seriousness of the second dimension of the problem can be mitigated when one realizes that recognition of ecological selfhood significantly reduces the dangers of incorporation. For the problem is not merely the fact that the other is defined in relation to the self, but that the other is defined *only* and *always* in relation to the self conceived as center. Ecological selfhood is a relational selfhood that attempts to correct this imbalance such that human self and earth others are recognized as co-constituting, and as irreducible to an assimilated definition. Likewise, the danger of incorporation is not in the

use of the other, but in defining the other only as something to be used, or always by their role in the master subject's projects. This important distinction should bring to mind the central Kantian prohibition against treating a person *merely* as a means to an end (1993, 36). The expediency of treating a person as a means to an end as a part of a business transaction, for example, is not the same as the complete rejection of autonomy that comes with treating a person merely, only, as a means, as in slavery. The difference can serve as a basis for making a relevant ethical distinction between instrumentalism and use, where the distinction ultimately lies in the presence or lack of respect for the other as an independent center of agency (Plumwood 1993, 142; Plumwood 2000, 297).[10] Incorporation precludes the possibility of responding to others with genuine respect or care. It results in a lack of space to encounter the other fully, richly, dialogically. It undermines one's ability to be attentive and responsive to the other's needs and ends. In so doing it prevents the possibility of respectful use and facilitates the treatment of others as mere means.

Countering the problem of incorporation can begin with openness to encountering the other in their fullness of being, and letting such encounters be transformative of human outlooks and behaviors. Plumwood mentions some practical ways to counter incorporation, for example, through biological education and local wildlife preservation (2002, 112-113). These practices successfully address and/or resist assimilated definition when they contest the traditional view of nonhuman difference as a lack, replacing it with an affirmation of the richness of nonhuman life and "a view of nonhumans as presences

[10] While for Kant this respect was inextricably linked to rationality, we do not need to adopt that position in order to find this distinction meaningful insofar as it aids us in distinguishing between respectful and disrespectful use.

to be encountered on their own terms as well as on ours" (Plumwood 2002, 112). Surely there are ways to minimize incorporation in agricultural contexts. The examples I refer to above, of practices that manifest responsible ranking, might also serve as a list of practices meant to address incorporated definition**.** For example, pasture farming counters incorporation by recognizing the health benefits of grazing and foraging, rather than consuming a diet of harvested grain, *for the animals themselves*. The work of The Land Institute counters incorporation by creating an understanding of nature's own complex ecological order, and attempting to develop cultivation practices that sustain it.

It is important to note, as Thompson (1995) does, that many farmers who adopt sustainable, appropriately responsive practices will be the first to describe themselves as "self-interested." They farm the way that they do primarily for their own or their successors' own long term benefit. "[Agricultural] stewardship requires the conservation of nature, and enjoins against the waste and abuse of land or water… [It] does not arise as a constraint on the farmer's ownership and dominion over the land, but as a character trait, a virtue, that all farmers would hope to realize in service to the self-interests created by ownership of the land" (Thompson 1995, 74). The question of ownership is critical to some animal rights advocates, in particular, who worry that ownership is a necessary site of domination; animal agriculture (at least) is premised on owning beings that ought not be owned. This objection most forcefully motivates Stanescu's (2013) critiques of "happy meat" marketed as the product of love and care. He writes, "what concerns me most is that these expressions of feelings of care for animals serves to mask the simple reality that for the entirety of their lives, these animals live only as buyable and sellable commodities, who exist wholly at the whim of their 'owners'" (2013, 108). Thus we

might worry that, in the end, even the practices that appear to mitigate incorporation ultimately fail to do so. But it seems that, for many farmers, it is possible to regard the animals in one's care not as flesh-producing machines but as partners in the project of sustaining a robust agroecosystem. (Recall Logsdon's explicit appeal to partnership above.) If so, then despite the fact that the farmer legally owns the land, animals, and crops, it is simply not the case that the animals exist "only" or "wholly" as commodities. Moreover, the self-interest of good farming is tempered by recognizing that the self in question is defined as *ecological* at the most fundamental level, thus requiring a different understanding of interests. Rather than leading to a maximizing principle, ecological self-interest of the sort at the heart of agrarian thinking leads to a keen understanding of ecological limits and a principle of cyclical reciprocity**.**

On my view, cultivation and consumption are the primary sites for recognizing, engaging, and acting on our ecological embeddedness on a daily basis.[11] Rather than proving devastating for the possibility of ethical agriculture, thinking through the problem of incorporation reveals that agriculture may in fact be the most significant area of human life in which incorporation can be obviously addressed. If we heed Wendell Berry's urging (2002) and recognize eating as an "agricultural act," then we have the opportunity to address incorporation on an immediate and daily level. This leads me to conclude that the best way to counter the problem of incorporation – the objection that the purpose of agriculture, and the nonhumans embedded in it, must be understood in terms of human ends – is to propose (optimistically) that it mischaracterizes the

[11] Obviously, fishing and hunting traditions are sites for encountering and organizing life around our ecological embeddedness as well. "The centrality of farming…is contingent on the actual history of European civilization, as well as on its [prominent] role in providing life and livelihood" (Thompson 2010, 116).

agricultural project. In one sense, of course, the end of agriculture is food provisioning which necessarily involves cultivating nonhuman beings and then consuming them. In a more expansive sense though, the end of agriculture might be understood as the sustained health of human and nonhuman communities in interrelationship. Or the creation of human cultures that are responsive and responsible to their places. The problem of incorporation is alleviated insofar as human beings come to understand and define themselves in terms of the nonhumans that co-constitute their lives and culture. It is alleviated insofar as nonhumans and places are recognized as creative, transformative, and having meaning that cannot be reduced to their usefulness toward human beings' short-term aims.

In this chapter, I mitigated the problems of equality and incorporation in order to demonstrate the possibility of ethical agriculture. In the remaining chapters, I turn to two specific conceptions of ethical agriculture, American agrarianism and food sovereignty discourse, investigating their arguments for good food production through the lens of the ecological feminist framework developed in chapter one.

CHAPTER 3

THE POLITICS OF PLACE-SENSITIVITY: AN ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN AGRARIANISM

In chapter one of this project I argued that care, respect, and solidarity ought to be understood as distinct modes of moral response that emerge from the recognition of both continuity with and difference from others, human and nonhuman. These ethical commitments are the product of the recognition of one's ecological selfhood. In chapter two, I appealed to particular agrarian practices in illustrating that the kind of egalitarianism most appropriate to a counterhegemonic commitment to respect for nonhuman life – an egalitarianism based on incommensurability rather than sameness – is indeed compatible with the agricultural project. A common feature of the practices that I described was their responsiveness to the particularities of the land with which they engaged. In this chapter, I will outline the necessary connection between ecological selfhood and place-sensitivity. The moral responses of care, respect, and solidarity that are generated by ecological selfhood cannot be separated from place-sensitivity insofar as relationship to particular places and the inhabitants of those places is central to understanding the mutuality of selfhood in an ecological way.

As I will demonstrate, there are many points of resonance between an ecological feminist understanding of place-sensitivity and the philosophy of American agrarianism – as advocated by Wendell Berry in particular – which articulates a direct connection between the agrarian life and political and ecological virtue. These points of resonance

are important for ecological feminists to recognize, given the enormous influence that agrarian voices continue to have on contemporary advocacy for the local food movement. The ecological feminist perspective further illuminates the ethical possibilities of agrarianism as a place-sensitive philosophy, but more importantly, ecological feminism reveals agrarianism's significant limitations. In my development of the meaning of multidimensional place-sensitivity, I advance the claim that one's sensitivity to place must include sensitivity to power disparity and injustice. This has been significantly overlooked by agrarianism's leading voices. I contend that agrarianism is unable to put the key modes of moral response into practice without amendment to emphasize responsiveness to questions of social justice. I demonstrate this by identifying agrarianism's unfortunate susceptibility to justifying an "unreflexive localism," which assumes a direct connection between scale and morality (DuPuis and Goodman 2005). By contrast, ecological feminism offers a framework for a place-based social critique that takes on questions of power and justice directly.

Multidimensional Place-Sensitivity

As I described in chapter one, on a relational view, selves are understood as fundamentally interdependent and co-constituting, rather than as atomized and ultimately isolatable. Here, as in chapter one, I will describe ecological selfhood as a motivating identity, and thus a normative concept and not just an ecological fact. The *ecological self*, as an expansive relational self, is in co-constituting, non-instrumental relationship with human and with earth others, or nature. The mutuality emphasized by such a view requires non-instrumental relationship between self and other, that is, a fundamental valuing of others and their ends (Plumwood 1993, 154-155). Plumwood writes, "The

ecological self can be viewed as a type of relational self, one which includes the goal of the flourishing of earth others and the earth community among its own primary ends, and hence respects or cares for these others for their own sake" (1993, 154). In order to include the flourishing of others as among it's own primary ends, the ethical ecological self is committed to a dialogical interaction with others. It is to particular others that we relate and by whom our identity is constituted, but this necessarily takes place within broader social and ecological systems. The formation of the self's identity involves interaction with the other who is relatable, "non-alien," but also different, other (Plumwood 1993, 156). This formative interaction between self and other occurs within contexts of systemic interdependence and influence, which are shaped by complex histories and trajectories. The mutuality of ecological selfhood must include the self's embeddedness in and engagement with these systems, processes and narratives. In other words, the ecological self recognizes that one is in a co-constituting relationship to *place*. Thus, place-sensitivity is necessary for a full recognition of ecologically relational selfhood.

"Place" is a notoriously ambiguous term—as it includes the spatial, temporal, material, and intangible—with boundaries that are not unidentifiable, but are certainly fluid. A place is loosely bounded by ecological interconnection and shared ecological consequences. Plumwood emphasizes that knowledge of place is created through narrative histories involving both human and nonhuman actors and action. A narrative conception of place cultivates an understanding of systems as intentional, in the broadest sense of the word. As I described it in chapter one, for Plumwood "intentionality" serves as a non-reductive basis for the continuity between mind and nature, which

simultaneously allows for complex patterns of difference. Plumwood argues that the historical denial of mindlike qualities to nonhuman nature allows for reductive, instrumental use. Addressing this problem requires a continuity between the hyperseparated categories of mind/reason and nature. It also requires a rethinking of "mind" as equivalent to rational consciousness and nature/body as its material lack. For Plumwood, the intentional level of description is not confined to the human or to the conscious but appears widely in nature, and is used appropriately to describe the activity of broad ecological systems (1993, 134). Ecosystems exhibit directional activity in their maintenance, resilience, and response to forces of change. Nature, in a systemic sense, can be described as agentic, meaning that its activity is not reductively contingent or accidental (2002, 227-229). This asserts that nature or land is an active presence rather than an inert material background for the unfolding of human activity (Plumwood 2002, 215).

The ethical ecological self adopts an intentional recognition stance, a posture of openness to others as potentially communicative. There is no reason to limit this stance of openness to individual human or nonhuman subjects. It is a posture that one takes as an inhabitant of ecological and social systems. So, we can engage with place in much the same way that we engage with particular human and nonhuman others: monologically, adopting a stance of closure, or dialogically, adopting stance of openness. Place-sensitivity implies a dialogical engagement with place just as ethical sensitivity more generally implies that our responses be genuinely informed by the other and not prescribed "top down." Plumwood describes, "To understand…a language of the land requires a deep acquaintance with some place, or perhaps a group of places. It also

requires a capacity to relate dialogically to the more-than-human world, since this is a very important source of narratives and narrative subjects defining the distinctiveness of place" (2002, 231). Conceiving of place in narrative and communicative terms allows us to resist the tendency to think of place merely as one's natural surroundings, the background against which our human activity independently unfolds. Appropriately understood, place-sensitivity is a concept that requires the rejection of the dualistic assumptions of hyperseparation and backgrounding (described in chapter one of this project). So, the concept does significant work in addressing anthropocentric ecological irrationality by actively situating human beings ecologically and nonhuman beings and systems ethically.

Place, conceptually and materially, provides constitutive context for our relationships and our moral responses. Place-sensitivity recognizes the shared material and ecological bases of life, affirming continuity and kinship between a place's inhabitants. As an element of one's ethical sensitivity more generally, place-sensitivity will most obviously be sensitive to ecological dependencies, cycles, and shared risks. It includes sensitivity to the particularity of these relationships in a given ecological location, such as a watershed. It must also include sensitivity to the similarities, differences, and connections between particular locales, like connections between places upstream and downstream. For just as the self cannot be understood as radically separable from others, a given place or community ought to be regarded as in relationship to others rather than as singular or self-sufficient.

Less obviously, one must be sensitive to the social dependencies, cycles, and relationships in a given location. The narratives of place are not just histories of

harmonious dependence but also of tension and conflict. The critical ecofeminist insight regarding structural domination reveals that some human groups are conceptually and materially relegated to the "background" of place as mere surroundings. The devaluing of these human social groups is carried out in part by naturalizing them. In chapter one I outlined Plumwood's articulation of rationalist hegemonic centrism. In the set of dualistic concepts that it mobilizes to maintain its structure, reason aligns with culture, the mental, and masculinity, and nature aligns with the physical, the nonhuman, and femininity. Under what Karen Warren calls "the logic of domination," for any oppositional categories, if one is superior to the other then it is morally justified in dominating the other (2000, 49). So, if culture is superior to nature, then culture is justified in dominating nature. And if certain social groups, such as women and indigenous peoples, are identified with nature, then they are conceptualized as morally inferior to those social groups identified with culture, such as men with European ancestry (Warren 2000, 50-51). Thus the conceptual associations between certain human social groups and nonhuman nature facilitate their exploitation. Given these foundational insights, an ecological feminist place-sensitivity must include sensitivity to human-human and interspecies power relations. Thus on my view it is an explicitly political concept. In fact, what I call *multidimensional place-sensitivity* is best understood as sensitivity to the way that ecological and sociopolitical forces are interconnected within and between locales.

Multidimensional place-sensitivity is required to address what Plumwood (2002, 72) calls the problem of "remoteness," or distance from the effects of our attitudes and behaviors. This distance can be spatial, temporal, consequential, technological, and/or epistemic. To take an agricultural example, industrial farming practices require many

chemical inputs. The runoff from these inputs is potentially devastating to ecological communities downstream. So some farmers are spatially distant from the location where the harmful effects of the farming practice are experienced. The nature of watershed ecology results in consequential remoteness as well, in that the contamination as a consequence of the practice impacts the downstream communities but leave the upstream communities largely unaffected. Given the consequential distance, unless there is communicative feedback from downstream places, those upstream would be epistemically remote from these consequences as well. This distance constitutes a problem insofar as it prevents destructive practices and attitudes from being identified and redressed. The problem is compounded by the fact, often emphasized by food movement activists, that many individuals do not know where or how the food that they consume is actually produced. The lack of transparency maintained by transnational food corporations intensifies epistemic remoteness insofar as paths to gaining that knowledge are purposefully blocked.[1] Thus consumers typically are remote from the effects of their consumption choices along a number of different lines.

Attending to the problem of remoteness solidifies an understanding of community, and of self-in-community, as necessarily "place-based." In many ways, remoteness is a privilege that is distributed along lines of social power disparity. Warren's groundbreaking ecofeminist arguments begin with an empirical demonstration of the way that women suffer the effects of environmental harm disproportionately (Warren 1997b; for an additional overview see also: Warren 2000, 1-20 and Shiva 2002).

[1] This could be no clearer than in recent legislation to block access to industrial meat production facilities, and limit protections for would-be whistleblowers in the agricultural sector, the so-called "ag gag" laws (Carlson 2012; Negowetti 2015).

The environmental justice movement offers similar evidence that negative environmental consequences tend to affect impoverished racial minority populations disproportionately (Shrader-Frechette 2002; Taylor 1997). Thus it would be a mistake to identify the general problem of remoteness too closely with spatial rather than consequential or epistemic remoteness, and a mistake to identify the remedies too closely with smallness of scale. The political dimension of place-sensitivity allows the ecological feminist to connect spatial, consequential and epistemic forms of remoteness/closeness. This is necessary insofar as there is nothing inherently just about the distribution of consequences, even if undertaken on a small scale. Normative family dynamics under patriarchy reveal that a small group in a small space can still be hierarchically ordered. It is still possible, perhaps even probable given the hubristic blindspots of centrist conceptual frameworks, that the majority of the risks and harms of a given practice will befall those individuals and groups that have historically been devalued: people of color, indigenous people, manual laborers, women, and nonhumans. Epistemic and consequential remoteness allow the socially powerful to passively maintain the status quo, knowingly and/or unknowingly, given that they tend to be the least impacted by and cognizant of the harms of development, agricultural, energy and other policies.[2] The socially powerful also reproduce their power by occupying decision-making positions, but "remoteness" indicates that they may not be in an appropriate physical, consequential, or epistemic position to makes their decisions wisely and in service of the flourishing of others. "The

[2] There are clear overlaps between the phenomenon of remoteness in the food and agricultural sphere and remoteness in relation to the effects of climate change. This is worth noting given the enormous role of industrial agriculture in the climate crisis. And to me the point regarding remoteness as a privilege becomes even more powerful in the context of climate change. For more on climate change with special attention given to questions of ecological feminist concern see Cuomo (2011) and Whyte (2013).

ill-effects of remoteness on decision-making suggests decision-making communities should be defined to a major extent by shared consequences and risks, especially shared ecological consequences" (Plumwood 2002, 75). So, decision-making should be "place-based" in the sense that it is attentive to the reality of particular ecological interconnections, and carried out by those who are most directly entangled, sharing the benefits and risks of those connections.

These are powerful insights insofar as they connect the ecological feminist perspective on domination and contextual ethics to the central insights of the environmental justice movement. Environmental racism has been acknowledged but remains underexplored in academic philosophical work (Taylor 1997;Warren 2000; Schrader-Frechette 2002; Shiva 2002; Whyte 2015). The ecological feminist theoretical perspective that I am developing here provides the conceptual tools to engage the tensions and interplay between race and gender within multidimensional place-sensitivity. One of the most dominant place-sensitive philosophies in food discourse, American agrarianism, lacks many of these tools. I turn to an introduction to agrarianism that highlights its consonance with ecological feminist insights in the following section. Then I turn to a gender-focused critique that reveals the limitations in agrarianism's portrayal of place and power dynamics in local communities.

American Agrarianism: Remoteness and the Ecological Self

Popular arguments for ethically responsible food production and consumption regularly appeal to the normative value of "the local." Sourcing one's food locally is regarded as a way of being responsive and accountable to one's place. In this context, place is predominantly understood spatially; one is "eating local" if one is eating food

that was grown within a 100 mile radius of the site of consumption, for example.[3] American agrarianism provides significant philosophical impetus for the local food movement. Notable advocates of local food, like Michael Pollan (2006; 2008) and Barbara Kingsolver (2003; 2007), appeal specifically to the tenets of agrarianism in their work.[4] It is essential to seriously and critically engage the agrarian perspective, as it is a major source of the historical, rhetorical, and philosophical power of the contemporary "good food movement" in the United States.

Agrarianism is a comprehensive worldview that is grounded in a "synoptic vision of the health of land and culture" (Wirzba 2003, 5). It regards the stability of human cultures, the resilience of natural ecosystems, and the development of noble individual character as inextricably linked. It provides a normative vision of the good life as rooted in land and tradition. Paul Thompson identifies the belief that "farmers make the best citizens" as the "central agrarian tenet" (2010, 53). For agrarians, the long term inhabitation and cultivation of land fosters the cultivation of character, producing virtuous individuals capable of being responsible citizens in their local communities. This tenet connects Thomas Jefferson's agrarian republican vision[5] with the vision of the contemporary New Agrarians, like Thompson, Wendell Berry, Wes Jackson, Eric Freyfogle and others. As with any "ism," the emphases vary amongst adherents. But,

[3] "Locavore" was the 2007 Oxford "word of the year," and the 100 mile radius benchmark is identified in the discussion of its definition and origin. http://blog.oup.com/2007/11/locavore/, Accessed November 18, 2015.
[4] See Fassler (2013) for an interview in which Michael Pollan, arguably the most prominent contemporary local food advocate, discusses the direct influence of Wendell Berry's agrarianism on his own thinking.
[5] For more on Jeffersonian agrarianism, see Thompson (2014; 2010, 44-47).

despite differences in emphasis, agrarian views share an intellectual lineage, and some fundamental commitments.

Agrarianism is "land-focused;" it acknowledges the particularities of the land in specific places with specific traditions as the source of people's material and cultural sustenance. In the agrarian tradition land-focus is essentially a farm-focus, as the "central agrarian tenet" above indicates. Connected to this tenet is the assertion that farming is an essential, constitutive human activity, and that we cannot articulate an appropriate environmental philosophy that does not begin with an understanding of the role of agriculture in human and nonhuman life. This farm-focus is maintained through experiential, embedded knowledge building and the acquisition of practical skills. These practices allow for the recognition of limitations with regard to the adaptability of particular ecological (and social) systems. As a result, agrarians are committed to the exercise of restraint. The activity of farming and maintaining a home place fuses labor and pleasure, work and leisure, production and consumption. Thus the view is sometimes described as "holistic" insofar as it reflects an "unwillingness to fragment the human condition" (Freyfogle 2001, xxi). The activity of farming and maintaining a home place also produces fundamental cultural values: land, beauty, tradition, good food, good work, community (Donahue 2003, 36-37; Berry 2001, 67-69). The agrarian sense of place involves an understanding of the co-constituting relationship between human individuals and their communities, and between human communities and the land. The valuing of land and tradition embedded in this understanding of place fosters one's responsibility and fidelity to one's particular home place.

In the analysis that follows, I turn specifically to the work of the current patriarch of agrarianism, Wendell Berry. Here, I am taking Berry as he is often taken: that is, as a paradigmatic agrarian voice. Though many feminists dismissed him long ago (Berry 2002, 65-71; Smith 2001), perhaps prematurely, Berry's singular influence on the tone and content of the so-called "new agrarianism" is not to be underestimated. He is included in the most prominent anthologies on agrarianism (Freyfogle 2001, Wirzba 2003). He is cited in every contemporary text on the philosophy, and his life and work is the subject of multiple dedicated volumes (Peters 2007; Bonzo and Stevens 2008; Mitchell and Schlueter 2011). As Janet Fiskio has said, "[Berry] has been a voice for the family farm, the rural community, and the nonhuman world for more than forty years" (2012, 302). And as I indicated above, Berry's thought has had a direct influence on some of the leading voices in the public conversation regarding what "good food" is: Michael Pollan (2006, 2008; Fassler 2013), Barbara Kingsolver (2007), Alice Waters (Rodale 2013), and many others.

I approach Berry's work very sympathetically. There is much that resonates between the ecological feminist view that I favor and Wendell Berry's agrarian perspective. Not least, I read Berry's *The Unsettling of America* (1978) as an articulation of the problem of remoteness and his agrarianism as a critical response. Berry traces the ecological crises of water contamination, soil depletion, biodiversity loss, overconsumption, etc. to an "unsettling" remoteness from our places of dwelling, as well as from our metaphorical place in the so-called "order of things." Berry claims that these ecological crises cannot be fully understood without attending to agricultural trends that ought to be thought of as crises as well: the consolidation of land and expansion of

farming operations, along with the technological consequences of that expansion as reflected in, for example, the need for bigger machinery and more chemical inputs. Like Plumwood, Berry aims for a cultural understanding of ecological devaluation and destruction. For Berry, these ecological and agricultural crises reflect an ultimate crisis of character; they are not merely technological or policy problems that can be effectively handled with technological or policy fixes.

I read Berry as thinking about the problem of our unsettling remoteness in a similar way to Plumwood: as the product of a kind of irrational rationalism. As we saw in chapter one, rationalism deforms critical reason within a centrist framework, elevating a narrow understanding of reason to extreme supremacy and correspondingly devaluing the contrasted sphere of nature and embodiment. Berry describes the modern world, and the modern farm, as reflecting a rationalist impulse to specialization and mechanization as means of control (1978, 55-72). "Confronted with the living substance of farming – the complexly, even mysteriously interrelated lives on which it depends from the microorganisms in the soil to the human consumers – the agricultural specialist can think only of subjecting it to total control, of turning it into a machine" (Berry 1978, 70). Place-based values – like relationship, restraint, and resilience – are replaced with rationalist values that further the mechanization of agricultural processes – efficiency, maximization, and reductionist economic valuation. From the master perspective what is being done is "rational," but for Berry, as for Plumwood, there is much that the master perspective cannot see. Describing the destructive power of this hubristic rationalism, Berry writes,

> The Modern World would respect the Creation only insofar as it could be *used* by humans. Henceforth, by definition, by principle, we would be unable to leave anything as it was. The usable would be used; the useless would be sacrificed in the use of something else. By means of the machine metaphor we have eliminated any fear or awe or reverence or humility or delight or joy that might have restrained us in our use of the world. We have indeed learned to act as if our sovereignty were unlimited and as if our intelligence were equal to the universe. Our 'success' is a catastrophic demonstration of our failure (Berry 1978, 56).

Plumwood's articulation (2002) of the destructive consequences of rationalist human/nature relationships echoes this description of the reductive use of nonhumans. Our relationships to others – in ecological, agricultural, and cultural senses – have become abstract, generalized, and ultimately exploitative, in large part due to our distance from the source of our physical and cultural sustenance. Consonant with ecological feminist critiques, Berry argues that "generalized" relationships, those inattentive to place and context, tend to be destructive, whereas particular, partial relationships and knowledges are healthier (1978, 33, 45-47, 110-111).

Additionally, Berry insists that exploitation relies on a false division between things that are inherently interdependent. For Berry this is nowhere more evident than in the transformation of agriculture from a localized, embedded practice to an industrialized, "top down" model that relies on a reductive split between culture as a tool of human control and nature as mere resource. Exploitative food production ignores the idea that "neither nature nor people alone can produce human sustenance, but only the two together, culturally wedded" (Berry 1978, 9). As a part of this broader critique, Berry

criticizes the underlying cultural split between soul and body (1978, 103-106). Echoing feminist insights, he insists that the soul must be understood as embodied and the body must be understood as embedded within relationships of interdependence, "yet modern social and cultural patterns contradict [these ideas] and make it difficult or impossible to honor them in practice" (Berry 1978, 103). Like ecofeminists, Berry also criticizes what he calls the "sexual division," under which "nurture is made the exclusive concern of women" (1978, 112-115). (He does, however, maintain a binary understanding of gender and gender relations. I will attend to this and other aspects of Berry's discussion of gender in more detail below.)

Like Plumwood, Berry's agrarian response to the problem of cultural remoteness from our ecological dependencies requires a rethinking of human self as self-in-relationship. As I mentioned above, the co-constituting relationships between human individuals and their communities, and between human communities and the land, is one of the themes that unites agrarian voices. Berry writes:

> We have given up the understanding…that we and our country create one another, depend on one another, are literally part of one another; that our land passes in and out of our bodies just as our bodies pass in and out of our land; that as we and our land are part of one another, so all who are living as neighbors here, human and plant and animal, are part of one another, and so cannot possibly flourish alone; that therefore our culture must be our response to our place, our culture and our place are images of each other, and so neither can be better than the other (1978, 22).

So Berry's agrarian response to the problem of remoteness involves a kind of place-sensitivity that clearly resonates with the understanding of ethical ecological selfhood developed by Plumwood. We begin to address our mistaken perception of the distance between our actions and their ecological consequences when we consciously shift our attention to the connections between others and ourselves. And given the observable dangers of remoteness on the ability to make good decisions, Berry likewise asserts, "The deciders should [literally] live with the results of their decisions" (2001, 74).

Limitations for Agrarianism: Gendered Traditions and Cultural Unity

Despite these notable affinities between the work of Berry and ecological feminists that I outlined in the previous section, Berry is often criticized as at best insensitive to contemporary views on gender issues (Smith 2001, 624), and at worst a "sentimental" advocate of patriarchy (Fink 1992, 193). Berry himself has been explicitly critical of the feminist movement (1990, 179-196), and rejects much of the liberal feminist agenda (Berry 2002, 65-80; Smith 2001). For example, Berry tends to adopt a dismissive tone in handling the question of women's access to the public sphere and meaningful work outside of the home. He sees nothing "liberating" in women's collective attempt to seek a kind of social status that is afforded to them by working outside of the home. "How, I am asking, can women improve themselves by submitting to the same specialization, degradation, trivialization, and tyrannization of work that men have submitted to?" (Berry 2002, 70). In part because of this tone he often appears insensitive to many women's legitimate concerns. Kimberly Smith (2001) argues that his critical priorities also contribute to the impression that Berry is dismissive of feminist issues. "Starting from the problem of creating a healthy and sustainable relationship to the earth,

he addresses social and political relations only secondarily, as they relate to his primary interest in ecological integrity" (Smith 2001, 624). On Berry's view, revaluing the home economy is central to establishing a viable ecological culture. Thus he is not especially sympathetic to arguments aimed at securing women's equal place in the industrial workforce.

Berry argues that his focus is on a deeper criticism: "the problem is not just the exploitation of women by men. A greater problem is that women and men alike are consenting to an economy that exploits women and men and everything else" (Berry 2002, 71). I see two problems with this claim. First, I take issue with the idea that one problem of exploitation is "greater" or takes priority over another. This kind of ranking of injustices has the effect trivializing legitimate experiences of oppression and exploitation. Second, given the reality of patriarchy and the traditional exclusion of women from the public, political sphere, it is not true that women and men consent to an economy in "like" ways. Like many feminists, Berry is engaged in an ongoing criticism of the public/private dualism; while some feminists respond to this dualism by seeking to carve out space for women in the public sphere, Berry responds by attempting to reverse traditional value assignments with a revaluation of the domestic sphere and the home. Unfortunately, these two approaches tend to argue at cross-purposes, making it easy for each view to dismiss the other.

Feminist engagements with Berry's work, or with agrarianism more widely, tend focus on the ways in which the material conditions of rural life and the patrimonial ideal perpetuate the oppression of women, and criticize views that seem to romanticize agrarian life (Fink 1992; McKenna 2012). In a notable exception, Smith (2001) argues

that contrary to the impressions of many, Berry's work is infused with substantive engagements with gender issues, such as a critique of traditional constructions of masculinity, and an analysis of the construction of marriage and family under industrialized economies. My reading of Berry's agrarianism as described above also suggests that he anticipated much of the ecofeminist agenda. As I mentioned, Berry is explicitly concerned with the dualistic conceptualization of the relationship between body and soul, and the exclusive characterization of caretaking as "women's work." To me, feminist analyses of Berry's work tend to overlook these ways in which it anticipated and engaged with key theoretical components of contemporary feminism. On my view, even given Berry's dismissive tone, ecological feminists ought not dismiss Berry and American agrarianism prematurely. That said, from an ecological feminist perspective, the "new" agrarianism that Berry represents has several very important conceptual limitations. I offer the following critique so as to indicate the nature of these limitations as well as their impact on the adequacy of agrarian arguments for ethical place-based food systems/relationships.

Although Berry is very skeptical of some conceptual dichotomies, as between body and soul, he remains overly committed to others. Most troubling for me is the maintenance of rural/urban and local/global dualisms. Berry depicts industrial economies in a way that pits urban and rural communities against each other. For example, he writes:

> The cities subsist in competition with the country; they live upon a one-way movement of energies out of the countryside – food and fuel, manufacturing materials, human labor, intelligence, and talent. Very little of this energy is ever

> returned. Instead of gathering these energies up into coherence…the modern city dissipates and wastes them (1978, 137).

Berry is suggesting that remote (perhaps spatially, but certainly epistemically and consequentially) urban centers strip rural land and communities of their varied goods in a way that does not put those goods to appropriate use. "From a cultural point of view, the movement from the farm to the city involves a radical simplification of mind and of character" (Berry 1978, 44). By this Berry is emphasizing that the autonomy, complexity, challenges, self-discipline, and knowledge of the life of a competent farmer is compromised by moving to the city and taking a job in industry; "for a complex responsibility he has substituted a simple dutifulness" (1978, 44-45). Clearly this has more to do with the occupation of one's time and the understanding of one's varied responsibilities than it does with population density. To me the maintenance of an overly simplistic and normatively charged distinction between rural and urban life makes Berry's overall perspective less plausible, especially at a time when human populations are more urban than ever, and when arguments are frequently made that city living is more ecologically responsible than country living (Owen 2009; Glaeser 2011). Thus there are pragmatic reasons for wanting to abandon the idea that rural life is nobler and focus on how the virtues that are supposedly inherent in it might be encouraged in a city setting. This certainly seems to be an important element of urban agriculture and other activist practices intent on demonstrating that agriculture is not and ought not be just a rural activity. The strength of the rural/urban dualism is mitigated in some of Berry's later work and in the work of other prominent agrarian writers (Berry 2001, 74; Northrup and Liscomb 2003; Orr 2001; Wirzba 2003, 6-8). This is an important trend that may

require an amendment to the "central agrarian tenet" identified above; rather than asserting that "farmers make the best citizens" we may want to say, "those who hold and enact agrarian values make the best citizens."

However, the rural/urban dualism in Berry's agrarianism is closely associated with a local/global dualism that has not been similarly mitigated. The dichotomous relationship between the local/global scales is reflected in the either/or portrayal of the small family farm versus the industrial monolith that runs throughout agrarian imagery. Contrasting industrial and agrarian economies, Berry writes, "The global economy institutionalizes a global ignorance, in which producers and consumers cannot know or care about one another, and in which the histories of all products will be lost. In such a circumstance, the degradation of products and places, producers and consumers, is inevitable" (2001, 74). While it may be the case that the industrialized global economy tends to foster spatial and consequential remoteness, on my view the claim that global scale interactions inevitably preclude knowledge and care is hasty. It assumes a necessary connection between smallness of scale and morality; why should we think it is the case that smallness of economic scale implies a wholesomeness that is inevitably degraded? This assumption has the potential to obscure conflict and unfairness in local economies. Moreover, it has the potential to close avenues of communication, knowledge-sharing, and even affection that ought to remain open. My descriptions of global-scale solidarity movements for food justice in chapter four should make clear the potential for shared moral responses and political cooperation at multiple scales.

Berry's critical argument regarding the destructive trajectory of American farming toward industrialization is premised on the idea that farmers in rural areas

haven't always gotten things right. But these mistakes are presented as the consequences of farming communities having limited options in response to enormous external pressures. Of course I don't want to underestimate the power that public policy and restricted avenues to economic viability have over the choices that individuals make. I do want to emphasize in light of this, though, that the depiction of the national and global scale as the source of external, inevitably compromising pressures allows for the local scale to be characterized as wholesome and pure, as that which is unfortunately undermined by such pressures. In the remainder of the chapter I sketch some of the troubling implications of this characterization. First, I conclude this section with a discussion of the limitations and misconceptions of appealing to tradition in support of wholesome and unified local communities. In the final section of the chapter I argue that the inattentiveness to social power relations outlined here lends itself to supporting an unreflexive localism.

On my reading, the rural/urban, local/global dichotomies that are woven into Berry's analysis of ecological, agricultural, and cultural crises are value-laden in a one-dimensional way. In service of these dualisms and in response to the crises, agrarianism appeals to "traditional" ways of organizing individual and communal rural life. I insist that appealing to "tradition" is dangerous if it reproduces oppressive or hegemonic social structures. While I don't think that Berry and others argue that tradition is simply good for its own sake, it does wield a strong and insufficiently questioned amount of authority over what is regarded as productive, healthy, and moral in the agrarian perspective. Feminists certainly have good reason to be wary of such appeals, as "traditionally" women's perspectives and interests have not been foregrounded. Here I highlight two

arenas in which the "tradition" that Berry appeals to is insufficiently questioned from an ecological feminist perspective: gender normativity and community membership.[6]

Berry explicitly engages the question of gender division and its effects. And as I mentioned above, many of his observations are consonant with ecofeminist theory, as when he writes, "This determination that nurturing should become *exclusively* a concern of women served to signify to both sexes that neither nurture nor womanhood was very important" (Berry 1978, 114). However, he proceeds from this observation to a critique of modern marriage that is centered on its compromising and devaluation of traditional gender roles. Utilizing a naturalized understanding of binary gender relations, Berry proceeds to argue that traditional hetero-normative marriage is the foundation of a truly healthy household and home place. On his view, the establishment of a healthy home place, built on this foundation of marriage, fosters a healthy holistic relationship with the earth. Relying on a depiction of traditional marriage for one's understanding of a healthy relationship to place is problematic to the extent that it is exclusionary. It implies that individuals who choose to disrupt binary gender norms more radically by rejecting the institution of marriage or its close connection to childbearing and rearing, are unable to cultivate a healthy home and a healthy relationship to place. Despite the 2015 legalization of gay marriage by the US Supreme Court, the point concerning exclusion still stands. The stability and health of the household remains tethered to a naturalized understanding of binary gender roles as the foundation of traditional (read "good") families. Same-sex married couples, childless couples, blended families, and any number of iterations of the

[6] Appeals to tradition for moral justification in local food advocacy remain common and insufficiently questioned today. See Portman (2014) for a more thorough analysis of such appeals in the work of Michael Pollan, Barbara Kingsolver, and other local food advocates.

modern family are marginalized, in essence regarded as "unnatural" on Berry's view. Coming to Berry's defense, Smith reminds us "that concern about gender roles is to some extent an artifact of industrial capitalism; agrarian life is famous for maintaining less rigid divisions between work and home than industrialism requires" (2001, 632). This may be true, but to me Berry's unwillingness to question traditional gender binaries undermines his questioning of dichotomous thinking in other areas. While his critique is focused on the dangers of a gendered division of work that is tethered to gendered public/private spheres, his answer to this harmful division leaves naturalized conceptions of gendered relations within the family largely unquestioned.

Berry argues that a good agricultural system is not fragmented; there is a kind of unity that is recognized in the health of the soil, plants, animals, and humans of the homestead. He bases this on an ecological principle of holism that assumes a kind of unity and harmony between interdependent parts (Berry 1978, 47). Likewise, he claims that "the best human cultures also have this unity. Their concerns and enterprises are not fragmented, scattered out, at variance or in contention with one another" (Berry 1978, 47). The general emphasis on cooperation over competition may be a welcome rejoinder to the dominant themes of economic discourse. It furthers the overarching idea that we ought to be designing agricultural systems in response to ecological and community-based principles. But I argue that the assumption that healthy communities are characterized by unity leaves us with practical and theoretical problems. It leaves us unable to answer the question of how to handle conflict or tension when it inevitably arises. If, as I've argued, the commitment to moral respect is connected to the recognition of difference, the concept of an ethical community requires space for this recognition.

The assumption of unity precludes appropriate engagement with difference; it precludes open communication, negotiation, and mutual adjustment. The assumption of cultural unity is a homogenizing assumption; one that can dangerously mask gendered and racialized power relations (Mills 1999).

In the US context, our agricultural traditions include a history of settler colonialism and the institution of slavery, topics on which many agrarians are oddly silent. Interestingly, Berry begins *The Unsettling of America* by describing industrial agriculture as a neocolonial enterprise with the norms and assumptions to match. He characterizes colonialism as "the abstract values of an industrial economy preying upon the native productivity of land and people" (Berry 1978, 4-5). In the Americas, the first iteration of colonialism resulted in the decimation of the place-centered livelihoods of Native peoples, and ultimately of the peoples themselves. Berry recognizes that the "success" of colonial empire relies on a fundamental disregard for the rights of Native peoples and the inherent value of nonhumans and ecological systems. "What [the 'discoverers'] saw was a great concentration of 'natural resources'—to be used according to purposes exterior to them. That some of those resources were human beings mattered not at all" (Berry 1978, 54).

Yet Berry's description of the history of colonial settlement valorizes those individuals and families who put down roots in new places, intending to "remain and prosper where they were" (Berry 1978, 4). Kyle Whyte (2015) and others (LaDuke 1999; Wolfe 2006; Veracini 2010) would frame this homemaking not as a benign consequence of colonial exploration, but as an integral element of a sustained settler-industrial campaign. "Settler-industrial campaigns refer to global waves of settlers…who continue

to deploy strategic tools and weapons to establish permanent roots in Indigenous territories with the hopes of inscribing homelands for themselves in those territories" (Whyte 2015, 144). Agriculture is one of the principal means of carving settler homelands out of indigenous homelands, along with military technologies and mineral and fossil fuel extraction. The question of the many material ways in which such settlement disrupts Indigenous livelihoods remains largely unaddressed by Berry, and the trope of rural cultural unity precludes such questions from being readily taken up.

For Berry the second iteration of industrialist colonialism resulted in the decimation of small farms and farm communities (1978, 6). As with the original colonial expansion into the Americas, Berry attributes the destruction to the arrival of people with industrialist economic agendas who do not regard the land as a homeland (1978, 167-168). Berry argues that federal policy makers, agricultural scientists, and corporate interests are colonizing the resources of (settler) agroecological communities. In the service of progress, growth, and future prosperity, corporations "have made 'redskins' of our descendants, holding them subject to alien values, while their land is plundered of anything that can be shipped home and sold" (Berry 1978, 58). The language is provocative, but Berry does not explore the differences between the racialization of native peoples under colonialism and the loss of livelihood of (majority white, settler) small farmers under industrialization. The two iterations of industrialist colonialism are not analogous right at this nexus of racialized social identities and the impacts of racialized difference on the supposed cultural unity of rural places.

Additionally, neither African enslavement nor the racialization of agricultural work is discussed in *The Unsettling of America*, arguably Berry's most influential book.

However, it is worth noting that in 1970 Berry wrote *The Hidden Wound*, a personal account of his own engagement with race and whiteness. In it he acknowledged his family's slaveholding history (Berry 2010 [1970], 5), and attempted to trace the development of his own understanding of the damages of racism from the influence of two black Americans on his rural childhood. In his description of these influences, the farmhand Nick and his companion Aunt Georgie, Berry directly acknowledges the continued racialization of "work" in post-slavery farm culture, and the racism of partitioning labor from ownership (2010, 80-81). He also describes the resources this provided for a rich culture of black resilience, authenticity, and intimacy with the land that was lacking in "white society" (2010, 83-84). Berry's acknowledgement of radical difference – difference that might be beneficial or painful, necessary or oppressive – is explicit throughout this work. He writes, "the great benefit in my childhood friendship with Nick and Aunt Georgie…[was] a prolonged intense contact with lives and minds radically unlike my own, and radically unlike any other that I might have known as a white child among white adults" (Berry 2010, 63).[7] This intimate acquaintance with lives and minds unlike his own was beneficial insofar as it revealed the tension between the character prescribed to individuals by virtue of their role in the social structure and the character revealed by the experience of particular relationships. But the experience of closeness Berry felt with Nick in particular is also undermined by the thoroughness of the racialization of both of their identities. Thus, "[T]here were times when I was inescapably aware of the conflict between what I felt about [Nick and Aunt Georgie], in response to

[7] See also: "[I]n the effort to live meaningfully and decently in America, a white man simply cannot learn all that he needs to know from other American white men" (Berry, 2010, 78).

what I knew of them, and the feelings that were prescribed to me by the society's general prejudice against their race. Being with them, it was hard to escape for very long from the sense of racial difference prepared both in their minds and in my own" (Berry 2010, 50).

In light of this profound awareness of difference, the appeal to cultural unity in *The Unsettling of America* is perplexing. Perhaps Berry idealized a unity between those who know the land and know hard work (2010, 25), but this is in tension with his understanding of racism as both structural and psychological (2010, 52). An ongoing appeal to unity, in the work generally or in response to racialized social structures specifically, is misguided. In 1988 Berry wrote an essay entitled "Racism and the Economy" (2002, 47-64). In it, Berry does argue that meaningful discussions of racism and proposed solutions to the problems of racism need to go deeper than the question of how many black Americans have high paying jobs (2002, 49). But he suggests that the failure to address racism adequately is due, in part, to the "displacement of the racial problem itself from the country to the cities" (Berry 2002, 49). His handling of this question is consistent with the problematic rural/urban dualism that he maintains elsewhere in his work. Here again his justified complaint regarding the dispossession of American blacks from the land (2002, 50-51) is in difficult tension with his praise for rural cultural unity, and the absence of attention to power disparity in his advocacy of land ownership and localized economic control.

Berry regards fragmentation as destructive and so appeals to unity as a sign of health (1978, 102-103). However, María Lugones (1994) has argued persuasively that the appeal to unity relies fundamentally on a "logic of fragmentation." Fragmenting logic attempts a complete separation, for example as between self and other, us and them. The

unity of "self," or "us" is conceptually linked to an assumption of purity. Unity and purity logically require the reduction of multiplicity through a complex series of fictions. The reduction of multiplicity "generates the fictional construction of a vantage point from which unified wholes, totalities, can be captured. It generates the construction of a subject who can occupy such a vantage point. Both the vantage point and the subject are "outside historicity and multiplicity" (Lugones 1994, 464). Thus, the assertion of unity is an assertion of control, an attempt to limit meaning through reductive separation, categorization, and abstraction. For Lugones, fragmentation is a form of domination. So claims to unity that rely on fragmenting logic can support dominating social structures. The assumption of cultural unity mobilizes and maintains the backgrounding of marginalized others. One assumes unity in multiplicity through homogenization or denial, both of which require a logic of fragmenting separation.[8] Despite some explicit work on racial difference, Berry does not consistently apply caution or attention with regard to the oversimplifying the unity of communities. This results in a kind of fundamental tension, even "incoherence" as Lugones puts it (1994, 466), between the desire to attend to the bodily and multiplicitous nature of the subject while denying cultural variation between embodied subjects or groups in a given place.

Thus, on my view, appealing to tradition in the arenas of gender normativity and community membership—along with the overarching assumption of ecological and communal holism—reflects a failure of agrarianism to seriously incorporate the politics

[8] Alternatively one might assume a unity in multiplicity through the aggregation of interests. A family or community is united in their flourishing if the aggregated sum of their interests is positive. But this approach would attempt to redress exclusion through a mathematical inclusion that need not necessarily attend to the distribution of goods within the supposedly unified set. Thus aggregative unity, too, is unsatisfactory.

of gender and race. Appeal to the unity of "traditional" rural communities, given the reality of the history of settler colonialism and slavery, is plain false. Attempting unity through social inclusion without reconciling that falsehood is dangerous. Some agrarian writers do mention that we ought not romanticize past (or present) agrarian lives, and that agrarianism ought to be less male-dominated (for example: Orr 2001, 97; Thompson 2010; Wirzba 2003, 8). But these concerns are only mentioned in passing and do not sufficiently reform the foundations of the philosophy. Thompson writes, "A public motivated and guided by agrarian ideals will have better philosophical resources with which to articulate our relationship to the natural world and our dependence on the continuing viability and integrity of natural ecosystems" (2010, 17). Berry's and Thompson's work demonstrate that the philosophical resources may be much more rich and valuable than the ideals of industrialization, specialization, and fragmentation can provide. However, my contention is that the ecological feminist critique of agrarianism reveals important conceptual resources that remain unavailable to an agrarianism that is inattentive to power disparity and social history in the politics of place.

Localism, Environmental Justice, and the Politics of Place-Sensitivity

Bearing in mind the conceptual limitations related to inattentiveness to power disparity in the politics of place, described above, there are two problematic underlying assumptions that have been extrapolated out of Berry's work and that infuse agrarian arguments advocating small-scale food production and consumption. First, that small-scale, local interaction tends to be more virtuous. Second, that local communities tend to be unified and conflict-free. Deviations from these assumptions tend to be regarded as abnormal or the degrading consequences of outside forces. Working together, these

assumptions make agrarianism susceptible to justifying an "unreflexive localism," which assumes a direct connection between scale and morality (DuPuis and Goodman 2005). At the theoretical level, unreflexive localism amounts to a strategy of reversal in response to the devaluing of local economies and knowledges under global industrial economic systems. Positive moral value is unquestioningly assigned to local scale activities and interactions and negative moral value assigned to the global scale (Portman 2014). Possible intermediate scales between the local and the global are given little serious attention. Unreflexive localism, by reifying the local, takes its character and its oppositional relationship to the global as a given—a poor representation of lived experience. Despite Berry's appeal to the ideal of communal unity, "the local" does not necessarily have a homogenous character and cannot be rigidly demarcated from its surroundings or from global influence. Inattentiveness to the heterogeneous nature and ambiguity of the local renders an unreflexive localism unable to effectively challenge local level problems of power disparity and injustice. The ideal of a local with a fixed identifiable character is easily, perhaps necessarily, characterized by exclusivity. Not only is this a historical problem, as evidenced by the general lack of engagement with the history of settler colonialism and slavery in agrarian literature, but it remains inattentive to the lived experience of many agricultural laborers today. As Fiskio rightly criticizes:

> The difficulty with [Berry's agrarian] framework is that it reinscribes the marginalization of migrant, undocumented, tenant, and temporary workers. Berry is correct that the industrial agricultural system ruthlessly exploits these workers and that land consolidation undergirds this system. But an account of agricultural ethics stemming from the experience and perspective of the settled landowner

> excludes the agency of many who engage in agricultural labor today (Fiskio 2012, 308).

In other words, agrarianism has failed to recognize that being settled and integrated into a local community is a privilege conditioned by class and nationality.

The critical ecological feminism that I advocate in this project is able to recognize the above shortcomings of American agrarianism and is itself able to stave off the problem of being reduced to an unreflexive localism. Because the view is explicitly concerned with dismantling the very structure of dualism, rather than merely reversing value assignments, global and local need not be understood as exclusive categories. This allows one to acknowledge the history and ongoing inevitability of global influence as well as conflict within the local. One is required to be reflexive and critical about structures and relationships at the local level. Thus ecological feminism offers more than just a reification of one's local place and one's special relationship to it, but a "place-based critique" that takes questions of power and justice more seriously.

Berry argues that fidelity to a singular home place is foundational to personal and civic identity and to responsible action. Of the moral responses discussed in chapter one, Berry is most clearly focused on care, describing agrarian caretaking as resolve maintained by affection (Wirzba 2007, 152). He also recognizes the importance of the limits that respect puts on care, for example in his insistence that we cannot care well for cultivated land without the necessary buffers of wildness that must continue to inform our agricultural practices (Berry 1978, 30). But the emphasis on our harmonious cultivated homeplaces leaves little room for the development of solidarity. In the present context of globalization and urbanization, attentiveness and care for the places that we love and in

which we dwell does not preclude, and perhaps in some cases even requires, inattentiveness to the other "shadow places" that make our daily endeavors possible (Plumwood 2008). This kind of attachment and attentiveness to one's particular dwelling place might fuel NIMBYism, a kind of protectionist impulse ("not in *my* backyard"). On its own, this impulse neither necessitates nor precludes caring about the homeplaces of others. It must be combined with some other conviction or response in order to express care not just for one's own home place but the homeplaces of others, importantly including those of the less privileged. To me this indicates the importance of solidarity as a mode of moral response exercised by those ecological selves who are aware of their place's connection to others' places. Agrarian perspectives emphasize fidelity and responsibility to one's dwelling place and overlook the necessity and virtue of trans-community solidarity.

I do think that space can be created in the agrarian framework to appeal to a kind of solidary political unity rather than a cultural unity that tends to obscure social difference. Berry's underexamined and problematic cultural unity might be rearticulated in terms of political solidarity. That is, as the unity created by the collective, active commitment to addressing a shared vulnerability. As I described in chapter one, this kind of political solidarity entails positive moral obligations, for example to reflexivity, or social and self criticism. This might alleviate some of the concerns regarding inattentiveness to social difference that I outline in this chapter. Political solidarity also implies cooperation, which already figures prominently in agrarian thinking. Appealing to solidarity as a critical element of an exemplary agrarian life would solidify the connections between small-scale agrarian practices and broader political efforts.

Whereas ecofeminists have tended not to use the language of citizenship to elaborate on our relational values and responsibilities (MacGregor 2007), Berry explicitly does, a reflection of the Jeffersonian influence (Berry 1978, 143; Berry 2003; McKibben 2007). Berry's concept of citizenship appropriately carries the connotation of responsibility to something larger than oneself – to land, to community, to tradition and to future generations. He asks us to reconsider how citizenship ought to be expressed in light of economic globalization and international military conflict that is interwoven with economic concerns (Berry 2003, 1-22). But on my view a place-based understanding of citizenship must be attuned to gender and racial injustices in a way that agrarian citizenship has not been. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, ecological selfhood implies a multidimensional place-sensitivity that is explicitly attuned to social power relationships. The assumptions of the virtue of local-scale interactions and of community unity embedded in the maintenance of a rigid local/global dualism facilitate unreflexive localism. This undermines agrarianism's ability to fully embrace and manifest a multidimensional place-sensitivity. I maintain that to the extent that it lends itself to unreflexive localism, the agrarian understanding of place-based citizenship remains inadequate for connecting ecological concerns with concerns about environmental and social justice. In the following chapter I turn to the emerging global food sovereignty movement as a justice-oriented place-sensitive alternative for realizing the ecological feminist modes of moral response in subversive practice.

CHAPTER 4

ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST FOOD SOVEREIGNTY

This project is an attempt to articulate how the ecological feminist virtues of care, respect, and solidarity can be made more determinate and how they ought to be invoked and enacted in an appropriately place-based agricultural ethic. In chapter one I expounded on care, respect, and solidarity as modes of moral response. In chapter two I argued that, contrary to possible objections, interspecies care and respect are compatible with the agricultural project of rearing and cultivating nonhumans for human use. In chapter three I critically engaged the dominant place-based philosophical foundation for some of the most prominent voices in the US food movement, American agrarianism. I argued that the lingering local/global dualism conceptually impedes the tradition's ability to address local conflict and build trans-community solidarity. In this final chapter I will suggest that the concept and practice of *food sovereignty* emerging from anti-globalization movements provides a context for how respect, care, and solidarity can be made more (but not fully) determinate in agricultural contexts. Food sovereignty has been criticized as being all-encompassing to the point of incoherence, including as it does a wide range of aims, which I will describe in detail below. On my view food sovereignty must be understood as more than just a list of goals agreed to at global summits year after year. The ecological feminist view provides a framework for identifying key commitments of the existing food sovereignty framework as a part of a coherent, counterhegemonic worldview. The ecological feminist analysis also indicates elements of

the existing food sovereignty framework that should continue to be emphasized, like gender justice, and that are in need of further development, like the political role of nonhumans in food sovereignty.

As we saw in the previous chapter, there is a temptation and a tendency to respond to agricultural industrialization and globalization with a normative localism that connects goodness to smallness of scale. On such a view local cultural traditions are constitutive of the individuals that make up local communities, and the maintenance of localized culture is morally valuable. However, in the arena of global policy, problems of food injustice and insecurity have been addressed as questions of how to meet our obligations to geographically and culturally distant others to whom we are bound by the ties of global citizenship. A cosmopolitan understanding of human identity and moral attachments supports this global approach. On a cosmopolitan view, our primary moral commitment is to individuals by virtue of their humanity. Cosmopolitan views (Appiah 2006) would espouse the arbitrariness of cultural identity and the value in the freedom to construct one's own meaningful life from a wide range of possibilities. The virtues of any specific localized culture, including the family farming community, are not so great that individuals should not be free to cast them off if they so choose (Heldke 2012, 40). Neither the localist nor the cosmopolitan position appears well suited to accommodating the insights or motivations of the other. The local view cannot easily accommodate the critiques of individuals who desire to cast off elements of the local culture into which they were born or otherwise inserted. The global view cannot easily accommodate the need develop and preserve a deep contextualized knowledge of idiosyncratic local places

for it does not recognize the need to preserve the cultures responsible for the cultivation of such knowledge.

Lisa Heldke (2012) has convincingly argued for the need to articulate a "third option" between cosmopolitanism and localism, both generally and with particular attention to food production and consumption. This third option is a necessary response to the problem of the dualistic relationship between the local and the global that I describe in the previous chapter; it would inform theory-building, practice, and advocacy. While traditional American agrarianism's understanding of place leaves it firmly rooted on the localist side of the dichotomy in response to globalizing food regimes, in this chapter I will demonstrate that the concept of food sovereignty has emerged as a powerful manifestation of an ecofeminist third option. I refer to Heldke's analysis not just because it specifically engages the global/local dualism that I find to be particularly troublesome in food ethics discourse, as I described in chapter three, but also because on my view Heldke's argument represents an ecological feminist perspective on how to best respond to this dichotomy. Rather than validating one half of the dichotomy and denigrating the other, which maintains the dualized structure regardless of the side that is taken, a counterhegemonic position, as we have seen, attempts to dismantle the dualized structure itself. As Plumwood's work reveals, this requires the simultaneous recognition of continuity and difference, and the embrace of ambiguity and multiplicity.

Heldke identifies four conditions of adequacy that a third, anti-dualistic, position between cosmopolitanism and localism should meet (2012, 45). First, it must manifest a non-arbitrary "earthy contextuality" for intentional encounters with one's literal place and also with ways of being that challenge one's own. Second, the third option will be

thoroughly anti-dualistic insofar as it will "recognize that no place is too small, local, and homogenous to escape us/them thinking, nor is any connection between two people too tenuous to preclude the possibility that they will share a sense of being from the same tribe" (Heldke 2012, 45). In other words, neither is the local necessarily culturally unified, nor is social or solidary unity impossible across spatial and cultural difference. Third, the anti-dualistic option will exhibit "greater concern with the cultural than displayed by many agrarian forms of localism, and more concern with the agricultural than most versions of cosmopolitanism manifest" (Heldke 2012, 45). In other words, it will recognize the necessary links between the cultural and the agricultural. And unlike the agrarian position that I described in chapter three of this project, this option will necessarily attend to the fact that urban centers are agricultural places and rural locations are culturally diverse. Finally, this third option between localism and cosmopolitanism should "help us think about how food practices could enable us both to *conceptualize* and to *enact* justice and sustainability" (Heldke 2012, 46), noting that these two moral-political aims are not discrete in the ways that dominant cosmopolitan and localist positions often assume.

In this chapter I will describe food sovereignty as a manifesting an ecofeminist third option. In what follows I will provide a history of the concept of food sovereignty, and address some preliminary worries regarding the scope of the concept. I will identify the ways in which the concept, as described by transnational alliances, captures many of the important features of an ecological feminist ethic. First and foremost, an explicitly stated commitment to gender justice has been embedded in the food sovereignty concept from the beginning (La Vía Campesina 2010[1996]; Our World Is Not For Sale

2010[2001]; Delcaration of Nyeleni 2007). Some argue that emphasis on gender as an axis of injustice remains marginal in the discourse on food justice more generally, with even the more radical scholar-activists emphasizing race and class and de-emphasizing gender or failing to mention it altogether (Allen 2012, 56-57). I agree that, at its broadest, food justice does not attend to gender justice as thoroughly as it should, hence the value of my project. Some argue that despite the inclusion of gender as a mobilizing factor in the food sovereignty movement, systematic integration of gender issues in the movement itself is still lacking (Allen 2012, 57). My analysis suggests that while there is still practical progress to be made, the conceptual foundation for the thorough integration of gender justice is embedded in the food sovereignty concept itself. In this chapter I will also demonstrate how the moral responses of care, respect, and solidarity are purposefully located within the food sovereignty concept. I will suggest that ecological feminism can further illuminate the connections between social justice and environmental justice that are foundational to food sovereignty efforts. It can also attend to questions of interspecies justice, an underexplored topic in food sovereignty discourse.

Food Sovereignty

Since the mid 1990's transnational coalitions of peasant activists have taken to the global stage to assert the need for food sovereignty. They do so in response to the corporatization and globalization of food networks, as well as the perceived inadequacy of global institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to address the inequities inherent in the "globalizing food regime" (Andree et al 2014; Schanbacher 2010). Food sovereignty remains an emerging and contestable structure of resistance, continuously being framed and reframed in the context of a

growing movement comprised of a diverse constituency of producers, processors and consumers around the world. But generally, food sovereignty asserts the right of peoples to define and organize their own agricultural and food systems so as to meet local needs and so as to secure access to land, water and seed. The concept is predicated on a more egalitarian dispersal of power (Patel 2010), and valorizes "localized, accountable, and democratic economic decision-making…in ways that link local communities as part of regional and global movements" (Andree et al 2014, 11). In Wittman's words, "As an organizing principle, food sovereignty covers a variety of related aims and action areas that involve the unification of social, environmental and agricultural principles" (2010, 96).

La Vía Campesina was the group that first elaborated the concept of food sovereignty and remains the most politically influential transnational agrarian movement. It was founded in 1993 as a transnational alliance between farmers organizations from Latin America, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America, following the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), where the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights were signed (Desmarais 2007). These agreements were criticized for focusing on technical problems and maintaining the status quo with regard to global trade rather than addressing food as a human right denied to many, especially those living in the global south. La Vía Campesina emerged as an international peasant-led initiative formed to collectively speak out against further globalization of an industrial, corporate-led model of agriculture (Desmarais 2007; Desmarais et al 2014). The movement ultimately aimed to build an alternative model of agriculture centered on the idea of food sovereignty. La Vía

Campesina adopted an intentional strategy of building solidarity amongst geographically, culturally, and organizationally diverse peasant and farmer groups, predominantly in the global south, that were facing similar struggles in response to globalizing food regimes (Desmarais 2014, 91). As of 2011, La Vía Campesina connects 164 local and national organizations in 73 countries, representing about 200 million farmers. It remains at the forefront of the growing global food sovereignty movement that involves rural- and urban-based environmental, social, and feminist movements, as well as consumer groups, fishers, farmers and pastoralists, and other social actors (Desmarais et al 2014).

La Vía Campesina asserted the need for food sovereignty as a direct response to the inadequacy of the discourse and policies centering on "food security." In an attempt to address the devastating problem of global hunger, the FAO focused its efforts on articulating and building policies around the idea of food security: "A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO 2003, quoted in Werkheiser and Noll 2014, 205-206). In the later half of the twentieth century, with the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the WTO, global food security was increasingly managed through economic policies centered on the idea that economic growth, via market mechanisms, is the most suitable solution for addressing poverty and achieving food security (Schanbacher 2010).

Food security remains a prominent goal along several axes in food discourse, from international trade policies to local food advocates who focus on alleviating the problem of "food deserts." However, many activists and theorists contend that food

security remains committed to the systemic maximization of food production and that the globalized economic system it is bound to is characterized by inequity and injustice. As Wittman claims, "contemporary policies aimed at food security offer no real possibility for changing the existing inequitable, social, political and economic structures and policies that peasant movements believe are the very causes of the social and environmental destruction in the countryside in both the North and the South" (2010, 3). Critics contend that the food security orientation relies on and reinforces a model of globalization that reduces human relationships to their economic value (Andree et al 2014; Schanbacher 2010). Alternatively, the food sovereignty model considers human relations in rich rather than reductionist terms, recognizing mutual dependence, cultural diversity, and embeddedness in place.

La Vía Campesina argued that food sovereignty was actually a prerequisite for achieving food security: "Long-term food security depends on those who produce food and care for the natural environment…Food sovereignty is the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity" (La Vía Campesina 2010 [1996], 197). It laid out seven principle commitments that would ground the concept of food sovereignty and serve as preconditions for recognizing people as genuinely food secure (La Vía Campesina 1996): 1) that food is a basic human right, 2) agrarian reform that remedies landlessness, 3) protection of natural resources and biodiversity, 4) reorganization of the food trade to emphasize self-sufficiency, 5) ending the globalization of hunger,[1] 6) social peace, and,

[1] By this they meant to highlight the way that the growing control of multinational corporations over food systems was "facilitated by the economic policies of multilateral

7) democratic control. La Vía Campesina and its global partners proceeded to formulate and reformulate the concept over the course of the following decade, but these principles remain its foundation. The following oft-cited description of food sovereignty comes from the Forum for Food Sovereignty, held in Mali in 2007. (I include a lengthy excerpt here in order to demonstrate the "laundry list" nature of the description. I will also return to the emphases of this passage throughout the chapter.)

> *Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems*. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local producers. *Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralist-led grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic sustainability.* Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. *Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations* (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007, my emphasis).

Patel (2010) has observed that this description of food sovereignty is clearly a "definition by committee," including as it does such a wide variety of perspectives, concerns, and priorities. As a consequence there are some tensions inherent in this description itself; for example, the simultaneous emphasis on the construction of "new social relations" and the reinforcement of *family* farming, "when the family is one of the oldest factories for

---

organizations such as the WTO, World Bank and the IMF" (La Vía Campesina 2010 [1996], 199).

patriarchy" (Patel 2010, 190). Nevertheless, from this description we can discern and continue to elaborate on the key principles and aims of the food sovereignty movement.

First and foremost, from this description we can see that central to the concept is the idea that the nature and structure of food systems ought to be determined by the producers and consumers themselves rather than corporations or the "market" more abstractly. There is an underlying recognition of the tangible connections between land/food and farmer, between farmer and consumer, and between individuals of various social groups (recall Heldke's "earthy contextuality.") Furthermore, the Declaration advocates malleability in structuring and restructuring actual food systems, giving food sovereignty a conceptual flexibility that makes it particularly well suited to being reframed for application in different cultural and political contexts. We begin to see that food sovereignty can be appropriated, transformed, and tailored for localized "micro-resistance" (Ayres and Bosia, 2011). The reader should note that the first mention of the local does not occur until halfway through the statement. And when prioritizing the local is mentioned, the "national" immediately follows it. In the Declaration, local control is advocated insofar as it promotes sustainability, transparency and democratic determination of the structure of food systems. The emphasis of this statement is on democratically including a plurality of voices with special attention given to marginalized, non-corporate voices. Note that there is no implication that the local scale is somehow good in itself. To me, this indicates the concept's promise as an appropriately place-based third option between cosmopolitanism/globalism and provincialism/localism.

The food sovereignty concept recognizes that social justice (intergenerational, gender, racial and so on) is practically bound to ecological sustainability. As in

environmental activism generally, the concept of "sustainability" itself remains nebulous and under-examined in food sovereignty discourse. Sustainability implies the ability to meet present needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Plumwood 2003, 1). For many food activists "sustainability" retains a largely human-centered focus, indicating the maintenance of viability for long-term human use. As we saw in chapter two, the notion of sustainability developed in American agrarian thought remains largely human-centered, though the human is recognized as an ecologically constituted being (Thompson 2010). But the sustainability concept is limited/hindered by being a human-centered, distributive concept (one concerned with the distribution of goods across present and future generations of humans). Plumwood (2003) argues that sustainability must be understood in terms of other, more fundamental, concepts such as environmental/interspecies justice and ecological rationality. Questions of environmental justice have been deployed to examine the distribution of environmental risks, harms, and benefits across human populations (Shrader-Frechette 2002). A claim to sustainability must always be accompanied by questions of environmental justice: ethical and political questions of "who gets what, when, why, and how much," (Plumwood 2003, 2) in the present as well as in the future. As should be obvious by now, on Plumwood's and my own view, limiting the scope of justice to human concern is itself an injustice; environmental justice is better understood as having an interspecies distributive aspect. She writes, "Interspecies distributive justice principles should stress the need to share the earth with other species (including difficult and inconvenient ones…) and provide adequate habitat for species life and reproduction" (Plumwood 2002, 117). As a distributive concept, sustainability should attend to human

and nonhuman needs, but "the standard concept is too exclusionary or is too vague about this" (Plumwood 2003, 3).

As I described in chapter one, Plumwood makes clear that situating human life ecologically and situating nonhuman life ethically are the key tasks of ecological rationality. An understanding of sustainability consistent with ecological rationality should reflect an attention to interspecies justice and to building human social structures that are consistent with the flourishing and resilience of ecological systems. Plumwood writes, "An ecologically rational society would be sustainable to the extent that its corrective capacities enable it to make consistently good ecological decisions that maintain viable ecological relationships and coordinate them with its social organisation" (Plumwood 2002, 68). So, for my purposes, we can think of sustainability as an aspect of ecological rationality, which indicates that a practice or policy provides for the long-term flourishing and adaptability of individuals, communities, and ecological systems. We will see how elements of this understanding of sustainability are present in food sovereignty efforts as the chapter progresses.

Of course, the food sovereignty concept is not without its detractors. Given the scope of principles set out in La Vía Campesina's 1996 statement, and the range of commitments outlined in the 2007 Declaration of Nyéléni, *food* is supposed to do a lot of very difficult work. One might wonder whether this is too heavy a burden for the food movement to carry (Werkheiser and Noll 2014, 208). Some would say that the breadth of food sovereignty's call to radical change is more of a weakness than a strength. As Flora notes, there is a tendency to group all manner of activist efforts "from the Zapatistas to the women's movement" under the label of food sovereignty (2011, 545). The danger of

this radical inclusion is the diffusion of the concept and a movement without clear priorities. Indeed, the recommendations are somewhat vague on the macro-level of transnational alliances and activists groups on the ground vary their application.[2] Thus I see a two-part objection: that food sovereignty as a concept and a movement simultaneously 1) lacks cohesion and 2) over-determines the role of food in achieving social justice.[3]

This tension has not gone unrecognized by food sovereignty theorists and activists. Regarding cohesion and diversity within the food sovereignty movement, Brazilian Vía Campesina leader Itelvina Masioli says, "Our concept of sovereignty has to be linked to a project of agriculture...I think that we have to continue constructing from our practice, respecting the differences that exist, but the principles should have merit for all of us wherever we are" (Masioli and Nicholson 2010, 44). In other words, there exist principle commitments that underlie differences in practice and allow for a political cohesion in the food sovereignty movement. Recognizing the diffusion problem, Raj Patel argues that "at the core of programme there needs to lie an internally consistent set of ideas" (2010, 189). On my view, this must amount to more than a list of demands presented year after year at global summits. One of those consistent ideas needs to be a robust conception of justice. We have already seen that, in being articulated as an

[2] See Masioli and Nicholson for an insightful conversation regarding the similarities and differences in "strategies, tactics and political approaches to implementing food sovereignty in different agroecological, cultural and political contexts" (2010, 33-34).
[3] This objection is not unlike the general worry regarding lack of cohesion that is sometimes raised against ecofeminist positions (Warren 2000). Rather than undermining the approach, such objections simply speak to the importance of projects like mine that provide frameworks for theoretical cohesion, while attempting to make moral and political responses more determinate at the conceptual level in a way that can yet inform and be informed by practice and advocacy.

alternative to food security, food sovereignty does not rely on a limited conception of distributive justice. The appeal to mutuality in understanding the relationships between individuals, community, and land points us to a conception of justice that is consonant with the ethical framework that I outlined in chapter one of this project. Ecological feminism, in conversation with food sovereignty practice, can help to provide a conceptual framework that clarifies how the seemingly diffuse aims of sustainability, economic security, social empowerment, and more, are fundamentally interconnected. The role of food production and consumption appears over-determined precisely because it is located at this nexus of justice concerns.

Advocacy for food sovereignty has emerged as an ever-more prominent call to re-envision the politics of food. As Raj Patel notes, "the movement is not simply rejecting processes of globalization, but rather calling for legal, economic, and political rights that challenge the fundamental grounding of how we conceive of themes such as justice, equality, and democracy" (2007, 203). In other words, in many ways food sovereignty has emerged as a call to re-envision politics and ethical social relations in general. On my view an ecofeminist engagement with the concept helps to illuminate why and how.

Ecological Feminism and Food Sovereignty: Contributions

The food sovereignty concept captures many important features of an ecological feminist ethic. Most obviously, a commitment to gender equity has been embedded in the food sovereignty concept from the beginning. The "democratic control" component of La Vía Campesina's original call to food sovereignty ends by asserting, "Rural women, in particular, must be granted direct and active decision-making on food and rural issues" (2010 [1996], 199). Each prominent articulation of the concept from transnational

alliances has included a direct call to address gender injustice.[4] Efforts to acknowledge women's central role in food production and to address patriarchal oppression and violence against women figure prominently on La Vía Campesina's website as well. See, for example, this statement from the group's summation of its own history and efforts: "Women play a crucial role in the Via Campesina work. According to the FAO, women produce 70% of the food on earth but they are marginalized and oppressed by neoliberalism and patriarchy. The movement defends women's rights and gender equality at all levels. It struggles against all forms of violence against women (La Vía Campesina 2011).

This long-term, prominent emphasis on the need to address gender justice alongside questions of sustainability should appeal to ecological feminists, but others might wonder why gender figures so prominently in a food movement. Why should the attainment of food sovereignty require the active resistance of patriarchy and violence against women? As in the statement from La Vía Campesina above, most explanations begin with the fact that women constitute the majority of the world's food producers (and preparers too, it should be noted). Thus, the most obvious argument is the following one, articulated by Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe: "Because women play a key role in food production and procurement, food preparation, family food security and food culture, the social and political transformation embedded in the food sovereignty concept specifically entails changed gender relations" (2010, 5). In other words, if the majority of the world's

[4] For example: "Upholding gender equity and equality in all policies and practices concerning food production" (Our World Is Not for Sale 2010 [2001], 205). And: "Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations" (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007).

food producers are women, then agricultural policy is a women's issue. And insofar as patriarchal social relations continue to dominate the globe, then changing agricultural policies will require explicit attention to gender injustice. Patel (2012) also importantly notes that women suffer disproportionately from hunger, malnutrition, and related diseases due to the inequitable distribution of power at the household level. These are strong enough reasons to make attention to gender equity an explicit part of the food sovereignty concept.

However, I maintain that the ecological feminist perspective that I'm working with can provide additional theoretical reasons for the centrality of gender to food sovereignty discourse. My reading positions food sovereignty's call to social justice as embedded in a truly radical re-thinking of dominant conceptual frameworks, and re-envisioning of political and ethical relations. The ecological feminist perspective provides a much-needed conceptual foundation for understanding why those most concerned with food policy would, for example, mobilize a campaign to end violence against women (La Vía Campesina 2015). The foundational ecofeminist claim is that there are historical, conceptual, and material connections between the degradation of nature and the devaluing of women (and to this we ought to add the parallel devaluing of indigenous and colonized human others). On Plumwood's ecological feminist view, the structure for these connections is a rationalist conceptual framework that elevates (masculine) human economic reason over all else – the feminine, the bodily, the natural, the nonhuman, the indigenous, etc. The "globalized food regime" (Andree et al 2014) is governed by the norms of "rational" economics, under which the environment is to be treated as a mere resource for turning a profit. Food is regarded as a mere commodity and

the social impacts of globalization on local communities are not relevant decision-making factors. To fundamentally resist this regime will require a radical rethinking of this rationalist, centrist conceptual structure as well as a political reorganization of power. As the masculine/feminine conceptual dichotomy figures prominently in this rationalist framework, an explicit attention to gender and gender justice will also figure prominently in dismantling it. Food sovereignty challenges the assumption of food as commodity and food producers as merely rational economic actors. It recognizes the co-constituting relationship between self and other, community and place. It recognizes and revalues the knowledge and agency of those with experience in subsistence food production. On my view, these recognitions constitute a deeper commitment to feminist aims, going beyond the observation of the sheer number of women directly affected by specific agricultural policies.

Moreover, food sovereignty, like ecofeminism, recognizes and relies on an integrated relationship between theory and practice. We began to see this in Masioli's comments above when she describes the *concept* of food sovereignty and the *project* of agriculture as necessarily linked in a way that creates a politically coherent set of practices. She goes on to say, "It is an arduous struggle to ensure our concept of food sovereignty, of the autonomy of peoples, continues to have real power. It can't stay fixed in concepts only" (Masioli and Nicholson 2010, 35). Warren's (2000) imagery of theory-building as quilting is helpful here. The borders of the quilt are created by some basic necessary conditions, giving the quilt its boundaries and structure, while the patterns of the quilt emerge from the diversity of visions and practices of the quilters who construct and patch it over time (Warren 2000, 66-67). Fittingly, plots of land under cultivation

resemble quilts from above. Both quilting and farming are highly contextual; for me farming is an obvious case in which practices, experiments, and histories on the land will necessarily directly inform any theories that are formed regarding human-nonhuman relationship. Those theories in turn will shape and reshape ongoing practices, and for a theory to obtain any real staying power or impact, it will need to be implicated in practices.

Most importantly, though, the *ecological feminist modes of moral response* that I detailed in chapter one of this project – care, respect, and solidarity – are all purposefully located in the food sovereignty concept. Recall that, following Plumwood, I've described the modes of moral response as situated within a counterhegemonic, context-sensitive moral framework; as the attitudinal and behavioral outcomes of adopting a particular posture in the world, one oriented toward recognizing the intentionality of human and nonhuman others. As with Heldke's "third option," such a framework requires a simultaneous recognition of continuity between "categories," and difference within them. I then argued that care emerges as a moral response to the recognition of continuity, respect emerges from the recognition of difference, and solidarity critically integrates these responses for political purposes. All three of these determinable modes are evident in the food sovereignty concept and become more determinate in food sovereignty practices.

Respect

The core of respect is the acknowledgement of others' fullness of being. Thus, as I described it in chapter one, respect constrains my ability to regard the other as a mere background to my own projects, or as a resource to service my own ends. Active moral

responses that are respectful will put constraints on our interactions with others, for example by prohibiting particular kinds of instrumental use and appropriation. Respect is central to the food sovereignty concept and project in three ways. First, those who appeal to food sovereignty are calling for their own recognition as agents with their own immediate and long-term aims. It is a demand on the part of those who invoke the concept to be "put on the moral agenda," so to speak -- a demand that their independent ends be recognized as both distinct and valuable. As the appeal to "sovereignty" implies, the aim is the realization of self-determination against the imposed ends of more powerful corporate/policy actors. Food sovereignty manifests respect insofar as sovereign food structures are built on the foundation of recognizing the knowledge, agency, and competence of a wide variety of actors, especially actors whose knowledge, agency and competence has historically been erased. Second, relatedly, as a coalition project, food sovereignty requires respectful acknowledgment of difference across human and nonhuman communities. Food sovereignty explicitly rejects a "one-size fits all" understanding of the relationships between food and culture, agriculture and nature, communities and the state.

Kyle Whyte argues that the best way to understand indigenous food systems is as collective capacities, or "*unique, hard to replace means* through which collectives can *exercise self-determination* in adapting to disruptive metascale forces" (2015, 148, *my emphasis*). In other words, indigenous food systems allow communities a robust way to protect quality of life. The disruption of indigenous food systems by "metascale forces" like settlement and appropriation, or climate change, results in an interference with communities' capacities for self-determination. Whyte convincingly argues that attention

to this kind of disruption indicates a need to understand environmental injustice against indigenous peoples as more than an unjust distribution of hazards and benefits. He indicates that a major part of the injustice is the removal of the communities' unique capacities to adapt to change.[5] The ecological feminist framework I am working with helps us to understand the injustice in question as a fundamental failure of respect. Inscribing the logic ("ecologies" in Whyte's language) of settlement reflects the failure to acknowledge the fullness of human-nonhuman agency and relationship that already exists in a given place. Affirming indigenous food sovereignty, then, becomes a manifestation of respect insofar as it embodies the recognition of difference in acknowledging the intentions and capacities of others. Indigenous communities that work toward a resurgence of food sovereignty manifest the call to be respected in attitudes, policies, and practices.

Finally, the food sovereignty movement's commitment to promoting biological diversity reflects a respect for nature. Just as gender equity has been embedded in the food sovereignty concept from the beginning, so too has the call to promote biodiversity (La Vía Campesina 2010 [1996]; Declaration of Nyeleni, 2007; Shiva 1997b). The focus of this call has typically been on the right of local peoples with local knowledges to the ability to maintain a diversified agricultural system, especially including a diversified seed stock. La Via Campesina participated in meetings at the United Nations Conference of the Parties Convention on Biological Diversity (COP8 in 2006, and COP9 in 2008) (Wittman 2010, 100). In these meetings it contested the concentration of seed ownership at the hands of multinational agribusiness for its implications for the ability of local

[5] For more on food sovereignty and "adaptation," in particular to the forces of climate change, see McMichael (2010, 174-177).

peoples to access a diverse seed stock. Maintenance of seed biodiversity is an ecologically rational approach to agriculture; what would appropriately be termed agroecological rationality. “In an era of climatic uncertainty, access to biologically resilient seeds that can be utilized under changing conditions is critical for ensuring not only local food security but also for maintaining a foundation for agroecological resilience” (Wittman 2010, 99). So it is not just for the sake of the human participants in agricultural systems that the promotion of biodiversity is important. There is a latent respect for nature’s difference here, its richness, resilience, and resources. There is respect in the recognition that different species and varieties are well suited to different contexts and are not easily interchangeable. Moreover, many food sovereignty activists are opposed, in principle, to the patenting of genetic material (“Our World is Not for Sale” 2010[2001], 201, 205). To me this reflects a deeper respect for nonhuman life as an independent center of agency. As I will discuss later on in this chapter, I do think that this element of interspecies respect could be emphasized more in the recognition of nonhuman contributions to food sovereignty. To do so would amplify the idea that food sovereignty is both a social and an environmental ethical concept.

Care

Care is connected to the recognition of continuity, kinship, and embeddedness. In embracing continuity, care takes our particular relationships to be sites of responsibility. Inspired by the work of Tronto (1993), I described care as connoting a fundamental attachment to others that fosters sensitivity to their needs. An attitude of care recognizes mutual dependence and that care is necessary, and it assumes a level of responsibility for the identified need. Active moral responses that are caring are sensitively responsive and

competently executed. Food sovereignty relies on such an understanding of the responsibility to take care as endemic to relationships of mutual dependence.

The care response fundamentally underlies the commitment of food sovereignty activists to support agroecological practices. Food sovereignty advocates tend to emphasize the importance of supporting diversified, sustainable farms as part of a robust regional and national food system. In agroecology, "the emphasis is on agricultural systems in which ecological interactions and synergisms between biological components provide the mechanisms for the system to sponsor its own soil fertility, productivity and crop protection" (Altieri 2010). Attending to the particularities of a given agroecosystems reduces dependence on high chemical and energy inputs. It also reframes the role of the human in the agricultural system from that of master to that of partner. As I described in chapter two, agroecology can serve as an example of how to reject interspecies ranking (between humans and nonhumans, and also plants and animals) in agricultural contexts. The partnership orientation facilitates the recognition of mutual dependence between local peoples (and their cultures) and local agroecosystems and prompts the ethical recognition of the need to take care. The caretaking that occurs in agroecological practices is most successful when it is sensitively responsive to feedback and competently executed.

Many of the farmers involved in the food sovereignty movement understand themselves as having a privileged epistemic position when it comes to the health of the land, a position that creates special caretaking responsibilities (La Vía Campesina 2011; Masioli and Nicholson 2010, 44; Holt-Giménez 2006). The market-driven, corporate system relies on abstraction through commodification, and the interchangeability of

producers, consumers, and products. So, one of the problems of globalization that food sovereignty efforts aim to resist is the concentration of power that erases the ability to competently attend to differences in local needs. The democratization of decision-making through food sovereignty reflects a caring attention to the particularities of place, but food sovereignty activists do not rely on the simplistic claims of defensive localism in order to resist globalization.

I should note here that there are actually significant, worrying exceptions to this claim. Food sovereignty was intentionally articulated as a concept that is well-suited to reframing in particular places for localized "micro-resistance" to neoliberal globalization (Ayres and Bosia 2011). However, as the concept has been reframed and applied in the US context, the tendency has been to understand food sovereignty as a matter of the hyper-local control of food networks. Fairburn's (2012) survey of US food activism groups' websites confirms the tendency to reify the local. If this trend continues, then food sovereignty will lose many of the desirable aspects that I'm describing here, its subversive potential will be stifled, and it will become yet another localist justificatory concept along the lines of agrarian character, with the attendant problems I've previously identified.

In chapter one I made the point of emphasizing that while respect and care have different emphases, encompass different kinds of actions, and ought to be regarded in important ways as distinct, it would be wrong to think of these modes as completely separable. I indicated that there is significant danger in thinking that one can be appropriately respectful without the caring recognition of particularity, and danger in attempting to take care without respect for difference and separation. Here again, it is

worth emphasizing that while respect and care can be independently identified as modes of moral response in the context of food sovereignty, the two remain integrated in significant ways. To illustrate this, take Eric Holt-Giménez's description of "campesino pedagogy," within the context of the Movimiento Campesino a Campesino (MCAC) in Latin America. He describes agricultural practices as shared between farmers in a way that reflects a "deeper, culturally embedded exchange in which *knowledge is generated and shared*" (2006, 78, original emphasis). This is a reflection of a set of social relations and the recognition of mutuality in the formation of those relations and the generated body of knowledge. This creates a sort of "knowledge commons" that is "accessed individually but cared for and cultivated by all" (Holt-Giménez 2006, 96). The ongoing success of campesino pedagogy relies on the idea that those who receive knowledge from others have an obligation to share what they learn and give back to the movement by teaching others. Holt-Giménez insists that these activities are neither instrumentalist nor altruistic, but primarily guided by reciprocity and solidarity (2006, 95).

Solidarity

In food sovereignty efforts, *solidarity*, or "standing with the other in a supportive relationship in the political sense" (Plumwood 2002, 202), comes to the fore. I argued that in solidarity respect and care are integrated for political purposes in response to injustice. Solidarity recognizes the material and historical connections between particular relationships and local situations and those of distant others, while maintaining the appropriate constraints set by respect. The language of food sovereignty is consciously political language; it moves beyond food as merely a natural good or a cultural commodity, to recognizing it as the "locus of highly charged political struggles" (Masioli

and Nicholson 2010, 33). As we have seen, food sovereignty explicitly connects the issue of food provisioning to social justice and questions of power disparity, including disparities based on gender, race and ethnicity. The food sovereignty movement broadly, and the subgroups that directly contribute to the movement's efforts, form a solidary collective, united by the commitment to redressing food injustice. This commitment to the shared cause implies the moral activity of solidarity: reflection and criticism, dialogue and cooperative activism (Scholz 2008).

Global action on food sovereignty relies on the practical strategies of building alliances and cooperation within and among other environmental and social justice movements (Masioli and Nicholson 2010, 39-41; Desmarais et al, 2014). Building alliances on the recognition of shared struggles amongst the world's food producers, peasants, and indigenous populations leads immediately to the navigation of tensions and difference in experience and immediate priorities within those alliances. As Paul Nicholson, a Vía Campesina leader in Basque country has said, "in the Basque country, we're identifying the diversity of resistances, the practices as well as the demands. In alliance building it is important to take part in dialogue, there's room for internal differences, there are many issues yet to be discussed" (Masioli and Nicholson 2010, 41). Thus the need to negotiate conflict and disagreements, the need to discuss and incorporate multiple perspectives at multiple scales while attending to questions of power, is built into the concept of food sovereignty. Transnational alliances promoting food sovereignty function on an understanding of dialogue amongst different knowledges and ways of knowing that are shared horizontally rather than imposed "top-down" (Rosset and Martínez-Torres 2014). As Schanbacher (2010, 55) notes, any critical

examination of food sovereignty "reveals the complex and heterogeneous makeup of peasant, family, and small-scale agricultural communities," and understanding this complexity and diversity of communities and traditions allows us to avoid romanticizing them and/or conceiving of them as "passive subjects of the globalization process." This is a significant departure from the conceptual limitations of the American agrarian perspective that I identified in chapter three of this project. As I described, the American agrarian traditions tends to rely on a conception of rural cultural unity, and tends to portray rural populations as powerless against the onslaught of industrialization. This results in an inability to address local level conflicts in an adequate way, producing a tension in its portrayal of the conceptual and material relationships between ecological health and social justice.

Seed Sovereignty: Nonhumans and Food Sovereignty

My descriptions of the modes of moral response as they manifest in food sovereignty do have a social justice emphasis. It is important to recall that on my view social and environmental justice are inextricably entangled. However, I suggest that there is room for further development with regard to the idea of nature as a partner in food sovereignty. An ecological feminist account is able to meaningfully contribute to the food sovereignty concept by highlighting and expanding on the role of nonhuman beings in enacting food sovereignty. On my view, this is an underdeveloped area of food sovereignty discourse. As I described above, the commitment to the preservation of biodiversity reflects a respect for species' unique qualities. And food sovereignty efforts centered on agroecological practices do seem to reflect a genuine care for and responsiveness to the nonhuman members of agroecosystems. Such farming practices,

grounded in the particularities of place-based knowledge, are responsive to land, species, and place; I think this is rightly identified as ethical caretaking. The farming practices themselves reflect an orientation toward partnership with nonhuman nature as central to food sovereignty. But while the concept and movement center on the idea of "sustainability" in agriculture, as with the American agrarian tradition, this idea most frequently remains framed in terms of long-term human use (Altieri 2010, La Vía Campesina 2010[1996], 198). Plumwood's view on sustainability, points us in another direction. An ecologically rational understanding of sustainability reflects an attention to interspecies justice and to building human social structures that are consistent with the flourishing and resilience of ecological systems. As should now be clear, this understanding of sustainability that reflects both social and environmental justice is latent in food sovereignty discourse. The ecological feminist view presented here reveals that it can, and should, be amplified to solidify food sovereignty as central to a thorough social and environmental ethic.

An ecological feminist perspective reveals the importance of highlighting the agency of nonhuman beings and entities. As I described in chapter two of this project, the modes of moral response are prompted by adopting a stance of openness to human and nonhuman others, resulting in a commitment to interspecies egalitarianism. To me the interspecies egalitarian claim is not only compatible with the democratic commitments of food sovereignty, but in fact takes those commitments to their logical conclusion. As Patel (2010) reminds us, the claim that communities are entitled to construct their own relational structures is only meaningful when *everyone* is able to substantively engage with them. "But the prerequisites for this are a society in which the equality-distorting

effects of sexism, patriarchy, racism and class power have been eradicated" (Patel 2010, 154). Thus a commitment to egalitarianism is a fundamental prerequisite to sovereignty; indeed, it is a prerequisite to having the discussion at all. Certainly nonhumans are community members in a nontrivial sense, and I have argued in support of Plumwood's view that the recognition of nonhuman agency is partly constitutive of ethical ecological selfhood. Thus extending the egalitarian commitments of food sovereignty to more fully recognize the mutuality of human-nonhuman relationships is appropriate. An easy entry point for a more robust discussion of interspecies egalitarianism and the role of nonhumans in creating food sovereignty is through the already prevalent topic of seeds.

Access to and control over seeds is a fundamental component of food sovereignty efforts, with seeds taking on a powerful symbolic and material role in active resistance to the industrialized, corporate-driven food system (McMichael 2010, 177; Wittman et al 2010, 11). Since the 1990s, the leading voice of seed sovereignty as a radical response to the patent system has been Indian physicist, feminist, philosopher Vandana Shiva. She founded *Navdanya*, a women-centered network of seed keepers and food producers committed to the protection of biological and cultural diversity and the rejuvenation of indigenous knowledge (Navdanya 2016a; Shiva 2005, 92). Navdanya presents its seed saving, educational programs, and advocacy work as *satyagraha*, or Gandhian nonviolent resistance (Navdanya 2016b). Thus Shiva writes, "The seed has become the site and symbol of freedom in an age of manipulation and monopoly of its diversity. It plays the role of Gandhi's spinning wheel in this period of neocolonization through free trade. The charkha (spinning wheel) became an important symbol of freedom because it was small; it could come alive as a sign of resistance and creativity in the smallest of huts and

poorest of families" (Shiva 1997, 126). Many food sovereignty advocates agree, and seed keeping as a manifestation of sovereignty has taken a central place in food sovereignty discourse and activism.

However, despite all of the attention given to the role of seeds for the attainment of human food sovereignty, the sovereignty *of the seeds themselves* is seldom given explicit attention in food sovereignty discourse. On one page of a Navdanya brochure (2016a, 7) is the image of heritage Indian wheat overlaid with the words "I am not an invention." This powerful but marginal claim is the closest to an assertion of nonhuman agency being central to food sovereignty that I've seen. It is a claim that is unsurprising given Shiva's own significant contributions to ecofeminist thinking (2002; Mies and Shiva 1993), and in particular to our understanding of the material implications of epistemological monocultures in science and technology (1997a; 1997b). For Shiva, dominant knowledge systems generalize from a particular privileged perspective, encouraging universalizing or "monocultural" thinking. When supported by social power and capital, "monocultures of the mind make diversity disappear, from perception and consequently from the world (Shiva 1997b, 5). Movements to protect diversity in nature and culture consciously make space for the recognition of nondominant (human and nonhuman) knowledge and agency. So the assertion that a plant is not a human invention, with the implication that it is a center of meaning and value unto itself, makes sense coming from an organization founded by Shiva. What is surprising to me is that other food sovereignty activists and advocates tend not to prioritize or amplify the critical importance of nonhuman sovereignty, and human beings' role in nurturing it.

I contend that nonhuman agency and role of nonhumans in agri*culture* must be further emphasized so as to highlight the nontrivial contributions of nonhumans to achieving the sovereignty of place-based food production. So I mention seed sovereignty in order to assert the point that the *seeds themselves* play an essential part in the attainment of human and nonhuman flourishing. To me this is evident in the practice itself insofar as seed collectives and exchanges are culture builders/restorers. As Wittman notes, "the idea of reciprocity between humanity and nature is especially evident here, as the seed biodiversity of food crops has expanded tremendously through human actions over the past millennia, even as the number of commercially grown species continues to diminish under the industrial food regime" (2010, 101). The mutuality evidenced in human-plant community of the seed collective points toward the space for recognizing interspecies egalitarianism the practice. Thus the ecological feminist perspective on food sovereignty allows us to identify and engage something that has as yet been under-examined in food/seed sovereignty discourse. In seed sovereignty efforts we can clearly see that being in communicative relationships of care, respect and solidarity with nonhuman others allows those others to be a nontrivial part of the sovereign structuring of food systems. Thus the ecological feminist perspective would take food sovereignty's call to egalitarianism seriously, and purposefully extend it even further into the realm of human-nonhuman interrelationship.

In summary, we can see now how food sovereignty meets Heldke's (2012) conditions for a robust third option between localism and cosmopolitanism with regard to food and agriculture. It manifests "earthy contextuality" in its recognition of mutuality through care, and its requirement that food systems be built by people with localized

knowledge who are responsive to the needs of human-ecological communities. The strategic practices of food sovereignty activism navigate the simultaneous recognition of heterogeneity within local communities and substantive connections across communities. Clearly, food sovereignty exhibits agri*cultural* concern wherein the co-constituting relationship between culture and place, food and community, humans and nonhuman nature are embraced. And finally, food sovereignty is explicitly concerned with enabling the conceptualization and enactment of justice and sustainability, "two sociopolitical aims toward which many eaters are attempting to aim our forks" (Heldke 2012, 46). Thus food sovereignty embodies this third, antidualistic option, reflecting its ability to put the modes of moral response into subversive practice. Respect, care, and solidarity can all be purposefully located in food sovereignty efforts, and meaningfully contribute to the movements' understanding of "good food" as a collaborative achievement of social and environmental justice. The ecological feminist conceptual framework grounds food sovereignty's principle claims regarding the interplay between ecological health, economic and political self-determination, and social justice. In this ethical-political framework we can coherently situate the seemingly disparate, "laundry list" aims and efforts of food sovereignty activists, and recognize their counterhegemonic power. The global food sovereignty movement, and its many regional and localized activisms, provides a wonderful model of place-based ecological feminist food justice. I will provide a final, general summary of my preferred vision of food justice in the conclusion to this dissertation, to which I now turn.

CONCLUSION

Place-based Ecological Feminist Food Justice

This dissertation has been a theoretical project that aims to enhance an ecological feminist ethical framework and use it to evaluate prominent alternatives for thinking about the possibilities of ethical agriculture. This conclusion will briefly summarize the project, lay the cornerstones of an ecological feminist food justice, and then indicate just a few avenues for future research projects.

Working with Val Plumwood's moral philosophy, in chapter one I provided a more robust account of the key modes of moral response – respect, care, and solidarity – highlighting their respective emphases and distinct roles in a counterhegemonic ethical framework, while maintaining context-sensitivity. In chapter two, I anticipated and responded to potential objections regarding the very possibility of ethical agriculture. I argued that a kind of interspecies equality was in fact compatible with an agricultural project that was oriented toward mutual flourishing. In chapter three I went on to argue that the ecological feminist concept of self prompts a multidimensional place-sensitivity, necessarily attuned to the connections between ecological flourishing and social justice. Doing this theoretical work set the foundation for demonstrating how different understandings of "good food" benefit from thoughtful engagement with the ecological feminist perspective. In chapter three I demonstrated that while American agrarianism is keenly attentive to the relationship of co-constitution between humanity and the land, it as yet lacks the resources for recognizing the importance of solidarity as a mode of moral

response, and its conception of community requires an infusion of respect for human difference. In chapter four I argued that the key modes of moral response and a multidimensional understanding of place were all purposefully located in the concept and practice of food sovereignty. Despite room for improvement with regard to addressing interspecies justice, the food sovereignty movement is a promising arena for identifying and enacting ethical food relationships.

Everything that I've done here aids in sketching a more general vision of food justice that is appropriately place-based and consistent with an ecological feminist ethic. As inspired by Val Plumwood's (1993, 2002) philosophical framework, it is explicitly anti-dualistic and thus counterhegemonic. The view resists rigid and hierarchical distinctions between human and animal, culture and nature, masculine and feminine, self and other, public and private, global and local. It is also consistent with Karen Warren's (2000, 98-102) "boundary conditions" for ecofeminist theorizing, the most important of which are that it is context-sensitive, resistant of social domination, and inclusive of multiple (especially underrepresented) perspectives. As a vision of *food* justice, it also meets Heldke's (2012) conditions for navigating the space between cosmopolitanism and localism. It recognizes the necessary links between culture and agriculture in ways that allow us to conceptualize and enact justice.

Given this theoretical positioning, the following are critical aspects of my preferred view of food justice. First, it is fundamentally grounded in the general ecological feminist recognition of (biological, ecological, social, and political) continuity and difference. The embrace of ecological and social relationality allows for the recognition of self as bound to and dependent on others, yet simultaneously differently

constituted and socially positioned. Our food relationships capture this state of dependence and independence, similarity and difference, in a way that makes ecological selfhood obvious. The embrace of ecological selfhood generally informs the posture that ethical agents strive to adopt as they move about in the world and the moral responses animated by that posture. I have argued that an ecological feminist justice should adopt a specific understanding of respect and care as modes of response to difference and continuity respectively. This reveals the counterhegemonic force that these modes of moral response can wield when they are manifest in certain contexts. Thus, in the context of industrial agriculture systems, where the difference between human and nonhuman animals is exaggerated and cemented for the purposes of exploitation, appealing to continuity and responding to dependence with care becomes subversive. Likewise, in the context of local food advocacy where the cultural unity of the local is often exaggerated, drawing attention to cultural difference and disparities in social power is a much-needed reminder of the importance of respect.

Second, (interspecies) justice is the political achievement of this moral framework. The final identification of the view as an account of food *justice* rather than food *ethics* more generally is meant to emphasize the commitment to an understanding of food relationships, of production and consumption, as political. The notion of the "political" at work here is quite general. We can understand it as the production, reproduction, and distribution of social power through interactions and institutions, in this case through relations of production and consumption in the context of food systems. Justice is achieved when our relationships, social structures, and institutions consistently and enduringly reflect our ethical commitments to respond to conflict, competition,

cooperation, fallibility, and shared need with respect, care and solidarity. Food justice is achieved when food relationships and institutions consistently and enduringly reflect these ethical commitments. The question of whether true justice can ever be achieved is an open one, but to my mind it is not a pressing one given how much room for improvement there is in the dominant model of food relationship.

Third, my account of food justice will be appropriately place-based insofar as it reflects a multidimensional place-sensitivity that engages the entanglements of ecological flourishing and social justice. As I detailed in chapter three, the ecological self recognizes that a co-constituting relationship to place. The formative interaction between self and other occurs within contexts of systemic interdependence and influence, which are shaped by complex social and ecological histories and trajectories. Multidimensional place-sensitivity means a sensitivity to ecological dependencies, cycles, and shared risks, as well as to human-human and interspecies power relations.

Fourth, ecological feminist food justice will reflect and/or advocate for dialogical communication and democratic control – a sort of (ecological) self-determination – in the structuring of food systems. This element of the view draws most directly from the discourse on food sovereignty. Food sovereignty asserts the right of peoples to define and organize their own agricultural and food systems so as to meet local needs and so as to secure access to land, water and seed. Gender equity has been, and must continue to be a central component of the democratization efforts at the heart of food sovereignty campaigns. As I suggest in chapter four, there is room here to emphasize the importance of interspecies "dialogue" – a commitment to seeking feedback from nonhuman partners and ecological systems. What I have in mind is something akin to Shiva's "Earth

Democracy" (2005): a kind self-determination and independence of living economies and living cultures that yet remain ever aware of their connections and ecological entanglements.[1] Earth Democracy is inclusive of the diversity of human and nonhuman life on earth while recognizing the kinship and interdependence of the earth's inhabitants on one another. The autonomy it advocates for is built on a non-absolutist localization: one that recognizes localization as a test for justice and sustainability insofar as it internalizes social and ecological costs (Shiva 2005, 64, 82), and also recognizes ecological, economic, and political multi-scale interdependence.

Avenues for Future Research

My project leaves us well equipped to use this understanding of food justice to engage and evaluate arguments that a given method of food production, distribution, or consumption is "good." In the face of ethical claims about food – that one ought to support organic agriculture, ought to consume local produce, ought to avoid genetically modified organisms, and so on – we can of course ask: *why?* The reasons provided can be evaluated using the framework I have outlined here. We might find that the reasons provided aren't the best reasons and urge a shift in rhetoric and underlying ethical commitments. For example, I frequently hear that I should buy organic produce at my neighborhood Morningside Farmers' Market because it is more "natural" and therefore healthier than conventional produce from the supermarket. I can interrogate the concept

[1] Here I am appealing specifically to Shiva's articulation of democratic and dialogical cultures and economies. I am not, at this point, endorsing all of the conclusions she draws out of this articulation; for example, I think that further arguments must be given before rejecting all of genetic modification technology. Moreover, my appeal to Shiva's earth democracy concept does not commit me to any of her particular statements on gender or femininity, which have been the subject of disagreement in ecofeminist circles (Shiva 2002; Davion 1994; Cook 1998).

of the "natural" employed here using the ecological feminist framework, asking whether it is consistent with the counterhegemonic ethical stance that I am committed to, or whether it reproduces hegemonic assumptions. The examination reveals an uncritical conceptual association of the "natural" with a cluster of earth-, family-, and feminine-based concepts that are problematic from an ecological feminist standpoint (Portman 2014). The valorization of these associations is uncritical insofar as it is asserted without adequate attention to the social construction of concepts like femininity and family. The result is a mere reversal of value assignments in response to culture/nature, artificial/natural, global/local dualisms, rather than a rethinking of the dualistic conceptual framework itself (Portman 2014). I anticipate the dissertation work being used in future projects that would attempt to purposefully locate ethical responses – respect, care, solidarity – in particular systems, movements, and practices. I modeled such an approach in chapter four's description of food sovereignty. This can be done with micro level projects (how is the Morningside Farmers' Market organization thinking about and promoting its efforts?), as well as macro level projects (is the USDA formulating and responding to the phenomenon labeled "food deserts" in a responsible way?).

One immediate opportunity for employing the critical insights of this project is in examining the way that the food sovereignty concept is being reframed as it is taken from the transnational sphere and applied in the context of US food movements. In chapter four I briefly indicated that when food advocacy groups in the US appeal to the food sovereignty concept explicitly, its meaning tends to be reduced to the hyper-local control of food networks (Fairburn 2012). By emphasizing local control while simultaneously de-

emphasizing transnational (or even trans-community) solidarity, food sovereignty becomes susceptible to justifying an unreflexive localism. As I argued in chapter three, the ecological feminist perspective reveals the limitations of an unreflexive localism. A future project would criticize a particular way of reframing food sovereignty in order to highlight its limitations, while at the same time maintaining an understanding of the possibilities that the food sovereignty concept opens up for a more egalitarian dispersal of power with regard to the practices and structure of food production and consumption.[2]

Additionally, US local food advocacy is criticized in academic circles as being unreflexive (Hinrichs 2000; DuPuis and Goodman 2005), as reinforcing neoliberal economic and political structures (Guthman 2008b; DeLind 2011; Alkon and Mares 2012), and, relatedly, as failing to attend to the dynamics of race and class (Slocum 2006; Guthman 2008a; Alkon and Mares 2012). The ecological feminist framework provides additional, theoretically robust grounding for such critiques.[3] I have already commented on the importance of ecological feminist critiques in understanding the limitations and the dangers of unquestioned localism. The ecological feminist framework presented here also rejects neoliberal assumptions regarding the primacy of the market as well as the over-emphasis on individual responsibility for one's own wellbeing. It thus provides a theoretical framework from which to critique discourses around food and agriculture that

[2] For a qualitative sociological study of the ways that food justice and community food security activism articulates with the idea of food sovereignty in low-income communities of color in the urban US, see Alkon and Mares (2012).

[3] Mallory (2013) provides an example of an ecofeminist engagement with food and place that is attentive to the entanglements of race and gender, and the patterns of inequality that emerge with the impetus to "shop local." My analysis provides additional resources for thinking about solutions to the problematic reproduction of existing social relations, by locating specific moral responses within the broader virtue- and place-based framework.

reinforce neoliberal subjectivities. Alkon and Mares (2012) argue that the shift toward a food sovereignty framework in US food justice activism requires a broader acknowledgment of and resistance to neoliberalism. Engagement with their qualitative research from an ecological feminist standpoint provides theoretical resources for a critique of neoliberalism that is explicitly attentive to unequal distributions of social power and material resources on the basis of gender, race, and ethnicity. Thus there is much room for amending or amplifying existing critiques by utilizing the arguments of this dissertation project, while at the same time acknowledging the valuable work of local food producers and advocates.

A recent opinion piece in *The New York Times* indicates the value of an ecological feminist perspective for the ongoing public conversation regarding animal welfare and human health in relation to US agricultural policy. Nicholas Kristof (*New York Times*, April 17, 2016) relays the concerns of the animal rights group Compassion in World Farming that "modern chicken genetics constitute a form of abuse." In suggesting that citizens and consumers ought to push for food that causes less harm, he appeals to public outrage over the abuse of companion animals: "If we can rally on behalf of a frightened dog…can't we also muster concern for billions of farm animals"? Plumwood herself wrote about the troubling ontological contrast we have created between nonhumans raised as companion animals and nonhumans raised for food (2002, 160-166). The framework I have outlined here gives us a way to think about genetic abuse as an outcome of value dualism and gives us tools for explaining the injustice of the practice that go beyond the claim that it is unnatural or grotesque. It points toward real avenues along which we might "muster concern" by imagining, and hopefully materially

supporting, efforts of practical care in response to the recognition of the birds as intentional others. It also provides a theoretical platform for cultivating political solidarity with farmers who risk their livelihood by exposing the harmful practices required by the world's largest chicken producers.

Another timely application project with regard to animal welfare would be to use the framework to think about the response to epidemic disease in factory farming systems. In response to the 2015 outbreak of avian flu millions of birds were killed, many of which showed no sign of disease but were slaughtered in an attempt to prevent the influenza from spreading geographically (McKenna, *New York Times Magazine,* April 13, 2016). This horrifying response was deemed necessary for long term human and nonhuman health. Although the ecological feminist framework condemns factory farming and advocates alternative systems, it nevertheless remains the dominant system in place. So we need to ask questions about what an appropriate response to immediate problems like avian influenza is, even while rejecting the context in which the specific problem arises. Is a caring response to epidemic disease possible in the current system? What are the limitations of the typical appeal to animal rights in thinking about animal abuses in industrial contexts? So, broadly speaking, there remains room for extending Plumwood's work (1999, 2000, 2002) regarding the value and limitations of the discourse on animal rights and how it intersects with the reality of corporate factory farming. Such work should be undertaken with specific attention to the fuller meanings of the modes of moral response that I provided here.

The above suggestions indicate the wide range of possibilities for application of the arguments here to ongoing conversations regarding "good food." There is ample

room for theoretical expansion on the ideas I've conveyed here as well. The subject of race, racism and food justice is one area of philosophical interest and political import that I only touched on briefly here. Ecological feminism is able to identify and engage theoretical and material connections between multiple, intersecting oppressions. It begins by analyzing the ways that the oppressions of women and nature stem from parallel and mutually reinforcing conceptual assumptions and material conditions. The approach is well suited to deeply exploring the connections between gender, species and race oppressions. The emergence of the concept of race with the historical rise of colonial power (Mills 1999; Omi and Winant 2015) is an appropriate entry point into a conversation with ecological feminist views that are grounded in theories of colonization (Plumwood 1993; Shiva 2005). Ecological feminism can be put into productive conversation with critical race theories in exploring the theoretical connections between gender, race, and species as *master categories* of oppression (Omi and Winant 2015, 106). This work would examine these categories as being similarly bodily, irreducible to other forms of difference, and used as "templates" for structures of inequality (Omi and Winant 2015, 106-107). Omi and Winant (2015) leave the connections between race and gender oppressions underexplored. The ecological feminist perspective has the opportunity and the conceptual resources to bring those connections to the fore, exploring the way that race is gendered and gender is raced in different contexts, as well as the role of "animality" in maintaining raced and gendered conceptions of the human life.

In chapter three of this project I suggested that place-based philosophies must attend to the way that social relations are produced and reproduced in place. I argued that ecological feminism puts forward a multidimensional place-sensitivity that responds to

the power relations within and between places, striving to make those relations equitable and just. This concept of multidimensional place-sensitivity builds upon and names an important element of ecofeminist work on food. Mallory (2013) argues that because an ecofeminist analysis is able to explain and address multiple and intersecting oppressions, it is well suited to examining differential participation in local food activism according to race, gender, class. There is an ongoing academic debate regarding the "whiteness" of the local food movement in the US and the whiteness of the spaces in which "good" food is produced, exchanged, and consumed (Slocum 2006; Guthman 2008a; Alkon and Agyeman 2011). There is ever-more work to be done on the ways that current food systems replicate or reproduce racist social structures. As I indicated above, the ecological feminist framework provides the language and the tools to be able to ask these important questions and address them. At the same time, it is important to recognize the prominence of people of color in the food justice movement, globally and in the US. There is an interesting parallel here with the environmental movement in the US more broadly; while conservation efforts are criticized for their lack of racial diversity, like the locavore trend has been, the environmental justice and food justice movements grow out of communities of color and get to work.

A future project would provide specific examples of food justice work as what Omi and Winant call "racial projects." The theory of racial formation posits race as both a social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers that imbue individual and collective identities with meaning, demarcate and maintain social boundaries, and organize social institutions and the distribution of resources (Omi and Winant 2015, 110-111, 125). This structure and signification is not stable, but made and remade through the

processes of racial formation: racialization and racial projects. Racialization is the extension of racial meaning to a previously unclassified group, relationship, or practice (Omi and Winant 2015, 111). Racial projects are "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines" (Omi and Winant 2015, 125). Racial projects are best understood as processes that do the work of linking racial meaning with the ways social structures and experiences are racially organized. In asking what work the project is supposed to do, we can determine whether the racial project has racist or antiracist ends, whether it creates/upholds structures of domination based on racial significations, or whether it attempts to undo/resist them. For example, one can look at the work of Jamila Norman of Patchwork City Farms in Atlanta's predominantly African-American West End neighborhood, as an antiracist project. Leasing land through the city's public school system, the farm operates through farmers' markets and CSA channels, hosts an after school program, and doubles as a community space for meetings, picnics, and events. Norman's concerns over poor health and low-access to healthy foods in her community prompted her to start farming within and for the community (Hester 2015). This is a way of directly resisting racist structuring of food access within existing distribution structures. Norman sees her work as a positive response to the legacy of farming in the south – the painful history of slavery and Jim Crow era policies that displaced black farmers from the land (Hester 2015). Thus through her work on the farm Norman is constructing new signification of race in relation to farming as well as reorganizing resources – healthy food and community space – in ways that redress racial inequalities.

The theory offered in this work would fill out potential analyses like this one by situating the antiracist project within a broader ethical framework and orientation. For example, antiracist projects might be understood as the social and material practice of solidarity. Or we might understand antiracist food projects as expressions of multidimensional place-sensitivity. As I mentioned above, the connections between gender and race remain underexplored in Omi and Winant's theory of racial formation, and thus are not explicitly mentioned in relation to racial projects. I anticipate future research that would examine the ways that antiracist and feminist aims bolster or are in tension with one another in food justice activism.

Finally, I continue to explore additional ways of rethinking the concept of the self and articulating the experience of selfhood. For my purposes here, I followed Plumwood in describing the self as ecological and relational. The moral responses that I described here derive, in part, from the acknowledgment of the co-constitutive mutuality of selfhood, along with the adoption of the intentional recognition stance. On this picture the self is recognized as socially, politically, and ecologically constructed, yet the unity of selfhood and the singular identity of the agent is left unquestioned. María Lugones (1987; 1994) argues that unity is conceptually tied to domination and a logic of fragmentation; this precludes love and solidarity within multiplicity. Lugones' (1987) work also demonstrates how moving about and interacting in loving ways can be ontologically revelatory. She takes the experience of being at ease in some social contexts, or "worlds," and ill at ease in others, along with the experience of possessing an attribute in one world that one does not possess in other worlds, as evidence of a plurality of selves (Lugones 1987, 14). She suggests that openness to creative self-construction, and to the

construction of worlds without the assumption that any of the rules there are "sacred," allows one to travel between worlds with "playfulness" (Lugones 1987, 16-17). Playful world-travelling is a way of lovingly identifying with others, "because by travelling to their 'world' we can understand *what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes*" (1987, 17, *original emphasis*). I think that Lugones' conception of playfulness provides an attitudinal, experiential expression of how it feels move about with a posture of openness, to engage dialogically with intentional others as well as with the "worlds" themselves. The connection between this playfulness and a kind of openness or transparency between a plurality of selves may have implications for our thinking about the nature of ecological selfhood. Teasing out those implications would require an exploration of the "ontologically problematic" (Lugones 1987, 11) elements and implications of the claim that one's phenomenological experience is that of a plurality of selves. Future research projects might ask: is the intentional recognition stance best fostered through an appeal to the ontological multiplicity of self? Does such a claim strengthen or weaken our understanding of selves as *ecological*? What might such a view say about nonhuman selves and worlds?

So, as the suggestions of this section show, the work presented here leaves us well equipped to engage ongoing debates around food production and consumption. It also provides a robust framework that can be put into meaningful conversation with other philosophical views, for example the view of racial formation and the view of playful world travel.

Global Growers and My Own Backyard

While this dissertation work is a theoretical project, ultimately its aim is to assist in the cultivation of ethical sensitivity. While I was writing it, I was also experimenting with how I might move about in the world, interacting with and impacting, cultivating and devouring others in a more just way. While I still spend plenty of time at the supermarket, I have sought ought alternative food networks that more closely manifest food sovereignty. With the help of my mother and alongside my young children, I cultivated my backyard garden. Tending the garden is a daily reminder that "eating is an agricultural act" (Berry 1990, 145).

In asking myself how I might get involved in food sovereignty efforts in my own neighborhood I decided to join Global Growers' CSA. Global Growers Network is an Atlanta-based 501c3 nonprofit organization whose mission is to support sustainable agriculture in Georgia by growing food, training farmers and providing economic opportunity. Many of the farmers in the Global Growers network came to Atlanta as refugees of war and were looking to "reconnect to their agriculture heritage in their new home" (Global Growers Network 2016). The group also works with American-born farmers, focusing on low-income and socially disadvantaged growers who are underserved by mainstream agricultural organizations. Recognizing both the expertise of agriculturalists from around the world and the needs of the farming community in the Atlanta area, Global Growers "connects local families to land, education, and markets in order to build healthier communities and strengthen [the] local economy" (2016). The group manages about 20 acres of land throughout metro Atlanta, providing produce

through the Decatur Farmers' Market and the organizations own CSA, as well as selling directly to several area restaurants.

Global Growers Network is not affiliated with La Via Campesina or other transnational agrarian movments; the phrase "food sovereignty" does not appear in its mission statement or anywhere on its public website. But the activities of the group, and the way it expresses why those activities are important, manifest respect, care, and solidarity in the same ways as other food sovereignty efforts around the world. The organization enacts a respect for cultural difference and ecological limits, it practices care for human communities and the land, and it engages its activities in solidarity with those who seek to redress the harms of war, displacement, and disenfranchisement.

And as the organization reiterates, "The farmers are global, the food is local." It just so happens that one of the drop sites of Global Growers' CSA is my neighbor Pam's front porch. My family picks up our first box of the season in April. In the mean time, we are finishing off the spring greens from our own backyard kitchen garden and amending the soil in preparation for a summer crop.

REFERENCES

Adams, Carol J. 1991. “Ecofeminism and the Eating of Animals.” *Hypatia* 6(1): 125-145.

----------.1994. *Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals.* New York, NY: Continuum.

Alkon, Alison Hope and Julian Agyeman. 2011. *Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Alkon, Alison Hope and Teresa Marie Mares. 2012. “Food Sovereignty in US Food Movements: Radical Visions and Neoliberal Constraints.” *Agriculture and Human Values* 29: 347-359.

Allen, Patricia. 2014. “Divergence and Convergence in Alternative Agrifood Movements: Seeking a Path Forward.” In *Alternative Agrifood Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence*, edited by Douglas H. Constance, Marie-Christine Renard and Marta G. Rivera-Ferre, 49-68. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Altieri, Miguel A. “Scaling Up Agroecological Approaches for Food Sovereignty in Latin America.” In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 120-133. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

----------.1987 *Agroecology: The Scientific Basis of Alternative Agriculture.* Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Andree, Peter, Jeffrey Ayres, Michael J. Bosia, and Marie-Josee Massicotte, eds. 2014. *Globalization and Food Sovereignty: Global and Local Change in the New Politics of Food.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony. 2006. *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers.* New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

Ayres, Jeffrey and Michael J. Bosia. 2011. Beyond Global Summitry: Food Sovereignty as Localized Resistance to Globalization. *Globalizations* 8(1): 47-63.

Baier, Annette C. 1987. "The Need for More than Justice." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17(1): 41-56.

Bayertz, Kurt. 1999. "Four Uses of 'Solidarity.'" In *Solidarity*, edited by Kurt Bayertz, 3-28. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Benhabib, Seyla. 1987. "The Generalized Other and the Concrete Other." In *Feminism as Critique*, edited by Seyla Benhabib and Drusilla Cornell, 154-177. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Benjamin, Jessica. 1988. *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination*. London: Virago.

Berry, Wendell. 2010 [1970]. *The Hidden Wound.* Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press.

----------2003. *The Citizenship Papers*. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press.

----------. 2002. *The Art of the Common Place: The Agrarian Essays*. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press.

----------. 2001. "The Whole Horse." In *The New Agrarianism: Land, Culture and the Community of Life,* edited by Eric T. Freyfogle, 63-79. Washington, DC: Island Press.

----------. 1990. *What are People For?* San Francisco, CA: North Point Press.

----------. 1978. *The Unsettling of America*. New York, NY: Avon Books.

Biehl, Janet. 1991. *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.

Blum, Lawrence A. 1988. "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory." *Ethics* 98: 472-91.

Bonzo, Matthew J. and Michael R. Stevens. 2008. *Wendell Berry and the Cultivation of Life: A Reader's Guide.* Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press.

Callicott, J. Baird. 1993. "The Search for an Environmental Ethic." In *Matters of Life and Death*, 3rd edition, edited by Tom Reagan, 332-382. NewYork, NY: McGraw Hill.

Carlson, Cody. 2012. "The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public Scrutiny." *The Atlantic* 20.

Cheney, Jim. 1994. "Nature/Theory/Difference." In *Ecological Feminism*, edited by Karen J. Warren, 158-178. New York, NY: Routledge.

Constance, Douglas H., Marie-Christine Renard and Marta G. Rivera-Ferre. 2014. *Alternative Agrifood Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence.* Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Cook, Julie. 1998. "The Philosophical Colonization of Ecofeminism." *Environmental Ethics* 20(3): 227-246.

Cossins, Daniel. 2015. "Amazing Animal Farmers that Grow Their Own Food." BBC Earth. January 2, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20150105-animals-that-grow-their-own-food

Cuomo, Christine. 2011. “Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility.” *Hypatia* 26(4): 690-714.

----------. 1998. *Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing*. London: Routledge.

Curtin, Deane.1991. “Toward an Ecological Ethic of Care.” *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 6(1): 60-74.

Davion, Victoria. 1994. “Is Ecofeminism Feminist?” In *Ecological Feminism*, edited by Karen J. Warren, 8-28. New York, NY: Routledge.

----------. 1993. “Autonomy, Integrity, and Care.” *Social Theory and Practice* 19(2): 161-182.

“Delcaration of Nyeleni.” 2007. Forum for Food Sovereignty. www.nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290. Accessed October 2013.

DeLind, Laura B. 2011. “Are Local Food and the Local Food Movement Taking Us Where We Want to Go? Or Are We Hitching Our Wagons to the Wrong Stars?” *Agriculture and Human Values* 28: 273-283.

Desmarais, Annette Aurelie. 2007. *Globalization and the Power of Peasants.* London: Pluto Press.

Desmarais, Annette Aurelie, Marta G. Rivera-Ferre and Beatriz Gasco. 2014. “Building Alliances for Food Sovereignty: La Via Campesina, NGOs, and Social Movements.” In *Alternative Agrifood Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence*, edited by Douglas H. Constance, Marie-Christine Renard and Marta G. Rivera-Ferre, 89-110. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Diamond, Irene and Gloria Feman Orenstein. 1990. *Reweaving the Web of Life: The Emergence of Ecofeminism.* San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books.

Donahue, Brian. 2003. "The Resettling of America." In *The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community and the Land*, edited by Norman Wirzba, 34-51. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press.

Donovan, Josephine. 2007. *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics: A Reader.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

DuPuis, E. Melanie and David Goodman. 2005. "Should We Go 'Home' to Eat?: Toward a Reflexive Politics of Localism." *Journal of Rural Studies* 21(3): 359-371.

Fairburn, Madeleine. 2012. "Framing Transformation: The Counter-Hegemonic Potential of Food Sovereignty in the US Context." *Agriculture and Human Values* 29: 217-230.

Fassler, Joe. 2013. "The Wendell Berry Sentence that Inspired Michael Pollan's Food Obsession." *The Atlantic*, April.

Fink, Deborah. 1992. *Agrarian Women*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

Fiskio, Janet. 2012. "Unsettling Ecocriticism: Rethinking Agrarianism, Place, and Citizenship." *American Literature*, 84(2): 301-325.

Flora, Cornelia Butler. 2011. "Review: Schanbacher, William D.: The Politics of Food: The Global Conflict Between Food Security and Food Sovereignty." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 24: 545-547.

Fox, Warwick. 1990. *Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism*. Boston, MA: Shambala Publications.

Freyfogle, Eric, ed. 2001. *The New Agrarianism: Land, Culture and the Community of Life.* Washington, DC: Island Press.

Frye. Marilyn. 1983. *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*. Berkeley, CA: Crossing Press.

Fukuoka, Masanobu. 1978. *The One Straw Revolution*. Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press.

Gaard, Greta. 2011. "Ecofeminism Revisited: Rejecting Essentialism and Re-Placing Species in a Material Feminist Environmentalism." *Feminist Formations* 23(2): 26-53. doi: 10.1353/ff.2011.0017

----------. 1998. *Ecological Politics: Ecofeminists and the Greens.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

----------. 1993. *Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, and Nature.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. *In A Different Voice.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Glaeser, Edward. 2011. *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier and Happier.* New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Global Growers Network. 2016. "Global Growers: What We Do." Accessed March 30, 2016. http://www.globalgrowers.org/about/

Griffin, Susan. 1978. *Women and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her*. New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Gruen, Lori. 2007. "Empathy and Vegetarian Commitments." In *The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics*, edited by Josephine Donovan, 333-343. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

----------. 1996. “On the Oppression of Women and Animals.” *Environmental Ethics* 18(4): 441-444.

Guthman, Julie. 2008a. “Bringing Good Food to Others: Investigating the Subjects of Alternative Food Practice.” *Cultural Geographies* 15: 431-447.

----------. 2008b. “Neoliberalism and the Making of Food Politics in California.” *Geoforum* 39: 1171-1183.

Held, Virginia. 1995. “The Meshing of Care and Justice.” *Hypatia* 10(2): 128-32.

----------.1990. “Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory.” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50: 321-44.

Heldke, Lisa. 2012. “Down-Home Global Cooking: A Third Option between Cosmopolitanism and Localism.” In *Philosophy of Food*, edited by David M. Kaplan, 33-51. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Hester, Jessica Leigh. 2015. “Meet the Modern Farmer: Jamila Norman.” *Modern Farmer.* Accessed March 7, 2016. http://modernfarmer.com/2015/10/meet-the-modern-farmer-jamila-norman/

Hinrichs, Clare. 2000. “Embeddedness and Local Food Systems: Notes on Two Types of Direct Agricultural Market.” *Journal of Rural Studies* 16(3): 295-303.

Hoagland, Sara Lucia. 1990. “Some Concerns About Noddings’ *Caring*.” *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 5: 109-114.

Holowchak, M. Andrew. 2014. *Thomas Jefferson and Philosophy: Essays on the Philosophical Cast of Jefferson’s Writings.* Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Holt- Giménez, Eric. 2006. *Campesino a Campesino: Voices from Latin America's Farmer to Farmer Movement for Sustainable Agriculture.* Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

hooks, bell. 1984. "Sisterhood: Political Solidarity Among Women." *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*, 43-65. Boston: South End Press.

Howard, Albert. 2006. *The Soil and Health: A Study of Organic Agriculture.* Lexginton, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

Ingold, Tim. 2000. "From Trust to Domination: An Alternative History of Human-Animal Relations." In *The Perception of the Environment*, by Tim Ingold, 61-76. New York, NY: Routledge

Jackson, Wes. 1994. *Becoming Native to This Place.* Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

----------.1980. *New Roots for Agriculture.* Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Jaggar, Alison. 1991. "Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects." In *Feminist Ethics*, edited by Claudia Card, 78-106. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.

Kant, Immanuel. 1993, [1785]. *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals.* Translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

Kaplan, David M. 2012. *Philosophy of Food*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Kheel, Marti. 2004. "Vegetarianism and Ecofeminism: Toppling Patriarchy with a Fork." *Food for Thought* (2004): 327-341.

----------.1995. “License to Kill: An Ecofeminist Critique of Hunter’s Discourse.” In *Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations*, edited by Carol J. Adams, 85-125. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

----------.1993. “From Heroic to Holistic Ethics: The Ecofeminist Challenge.” In *Ecofeminism*, edited by Greta Gaard, 243-271. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Kingsolver, Barbara. 2003. “Foreword.” In *The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community and the Land,* edited by Norman Wirzba, ix-xvii. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Kingsolver, Barbara, with Camille Kingsolver and Steven Hopp. 2007. *Animal, Vegetable, Miracle: A Year of Food Life.* New York, NY: HarperCollins.

Kline, David. 2001. “Great Possessions.” In *The New Agrarianism: Land, Culture and the Community of Life*, edited by Eric T. Freyfogle, 181-195. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Larrabee, Mary Jeanne, ed. 1993. *An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives.* New York, NY: Routledge.

La Vía Campesina. 2015. “La Vía Campesina struggle against femicide and violence against women.” Published on November 25, 2015. http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/main-issues-mainmenu-27/women-mainmenu-39/1911-la-via-campesina-struggle-against-femicide-and-violence-against-women. Accessed February 18, 2016.

----------. 2011. “The International Peasant’s Voice.” Last modified February 9, 2011. http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44. Accessed February 5, 2016.

----------. 2010 [1996]. “The Right to Produce and Access to Land.” In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Hannah, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 197-199. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Leopold, Aldo. 1989. *A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There.* New York, NY: Oxford Paperbacks.

Logsdon, Gene. 2004. *All Flesh is Grass: The Pleasures and Promises of Pasture Farming.* Athens, OH: Swallow Press.

----------. 2001. “All Flesh is Grass: A Hopeful Look at the Future of Agrarianism.” In *The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community and the Land*, edited by Norman Wirzba, 154-170. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

----------. 2000. *Living at Nature’s Pace*. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing.

----------. 1995. *The Contrary Farmer*. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing

Low, Nicolas. 1999. *Global Ethics and Environment.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Lugones, María. 1994. “Purity, Impurity, and Separation.” *Signs* 19(2): 458-479.

----------. 1987. “Playfulness, ‘World’-travelling, and Loving Perception.” *Hypatia* 2(2): 3-19.

MacGregor, Sherilyn. 2007. *Beyond Mothering Earth: Ecological Citizenship and the Politics of Care.* Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.

Mallory, Chaone. 2013. "Locating Ecofeminism in Encounters with Food and Place." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 26: 171-189.

----------. 2009. "Val Plumwood and Political Solidarity: Standing With the Natural Other." *Ethics & the Environment* 14(2): 3-21.

Masioli, Itelvina and Paul Nicholson. 2010. "Seeing Like a Peasant: Voices from La Vía Campesina." In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 33-44. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

McKenna, Erin. 2012. "Feminism and Farming: A Response to Paul Thompson's *The Agrarian Vision*." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 25: 529-534.

McKibben, Bill. 2007. "A Citizen of the Real World." In *Wendell Berry: Life and Work*, edited by Jason Peters, 113-118. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press.

McMichael, Philip. 2010. "Food Sovereignty in Movement: Addressing the Triple Crisis." In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 168-185. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Mellor, Mary. 1992. *Breaking the Boundaries: Toward a Feminist Green Socialism*. London: Virago Press.

Memmi, Albert. 1965. *The Coloniser and the Colonised.* New York, NY: Orion Press.

Merchant, Carolyn. 1983. *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution.* San Francisco, CA: Harper San Francisco.

Mies, Maria and Vandana Shiva. 1993. *Ecofeminism*. London: Zed Books.

Mills, Charles. 1999. *The Racial Contract.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Mark T. and Nathan Schlueter. 2011. *The Humane Vision of Wendell Berry.* Wilmington, DL: ISI Press.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 2003. *Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Naess, Arne. 1973. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary." *Inquiry* 16: 95-100.

Navdanya. 2016a. "Navdanya: Two Decades of Service to the Earth & Small Farmers." Accessed February 22, 2016. http://www.navdanya.org/attachments/Navdanya.pdf

----------. 2016b. "Seed Satyagraha (Civil Disobedience to End SeedSlavery)." Accessed February 22, 2016. http://navdanya.org/news/521-seed-satyagraha

Negowetti, Nicole E. 2015. "Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparency and the Resurgence of Ag-Gag & Veggie Libel Laws." *Seattle University Law Review* 38: 1345-1398.

Noddings, Nel. 1984. *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Moral Education*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Northrup, Benjamin E. and Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Liscomb. 2003. "Country and City: The Common Vision of Agrarians and New Urbanists." *The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community and the Land,* edited by Norman Wirzba, 191-211. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. 2015. *Racial Formation in the United States*, Third Edition. New York, NY: Routledge.

Orr, David W. 2001. "The Urban-Agrarian Mind." In *The New Agrarianism: Land, Culture and the Community of Life*, edited by Eric T. Freyfogle, 93-107. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Our World Is Not for Sale. 2010 [2001]. "Priority to Peoples' Food Sovereignty." In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 200-207. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Owen, David. 2009. *Green Metropolis: Why Living Smaller, Living Closer, and Driving Less are the Keys to Sustainability.* New York, NY: Riverhead Books.

"Oxford Word of the Year 2007: Locavore." 2007. Oxford University Press. http://blog.oup.com/2007/11/locavore/. Accessed November 2015.

Patel, Rajeev C. 2012. "Food Sovereignty: Power, Gender, and the Right to Food." PLoS Med 9(6): e1001223. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1001223

Patel, Raj. 2010. "What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like?" In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 186-196. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

----------. 2007. *Stuffed and Starved: The Hidden Battle for the World Food System.* Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing.

Peters, Jason. 2007. *Wendell Berry: Life and Work*. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press.

Plant, Judith. 1989. *Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism*. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Press.

Plumwood, Val. 2008a. “Shadow Places and the Politics of Dwelling.” *Australian Humanities Review* 44.

----------. 2008b. “Tasteless: Towards a Food-based Approach to Death.” *Environmental Values*, 17: 323-330.

----------. 2006. “The Concept of a Cultural Landscape: Nature, Culture and Agency in the Land.” *Ethics & the Environment* 11(2): 115-50.

----------. 2005a. “Belonging, Naming and Decolonisation.” In *Habitus: A Sense of Place*, edited by Jean Hillier and Emma Rooksby, 353-374. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

----------.2005b. “Toward a Progressive Naturalism.” In *Recognizing the Autonomy of Nature: Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Heyd, 25-53. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

----------. 2003. “Sustainable What?” *Humanities and Sustainability Workshop*.

----------. 2002. *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason*. London: Routledge.

----------. 2000. “Integrating Ethical Frameworks for Animals, Humans and Nature: A Critical Feminist Eco-Socialist Analysis.” *Ethics & the Environment* 5(2): 285-322.

----------. 1999. “Ecological Ethics from Rights to Recognition: Multiple Spheres of Justice for Humans, Animals and Nature.” In *Global Ethics and Environment*, edited by Nicolas Low, 188-212. New York, NY: Routledge.

----------.1998. “Intentional Recognition and Reductive Rationality: A Response to John Andrews,” *Environmental Values* 7(4): 397-421.

----------. 1996. “Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism: Parallels and Politics,” *Ethics & the Environment* 1(2): 119- 52.

----------. 1995. Human Vulnerability and the Experience of Being Prey. *Quadrant* 39(3): 29-34.

----------. 1994. “The Ecopolitics Debate and the Politics of Nature.” In *Ecological Feminism*, edited by Karen J. Warren, 64-87. New York, NY: Routledge.

----------. 1993. *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature.* London: Routledge.

----------. 1991. “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and the Critique of Rationalism.” *Hypatia* 6(1): 3-27.

Pollan, Michael. 2009. *Food Rules: An Eater’s Manuel.* New York, NY: Penguin Books.

----------. 2008. *In Defense of Food: An Eater’s Manifesto.* New York, NY: The Penguin Press.

----------. 2006. *The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals.* New York, NY: The Penguin Press.

Portman, Anne. 2014. “Mother Nature Has It Right: Local Food Advocacy and the Appeal to the ‘Natural.’” *Ethics and the Environment* 19(1): 1-30.

Regan, Tom. 1986. *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rodale Institute 2013. “Organic Pioneer: Alice Waters.” Accessed February 26, 2016. www.rodaleinstitute.org/organic-pioneer-alice-waters/

Rolston, Holmes, III. 1988. *Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World.* Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Rosset, Peter M. and María Elena Martínez-Torres. 2014. "Food Sovereignty and Agroecology in the Convergence of Rural Social Movements." In *Alternative Agrifood Movements: Patterns of Convergence and Divergence*, edited by Douglas H. Constance, Marie-Christine Renard and Marta G. Rivera-Ferre, 137-157. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing.

Routley, R. and V. Routley.1979. "Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism." In *Ethics and Problems of the 21st Century,* edited by K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre, 36-59. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Ruddick, Sara. 1989. *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace.* Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Rudy, Kathy. 2012. "Locavores, Feminism, and the Question of Meat." *The Journal of American Culture* 35(1): 26-36.

Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Salatin, Joel. 2010. *The Sheer Ecstasy of Being a Lunatic Farmer.* Swoope, VA: Polyface, Incorporated.

Sanders, Scott Russell. 2001. "Learning from the Prairie." In *The New Agrarianism: Land, Culture and the Community of Life*, edited by Eric T. Freyfogle, 3-15. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Sandler, Ronald L. 2007. *Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Schanbacher, William D. 2010. *The Politics of Food: Global Conflict Between Food Security and Food Sovereignty*. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International.

Scholz, Sally J. 2008. *Political Solidarity.* University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State Universiry Press.

Shiva, Vandana. 2005. *Earth Democracy: Justice, Sustainability, and Peace.* Brooklyn, NY: South End Press.

----------. 2002. *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development.* London, UK: Zed Books.

----------. 1997a. *Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge.* Boston, MA: South End Press.

----------. 1997b. *Monocultures of the Mind: Perspectives on Biodiversity and Biotechnology.* London: Zed Books.

Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. 2002. *Environmental Justice: Creating Equality, Reclaiming Democracy*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Singer, Peter. 2002. *Animal Liberation.* New York, NY: Ecco Press.

----------. 1974. "All Animals are Equal." *Philosophic Exchange* 5(1): 6

Slocum, Rachel. 2006. "Whiteness, Space and Alternative Food Practice." *Geoforum*. doi: 10.1016/j.geoforum.2006.10.006

Smith, Kimberly K. 2001. "Wendell Berry's Feminist Agrarianism." *Women's Studies* 30: 623-646.

Snyder, Gary. 1969. *Earth House Hold: Technical Notes and Queries to Fellow Dharma Revolutionaries*. New York, NY: New Directions.

Stanescu, Vasile. 2013. "Why 'Loving' Animals is Not Enough: A Response to Kathy Rudy, Locavorism, and the Marketing of 'Humane' Meat." *The Journal of American Culture* 36(2): 100-110.

Stephens, Piers HG. 2009. "Plumwood, Property, Selfhood and Sustainability." *Ethics & the Environment* 14(2): 57-73.

Sturgeon, Noël. 1997a. *Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender, Feminist Theory and Political Action*. New York, NY: Routledge.

----------. 1997b. "The Nature of Race: Discourses of Racial Difference in Ecofeminism." In *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature*, edited by Karen J. Warren, 260-278. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Taylor, Dorceta. 1997. "Women of Color, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism." In *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature*, edited by Karen J. Warren, 38-81. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Taylor, Paul W. 1986. *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Telleen, Maurice. 1977. *The Draft Horse Primer: A Guide to the Care and Use of Work Horses and Mules*. Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press

Thompson, Paul. 2014. "Thomas Jefferson's Land Ethics." In *Thomas Jefferson and Philosophy: Essays on the Philosophical Cast of Jefferson's Writings*, edited by M. Andrew Holowchak, 61-77. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

----------. 2010. *The Agrarian Vision: Sustainability and Environmental Ethics*. Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky.

----------.1995. *The Spirit of the Soil: Agriculture and Environmental Ethics*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Tronto, Joan. 1993. *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Veracini, Lorenzo. 2010. *Settler Colonialism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Warren, Karen J. 2000. *Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

----------. 1997a. *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

----------. 1997b. "Taking Empirical Data Seriosly."In *Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature*, edited by Karen Warren, 3-20. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

----------. 1994. *Ecological Feminism*. New York, NY: Routledge.

----------. 1990. "The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism." *Environmental Ethics* 12(2): 125-146.

Werkheiser, Ian and Samantha Noll. 2014. "From Food Justice to a Tool of the Status Quo: Sub-movements Within Local Food." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 27: 201-210.

Whyte, Kyle. 2015. "Indigenous Food Systems, Environmental Justice, and Settler-Industrial States." In *Global Food, Global Justice: Essays on Eating Under Globalization*, edited by Mary C. Rawlinson and Caleb Ward, 143-166. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

----------. 2013. "Justice Forward: Tribes, Climate Adaptation, and Responsibility." *Climatic Change*. doi: 10.1007/s10584-013-0743-2

Wirzba, Norman. 2007. "An Economy of Gratitude." In *Wendell Berry: Life and Work*, edited by Jason Peters, 142-155. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press.

----------. 2003. *The Essential Agrarian Reader: The Future of Culture, Community and the Land.* Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Wittman, Hannah. 2010. “Reconnecting Agriculture & The Environment: Food Sovereignty & the Agrarian Basis of Ecological Citizenship.” In *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*, edited by Hannah Wittman, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, 91-105. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Wittman, Hannah, Annette Aurelie Desmarais and Nettie Wiebe, eds. 2010. *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community*. Oakland, CA: Food First Books.

Wolfe, Patrick. 2006. “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.” *Journal of Genocide Research* 8(4): 387-409.

Young, Iris Marion. 2011. *Justice and the Politics of Difference.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.