THE CONCEPT, MEASUREMENT, AND DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN SECURITY: A SPOTLIGHT ON PERSONAL SECURITY

by

CAROLIN MANEY PURSER

(Under the Direction of Amanda Murdie)

ABSTRACT

H*uman security* is a concept focused on individuals' ability to live and thrive without being held back by concerns of survival or day-to-day living. The concept has received increasing attention since the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report highlighted the importance of the concept. Two decades later, the subfield of human security still lacks a publically available, cross-national time series dataset of human security, and with it empirical studies that investigate the causes and effects of threats to human security. This dissertation serves as a first step in addressing this lacuna by revisiting the conceptualization of human security, presenting a new dataset of one component of the broader human security, *personal security*, which captures an individual's vulnerability to violent threats to their self. It also evaluates the causes and effects of threats to personal security. The first chapter introduces the project. The second chapter lays out the argument for a new conceptualization of human security, conceptualizes personal security, and presents a new dataset of personal security variables. The resulting dataset consists of estimates and error estimates of four categories of threats to personal security as well as a measure of overall threats to personal security for 186 countries from 2005 to 2014. The third chapter uses the new dataset

to assess the effects of empowerment rights on personal security. Here, I lay out the argument that empowerment rights can constrain government actors, but not civilian actors, in initiating threats to personal security of civilians and government agents. The results of this study indicate that empowerment rights can have a constraining effect on government actors, and that the effects of different empowerment rights on threats to personal security can vary by the actor initiating violence. The fourth chapter assesses how threats to personal security, as conceptualized and measured in this project, compare to individual perceptions of human rights conditions and safety. The results from this study show a strong negative relationship between civilian-government threats to personal security and perceptions of human rights and safety. The fifth and final chapter, reviews the project and discusses avenues for future research.

INDEX WORDS: Human security, Human rights, Personal security, Empowerment rights, Perceptions of safety.

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CAROLIN MANEY PURSER

B.A., Colby College, 2012

A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2017

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CAROLIN MANEY PURSER

Major Professor:	Amanda Murdie
Committee:	Ryan Bakker
	K. Chad Clay
	Daniel Hill Jr.

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2017

To

friend, love, and spouse, Gregory,

inspiring parents, Meena (Amma) and Maney (Appa),

selfless sister, Catharin (Chechi),

exceptional teachers through the years,

constant source of joy and companionship, Elia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation project is a fruit of years of excellent teaching, mentoring, and support I have been privileged to receive from a range of people in my academic and personal lives. I will always be grateful to all who helped me work hard, persevere, stay positive, and reach the various academic milestones during what has been the most challenging and rewarding five years of my life.

I am sincerely grateful to the members of my dissertation committee. My committee consists not only of excellent researchers and teachers, but genuinely supportive individuals who are dedicated to the success and happiness of their colleagues and students. I thank Amanda for taking a chance on me by agreeing to chair my committee. She has provided me many opportunities for growth, practical counsel about life and work, and constructive feedback since the first time I met her in January 2016. She inspires me to be a productive researcher and teacher. I will always be indebted to Ryan for seeing potential in me in my first year of graduate school, long before I could see myself as a researcher or teacher. Opportunities to learn from, work with, and get to know him have enriched the past five years of my life as a graduate student. His tireless efforts to help me succeed, and willingness to help me pursue whatever career path would make me happy gave me hope at otherwise hopeless times. I thank Chad for introducing me to the literature on human rights and political violence, and being present and helping brainstorm ideas right from the inception of this dissertation. He has seen this dissertation take shape slowly but surely over the past three years. His willingness to listen, generate ideas, and share his career experiences, have been highlights of my time at UGA. I am deeply appreciative of Danny for his willingness to listen to my ideas, and provide detailed feedback on ways to improve my work. His counsel on dissertation-writing, graduate career, have been insightful.

My dissertation committee is a microcosm of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, where cordiality and goodwill are internalized norms. I am grateful for every person I have met in the international affairs and political science departments, for inspiring me to constantly improve myself and helping me master valuable skills during my time at UGA. I am particularly appreciative of Emily Smith and Bill Zachmann for

answering many questions, scheduling classes, exams, and defenses with student preferences in mind, and helping us, graduate students, worry as little as possible about administrative matters.

I would also like to acknowledge and thank my husband, Greg, for all the ways in which he has helped me survive and thrive in graduate school, and especially during dissertation-writing. He has been a patient listener, a proactive supporter, the maker of many delicious meals and beautiful music that brightened my otherwise work and worry-filled days. He accepted my twelve and fourteen-hour hermitic days in the office with grace, humor, and empathy. He cheered me on when the going was tough, and celebrated my small victories. I recognize these are privileges that many intelligent and hard-working women I know have not had in the pursuit of their goals and dreams. I thank Greg's parents, Cathy and Steve Purser, for raising Greg, and being the most encouraging and understanding of in-laws through my graduate career. I also thank MomMom, my grandmother-in-law, whose home and hospitality have been a warm and welcoming oasis from the monotony of our graduate school life many times in the past four years. There are few things in life that her Sour Cream Pound Cake cannot make better.

The dedication of the dissertation to my parents is only the smallest of tokens of gratitude for the incredible ways in which they brought up their two daughters who believed they could do anything they wanted to do, against all odds. I am grateful to Amma, for the numerous times she listened to my worries, prayed for me, consoled me, and reminded me to stay positive. Appa's support, love, and art have been therapeutic during stressful times in graduate school. His list-making and organizational skills that I incorporated into my life have been of more use during the past few years that any other time in my life. I owe a large part of my academic successes to my sister, who, by being intelligent and hardworking, set a very high bar for this lackadaisical younger sister. I can admit that many of the academic challenges I took on in my life were in some part to prove to myself that I could be as hardworking and successful as my sister. She has also been a pillar of support at various points in my life, by lobbying my parents to let me pursue exciting opportunities even when cultural and family norms initially dictated otherwise. Last, but not least, I thank my six-year-old Australian Shephard, Elia, for waking me up with gusto every morning, making sure I go on long walks, and staying up with me during late nights of work. I can confidently say that writing the dissertation would have been substantially more challenging without her cheerful presence in my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

A NEW APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING HUMAN SECURITY

H*uman security* is a concept focused on individuals' ability to live and thrive without being held back by concerns of survival or day-to-day living. The concept has received increasing attention since the United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report highlighted the need for the international community to reevaluate its policy agendas and redesign policy implementation around individuals' freedom from fear and want. More than two decades after the UN Human Development Report (1994), the research on human security has received some attention and has led to a wide range of useful conceptualizations of the concept (UNDP 1994; Chen 1995; King and Murray 2001; Bajpai 2003; Inglehart and Norris 2012). Some researchers have also measured human security in innovative ways (Owen 2008; Hastings 2011; Carolan 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2012). However, no publically available, cross-national time series dataset of human security exists to date. This lacuna in the subfield has limited investigation of cross-national and cross-temporal changes of human security to one country (e.g., Owen 2008) or cross-national differences in only one year (e.g., Hastings 2001), in turn, limiting the questions that we can answer about the causes and effects of human security. This research project aims at overcoming these limitations.

Answering empirical questions that help to understand causal mechanisms can help to improve individuals' ability to live their lives without fear or need. How do we learn more about

the complex concept of human security? What are the causal mechanisms that influence human security? How does human security influence individuals' life outcomes? How does human security influence national-level economic and social indicators? These are some of the broad questions that led to this project. While this project does not provide answers to all these questions, it contributes empirically and theoretically in ways that make future research about human security more practical.

This research project addresses a bite-sized portion of the concept of human security. The primary goal of this project has been to simplify the conceptualization of human security, capture the complexity of one aspect of human security, and deepen our understanding of human security. To achieve this goal, this project makes the case for a piecemeal approach to conceptualization and measurement of human security, and uses a newly created dataset to answer two questions that have not been answered before.

Scope

This study focuses on one component of the broader concept of human security, *personal security*. I decided to narrow down on this one element of personal security, rather than reconceptualizing human security as a whole, to overcome some limitations of conceptualizing and measuring umbrella concepts that limit researchers in understanding some of the interdependence between different components of the bigger concept (Paris 2001). Disaggregation of human security by components can ultimately lead to a richer body of research than a single measure of human security. I hope that this project is only a first step towards a database with cross-national and cross-temporal latent measures of all seven categories of threats

to human security listed by UNDP (1994) – personal, economic, food, health, environmental, community, and political.

Personal security refers to an individual's vulnerability to violent threats to their self. I chose this component of human security for three reasons. First, safety from physical violence is a necessary condition for individuals to survive and thrive without fear and want. Second, despite its importance, only certain aspects of personal security such as repression of civilians and civil conflict have received attention in human rights and human security research. Third, existing research on repression, coups, human rights violations, and violent conflict can help to advance a theory-driven personal security research agenda.

I conceptualize personal security as a concept influenced by interactions between groups based on their roles in a state, i.e. civilian and government actors. By this definition, personal security is threatened by intentional acts of violence during interactions between individuals. Based on this conceptualization of personal security, I identify four categories of threats to personal security – *civilian-civilian, civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government,* based on the source and target of the act of violence. Though this definition can be expanded to include international state and non-state actors, for purposes of parsimony, this project focuses strictly on within-state actors and their role as a civilian or government actor.

Overview of the Project

The rest of the introduction will discuss the layout of the project, the main question addressed in each chapter, the basic theoretical underpinnings, the theoretical argument, and a brief discussion of the findings and their relevance. Chapter 2 focuses on answering the question of how best to conceptualize and measure human security for rich theoretical and empirical research. The goal of this chapter is to help understand why human security improves in some countries, while staying stagnant or deteriorating in others, and how human security influences life outcomes at the individual level and social and economic development at the national level. This chapter lays out the argument for a new conceptualization of human security and goes on to conceptualize and measure one component of human security to illustrate this new approach to conceptualization. This chapter also lays out the operationalization of threats to personal security used in this project. Each category of threats to personal security is operationalized using the frequency of violent, intentional actions that a member or members of the source of violence committed to the group to which the target belonged. The measurement of each category utilized events data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (Virtual Associates) along with other data relevant to each of the categories. The estimates and their error margins were derived using Bayesian factor analysis, a methodology highly favorable for human security variables due to the inevitable missing values and uncertainty associated when managing large datasets that draw information from multiple data sources. The resulting dataset consists of estimates and error estimates of each of the four categories of threats listed above as well as a measure of overall threats to personal security for 186 countries for the time period from 2005 to 2014. This dataset not only serves as a source of data for the two following chapters, but will be publically available to any researcher studying personal security.

Chapter 3 uses the newly created dataset in understanding a possible causal mechanism that influences threats to personal security. The focus of this chapter is to assess the effects of empowerment rights on personal security. Empowerment rights, which refer to political rights and civil liberties such as freedom of association, electoral self-determination, religion, domestic and foreign movement. I lay out the argument that empowerment rights can constrain government actors, but not civilian actors, in initiating intentional threats to personal security of civilians and government agents. The analyses from this study suggest that empowerment rights can reduce threats to personal security initiated by government agents against civilians and other government agents, but not have a constraining effect on civilian-initiated threats to personal security. The results indicate that the effects of the different empowerment rights vary depending on the source and target of violence. This study highlights the need to investigate the effects of specific empowerment rights on disaggregated measures of human security.

Chapter 4 treats threats to personal security as independent variables. This chapter assesses the effects of threats to personal security, as conceptualized and measured in this project, on individual perceptions of human rights conditions and safety. Additionally, this chapter investigates the impact of victimization of self or family members on perceptions of human rights protection within the country and safety within homes and neighborhoods. The motivation of this study is that in the limited research that has been done in recent decades about individual attitudes and perceptions of national human rights conditions, we are unclear of the extent to which perceptions of personal safety from violence in homes and neighborhoods compare with national level indicators of threats to personal security. The findings from testing hypotheses through analyses of data from 2011 and 2012 suggest that the different categories of threats to personal security have different relationships with perceptions of human rights

conditions. The differences in the effect and magnitude of each category of threat on perceptions of human rights conditions and safety highlight the need for further research on individual perceptions related to human rights and human security. The strong negative association of civilian-government threats to personal security with perceived quality of human rights and safety in home and neighborhood illustrate the importance of investigating and understanding gaps in the literature about how individuals think about human rights and safety, and how people become aware of different kinds of threats to human security.

Chapter 5 revisits the questions, findings, and implications of Chapters 2 through 4. In this chapter, I discuss the answers to the research questions as suggested by the analyses in this project, but also addresses the questions that are still left unanswered. I lay out ways in which the current dataset could be improved over time to answer a greater variety of questions. This concluding chapter also suggests questions and approaches for human rights scholars to consider in future research endeavors.

CHAPTER 2

BEYOND THE STATE:

CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING HUMAN SECURITY

What are the effects of inclusiveness of national institutions and rule of law on various aspects of human security? Do human rights organizations have similar effects on all aspects of human security? These are important questions for researchers and practitioners of human security. However, these are questions that are yet to be answered empirically due to challenges in defining and measuring the concept.

The concept of human security received widespread international attention after the United National Development Programme (UNDP) featured the concept as a vital component to be considered in future development projects in the 1994 Human Development Report. The Report (UNDP, 1994) noted that international institutions, state governments, and research had long focused on security as affected by interstate disputes, territorial borders, and state military power. The Report points to the need to redefine security to include human security, which places focus on individuals and their day-to-day needs to survive and thrive. The Report categorizes the sources of threat to human security to fall under seven main groups: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. While many researchers have discussed various ways to

conceptualize and operationalize human security (King and Murray, 2001; Bajpai, 2003; Gasper, 2005; Inglehart and Norris, 2012) few have quantitatively measured the concept[1].

Existing definitions and conceptualizations of human security have established that the concept focuses on the safety, needs, and well-being of individuals, highlighting the need to go beyond the state-centered definitions of security (UNDP, 1994; Chen, 1995; King and Murray, 2001; Alkire, 2003; Bajpai, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2012). While allowing to capture the various sources of insecurity at the individual level, the breadth of traditional conceptualizations of human security has made a theoretically and empirically meaningful measure of the concept challenging (Paris 2001). The range of suggestions for operationalization of the concept range from creating a threshold measure (King and Murray, 2001), multilevel measure (Inglehart and Norris, 2012), latent variable measures based on existing data (Hastings, 2011; Carolan, 2012), and threat mapping (Owen, 2008). While researchers such as Carolan (2012), Hastings (2011), and Owen (2008), have operationalized the concept in innovative ways, the subfield of human security lacks a cross-national measure of human security across time that allows for comparison of human security across countries, across time, and better investigation of the determinants of human security.

In this project, I focus on one aspect of human security, *personal security*, which captures individuals' vulnerability to violent threats to their physical being. I conceptualize personal security as reflected by the proportion of individual interactions that directly threaten their physical safety. In this definition, personal security is threatened by intentional acts of violence during interactions between individuals, whether civilian or governmental agents. The inclusion of sources of insecurity in the form of interactions between civilians contributes to human

[1] Carolan (2012), Hastings (2011), and Owen (2008) are among the small number of researchers that have measured human security.

security literature by utilizing a strand of literature on crime that has been mentioned and implied but largely omitted in the subfield (Human Security Centre, 2005). By building on existing definitions of human security, and utilizing Bayesian latent variable estimation, I conceptualize and measure personal security. This new approach to conceptualizing components of human security makes a theoretical contribution that can be utilized to conceptualize and measure other aspects of human security. The new cross-national measure of personal security of 186 countries from 2005 to 2014 will make a unique contribution to the study of human security by allowing researchers to empirically answer questions similar to those listed earlier, about the determinants and effects of human security, that were previously unanswerable. The new measure I present here also permits researchers to compare the level of personal security across countries and time, with appropriate uncertainty in measurement.

Old and New Conceptualizations of Human Security

Human security, as discussed in the UNDP Human Development Report (1994), was brought forth as an important focus of UN development programs out of the recognition that many different kinds of insecurity individuals experience beyond those that pertain to national military security had not received enough attention from the international community. The Report distinguishes the concept of human development from human security, noting that the former pertains to increasing individuals' choices in life, and that the latter relates to people's ability to make choices safely and freely (p.23). The Report (UNDP, 1994) lists and describes seven categories of threats to human security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political security(pp.24-33). It describes, personal security, the major focus of this project, as security from physical violence. These threats to personal security include threats

of violence from the state, other states, or groups of individuals (p. 30). According to this definition, physical torture, interstate war, crime, rape, domestic violence, and child abuse are all manifestations of human insecurity.

Most researchers that conceptualized human security have attempted to do so in a way that includes multiple components of human security (MacLean, 1998; Nef, 1999; Reed and Tehranian, 1999; King and Murray, 2001; Alkire, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2012). Paris (2001) asserts that human security is too vague to be useful for policymakers or generate specific research questions (pp 92, 97). However, he suggests that the redefinition of the concept in more precise terms could help facilitate good research and policymaking on human security. Of the various conceptualizations of human security, Bajpai (2003) conceptualizes direct and indirect violent actions as threatening human security based on Canadian and UNDP descriptions of human security (Bajpai, 2003, pp. 218-220). In this categorization, direct threats to human security include but are not limited to violent death, physical abuse, kidnapping, unlawful detention of political opponents, killing and torture of government agents, war casualties, terrorism, and landmines (Bajpai, 2003, p. 219). Many of these direct threats to human security relate closely to the UNDP (1994) definition and description of personal security. However, the categorization of deprivation, disease, natural disasters, population displacement, or environmental degradation as indirect threats can be misleading in how these indirect threats can still result in serious injury or death. Partly due to the complexity of the concept, it is not uncommon to find such broad conceptualizations of human security in the early literature.

These approaches to conceptualizing human security described earlier often encompass multiple, unrelated components of human security. While these works have been essential for a comprehensive understanding of the concept, the breadth of the concept made operationalization,

and more importantly, theorizing about the causes and effects of human security challenging, if not impossible. Therefore, I attempt to adopt the strengths of existing definitions of human security, and remedy some of the weaknesses by conceptualizing and measuring personal security, one of the seven components of human security described in the UNDP Human Development Report (1994). While this is just one small step towards conceptualization, the same approach can be useful in conceptualizing and measure the six other components of human security.

I focus exclusively on personal security for multiple reasons. First, security from physical violence is vital for the safety and well-being of an individual. This is demonstrated by widespread perception of criminal violence, terrorism, or war as the greatest single threat to their personal security (Human Security Centre, 2005, p. 51). Traditionally, conflict and peace researchers have largely ignored acts of physical violence between civilians despite their continued impact on domestic politics in many countries, and the lives of residents and travelers. However, the fear and ubiquity of criminal violence among individuals around the world suggests the need for researchers to conceptualize intentional and violent threats to human security. Second, despite the importance of personal security, frameworks for conceptualization of personal security, among other aspects of human security, are few. Multiple measures of physical integrity rights, such as the CIRI Human Rights data (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Wood and Gibney 2010) are focused on government use of violence and repression, but not on the physical integrity rights violations by civilian actors against other civilians or government agents. Third, a new conceptualization of personal security could facilitate new theories about the determinants and effects of personal security.

Traditionally human security has been conceptualized as an individual concept, where an individual is threatened by various actors or circumstances around them. While such a conceptualization may be appropriate for some aspects of human security such as environmental or health threats to an individual, it ignores that violent threats to physical integrity of individuals often arise from intentional and relational interactions. The new conceptualization presented in this study incorporates the relational and interactive aspects of one aspect of human security, personal security. In this definition, personal security is threatened by intentional acts of violence during interactions between individuals.

I classify intentional violent threats to personal security into four main categories based on the group membership of the target(s) of violence, group membership of the individual(s) that committed the act of violence, and the direction of interaction between the groups in the event that threated personal security (see Table 2.1.). This concept of personal security is a quality of a state that cannot be directly observed, but can be inferred based on observable interactions of residents and government agents within a country with each other. I propose that personal security within a state can be observed from four categories of interactions among domestic-level actors of a state, the two major groups of domestic-level actors being civilians and government agents. The categories are based on direction of interaction, i.e. a threat to personal security caused by actor *A* towards actor *B* is termed as *A-B security*, where a threat originating from actor *B* towards actor *A* is *B-A security*. Table 2.1, below, illustrates the terms I use to describe the four major categories of threats to personal security. The four categories I identify are *civilian – civilian, civilian – government, government – civilian, government – government* security. In these terms, civilian refers to individual citizens that are not government agents or

acting on behalf of the government at time of interaction, and government refers to individuals that are government agents or acting on behalf of the government at the time of interaction.

Table 2.1. The Categories of Threats to Personal Security Based on Source and Target of Intentional Violence

		Target of Violence	
Source of Violence	Actor Groups	**Civilian**	**Government**
	Civilian	Civilian - Civilian	Civilian – Government
	Government	Government- Civilian	Government – Government

Civilian – Civilian Threats

This term refers to violent threats to a civilian by another civilian, neither of whom was acting on behalf of the same or other national government at the time of interaction. This aspect of personal security has received attention in criminal justice (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981) and human security research (Bajpai, 2003; Inglehart and Norris, 2012). Civilian-civilian personal security that would capture threats to civilians such as violent crimes, domestic violence, physical abuse of individuals, among others, where the injury is intentionally caused by and inflicted on a civilian. The UNDP Human Development Report (1994) mentions the following four forms of threats that qualify as civilian-civilian threats to personal security – "threats from individuals or gangs, threats from other groups of people, threats directed against women, threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence." This aspect of personal security, though frequently discussed has not been conceptualized as an outcome of civilian-civilian interactions. Furthermore, the lack of clear conceptualization of personal security and

civilian-civilian threats to personal security have made it challenging to understand the causes and effects of personal security.

Civilian – Government Threats

This term refers to violent threats to the physical being of a government official, or individual acting on behalf of the national government, by a civilian, i.e. an individual not acting on behalf of the same or other national government at the time of interaction. This category, therefore, captures the safety and well-being of individuals that act as agents of the government vis-à-vis civilians, not other government actors. While government officials are typically thought to have more resources to protect themselves, it is not uncommon for agents of the government to be killed or injured during protests, shootouts, or planned attacks by individuals who are residents or citizens of the same country. While many researchers have conceptualized and measured state repression and physical integrity rights of civilians (Cingranelli and Pasquerello. 1985; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007b; Wood and Gibney, 2010; Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014), few have done the same with the threats to physical safety and well-being of government officials. An accurate conceptualization of human security at the domestic level should include all humans within a country at that point, and not exclude representatives of the national government. However, the power asymmetry that often exists between civilians and government warrants that the personal security of government agents be considered different from that of civilians. However, some threats to the personal security of government agents are assassinations, beatings, violent protests or attacks against government officials. This is an important aspect of personal security that could provide insights into the risk of being part of the government across countries and years. This category of personal security could also help researchers answer more questions about state repression. One example of such a question is

whether the frequency or intensity of violent threats to personal security of government agents increases the likelihood of violations of human rights by a government through agency loss.

Government – Civilian Threats

This term refers to violent threats to a resident or citizen's physical integrity caused by a government agent, towards an individual not acting on behalf of the same or another national government at the time of interaction. This concept relates to "threats from the state," one of the several forms of threats to personal security mentioned in the UN Human Development Report (1994), but includes much more than physical torture. Usually the government agents in these cases tend to be part of the military or police force either because they are executed or enforcing the policies of the national government or because they breached protocol or acted beyond their expected range of operation in an interaction. However, any government agent physically injuring a civilian would count as a threat to government- civilian personal security. Government-civilian threats are comprised of various human rights violations of a state of its citizens and non-citizen residents. This category of personal security captures protection and violation of physical integrity rights, an international law provision[2] that entitles all individuals to freedom from arbitrary physical harm and coercion by their governments (Cingranelli and Pasquerello. 1985; Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). The primary threats to citizen physical integrity identified in the human rights literature

[2] Listed under articles of Part III of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), among other rights based on the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948)

are torture[3], disappearance[4], political imprisonment[5], and extrajudicial killings[6]. Poe and Tate (1994) refer to such activities designed by the government to induce compliance in others. However, Englehart (2009) finds that state capacity and agency loss can impact human rights violations, highlighting that violations are not always planned or purposeful. The four primary categories of violations of physical integrity listed above include many outcomes from government interactions with civilians. Examples of government – civilian threats to personal security include, but are not limited to use of torture, extrajudicial killing, political arrests, and military occupation.

Government – Government Threats

This category of threats to personal security refers to violence directed by a government agent against another government agent. Traditional measures of human rights violations have not addressed the risk of violation of physical integrity rights of government. However, when considering threats to all individuals within a state, violent attacks led by one or more government agents against another group of government agents capture an aspect of personal security not captured by traditional measures of human security. Government-government threats to personal security may help to explain behaviors of government agents in domestic and international matters. Examples of this category of threats to personal security include but are not limited to physical violence in the form of individual encounters, one branch of the government

[3] Defined as "purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, mental or physical, by government officials or by private individuals at the instigation of government officials" (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014, p.17)
[4] Defined as "cases in which people have disappeared, agents of the state are likely responsible, and political motivation may be likely" (Cingranelli, Richarda, and Clay, 2014, p.12)
[5] Defined as incarceration of people by the government due to their speech, opposition to government policies, religious beliefs and practices, or racial or ethnic group. (Cingranelli, Richarda, and Clay, 2014, p.21)
[6] Defined as "killings by government officials without due process of law" (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay, 2014 p.7)

violently attempting to remove other government agents by force such as in a coup or some revolutions.

Operationalization

The operationalization and measurement of human security have received increasing attention in the past decade, with researchers proposing and implementing innovative approaches to capture the concept quantitatively to allow for further social scientific research on the causes and effects of human security (Owen, 2008; Eldering 2010, Carolan, 2012; Hastings, 2013). Various ways in which researchers have operationalized and measured human security have been beneficial in helping advance social scientific research on the concept.

The new conceptualization I propose above allows for easier operationalization and measurement of each component of human security, thereby allowing for fine-tuned theorizing about human security where necessary. There are multiple approaches one could take to operationalizing the threats to personal security the conceptualization described earlier. One way to operationalize the concept would be capture the level of fear among civilians and government agents about violation of their physical integrity by members of their own or other group's members, and the general level of trust of individuals in civilians and in government agents. Another operational definition could be that each category of threats to personal security is represented by the proportion of intentional and violent interactions to the cooperative interactions between the two relevant groups of actors in a given place and time.

The operational definition I use for each category, 'A-B', corresponding to the source and target group of intentional violence, threats to personal security in this project is as follows. The A-B threat to personal security is captured by the frequency of violent, intentional actions that a

member or members of group A commits against a member or members of group B in a given place and time. This operational definition could be used to measure threats to personal security ideally by using reports or counts of intentional and violent acts where the membership of the perpetrator and target of the action are known. Such data at the subnational or national levels could be used by researchers to measure the relational and directional conceptualization of personal security as laid out earlier.

Each domestic dyadic interaction could be gathered from local and international news sources and be identified as civilian-civilian, civilian- government, or government-civilian based on the actors and source of initiation. Each of the interactions could then be rated as cooperative, neutral, or conflictual similar to Goldstein's (1992) approach. Such data could then be used to evaluate the proportion of cooperative interactions to neutral and conflictual interactions, similar to Goldstein's (1992) conflict-cooperation scale for international dyads. Another approach would be to isolate the threats to each set of civilian interaction, and calculate a risk based on the frequency and intensity of threats in a given country and year. One could also use indicators of personal security based on actors and direction of initiation that have been collected for years. I operationalize personal security using events data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (Bond et al., 2001; King and Lowe, 2003) procured from Virtual Research Associates (VRA). This dataset, maintained by VRA, consists of events coded in the form of "who" did "what" "to whom" and "when" based on news reports from Reuters. Events data based on global news sources, including Reuters, tend to have a western bias. For this reason, I have excluded United States and United Kingdom from the dataset, and controlled for total events reported from each country in a given year. I relied on country-level data of reports of threats to personal security such as homicide, sexual violence, burglary, among others, as well as by coding events from the

IDEA data that correspond to each manifestation of personal security and calculating the frequency of threats. The inclusion of automated extracted data, such as subsets of IDEA (King and Lowe, 2003), is a previously underused tool especially in human security research that could improve the quality and nuance of data on different aspects of human security. Below, I detail my operationalization of each category of interaction and threats I noted in the conceptualization of personal security above. Table 2.2 below includes the complete list of variables used to operationalize personal security in this project, and their sources.

Civilian- Civilian Threats

This component, which is central to my contribution to the conceptualization and measurement of personal security, can be measured by national-level count data on reported homicides, burglaries (violent), sexual violence, kidnapping, and violent assaults from 2006 to 2013 available through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Statistics database. Furthermore, I used violent event forms from Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) database (Bond et al., 2001; King and Lowe, 2003) and categorized the violent actions based on whether the actors were civilians or government agents. Using frequentist factor modeling, I identified variables that had the highest factor loadings to create a parsimonious model.

Civilian – Government Threats

I operationalize Civilian-Government Threats by isolating violent events initiated by civilians against government agents from the IDEA database. I then using a frequentist factor model to identify variables with the highest factor loadings for a parsimonious model. These violent events include armed attacks against government agents, small arms attacks, hijackings, and beating incidents.

Government – Civilian Threats

I operationalize Government- Civilian Threats using the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Richards, Cingranelli, and Clay, 2014) and the IDEA database. Specifically, I use the CIRI scores of countries on the variables that rate the country's yearly performance on taking political prisoners, using torture, "disappearance" of individuals that are politically opposed to the government, and extrajudicial killing. Along with these variables, I use the count of arrest and detentions civilians by government agents from the IDEA database (VRA, 2016) to measure the latent variable of government-civilian threats to personal security.

Government – Government Threats

I operationalize Government-Government Threats by isolating violent events initiated by government agents against other government agents from the IDEA database. I then used a frequentist factor model to identify variables with the highest factor loadings to have a parsimonious Bayesian latent variable model. These violent events include armed attacks, small arms attacks, political arrests, and torture.

Table 2.2. Constructs and Operationalization of Threats to Personal Security

CONSTRUCT	VARIABLES	SOURCES
Civilian – Civilian Threats	Sexual Violence Reports, Burglaries, Violent Assaults, Kidnappings	UN Office of Drugs and Crime
	Small Arms Attacks	Integrated Data for Events Analysis
Civilian – Government Threats	Abductions, Armed Attacks, Assassinations, Hijackings, Riots, Small Arms Attacks, Torture, Arrest and Detention	Integrated Data for Events Analysis.
Government – Civilian Threats	Arrest and Detention,	Integrated Data for Events Analysis
	Torture, Disappearance, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment	CIRI Human Rights Data.
Government – Government Threats	Armed Attacks, Armed Forces Occupation, Arrest and Detention, Beatings, Political Arrests, Small Arms Attacks, Torture	Integrated Data for Events Analysis.

Measurement Model

I use Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis, to overcome some of the challenges to measurement of human security. Frequentist structural equation models often force researchers to ignore the uncertainty associated with estimated latent variables. Other times, such models do not yield estimates of the latent variable of interest. A Bayesian approach to latent variable models, however, allows researchers to model the data generating process based on theory, without the restrictions of the distribution of variables. Perhaps, most importantly, Bayesian factor models yield both estimates of the latent variable and credible intervals that correspond to the uncertainty associated with a specific estimate of the latent variable. This feature of the Bayesian approach is especially useful in meaningfully comparing the estimates of the latent variable across time and space. In the context of this research paper, this approach allows us to rank

country-years by the level of personal security, and note whether country-years with different ranks are discernibly different from each other. Bayesian approach to modeling is also favorable for measurement of different types of human security because of the inherent flexibility of these models to incorporate hierarchical and time components.

In line with my conceptualization of personal security as a latent and continuous variable that is determined by four latent variables of threats to personal security operationalized above, I specify a normal distribution for personal security in any given country-year. I model standardized counts of threats to each group of interactions as functions of the unobserved level of democracy.

The Bayesian model below illustrates my conceptualization of personal security as an unobservable latent variable that can be inferred from observable variables. These observable variables can be categorized into the four constructs, civilian-civilian, civilian-government, and government-civilian threats to personal security. In estimating the measurement model, I assumed the standardized observed values *y* of the latent concept *X*, in this case, threats to personal security, to follow normal distributions. Formally, the model is as follows for each observed variable

$$y_{i,t} \sim N\left(\mu_{i,t}\,,\,\sigma^2\right)$$

$$\mu_{i,t} = \beta X_{i,t}$$

Results from Measurement Model

The estimated models produced estimates of overall, civilian-civilian, civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security in 186 countries[7] across ten years[8]. Due to the impracticality of including all estimates of each latent variable for each of the 1860 country-years, I use subsets of the dataset, specifically from the year 2011, to the illustrate the nature and validity of the newly created dataset. Additional figures that illustrate the mean and error estimates of each of the latent variables are included in Appendix A. Figures 2.11 through 2.15 (Appendix A) illustrate the means, and 95% credible intervals for the country-years with the highest and lowest estimates of threats to personal security based on the baseline model of overall threats to personal security, and each of the categories of threats to personal security discussed earlier.



Figure 2.1. Graphical representation of the country-years with the ten highest and ten lowest threats to personal security.

[7] All the countries in the dataset are presented in Table 2.3(Appendix A).
[8] Each of the estimated models indicated convergence, based on Gelman-Rubin diagnostics.



Figure 2.2. Graphical representation of the country-years with the ten highest and ten lowest civilian-civilian threats to personal security.



Figure2.3. Graphical representation of the country-years with the ten highest and ten lowest civilian-government threats to personal security.



Figure 2.4. Graphical representation of the country-years with the ten highest and ten lowest government-civilian threats to personal security.



Figure 2.5. Graphical representation of the country-years with the ten highest and ten lowest government-government threats to personal security.

These graphical representations indicate face validity, and highlight the strength of the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted in this project. The correlations between the various latent variable estimates from the models estimated in the project included in Appendix A suggest that while the five latent variables estimated have positive correlations, they do not have extremely high correlations that may suggest redundancy of the theoretical model. The models' theory-based latent variable estimates and associated error facilitate research that can investigate the causes and effects of directions of interactions between civilians and government actors, a feature largely absent from existing data on human security or human rights. These data are also beneficial to researchers and practitioners alike to evaluate change in different aspects of personal security within a country across time. Figure 2.6 illustrates these benefits by graphically presenting the latent variables of the different latent variables that indicate threats to personal security in Tunisia between 2005 and 2014.



Figure 2.6. Posterior estimates of the latent variables of overall, civilian-civilian, civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security in Tunisia 2005-2014.

Note: The dots and lines show the point estimates (posterior means) and 95 percent crediblt intervals respectively.

The data also respond to major protest and repression events. This responsiveness is indicated in Figures 2.7-2.10 below. Figure 2.7 with the graphical representation of civilian-government threats to personal security in Iran shows a clear increase in threats civilian-government threats to personal security in 2009, corresponding with the large-scale protests and unrest following the presidential election (New York Times, June 13, 2009). Figure 2.8., which includes a graphical representation of the data for civilian-civilian threats to personal security in India, shows a pattern different from patterns in civilian-government (Figure 2.9) or government-civilian (Figure 2.10) threats to personal security, highlighting the distinctiveness of each latent variable.



Figure 2.7. Posterior densities of the latent variable of civilian-civilian threats to personal security in Iran from 2005 to 2014.

Note: The points are posterior mean estimates and the lines are 95 percent credible intervals.



Figure 2.8. Posterior densities of the latent variable of civilian-civilian threats to personal security in India from 2005 to 2014.

Note: The points are posterior mean estimates and the lines are 95 percent credible intervals.



Figure 2.9. Posterior densities of the latent variable of civilian-government threats to personal security in India from 2005 to 2014.

Note: The points are posterior mean estimates and the lines are 95 percent credible intervals.



Figure 2.10. Posterior densities of the latent variable of government-civilian threats to personal security in India from 2005 to 2014.

Note: The points are posterior mean estimates and the lines are 95 percent credible intervals.

Comparison with Related Measures

While measures of human security for large numbers of countries across time does not exist, a comparison of the new measure of personal security to existing measures of peacefulness and human rights illustrates the benefits of the new measures. Comparison of the overall threats to personal security to personal security to the *peacefulness* index of Hastings' (2011) human security index[9] shows a strong negative relationship (ρ = -0.68), in line with the inverse scaling of Hastings' index where higher scores meant greater peacefulness within a country. However, the new measure derived in the current project includes more years of data and error estimates for each latent variable posterior mean. The government-civilian variable, only slightly different from Farris in the modeling and inclusion of a variable from the CIRI dataset, has a strong negative relation (ρ = -0.91), in line with the scaling of the Farris (2014) data where higher scores indicate higher respect for citizens' human rights by a government. The government-

[9] Available only for the year, 2010.

civilian variable also has a strong negative correlation (ρ= -0.99) with the CIRI physical integrity rights index. These comparisons support construct validity of the new measures of personal security.

Discussion

The new conceptualization and measurement introduced in this article provides researchers with a new dataset that increases their ability to study the causes and effects of relational aspects of personal security. One of the strengths of the new conceptualization and measurement of personal security in this paper is the narrow definition of personal security used in this project addresses one of the strongest critiques of human security as a concept that is too broad to be usefully conceptualized or measured (Paris, 2001). The conceptualization and measurement of narrow aspects of human security is much more feasible than conceptualizing and measuring human security in its entirety. Furthermore, the piece-meal approach can help provide measures of components of human security that may be more beneficial to study the complex causal mechanisms involving the concept. The introduction of the use of events data in the format of "who did what to whom, when and where" to capture different relational aspects of personal security is also one that can be extended to other aspects of human security. While the current latent variable estimates are somewhat limited by the amount and quality of data available, the measurement approach used in this project is easy to replicate for more country-years with newer and higher quality data, when such data become available. The five latent variables obtained through this project for 1860 country-years serves as a good starting point to answer questions about the nuanced effects of rule of law, inclusiveness of domestic political institutions, and the presence of domestic non-governmental organizations on human security.

CHAPTER 3

EMPOWERING WAY TO GOVERNMENT NON-VIOLENCE: EVALUATING THE INFLUENCE OF EMPOWERMENT RIGHTS ON VIOLATION OF PERSONAL SECURITY BY GOVERNMENT ACTORS

Can empowerment rights improve physical integrity rights within a country? The limitations in freedom of domestic movement and freedom of press in regions with widespread physical integrity rights violations may be an indication that these rights, at least as perceived by key actors, could influence perpetrators of violence. The restrictions for press and international tourists to northeastern states of India such as Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur is one of many examples of limitation of domestic movement and press. Restrictions in the freedom of movement to and within the Tibetan Autonomous Region is another illustration of this pattern.

Some researchers have found that government respect for various empowerment rights may influence political violence and civil unrest (Bell, Cingranelli, Murdie, and Caglayan 2013; Barry, Clay, Flynn, and Robinson 2014). Bell and associates (2013) find that freedom of assembly and association and widespread use of communication technology are associated with higher levels of political violence. Barry and associates (2014) find a negative relationship between freedom of foreign movement with civil unrest. They attribute the negative relationship with potential dissenters choosing to leave the country, especially when economic opportunities abound in immigrant destinations.

However, no known study has considered the effects of empowerment rights on government actors' choice to use violence against civilians or other government actors. Such a study would help to identify specific empowerment rights that may be most important to strengthen to increase safety of civilians. This research project uses a new dataset that measures threats to personal security across countries and years to understand the effects of empowerment rights protection on violence initiated by civilian and government actors against other civilian and government actors.

The concept of *personal security* captures individuals' vulnerability to violent threats to their physical being. Though traditionally human security is conceptualized as an individual concept where an individual is threatened by various actors or circumstances around them, a relational approach to the concept as proposed by Purser (2017) helps to answer questions that were previously unanswerable in the fields of human security as well as human rights. I argue that empowerment rights would be negatively associated with threats to personal security by government agents. Additionally, even though freedom of assembly and association, and freedom of speech are most important in helping civilians voice their grievances, I theorize that other empowerment rights such as freedom of domestic movement, religion, and self-determination would decrease the threats to personal security by government agents.

This study finds empirical support for the claim that empowerment rights can reduce physical integrity rights violations or threats to personal security initiated by government agents against civilians and other government agents. Additionally, the study also finds that the effects of the empowerment rights vary depending on the source and target of violence. The findings from this study indicate the need to investigate the effect of specific empowerment rights on disaggregated measures of human security. More importantly, the study is among the first to

find empirical support for how empowerment rights may have a dual role in advancing civilian causes, one of supporting citizens in voicing their grievances or pursuing their interests, and a second of constraining government actors by making violence a less attractive strategy.

Substantive Background

This paper draws from research questions and findings about the influence of domestic factors and rights on various forms of threats to personal security, specifically to understand the role of empowerment rights on government-initiated violence. With a relational focus on the nature of threats to personal security, I look at existing research based on whether the general source and target of violence in each form of violent conflict are civilians or government actors. In this sense, I categorize relevant social science research and findings into four categories: of 1) determinants of repression, 2) determinants of coups, 3) determinants of violent conflict, more broadly defined, and 4) rights and civil unrest.

Domestic Level Influences on Repression

A few researchers have delved deep into the variables that motivate or deter state governments with respect to use of non-violent and violent forms of repression. This strand of literature provides us with insights on the preferences and strategies of government actors, and the role of state capacity and corruption when considering repression. Englehart (2009) highlights that states with poor state capacity, agency loss and lack of effective policing can result in violation of human rights both by individuals and government agents. As with research on interstate conflict, research on repression has looked at the various ways in which regimes and domestic institutions affect repression of citizens by their governments. Democratic institutions are understood to decrease repression in multiple ways (Davenport, 1996, 2007a). Davenport

(2007a) points to three mechanisms in the literature that may help to decrease repression in democracies. First, democratic regimes vest citizens with the power of people to vote leaders out of office. Second, democratic norms include general acceptance of passivity, toleration, communication, and deliberation. Third, democracies often offer citizens alternative and institutional channels for participation and contestation that may be unavailable or severely monitored in other regimes.

However, more recent research has delved into specific characteristics of regimes that encourage or discourage governments from using repression. In one such project, Davenport 2007a lays out the logic for why different kinds of autocratic regimes may use repression differently. He suggests that among autocracies, single-party governments are the least inclined to restrict. In his research, Davenport (2007a) finds that though military governments are less repressive than other types of autocratic governments with respect to civil liberty restrictions, they tend to be more repressive than others with respect to violent repression through torture or mass killing (500). In a similar vein, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) find support for their theory that political parties and legislatures help to decrease restrictions on empowerment rights, but increase physical integrity rights violations like torture. They argue that parties and legislature help to incorporate opposing groups into an institutional system, making it easier for the ruling leaders to identify, monitor, and accommodate these groups. However, since the opposition groups may gain membership and public support due to institutionalized channels of participation, the governing leaders may find physical integrity violations favorable to prevent rivals from gaining too much power. Ritter (2014) finds that executive job security decreases the likelihood that the governing leaders use repression in the first place but the observed violations are more severe than those by governments whose executives do not have job security. In their

assessment of political, economic, and social conditions that are associated with government repression, Hill and Jones (2014) find that various measures of various domestic political institutions are much more accurate at predicting certain kinds of repression much better than others. One such example is that judicial independence predicts levels of torture much better than it does disappearances, killings, or political imprisonment. These findings highlight the importance of investigating the effects of specific institutions rather than making comparisons across regimes. Furthermore, these research studies show how the same institutions can have different effects on different forms and aspects of repression.

Research in the human rights and human security literatures have not extensively studied physical integrity violations other than those by government actors against civilians until recently (Human Security Centre 2005; Inglehart and Norris 2012; Hastings 2013). The research about government use of violence in the literature on coups and literature of repression is largely done separately (Zimmerman 1983; Englehart 2009; Boix and Svolik 2013; Ritter 2014). This lacuna in research leaves us with important unanswered questions about the effect of changes in institutional features on the various forms of physical integrity violations that may happen within a state. Do domestic-level features such as empowerment rights decrease the use of violence by civilians and government agents alike? Do transparent laws and predictable enforcement have the same relationship and magnitude of effect on all forms of threats to personal security? What domestic institutional features constrain civilians and government agents from using violence against other civilians or government actors?

Domestic Level Influences on Probability of Coups

Violent coups, where one group of government agents use violence against the governing leader or coalition, another group of government actors, are threats to personal security that have been traditionally ignored by human rights researchers. However, some researchers have looked at factors that influence the risk of coups. Social scientists have identified various domestic level variables that influence the likelihood of launching a coup (Luttwak, 1968; Zimmerman, 1983; Finer, 1988; Boix and Svolik, 2013). Zimmerman (1983) refers to "push" factors, which motivate military officers to launch coups, and "pull" factors, which include favorable conditions a coup, that work together to determine the probability of a coup.

Some variables that can be identified in the literature on coups include civilian dependence on the armed forces during wartime, domestic crises, military popularity (Finer, 1988), low level of political participation by the state's population, and centralized nature of state institutions (Luttwak, 1968). Boix and Svolik (2013), in assessing why dictatorships might build institutions that may constrain the executive powers, propose that institutionalized interactions between the dictator and his allies contribute to the stability of authoritarian power-sharing in two ways. Firstly, regular interactions between dictator and high level bodies within authoritarian parties and legislatures can result in greater transparency, much like the mechanism discussed in the role of legislatures in authoritarian governments on repression. Secondly, dictator's compliance with the institutionalized rules creates a publically observable signal of the dictator's commitment to sharing power, which may help increase legitimacy, and ultimately, survival of authoritarian regimes.

Bell (2016) finds that while democratic constraints result in fewer coup attempts, when coups are attempted, they more likely to succeed in democracies. This finding supports his theory that democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader's ability to repress threats from political rivals. These theories and findings on coups share similar theorized causal mechanisms with multiple domestic level features such as the impact of legislative constraints, judicial constraints, and level of political participation.

Domestic Level Influences on Violence

Findings from studies about violent conflict may inform us about the factors that encourage or deter civilians from using violence as opposed to or along with other tactics of achieving political goals. Collier and Hoeffler (2005) discuss two different pathways by which resources are understood to cause conflict. The first is when high levels of natural resources lead to low income growth rate and low levels of income, which result in low opportunity costs for rebellion, making a country more civil-war prone. The second is when states with natural resources may not have strong incentives to develop a democratic system based on electoral competition, scrutiny, and civil rights. While these pathways suggest two ways in which civilians decide to pick up arms – one increases grievances and the other decreases opportunity costs of being involved in a conflict. It is unclear how resources might affect government-initiated violence, except indirectly based on the threat posed by protests. Multiple research studies have shown the effects of economic and political inequality on conflict. The effect of inequality on conflict is one that recurs in the literature about protests and civil wars (Schock, 1996; Besancon, 2005; Stewart, 2009). Schock (1996) finds support for his argument that the effect of economic inequality on violent political conflict is moderated by political opportunity structures. Besancon (2005) finds that systematically disadvantaged identity groups are more likely to be involved in

conflict under otherwise more economically equal conditions. He also finds that revolutionary wars are more likely to happen under conditions of greater economic inequality and war than at other times. Horizontal inequalities, a concept that captures inequalities across culturally or socially determined groups such as ethnicities, religions, religious sects, or regions, is another concept related to egality that researchers have shown to influence risk of violent conflict in communities (Stewart, 2009; Ostby et al. 2011). Ostby et al. (2011), in assessing the effects of population pressure and horizontal inequality on political violence, find that where population growth is high, greater levels of inequality between religious groups appear to increase the violence risk. However, population pressure and inequality, when considered separately, showed little effect on risk of violence. All these studies suggest that uneven protection of empowerment rights is a vital domestic-level variable to consider with respect to threats to personal security, especially when considering the decision calculus for civilians. These existing studies also conjure the question of whether horizontal inequalities increase the risk of violation of personal security regardless of whether conflict is initiated by or targeted at civilians or government agents.

The literature on the effect of political institutions on civil wars finds that specific domestic institutions can impact the risk of civil wars. Dictatorships with democratic institutions such as legislatures are much less prone to civil war than other regime types (Gandhi and Vreeland, 2004). Some research has also demonstrated the role of political and legal institutions in constraining elites and preventing repetition of civil wars in countries that have previously experiences civil wars (Walter, 2015). Walter (2015) argues that political and legal institutions place checks on executive power and alleviate the credible commitment problem for both rebels and incumbent elites. The supporting findings demonstrate that strong political institutions are

negatively related to repeat civil war or a relapse into conflict. These findings resonate with similar effects of political institutions on repression and coups. When considered together, the research on repression, and coups, suggest that there may be shared explanatory variables that influence violations of physical integrity violations whose sources are government actors. Understanding these variables can provide researchers and policymakers with potential institutions or policy options to focus resources on. Furthermore, while some domestic factors seem important in influencing certain kinds of domestic level conflict, there has been little research on how these factors affect different actors in their decision to use violence against other civilian or government actors within a country.

Role of Voice and Empowerment Rights

Empowerment rights refer to a set of freedoms that help to improve the quality of political rights for all civilians or traditionally disadvantaged groups. There are seven rights that are generally agreed upon in this category: freedom of assembly and association, speech, domestic movement, foreign movement, electoral self-determination, religion, and worker's rights (Sobek, Abouharb, and Ingram 2006; Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014)

While researchers have emphasized the role of *voice*, or the ability for civilians to vote and participate in the political system in improving physical integrity rights (Davenport 2007b), the role of empowerment rights in protection of physical integrity rights has not received as widespread of attention. Based on the role that empowerment rights can have on the effectiveness with which civilians can participate safely and effectively in a state, the extent to which empowerment rights are protected could influence civilian and government actors' use of violence. Bell et al.'s (2013) findings indicate that freedom of assembly and association and widespread use of cellphone and internet technology could lead to higher levels of civilian-led

violence. This finding is in line with the logic that these rights increase citizens' opportunities to organize and coordinate among themselves, voice their grievances, and mobilize in case of an inadequate government response. However, empowerment rights do not all have the same effect on political participation, unrest, and violence. Barry et al.'s (2014) find a negative relationship between freedom of foreign movement and civil unrest in non-democratic regimes, given that potential emigrants had economic opportunities abroad. This finding follows the reasoning that freedom of foreign movement allows potential dissenters to leave the country, as long as they are able to find good economic opportunities abroad. These two studies show the extent to which the effect of empowerment rights and their mechanisms of affecting unrest and violence can differ. These studies offer a glimpse into how empowerment rights could influence civilian actors in their decisions to protest or use violence against the government. They also suggest how empowerment rights could influence government's use of violence.

Theoretical Argument

Based on existing research, I argue that empowerment rights and equal protection of rights, aspects of domestic governments that have been traditionally ignored in research on repression and coups, can constrain government actors from using violence to threaten personal security of other government agents or civilians.

Empowerment Rights and Egality

Empowerment rights refer to political rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech, association, electoral self-determination, religion, domestic movement, and foreign movement that improve the quality of life of civilians and supplement effective civilian participation in a state (Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001, Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). Based on

existing literature on protests and violence, horizontal inequality can exacerbate propensity for violence within a community. One could imagine empowerment rights, equal protection of rights across social groups, and equal distribution of resources across social groups as possibly reducing horizontal inequality. However, considering that all populations may have some individuals or groups prone to the use of violence, empowerment rights and equality in the protection of rights across groups may not have a constraining effect on civilian threats to the personal security of other civilian actors or government actors.

Greater protection of empowerment rights could reduce threats to personal security by government actors in multiple ways. Protection of empowerment rights, equality in protection of rights across groups, and equality in distribution of resources can result in fewer grievances among civilians with respect to inequality and improvement in legitimacy of the government across groups. Furthermore, empowerment rights could serve as a safety valve that allows large groups of civilians to move within the state, or outside the state, or express their grievances through formal or informal channels without resorting to violence, similar to the logic presented by Barry et al. (2014). These effects of rights and resource distribution on perceptions of strength, threats, and legitimacy of the government by civilian and government actors could reduce threats to personal security by government agents against other government agents and civilian actors. This logic leads to hypothesis 1 below:

> *Hypothesis 1: Protection of empowerment rights and equality in the protection of rights across social groups will be negatively associated with threats to personal security initiated by government actors against civilians or other government actors.*

Freedom of association, freedom of speech, and freedom of self-determination increase accountability for government actors. This logic leads to hypothesis 2 below:

Hypothesis 2: Freedom of association, speech, and self-determination will constrain government actors, but not civilian actors, in their use of violence against civilian or other government actors.

Additionally, building on the findings by Barry et al. (2014), it is reasonable to expect that freedom of domestic movement, could help civilians make the choice to move to parts of the country that are not riddled with conflict, leading to lower levels of threats to personal security initiated by civilians against government agents. With respect to government actors, freedom of domestic movement could also mean increased accountability due to civilians from other parts of the country being able to visit and assess human rights violations occurring in an area. This reasoning is particularly relevant for democratic countries where conflict is not pervasive in all parts of the country. This logic leads to hypothesis 3 below:

Hypothesis 3: Freedom of domestic movement will be associated with lower civilian-government, and government-civilian threats to personal security.

Research Design

Traditionally, events-based data have not been employed in human rights for the purposes of measuring threats to personal security or violation of physical integrity rights. Purser's (2017) cross-national time-series dataset on threats to personal security by source and target groups provides a new tool to understand the effects of domestic level institutional features and policies on different forms of threats to personal security using events data. To test the hypotheses of this research study, I use the Purser (2017) latent measures of threats to personal security as well as various measures of domestic level institutional features and rights protection

within a country. helping us gain a more nuanced understanding of human security and human rights protection and violations.

Dependent Variables

Purser's (2017) Relational Threats to Personal Security (RTPS) dataset includes latent measures of threats to personal security based on direction of use of violence between two groups, civilian actors and government actors, for 186 countries for the years from 2005 to 2014. The dataset used Bayesian factor analysis to estimate threats to personal security for civilian and government actors within a country in each year based on crime counts, measures of human rights protection, and events-based data that are classified by the source and target of violent actions.

The dependent variables in this study are five variables from the RTPS data. The first variable is a measure of overall threat to personal security, regardless of source and target. The second is civilian-civilian threat to personal security, which measures the latent likelihood that physical integrity of civilian actors will be threatened by another civilian actor. The third dependent variable of interest is civilian-government threat to personal security, which is a latent measure of the risk that a civilian actor commits violence against a government actor. The fourth is government-civilian threat to personal security, which captures the risk that a government actor threatens the personal security of a civilian actor. The fifth dependent variable, government-government threats to personal security, captures the likelihood of a government actor using violence against another government actor.

Key Independent Variables

This research project is concerned with how protection of empowerment rights influences types of threats to personal security based on how these variables constrain or deter actors' use of violence based on their political relationship with the potential target. Therefore, the key independent variables used in this project are drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016) and the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014).

The explanatory variables of primary interest are empowerment rights protection and equal protection of rights across social groups. I used the *equal protection index* from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016) to operationalize equal protection of rights across social groups. In the first set of analyses (shown in table 3.1), I used the CIRI *empowerment index (new)* from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014) to operationalize protection of empowerment rights. This variable is an additive index based on a government's protection of seven different rights, freedom of assembly and association, speech, domestic movement, foreign movement, workers, electoral self-determination, and religious practice (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). I used the separate empowerment rights, specifically *freedom of assembly and association*, *freedom of speech*, *freedom of domestic movement, freedom of foreign movement, electoral self-determination, workers' rights,* and *freedom of religion* from the CIRI Human Rights Database to understand the effects of each of the empowerment rights included in the CIRI *empowerment index(new)* variable.

Controls and Modeling Decisions

I included control variables drawn from existing literature on violent conflict, repression, and coups. These control variables are drawn from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016), World Bank Governance Indicators (World Bank 2016a), and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016b). They can be divided into four categories: 1) institutional constraints on executives, 2) state capacity, 3) rule of law, and 4) opportunities for participation and expression. The variables to control for institutional constraints on executives included the variables, *legislative constraints on executive*, and *judicial constraints on executive* from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016). I used *state authority over population* variable from the V-Dem dataset to account for state capacity. The model also includes *transparent laws with predictable enforcement* variable to capture the transparency and enforcement of rule of law within the state. The *participatory component index* from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016) incorporates level of informal political participation within states. The *equal distribution of resources* from the V-Dem dataset measures (Coppedge et al. 2016) controls for inequality in material as well as political rights. I also include *control of corruption* (World Bank 2016a), *log(population), and log(GDP per capita)* (World Bank 2016b) to account for effects discussed in research related to protests, repression, and conflict (Hill and Jones 2014; Barry, Clay, Flynn, and Robinson 2014).

I used Generalized Estimation Equations models to estimate the effects of various domestic level variables on each of the four different kinds of threats to personal security to test the hypotheses. This methodological approach lends itself well to making inferences based on population averages as opposed to purely based on within-country variances. I estimated a set of models with the four categories of threats to personal security as dependent variables, and with

the integrated the CIRI empowerment index (2014) as the primary independent variable. Additionally, I tested the hypotheses by repeating the model with the empowerment rights separated by right. In doing so, I used data on protection of freedom of association, speech, domestic movement, foreign movement, electoral self-determination, workers, and practice of religion from the CIRI human rights database (2014).

Results and Discussion

The estimates of the generalized linear models with AR 1 structure[10], shown in table 3.1[11], are estimated on 138 countries between the years 2005 and 2010. The results of the models indicate support for hypothesis 1, with neither empowerment rights protection nor equal protection of rights across social groups having a significant relationship with threats to personal security originating from civilians. More importantly, I find partial support for Hypothesis 2, with protection of empowerment rights being negatively associated with threats to personal security by government agents against other government actors or civilians. The negative relationship suggested by the results were not sensitive to addition or removal of variables. The results of the model indicate face validity with control variables behaving generally as expected. Population is positively associated with all forms of threats to personal security in line with previous studies (Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Barry, Clay, Flynn, and Robinson 2014). Equal distribution of resources is negatively associated government-civilian threats to personal security in line with previous research (Stewart, 2009; Ostby et al. 2011).

[10] The AR1 correlation structure accounts for serial correlation in the dependent variables. In each case, the models with AR1 correlation structure were compared to the same models with exchangeable correlation structure using the QIC fit statistic for Generalized Estimation Equation. The AR1 model was superior in model fit.
[11] The results of the model show similar results after excluding outliers (see table 3.3 in Appendix B).

The second set of analyses, whose results are presented in table 3.2 and figures 3.1-4, were aimed at understanding the effects of specific empowerment rights on constraining government-initiated threats to personal security. These results suggest that not all empowerments are equally influential in constraining government agents. Surprisingly, freedom of assembly and association and freedom of speech do not have a discernible effect in constraining threats to personal security by government actors in this sample and model specification. The results show a negative association between electoral self-determination and government-civilian threats to personal security, partially supporting hypothesis 2. The model with government-government threats to personal security as the dependent variable showed two different empowerment rights, freedom of domestic movement and freedom of religion, to have distinguishable effects in explaining variance in the estimates, partially supporting hypothesis 3. While the results only partially support hypotheses 2 and 3, they paint a more nuanced picture about the impact of empowerment rights on different categories of physical integrity rights violations.

Table 3.1. Estimated Effects of Empowerment Rights Index on Threats to Personal Security

Covariates	Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security	Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security	Government-Civilian Threat to Personal Security	Government-Government Threat to Personal Security
Empowerment Index	0.011 *	-0.011	-0.018 ***	-0.027 ***
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Legislative Constraints	-0.182	0.315	0.019	-0.005
	(0.123)	(0.245)	(0.124)	(0.202)
Judicial Constraints	0.828	0.555	0.045	0.218
	(0.648)	(0.357)	(0.171)	(0.220)
State Authority	-0.015	-0.028	0.003	-0.005
	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Transparency and Predictable Enforcement	0.027	-0.061	-0.084 ***	0.014
	(0.044)	(0.073)	(0.029)	(0.049)
Participatory Index	-0.859	0.459	0.023	0.068
	(0.718)	(0.524)	(0.167)	(0.443)
Equal Protection of Rights	-0.302	-1.444 *	-0.030	0.035
	(0.349)	(0.874)	(0.204)	(0.242)
Equal Distribution of Resources	0.317	1.054	-0.528 ***	0.049
	(0.397)	(1.090)	(0.192)	(0.295)
Control of Corruption	-0.081	-0.138	-0.102 ***	0.051
	(0.129)	(0.105)	(0.037)	(0.060)
Military Spending	0.021	0.016	0.027	0.059 **
	(0.019)	(0.036)	(0.017)	(0.060)
log(Population)	0.112 ***	0.1138 ***	0.149 ***	0.221 ***
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(0.035)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.009	-0.034	0.012	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.0211)	(0.009)	(0.024)

Note: N= 786. The model used AR1 structure. Two tailed significance tests used * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 3.2. Estimated Separate Effects of Empowerment Rights on Personal Security

Covariates	Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security	Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security	Government-Civilian Threat to Personal Security	Government-Government Threat to Personal Security
Freedom of Association	-0.012 (0.022)	0.042 (0.033)	-0.015 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.028)
Freedom of Speech	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.033 (0.029)	0.009 (0.022)	-0.041 (0.037)
Freedom of Domestic Movement	-0.022 (0.064)	-0.086 (0.104)	-0.039 (0.024)	-0.088 * (0.048)
Freedom of Foreign Movement	0.077 (0.065)	0.078 (0.051)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.049)
Electoral self-determination	0.058 * (0.035)	-0.038 (0.041)	-0.045 ** (0.018)	0.001 (0.030)
Workers' Rights	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.028 (0.037)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.028)
Religious freedom	-0.008 (0.015)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.051 ** (0.025)
Legislative Constraints	-0.219 * (0.853)	0.346 (0.248)	0.057 (0.123)	-0.015 (0.204)
Judicial Constraints	0.886 (0.687)	0.575 (0.385)	0.019 (0.170)	0.266 (0.227)
State Authority	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.027 (0.019)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.005)
Transparency and Predictable Enforcement	0.032 (0.047)	-0.062 (0.072)	-0.084 (0.030)	0.017 (0.048)
Participatory Index	-0.865 (0.729)	0.403 (0.525)	0.003 (0.169)	0.067 (0.451)
Equal Protection of Rights	-0.296 (0.365)	-1.392 (0.867)	-0.043 (0.202)	0.035 (0.241)
Equal Distribution of Resources	-0.311 (0.413)	1.024 (1.086)	-0.507 *** (0.192)	0.038 (0.291)
Control of Corruption	-0.087 (0.141)	-0.145 (0.113)	-0.105 *** (0.038)	0.041 (0.060)
Military Spending	0.019 (0.017)	0.011 (0.039)	0.027 (0.017)	0.055 ** (0.028)
log(Population)	0.107 *** (0.025)	0.113 *** (0.028)	0.152 *** (0.015)	0.215 *** (0.033)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.012 (0.009)	0.013 (0.024)

Note: N = 786, Generalized linear model with AR1 structure. Two tailed significance tests used
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p<0.01



Figure 3.1. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security



Figure 3.2. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security



Figure 3.3 Estimated Effects of Covariates on Government-Civilian Threats to Personal Security



Figure 3.4. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Government-Government Threats to Personal Security

Implications

This quantitative analysis using Purser's (2017) measures of threats to personal security provides some support for the theory that empowerment rights constrain government actors from threatening personal security. The study also finds that not all empowerment rights have the same effect on constraining government agents' use of violence. While this study is only a first-step in quantitatively understanding the varying effects of empowerment rights across the groups of the source of violence, the findings illustrate the need for human rights and human security researchers to study the varying effects of different empowerment rights on disaggregated human rights and human security data.

The current analysis only used a sample of 138 countries from the years 2005 to 2010 due to availability of relevant data. The latent measures of civilian-civilian, civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security are based on events-data based on Reuters news reports (Bond et al. 2003; VRA 2016). While the bias in coverage of news events of Reuters is accounted for in the latent measures of personal security, testing the hypotheses using more accurate measures of personal security could improve our understanding of the various domestic features in a country that influence different types of personal security.

This study is one of the first to show the varying effects of empowerment rights on threats to personal security. This finding identifies freedom of domestic movement and electoral self-determination as having the potential to constrain government actors in their use of violence. The findings also serve as a call for human rights and human security researchers to further study the causal mechanisms by which different empowerment rights influence use of violence by actors. The results also hold suggestions for human rights practitioners, about focusing on

specific empowerment rights such as freedom of domestic movement, and freedom of electoral self-determination when attempting to improve personal security within a country.

CHAPTER 4

REALITY VS. PERCEPTIONS: INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF NATIONAL-LEVEL THREATS TO PERSONAL SECURITY ON INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY.

The United Nations Development Programme's 1994 Human Development Report that discusses the importance of considering human security in policy suggests there are two components to human security, freedom from fear and freedom from want (24). Though recent scholarship in the field of human rights have assessed the influences on and of individual beliefs about the rights, these studies are part of a recent focus of human rights research on public opinion (Murdie and Purser, 2016; Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp, 2009; Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard 2002). Assessing the effect of events that threaten personal security on individual perceptions of threat is important in understanding what circumstances influence individual perceptions of freedom from fear and freedom from want for citizens.

Research on student perceptions and educational achievement highlights the importance of perception of school safety and order for effective learning among students (Ripsky and Gregory, 2009; Cornell and Mayer, 2010). Exposure to violence and related trauma have been associated with attentional disorders, depression, anxiety, and school avoidance among students (Buhs, Ladd, and Herald, 2006; Flannery, Wester, and Singer, 2004). Based on a mixed-methods study of the Western suburbs of the city of Adelaide in Australia, Ziersch et al. (2005) found that individuals' attitudes of perceived safety within a neighborhood were positively associated with

their physical and mental health indicators. Other researchers have also found fear of violence and safety influence individual behavior and life outcomes in different age groups (Piro, Nœss, Claussen 2006; Ratner et al. 2006). These findings, which show the importance of human security, especially personal security[12], on individuals' health and day-to day life choices, illustrate why it is important to understand the various individual, local, and national circumstances that influence perceptions of human security.

Though existing research provides insights on the association of government repression, human rights organizations and individual-level characteristics such as education with individual perceptions of human rights conditions, there are still many unanswered questions about individual attitudes related to other aspects of human security. Existing studies have looked at the question of how individuals evaluate the human rights conditions of their state, but not whether these evaluations were associated with feelings of insecurity, an important gap in human rights and human security research. We also know little about the extent to which violence not initiated by the government against civilians affects individual perceptions of safety[13].

Understanding the level of perceived safety is crucial in the study of human security and human rights to evaluate the circumstances under which public awareness occurs, and could lead to the use of institutionalized or non-institutionalized channels to express grievance. More importantly, when different definitions of human security focus on indicators of different forms of poverty, and not individual perceptions, it is imperative for human security researchers to understand the extent to which individual perceptions reflect national-level indicators of human security.

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[12] Personal security here refers to any intentional use of physical violence against an individual.

[13] With exceptions from a small group of studies on community health and education that evaluate the impact of perceptions of safety on day-to-day events such as outdoor physical activity and educational achievement. A few examples include works by Ziersch et al. (2004), Ratner et al. (2006), and Piro, Noess, Claussen (2006).

In this study, I investigate how threats to the personal integrity of civilians and government agents affect individual perceptions of safety. Specifically, this study helps to understand the extent to which national level threats to personal security can affect residents of a country.

Theoretical Background

Existing research that utilizes individual attitudes related to human rights or human security had been infrequent until recently[14]. However, recent research studies that include individual attitudes have contributed significantly to gaps in the literature about how citizens of a country perceive human rights protection within their country and abroad. These studies can be broadly categorized as focused on either a) public opinion on the importance of specific human rights within a country or with respect to foreign policy decisions (Geyer and Shapiro, 1988; Chong, 1993; WorldPublicOpinion.org 2008; Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp, 2009; Richards, Morrill, and Anderson, 2012) or b) the quality of human rights protection or level of government repression within a country (Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2012).

Individual Attitudes on Human Rights and Human Security

Geyer and Shapiro (1988), in one the earliest works in political science on the issue, point to the utility of and the lack of consistency in survey questions about human rights in the context of American foreign policy. Chong (1993) sheds light on how individuals think and reason through controversial issues about how and when rights and liberties should be protected using in-depth interviews. In a more recent study that emphasizes the role of individual attitudes about human rights, Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp (2009) explore the impact of human rights

[14] See Hertel, Scruggs, and Heidkamp(2009), Murdie and Purser(2016), Inglehart and Norris (2012)

attitudes on ethical consumption using a nationally representative telephone survey conducted in the United States. Richards, Morrill, and Anderson (2012) use surveys to identify the nature and possible causes of individual attitudes on the acceptability of torture among US college students. Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard's (2002) study, distinct from the studies discussed above, uses data from 18 Central European countries to assess whether citizen perceptions of human rights conditions in a country reflect the country's conditions of government repression. Furthermore, they find support for their proposition that the less repressive a country's government, the more positively citizens assess the human rights conditions of the country. Many theories on repression and dissent are based on the implicit or explicit assumption that influencing perceptions can affect individual actions. With respect to human security, Inglehart and Norris (2012) argue that individual perceptions are integral to measuring the concept. In a related vein, Engel and Ibáñez (2007) use survey data from Colombia to conclude that violence and perceptions of safety can be a significant predictor of displacement. While Engel and Ibáñez (2007) used various proxies to capture perceptions of safety, their study did not shed light on how individual perceptions of safety compare to national or regional level data that capture actual levels of violence

Inglehart and Norris (2012) acknowledge the importance of individual perceptions of human security through their questions in the Wave 6 of World Values Surveys. However, there are no published studies that evaluate how perceptions of safety compare to national level indicators of personal security. While the current study relates to the important study by Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard (2012), it is distinct in two ways. First, my study looks beyond state repression, and instead looks at four different categories of threats to personal security that may exist within a country. The four categories are based on whether the source and target actors

civilians or government agents. Based on these criteria, there are four distinct categories of threats to personal security that may exist within a state – civilian-civilian, civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security. By looking beyond purely government repression of civilians, we are able to assess how threats to physical integrity that have traditionally been ignored in the human rights literature, such as violent coups, violent crime, and violent dissent by civilians against government actors, can influence perceptions of safety among individuals.

Effects of Violence on Perceptions of Human Rights and Safety

Some recent studies have explored effects of violence and repression on individual attitudes. In general, individual attitudes related to repression and violence seem to reflect realistic estimations of the amount of repression and violence within a given area, with some variations based on individual and national-level characteristics (Anderson, Regan, Ostergard, 2002; Anderson et al., 2005; Carlson and Listhaug, 2007). Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard (2002), in assessing the extent to which individual attitudes align with national-level data, find that individual perceptions of government repression reflected national-level indicators of government repression. A study by Anderson and colleagues (2005) that investigated the determinants of individual attitudes regarding the protection of human rights within their countries found that attitudes were influenced by the government's disregard for human rights as well as individuals' level of education. The findings from Carlson and Listhaug's (2007) study that compares citizen perceptions of human rights with those of expert evaluations also supports the assumption that citizens tend to be aware of human rights conditions within a country, and an effect of individual-level education on perception of human rights protection within repressive

states. Another important national-level feature that has been associated with variations in individual evaluations of human rights is HRO presence (Davis, Murdie, Steinmetz, 2012).

The current study focuses on perception of safety as opposed to general evaluation of human rights protection. One determinant of perception of safety may be awareness and perception of human rights violations by government, through HROs, hearsay, or news media, as suggested by research discussed above. However, perceptions of safety, specifically from violence, also could depend on an individual's perception of whether the different forms of violence occurring within the state, regardless of its intensity or expansiveness, threatens them directly. Hypotheses 1 follows from the findings about literature discussed above (Anderson, Regan, Ostergard, 2002; Anderson et al., 2005; Carlson and Listhaug, 2007).

Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of threats to personal security nationally with be associated with lower levels of perceived safety and human rights protection.

An additional aspect that many criminology researchers have explored is the effect of personal or family victimization on perception of safety (Stafford and Galle, 1984; Smith and Hill, 1991; Weitzer and Kubrin, 2004). Based on their findings that prior victimization is positively associated with fear, I expect to find similar effects when investigating a broader range of violence within a state. This logic leads to Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals who have been personally victims or have family members that have been victims to violence in the past are likely to perceive lower levels of human rights protection and security.

Research Design

Studies involving human rights attitudes and perceptions have largely excluded events-based data in assessing the extent to which individual attitudes reflect actual levels of repression. Furthermore, there are few cross-national datasets that go beyond the general levels of government repression and protests, and disaggregate violent events based on the source and target. Purser's (2017) cross-national time-series dataset on threats to personal security by source and target groups. This dataset serves as a latent measure of intentional violence between individuals that are civilians or government actors. To test the hypotheses of this research study, I use data on perceptions of safety from the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014), the Purser (2017) latent measures of threats to personal security along with other individual and national-level features to gain a better understanding of types of violence and how they affect perceptions of safety.

Dependent Variables

The World Values Survey Wave 6 (WVS Wave 6) was conducted between 2010 and 2014 in 57 countries (2016) and over 85,000 respondents. This wave of the survey includes four questions (V 188 – V 191) that assess individual perceptions of human security. The first dependent variable I use in this study concerns individual perceptions of individual human rights in the country. I use data from the following question from the World Values Survey Wave 6 to capture individual assessment of human rights conditions in the country:

> "How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in this country?" The participants were asked if they felt there was a) "a great deal of respect for individual human rights" b) "fairly much respect" c) "not much respect" d) "no respect at all." (World Values Survey Wave 6 2012, 10)

This question revisits previous research studies that attempted to evaluate how individual perceptions compare to reality of human rights practices within the country (Anderson, Regan, and Ostergard 2002; Anderson et al. 2005; Carlson and Listhaug 2007; Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz 2012). For the ease of interpretation, I invert the scale so that higher ratings reflect perceptions of higher human rights protection. The same question is used in analyses by Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz (2012) in assessing the role of international non-governmental organizations in influencing individual-level perceptions of human rights. The second question whose data I use relates to perception of safety within individuals' homes. I use this question as one operationalization of the concept of perception of safety from violence in this study. The question in the survey is:

> "In the last 12 month, how often have you or your family felt unsafe from crime in your home: a) "often," b) "sometimes," c) "rarely," d) "never," and e) "DK/NA"." (World Values Survey Wave 6 2012, 14)

For the purposes of this study, I only include the frequency of feelings of safety, and exclude the participants whose answers were "DK/NA (don't know or not applicable)" in the analysis. The third dependent variable I include in this study focuses on perception of safety in the participants' neighborhoods. This variable, which is a different way of operationalizing perception of safety is drawn from the following question:

> "Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days in your neighborhood?" The participants are given the options a) "Very secure," b) "Quite secure," c) "Not very secure," d) "Not at all secure," and e) "DK/NA" (World Values Survey Wave 6 2012, 13)

In the analyses for this study, I exclude participants that chose "DK/NA." I also inverted the scale of the answers in such a way that higher categories indicated higher levels of perceived safety in the neighborhood.

Key Independent Variables

The hypotheses of this study concern the relationship between various forms of intentional acts of violence within a country and how they affect individual perceptions of human rights as well as safety. To capture the different kinds of violent threats to personal security, I use four variables from Purser's (2017) Relational Threats to Personal Security. This dataset includes latent measures of threats to personal security based on direction of use of violence between two groups, civilian actors and government actors, for 186 countries for the years from 2005 to 2014. The measure used Bayesian factor analysis to estimate threats to personal security for civilian and government actors within a country in each year based on crime counts, measures of human rights protection, and events-based data that are classified by the source and target of violent actions. The first variable is an estimate of civilian-civilian threat to personal security, which measures the latent likelihood that the physical integrity of civilian actors will be threatened by another civilian actor. The second variable I use, civilian-government threat to personal security, measures captures the extent of violence initiated by civilians against government actors. The third variable of interest is government-civilian threat to personal security, which measures the risk of government actors utilizing violence against civilian actors. The fourth independent variable I use is government-government threats to personal security, capturing violence by government actors against other government actors.

In addition to the measures of four different categories of violations of physical integrity rights discussed above, I also use data from two questions from the World Values Survey Wave

6 (2012). In operationalizing whether the respondent or someone close to them had been a victim of violence, I use the following questions:

"Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year?"

"And what about your immediate family – has someone in your family been the victim of a crime during the last year?"

The participants could choose a) Yes, b) No, or c) Don't Know or Not Applicable. For the purposes of this study, I do not include the respondents that answered "don't know or not applicable." (World Values Survey Wave 6 2012, 13)

Controls and Modeling Decisions

The research question in this study is focused on the effects of both individual and national-level variables on individual attitudes related to human rights and human security. The individuals whose attitudes I analyze are nested in a specific country. For these reasons, I use multilevel or hierarchical statistical models to analyze the data. For each of the three dependent variables, I estimate multiple models with a subset of the larger World Values Survey of the year with only data from 2011 and another subset with data from 2012. Due to the World Values Survey being conducted in different years in different countries, data from each of the years does not include the same countries. The list of countries in each of the years is included in tables 4.1 and 4.2 below. The models based on the surveys conducted in 2011 include data from over 23000 respondents from 19 countries, and those based on surveys conducted in 2012 include data from over 24000 respondents from 16 countries. Using different years and countries also serves the purpose of testing reliability of results across countries and years. All dependent variables are ordered categorically, making multilevel mixed ordered logistic regression an appropriate way to analyze these data. I conduct analyses for each of the years with the complete

sample, and then analyses with the data from respondents from only non-OECD countries. This choice to test data with multiple subsets allows the researcher and readers to look for stability of results across analyses of subsets, providing insights into generalizability of results.

Table 4.1 Countries included in 2011 analyses

Country Name	Number of respondents
Trinidad and Tobago	999
Chile	1000
Uruguay	1000
Spain	1189
Slovenia	1069
Cyprus	1000
Russia	2500
Estonia	1533
Ukraine	1500
Belarus	1535
Armenia	1100
Azerbaijan	1002
Sweden	1206
Nigeria	1759
Morocco	1200
Turkey	1605
Kyrgyzstan	1500
Uzbekistan	1500
Kazakhstan	1500
New Zealand	841

Table 4.2 Countries included in 2012 analyses

Country Name	Number of Respondents
Mexico	2000
Colombia	1512
Peru	1210
Netherlands	1902
Poland	966
Romania	1503
Ghana	1552
Rwanda	1527
Zimbabwe	1500
Iraq	1200
China	2300
India	4078
Pakistan	1200
Malaysia	1300
Singapore	1972
Philippines	1200
Australia	1477

The models in this study include control variables drawn based on prominent findings on individual attitudes related to human rights and human security perceptions. Individual level control variables are drawn from demographic data from the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014). National level data that may affect individual perceptions were drawn from the Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2016), World Bank Population data (World Bank 2016a) and World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016b). The individual level variables I control for are sex, age, and highest level of education received (World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014). The national level controls include log(population) (World Bank 2016a), log(GDP per capita) (World Bank 2016b).

Results and Discussion

Based on the models estimated as part of this study, I find evidence that different categories of threats to personal security are associated with perceptions of human rights conditions, safety from crime in home, and safety in neighborhood. I also find that personal and family member victimization are not consistently associated with perception of lower levels of regard for human rights in the country or feelings of lower safety within individuals' homes and neighborhoods.

Results from the analyses to investigate the effects of individual and national-level variables on perceptions of human rights conditions within the country are presented in table 4.3 and figures 4.1 and 4.2[15]. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 show the results of the 2011 and 2012 models estimated after excluding OECD countries in each of the samples. These various models are presented to account for multicollinearity and show how the models compare to the original models in table 4.3. The results partially support hypothesis 1, with greater civilian-initiated threats to personal security associated with perception of poor human rights conditions. Civilian-civilian and civilian-government threats to personal security are negatively associated with the perceptions of human rights conditions variable, where lower values represent perceptions of lower human rights respect. However, the effects of government-civilian and government-government threats to personal security are not consistent and therefore inconclusive with the current study. The mixed results with respect to government-civilian and government-government threats to personal security may indicate the dependence of citizen awareness of those categories of threats on HROs and media outlets for awareness of these kinds of human rights violations. The effect of personal or family member's victimization did not have a clear

[15] Additional analyses on perception of human rights perceptions included in tables 4.12 and 4.13 (Appendix C).

relationship with perceptions of human rights conditions. Surprisingly, the results in the non-OECD samples from 2011 and 2012 both indicate a positive association between government-initiated threats to personal security and reports of higher levels of human rights conditions. It is unclear if these findings are due to fear of governments with higher rates of repression or lack of access to information on and awareness of human rights violations.

Table 4.3. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Human Rights Perceptions, Excluding Log(population).

Covariates	2011	2012
Personal victimization	0.042 *** (0.011)	0.044 *** (0.013)
Family member victimization	0.002 (0.015)	0.038 ** (0.018)
Civilian-Civilian	0.009 (0.109)	-0.752 *** (0.172)
Civilian-Government	-0.479 *** (0.057)	-0.117 *** (0.042)
Government-Civilian	-0.146 ** (0.064)	0.206 (0.247)
Government-Government	0.001 (0.057)	0.078 (0.371)
Female	-0.026 (0.048)	-0.024 (0.045)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
Highest Level of Education	0.049 *** (0.016)	0.016 (0.017)
Log (GDP per capita)	0.033 (0.026)	-0.411 *** (0.083)
N	24451	25756
Number of Groups	19	16

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated no multicollinearity.



Figure 4.1. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Human Rights Conditions, 2011 (based on column 1 of table 4.3).



Figure 4.2. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Human Rights Conditions, 2012 (based on column 2 of table 4.3).

Table 4.4. Estimated effects of covariates on perception of human rights conditions, non-OECD countries, 2011.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2
Personal victimization	0.049 ***	0.036 ***
	(0.015)	(0.013)
Family member victimization	0.009	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Civilian-Civilian	-2.488 ***	-1.961 ***
	(0.441)	(0.224)
Civilian-Government	-0.162 **	-0.057 ***
	(0.072)	(0.022)
Government-Civilian	-0.401	0.324 ***
	(0.337)	(0.065)
Government-Government	0.387 ***	0.419 ***
	(0.112)	(0.068)
Female	-0.009	-0.002
	(0.055)	(0.056)
Age	-0.000	0.002
	(0.055)	(0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.009	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.016)
Log (GDP per capita)	-0.338 ***	-0.267 ***
	(0.082)	(0.016)
Log(Population)	0.319 ***	
	(0.109)	

Note: N= 17820, number of groups = 13, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression, two-tailed significance tests used $*p < 0.10$ $**p < 0.05$ $***p < 0.01$.
Variance inflation factors indicate multicollinearity in model 1, but not in model 2.

Table 4.5. Estimated effects of covariates on perceptions of human rights conditions, non-OECD countries, 2012.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Personal victimization	0.027 * (0.016)	0.036 (0.015)	0.036 (0.015)
Family member victimization	0.019 (0.017)	0.031 (0.023)	0.031 (0.024)
Civilian-Civilian	-0.414 *** (0.118)	-0.629 *** (0.143)	-0.589 *** (0.139)
Civilian-Government	-0.023 (0.031)	-0.094 ** (0.040)	-0.111 *** (0.034)
Government-Civilian	1.188 *** (0.209)	0.254 *** (0.087)	
Government-Government	-1.182 *** (0.380)		0.265 ** (0.133)
Female	0.006 (0.048)	0.008 (0.052)	0.009 (0.052)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Highest Level of Education	0.002 (0.026)	0.001 (0.028)	0.002 (0.028)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.297 *** (0.065)	-0.349 *** (0.081)	-0.324 *** (0.075)
Log(population)	-0.072 (0.057)		

Note: N= 19556, number of groups = 12, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$.
Variance inflation factors indicate multicollinearity in model 1, but not in models 2 and 3.

The results from the analyses of dependent variables related to individual perceptions of safety in home (tables 4.6-4.8, figures 4.3-4.4)[16] show partial support for hypothesis 1, which expects that threats to personal security at the national level would be associated with perceptions of decreased safety both at home and in the neighborhood. Civilian-government threats to personal security are associated with lower levels of perceived safety from crime in the respondents' homes (see table 4.6). The non-OECD analyses (tables 4.7 and 4.8) also show that civilian-initiated threats to personal security consistently have a negative effect on perceived safety at home. However, the associations between government-initiated threats to personal security are not consistent across all the non-OECD models in this study. The results indicated a consistent positive association between victimization, personal or family, and perceived safety at home. Though not in alignment with hypothesis 2, this finding may indicate individuals that have been victims of crime feel safer at home than elsewhere.

[16] Additional analyses on perception of safety in home are presented in tables 4.14 and 4.15 (Appendix C)

Table 4.6. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceived Safety from Crime at Home, Excluding Log(population).

Covariates	2011	2012
Personal victimization	0.186 *** (0.034)	0.157 *** (0.023)
Family member victimization	0.147 *** (0.015)	0.108 *** (0.028)
Civilian-Civilian	0.685 *** (0.226)	-0.561 *** (0.049)
Civilian-Government	-0.390 *** (0.037)	-0.355 *** (0.017)
Government-Civilian	-0.118 (0.092)	-0.448 *** (0.099)
Government-Government	0.193 ** (0.088)	1.238 *** (0.137)
Female	-0.130 *** (0.045)	-0.023 (0.061)
Age	-0.000 *** (0.002)	0.005 *** (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.046 *** (0.016)	0.034 *** (0.013)
Log (GDP per capita)	0.087 * (0.046)	-0.389 *** (0.036)
N	25884	26130
Number of Groups	20	16

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated no multicollinearity.



Figure 4.3. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Safety from Crime at Home, 2011 (based on column 1 of table 4.6).



Figure 4.4. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Safety from Crime at Home, 2012 (based on column 2 of table 4.6).

Table 4.7 Estimated effects of covariates on perceptions of safety from crime at home, non-OECD countries, 2011.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2
Personal victimization	-0.959 *** (0.192)	0.156 *** (0.045)
Family member victimization	-0.822 *** (0.172)	0.145 *** (0.023)
Civilian-Civilian	-1.546 *** (0.456)	-0.928 ** (0.386)
Civilian-Government	-0.628 *** (0.054)	-0.589 *** (0.061)
Government-Civilian	0.166 (0.243)	0.536 *** (0.156)
Government-Government	0.777 *** (0.090)	0.693 *** (0.098)
Female	-0.103 * (0.061)	-0.091 * (0.056)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.053 *** (0.015)	0.055 *** (0.018)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.046 (0.093)	0.032 (0.089)
Log(population)	0.199 * (0.102)	
N	18734	19157
Number of Groups	14	14

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in Model 1, but not in Model 2.

Table 4.8. Estimated effects of covariates on perceptions of safety from crime at home, non-OECD countries, 2012.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model3
Personal victimization	-0.723 *** (0.081)	0.151 *** (0.029)	0.152 *** (0.029)
Family member victimization	-0.608 *** (0.111)	0.082 *** (0.025)	0.103 *** (0.025)
Civilian-Civilian	0.278 *** (0.098)	-0.448 *** (0.049)	-0.398 *** (0.067)
Civilian-Government	0.423 *** (0.054)	-0.166 *** (0.013)	-0.633 *** (0.057)
Government-Civilian	1.556 *** (0.227)	0.652 *** (0.032)	
Government-Government	-0.782 ** (0.367)		0.675 *** (0.080)
Female	0.022 (0.063)	0.027 (0.063)	0.037 (0.064)
Age	0.005 * (0.003)	0.006 *** (0.002)	0.006 ** (0.003)
Highest Level of Education	0.034 * (0.019)	0.037 * (0.019)	0.041 * (0.021)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.628 *** (0.044)	-0.446 *** (0.038)	-0.302 *** (0.043)
Log(population)	-0.609 *** (0.075)		
N	19008	19942	19942
Number of Groups	12	12	12

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in Model 1, but not in Models 2 and 3.

The models that analyzed the effects of individual and national-level variables on perceptions of safety in the neighborhood say a slightly different story than the question about safety in homes. These results (see Table 4.9[17], figures 4.5 and 4.6) show that higher levels of civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security at the national level are associated with lower levels of perceived safety in the respondents' neighborhood in all models[18]. These findings support the hypothesis 1 for the most part. However, the association between civilian-civilian threats and perceived security in neighborhood were mixed, and inconclusive. The effect of victimization was also mixed across models, resulting in no clear support for hypothesis 2.

[17] Additional analyses on security in neighborhoods are included in table 4.16 and 4.17 (Appendix C).
[18] Not including models with identified multicollinearity.

Table 4.9. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceived Safety in Neighborhood, Excluding Log(population).

Covariates	2011	2012
Personal victimization	0.084 *** (0.033)	0.174 *** (0.014)
Family member victimization	0.121 *** (0.019)	0.092 ** (0.039)
Civilian-Civilian	1.369 *** (0.089)	0.204 (0.149)
Civilian-Government	-0.053 ** (0.021)	-0.036 (0.029)
Government-Civilian	-0.247 *** (0.060)	-0.044 (0.203)
Government-Government	-0.221 *** (0.028)	-0.665 ** (0.328)
Female	-0.134 *** (0.031)	-0.107 ** (0.045)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.005 *** (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.021 * (0.011)	0.003 (0.013)
Log (GDP per capita)	0.313 *** (0.028)	-0.085 (0.103)
N	25663	16264
Number of Groups	20	16

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated no multicollinearity.



Figure 4.5. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Security in Neighborhood, 2011 (based on column 1 of table 4.9).



Figure 4.6. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Security in Neighborhood, 2012 (based on column 2 of table 4.9).

Table 4.10. Estimated effects of covariates on perceived safety in neighborhood, non-OECD countries, 2011.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2
Personal victimization	-0.362 * (0.218)	0.049 (0.038)
Family member victimization	-0.884 *** (0.129)	0.143 *** (0.028)
Civilian-Civilian	0.654 *** (0.157)	1.213 *** (0.226)
Civilian-Government	-0.126 *** (0.034)	-0.067 ** (0.031)
Government-Civilian	-0.098 (0.149)	-0.059 (0.086)
Government-Government	-0.231 *** (0.042)	-0.303 *** (0.059)
Female	-0.128 *** (0.037)	-0.117 *** (0.033)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 * (0.001)
Highest Level of Education	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.016)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.174 *** (0.038)	0.226 *** (0.041)
Log(population)	0.058 (0.043)	
N	18531	18953
Number of Groups	14	14

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in Model 1, but not in Model 2.

Table 4.11. Estimated effects of covariates on perceived safety in neighborhood, non-OECD countries, 2012.

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Personal victimization	-0.643 *** (0.063)	0.156 *** (0.012)	0.157 *** (0.012)
Family member victimization	-0.745 *** (0.112)	0.071 (0.051)	0.076 (0.048)
Civilian-Civilian	0.349 (0.246)	0.282 * (0.168)	0.287 * (0.152)
Civilian-Government	-0.004 (0.048)	-0.063 * (0.037)	-0.014 (0.025)
Government-Civilian	0.115 (0.443)		-0.693 *** (0.133)
Government-Government	-0.716 (0.734)	-0.497 *** (0.097)	
Female	-0.081 * (0.046)	-0.081 * (0.045)	-0.082 * (0.045)
Age	0.005 ** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 * (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.015)
Log (GDP per capita)	-0.056 (0.097)	0.009 (0.130)	-0.029 (0.108)
Log(population)	-0.031 (0.164)		
N	19133	20054	20054
Number of Groups	12	12	12

Note: Mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in Model 1, but not in Models 2 and 3.

Conclusions, Implications, and Future Research

This study contributes to the important and increasingly prevalent literature on individual perceptions about human rights conditions, and safety. These findings provide researchers of human rights and human security insights into the effects of individual and international-level variables on individual perceptions of human security, especially safety from violence. It is worth noting from the results of the analyses that the different categories of threats to personal

security vary in the nature and magnitude of association with individual attitudes about human rights and security. This study finds that civilian-government threat to personal security is negatively associated with all three of the dependent variables considered here, perception of human rights conditions, perceived safety at home, and perceived safety in neighborhood. This finding may be yet another key to why nonviolent resistance is more successful as a strategy for political and social movements.

The mixed results with respect to the association between victimization and perceptions of national human rights conditions and personal safety within home and neighborhood indicate the necessity for surveys that ask more specific questions about the source and circumstances of victimization. The mixed results on the effects of personally salient crime victimization with individual level attitudes about human rights points to two lacunas in human rights research. First, we know little about how individuals think about human rights. Human rights and human security research have largely ignored what information individuals draw from when asked about human rights generally. Do respondents think about government violations of citizen human rights, all physical integrity violations regardless of source and target, any physical violence that is personally relevant, or rights violations that HROs or the media highlight, or a combination of all of the above? Second, we have much left to learn about how individuals answer survey questions about human rights in countries with repressive governments. It is unclear even in the above study if the survey respondents who report as victims of crime within a year before the survey are referring only to being victims of law-breaking by other civilians or also different kinds of physical integrity violations by government agents.

The finding that civilian-initiated threats to personal security are consistently associated with perceptions of poor quality of human rights in the country further highlights the need to

identify how individuals think about human rights. The results of this study seem to indicate that individuals perceive any physical use of violence as human rights violations, including those initiated by other civilians, a view that has not been captured in much of the prior literature on human rights.

The findings from this study serve as a jumping-off point for many future research projects. Some questions that arise from this research are: Do individuals consume news in ways that make them more aware of civilian-initiated violence? Is there a distinction in the way people think about human rights and human security? How does local prevalence of various threats to personal security influence perception of human rights conditions and safety? How do other threats to human security, such as food insecurity and environmental security, influence perceptions of human rights and safety? Theoretically and empirically answering these questions could provide important insights for researchers and practitioners alike.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION:

A LOOK BACK, AND NEXT STEPS

This project measures and explores one aspect of human security, personal security, in an attempt to improve theoretical understanding of human rights and human security. I addressed three questions as part of this project: How do we conceptualize and measure human security in a theoretically and empirically useful way? What are the effects of governmental efforts to protect empowerment rights on measures of personal security? How do individual-level perceptions of human rights and safety compare to national-level measures of threats to personal security?

The first question is one whose answer is necessary to address the other two. While human security researchers have conceptualized and attempted to measure human security in different ways, we still lack a cross-national time series dataset of human security that we could use to further learn about the causes and effects of human security. In an effort to overcome some of the challenges of existing conceptualization and operationalization, I argue that the best way to measure human security is to conceptualize and measure smaller components of human security, such as personal security, environmental security, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, community security, and political security. In my first attempt to follow this model of understanding human security, I conceptualize and measure the component of personal security, which captures individuals' vulnerability to violent threats to their physical being. I define threats to personal security as intentional acts of violence during

interactions between individuals, whether acting as a civilian or government actor. The utilization of Bayesian latent variable models to estimate the level of threat to personal security in 186 countries between 2005 and 2014 fills an important empirical gap in the human security subfield. Additionally, for researchers and practitioners alike, these data with credible intervals, indicate discernible differences in the latent score between countries and within countries across time. Though the quality of the measure of threats to personal security is dependent on the availability and accuracy of events data, the increasing collection and geographically referenced data will help to update the current dataset as and when newer data are available.

The second question, about the impact of empowerment rights on the various kinds of threats to personal security is one that was not easily answerable prior to the creation of the Relational Threats to Personal Security dataset. The quantitative analyses that used dependent variables from the newly created dataset of personal security, showed that empowerment rights do not have a discernible effect on threats to personal security originating from civilians, but can have an impact on violence originating from government actors. The findings suggest that empowerment rights, like many other domestic features of a state, can have different effects on different categories of threats to personal security depending on the sources and targets of physical integrity rights violations. Furthermore, the findings illustrate that not all empowerment rights have the same direction and magnitude of effect on personal security. The question and its answer from this study suggest the need to explore the differing effects of domestic level policies and institutions on the different categories of personal security.

The third question is a first step in attempting to understand the individual perception aspect of human security. Specifically, this question focuses on the associations between national-level events and counts-based data and individual perceptions of human rights

conditions within the country, and perceptions of safety within homes and neighborhoods. This helps to address the extent to which national-level data affect individual perceptions of human rights and safety in nationally-representative samples. The findings suggest that different categories of threats to personal security within a country have varying associations with perceptions of human rights conditions, safety within homes, and safety in neighborhoods. The study also found strong negative relationship between civilian-government threats to personal security and perceived human rights conditions within the country, and safety within homes and neighborhoods. The differing effects of national- level data on individual perceptions about human rights and safety point to a theoretical and empirical gap in human rights and human security research about the circumstances that translate frequency and magnitude of different forms of violence between groups to perceptions of human rights conditions and personal security.

The answers to the three questions addressed as part of this project build on and contribute to theories and empirical research on human rights and human security in the ways described above. More importantly, the new conceptualization, dataset presented, and findings from the empirical chapters point to important implications and many questions that are left to answer in future research. While the dataset created is beneficial in understanding important cross-temporal and cross-national patterns, there are many ways in which his dataset could be improved over time to expand its scope. First, the dataset is currently strongest on the civilian-government, government-civilian, and government-government threats to personal security. This is a result of many civilian-civilian threats to personal security such as sexual violence reports, burglaries, violent assaults, and small arms attacks receiving limited coverage in international coverage of a country. The current dataset attempts to offset this bias in the news covered by

international news companies by incorporating national-level report counts on the different civilian-civilian threats to personal security. In future iterations of the dataset, the incorporation of more local news may help to paint a more accurate picture of all categories of threat to personal security, especially of the civilian-civilian category.

An improvement that could increase the scope of questions that can be answered by the Relational Threats to Personal Security dataset is by disaggregating the different categories of threats to personal security by subnational regions. With an increasing number of events databases with geographically referenced data, adapting the model used in this dataset to subnational dataset of threats to personal security is a practical next step that can deepen our understanding of personal security. Additionally, this dataset could be expanded to international state and non-state actors to capture all threats to personal security experienced by individuals within a country.

While this project focused on personal security, this exercise in conceptualizing, measuring, and empirically testing new theories can be easily applied to other categories of threats to human security. An events and counts-based approach may also serve a useful way of measuring environmental security, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, community security, and political security. The approach of cooperation among researchers who specialize in different threats to human security may be the best way to counter overly broad concepts that are not conducive to theory-building or testing. As the findings from Chapters 3 and 4 suggest, often one category of human security can affect another category of human security.

The dataset and findings from this project highlight the wealth of associations and causal mechanisms related to personal security and human security we still know little about. A few

questions to explore in the future include but are not limited to: how does increased law enforcement training affect the different threats to personal security? How does social capital influence perceptions of security among individuals? Do civil society groups influence each of the categories of threats to personal security discussed similarly? What roles do media coverage and individual consumption of local and national news play in individual perception of human rights conditions in a state and the perception of safety? An area that is mostly disregarded in the field of human security is how individuals and communities cope with government action with respect to the different threats to personal security. The question of coping strategies to different threats to human security could also help understand the circumstances under which individuals decide to choose various strategies, individually or communally, to cope with or counter threats to personal security.

This project is a first step in understanding the causal mechanisms and complex interdependence of various national and individual-level data. Qualitative research that includes individual interviews, and case studies, are necessary next steps to understand personal security in context, and test the extent to which the associations found in the quantitative analyses apply in subnational contexts.

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APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 2 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

BUGS Code for Overall Threats to Personal Security

```
model {
for (i in 1:N) {
ps[i] ~ dnorm(0, 1)

burg [i] ~dnorm( mu1[i], tau[1])
mu1[i] <- b[1] *ps[i]

kidnap[i] ~dnorm( mu2[i], tau[2])
mu2[i] <- b[2] *ps[i]

asslt [i] ~dnorm( mu3[i], tau[3])
mu3[i] <- b[3] *ps[i]

sviol[i] ~ dnorm(mu4[i], tau[4])
mu4[i] <- b[4]* ps[i]

mccsarm[i] ~dnorm( mu5[i], tau[5])
mu5[i] <- b[5] *ps[i]

mcgabd[i] ~dnorm( mu6[i], tau[6])
mu6[i] <- b[6] *ps[i]

mcgarm[i] ~dnorm( mu7[i], tau[7])
mu7[i] <- b[7] *ps[i]

mcgassn[i] ~dnorm( mu8[i], tau[8])
mu8[i] <- b[8] *ps[i]

mcghijk[i] ~dnorm( mu9[i], tau[9])
mu9[i] <- b[9] *ps[i]

mcgriot[i] ~dnorm( mu10[i], tau[10])
mu10[i] <- b[10] *ps[i]

mcgsarm[i] ~dnorm( mu11[i], tau[11])
mu11[i] <- b[11] *ps[i]
```

```
mcgtort[i] ~dnorm( mu12[i], tau[12])
mu12[i] <- b[12] *ps[i]

mgcadet[i] ~dnorm( mu13[i], tau[13])
mu13[i] <- b[13] *ps[i]

cdisap[i] ~dnorm( mu14[i], tau[14])
mu14[i] <- b[14] *ps[i]

ckill[i] ~dnorm( mu15[i], tau[15])
mu15[i] <- b[15] *ps[i]

cpolpr[i] ~dnorm( mu16[i], tau[16])
mu16[i] <- b[16] *ps[i]

ctort[i] ~dnorm( mu17[i], tau[17])
mu17[i] <- b[17] *ps[i]

mggarm[i] ~dnorm( mu18[i], tau[18])
mu18[i] <- b[18] *ps[i]

mggafoc[i] ~dnorm( mu19[i], tau[19])
mu19[i] <- b[19] *ps[i]

mggardet[i] ~dnorm( mu20[i], tau[20])
mu20[i] <- b[20] *ps[i]

mggbeat[i] ~dnorm( mu21[i], tau[21])
mu21[i] <- b[21] *ps[i]

mggparr[i] ~dnorm( mu22[i], tau[22])
mu22[i] <- b[22] *ps[i]

mggsarm[i] ~dnorm( mu23[i], tau[23])
mu23[i] <- b[23] *ps[i]

mggtort[i] ~dnorm( mu24[i], tau[24])
mu24[i] <- b[24] *ps[i]

}
for (i in 1:24) {
b[i] ~ dnorm (0,1) I(0,)
tau[i] ~ dgamma(1, 0.1)
}
}
```

BUGS Code for Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security

```
model {
for (i in 1:N) {

civciv[i] ~ dnorm(0,1)

burg [i] ~dnorm( mu1[i], tau[1])
mu1[i] <- b[1] *civciv[i]

kidnap[i] ~dnorm( mu2[i], tau[2])
mu2[i] <- b[2] *civciv[i]

asslt [i] ~dnorm( mu3[i], tau[3])
mu3[i] <- b[3] *civciv[i]

mccsarm[i] ~dnorm(mu4[i], tau[4])
mu4[i] <- b[4] *civciv[i]

}

for (i in 1:4) {
b[i] ~ dnorm (0,1) I(0,)
tau[i] ~ dgamma(1, 0.1)
}

}
```

BUGS Code for Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security

```
model {
for (i in 1:N) {
civgov[i] ~ dnorm(0, 1)

mcgabd[i] ~dnorm( mu1[i], tau[1])
mu1[i] <- b[1] *civgov[i]

mcgarm[i] ~dnorm( mu2[i], tau[2])
mu2[i] <- b[2] *civgov[i]

mcgassn[i] ~dnorm( mu3[i], tau[3])
mu3[i] <- b[3] *civgov[i]

mcghijk[i] ~dnorm( mu4[i], tau[4])
```

```
mu4[i] <- b[4] *civgov[i]

mcgriot[i] ~dnorm( mu5[i], tau[5])
mu5[i] <- b[5] *civgov[i]

mcgsarm[i] ~dnorm( mu6[i], tau[6])
mu6[i] <- b[6] *civgov[i]

mcgtort[i] ~dnorm( mu7[i], tau[7])
mu7[i] <- b[7] *civgov[i]

}

for (i in 1:7) {
b[i] ~ dnorm (0,1) I(0,)
tau[i] ~ dgamma(1, 0.1)
}

}
```

BUGS Code for Government-Civilian Threats to Personal Security

```
model {
for (i in 1:N) {

govciv[i] ~ dnorm(0, 1)

mgcadet[i] ~dnorm( mu1[i], tau[1])
mu1[i] <- b[1] *govciv[i]

cdisap[i] ~dnorm( mu2[i], tau[2])
mu2[i] <- b[2] *govciv[i]

ckill[i] ~dnorm( mu3[i], tau[3])
mu3[i] <- b[3] *govciv[i]

cpolpr[i] ~dnorm( mu4[i], tau[4])
mu4[i] <- b[4] *govciv[i]

ctort[i] ~dnorm( mu5[i], tau[5])
mu5[i] <- b[5] *govciv[i]

}
```

```
for (i in 1:5) {
b[i] ~ dnorm (0,1) I(0,)
tau[i] ~ dgamma(1, 0.1)
}
}
```

BUGS Code for Government-Government Threats to Personal Security

```
model {
for (i in 1:N) {
govgov[i] ~ dnorm(0, 1)

mggarm[i] ~dnorm( mu1[i], tau[1])
mu1[i] <- b[1] *govgov[i]

mggafoc[i] ~dnorm( mu2[i], tau[2])
mu2[i] <- b[2] *govgov[i]

mggardet[i] ~dnorm( mu3[i], tau[3])
mu3[i] <- b[3] *govgov[i]

mggbeat[i] ~dnorm( mu4[i], tau[4])
mu4[i] <- b[4] *govgov[i]

mggmssl[i] ~dnorm( mu5[i], tau[5])
mu5[i] <- b[5] *govgov[i]

mggparr[i] ~dnorm( mu6[i], tau[6])
mu6[i] <- b[6] *govgov[i]

mggsarm[i] ~dnorm( mu7[i], tau[7])
mu7[i] <- b[7] *govgov[i]

mggtort[i] ~dnorm( mu8[i], tau[8])
mu8[i] <- b[8] *govgov[i]
}

for (i in 1:8) {
b[i] ~ dnorm (0,1) I(0,)
tau[i] ~ dgamma(1, 0.1)
}
}
```

Table 2.3. List of Countries in Analysis

State Name	COW Code	State Name	COW Code	State Name	COW Code
Afghanistan	700	Congo	484	Indonesia	850
Albania	339	Costa Rica	94	Iran	630
Algeria	615	Croatia	344	Iraq	645
Andorra	232	Cuba	40	Ireland	205
Angola	540	Cyprus	352	Israel	666
Antigua & Barbuda	58	Czech Republic	316	Italy	325
Argentina	160	Democratic Republic of the Congo	490	Ivory Coast	437
Armenia	371	Denmark	390	Jamaica	51
Australia	900	Djibouti	522	Japan	740
Austria	305	Dominica	54	Jordan	663
Azerbaijan	373	Dominican Republic	42	Kazakhstan	705
Bahamas	31	Ecuador	130	Kenya	501
Bahrain	692	Egypt	651	Kiribati	946
Bangladesh	771	El Salvador	92	Kuwait	690
Barbados	53	Equatorial Guinea	411	Kyrgyzstan	703
Belarus	370	Eritrea	531	Laos	812
Belgium	211	Estonia	366	Latvia	367
Belize	80	Ethiopia	530	Lebanon	660
Benin	434	Federated States of Micronesia	987	Lesotho	570
Bhutan	760	Fiji	950	Liberia	450
Bolivia	145	Finland	375	Libya	620
Bosnia and Herzegovina	346	France	220	Lithuania	368
Botswana	571	Gabon	481	Luxembourg	212
Brazil	140	Gambia	420	Macedonia	343
Brunei	835	Georgia	372	Madagascar	580
Bulgaria	355	Germany	255	Malawi	553
Burkina Faso	439	Ghana	452	Malaysia	820
Burundi	516	Greece	350	Maldives	781
Cambodia	811	Grenada	55	Mali	432
Cameroon	471	Guatemala	90	Malta	338
Canada	20	Guinea	438	Marshall Islands	983
Cape Verde	402	Guinea-Bissau	404	Mauritania	435
Central African Republic	482	Guyana	110	Mauritius	590
Chad	483	Haiti	41	Mexico	70
Chile	155	Honduras	91	Moldova	359
China	710	Hungary	310	Monaco	221
Colombia	100	Iceland	395	Mongolia	712
Comoros	581	India	750	Morocco	600

Table 2.3 Contd. List of Countries in Analysis

State Name	COW Code	State Name	COW Code
Mozambique	541	South Korea	732
Myanmar	775	Spain	230
Namibia	565	Sri Lanka	780
Nauru	970	St. Kitts and Nevis	60
Nepal	790	St. Lucia	56
Netherlands	210	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	57
New Zealand	920	Sudan	625
Nicaragua	93	Suriname	115
Niger	436	Swaziland	572
Nigeria	475	Sweden	380
North Korea	731	Switzerland	225
Norway	385	Syria	652
Oman	698	Taiwan	713
Pakistan	770	Tajikistan	702
Palau	986	Tanzania	510
Panama	95	Thailand	800
Papua New Guinea	910	Togo	461
Paraguay	150	Tonga	955
Peru	135	Trinidad and Tobago	52
Philippines	840	Tunisia	616
Poland	290	Turkey	640
Portugal	235	Turkmenistan	701
Qatar	694	Tuvalu	947
Romania	360	Uganda	500
Russia	365	Ukraine	369
Rwanda	517	United Arab Emirates	696
Samoa	990	United Kingdom	200
San Marino	331	United States of America	2
Sao Tome and Principe	403	Uruguay	165
Saudi Arabia	670	Uzbekistan	704
Senegal	433	Vanuatu	935
Seychelles	591	Venezuela	101
Sierra Leone	451	Vietnam	816
Singapore	830	Yemen	679
Slovakia	317	Yugoslavia	345
Slovenia	349	Zambia	551
Solomon Islands	940	Zimbabwe	552
South Africa	560		

Table 2.4. Correlation Matrix of Latent Variable Mean Estimates

	Personal Security	Civilian-Civilian	Civilian-Government	Government-Civilian	Government-Government
Personal Security	1.00				
Civilian-Civilian	0.33	1.00			
Civilian-Government	0.64	0.23	1.00		
Government-Civilian	0.71	0.09	0.20	1.00	
Government-Government	0.70	0.29	0.34	0.31	1.00

Additional Figures



Figure 2.11. Estimated Overall Threats to Personal Security for the year 2011



Figure 2.12. Estimated Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security for the year 2011



Figure 2.13 Estimated Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security for the year 2011



Figure 2.14. Estimated Government-Civilian Threats to Personal Security for the year 2011



Figure 2.15. Estimated Government-Government Threats to Personal Security for the year 2011

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 3 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Table 3.3. Generalized Estimation Equation Model without Outliers. Empowerment rights and threats to personal security.

Covariates	Civilian-Civilian Threats to Personal Security	Civilian-Government Threats to Personal Security	Government-Civilian Threats to Personal Security	Government-Government Threats to Personal Security
Empowerment Index	0.001	-0.001	-0.018 **	-0.019 **
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Legislative Constraints	-0.096 **	0.022	0.019	0.302 **
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.124)	(0.095)
Judicial Constraints	0.075	0.015	0.045	-0.0252
	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.171)	(0.109)
State Authority	-0.001	-0.001	0.003	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Transparency and Predictable Enforcement	0.003	0.012	-0.084 **	0.017
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Participatory Index	-0.053	-0.039	0.023	-0.229
	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.167)	(0.142)
Equal Protection of Rights	0.013	-0.074	-0.030	0.033
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.204)	(0.114)
Equal Distribution of Resources	0.011	-0.028	-0.528 **	0.141
	(0.062)	(0.051)	(0.192)	(0.134)
Control of Corruption	0.012	0.010	-0.102 **	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Military Spending	0.002	0.014 **	0.027	0.025 *
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.012)
log(Population)	0.027 **	0.025 **	0.149 **	0.115 *
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.001	-0.003	0.012	0.007
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.009)

Note: Number of observations: 786. The model used AR1 structure to account for serial correlation. Two tailed significance tests used * p <0.05, ** p <0.01

APPENDIX C

CHAPTER 4 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Table 4.12. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Human Rights Conditions, 2011

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	0.039 *** (0.012)	0.033 *** (0.011)	0.044 *** (0.011)	0.037 *** (0.012)	0.039 *** (0.013)
Family member victimization	-0.003 (0.012)	0.002 (0.014)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.003 (0.014)
Civilian-Civilian	-0.467 *** (0.138)				-1.566 *** (0.183)
Civilian-Government		0.109 *** (0.014)			-0.292 *** (0.044)
Government-Civilian			-0.990 *** (0.124)		-0.847 *** (0.105)
Government-Government				-0.097 ** (0.038)	-0.107 *** (0.031)
Female	-0.025 (0.047)	-0.035 (0.047)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.033 (0.047)	-0.032 (0.046)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.048 *** (0.002)	0.032 ** (0.016)	0.050 *** (0.017)	0.041 ** (0.016)	0.046 *** (0.017)
Log(population)	0.063 *** (0.023)	-0.065 ** (0.028)	0.094 ** (0.038)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.253 *** (0.037)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.005 (0.025)	-0.056 (0.037)	-0.087 *** (0.028)	-0.059 ** (0.027)	-0.072 ** (0.034)

Note: N = 24451, number of groups = 19, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.

Table 4.13. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perception of Human Rights Conditions, 2012

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	0.040 *** (0.014)	0.037 ** (0.014)	0.043 *** (0.012)	0.046 *** (0.011)	0.035 ** (0.014)
Family member victimization	0.037 ** (0.014)	0.034 ** (0.015)	0.032 * (0.017)	0.016 (0.015)	0.025 * (0.014)
Civilian-Civilian	0.154 (0.149)				-0.498 *** (0.143)
Civilian-Government		-0.167 *** (0.019)			0.351 *** (0.037)
Government-Civilian			1.104 *** (0.286)		0.485 ** (0.232)
Government-Government				-0.304 (0.329)	-0.266 (0.241)
Female	-0.023 (0.043)	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.032 (0.042)	-0.025 (0.045)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)
Highest Level of Education	0.028 (0.017)	0.026 (0.018)	0.022 * (0.011)	0.008 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)
Log(population)	0.004 (0.029)	0.047 (0.037)	-0.364 *** (0.117)	0.051 (0.085)	-0.079 (0.075)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.171 ** (0.069)	-0.196 ** (0.082)	-0.339 *** (0.096)	-0.089 (0.067)	-0.225 *** (0.058)

Note: N = 25756, number of groups = 16, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.

Table 4.14. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceptions of Safety at Home in 2011

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	-0.972 *** (0.138)	-0.969 *** (0.139)	-0.977 *** (0.139)	-0.969 *** (0.145)	-0.976 *** (0.148)
Family member victimization	-0.829 *** (0.101)	-0.808 *** (0.091)	-0.829 *** (0.099)	-0.825 *** (0.102)	-0.810 *** (0.103)
Civilian-Civilian	0.916 *** (0.213)				0.900 *** (0.234)
Civilian-Government		-0.349 *** (0.038)			-0.762 *** (0.071)
Government-Civilian			-0.539 *** (0.167)		0.463 *** (0.196)
Government-Government				0.427 *** (0.058)	0.427 *** (0.067)
Female	-0.129 *** (0.045)	-0.126 ** (0.050)	-0.116 ** (0.053)	-0.130 *** (0.049)	-0.123 ** (0.052)
Age	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Highest Level of Education	0.044 *** (0.002)	0.061 *** (0.012)	0.070 *** (0.017)	0.037 *** (0.014)	0.053 *** (0.019)
Log(population)	-0.181 *** (0.035)	0.030 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.063)	-0.260 *** (0.029)	-0.196 *** (0.066)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.148 *** (0.052)	0.153 *** (0.039)	0.039 (0.071)	0.184 *** (0.038)	0.258 *** (0.074)

Note: N = 25285, number of groups = 20, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.

Table 4.15. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceptions of Safety from Crime at Home in 2012

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	-0.710 *** (0.084)	-0.723 *** (0.083)	-0.707 *** (0.087)	-0.336 *** (0.039)	-0.336 *** (0.039)
Family member victimization	-0.755 *** (0.123)	-0.741 *** (0.138)	-0.739 *** (0.103)	-0.354 *** (0.070)	-0.355 *** (0.070)
Civilian-Civilian	1.279 *** (0.120)				0.077 (0.186)
Civilian-Government		-0.026 (0.059)			-0.078 *** (0.022)
Government-Civilian			1.555 *** (0.119)		0.218 (0.304)
Government-Government				0.689 *** (0.230)	0.731 *** (0.238)
Female	-0.025 (0.061)	-0.026 (0.059)	-0.021 (0.061)	-0.010 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.025)
Age	0.005 ** (0.002)	0.005 *** (0.002)	0.007 *** (0.002)	0.002 ** (0.001)	0.002 ** (0.001)
Highest Level of Education	0.035 *** (0.013)	0.037 *** (0.013)	0.042 *** (0.012)	0.014 *** (0.005)	0.014 *** (0.005)
Log(population)	-0.101 *** (0.022)	-0.068 *** (0.025)	-0.559 *** (0.042)	-0.175 *** (0.061)	-0.245 * (0.126)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.405 *** (0.039)	-0.445 *** (0.045)	-0.593 *** (0.052)	-0.153 ** (0.064)	-0.216 *** (0.061)

Note: N = 25028, number of groups = 16, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.

Table 4.16. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceptions of Security in Neighborhood in 2011

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	-0.475 *** (0.165)	-0.461 *** (0.159)	-0.438 *** (0.164)	-0.483 *** (0.157)	-0.462 *** (0.159)
Family member victimization	-0.670 *** (0.101)	-0.677 *** (0.094)	-0.667 *** (0.095)	-0.709 *** (0.093)	-0.686 *** (0.095)
Civilian-Civilian	1.419 *** (0.295)				1.527 *** (0.136)
Civilian-Government		0.041 (0.029)			0.003 (0.028)
Government-Civilian			-0.622 *** (0.111)		-0.198 *** (0.064)
Government-Government				-0.207 *** (0.073)	-0.374 *** (0.034)
Female	-0.144 *** (0.031)	-0.138 *** (0.032)	-0.148 *** (0.032)	-0.138 *** (0.032)	-0.149 *** (0.031)
Age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Highest Level of Education	-0.005 (0.011)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.012 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.011)
Log(population)	-0.192 *** (0.049)	0.124 *** (0.017)	0.091 ** (0.039)	-0.051 * (0.028)	-0.021 (0.028)
Log(GDP per capita)	0.357 *** (0.050)	0.281 *** (0.022)	0.174 *** (0.034)	0.234 *** (0.045)	0.226 *** (0.033)

Note: N = 25067, number of groups = 20, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.

Table 4.17. Estimated Effects of Covariates on Perceptions of Security in Neighborhood in 2012

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Personal victimization	-0.686 *** (0.054)	-0.673 *** (0.045)	-0.651 *** (0.049)	-0.650 *** (0.051)	-0.651 *** (0.053)
Family member victimization	-0.799 *** (0.098)	-0.722 *** (0.080)	-0.700 *** (0.069)	-0.702 *** (0.071)	-0.715 *** (0.069)
Civilian-Civilian	0.494 *** (0.161)				0.381 *** (0.089)
Civilian-Government		-0.099 *** (0.024)			-0.042 ** (0.017)
Government-Civilian			0.070 (0.074)		-0.031 (0.158)
Government-Government				-0.376 *** (0.097)	-0.498 *** (0.117)
Female	-0.110 ** (0.046)	-0.122 *** (0.043)	-0.113 ** (0.046)	-0.114 ** (0.046)	-0.106 ** (0.046)
Age	0.005 ** (0.002)	0.004 *** (0.001)	0.004 *** (0.001)	0.004 *** (0.001)	0.005 *** (0.011)
Highest Level of Education	0.010 (0.013)	0.005 (0.014)	0.011 (0.012)	0.004 (0.010)	0.013 (0.011)
Log(population)	-0.198 *** (0.032)	-0.164 *** (0.036)	-0.159 *** (0.029)	0.011 (0.020)	-0.063 (0.065)
Log(GDP per capita)	-0.123 (0.096)	-0.391 (0.072)	-0.333 *** (0.044)	-0.162 *** (0.024)	-0.070 *** (0.027)

Note: N = 25171, number of groups = 16, mixed-effect ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, two-tailed significance tests used *$p < 0.10$ **$p < 0.05$ ***$p < 0.01$. Variance inflation factors indicated multicollinearity in model 5.