

SOME TAKE CONTEXT MORE SERIOUSLY:  
CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS × IDEOLOGICAL VALUES MODEL OF IMMIGRATION  
RELATED POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

by

SZYMON MIKOLAJ AUGUSTYN STOJEK

(Under the Direction of Markus M. L. Crepaz)

ABSTRACT

In recent decades immigration has become the focal point of change in social and political attitudes of Europeans. This dissertation, in a series of articles, explores how ideological predispositions shape contemporary attitudes and voting behavior of natives in the age of migration. I develop a general model whereby individual-level ideological values interact with contextual factors. This model is tested against a variety of attitudinal and behavior outcomes from immigration and welfare attitudes to voting for radical right wing parties. Focusing on the 2000s, I am able to show complexity with which ideological values – especially those associated with ‘right-wing’ ideology – relate to individual attitudes and electoral choices in various contexts.

In chapter one, I provide a brief motivation for and an overview of the study of immigration-related attitudes – especially as they are linked to ideological predispositions – and develop general research questions guiding this dissertation. In chapter two, I examine how ideological predispositions interact with presence of immigrants in forming individually held immigration attitudes and policy preferences. I find that while both *conservative* and *authoritarian*

predisposed hold more negative views of immigrants than other natives, these predispositions react differently to immigrant presence when forming immigration related attitudes. In chapter three, I peruse the question welfare solidarity and exclusion as it related to immigrants. I find that while *authoritarians* are relatively supportive of general redistribution, *conservatives* tend to oppose it, and for conservatives this opposition to redistribution is stronger in higher immigrant contexts. Further, I find that both *conservative*- and *authoritarian*-predisposed hold negative perception of immigrant welfare participation, but only those with *authoritarian* predisposition increase their negative view in contexts with larger immigrant presence.

Chapter four turns towards one of the most studied questions at the intersection of immigration and ideology literatures. The question of what explains a variation in populist radical right parties' support in Europe. Findings provide evidence that those RRW parties which moderate their economic position while maintaining the radical right cultural position (larger cultural-economic distance) receive on average more support than do those parties which maintain more neoliberal economic position. I find this pattern in examination of aggregate party-level positions and electoral outcomes, as well as individual's voting preferences. Moreover, survey data analyses confirmed that the cultural-economic distance position increased the probability that individuals who hold more centrist economic positions were more likely to support such party than were those individuals located at the far right of economic ideological dimension. Concluding chapter summarizes this contribution, discusses its possible future applications as well as limitations.

INDEX WORDS: Immigration, welfare attitudes, welfare chauvinism, ideological orientation, authoritarianism, egalitarianism, populist radical right parties

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## DEDICATION

*To my dearest wife Monika, whose strength is at the foundation of all I do.*

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At the inception of every work there is a naive vision of its process and completion. Carefully arranged sequence of abstract events traversing the plane of imagination as if the best montage of the dream factory. These images are as beautiful as they are unrealistic.

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Verona, Italy

S.M.S.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

In 1993 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller released the first edition of their bestselling book, *The Age of Migration*. It was a culmination of many years of studying global migration trends and the associated social phenomena. Today, 22 years on, it is an accepted wisdom that we live in the *age of migration* and much has been learned over the two decades of rigorous empirical study. The work is not done yet. Much remains to be learned about immigration and its social consequences. Indeed, the questions surrounding the effect of immigrant presence, the future of inclusive welfare state, and the rise of the radical right wing parties are all full of proverbial ‘dark corners.’ This dissertation attempts to shed some light on these pressing socio-political questions.

The study of the immigration related socio-political questions is increasingly relevant. Over the last two decades, economic instability and anti-immigrant sentiments resulted in the electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties and their agendas in Austria, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Norway – to name a few. Capitalizing on popular sentiments, these radical right movements often influence public policy participating in government directly (e.g. Switzerland, Austria). For instance, led by *Swiss Peoples Party*, Swiss federal and cantonal governments have been restricting immigration policies, imposing quotas on EU job seekers, curbing asylum seeking, or as is the case with several Swiss cities, restricting asylum-seekers from accessing publically funded facilities, including churches.

Even in states where populist radical right parties do not hold governmental positions they do influence agenda for more center and left coalition governments (e.g. Denmark, England, the Netherlands), which have to grapple with public concern over the ‘immigration problem.’ Recent coalition government initiatives in Denmark and Norway, or Tory rhetoric in England are emblematic of how mainstream parties pursue agendas set by radical right parties (*The Economist*, 2013, August 17<sup>th</sup> “Of mosques and meat”; 2013, August 24<sup>th</sup> “Overflow”). For instance, a recent Danish government report attributed 6.7 billion Euros savings to restrictive migration policies. Commenting on these findings, the Danish integration minister and a member of the center-right *Venstre* party, Søren Pind, said he has “no scruples in further restricting [immigrants], who one can suspect will be burden on Denmark” (*Der Spiegel*, 2011).

These policies spark heated debates as the substance of these policies challenges established liberal-democratic principles characteristic of Western European societies. However, these policies do not emerge in a vacuum. The anti-immigrant sentiments are present across Europe, from multicultural states such as Sweden and Netherlands to assimilationist countries such as Switzerland and Denmark. Moreover, the public concern over immigration is not a recent development in the Western Europe. Over the past 50 years, immigration has been linked to increased social tension, discriminatory attitudes, a decline in support for welfare, and the electoral successes of radical right parties (Carlsson & Rooth, 2007; Crepaz, 2008; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; Thomas F Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Scheepers, Grotenhuis, & Slik, 2002; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Koopmans & Schaeffer 2014). These actual (or perceived) negative externalities of immigrant presence are not surprising. It is hardly revolutionary to suggest that presence of

culturally different, and on average poorer, immigrants is likely to generate some negative social outcomes.

What is more surprising is just how widespread anti-immigrant sentiments are within societies, encompassing quite diverse socio-economic groups. Illustrating this diversity, *Der Spiegel's* domestic politics editor, Melanie Amann, commented on the emergence of anti-immigrant, anti-Islamization movement in Germany (PEGIDA -Patriotic Europeans Against Islamisation of the West) noting that: “it's hard to put just one face on them. They are such a diverse group. They have all kinds of people from all kinds of age groups and different layers of society” (NPR 2015). Recent opinion polls seem to confirm this trend, showing that increasingly large and diverse segments of native publics express negative immigration attitudes (cf. Mudde 2013; Kitschelt 2007; Castles and Miller 2009).<sup>1</sup>

Existing social frictions are not the only reason why is worth pursuing the examination of how immigrants influence natives' attitudes and electoral choices. It's relevance becomes abundantly clear in light of recent projections suggesting that even with the current rate of migration, the working age population of European Union will decline by 50 million by year 2060. This decline will endanger healthcare, pensions, and other social benefits (EU 2008). Whatever the shape of the eventual policies addressing the ‘graying’ of EU states, Europe can expect more, rather than less, immigrants. In other words, the *age of migration* is not only clearly visible part of our present, immigration is likely to expand its reach into the social and political domains of most, if not, all European communities.

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<sup>1</sup> According to recent survey about two-thirds of Germans “believe that Angela Merkel’s government is not doing enough to address concerns about immigration and asylum seekers, and 34% think Germany is enduring a process of “Islamisation” (Connolly 2014).

This mostly context-driven picture, however, is incomplete, since apart from the contextual conditions (e.g. immigrant proportion), native individuals vary in how prone they are to feeling threatened by immigration. It is, thus, theoretically incorrect to treat the effects of context as constant across populations with varying levels of sensitivity to the contextual stimuli. To this effect, the literature has long stressed the importance of individual-level factors in analyses of perceived threat, intergroup competition, and attitudes towards immigrants (e.g., Hopkins 2010; Oliver and Wong 2003, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Mayda 2006, Duckit and Sibley 2007). This dissertation analyses social and political manifestations of immigration and models the effect of contextual factors as conditional on natives' ideological value-predispositions.<sup>2</sup>

In this dissertation, I argue that using the individual level value-predispositions is an effective way of modeling a variety of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes in contemporary societies. Moreover, this dissertation claims that a more complete account of natives' attitudes and behavior comes about in a model where value-predispositions interact with contextual factors. This – ideological values  $\times$  context – model is applied to three empirical tests which increase in the severity of the empirical challenge. Chapter 2 looks at *expressed attitudes* towards immigrants and immigration, chapter 3 examines the *support* for the welfare and *perceptions* of immigrant welfare participation, and chapter 4 tests whether people actually *behave* differently dependent on their value-predispositions and context, selecting parties that will likely move policies closer to their anti-immigrant ideal point.

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<sup>2</sup> The salience of ideological convictions is manifest, when one recalls the many well-established political parties actively opposing immigration and promoting the curbing of immigrant rights as central pillars of their platforms (e.g. SVP, PVV, FOP, True Finns, Front National, BNP, Republicaner, etc.). Most of these parties are firmly placed on the right of the political spectrum.



## **Immigration and the Role of Individual Ideological Predispositions**

In particular, this dissertation contribution rests in examination of individuals' ideological value-predispositions that structure right-wing ideological orientation. I begin by noting that the hypothesized contextual effects should be most pronounced among those on the ideological right, who are especially sensitive to threat from outgroups. While this relationship may seem of conventional rather than discovered wisdom, a growing body of research suggests that the attitudes held by the ideologically right-leaning are quite complex and varied, for instance combining right-wing economic agenda with a progressive social posture and vice-versa (e.g. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, & Dolezal, 2008; Stimson 2004; Elis and Stimson 2012). This diversity of attitudes among seemingly ideologically likeminded individuals has led to the definition of at least two – socio-economic and socio-cultural – dimensions underlying the basic structure of the public's ideological space. (Kriesi et al 2006, Van Der Brug and Van Spanjie 2008, Layman and Carsey 2002; Feldman 1988, Feldman and Steenbergen 2002; Jacoby 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Inglehart 1990).

The most obvious way of operationalizing individuals' economic and social ideological positions is to rely on survey items asking opinions about minorities, immigrants, and welfare state. Such an operationalization, however, is problematic when analyzing immigration attitudes of the public and support for anti-immigrant parties. First, it is problematic to measure ideological dimensions using questions referencing immigrants or minorities and then also using these dimensions, in turn, to explain immigration attitudes (cf. Lewis-Beck et al. 2009). Additionally, it is well established that public attitudes respond to the way political elites articulate their ideological positions, and simultaneously that elite positions respond to public

attitudes (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Jacoby 1991).<sup>3</sup> Relying on salient political opinions to approximate ideology may, in such analyses, fail to account for the bi-directionality between individuals' attitudes and political elite positions, and at the worst, suggests dreaded endogeneity.

### **Ideology: Value Predispositions, not Expressed Opinions**

Following recent contributions, I turn to authoritarian and egalitarian value-predispositions as antecedents of expressed ideological opinions (cf. Schwartz 1992; Duckit 2001; Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005; Feldman and Johnston 2014). In particular, *Authoritarian predisposition* describes a generalized preference for uniformity and conformity over diversity and individualism (Adorno, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). Egalitarian predisposition, in turn, is underpinned by a preference for equality and social justice over individual achievement (Rokeach 1968; Scheffler 2003; Walzer 2002). In terms of authoritarian values, right-wing individuals should express desire for greater uniformity rejecting less predictable diversity. Right-wing individuals, also can express anti-egalitarian position conceiving of inequality as natural consequence of individual choice and (lack of) personal responsibility. These values, however, show divergent associations with specific political attitudes and individuals holding these values can be expected to have varying sensitivity to contextual stimuli such as immigrant presence. Therefore, one should not expect these values to be unconditionally aligned in a single ideological spectrum. Consequently, one

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<sup>3</sup> Ellis and Stimson (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 155) sum up this relationship: “*For most citizens, those not deeply attentive to the work of politics or to serious analysis of it, the information that is used to make political decisions and to decide which policies to support and which to oppose is obtained through framed messages from political elites.*”

should not expect that anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values holders express the same positions on salient political attitudes and react to immigration in the same way.

In sum, conceptualizing ‘right-wing’ or ‘conservative’ position in terms of authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values I can explore the diversity of ‘right-wing’ positions as they relate to immigration and immigrants. Moreover, by modeling the effect of contextual factors as conditional on the core ideological values, I provide a more accurate model of how context and individual values shape a variety of attitudinal and behavior outcomes.

### **Summary of Empirical Chapters**

Chapter 2 tries to shed light on the critical question of how the presence of immigrants affects the immigration attitudes of the natives. I note that there is significant cross-national variation in the proportion of immigrants, and simultaneously, natives themselves vary in how sensitive they are to immigrant presence. Beginning with these two observations, I develop a model of immigrant attitude formation where contextual effects of immigrant presence are conditional on the ideological predispositions of the natives. Ideological predispositions are conceptualized in terms of (anti-)egalitarian and authoritarian values, broadly corresponding to the economic and social dimensions of ideological space.

As expected, I find that the right-wing predispositions – authoritarianism and anti-egalitarianism – are both positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for stricter immigration policy. In contrast to direct effects, there are good reasons to expect that authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values stimulate a different reaction to immigrant presence. Authoritarians, due to their dispositional resistance to diversity, deepen their anti-immigrant attitudes when confronted with a larger immigrant presence. Anti-egalitarians do not intensify their negative attitudes in contexts with more immigrants, since their dispositional aversion is to

generally conceived equality, and not diversity. I find that authoritarians do indeed increase their negative immigration attitudes in context with a higher immigrant proportion. In contrast, anti-egalitarians in contexts with a greater proportion of immigrants actually moderate their anti-immigrant attitudes, albeit this effect is substantively modest.

This conditional argument contributes to the literature examining immigration attitudes by proposing that individual differences condition the contextual effects of immigrant presence. Additionally, I illustrate the ‘diversity’ of responses to immigration among right-wing predisposed natives, suggesting important advantages of two-dimensional, values-based measures of ideology.

In chapter 3, I introduce the values-based, two-dimensional model of ideology to the explanations of natives’ welfare attitudes in the context of the so-called ‘new liberal dilemma.’ Salient immigration debates combined with a lackluster economic performance over the recent decade brought into a sharp focus arguments over the future of the welfare states. An especially intriguing outcome of the intersection between welfare support and immigration is an attitude of welfare chauvinism – simultaneous support for welfare and opposition to immigrant welfare participation. This complex set of attitudes is examined through the prism of *authoritarian* (resisting diversity) and *status-quo conservative* (resisting change and equality) predispositions.

The argument asserts that welfare chauvinist attitudes are the systematic consequence of varying preferences across status-quo conservative and authoritarian predispositions. In particular, I argue that natives holding a *status-quo conservative* predisposition, oppose equality-promoting redistribution in general, and this opposition will likely be more pronounced in high immigration contexts. This pattern closely corresponds to the ‘welfare state decline’ hypothesis (cf. Crepaz 2008). Further, I argue that those with authoritarian predisposition should actually

support redistribution as it aims to increase sameness and unity, while decreasing social cleavages. This effect should be higher in contexts where unity is threatened by a larger immigrant presence. In contrast, both predispositions should be associated with a negative view of immigrant welfare participation, and due to values underpinning these predispositions, these negative associations should be stronger in higher immigration contexts.

The results confirm hypothesized patterns of direct association between ideological predispositions and welfare attitudes, underscoring the complexity of ‘right-wing’ predisposed welfare attitudes in Western Europe (e.g. van Oorschot et al. 2008). Conditional effects, however, show that presence of immigrants strengthens conservatives’ opposition to redistribution, but has no effect on authoritarian support. In contrast, the presence of immigrants only increases negative views of immigrant welfare consumption for the authoritarian predisposed. Additionally, robustness checks show that the anti-egalitarian element of status-quo conservative predisposition drives its direct association with welfare attitudes, while the response to immigrant proportion can be attributed to the conservative preference for the *status-quo* (resistance to change).

In chapter 4 turns to the supply-side and individual-level explanations of the electoral success of populist radical right-wing parties (PRR) in Western Europe. I begin with an examination of the role the ideological position of these parties play in their electoral outcomes. Building on recent scholarship, I argue that post-1990s PRR success is maximized by assuming relatively moderate economic platform and maintaining the radical right-wing socio-cultural position, an ideological profile I call ‘populist radical right’s catchall’. Such a PRR catch-all position attracts voters preoccupied with immigration who vote mostly based on cultural dimension, while not scaring-off economically moderate or even left-wing voters with a radically

right-wing neoliberal position. To thoroughly test my assertions, I leverage expert party placement data for the decade of 2000s across Western Europe. I also analyze data from five-waves of public opinion surveys for the same time period, which include the measures of two dimensions of ideological predispositions. I find that the PRR catchall position increases electoral outcomes of radical right parties, and does so by attracting broad-based electorate including those natives who are economically moderate..

In sum, chapter 4's theorizing and findings shed light on the puzzle of the varying electoral success of populist radical right parties in Europe, by bringing attention to the ideological positioning of successful PRRs. Findings also suggest that two-dimensional ideological positions of voters can shed more light on their electoral choices. Finally, in more general terms, this chapter underscores the importance of the party ideological positions (supply-side factor) in electoral competition.

The final chapter offers broad conclusions and implications that emerge from the three empirical chapters. In comparative analyses of attitudes and voting behavior, individual ideological predispositions do suggest themselves as a good point of analytical departure. In particular, I stress the advantages of using value-predispositions for the analyses of attitudes and vote choices of western publics. I also suggest that the immigration-related phenomena should be analyzed by modeling the contextual effects of immigration as conditional on individual level differences. I conclude by suggesting that both context—individual differences model as well as the two-dimensional ideological predispositions can be fruitfully used in a variety of political science subfields. Such applications can lead to new previously undisclosed insights, and at the minimum, can provide verification of previous findings based on causally problematic, political-attitudes.

## CHAPTER 2

### IDEOLOGICAL VALUES AND IMMIGRANT PRESENCE: NATIVES' ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION

*We do not as yet have a clear enough consensus about the conceptual differences between values and attitudes, or about the relation between them. We do not as yet have methods for assessing values in a manner that would be distinct from the assessment of attitudes.*

Milton Rokeach (1968, p. 547)

Over recent decades, scholars have identified the presence of immigrants as a crucial contextual factor contributing to perceptions of immigrant threat, mounting social tension, and intolerance (Carlsson and Rooth 2007; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Individuals, however, vary in their propensity to feel threatened by the presence of immigrants and immigration in general (e.g. Hopkins 2010; Mayda 2006; Oliver and Wong 2003; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Sibley and Duckitt 2009). Thus, it is theoretically incorrect to treat the effects of context as constant across populations with varying levels of sensitivity to immigration.

In particular, I examine natives' ideological orientation as one of the most obvious, but also most understudied, variables capturing this individual-level proclivity for anti-immigrant sentiment. Conventional wisdom suggests that those of the ideological right-wing, by and large, hold negative views of immigration (Adorno, Levinson, Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Theil, 2006; Kitschelt 2007). Indeed, recent findings seem to confirm this pattern (e.g. Karreth, Singh

and Stojek *forthcoming*). Moreover, a growing body of research suggests that the attitudes held by the ideologically right-leaning are complex and quite diverse (e.g. Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, & Dolezal, 2008; Kriesi, 2010; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Scholars, addressing this diversity of attitudes among ideologically similar individuals, suggest that the explanation may lie in a multidimensional character of ideological conviction (Feldman and Johnston 2013; Stimson 2004; Elis and Stimson 2012). Finally, it is become apparent that large segments of native publics, not just the far right-wing few, express negative immigration attitudes (Mudde 2013; Kitschelt 2007; Castles and Miller 2009).<sup>4</sup>

Beginning with these observations, I argue that the contextual effects of immigrant presence on right-wing attitude holders should be modeled as conditional on individual-level predispositions. Specifically, this paper builds on recent efforts exploring values and predispositions, which underlie expressed ideological orientation (Stenner 2005, Kinder and Kam 2012, Feldman and Johnston 2013; Sibley et al. 2013). Taking this step back in the causal chain – by focusing on values and disposition rather than expressed attitudes – avoids the empirical limitations of existing ideological scales (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009). Ideological measures based on expressed attitudes are of limited utility in examinations of salient political opinions, since their operationalizations rely on these very attitudes. For instance, economic and cultural ideological position are often measured using welfare and immigration attitudes, respectively (see van der Brug and van Spanje 2008, Kriesi et al 2006, 2008; Bakker et al. 2008).

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<sup>4</sup> The salience of ideological convictions is manifest, when one recalls the many well-established political parties actively opposing immigration and promoting the curbing of immigrant rights as central pillars of their platforms (e.g. SVP, PVV, FOP, True Finns, Front National, BNP, Republicaner, etc.). Most of these parties are firmly placed on the right of the political spectrum.



Consequently, in the forgoing examination of the effect immigrants have on natives' immigration attitudes, I model the contextual effects of immigrant presence as conditional on two right-wing value predispositions. I model authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values, which are often conflated within the right-wing of the one-dimensional ideological orientation (Jost et al. 2003, 2007; Donald R. Kinder and Kam 2010; but see Stenner 2005). In line with conventional wisdom, I first argue that these 'right-wing predispositions' are both associated with anti-immigrant attitudes. I then argue that immigrant presence stimulate a different reaction from authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values. Specifically, while authoritarians, due to their dispositional resistance to diversity, deepen their anti-immigrant attitudes when confronted with a larger immigrant presence, anti-egalitarians do not intensify such a negative reaction since their aversion is not to diversity, but to a more generally conceived equality.

This conditional argument contributes to the literature examining immigration attitudes by proposing that individual differences condition the contextual effects of immigrant presence. Additionally, I show that 'right-wing' predisposed individuals do not react to immigrant presence uniformly, suggesting important advantages of multidimensional predispositions-based ideological measures (cf. Feldman and Johnston 2013; Sibley et al. 2013; Lewis-Beck et al. 2009).

First, I show that values-based ideological predispositions are appropriately suited for analyses of ideologically-salient individual attitudes in a two dimensional (economic and cultural) ideological space. Then, I build the theoretical model linking both right-wing predispositions to anti-immigrant attitudes, and argue that these predispositions stimulate divergent reaction to the immigrant group size. Next, I outline an empirical methodology for testing my hypotheses using the sample of five waves of the European Social Surveys (ESS).

The fifth section presents and discusses the results, including robustness checks. The final section provides concluding remarks and discusses implications of model's results.

### **Ideological Orientation(s) and Political Attitudes**

Historically, the ideological divide of both party systems and individual voters in Western liberal democracies was accurately captured by a single left/right ideological dimension (Hix 1999; Klingemann 1995; Sartori 1976). Empirically, a single dimensional ideological self-orientation is typically measured by a version of the following: “[i]n politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?” (e.g. European Social Surveys 2013). Respondents then place themselves on the provided scale based on their understanding of the left/right spectrum.

Such ‘right-wing’ position can refer to ‘socially conservative’ individuals – those who eschew diversity of lifestyles and prefer uniformity – that we can broadly call authoritarians. It may also describe individuals which place value on personal achievement and devalue socio-economic equality – which can be broadly called anti-egalitarians (cf. Stenner, 2005; Wilson, 1973, Jost et al., 2003; Lipset & Raab, 1970). While each of these distinct preferences can have an influence on the attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, there is no reason to assume that they are unconditionally aligned and can be retrieved by a single measure.<sup>5</sup> Feldman and Johnson note “[w]hile some citizens may see liberalism and conservatism as primarily about social issues, others may understand the dimension in terms of economics, while others may see both domains as relevant to ideological categorizations” (2014, 341).

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<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that each or both these ideological proclivities – depending on the context and time-period – can be labeled left/right (cf. Jost et al. 2009).

When considering these questions, it is apparent that the left-right orientation either captures only one of these dimensions or, at best, is a hasty compromise between the two as the respondent is forced to place herself on a single dimension. In this sense, self-placement on a left/right scale as a measure of ideological orientation may conflate multiple inclinations and may be ill-suited to address complex political attitudes of the public. This observation is crucial if one wishes to examine how individuals' ideological preferences influence natives' attitudes towards immigrants.

### ***Single versus Multidimensional Space for Ideology***

Contemporary literature has quite convincingly resolved the most obvious problem of the one-dimensional conception of ideology by adding a second dimension. The original left-right question has been often included as a part of the economic position, which is usually referred to as the socio-economic, or socialist/laissez-faire dimension (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Kriesi, 2010; Van Der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). The second dimension is variously referred to as authoritarian/libertarian (Kitschelt and McGann 1997), materialist/post-materialist (Inglehart 1990, 1997), or, more generally, as the cultural dimension (van der Brug and van Spanje 2009). Although the discussion of particular elements and the existence of additional dimensions is ongoing (cf. Bakker et al., 2012; Kriesi et al. 2010), these two dimensions are now widely accepted as a basic model of ideological space.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The waters of multidimensional ideology are even more muddled when we consider that support for the free market and an intolerance of diversity can be skillfully combined by political entrepreneurs. For instance, some American conservative elites combined anti-egalitarian arguments about blacks' lack of free market work ethic with authoritarian racial intolerance to generate opposition to welfare programs (Gilens, 1999; Kinder, 1996; cf. Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1999). In contrast, in European politics the two dimensions are often instinctually kept separate. Some European populist right-wing parties such as *Danish People's Party* (DPP) project welfare

At the individual level, the first dimension is often measured using a variety of questions referring to taxation, government's role in the economy, and redistribution. The second dimension typically uses questions about respondents' opinions on salient socio-political questions, such as personal-freedoms, same-sex marriage, and immigration (e.g. Van Der Brug and Van Spanje, 2008; Bakker et al., 2012; Kriesi et al., 2010). Such two-dimensional operationalization is prevalent across the current literature and constitutes a clear improvement over the single-dimensional approach in explanations of electoral choices. That notwithstanding, its utility in explanations of individual political attitudes is limited.

### ***Limitations of Attitudes-based Ideological Measures***

Since these ideological dimensions are measured using questions about salient political attitudes – concerning redistribution, immigration, or minority rights – they cannot be applied to models explaining these same attitudes. That would place highly correlated items on both sides of the explanatory equation, yielding, at best, uninteresting and, at worst, biased results.

Additionally, political elites frame their messages affecting the opinions and political behavior of citizens (cf. Ellison and Stimson 2010). The relationship between how elites frame political positions and citizens' expressed opinions is most likely dynamically bidirectional, where certain attitudes in the public change following the articulation of the party's ideological position, even as changes in other elite positions may follow the public attitudes (e.g. Bafumi &

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chauvinist policies; supporting the maintenance of the welfare system (egalitarian position), but resisting immigration (authoritarian). In mid 2000s Geert Wilders' supporters in the Netherlands exalted in the liberal market, but portrayed immigrant inflow as damaging the economic chances of the native Dutch. Clearly, racial intolerance and free-market ethos do not always go together and should not be conflated (cf. Stenner 2006, 87).

Shapiro, 2009; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Nelson & Kinder, 1996). If such bi-directionality is indeed present, it poses obvious conceptual and empirical problems to the utility of ideology measures based on citizens' attitudes on salient political questions (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009, 25). Focusing on value antecedents of ideological proclivities instead allows for better separation of individual differences from an elite driven discourse.


### **Conceptualizing Individual Ideology: Values and Predispositions**

Based on the foregoing considerations, I focus on individual-held values, which underlie ideological positions across economic and cultural dimensions. While the opinions are focused on a specific subject, values transcend the specific and are concerned with a more general outlook. Milton Rokeach defines value as: 'enduring belief that a particular mode of conduct or that a particular end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternatives [...]' (Rokeach 1968, 550). We can thus conceptualize values as antecedents of attitudes; as predispositions towards a particular perspective or an attitude, but not equivalent to it.

These deep-seated values avoid some of the pitfalls of attitudes-based measures of ideology. First, predisposition-based measures avoid the empirical endogeneity between measures of attitudes and ideology, thus permitting models using individual-level ideology to explain politically salient opinions, such as those towards immigrants and immigration. Second, ideological predispositions are more isolated from the rhetoric of political entrepreneurs, allowing for cleaner separation between individual proclivities and elite driven rhetoric.

### **Ideological Values, Predispositions, and Immigration Attitudes**

The literature has traced ideological attitudes to underlying values, predispositions, and symbolic ideation (Adorno et al., 1950; Huntington, 1957; McClosky, 1958; Converse; Conover and Feldman 1981; Jost et al. 2003, 2007). In particular, the association between right-wing ideology and preferences for conformity, social order, and hierarchical, rather than egalitarian, social structures is well established (Converse 1964; Lipset and Raab 1970; McClosky 1958; Zaller 1992). Only recently, however, it has been furnished with essential microfoundations, dismantling this broad ‘right-wing’ disposition into at least two distinct value dimensions which we can broadly term – egalitarian and authoritarian predispositions (Altemeyer 1988; Feldman 2003; Jost et al. 2003; Stenner 2005).



Dots and diamonds report average country-level attitudes

reported for all available time points. Source: ESS (2012)

**Figure 2.1.** Cross-national variation in immigration attitudes

For instance, Duckit (2001) develops a dual process model (DPM) of prejudice formation describing two discrete worldviews. The first worldview is related to *right-wing authoritarianism (RWA)* and characterizes a perception of the world as a dangerous place, which

can be mitigated by increased social cohesion and order. In contrast, the second worldview, *social dominance orientation* (SDO) perceives world as a ‘ruthless competitive jungle’, which can be managed only by assuring one’s own success (or dominance) in a hierarchical social structure.

The DPM defines a powerful analytical tool, but it may share some challenges of previously discussed attitudes-based ideological measures, as they use questions related to salient political attitudes. RWA and SDO were found to be either strongly correlated with each other or potentially conflating discrete predispositions. Feldman found that “[c]onservatives will thus get higher scores on RWA than liberals even when (and especially when) they strongly value personal autonomy (and therefore are not predisposed toward authoritarianism)” (2003, 64). Similarly, Rubin and Hewstone (2004) point out that the conceptualization of the SDO leads to a diverse set of predictions depending if one focuses on in-group domination, subordination of an out-group, or an individual need for social hierarchy and dominance.

Recently, in the DPM analysis of immigration attitudes, Sibley and colleagues (2013) used social trust questions to capture SDO’s motivational preference for social dominance and questions about sense of safety in social settings to probe RWA’s motivation for social order and cohesion. This focus on more general ‘world-views’ as opposed to expressed attitudes is a crucial contribution that has the potential to increase the clarity of the causal association between values and attitudes. They find that both SDO- and RWA-predisposed individuals react to situational triggers challenging their motivational preferences in forming their anti-immigration attitudes (Sibley et al. 2013). While these new iterations of DPM provide a solid base supporting present analysis, the focus on individual differences conceived of in terms of threat and



competition are not readily relatable to the political ideological space, which is the focus of present theorizing.

Another approach to fundamental human predispositions emerged from the research on core human values. Foundational work by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) and Schwartz (1992), identified a complex structure of 10 basic human goals, which are cognitively represented as core human values. While the 10-value structure illustrates the complexity of human ambition it is also analytically unwieldy. However, scholars observed, two broad value dimensions, roughly corresponding to the social and economic dimensions of ideology (Schwartz 1992; see also Feldman and Johnson 2013). The value position underlying the economic dimension is characterized by the importance an individual places on personal achievement versus social equality. The value structure of the social dimension is defined by importance of tradition, conformity and, security vis-à-vis personal expression and individual autonomy (see Schwartz 1992, Davidov et al. 2010, Feldman and Johnston 2013). Indeed, the relatively direct link between the antecedents of ideological position (values) and social and economic ideological dimensions makes Schwartz's (1992) particularly well suited for analyses of immigration attitudes.

Building on these crucial contributions and using Schwartz's (1992) core values concepts, I examine two ideologically 'right-wing' predispositions (anti-egalitarian and authoritarian), which capture two core – economic and social – facets of 'right-wing' preferences (Adorno, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Huntington 1957; Jost et al. 2003, 2007; Rokeach 1968). The foregoing theoretical expectation states that while individuals holding anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values share general resistance to immigration, these values promote divergent

reaction to actual immigrant presence. This varying reaction to immigration context can be traced to different dispositional needs characterizing authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values.

*Authoritarian predisposition*, describes a generalized preference for uniformity and conformity over diversity and individualism (Adorno, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). Feldman suggests that authoritarianism is, in essence, orientation in the conflict between individual rights and the well-being of the social unit” (2003, p. 46). Authoritarian-predisposed individuals report a preference for order and uniformity over individual freedoms and social diversity (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Stenner, 2005). This preference results in support for restrictions on social behavior such that promote social uniformity (Feldman, 2003). Consequently, diversity inspires intolerance in authoritarian individuals whom – due to their predispositions – perceive diversity as a threat to social cohesion and unity.<sup>7</sup> In this sense, authoritarian values can be seen as underlying the ‘cultural’ dimension of ideological orientation.

*Egalitarian predisposition* differs from authoritarian predisposition in that it is underpinned by a preference for reduced inequality and social justice. To construct consistently directional hypotheses, I will refer to the inverse of egalitarian, namely anti-egalitarian value predisposition. Anti-egalitarians place little or no value on general equality of treatment or opportunity<sup>8</sup>, instead emphasizing outcomes, which benefit individual effort (Rokeach 1968,

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<sup>7</sup> Consistently, Napier and Jost (2008) find that lower income people tend to identify with the right based on their intolerance of diversity and preference for uniformity, while higher socioeconomic classes favor rightward affiliation based on economic preferences (cf. Lipset, 1960; Ellis and Stimson, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Some research also suggests that egalitarianism is rejected by those who affirm status quo. This is the case since promotion of equality implies change from existing social stratification towards equality (Jost et al. 2009; Stenner 2005).

Schwartz 1992; Kymlicka 2002; Barry 2001; Waltzer 2004). In more general terms, anti-egalitarians prefer hierarchical to equal social orders, where wellbeing depends on individual effort and not equality-promoting social structures. Thus anti-egalitarian values can clearly be seen as underlying the ‘economic’ dimension of ideological orientation.

These two dimensions of right-wing ideological predisposition have clear implications relevant to the analyses of immigration related attitudes. First, in line with conventional wisdom about right-wing or conservative preferences, we can expect that both anti-egalitarians and authoritarians should have similar association with immigration related attitudes. Since immigrants constitute an obvious out-group that implicitly introduces a foreign element to the existing cultural and economic landscape, they threaten existing social order and conformity as well as bring into focus a debate about desirability of socio-economic equality and redistribution. Therefore, we can expect that both anti-egalitarian and authoritarian predispositions are likely associated with more negative opinions about immigrants.

*Hypothesis 1a: authoritarian predisposition is positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for stricter immigration policies.*

*Hypothesis 1b: anti-egalitarian predisposition is positively associated with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for stricter immigration policies.*

### ***Anti-egalitarian and Authoritarian Predispositions in High Immigration Contexts***

The second testable implication revolves around the reaction to immigrant presence. While anti-egalitarian and authoritarian individuals align in their general negative view of immigrants and

immigration, there are good reasons to expect that these predispositions react to immigrant presence differently (cf. Stenner 2005; Napier and Jost 2008; Schwartz 1992).

The general group-threat hypothesis proposes that larger immigrant presence can stimulate the perception of threat and lead to negative immigration attitudes (Quillian 1995; Zolber and Woon 1999; Luccassen and Lubbers 2012). Larger immigrant presence has also been shown to afford greater possibility for exposure and contact, resulting in decreased prejudice and more positive attitudes (Wagner et al. 2006; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). This apparent contradiction is not controversial as these processes can operate simultaneously depending on individual predisposition to feel threatened by diversity. Indeed, existing research suggests that immigrant outgroup size proxies for both intergroup threat and contact, further showing that both mechanisms are present in Western societies (cf. Wagner, et al. 2006, Schlueter and Wagner 2008, Schneider 2008; Luccassen and Lubbers 2012).

Natives holding authoritarian values perceive larger immigration groups as greater diversity. This immigrant-diversity decreases social cohesion and uniformity, which authoritarians favor. Thus, the presence of immigrants is likely to exacerbate already negative immigration attitudes of authoritarians.

A more positive, contact-based dynamic is, however, also possible. This is especially true in Western Europe where immigration and tolerance have been a part of the socio-culture milieu for nearly a half of century. In this context, anti-egalitarian native individuals, whom are not *a priori* resistant to diversity, may actually benefit from greater exposure to immigrants, reducing their anti-immigrant sentiments. Thus, while in general viewing immigrants unfavorably, anti-egalitarian predisposed natives may hold less-negative attitudes in contexts where immigrant

groups are larger. This leads to two conditional hypotheses capturing different reactions to immigrant presence for those who reject equality and those who desire uniformity.

*Hypothesis 2a: Natives with higher authoritarian predisposition display stronger anti-immigrant attitudes in contexts with higher immigrant proportion than in lower immigrant proportion contexts.*

*Hypothesis 2b: Natives with higher anti-egalitarian predisposition display weaker anti-immigrant attitudes in contexts with higher immigrant proportion than in lower immigrant proportion contexts.*

## **Data and Modeling**

All analyses use the data from five waves of European Social Surveys (ESS) administered between 2002-2010. I analyze only the Western European states (EU-15 + EFTA) since recent studies observed that understanding of ideology is different in Central and Eastern European countries (Pioro et al. 2013). The unit of analysis is an individual, nested within a country wave of the survey. Since my theoretical focus is concerned with the attitudes of natives towards immigrants, I only retain those respondents where both parents are declared as native born in the country of residence (cf. European Social Surveys 2002, questions C24 and C25). The resulting sample's summary statistics, including country-level variables, are reported in Table A1.3 in the appendix A. The geographical and temporal coverage of the sample data as well as the distribution of left/right self-placement, anti-egalitarian, and authoritarian predispositions, can be seen in Figure 1.

### ***Attitudes Towards Immigration and Immigrants***

To test the above argument, I construct two related dependent variables: one testing attitudes towards immigrants, and a second variable testing natives' views on appropriate levels of immigration into the country. Attitudes towards immigrants are constructed based on three questions asking respondents about their views on the impact immigrants have on the host-country in general, its culture, and its economy. Exact wording of each item is reported in Table A1.1 in Appendix A. The resulting scale had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.85, where higher values denote more negative attitudes.

Natives' support for stricter immigration control were measured using questions asking: "[...] to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of [characteristic] to come and live here?" (ESS 2012). Questions referenced immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as host countries majority, people of different race or ethnic group than country's majority, and people from poorer countries outside of Europe. The scaled variable had a Cronbach's alpha of 0.87. Details are reported in table A1.2 in Appendix A.

### ***Individual Ideological Position***

As mentioned above, measuring individuals' ideological orientations raises questions about the relationship between positions articulated by political elites and individually held opinions. Conscious of this potential problem, I follow the recommendation of previous studies and focuses on antecedents of ideological attitudes and opinions (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009, Feldman and Johnston 2014). I use Schwartz's (1992) basic human values scale, which was administered by the ESS in all five analyzed waves. The validity and reliability of any measure across different contexts is always questionable. However, the 21-item values scale used in the ESS has been subjected to extensive examination and it was concluded that it "[...] demonstrates

configural and metric invariance, allowing researchers to use it to study relationships among values, attitudes, behavior and socio-demographic characteristics across countries” (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008).

### ***Authoritarian Predisposition***

The Authoritarian predisposition is one, which favors obedience and conformity while eschewing diversity. Many instruments used to measure authoritarianism such as the F-Scale or right-wing authoritarianism scale (see Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988) have, over time, met with significant criticism due to a host of conceptual and methodological problems (cf. Feldman 2003).<sup>9</sup> Recently scholars converged on a set of survey questions asking about childrearing preferences, a measure Donald Kinder calls “disarmingly straightforward” (2010, 431k). First popularized by Karen Stenner and Stanley Feldman (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005) these survey items ask respondents to indicate a quality most desirable in a child. Such conception of authoritarianism is isolated from policy opinions, and instead measures fundamental values – individuals’ preferences between personal autonomy and social cohesion (Stenner 2005).

The most common short-scale measures four questions asking about an individual’s preference between: independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners, obedience or

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<sup>9</sup> The original F-scale introduced by Adorno and colleagues suffered from numerous methodological mistakes ranging from sample selection from memberships in formal organizations to invariant question formulation leading to the acquiescence response set bias (see Cronbach 1946, Campbell, Siegelman and Rees 1967, Altemeyer 1988). Altemeyer’s (1988, 1996) *right-wing authoritarianism* scale improves on methodological problems of Adorno and colleagues, but items used in the scale’s construction often quite clearly resemble the very attitudes it aims to explain, such as attitudes towards gays and lesbians or immigrants (see Kinder and Kam, 2010; Feldman, 2003; Feldman and Stenner, 2003; Stenner 2005).

self-reliance, considerate or well behaved (e.g. ANES 2004). The validity of this scale as well as its reliability has been shown in a large body of empirical research (cf. Stenner 2005, 2009, Kinder and Kam, 2010, Feldman 2003). The ESS does not ask childrearing questions on a consistent basis, however, the abbreviated Schwartz's basic values inventory asks questions directly corresponding to the childrearing items (see Davidov et al., 2008; S. H. Schwartz et al., 2001). Questions ask respondents to place themselves on a six-category scale ranging from sounds "very much like me" (1) to "not like me at all" (6). Three items are directly related to childrearing questions, the probes individual preference for governmental authority:

1. Important to do what is told and follow rules
2. Important to behave properly
3. Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention to oneself
4. Important that government is strong and ensures safety


These items were reverse coded, added, and transformed to vary from 0 to 1 to construct authoritarian predisposition measure. The resulting variable, consistent with previous studies, reports a Cronbach's alpha of 0.66 (e.g. Kinder and Kam, 2010; Stenner, 2005).

### ***(Anti-)Egalitarian Predisposition***

The egalitarian predisposition, is defined by a value placed on promotion of general equality. Anti-egalitarianism is therefore defined by its resistance to equality in opportunity and in treatment. Typically scholars rely on questions asking individuals their preferences for or against redistribution (e.g. Van Der Brug and van Spanje 2009). Such operationalization, however, asks directly about policy preferences, and therefore runs the risks of conflating ones' own ideological preferences with the policy position of political elites (cf. Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009; Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; D.R. Kinder & Sears, 1985; Nelson & Kinder, 1996).



Moreover, egalitarian/anti-egalitarian values are not simply confined to the economic question but capture more general, core values relating to the desirability of equality and inequality.



Source: European social surveys 2002-2010. Note: country sampling weights applied; correlation between anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values  $r = .22$ ; correlation with left/right self-placement: anti-egalitarian  $r = .15$ , authoritarian  $r = .09$ .

**Figure 2.2.** Average anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values across left/right orientation

As an alternative, Schwartz’s basic values scale asks a question related to attitudes towards the desirable level of general equality. The question asks whether it is “[...] important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities” (ESS 2012). Respondents rate this statement across six grades from this statement sounds “very much like me” (1) to “not like me at all” (6). This simple measure captures the general essence of egalitarian values.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that both predispositions can be held jointly by the same individual. For instance, it is possible for authoritarians to hold egalitarian values, especially as they relate to the ethnic in-group. It is equally

### ***Control Variables***

To empirically test the role of ideological value-predispositions the model has to control for theoretically relevant covariates. First, I include respondents' ideological orientation classically measured as a self-placement on a 0 to 10 left/right scale, where higher values denote rightward identification. Previous research demonstrated that authoritarianism and egalitarianism are distinct from the simple left-right self-placement (Stenner 2006, Kinder and Kam, 2010). In Figure 2, I plot the mean value of anti-egalitarian and authoritarian predisposition for each level of the left/right scale for my entire sample.

As can be expected, both mean anti-egalitarian and authoritarian predispositions increase as one moves right-ward on the left/right ideological scale; this increase is, however, substantively relatively small. Indeed, left/right is only weakly correlated with authoritarian ( $r = 0.09$ ) and anti-egalitarian ( $r = 0.15$ ) predispositions (see figure 2). The positive association of anti-egalitarian predisposition increases as you move from 0 to 10 on the left/right scale for all but the highest two left/right categories. In general, authoritarian predisposition also displays increase as one moves right-ward (down) on the left/right scale. Moreover, confirming the existence of left-authoritarianism, those oriented at 0 (extreme left) do show, on average, higher authoritarian orientation than those who place-themselves 1-4 (left to moderate-left) on the left/right scale. Finally, anti-egalitarian and authoritarian predispositions are themselves correlated at  $r = 0.22$ , and thus cannot be considered as capturing the same individual level difference.

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possible for authoritarian predisposed to be in-egalitarian when comparing the desirable equality of treatment between national in-group and the outsiders. In both cases it is important to know how each predisposition affects political attitudes and behavior and then how each responds to contextual conditions.

The rest of the individual-level variables are those typically found in studies of immigration attitudes. To account for the finding that older natives are more sensitive to the immigrant threat and may therefore hold more negative immigration attitudes, I include *Age*, measured in years. I include *education*, coded in five ordinal categories, to capture insulation from the effects of immigration, a greater level of cosmopolitan attitudes, or better comprehension of the role labor migration plays in the economy – all of which have been linked to educational attainment (e.g. van der Waal, Achterberg, Houtman, de Koster, & Manevska, 2010). I further include two dummy variables, *female* coded 1 and 0 for male, and *unemployed* coded 1 if the respondent is out of work and 0 otherwise. Finally, household *income*, measured in deciles<sup>11</sup> (to facilitate cross-national comparison) and unemployment dummy, to capture how exposed or insulated one is from a perceived economic threat and immigrant threat to personal income (e.g. Mayda 2006).

### ***Country-Level Variables***

To assess the key contextual factor – immigrant presence – I use *% foreign born*, measured as foreign-born population as a percentage of total population one year prior to survey administration. As controls, I also include gross domestic product per capita (*GDP/capita*) and in the robustness check section add *% unemployed* for each country-year. These data are obtained from the European Social Surveys' Cumulative Data Wizard (European Social Survey 2013).

### ***Model Specification***

The base model of immigration attitudes for  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  is formalized in the equation:

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<sup>11</sup> 12-categories of income were recorded for 2002, 2004, and 2006 waves. In 2008 and 2010 the top-three categories were collapsed into one effectively recording income in deciles. To assure cross-wave comparability I collapse the top three categories into one for the first three waves.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Immigration Attitudes}_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{01}(\text{Unemployed})_{ij} + \beta_{02}(\text{Education})_{ij} + \beta_{03}(\text{Age})_{ij} + \beta_{04}(\text{Female})_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{05}(\text{Income})_{ij} + \beta_{06}(\text{Left/Right})_{ij} + \beta_{07}(\text{Anti-egalitarian\_Pred.})_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{08}(\text{Authoritarian\_Pred.})_{ij} + r_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where  $\beta_{0j}$  is specified as:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} (\% \text{ Foreign Born})_j + \gamma_{02} (\text{GDP per capita})_j + \mu_{0j}$$

As a test of conditional hypotheses 2a and 2b, to these base multilevel models, I add a cross-level interaction between ideological predispositions and % *Foreign Born*. These models estimate  $\delta_{01}$  and  $\delta_{02}$ , which represent coefficients on the cross-level interactive term between individual anti-egalitarian, authoritarian predispositions and the presence of immigrants (Models 2 and 4).

First, I consider the direct relationship between authoritarian and anti-egalitarian predispositions and the two dependent variables. Following, I discuss the results of cross-level interaction between ideological values and immigrant presence. All analyses are of multilevel ordinary least-squares regressions with random effects on country-year  $j$ .

## Results and Discussion

The results of the analyses are reported in Tables 1. In general, the data provide support for the commonsensical relationships stated in  $H_1$  and  $H_2$ : a positive association between ideological predispositions and negative immigration related attitudes (models 1 & 2). More importantly, I also find support for the conditional mechanisms expressed in the theory ( $H_3$  and  $H_4$ ): while immigrant presence increases the anti-immigrant attitudes of authoritarian-predisposed natives, those with an anti-egalitarian predisposition actually moderate their anti-immigrant stance in high immigration contexts.

**Table 2.1.** Anti-Immigrant Attitudes, Ideological Predispositions and Immigrant Presence.<sup>†</sup>

|                                       | (1)                      | (2)                 | (3)                                     | (4)                 |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|
|                                       | Anti-Immigrant Attitudes |                     | Support for Stricter Immigration Policy |                     |
| Anti-egalitarian × % foreign-born     |                          | -0.005**<br>(0.003) |   | -0.010**<br>(0.003) |
| Authoritarian × % foreign-born        |                          | 0.009**<br>(0.003)  |   | 0.015**<br>(0.003)  |
| Authoritarian predisposition (0-1)    | 0.697**<br>(0.016)       | 0.601**<br>(0.038)  | 0.641**<br>(0.017)                      | 0.474**<br>(0.039)  |
| Anti-egalitarian predisposition (0-1) | 0.698**<br>(0.013)       | 0.754**<br>(0.032)  | 0.699**<br>(0.014)                      | 0.801**<br>(0.033)  |
| Left/Right orientation (0-1)          | 0.468**<br>(0.013)       | 0.467**<br>(0.013)  | 0.534**<br>(0.014)                      | 0.533**<br>(0.014)  |
| Unemployment                          | 0.109**<br>(0.013)       | 0.109**<br>(0.013)  | 0.104**<br>(0.013)                      | 0.104**<br>(0.013)  |
| Highest level of education            | -0.135**<br>(0.002)      | -0.135**<br>(0.002) | -0.116**<br>(0.002)                     | -0.116**<br>(0.002) |
| Age of respondent                     | -0.001**<br>(0.000)      | -0.001**<br>(0.000) | 0.003**<br>(0.000)                      | 0.003**<br>(0.000)  |
| Female                                | 0.041**<br>(0.005)       | 0.041**<br>(0.005)  | 0.010*<br>(0.005)                       | 0.010*<br>(0.005)   |
| Income                                | -0.026**<br>(0.001)      | -0.026**<br>(0.001) | -0.021**<br>(0.001)                     | -0.021**<br>(0.001) |
| % Foreign-born                        | 0.006<br>(0.005)         | 0.002<br>(0.005)    | -0.002<br>(0.005)                       | -0.010**<br>(0.005) |
| GDP/capita (real 2000 USD)            | -0.000**<br>(0.000)      | -0.000**<br>(0.000) | -0.000<br>(0.000)                       | -0.000*<br>(0.000)  |
| Constant                              | -0.051<br>(0.127)        | 0.004<br>(0.127)    | -0.297**<br>(0.123)                     | -0.200<br>(0.114)   |
| $\rho$ (ICC)                          | 0.062                    | 0.059               | 0.055                                   | 0.045               |
| Prob > chi2                           | 0.000                    | 0.000               | 0.000                                   | 0.000               |
| N (country-wave)                      | 73846(59)                | 73846(59)           | 73329(59)                               | 73329(59)           |

\*\* p<0.05; Coefficients obtained from hierarchical models with random intercepts for country-wave (standard errors in parentheses).

### ***Direct Effects of Anti-egalitarian and Authoritarian Predispositions***


Hypotheses 1a and 1b propose that natives' attitudes towards immigrants and their views toward desirable immigration levels are related to individual ideological predispositions. The commonsensical expectation was that natives who are predisposed to resist equality (anti-egalitarian, H1a) and those who find diversity threatening (authoritarian, H1b) would express less favorable immigration sentiments than natives not espousing either of these predispositions.

The results, illustrated in figure 3, support both of these propositions. Natives holding anti-egalitarian predisposition one standard deviation above the mean expressed 0.14 more negative attitudes towards immigrants (A3) while natives with an authoritarian predisposition one standard deviation above the mean reported negative attitudes higher by 0.12 (model 1). When considering the approval of more restrictive immigration policies, these effects, for the same one standard deviation increase in ideological predispositions, were 0.13 for anti-egalitarianism and 0.11 for authoritarianism (model 3). While at first glance these effect sizes may seem small, they are comparable to the effect size of the traditional left/right self-orientation. With a one standard deviation increase in left/right orientation, the support for stricter policies increases by 0.11 and the negative immigration attitudes increase by 0.10. In other words, the effect sizes of the classical one-dimensional left/right ideological measure are comparable to both authoritarian and anti-egalitarian predispositions.

### ***Conditional Effects: Immigrant Proportion $\times$ Ideological Predispositions***

The core of the theoretical argument proposes that the way individuals respond to immigrant presence is quite different between those with two right-wing – anti-egalitarian and authoritarian – predispositions. Thus, the conditional effect of immigrant presence is central to the empirical analysis. The authoritarian-predisposed, whom are particularly sensitive to diversity, will

increase their negative attitudes towards immigrants and support for stricter immigration in the presence of larger immigrant groups. In contrast, anti-egalitarians are more likely to moderate their attitudes since they do not object to diversity *a priori*, and can thus experience the positive boon of repeated exposure to immigrants.



Note: Each panel presents the direct association of ideological predispositions with immigration attitudes in table 1. Top panels present effects of coefficients from model 1, the bottom panels from model 3.

**Figure 2.3.** Right-wing ideological predispositions and anti-immigrant attitudes


The results of the conditional effects analyses, reported in Models 2 and 4 (table 1), seem largely to support theoretical expectations. The coefficient sign on the interaction term of *authoritarian* and *%foreign-born* is positive and significant suggesting that in contexts with a higher immigrant presence, authoritarian predisposed express more negative attitudes and stronger support for immigration restriction. In contrast, the *anti-egalitarian* and *%foreign-born* interaction term returns a negative coefficient, suggesting that anti-egalitarians can moderate their immigration attitudes in a context with higher immigrant proportion.

Putting direct and conditional effects together, authoritarian natives report stronger anti-immigrant attitudes and stronger support for immigration restriction than do less authoritarian natives, and the strength of these attitudes is increased by the presence of immigrants. Anti-egalitarian natives report stronger anti-immigrant attitudes and stronger support for immigration restriction than do more egalitarian natives, but the strength of these attitudes is moderated by the presence of immigrants. Before drawing strong conclusions from these cross-level interactions, we should inspect these results graphically.

Figures 4 and 5 plot the conditional effects of *anti-egalitarian* and *authoritarian* values across the observed values of immigrant proportion (*%foreign-born*). In these figures, we can see how different levels of immigration affect the association between right-wing predispositions and immigrant attitudes. In other words, these figures depict by how much, and in what direction *% foreign-born* changes the main effect association between right-wing values and immigration attitudes. As can be seen in both figures, the effect of *anti-egalitarian* and *authoritarian* predispositions remain positive at all levels of immigrant presence. The marked difference, however, is how authoritarian and *anti-egalitarian* react as the proportion of immigrants increases.



More specifically, in figure 4 (Model 2), we see that those with an anti-egalitarian predisposition express more moderate immigration attitudes (downward slope) in contexts with a higher percentage of immigrants (left panel). In the left panel of figure 4, we can see a similar pattern when supporting restricting immigration. These illustration lend support to hypothesis 2B. In contrast to the anti-egalitarians, and in line with the hypothesis 2A, natives holding an authoritarian predisposition express negative attitudes towards immigrants and stronger support for immigration restriction, and this effect is stronger (upward slope) in countries with a higher proportion of immigrants.



Note: Figure presents effects of anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values conditional on proportion of immigrants in a state. Graphs obtained using STATA package Margins based on results of model 2.

**Figure 2.4.** Right-wing ideological values, immigrant presence and anti-immigrant attitudes

In sum, I find strong support for the unconditional effect of ideological predisposition on increased negative attitudes towards immigrants ( $H_{1A}$ ) and support for stricter immigration

policies ( $H_{1B}$ ). I also, however, find that individuals holding strong anti-egalitarian predispositions moderate their attitudes in contexts with a higher immigrant presence ( $H_{2b}$ ). I further find support for  $H_{2a}$ , which argues that natives with a strong authoritarian predisposition are likely to increase their negative attitudes towards immigrants when in a context with higher immigrant presence.


Finally, the control variables performed in line with the existing literature, increasing confidence in my models. Further inspiring confidence, my model clustered errors on country, rather than country-survey-wave and include survey wave fixed effects to account for the possible effects of temporal variance resulting from pooling of five survey waves.

## ***Discussion***

These results provide strong initial support for the theoretical expectation that individuals holding anti-egalitarian and authoritarian right-wing values may share a general disapprove of immigration, but vary in the way they react to actual immigrant presence. This difference can be attributed to the fact that these right-wing predispositions originate from very different values and dispositional needs. That immigrant presence increases anti-immigrant attitudes of the authoritarians is consistent with the psychological profile of the authoritarian predisposition, which favors uniformity over diversity (Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003). Anti-egalitarianism originates from a general opposition to equalization and affirmation of individual achievement (Feldman and Johnston 2014), and thus, while they object to the equalization of immigrants and natives in general, anti-egalitarians do not inherently react negatively to immigrant presence.

The most obvious implication of the conditional model suggests that the presence of immigrants has complex, even divergent influence on natives' attitudes, and this variation (at least in part) depends on individual predispositions. This finding in its own right contributes to a

more complete picture of the influence immigration exerts over natives' political and social opinions. What is less expected, and thus perhaps more telling, is that this differential reaction to immigrant presence is also present within the group of natives who on the surface hold decidedly right-wing predispositions.



Note: Figure presents effects of anti-egalitarian and authoritarian values conditional on proportion of immigrants in a state. Graphs obtained using STATA package Margins based on results of model 2.

**Figure 2.5.** Right-wing values, immigrant presence and support for stricter immigration policies

These findings also speak to the broad social and political questions of contemporary European societies. As immigrant presence increases its reach to more and more European communities, we can expect the emergence of two related but opposing social dynamics. First, immigrant resistance will probably increase among those holding cultural right-wing (authoritarian) values. Second, those who hold economic right-wing (anti-egalitarian) values, while generally perceiving immigrants as a social problem, through greater exposure may

actually moderate their anti-immigrant positions. Moreover, this study suggests that this split may be present not just on the progressive-conservative cleavage, but also within the segment of natives generally referred to as right-wing. The future of immigrant attitudes may thus see increasing resistance from those natives predisposed to resist diversity. Simultaneously immigrant presence may increase acceptance among those who disapprove of immigration on anti-egalitarian grounds, but who can improve their attitudes as immigrants increasingly become a part of the status quo. In other words, more immigration may mean more divided publics, splitting attitudes of even those who at first glance seem ideologically similar.

This research also speaks to the political realities of party competition. Indeed, if we extend the diverse right-wing reactions findings to the examination of party identification on the basis of ideological predispositions, the full potential of the model becomes apparent. If these results hold up against tests of replication, we could gain a much better understanding of which right-leaning voter is likely to hold stronger anti-immigrant attitudes, and thus be more likely to support strongly nativist platforms of political parties. In turn, we may be able to predict which ‘right-wing voter’ will find nationalist slogans less appealing, but be more attracted to affirmations of personal achievement and resistance to equality, even if it means acceptance of existing diversity (Stenner 2005). Thus, rather than applying a general political-ideological label to individuals, the present model allows a more in-depth look at how individuals’ values shape their sensitivity to various political messaging. Such insight is becoming increasingly relevant as ideological party space is increasingly displaying signs of (at least) two-dimensional competition (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008, Bakker et al. 2012).

Finally, my model directly relates to the empirical research program focusing on individual differences in explaining political attitudes and behavior. Here the most important

implication of my analysis is a promising new way of measuring two-dimensional ideological profiles of voters. Unlike previous attempts, the present model does not rely on expressed political opinions, which may be contaminated by the positions of political elites (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009, Elis and Stimson 2012). Instead, my approach relies on individual deep-seated values, which are not only isolated from the specific political questions, but also have been shown to be stable over time and valid across diverse national contexts (et al. Davidson et al., 2008). Of course, mine is not the only attempt at modeling ideological predispositions rather than actual salient political attitudes and opinions (cf. Sibley et al. 2001; Feldman and Johnson 2014). The results of the present model do, however, inspire confidence in the potential of this values-based measure of ideological predispositions. First, value-predispositions performed as expected, suggesting validity in association with immigration attitudes. Second, in the conditional analysis, value-predisposition have demonstrated consistently divergent reactions to immigrant borne diversity, conforming to what is logically expected based on their dispositional value profiles (cf. Sibley et al. 2013). This line of analytical inquiry is rapidly emerging, and it is important to pursue existing and develop competing models to push the frontier of social science in the area of ideological individual differences.

## **Conclusion**

In this paper, I have outlined a model of immigration attitudes using personality-based ideological predispositions as the main individual-level explanatory variable. My theory suggested that the anti-egalitarian and authoritarian ideological predispositions are related to different basic values and thus lead to divergent expectations for how individuals will react to different immigration contexts. I tested both direct and conditional effects of anti-egalitarian and

authoritarian predispositions using large multi-wave and multi-level sample drawn from the European Social Surveys.

In part, the results may seem obvious. The conventional wisdom would suggest that those who hold right-wing values – authoritarian and anti-egalitarian – are likely to hold predominantly negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. I do indeed find this to be the case. Further consistent with established arguments, I find that those with a strong authoritarian predisposition will likely react to a larger immigrant presence with higher attitudinal hostility.

The set of conditional findings about anti-egalitarian predisposition is less intuitive. The results suggest that while individuals with an anti-egalitarian predisposition unconditionally hold more negative immigration attitudes, they do seem to reduce their anti-immigrant resentment in contexts with higher immigration presence. In most Western European countries, immigration is not a new phenomena, and natives have an ample opportunity for prejudice-reducing contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Such contact may benefit immigration attitudes of anti-egalitarians, who are not dispositionally resistant to diversity. Immigrant diversity, I contend, are more likely to rouse authoritarian predisposed individuals, who view immigrants as a threatening diversity, regardless of how well-established the immigrant community may be.

Since I find that attitudes towards immigrants and support for stricter immigration regulation depend on an individual's ideological predispositions, both large, established immigrant communities as well as a rapid inflow of large immigrant cohorts may result in individuals changing their immigration attitudes and becoming more (or less) vulnerable to anti-immigrant political messaging. Bishop (2008), for instance, demonstrates that (in part) due to diversity, spatial ideological polarization is occurring in the United States. The loss of electoral

support suffered by the left, the rise of a populist radical right, and significant shifts in support of social democratic camps across Europe should be analyzed not simply from the perspective of attitudes, but perhaps more fruitfully by considering the conditional effect of ideological predispositions in the face of changing demographic landscapes across European states.

Further, the conditional effect of ideological predispositions suggests several potential applications of this model to studies of other phenomena associated with immigration, such as support for economic redistribution and welfare chauvinism, preferences for multicultural or assimilationist policies, and other manifestations of socio-political (in)tolerance.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE ‘NEW LIBERAL DILEMMA’ AND THE ‘OLD’ AUTHORITARIAN ANSWER? WELFARE CHAUVINISM IN THE AGE OF MIGRATION.

*The impact [of immigration] on infrastructure, rents, land prices, land use, energy consumption, schools, health care or social welfare institutions are now only in its infancy. A discussion on the limitation of immigration is therefore urgently needed. (SVP 2011)*

Martin Baltisser, *Secretary General of Swiss People’s Party*

The future of the welfare state in Europe remains an open question, with evidence in support of its durability (Crepaz, 2008; Finseraas, 2009; Larsen, 2011; van Oorschot, 2008) as well as its decline (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Eger 2010; Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2004). The crux of the political debate is centered on the ability to sustain popular support for redistribution when facing increasing levels of immigration-driven diversity. Indeed, over the last few decades, some of the most intriguing individual political positions have been concentrated at the intersection of redistributive preferences and immigration attitudes. The tension between the two is manifested in the so-called ‘new liberal dilemma’ (Newton 2007), which pits support for minority rights against the social-democratic value of redistributive justice (see also Freeman 2009; Pierson 2001).

These ideological crossroads produce complex political attitudes such as *welfare chauvinism* – simultaneous support for redistribution and opposition to the welfare participation of immigrant outgroups (Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2011). The existence of such attitudes is illustrated in Figure 1, where a respondents’ average level of agreement with a statement




suggesting that immigrants take more than they contribute (y-axis 1-10) is plotted across the 5-categories expressing level of support for redistribution (x-axis).<sup>12</sup> The mean perception of immigrants as consuming more than they contribute (y-axis) is highest among the individuals who do not support redistribution in general (strongly disagree), but also among those who strongly support redistribution (strongly agree). Thus, we can observe people on the economic right ('strongly disagree' on x-axis) and those on the economic left ('strongly agree' on x-axis) report a cultural position perceiving immigrants in rather negative terms that are typically associated with a right-wing attitudes.

Indeed, some of Europe's most successful populist right-wing parties exploit this diversity of the ideological stance of the electorate. This puzzling combination of attitudes is further important because it figures strongly in party politics. Most recently, British UKIP and Liberal Democrats have displayed remarkably similar core positions on the economic and cultural issues (Ford and Goodwin 2014). Parties such as the Dutch Party for Freedom, Swiss Peoples' Party, or Freedom Party of Austria, all advocate for right-wing, anti-immigrant policies under the justification that they seek to protect state provided benefits. The success of these parties in attracting support may be due to these ideologically 'inconsistent' positions.

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<sup>12</sup> The two questions are drawn from 2002 and 2008 waves of European Social Surveys; one asking about support for redistribution and the other about the perception of immigrant consumption of welfare in a set of 16 Western European countries.



#### **Governments Should Take Steps to Equal Income**

NOTE: Plot shows the mean value of negative perception of immigrant welfare participation across categories of support for general redistribution. Data obtained from the cumulative file of European Social Surveys (2002-2010) and pooled for all available EU-15 and EFTA states (appendix A2).

**Figure 3.1.** Welfare chauvinist attitudes

Part of the explanation for this puzzling set of ideological positions, Feldman and Johnston (2014) note, emerges from the fact that “some citizens may see liberalism and conservatism as primarily about social issues, others may understand the dimension in terms of economics, while others may see both domains as relevant to ideological categorizations.” Indeed, when considering public attitudes wedged in at the intersection of redistribution and diversity, the individual’s political ideology is an obvious point of theoretical and empirical

focus, as these attitudes cut across both socio-economic and socio-cultural ideological dimensions (Duckit 2001; Jost et al. 2003; Duckit 2001, Onaret et al. 2013; Stenner 2005).

The measures of economic and cultural ideological dimensions based on political opinions seem to be well suited to capture the diversity-redistribution nexus. However, more recent investigations of the nexus between ideology and attitudes have turned towards values and predispositions in an effort to capture the individual level antecedents of expressed ideological positions (cf. Feldman and Johnston 2014). This refocusing on the antecedents of expressed ideological positions took place in part due to theoretical developments concerning the values and beliefs underlying those ideological attitudes (Feldman 2003; Duckit 2001; Jost et al. 2003). Additionally, values and predispositions based measures are a response to the limitations of traditional measures of multidimensional ideological scales, which rely on welfare and immigration attitudes (see van der Brug and van Spanjie 2009, Kriesi 2010; Bakker et al. 2008).

Building on this work, I explore the role of resistance to diversity – an authoritarian predisposition (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005) – and resistance to change and equality – a conservative predisposition (e.g. Jost et al. 2003, 2007) – in moderating the effect of immigrant presence on natives' welfare attitudes. I model conservatism and authoritarianism as discrete predispositions, noting their varying relation to social equality and conformity, which comport well with economic and social dimensions of political ideology. I argue that authoritarians should express greater support for redistribution as a tool of reducing differences and promoting greater social stability. In contrast, the conservatively predisposed will oppose such programs since they promote undesirable equality. Both authoritarians and conservatives should, however, share a negative perception of outgroup participation in welfare benefits. This takes place as these predispositions 'see' welfare as either promoting undesirable equality (conservatives) or as

promoting diversity by awarding benefits to immigrant outsiders (authoritarians), or both. I find that authoritarian predisposition has a positive, and conservative predisposition negative relation to support for redistribution. This association is strengthened for conservatives in contexts with more immigrants, while immigrant presence does not seem to affect authoritarian support for redistribution. As expected, I also find that both conservative- and authoritarian-predisposed perceive immigrant welfare participation in negative terms. However, larger immigrant presence only strengthens this effect for those with authoritarian and not for conservative predispositions.

Following, I first discuss the meaning and dimensionality of ideological convictions. I show that a psychological predispositions-based ideological orientation—is better suited to the analysis of welfare attitudes than are standard attitudes-based measures of individual ideology. Second, based on recent literature, I outline a model of support for welfare and welfare chauvinism as explained by individuals' conservative and authoritarian predispositions. Third, I add a predisposition-context interaction to fully model how welfare attitudes are influenced by immigrant presence. The fourth and fifth sections present the empirical methodology and results. The final section discusses the findings and offers concluding remarks.

### **Welfare Attitudes and Ideology**

Citizens' opinions on the appropriate type of redistributive practices are inherently ideological. It is not entirely clear, however, how ideology should be conceptualized when considering support welfare and immigrant welfare participation attitudes. In a one-dimensional approach, Downs (1957) models party competition as a struggle over the role of the government in the economy where the “left” represents socialism-based intervention with strong redistributive programs and the “right” laissez-faire capitalism with minimal governmental activism (cf. Lipset 1959; McClosky 1958; Zaller 1992).

The one-dimensional conception of ideology has been a mainstay of empirical analyses. Its strength relies on two properties. First, the economic and cultural dimensions are positively correlated with a one-dimensional left-right orientation (Gabel and Huber 2000; Napier and Jost 2008; Warwick 2002). Second, the left/right orientation is an efficient predictor of political behavior (Huber and Inglehart 1995; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). However, the conceptual and empirical efficiency of the single ideological dimension may be overstated. Recent research shows, however, that the two dimensional ideological competition is likely a reality of Western European party systems (Bakker et al. 2012, Rovny 2014). First, its effectiveness in predicting party vote may not be an accurate representation of an individual's ideology. It may rather reflect the supply-side constraint of the party system, where parties are measured as largely distributed across a single, usually economic, dimension (cf. van der Brug and van Spanjie 2009). Second, a one-dimensional ideological perspective cannot clearly account for any heterogeneity of expressed political attitudes among those who place themselves on the political left/right scale. This is certainly the case in the 'new liberal dilemma' where support for welfare redistribution and opposition to equal access for immigrant groups fall on opposite sides of the left/right ideological spectrum.

In contrast to the Downsian conceptualization of ideology, Lipset (1959) observed that "conservative" identification appeals to individuals of lower socioeconomic status through the cultural cues, and to higher economic classes through economic cues. In this view, ideology captures broad, abstract ideas, which provide a preference structure for specific political attitudes, but these ideas are not necessarily neatly organized into a single left/right continuum (Jacoby, 1991). Indeed, people ascribe very different meanings to ideological labels such as "left" and "right," often emphasizing either economic or cultural values, and sometimes both (Ellis &

Stimson, 2012; Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001).<sup>13</sup> Thus, in spite of stated left/right orientation, individuals can express discrete ideological positions across social and economic policy domains.

This complexity of ideological positions has led to a model of ideology based on two primary dimensions: economic, capturing preferences related to the acceptance of inequality and stability, and cultural, corresponding to views on individual freedoms versus group cohesion (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Rudolph & Evans, 2005). These two dimensions have been shown to account for a vast majority of the variance in salient political attitudes of western publics (Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Hellwig 2008; Kitschelt 1997; Kriesi 2010).

The advantage of this two-dimensional conceptualization is, of course, the ability to account for complex sets of attitudes such as those captured by ‘welfare chauvinism.’ Indeed, the simultaneous position on the economic left-of-center – favoring economic redistribution – and the cultural right-of-center – espousing a negative view of immigrants – should be modeled across two-dimensions of ideology. While the two-dimensional ideological space can account for more complex attitudes, its utility in explaining these attitudes is hampered by the way it is typically operationalized.

### ***Welfare Attitudes and the Limits of Traditional Ideological Specifications***

Standard empirical measures of economic and cultural dimensions are based on survey items asking politically salient opinions, such as preferences for welfare and immigration

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<sup>13</sup> Not surprisingly, these two dimensions were also found in studies of party ideological positions, where, apart from the first economic dimension, the ‘second’ dimension is variously called ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ (Kitschelt 1997), ‘green/alternative/libertarian–traditional/authoritarian/nationalism’ (Hooghe et al. 2002) or ‘post-materialist-materialist’ (Inglehart 1990).

policies. For instance, van der Brug and van Spanjie (2009) use a question about redistributive preferences to measure the (“first”) economic dimension of ideology and an immigration attitudes scale for the (“second”) cultural dimension. Kriesi et al. (2010) find that welfare support and opinion on the desired restrictiveness of immigration policy are essential elements of the economic and cultural dimensions respectively (see also Huber and Inglehart 1995; Bakker et al. 2012). Such operationalizations may be appropriate in the models of electoral behavior, but they are less useful in the analyses of political attitudes. For the purpose of explaining welfare chauvinism – support for welfare and opposition to immigrant welfare participation – the inclusion of questions about redistributive preferences (on an economic dimension) and immigrant attitudes (on a cultural dimension) is of course problematic, since it would place similar items on both sides of the explanatory equation.

In other words, measuring ideology based on political attitudes precludes its use in the explanation of these attitudes and as Lewis-Beck put it “may not go back deep enough into the funnel to permit good understanding of the causes of behavior“ (2009, p. 26). Recent literature explores measures of the two dimensions of ideological orientation, which are structured across social and economic preferences and are measured without reliance on expressed attitudes about specific political issues (cf. Feldman and Johnston 2013).

### ***Predispositions – the Antecedents of Ideological Attitudes.***

An alternative to these attitudes-based measures of ideology can be found in the antecedents of ideological opinions—namely, values and predispositions of individuals (Duckitt 2001; Jacoby 2006). Feldman and Johnston (*forthcoming*) summarize this burgeoning literature, noting that individual ideological attitudes cannot be adequately defined as emerging from a single disposition. They find that multiple predispositions better reflect the reality of

multidimensional ideological space and that people ascribe heterogeneous meanings to ideological labels. This is certainly the case with welfare chauvinist attitudes, which cut across multiple dispositional preferences, supporting equality (left) but opposing diversity (right). There is thus a solid foundation for identifying multidimensionality in the personality-based antecedents of political ideology. Specifically, researchers focus on individual psychological needs, which motivate individuals to assume particular ideological attitudes.

Duckitt (2001) conceptualizes the two-dimensional process where Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) provide two pathways to forming prejudicial attitudes (Altemeyer 1988; Pratto et al. 1994). This *dual process model* (DPM) allowed scientists to distinguish between the preference for hierarchical dominance (SDO) and the preference for authority and uniformity (RWA), both of which are associated with right-wing attitudes, but emerge from quite different motivations. Those with RWA personalities are favor strong social order and respect for authority to fend off what they see as a dangerous world. The SDO-predisposed individuals see the world as fiercely competitive, and their political ideology emphasizes competition and the need for hierarchical dominance of some over others (Duckitt 2001).

While the DPM marked a pivotal advance in the study of antecedents of ideological positions, RWA and SDO measures suffered some criticism. Both measures typically rely on survey items closely related to salient political attitudes and thus do not offer clear enough separation between predispositions and attitudes (cf. Stenner 2005). Moreover, the two predispositions can potentially conflate discrete ideological dimensions, inconsistently predicting political attitudes. Feldman, for instance, found that “[c]onservatives will thus get higher scores on RWA than liberals even when (and especially when) they strongly value personal autonomy



*(and therefore are not predisposed toward authoritarianism)*” (2003, 64). Similarly, Rubin and Hewstone (2004) point out that the conceptualizations of the SDO as ingroup domination, subordination of an outgroup, or an individual need for social dominance can all lead to a different set of predictions.

Thus, while conceptually and empirically, these dispositional measures are an improvement over standard ideological operationalization, they still partly remain empirically (RWA) or conceptually (SDO) multidimensional. Moreover, even when DPM’s operationalizations and measurements are not based on socio-political attitudes (see Sibley et al. 2013) they do not correspond as clearly to the ideological dimensionality of individual attitudes. Building on these foundational contributions, I examine egalitarian and authoritarian values as deep-seated antecedents of expressed ideological preferences across economic and cultural domains (cf. Rokeach 1968).

### **The Argument: Ideological Predispositions and Welfare Attitudes**

I focus on the *authoritarian* predisposition as an antecedent to cultural ideological orientation and *status quo conservatism* (conservatism) as an antecedent of economic ideological orientation. The two predispositions are concerned with fundamentally different needs. Stenner notes that for “[...] conservatives, the primary concern is to promote stability and certainty over change and uncertainty. For authoritarians, the overriding objective is to promote unity and conformity over individual freedom and difference (autonomy and diversity)” (2005, 176).

Authoritarianism is in essence an orientation in the conflict “between individual rights and the well-being of the social unit” (Feldman 2003, p. 46).<sup>14</sup> *Authoritarian*-predisposed individuals report a generalized preference for uniformity and conformity over diversity and individualism. These preferences result in support for restrictions on behavior and policies promoting social uniformity (Adorno, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman & Stenner, 1997, Feldman, 2003). This authoritarian desire for conformity over diversity can quite easily be understood as a predisposition underlying the cultural dimension of individual ideological orientation.

The *conservative* differs from the authoritarian predisposition in that it is underpinned by a concern over change to the status quo and opposition to equality (Jost et al. 2003). Conservatively-predisposed individuals express a preference for the status quo and those who uphold it (Conover and Feldman 1981) and concomitantly a resistance to actions promoting equality, as such change is related to instability in the status quo (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Feldman 1988). The affinity between the psychological need to manage uncertainty and a resistance to change found in right-leaning individuals emerges because “*preserving the status quo allows one to maintain what is familiar and known while rejecting the risky, uncertain prospect of social change*” (Jost et al. 2007, 900, emphasis added). Due to their dispositional characteristics, both ideological constructs should have discrete influence on welfare attitudes.

There is also a significant conceptual and empirical evidence supporting varying effects of conservative and authoritarian predispositions on welfare support. In particular, conservatism

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<sup>14</sup> Consistently, Napier and Jost (2008) find that lower income people tend to identify with the right based on their intolerance of diversity and preference for uniformity, while higher socioeconomic classes favor rightward affiliation based on economic preferences (cf Lipset, 1960; Ellis and Stimson, 2010).

has been identified in terms of a dispositional need to reduce uncertainty, best served by the preservation of the status quo and hierarchical (unequal) social order (Jost et al. 2003, 2009). Recent research demonstrates that rationalizing support for the status quo undermines the support for redistribution of resources (Jost and Hunyady 2005; Wakslak et al. 2007). Such position is consistent with the economic right-wing ideological perspective. Therefore, we can expect that conservatively-predisposed individuals should see redistributive programs as the promotion of equality and thus contrary to their psychological predisposition.

Conversely, authoritarians may see redistribution as minimizing the diversity of status and promoting social cohesion. Thus, authoritarian-predisposed may find support for redistribution in line with their psychological predisposition. Stenner anticipated this possibility, noting that authoritarian “distaste for difference could be mobilized behind schemes of equalization and redistribution [...]” (2005, 174). Congruently, in empirical research, authoritarianism displays a much stronger association with social than economic conservatism, as the latter is associated with opposition to redistribution (e.g. Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Sibley and Duckitt 2009).

It is, therefore, likely that the two predispositions may differ in their relation to the redistributive system, especially its role in equalizing status and income. Based on these observations, I expect that conservatives—those especially threatened by change and equality—will express more negative attitudes towards redistribution, which in essence promotes change towards equality. In contrast, authoritarians may see government’s redistribution efforts as a means of increasing unity and conformity and thus express more positive attitudes towards redistribution. These expectations can be expressed in two hypotheses.


Hypothesis 1a: Natives holding stronger *status-quo conservative* predisposition will express more negative attitudes towards redistribution as compared to natives holding weaker *status-quo conservative* predisposition.

Hypothesis 1b: Natives holding stronger *authoritarian* predisposition will express more positive attitudes towards redistribution as compared to natives holding weaker *authoritarian* predisposition.

### ***Immigrant welfare participation and ideological predispositions***

The second element of the welfare chauvinist attitude is the opposition to outgroup participation in state's redistributive programs. When considering immigrant access to the redistributive goods, both the authoritarian- and conservatively-predisposed are likely to respond with similarly negative attitudes.

For the conservatively-predisposed, opposition to redistribution is highly influenced by the fact that these programs are generally concerned with the promotion of undesirable equality. Thus, those with conservative predisposition align their view of immigrant participation with their general opposition to redistribution.



The plots depict country-average levels of response to two questions, which are associated with the new liberal dilemma's welfare chauvinist attitude. The question asking about the perception of immigrant welfare participation was only asked in two waves of European Social Surveys (2002 and 2008). For details, see the 'Data Source and Method of analyses' section. Country ISO abbreviation listed in the appendix.

**Figure 3.2.** Cross-National Distribution of Welfare Chauvinist Attitudes.

Individuals with authoritarian disposition perceive diversity as a threat to social cohesion. Thus, such individuals are likely to perceive immigrant welfare participation in negative terms since members of an outgroup (immigrants) are benefitting from resources meant for (and putatively paid for) the ingroup. Moreover, welfare access may be seen as promoting diversity, as it allows immigrants to remain in the society, and indeed may even be seen as facilitating increased immigration (T Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick 2002; but see Tito Boeri 2010). Thus we can formulate two additional hypotheses:

Hypotheses 2a: Individuals holding stronger *status-quo conservative* predisposition express more negative attitudes towards immigrant welfare participation.

Hypothesis 2b: Individuals holding stronger *authoritarian* predisposition express more negative attitudes towards immigrant welfare participation.

### ***Predispositions, immigrant presence, and welfare attitudes***

The final element of the welfare chauvinist model considers the role of context. The general question underlying the ‘new liberal dilemma’ is the sustainability of the welfare system in the face of immigration. Thus, it is natural for this inquiry to ask how conservative- and authoritarian-predisposed individuals structure their welfare attitudes in contexts with a different proportion of immigrants? The presence of immigrants can be considered as a potential contextual trigger for both those who support and those who oppose redistribution. Consequently, immigration should be considered in models linking ideology and welfare attitudes.

In the contexts with higher proportion of immigrant outsiders, conservatives are likely to reinforce their negative attitudes towards redistribution and strengthen their negative perception of immigrant welfare participation. After all, the conservatively-predisposed see promoting

equality as a direct challenge to the status quo and more immigrants can only compound this undesirable change.

Authoritarians, who see redistribution as a program promoting ingroup unity and eliminating differences, perceive immigrant participation as undermining social order by increasing market competition with the natives. Thus, where immigrant proportion is higher, authoritarians' should express more negative view of immigrant welfare participation. It is less clear how a larger immigrant presence affects authoritarian support for redistribution. Since authoritarians make a clear distinction between desirability of native and immigrant access to redistribution, it is likely that higher immigrant proportion may actually increase their support for redistribution, which reduces differences among natives. That is, in high immigration contexts authoritarians should increase (if only moderately) their support for redistribution and strongly increase their negative view of immigrant welfare participation.

*Hypothesis 3a: In contexts with a higher proportion of immigrants, conservatively predisposed will express more negative attitudes towards redistribution, and a more negative view of immigrant welfare participation.*

*Hypothesis 3b: In contexts with a higher proportion of immigrants, authoritarian predisposed will express more positive attitudes towards redistribution, but also a more negative view of immigrant welfare participation.*

### **Data Sources and Method of Analysis**

I use public opinion data from five-waves of European Social Surveys (ESS) administered between 2002 and 2010. The units of analysis are native individuals who declared both parents as native-born in the country of residence (European Social Survey 2013 items C24 and C25).

The resulting sample's summary statistics, including the country-level variables, are reported in Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix.

### ***Outcome Variables***

To capture support for redistribution and opinion on the immigrant welfare participation, I use two questions from the ESS. To measure the first sentiment, I use the ESS question, asking about the respondent's level of agreement with the statement: "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels" (ESS 2002). This variable is coded on a five-point scale where 1 indicates 'strongly disagree' and 5 'strongly agree.' Refusals to answer and "don't know" answers were coded as missing. This very item has been used to measure general support for redistribution in several previous studies (e.g. Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten 2009). It is particularly well suited to test the first element of welfare chauvinism (support for welfare) since it does not refer to immigrants directly and is thus unlikely to confound attitudes towards immigrants with general support for redistribution (e.g. Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).

The second part of welfare chauvinism—the negative view of immigrant welfare participation—is more difficult to measure. I use a question asking: "Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out" (ESS 2002, 29)? The responses are recoded on an 11-point scale (0-10) where higher values indicate perception that immigrants are net consumers of state's resources. This question was asked in 2002 and 2008 ESS waves. While far from perfect, this question avoids more suggestive language asking about deservingness of immigrants, which may be tainted by a social desirability bias. As such, it subtly forces respondents to assess the costs of immigrant welfare



participation in terms of a burden it places on the natives' contributions. Both dependent variables' cross-national and cross-wave averages, are depicted in Figure 2.

### ***Ideological Predispositions***

The main explanatory variables operationalize authoritarian and conservative predispositions as defined in the theory section. Both conservative and authoritarian positions have several existing measures. Initially, authoritarianism was measured using the F-Scale and more recently right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale (see Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988). Both of these scales have over time met with significant criticism due to a host of conceptual and methodological problems (cf. Feldman 2003). For instance, the F-scale introduced by Adorno and colleagues suffered from sample selection (e.g. memberships in formal organizations) and invariant question formulation leading to acquiescence response set bias (see Cronbach 1946, Campbell, Siegelman and Rees 1967). Altemeyer's (1988, 1996) *right-wing authoritarianism* scale improves on the methodological problems of Adorno and colleagues, but items used in the scale's construction often quite clearly resemble the very attitudes it aims to explain, such as attitudes towards homosexuals and immigrants (see Kinder and Kam, 2010; Feldman, 2003; Stenner 2005).

Also conservatism is not easily operationalized. A classic measure of conservatism asks respondents to place themselves on the scale from liberal to conservative. Such a measure, however, is equivalent to, or at the very least, shares the same disadvantages as, the simple left/right self-placement question (see above). A more sensitive tool in assessing individuals' conservative positions is the 'Wilson-Patterson' conservatism scale (Wilson and Patterson 1968). Much like the F-scale and RWA, however, it too suffers from methodological and conceptual problems, and its updated set of questions probe respondents' opinion on salient political issues

such as abortion, gay rights, multiculturalism, and migration (cf. Henningham, 1996). This is problematic because such measures of conservatism and authoritarianism are bound to be correlated, even as the foregoing discussion illustrated their distinctiveness. If the conservative and authoritarian positions are indeed rooted in two distinct predispositions (resistance to change versus resistance to diversity), they cannot be measured using overlapping attitudinal questions.

As an alternative approach to capturing these predispositions, I rely on Schwartz's (1992) basic human values scale administered in the ESS. This set of questions probes individuals' values, including the significance respondents place on rules, obedience, equality, and the preservation of the status quo. The validity and reliability of any measure across contexts is always questionable. Extensive empirical testing, however, show that Schwartz's 21-item abbreviated scale holds up to use in cross-national analyses of values, attitudes, and behavior (see Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008). Moreover, this basic values scale has been included in every ESS wave, and thus has a significant spatial and temporal coverage. In other words, Schwartz's value scale allows measurement of the two ideological predisposition of interest, while not relying on salient socio-political opinions. Further, it has an advantage of relative empirical reliability and spatially/temporally consistent coverage.

### ***Authoritarian Predisposition***

Responding to the problems with existing authoritarian measures, scholars converged on a set of childrearing questions to capture the essence of authoritarian predisposition, a method Kinder calls "disarmingly straightforward" (2012, 431k). This conception of authoritarianism is isolated from policy opinions and instead measures fundamental values – individuals' preferences between personal autonomy and social cohesion (Stenner 2005).

The childrearing survey items ask respondents to indicate a quality most desirable in a child (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). The most common short-scale version asks questions about individual's preference between independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners, obedience or self-reliance, and being considerate or well behaved (e.g. ANES 2004). The validity and reliability of this childrearing scale has been shown in a large body of empirical research (cf. Stenner 2005, Kinder and Kam, 2010, Feldman 2003). The ESS does not ask childrearing questions, however, the abbreviated Schwartz's basic values inventory, asks questions directly corresponding to these items. I extract four relevant items from the basic values inventory contained in ESS. It asks respondents if the statement sounds "very much like me" (1) or "not like me at all" (6), with a range in between. The first three items display close correspondence to the childrearing questions, while the fourth asks about the preference for governmental authority associated with authoritarianism:

1. Important to do what is told and follow rules
2. Important to behave properly
3. Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention to oneself
4. Important that government is strong and ensures safety

To construct the Authoritarianism scale, these items were reverse coded, added and transformed to vary from 0 to 1. The resulting scale shows Cronbah's alpha of 0.66, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Kinder and Kam, 2010; Stenner, 2005).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> I replicate the analyses with authoritarian scale using only the first three items and find it consistent with the results of our main analysis (see Table A3 in the Online Appendix).

### ***Conservative Predisposition***

As outlined above, a conception of conservatism as a predisposition is defined by a psychological need for certainty which results in the need to reduce the threat presented by change and resistance to equality (Jost et al., 2007). Schwartz's basic values scale asks questions related to attitudes toward new, different, and adventurous things in life as well as desirable level of social equality. It asks respondents if the statement sounds "very much like me" (1) to "not like me at all" (6), with a range in between. Four items are of particular relevance:

1. Important to think new ideas and being creative
2. Important to try new and different things in life
3. Important to seek adventures and have an exiting life
4. Important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities

In construction of the Conservative predisposition scale, these items were reverse coded, added and transformed to vary from 0 to 1. This scale shows internal consistency score of Cronbach's alpha equal to 0.59. Previous studies document significant differences between authoritarian and conservative predispositions (Stenner 2006, Kinder and Kam, 2010). Indeed, in the ESS data, conservative and authoritarian predispositions cannot be considered as capturing the same individual level variation, as they are only weakly and negatively correlated at  $r = -0.066$ .

Since conservative predisposition is composed of two value components – *resistance to change* and *anti-egalitarianism* – in a final step of the analysis, I disaggregate this ideological predisposition to ascertain which element, if any, drives the conservative association with welfare attitudes. There are good reasons to expect that anti-egalitarian rather than resistance to change should figure more strongly into natives' welfare attitudes. I measure *anti-egalitarianism* by separating the question about the importance of people being treated equally from the above

conservative predisposition scale. The remaining three questions are scaled to measure *resistance to change* predisposition (Cronbach's alpha of 0.66).


### ***Control Variables***

As a theoretically fundamental control, I include respondents' ideological self-placements on a 0 to 1 left/right scale<sup>16</sup>, where higher values denote rightward identification. To verify that the authoritarian and conservative predispositions are not coterminous with the one-dimensional left/right ideology scale, in Figure 3, I plot the mean of both ideological predisposition across the values of the left/right scale. The sample includes all EU-15 and EFTA countries included in 2002 European Social Survey. In general, the mean authoritarian and conservative predispositions increase as one moves rightward on the left/right scale. This association is, however, weak, which is confirmed by weak correlation between the both predispositions and the left-right orientation(see figure 3).

Remaining individual level control variables are standard in the literature on welfare and immigration attitudes (see van der Waal et al. 2010). *Age of a respondent*, measured in years, accounts for the finding that older individuals are, on average, more supportive of redistributive programs and more sensitive to perceived threats from immigration. I also control for the highest level of *Education*, measured in five ordinal categories, which captures individual insulation from economic threat of immigration, enjoyed by those better educated. Better-educated individuals are also more likely to comprehend the economic causes of migration and labor market demand for cheap labor. Additionally, education may proxy for the level of cosmopolitan attitudes associated with a more positive perception of immigrants and immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; van der Waal et al. 2010).

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<sup>16</sup> Transformed from the original 11-point scale



Mean values plotted across the range of Left/Right self-placement in 2002 ESS survey. Conservative and authoritarian predispositions are correlated at  $r = -0.03$  with each other and at  $r = 0.076$  and  $r = 0.115$  with left/right respectively; EU-15 and EFTA countries only.

**Figure 3.3.** Mean national levels of authoritarian and conservative predispositions

I further include two dummy variables, *female* coded 1 and 0 for male, and *unemployed* coded 1 if the respondent is out of work and 0 otherwise. Females are, on average, more supportive of welfare programs, while the unemployed hold a greater stake in redistributive schemes and are more likely to see immigrants as labor competition. Finally, *unemployed* dummy and household *income*<sup>17</sup>, captures how dependent a respond is on welfare programs and consequently how likely one is to perceive immigrant welfare consumption as direct competition.

The main theoretical argument of this paper develops a more complete model of welfare chauvinist attitudes by proposing a two-dimensional operationalization of ideological predispositions and their interaction with the immigration context. First, I analyze support for

<sup>17</sup> 12-categories of income were recorded for 2002, 2004, and 2006 waves. In 2008 and 2010 the top-three categories were collapsed into one effectively recording income in deciles. To assure cross-wave comparability I collapse the top three categories into one for the first three waves.

redistribution as it is shaped by ideological predispositions (Model 2 and 3). Next, I perform analogous analyses, focusing on the perception of immigrant welfare participation (Models 6 and 7). Finally, models 4 and 8 estimate the effects of cross-level interaction terms between individual ideological predispositions and the presence of immigrants for support for welfare (Model 4) and perception of immigrant welfare participation (Model 8).

Given the form of the data, I employ a multilevel model where native individuals are nested within their country-wave. The equations are estimated using linear models with random intercepts for each country-wave in the sample. The basic model is represented by the following set of equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Welfare Attitude}_{ij} = & \beta_{0j} + \beta_{01}(\text{Employment})_{ij} + \beta_{02}(\text{Education})_{ij} + \beta_{03}(\text{Age})_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{04}(\text{Female})_{ij} + \beta_{05}(\text{Income})_{ij} + \beta_{06}(\text{Left/Right})_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{07}(\text{Authoritarian Pred.})_{ij} + \beta_{08}(\text{Conservative Pred.})_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

Where the  $\beta_{0j}$  is the second level intercept estimate with country-wave covariates:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}(\% \text{ Foreign Born})_j + \mu_{0j}$$

Across these models,  $\beta_{0j}$  is the mean level of the dependent variable in each country wave  $j$ , where  $\beta_{0j}$  is estimated by % foreign born. The country-wave error term is captured in  $\mu_{0j}$ , while the individual level error is indicated by  $\varepsilon_{ij}$ .

## Findings and Discussion

The results of my analyses are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports results from the models analyzing support for redistribution, starting with the intercept only model (1) to the fully—specified cross—level interaction model (4). Table 3 reports analogous models for the perception of immigrant welfare participation.

**Table 3.1.** Support for Redistribution: ideological predispositions  $\times$  immigrant presence.

| <i>Individual-level</i>                             | (1)                | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Unemployed  |                    | 0.128**<br>(0.016)  | 0.163**<br>(0.018)  | 0.163**<br>(0.018)  |
| Highest level of education                          |                    | -0.064**<br>(0.003) | -0.070**<br>(0.003) | -0.070**<br>(0.003) |
| Age of respondent                                   |                    | 0.002**<br>(0.000)  | 0.003**<br>(0.000)  | 0.003**<br>(0.000)  |
| Female  |                    | 0.137**<br>(0.007)  | 0.146**<br>(0.007)  | 0.146**<br>(0.007)  |
| Income  |                    | -0.045**<br>(0.002) | -0.048**<br>(0.002) | -0.049**<br>(0.002) |
| Left/Right Orientation                              |                    | -1.154**<br>(0.017) | -1.260**<br>(0.018) | -1.259**<br>(0.018) |
| Conservative Predisposition                         |                    | -0.235**<br>(0.021) | -0.207**<br>(0.024) | -0.118**<br>(0.058) |
| Authoritarian Predisposition                        |                    | 0.484**<br>(0.020)  | 0.453**<br>(0.022)  | 0.427**<br>(0.054)  |
| <i>Country-level &amp; Cross-Level Interactions</i> |                    |                     |                     |                     |
| % Foreign-Born                                      |                    |                     | 0.003<br>(0.006)    | 0.004<br>(0.007)    |
| GDP/Capita  |                    |                     | -0.000**<br>(0.000) | -0.000**<br>(0.000) |
| Conservative X % Foreign-Born                       |                    |                     |                     | -0.008*<br>(0.005)  |
| Authoritarian X % Foreign-Born                      |                    |                     |                     | 0.003<br>(0.005)    |
| Constant  | 3.737**<br>(0.086) | 4.433**<br>(0.065)  | 4.581**<br>(0.112)  | 4.565**<br>(0.105)  |
| $\rho$ (ICC)  | 0.101              | 0.048               | 0.054               | 0.042               |
| Chi-squared   | 0.000              | 0.000               | 0.000               | 0.000               |
| Survey Wave Fixed Effects                           | ✓                  | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| N (Country-wave)                                    | 126624(76)         | 84907(71)           | 70303(63)           | 70303(63)           |

\*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1 two-tailed test; Coefficients obtained from hierarchical models with random intercepts

for country-wave (standard errors in parentheses). NOTE: Outcome: “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.” Higher values on the outcome variables indicate higher support for the statement.



To facilitate interpretation of the results of the hypotheses testing, I construct two figures. Figure 4 focuses on authoritarian predisposition, showing its direct and conditional effects on support for welfare and the perception of immigrant welfare participation, while holding continuous covariates at their mean and categorical at mode values. Figure 5 shows analogous effects for the conservative predisposition. The top panels of figures 4 and 5 demonstrate model-based predictions of support for redistribution (left panels) and the perception of immigrant welfare consumption (right panels) across observed values of ideological predispositions. The bottom panels show how these effects vary across context with different levels of immigrant presence.

#### ***Direct Effect of Conservative and Authoritarian Predispositions on Support for Welfare***

H1a and H1b expressed the expectation that the individuals with a Conservative predisposition will display a lower level of support for redistribution as an agent of undesirable equality, while the Authoritarian-predisposed will express moderate support for such programs as they promote desirable unity and decrease social differences among the native ingroup. The data from 5-wave ESS survey for EU-15 states strongly support this proposition (Models 2 and 3). As expected, natives who hold higher levels of conservative predisposition tend to report lower support for redistribution. More surprisingly, although in the predicted direction, there is a relatively strong, positive association between authoritarian values and support for redistribution. These effects can be seen in the top left panels of figures 4 and 5. These results indicate that while the conservative predisposition is always negatively related to welfare support, when isolating redistributive mechanism from questions of diversity, authoritarians may in fact be quite in favor of difference—reducing welfare.

### ***Ideological Predispositions and Immigrant Welfare Participation***

The data also provide support for the more ‘conventional-wisdom’ hypotheses (H2a and H2b), which argued that both right-wing predispositions—conservative and authoritarian—should display negative perceptions of immigrant welfare participation (Models 6 and 7). Individuals on the right of the political spectrum espouse a negative perception of immigrant welfare consumption, as this attitude harnesses both individuals’ stance towards redistribution and immigration related opinions. Though both predispositions are driven by different motivational mechanisms (opposition to equality vs. dislike of diversity) their effects are in the same positive direction and can be seen in top right panels of figures 4 and 5.

The analysis of direct effects provides an interesting picture, in that those commonly associated with the right-wing can hold quite diverse attitudes. A conservative predisposition leads people to oppose redistribution and hold negative views of immigrant welfare consumption since any form of redistribution is an objectionable change and a challenge to the status quo. Authoritarians display a more complex duality. While they are more likely to support redistribution as a part of scheme reducing social differences and promoting uniformity, they also hold strong negative views of immigrant participation in welfare institutions. This is not surprising, since immigrants constitute “diversity,” accessing benefits meant for the ingroup, which may be seen as allowing diversity to take hold, and indeed, increase (e.g. Boeri 1999, 2010). In sum, those on the right, regardless of their particular dispositional differences, are likely to express a negative perception of immigrants’ interaction with the host state’s welfare system, but depending on their particular predisposition (authoritarian or conservative), these same individuals vary in their support or opposition to redistribution in general.

**Table 3.2.** Immigrant welfare participation: ideological predispositions × immigrant residence.

| <i>Individual-level</i>                                    | (5)                | (6)                 | (7)                 | (8)                 |
|--|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Unemployed   |                    | 0.180**<br>(0.056)  | 0.201**<br>(0.061)  | 0.203**<br>(0.061)  |
| Highest level of education                                 |                    | -0.144**<br>(0.009) | -0.146**<br>(0.010) | -0.145**<br>(0.010) |
| Age of respondent  |                    | -0.004**<br>(0.001) | -0.004**<br>(0.001) | -0.004**<br>(0.001) |
| Female   |                    | 0.063**<br>(0.022)  | 0.051**<br>(0.024)  | 0.051**<br>(0.024)  |
| Income   |                    | -0.019**<br>(0.005) | -0.020**<br>(0.006) | -0.020**<br>(0.006) |
| Left/Right Orientation                                     |                    | 1.137**<br>(0.056)  | 1.164**<br>(0.059)  | 1.163**<br>(0.059)  |
| Conservative Predisposition                                |                    | 0.586**<br>(0.071)  | 0.578**<br>(0.075)  | 0.725**<br>(0.180)  |
| Authoritarian Predisposition                               |                    | 0.979**<br>(0.067)  | 0.916**<br>(0.071)  | 0.409**<br>(0.168)  |
| <b><i>Country-level &amp; Cross-Level Interactions</i></b> |                    |                     |                     |                     |
| % Foreign-Born   |                    |                     | 0.011<br>(0.015)    | -0.014<br>(0.014)   |
| GDP/Capita   |                    |                     | -0.000<br>(0.000)   | -0.000**<br>(0.000) |
| Conservative X % Foreign-Born                              |                    |                     |                     | -0.015<br>(0.016)   |
| Authoritarian X % Foreign-Born                             |                    |                     |                     | 0.049**<br>(0.015)  |
| Constant   | 5.802**<br>(0.162) | 5.074**<br>(0.156)  | 5.341**<br>(0.231)  | 5.604**<br>(0.198)  |
| $\rho$ (ICC)   | 0.051              | 0.030               | 0.028               | 0.012               |
| Chi-squared  | 0.000              | 0.000               | 0.000               | 0.000               |
| Survey Wave Fixed Effects                                  | ✓                  | ✓                   | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| N (Country-wave)   | 49557(31)          | 32742(27)           | 28341(24)           | 28341(24)           |

\*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1 two-tailed test; Coefficients obtained from hierarchical models with random intercepts

for country-wave (standard errors in parentheses). NOTE: Outcome: “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out.” Higher values on the outcome variables indicate perception that immigrants take out more.

### ***Ideological Predispositions and Immigrant Presence***

Beyond the direct effects of ideological predispositions, the theoretical model specifies that ideological dispositions interact with contextual conditions, which appeal to these dispositions. The argument specified that the direct effect ideological predispositions have on welfare attitudes should be more pronounced in a higher immigration context. These expectations were expressed in two-part hypotheses 3a and 3b, in which the first part refers to general support for redistribution and the second to immigrant welfare consumption.


In model 4, I find support for the first part of hypothesis 3a. The conservative predisposition has a negative association with support for redistribution, and this association is stronger in higher immigration contexts. In contrast, I do not find support for the first part of hypothesis 3b. Authoritarian predisposition displays predicted positive association with support for redistribution, but this relationship does not change in higher immigration contexts. In other words, conservatives report lower support for redistribution and higher proportion of immigrants strengthens this negative association. Authoritarians support redistribution in general but this positive association is neither undermined nor strengthened in higher immigration contexts.

Model 8, examines how natives perceive immigrant welfare participation. Findings reveal that conservatively predisposed negatively perceive of immigrant welfare consumption, but this association does not seem to be sensitive to the proportion of immigrants in the context (second part of hypothesis 3a). In contrast, the authoritarian predisposition has a predicted positive association with a negative perception of immigrant welfare participation, and this effect is substantially bolstered by larger immigrant presence (second part of hypothesis 3b).

These results are illustrated in figures 4 and 5, which show the direct and conditional effects of authoritarian and conservative predispositions respectively. First looking at

authoritarian predispositions (figure 4), we see the direct effects of the authoritarian predisposition based on models 3 and 7. These positive associations can be compared to the bottom panels, presenting the marginal effects – or how the effect of authoritarian predisposition changes as % Foreign Born increases (models 4 and 8). For authoritarians the negative perception of immigrant welfare consumption increases by about one-third standard deviation for a 15-percentage-points increase in immigrant group size (bottom-right panel of figure 4). Immigrant presence does not influence authoritarian support for redistribution as is evident by large confidence bounds of a statistically not significant association (bottom-left panel). This illustrates that authoritarian support for redistribution does not seem to depend on the proportion of immigrants in the context. These results are not entirely surprising. Given the anti-diversity predisposition of authoritarian individuals, it is entirely feasible that the effect of diversity (% Foreign born) is present for the question referencing the immigrant outgroup directly and not for the more general welfare statement.

The top panels of figure 5 show strong direct negative effects of conservative predisposition on support for redistribution (left) and positive effects on negative view of immigrants' welfare consumption (right). The bottom left panel of Figure 5 illustrates that the conservatively predisposed further reduce their support for redistribution in face of larger immigrant groups.



NOTE: The plots display predicted (y-axis) support for welfare (left column) and perception of immigrant welfare participation (right column) across respondents' authoritarian predispositions. The bottom two panels present these effects conditional across the range of immigrants' presence (x-axis). Effects calculated from Models 3 (top left), 7 (top right), 4 (bottom left) and 8 (bottom right). Shaded areas indicate a 95% confidence bound of model prediction.

**Figure 3.4.** Authoritarian Predisposition, Immigrant Presence and Welfare Chauvinist Attitudes


This is understandable since conservatives perceive redistribution as an undesirable change towards equality and the presence of benefits-consuming outsiders only reinforces their opposition. Conservatively-predisposed also hold rather negative perceptions of immigrant welfare participation. As the bottom-right panel of figure 5 shows, this sentiment does not seem to depend on the proportion of immigrants in their context (see model 8).

In sum, the ideological predispositions of native individuals are associated with welfare attitudes, and this relationship is strengthened in the presence of immigrants. Specifically, conservatives are more likely to oppose redistribution, while authoritarians view it more approvingly. For conservatives, this relationship is stronger in contexts with a higher proportion of immigration. Moreover, both the conservative- and authoritarian-predisposed perceive immigrant welfare participation in negative terms, but a larger immigrant presence only strengthens this effect for those with an authoritarian predisposition.

Control variables perform in line with extant literature. The unemployed are more likely to support redistribution and are on average more likely to perceive immigrants as consuming more than contributing. Those with a higher level of education and income are less likely to support redistribution. Higher educated are also more likely to see immigrants as strong net consumers of welfare. Female respondents are more supportive of redistribution, and on average, hold more equitable perception of immigrant welfare participation.

As expected, it seems that support for redistribution and a negative view of immigrants welfare participation increases with respondents' age. Also as expected, those on the right of the standard left/right political spectrum see immigrants as consuming more and do not support redistributive programs. Finally, I find that in wealthier countries (GDP/capita), people are less supportive of redistribution on average, but also hold a less negative view of immigrants' use of

such resources. These results hold when I add an additional contextual control, % *unemployed* (see appendix 3).



NOTE: The plots display predicted (y-axis) support for welfare (left column) and perception of immigrant welfare participation (right column) across respondents' conservative predispositions. The bottom two panels present these effects conditional across the range of immigrants' presence (x-axis). Effects calculated from Models 3 (top left), 7 (top right), 4 (bottom left) and 8 (bottom right). Shaded areas indicate a 95% confidence bound of model prediction.

**Figure 3.5.** Conservative Predisposition, Immigrant Presence and Welfare Chauvinist Attitudes



### ***Conservative Predisposition - Status-Quo or Anti-Egalitarianism***

Finally, it may be instructive to consider which part of conservative predisposition does most of the heavy lifting. As defined by Jost and colleagues (2003, 339) “[t]he core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality [...]” When considering welfare attitudes, it is important to examine whether both elements influence welfare attitudes evenly, and if not, to which element can we attribute the findings related to conservative predisposition. Therefore, the next step is to reanalyze the main models, separating values related to *anti-egalitarian* and *status-quo* elements of conservative predisposition.

In table 3, we see that the two elements of conservative predisposition have different effects on welfare attitudes. First, resistance to change has a positive and significant association with general support for welfare, but this association is weaker in contexts with higher proportion of immigrants. Further, this preference for *status quo* does not have a statistically significant association with a negative perception of immigrant welfare participation. Thus, *resistance to change* returns direct association opposite to that reported for conservative predisposition (see tables 1 and 2). However, its effect conditional on % foreign born is similar to the conditional effect reported for conservative predisposition (in table 1). Importantly, these results suggest that those who resist change may actually be positively predisposed to redistributive system in place, or at the minimum, see its reduction as clashing with their dispositional need to preserve the *status quo*.

**Table 3.3.** Unpacking conservative predisposition: anti-egalitarianism and resistance to change

|                                       | Support for<br>Redistribution |                     | Negative View of Immigrant<br>Welfare Participation |                     |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|
| Authoritarian Predisposition (0-1)    | 0.327**<br>(0.023)            | 0.327**<br>(0.023)  | 1.133**<br>(0.072)                                  | 1.138**<br>(0.072)  |
| Resistance to Change                  | 0.027**<br>(0.005)            | 0.061**<br>(0.013)  | -0.016<br>(0.017)                                   | -0.044<br>(0.040)   |
| Anti-Egalitarianism                   | -0.118**<br>(0.004)           | -0.126**<br>(0.009) | 0.233**<br>(0.012)                                  | 0.290**<br>(0.029)  |
| % Foreign-Born                        | 0.003<br>(0.004)              | 0.001<br>(0.005)    | 0.012<br>(0.013)                                    | 0.023**<br>(0.012)  |
| Resistance to Change X % Foreign-Born |                               | -0.003**<br>(0.001) |   | 0.003<br>(0.004)    |
| Anti-Egalitarianism X % Foreign-Born  |                               | 0.001<br>(0.001)    |   | -0.005**<br>(0.003) |
| Constant                              | 4.369**<br>(0.133)            | 4.388**<br>(0.135)  | 4.999**<br>(0.427)                                  | 4.870**<br>(0.338)  |
| Rho                                   | .025                          | .026                | .022  | .013                |
| Prob > chi2                           | 0.000                         | 0.000               | 0.000   | 0.000               |
| N(country-wave)                       | 70060(55)                     | 70060(55)           | 28258(22)   | 28258(22)           |

\*\* p<0.05; control variables not shown, full model results presented in Table A2 in the appendix.

In contrast, those natives holding anti-egalitarian positions are less likely to support redistribution and are more likely to negatively perceive immigrant participation, a result reflecting the association reported for *conservative predisposition* in tables 1 and 2. Crucially, the results of interactions in table 3 show that anti-egalitarian natives in contexts with a higher immigrant presence moderate their negative view of immigrant welfare participation. In contrast, their general support for redistribution does not seem to vary with immigrant presence. While this may seem counterintuitive, one has to note that this effect is very small and that anti-egalitarians are not necessarily anti-immigrant, and may thus moderate their negative view of immigrants if exposed to them in larger numbers (cf. Wagner et al. 2006, Van Oorschott 2008).

In sum, it seems that the direct effect conservative predisposition has on natives' welfare attitudes is largely due to the *anti-egalitarian* values conservative-predisposed individual hold,

and not the *resistance to change*. This is not surprising since redistributive questions are, in essence, about the promotion of equality rather than change to the status quo. However, the conditional effect of conservative predisposition and % *Foreign-Born* on welfare attitudes seems to reflect both – *resistance to change* and *anti-egalitarian* – conservative dispositions. Support for redistribution seems to be declining among status-quo oriented natives as the % *foreign born* increases. In contrast, the negative view of immigrant welfare participation seems to be lower for *anti-egalitarians* in high % *foreign-born* contexts.

## **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have introduced a two-dimensional model of ideological predispositions to the question of natives' welfare attitudes. Focusing on the conservative predisposition (concerned primarily with change and equality) and the authoritarian predisposition (concerned primarily with diversity), I outlined an explanation for welfare chauvinist attitudes, which typify the politics of 'new liberal dilemma.' By combining these two ideological predispositions with the contextual presence of immigrants, I model attitudes that combine leftward expressions of support for redistribution with a right-wing negative view of immigrants. The results strongly suggest that contemporary political attitudes are more complex than the classic one-dimensional ideology model would allow.

While puzzling, welfare chauvinist attitudes are thus not aberrations, but rather a systematic outcome of varying predispositions distributed across conservative and authoritarian dimensions. It seems that the dynamic character of the new liberal dilemma may be well captured by the multidimensional ideological predispositions. First, those who display stronger conservative predispositions are, in general, opposed to redistribution and will likely favor less,

not more, redistribution. Moreover, in contexts where immigration is higher, this opposition will be stronger—partly conforming to the mechanism of welfare state decline (e.g. Crepaz 2008, Larsen 2011). Second, those holding authoritarian predispositions are actually likely to support redistribution, which increases sameness and decreases social cleavages – and this effect is unchanged even where immigrant presence is higher. However, authoritarian predisposed also express a strongly negative view of immigrant welfare participation, and immigrant presence increases this negative perspective.

In general, the results strongly suggest that contemporary welfare attitudes are more complex than the classic one-dimensional model would allow, as they display a clear two-dimensional distribution. In particular, focusing on predispositions rather than expressed political opinions allowed the construction of models predicting specific political attitudes as products of deeply held ideological values. Additionally, I showed that predispositions of individuals are sensitive to the presence of immigrants (new diversity), who create a perceived threat to the status quo and who increase diversity. In this sense, the model captured how individual dispositional differences (conservative and authoritarian predispositions) interact with contextual threats (presence of immigrants) to shape the complex welfare attitudes of contemporary Europeans.

It is important to note that these results should not be surprising based on what we know about conservative and authoritarian predispositions. First, the effect of an immigrant presence on welfare attitudes is stronger when redistributive questions mention immigrants specifically. Such ‘double-barreled’ questions may conflate, resistance to immigration and redistribution mobilizing both economic and cultural predispositions (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2004). Second,

present results also suggest that the authoritarian-predisposed—those likely to hold stronger anti-diversity views—are especially sensitive to immigrant presence.

My theoretical and empirical model holds promise for future research. Modeling individual level differences in ideological positions based on value-predispositions, rather than salient political opinions, allows researchers to reclaim multidimensional ideology as an explanatory factor in studies explaining salient public opinions and attitudes. This method avoids placing attitudes-based ideological measures and expressed welfare or immigration attitudes on both sides of the analytic equation. For instance, the economic scale, in two-dimensional models of ideology, was frequently operationalized by using questions about support for redistribution (e.g. Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2008, Kriesi et al. 2008, Bakker et al. 2012). Obviously, a measure of economic position cannot be used in turn to explain individuals' support for the welfare system. Relying on antecedents of ideological opinions allows us to bring ideology back into the analyses of socio-economic opinions.

The socio-political implications of this chapter suggest that the public support for the heralded process of welfare state decline is far from certain. For instance, I have shown that natives holding right-wing values have quite different positions on welfare state support. In particular, it seems that those who hold culturally right-wing positions (authoritarians) are actually relatively supportive of the general redistributive schemes, even when facing a significant non-native, immigrant presence. In contrast, status-quo conservatives resist redistribution and this resistance is stronger in states with higher immigrant presence. At minimum, the support for redistribution faces two opposing forces within the 'right-wing' predisposed population. This perhaps explains why despite ongoing political challenges to the welfare state, the system is showing remarkable resilience across Western Europe. In other

words, the European public remains divided over the issue of redistributive support, and this division may actually create a lock-in for the existing redistributive schemes.

Moreover, the fact that those on the right are themselves divided over support for the system suggests that political parties on the right are facing an uneasy choice in their economic platforms, risking alienation of anti-egalitarian voters if their support for welfare is too strong, while simultaneously risking the alienation of authoritarian predisposed supporters if the system promoting social cohesion is too forcefully challenged. Walking this tightrope may be why scholars and pundits observe that the right-flank of party space in Western Europe is increasingly two-dimensional (cf. Mudde 2007, Rovny 2014). Thus, rather than balancing the two positions within one party, there is an increasing diversity of right-wing parties, which assume contrasting positions on economic and cultural issues. These implications also conform to recent observations that populist radical right parties blur their economic position in an effort to attract voters broadly distributed on the economic spectrum, but united by concern over immigration.

The study, however, also illustrates that the right wing is united in their negative perception of immigrant welfare participation. Additionally, immigrant presence seems to exacerbate this negative view for culturally right-wing (authoritarians) and economically right-wing (anti-egalitarians) natives. In other words, while the popular support for redistributive schemes may be a divisive issue on the right, the view that immigrants are substantial net consumers of state resources may actually result in political mobilization to restrict non-native access to the welfare system. The welfare chauvinism, it seems, has a fertile ground for becoming an important political platform, and thus signals a potential for momentous change to the universal welfare institutions of the Western European states.

Finally, taken together the findings shed some light on recent developments in party competition, whereby parties from seemingly opposing sides of left/right spectrum embrace fundamentally similar programmatic ideas. For instance, UKIP and Liberal Democrats in England seem to be sharing similar positions, especially those related to economic and social issues (Ford and Goodwin 2014). These parties compete for the support of voters, which, while divergently self-identified on the left/right spectrum, share some of the predispositions and react to situational threats (immigration) in a similar fashion. Along these lines, recent research suggests that the importance of the cultural ideological dimension is increasing and even surpassing that of the economic dimension (De Vries et al., 2013). This foretells more tension in European politics as both immigration presence and their participation in welfare system is likely to increase.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE RADICAL RIGHT'S CATCHALL POSITION:

#### A PARTY AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL TEST OF THE 'NEW WINNING FORMULA.'

“...no intellectual position is likely to become obsolete quite so rapidly as one that takes current empirical capability as the limit of the possible [...].” Converse (1964)

In May 2013, Swiss people voted in a referendum to impose a quota on EU job seekers, undoing an open labor market association established years earlier. In June of that year, a referendum making asylum seeking a more restrictive process passed with over 80% of national vote. Subsequently in August, several Swiss cities moved to restrict asylum-seekers from accessing public places such as swimming pools, libraries, and even churches. These radical policy changes were spearheaded by the Swiss People's Party (SVP)— a populist radical right (PRR), which won the most votes of any party in the four previous Swiss federal elections.

Such political realities are not unique to Switzerland. Over the course of the last decade and a half, electoral successes of anti-immigrant parties and their agendas can be observed across Western Europe. Capitalizing on popular sentiments, these right-wing movements often influence public policy, either participating in government directly (e.g. Switzerland, Austria) or setting agenda for governments led by more mainstream parties (e.g. Denmark, England, and the Netherlands), which have to grapple with the public concern over the “immigration problem.” Their emergence has not only pushed policy agenda toward more anti-immigrant policies, it has




also significantly affected structure of the party systems across Europe (cf. Kitschelt 2007) (Mudde 2013; Norris 2005).

These processes have stimulated an impressive body of research seeking to explain PRR success. The explanations examined individual-level predictors of support for these parties (Van Der Brug and Fennema 2007; Lucassen and Lubbers 2011; Swyngedouw 2001) and contextual level factors from economic conditions and immigrant presence to the type of electoral system (Bale 2003; Van Der Brug 2005). This study first explores the variation in the radical right success by focusing on the ideological positions these parties assume (supply-side), and then examines how these ideological positions relate to the (demand-side) ideological values of voters.

The question of radical-right electoral successes cannot be accounted for only by support of citizens who are radically right-wing themselves. This is illustrated in figure 1. The bars illustrate the proportion of PRR voters from each category of the 11-point ideological left/right scale. Not surprisingly, the proportion of votes supporting radical right wing parties increases along with right-wing orientation. Figure 1, however, also illustrates the crux of this study's puzzle: that individuals located in the center and right-off-center (5-7) constitute a very significant (about 41%) voting base of all the PRR voters. While it is true that right-wing citizens are more likely to vote for PRR parties, it also seems that the largest proportion of PRR voters do not identify themselves as extreme right-wing. The implications of this graph are clear: the success (and failure) of the radical right wing cannot be explained without a theory accounting for the strong support among these ideologically "moderate" voters.

This observation is not entirely unfounded. Mudde (2013) notes that nativist sentiments are widespread among the Western European public, which can explain why some mainstream parties assume more right-wing, anti-immigrant positions (e.g. UK's *Conservative* or Danish

*Venstre* parties). Simultaneously, Kitschelt (2007) and de Lange (2007) argue that PRR parties have persisted in the political arena alongside established mainstream parties because of the center drift of their economic positions.



Source: *European Social Surveys 2002-2010*; PRR parties selected following Mudde (2007, 2014); bars report proportion of self-identified radical right-wing voters across self-placement on a L/R ideological orientation.

**Figure 4.1.** Ideological orientation of the populist radical right voters

I build on Kitschelt's (2007) and Mudde's (2007) analysis of the contemporary radical right and suggests that this economic center move is not only contributing to the persistence, but can also explain the variation in the electoral successes of PRRs across countries. I argue that the parties who embrace 'populist radical right's catchall' position – a economic ideological position that is moderate in comparison to their strong right-wing cultural position – are more electorally successful in comparison to those PRR parties who hold both far-right economic and cultural positions (cf. de Lange 2007). Populist Radical Right benefit from this widespread 'demand' for

nativist policies by setting their socio-economic programs around the center of economic policy space and thus becoming more palatable to the mainstream voters concerned about immigration.

By assuming this ‘PRR catchall’ position, these parties address the common public concern over immigration – while not alienating more economically moderate voters. Moreover, I extend this insight to the individual level. I argue that in line with conventional wisdom, these parties should attract voters who are far-right in general. However, and this is less obvious, parties which assume PRR catchall position, will also attract voters who are in the economic-ideological center (and left—of—center), but favor a stronger emphasis on national cultural homogeneity.

This study begins with a general demand-side model of radical right support. Subsequently, I examine PRR party-ideological positions and develop predictions about how this supply-side factor can influence electoral success. Next, using three different operationalizations of individual’s ideological positions, I show that economically moderate voters are more likely to support populist radical right parties when these parties are perceived as holding the “PRR catchall’ position. Finally, the last section provides a discussion and conclusion of this study.

### **Radical-Right Success: Structural Pressures and Individual Differences**

The most common general model of radical right party support focuses on demand-side factors. Structural models of the rise of the PRR focus on the processes of globalization and regional integration. These processes challenge national economies by decreasing governments’ control over domestic commodity and labor markets, as well as increasing the salience of supra-national institutions and challenging dominant national identity (Koopmans 2010; Norris 2005). Radical right parties emerge by filling the demand of popular anxiety about economic adjustment, outsourcing, and immigration, which remain unaddressed by mainstream parties (W. Van Der

Brug 2005; Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt and McGann 1997). To capture these aggregate demand-side conditions, empirical studies often use general indicators of economic or social trends thought to be associated with globalization, such as the level of unemployment and proportion of immigrants.

The structural conditions, however, affect heterogeneous citizenry unevenly. Specifically, the change in structural conditions (unemployment, immigration) places citizens with lower levels of education and professional training at a disadvantage, as they find it hard to compete in the globalized skills-based economies. These same natives find themselves in competition with immigrants over scarce low-skill positions (Lubbers, Coenders, and Scheepers 2006; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Apart from the economic competition, globalization poses a potent challenge to the cultural identity of the natives. Those with lower levels of cultural capital perceive immigration – a symptom of globalization – as the root cause of the erosion of national identity (Koopmans, 2013; Norris, 2005; van der Waal et al. 2010). Globalization-threatened natives, termed “losers of modernization,” are more likely to support populist radical right parties, which base their programs on restricting immigration and promoting national self-esteem (Betz, 1993; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). These demand side models have proven useful in exploration of PRR support. However, they allow little agency for the parties themselves and cannot convincingly account for variation in the electoral success of PRRs, across states experiencing similar structural pressures. Complementing this approach are the supply-side theories, which consider how radical right parties capitalize on these economic and cultural challenges to gain electoral support.

## **The Ideological Profile of the Contemporary Radical Right**

Political parties' response to any economic and cultural change is inevitably cushioned within their ideological positions. Consequently, when examining the support for radical right parties, a logical place to start is with ideological positions of these parties and the ideological preferences of their voters. Under the classic single left/right model of ideology, PRRs receive support from voters identifying themselves on the far right of the left-right spectrum, as these 'radically-right wing' parties are presumably most proximate to such voters' positions. Indeed, left/right has been shown to be a good predictor of PRR voting (Betz, 1993; Falter & Schumann, 1988; Van Der Brug & Fennema, 2007). Previous studies, however, also find what can be gleaned from figure 1: an 'average' supporter of the PRR is not necessarily located on the extreme right of the left/right scale (e.g. Billet and De Witte, 1995). Therefore, a simple left/right scale may not capture a sizable portion of PRR voters (cf. Mudde, 2007). Additionally, one-dimensional ideology cannot account for individuals who identify as conservative but express preferences for socially-liberal policies (e.g. Ellis and Stimson 2012).<sup>18</sup> Consequently, the literature analyzing these parties' ideological programs has adopted at least two-dimensional model of ideology, including economic and cultural preferences (Hans-George Betz 1993; Kitschelt and McGann 1997).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The one-dimensional ideological conception cannot account for a difference between what individuals symbolically identify as (conservative, liberal) and their actual operational policy preferences (see Ellis and Stimson 2012).

<sup>19</sup> Several studies suggest additional dimensions: Bakker et al. (2012) find that European parties may also be placed on the pro/anti-European integration scale. Kriesi et al. (2006) suggests that the emergence of the new globalization dimension is now embedded into the existing two primary dimensions transforming their meaning.

**Table 4.1.** Ideological positions of populist radical right parties (2002-2010)

| Country                        | Year | Party Id | General L/R | GALTAN<br>(Cultural L/R) | Economic L/R    |
|--------------------------------|------|----------|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Austria                        | 2002 | FPO      | 8.63        | 9                        | 7.31            |
| Austria                        | 2006 | BZO      | 8.83        | 8.83                     | 6               |
| Austria                        | 2006 | FPO      | 9.67        | 9.67                     | 4.83            |
| Austria                        | 2010 | BZO      | 8.29        | 7.79                     | 7.29            |
| Austria                        | 2010 | FPO      | 8.93        | 8.71                     | 5               |
| Belgium                        | 2002 | VB       | 9.55        | 9.37                     | 7.9             |
| Belgium                        | 2006 | VB       | 9.67        | 9.5                      | 7.13            |
| Belgium                        | 2010 | FN-B     | 9.21        | 9.67                     | 8.45            |
| Belgium                        | 2010 | VB       | 9.86        | 9.6                      | 7.93            |
| Denmark                        | 2002 | DF       | 8.85        | 8.92                     | 6.08            |
| Denmark                        | 2006 | DF       | 7.67        | 7.63                     | 4.75            |
| Denmark                        | 2010 | DF       | 7.82        | 9.4                      | 5.45            |
| Finland*                       | 2006 | PS       | 6.3         | 7.64                     | 4.82            |
| Finland*                       | 2010 | PS       | 5.4         | 7.5                      | 4.3             |
| France                         | 2002 | FN       | 9.92        | 9.8                      | 6               |
| France                         | 2006 | FN       | 10          | 9.25                     | 6.63            |
| France                         | 2010 | FN       | 9.89        | 9.56                     | 6.5             |
| Greece                         | 2006 | LAOS     | 9.11        | 9.63                     | 5.33            |
| Greece                         | 2010 | LAOS     | 8.82        | 9.55                     | 5.91            |
| Italy                          | 2002 | LN       | 7.71        | 8.23                     | 7.28            |
| Italy                          | 2006 | LN       | 8.71        | 8.75                     | 8.14            |
| Italy                          | 2010 | LN       | 8.56        | 8.44                     | 7.33            |
| Netherlands                    | 2006 | PVV      | 8.8         | 6.57                     | 8.29            |
| Netherlands                    | 2010 | PVV      | 8.62        | 7.15                     | 5.23            |
| Sweden                         | 2010 | SD       | 8.38        | 8.25                     | 5.55            |
| UK*                            | 2006 | UKIP     | 8.44        | 8.13                     | 8.38            |
| UK                             | 2010 | BNP      | 9.93        | 9.53                     | 5.85            |
| UK*                            | 2010 | UKIP     | 8.79        | 7.62                     | 8.17            |
| Average Score (Std. Deviation) |      |          | <b>8.73</b> | <b>8.7 (0.8)</b>         | <b>6.49 (2)</b> |

Source: party list generated based on Mudde (2007, 2014); party placement based on expert party placement data

from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker 2012); \* parties not included in Mudde's (2007) lists, for details see

'Robustness Check' section below; \*\*calculated by subtracting economic left/right from the GALTAN score.

The first dimension captures the economic ideological attitude – preference for neo-liberal versus redistributive policies – and is sometimes referred to as socio-economic, socialist/laissez-faire. The second dimension captures socio-cultural position – preference for individual liberty versus social cohesion – and is referred to variously as authoritarian/libertarian,

materialist/post-materialist or GALTAN<sup>20</sup> (cf. Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Inglehart 1990; Kitschelt and McGann 1997).<sup>21</sup> This two-dimensional conception accounts for a greater heterogeneity of ideological positions and allows for more precise examination of party families and their voters (Kriesi et al. 2006; Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009).

Radical right parties are typically labeled by their cultural ideological position (Carter 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2013; Norris 2005). In particular, in contemporary European politics, the nativist ‘anti-immigrant’ stance is considered to be the key defining characteristic of this party family, which otherwise contains parties with quite diverse political programs (Ivarsflaten, 2007; Norris, 2005). It is this cultural ideological position, which attracts voters who are concerned about the impact of immigration on their home countries. For instance, Kitschelt notes that the radical right parties can embrace a variety of policies while maintaining the core “xenophobic mobilization against immigrants and insistence on a dominant national cultural paradigm [...]” (2007, 1178). Mudde (2007, 26-30) largely agrees, but also argues that the populist radical right parties are *nationalistic* and espouse a special anti-establishment *nativism*. Additionally, unlike their historical counterparts, these parties are at least nominally *democratic*. Therefore, they are interested in a successful electoral showing rather than subversion of the democratic process. This observation is non-trivial since apart from their cultural position, PRRs may also look to other political positions, which can maximize their electoral performance.

There is far less agreement on what this party family represents on the economic ideological dimension. Betz (1993) suggests that in terms of their economic program, these

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<sup>20</sup> Green/Alternative/Libertarian–Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (see Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002)

<sup>21</sup> The discussion of particular elements and existence of additional dimensions is ongoing (cf. De Lange 2007; Bakker et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2006)

parties are essentially pro-market neoliberal (cf. Kischelt 1995). Kitschelt observes that while the PRRs and their supporters are in general on the right (neo-liberal) side of the economic spectrum, they are neither extremely neo-liberal nor pro-redistributive (2007, p. 1184). Mudde draws a more definitive line, arguing that neoliberalism is “either not present or not central” in the radical right parties’ identity (2007, 30). In sum, unlike the well-defined stance on cultural homogeneity, the neoliberal economic position is not a consensus element of radical right-wing party family. Ultimately, the economic ideological characteristic of the PRRs can be verified empirically.

Table 1 presents the economic and cultural ideological positions of PRR parties based on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) cumulative data (Bakker et al. 2012). I list these parties following Mudde’s criteria (2007, chapter 2-3; see also Mudde, 2014).<sup>22</sup> It is important to note that this list does not contain all of Western European PRR parties. This is because CHES does not include non-EU countries such as Switzerland (*Swiss Peoples Party*) and Norway (*Progress Party*), or in some cases does not rate parties (e.g. German *Republicaner*, NDP). The CHES data do have a paramount advantage, as they combine the best of qualitative examinations of party ideology (expert party analyses) with a quantitative (average expert score) approach to party ideological placement.

Several insights can be gleaned from table 1. First, Populist Radical Right parties are rated very ‘right-wing’ on the GALTAN dimension (average score of 8.78). Second, these parties are considered by the experts to be more moderate (average score of 6.64) on the economic dimension. Third, there is much more variation in these parties’ economic (std. dev.= 2) than in cultural (std. dev.= 0.8) placements, suggesting that experts perceived greater variation in these parties economic platforms. Thus when examining ideological positions of the radical right wing

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<sup>22</sup> see footnote in table 1.



parties, one should keep in mind that their cultural and economic positions do not have to (and perhaps rarely do) correspond in terms of their right-ward orientation. Additionally, while the economic ideology of the PRR is not crucial to its classification within this party group, how the party economic position is perceived may be very important to its electoral success (cf. Kitschelt 2007).

### ***Ideological ‘Winning Formula(s)’ of Radical right parties***

Some promising work observed that recently successful new radical right parties are relatively ‘moderate’ – as compared to their authoritarian fascist predecessors (Cole 2005; Ignazi 1992). It is not entirely clear, however, which type of moderation leads to success. While the overt comparisons to German National Socialism or the Italian *Fasci* movement can undoubtedly be damaging, the variation in parties’ electoral successes cannot be attributed to the moderation of their socio-cultural political position. Indeed, when properly classified, these parties do not vary all that dramatically in their socio-cultural ideological positions (Kitschelt 2007, Mudde 2007, Rovny 2014; see also table 1).

Scholars, of course, also examined the variation in the economic positions of radical right parties. In a foundational contribution, Betz (1993) notes that successful radical right parties combine nativist and nationally-focused neo-liberal programs, addressing both economic and cultural concerns of the far-right electorate. Similarly, Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) argument classified radical right parties across two axes, developing four ideological types: fascist, populist anti-statist, welfare chauvinist, and the new radical right. They conclude that successful PRRs combine a culturally authoritarian position – strongly protective of the national group identity – with a stance promoting liberal-market policies as represented by the ‘new radical right’ category.

Over the last decade, these seminal works met with significant criticism, as scholars observed that liberal position on the redistributive question or economic protectionism are not necessary conditions for PRR to gain significant electoral support (Norris 2005, Carter 2005). In fact, several successful radical right parties embrace so-called welfare chauvinist programs supporting protection (if not expansion) of existing redistributive schemes (e.g. Freedom Party of Austria, Danish People Party). Crucially for these parties, the support for the existing welfare system is expressed by tying their economic position with their cultural orientation. In particular, these parties' 'pro-redistribution' positions are nearly always based in observation of immigrant welfare abuse which threatens natives' benefits. At a minimum, this indicates that while PRRs' cultural-nativist position is largely 'fixed' on the far-right, their economic position may vary, sometimes emphasizing neoliberalism, and other times, welfare chauvinism, or both, in a type of a 'schizophrenic economic agenda' (Mudde, 2007, 135; Plasser and Ulram n.d. 5; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007, 1182; Mudde 2007, 31).

Two recent advances in the examination of radical right wing parties chart the course for my argument. First, in an update to his original theory, Kitschelt (2007) suggests that, to assure their electoral maintenance, established PRRs might gravitate towards a relatively centrist economic position. This move is a deliberate attempt to signal moderation of their economic platform, while continuing to champion nativist cultural agenda. In three case studies, Sara de Lange (2007) empirically examines this claim, finding *some* support for the economic center movement hypothesis.

Second, Rovny (2014) suggests an alternative interpretation of this perceived center move. Examining the variation in PRRs' economic positions, he shows that, in the multidimensional ideological competition, radical right parties might actually intentionally

deemphasize or ‘blur’ their economic positions. This electoral strategy, thus, focuses electoral competition on the socio-cultural ideological dimension and intentionally blurs the economic position. My argument builds on this ‘observed’ move towards the economic center and develops the PRR catchall hypothesis while relying on a more precise definition of this party family (Mudde, 2007).

### **The Argument: Radical Right Catchall Position**

The argument asserts that electoral success is more likely if a party program assumes a ‘populist radical right catchall position’: a combination of a far-right position on cultural ideological issues, and a (comparatively) more moderate position on the economic ideological questions. In particular, parties that are perceived to present a more moderate economic position in relation to their far-right cultural position – be it due to the actual center positioning (Kitschelt 2007) or blurring (Rovny 2014) of their position – are more successful in elections than are PRRs whose programs are far right-wing on both cultural and economic dimensions.

This success resides in the ability to attract a broad base of voters who are concerned about immigration and are thus sympathetic to PRRs’ nativist position. The emphasis on the nativist questions of the day allows PRR parties to assume a comparatively more moderate economic position, broadening the appeal of their nativist platform to include those individuals who are not economically radical. In other words, PRRs are able to garnish nativist sentiments, which typify the contemporary European *zeitgeist* (Mudde 2007), while not presenting radically neo-liberal or anti-welfare policies, which have the potential to turn off left-of-center and center voters. It is not difficult to imagine that the broad appeal of their populist socio-cultural position would be far less likely if these parties emphatically assumed a more radically right-ward

(neoliberal) or left-wing (socialist) economic position. Instead, successful PRRs champion radical-right cultural policies vis-à-vis the mainstream parties, while occupying a relatively centrist position on economic issues.<sup>23</sup> In multidimensional party competition, such an ideological combination describes the radical right catchall position. The success of this multidimensional positioning lies in the perception of the moderate economic as compared to the cultural position, thus increasing chances that generally more moderate voters find principally anti-immigrant platforms more acceptable.

### ***Ideology and Vote for Radical right parties***

This supply-side argument has some important testable implications for individual level vote-choice. First, it follows that the parties, which are perceived to occupy the PRR catchall position, should, on average, receive greater individual support. Such ideological positioning appeals to voters who sympathize with a strong cultural line and by presenting a relatively more moderate economic position it does not dissuade those voters who do not hold far-right neoliberal (anti-welfarist) proclivities.

Hypothesis 1: *Radical right parties with a far-right cultural ideological position and a moderate economic ideological positions receive greater support than parties which are hold comparably far-right position on both cultural and economic dimensions.*

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<sup>23</sup> These economic policies and their particular leaning (neoliberal vs. redistributive) are of course country and time-specific, but in general the success can be found in strong nativist socio-cultural position and an amorphous economic ideological identity. In this sense, the ‘schizophrenic’ economic ideological position may in fact be quite a reasoned and logical position.

Further, I expect that culturally right-wing individuals are also more likely to vote PRR since these parties focus primarily on socio-cultural agenda. Beyond the support of culturally right-leaning natives, those on the economic right may see immigrants as abusing the redistributive system, only increasing their negative view of the government's role in the economy. These voters may find PRRs worthy of support since these parties aim at restricting immigrant access to the state's resources, and thus limiting redistribution. Moreover, such an anti-egalitarian posture may also be representative of the worldview, which accepts inequity and sees outsider access to the economic boon of the 'native' economy as undesirable. If this is true, then those on the cultural and economic right are likely to be responsive to PRRs' agenda and show stronger electoral support for the PRR. Consequently, I formulate following hypothesis:

*Hypotheses 2: Individuals who hold ideologically right-wing cultural or economic views are more likely to support populist radical right parties.*

Third, since the perception of the socio-cultural challenges posed by immigration are widespread among European populations, I expect that the populist nativist message of the PRR will find a receptive audience beyond the far-right electorate (Kitschelt 2007; Mudde 2007). This will be aided by the catchall position of the radical right parties, which allows them to present a more moderate economic platform appealing to voters more broadly distributed across the economic spectrum. Consequently, individuals who hold more moderate positions on the economic redistribution-market economy spectrum, but still perceive immigration as causing socio-economic problems, may be attracted to these parties. Thus, I expect that the PRR catchall position should increase support for these parties among people of centrist economic position. Conversely, it should have less of an effect or no effect on those individuals holding far-right economic positions.

Hypothesis 3: *Individuals who hold centrist economic ideological views will be more likely to support radical right parties when these parties hold PRR catchall positions.*

### **PRR Catchall and Individuals' Ideological Predispositions**

Below, I examine a model of the voter-level support for radical right parties, which accounts for cultural and economic ideological position of parties and individuals. To perform the test at the individual-level, I use public opinion data from five-waves of European Social Surveys (ESS) administered between 2002 and 2010. These data correspond closely to the temporal and spatial coverage of the expert party placement data from CHES.<sup>24</sup> The units of analysis are native individuals who declared both parents as native-born in the country of residence (European Social Survey 2013 items C24 and C25). These individuals are nested in a country-survey wave. Since the hypotheses refer to the relative electoral success and not the emergence of the radical right wing parties, I only retain countries, which have a radical right-wing party participating in the national electoral contests. The resulting sample's summary statistics, including country-level variables, are reported in Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix.

### ***Outcome Variables***

To measure ideological position of the populist radical right parties, I use a question asking respondents who previously indicated voting in the last national elections “*Which party did you vote for in that election?*” Respondents are then given a card with a list of possible electoral options and indicate one of them or none. People who did not vote in last election, or do not

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<sup>24</sup> e.g. CHES data do not include Switzerland and Norway, while the ESS data do not cover Austria after 2006.

indicate any party, are coded as missing (ESS 2012). The decision of which parties should be classified as PRR was based on the Mudde's (2007) classification (see table 1).

### ***PRR's Catchall Position: Ideological Economic-Cultural Distance***

To measure populist radical right parties ideological positions, I use the expert party placement data from Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) between 2002 and 2010. The cultural (GALTAN) placement varies from 6.57 (Dutch *Party for Freedom* in 2006) to 9.8 (French *Front National* in 2002), with an average GALTAN score of 8.79. The economic score varies between 4.3 (*True Finns* in 2006) and 8.45 (Belgian *Front National* in 2010) and a mean of 6.64 for all populist radical right parties. The theory suggests that the more electorally successful PRR parties assume moderate economic position as compared to their cultural platform.

To capture the populist radical right catchall position, I measure the distance between cultural and economic positions by subtracting the expert assigned economic L/R position from GALTAN (cultural) position. This simple operation produces a variable with a range between -1.72 and 4.84 for radical right parties.<sup>25</sup> Positive (negative) 'distance' values indicate that the given party's cultural (GALTAN) position is higher (lower) than its economic L/R position. In line with the theory, I expect that PRR parties that represent a more moderate economic as compared to their cultural position (higher 'distance' scores) should be more electorally successful.

While the simplicity of the 'distance' calculation is a virtue, it runs the risk of numerical false-equivalence when the distance score is the same for two parties with different economic

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<sup>25</sup> Indeed, only English UKIP in 2006 and 2010 and Dutch PVV in 2006 have negative 'distance' scores, the ideological distance is -6.54 and 6.03 for non-radical right parties.

and cultural ideological scores.<sup>26</sup> However, utilizing the cultural L/R (GALTAN) as a party-specific anchor (a score that effectively places a given party in the radical right category) and subtracting this party's Economic L/R score allows us to construct a relative distance measure. Since the theory suggests that voters are more attracted to PRR parties, which are perceived as more moderate on economic position as compared to their radical right cultural stance, this distance measure accounts for this relative perception, more effectively capturing the cross-national variation in how PRRs are perceived. In other words, while the economic score of 8 may not mean exactly the same thing in two countries (cf. Bakker et al. 2012), the distance between cultural and economic position does capture the moderation of economic vis-à-vis cultural position for a given PRR party.

This measure would have also been inappropriate if there were PRR parties that were at once radical right on the cultural dimension and radical left on the economic dimension. Such parties' radicalism on the left side of economic scale would work to discourage voters much the same as the radicalism on the right side of the economic scale would. In such an instance and inline with my theorizing, the distance measure would suggest that the most successful PRRs are those who are culturally radically right-wing and economically radically left-wing as these parties would have obtained highest distance scores. However, a well-defined PRR party family does not contain such parties. Indeed, the lowest (most left wing) position on the economic scale is 4.3 (Finns Party in 2010). Thus the distance between cultural and economic positions, does capture the perceived moderation of economic position vis-à-vis cultural position without running the risk of suggesting that

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<sup>26</sup> For instance scoring 8 on GALTAN and 4 on Economic L/R produces the same distance score as scoring 10 on GALTAN and 6 on Economic L/R.



It is important to note that scholars question the accuracy of public and expert placement of PRR parties on the economic scale, since these positions are usually less-well known. Indeed, if Rovny (2014) is correct some of these parties intentionally blur their economic position to increase the appeal of their nativist position. This possibility only increases the utility of a perceived distance between cultural and economic position of PRRs, which accounts for country-specific party system idiosyncrasies while capturing how these parties are perceived across two main ideological dimensions. Effectively, it measures either actual (Kitschelt 2007) or perceived (Rovny 2014) distance by which economic is more moderate than cultural positions.

The ‘distance’ measure is merged with the ESS data at the country-survey wave level. The expert party placements in CHES are available for all the same years as the ESS, except for 2004 and 2008, when CHES did not administer the expert survey. For these two years, I match the ESS with the party expert placement scores for the year chronologically closest to the CHES survey year. For instance, party placement for Belgian *Vlams Block* in 2004 is drawn from the 2002 CHES survey since the election took place in May 2003 and the second wave of ESS surveys were administered between October 2002 and April 2003.

### ***Individual Ideological Positions, Expressed Attitudes and Predispositions***

The most obvious way to measure cultural and economic ideological positions of individuals is to use survey items asking respondents socio-economic and socio-cultural opinions. However, when predicting support for radical right parties, such an approach may be fraught with endogeneity. A large body of literature demonstrates that certain public attitudes change following the articulation of the party ideological position, while other studies show that party positions follow public attitudes (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Jacoby

1991).<sup>27</sup> The causal path between respondents' opinions and party positions is thus uncertain. Since the populist radical right parties actively scapegoat and often vilify immigrants in their campaign rhetoric, measuring ideological dimension through survey items referencing immigrants is problematic. For instance, in contemporary literature the cultural position of parties and individuals is often measured using immigration attitudes questions (e.g. Bakker et al. 2012, Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2008). Such method places immigration reference on the right side, and asks about support for the anti-immigrant parties on the left side of the equation. Lewis-Beck notes this limitation stating that using expressed attitudes to approximate ideology "may not go back deep enough into the funnel [of causality] to permit good understanding of the causes of behavior" (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009, 26).

An alternative is to focus on values, which underlie ideological positions on economic and cultural dimensions. Milton Rokeach (1968) argues that the attitudes are focused on a specific subject, values transcend the specific and are concerned with a more general outlook. In Rokeach's words, "[value is an] enduring belief that a particular mode of conduct or that a particular end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternatives [...]" (Rokeach 1968, 550). First, this distinction makes it clear that values can underlie attitudes, but are not equivalent or tied to the particular object of a given attitude or opinion. Second, focusing on values reduces the risk of causal contamination between individually expressed political attitude and elite driven agenda (Lewis-Beck, 2009).

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<sup>27</sup> Ellis and Stimson (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 155) sum up this relationship: "*For most citizens, those not deeply attentive to the work of politics or to serious analysis of it, the information that is used to make political decisions and to decide which policies to support and which to oppose is obtained through framed messages from political elites.*"

### ***Ideological Value Predispositions***

Theoretical discussions of ideological space were, from the beginning, underpinned by the discussion of the deep-seated values representing particular ideological position (Downs 1954; Converse 1964; Rokeach 1968). Existing studies of individual ideological positions zeroed in on a parsimonious two-dimensional structure of egalitarian and authoritarian values (Converse 1964; Fleishmann 1988; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Achtenberg et al. 2011; Rokeach 1968).

*Egalitarianism* connotes a dispositional need to reduce inequality. Anti-egalitarians express preference for a more hierarchical system where wellbeing is purely a function of individual achievement and not of social redistributive mechanisms. Anti-egalitarians do not place value on equality of treatment and opportunity (Rokeach 1968, Schwartz 1992).<sup>28</sup> In other words, egalitarian/anti-egalitarian value structure is underpinning the socio-economic ideological orientation of individuals as they express preferences between economic redistribution and laissez-faire economic system.

The second dimension captures values related to an *authoritarian* predisposition. *Authoritarianism* spectrum, is perhaps best summarized by the conflict “between individual rights and the well-being of the social unit” (Feldman 2003, p. 46; see also Adorno, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Authoritarian desire for conformity and social order over diversity and individualism can quite easily be understood as a predisposition underlying the cultural dimension of individual ideological orientation (e.g.

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<sup>28</sup> Some research also suggests that egalitarianism is rejected by those who affirm status quo as promotion of equality implies change towards equality (Jost et al. 2009; Stenner 2005).

Duriez, Van Hiel, and Kossowska 2005; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Sibley and Duckitt 2009).<sup>29</sup>

I rely on Schwartz's basic human values inventory (1992) to measure *authoritarian* predisposition as an antecedent to the cultural ideological orientation and *egalitarian* predisposition as an antecedent of economic ideological orientation.

### ***Authoritarian Predisposition***

To capture authoritarian predisposition, I use a set of childrearing questions. A common short version asks respondents to indicate a quality most desirable in a child: independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners, obedience or self-reliance, and being considerate or well behaved (Feldman 2003; Stenner 2005). The validity and reliability of this childrearing scale has been shown in a large body of empirical research (Feldman 2003; Donald R. Kinder and Kam 2010; Stenner 2005). Schwartz's human values inventory, asks questions directly corresponding to these items. It asks respondents if the statement sounds "very much like me" (1) or "not like me at all" (6), with a range in between. The first three items display close correspondence to the childrearing questions, while the fourth asks about the preference for governmental authority associated with authoritarianism:

1. Important to do what is told and follow rules
2. Important to behave properly

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<sup>29</sup> The authoritarian position has several existing measures. Traditional instruments measuring authoritarianism -- the F-Scale (Adorno, Levinson, and Sanford 1950), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1988) -- use survey items such as attitudes towards gays and lesbians, or immigrants which do not improve on the revealed attitudes measures above (for detailed discussions see Kinder and Kam, 2010; Feldman, 2003; Stenner 2005).<sup>29</sup> This is problematic because such measures of authoritarianism may be reflecting party positions of PRRs.

3. Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention to oneself
4. Important that government is strong and ensures safety

Constructing Authoritarianism scale, these items were reverse coded, added and transformed to vary from 0 to 1. Resulting scale shows Cronbach's alpha of 0.66, a reliability score consistent with previous studies (e.g. Kinder and Kam, 2010; Stenner, 2005).<sup>30</sup>

### ***(Anti-)Egalitarian Predisposition***

To capture egalitarian position, I use a single question related to attitudes toward a desirable level of general equality of treatment and opportunity. The question asks respondents if the statement, "it is important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities" sounds "very much like me" (1) to "not like me at all" (6), and a range in between. This simple measure of anti-egalitarian predisposition captures the general essence of the spectrum of egalitarian values.<sup>31</sup> To keep direction of expected association consistent for both authoritarian and egalitarian predisposition, this item is transformed to varying from 0 to 1, where higher values indicate more anti-egalitarian predisposition.

The resulting measures of authoritarian and anti-egalitarian predispositions cannot be considered as capturing the same individual level variation, as they are only weakly negatively

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<sup>30</sup> I replicate these analyses with authoritarian scale using only the first three items and find it consistent with the results of our main analysis (see Table A3 in the Online Appendix).

<sup>31</sup> It is important to note that both predispositions can be held jointly by the same individual. For instance, it is possible for authoritarians to hold egalitarian values, especially as they relate to the ethnic in-group. It is equally possible for authoritarian predisposed to be in-egalitarian when comparing the desirable equality of treatment between national in-group and the outsiders. In both cases it is important to know how each predisposition affects political attitudes and behavior and then how each responds to contextual conditions.

correlated at  $r=-0.19$ . This is consistent with previous studies documenting significant differences between authoritarian and egalitarian predispositions (Donald R. Kinder and Kam 2010; Stenner 2005).

### ***Control Variables***

I use a set of control variables at the individual level that are standard in the literature on radical right voting (Fitzgerald and Lawrence 2011; McGann and Kitschelt 2005; Rydgren and Ruth 2011; Rydgren 2008). I include *Age of respondent* (in years) accounting for the finding that older individuals are, on average, more ‘conservative,’ react to immigration more strongly and are thus, more likely to support PRRs. *Education*, measured in five ordinal categories, captures general negative association between more education and voting for PRR. This effect is attributed to the fact that better educated are not ‘losers of globalization’ and find themselves both economically and culturally more acceptant of globalization pressures (i.e. immigration) (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007). The unemployed are more sensitive to immigrant competition and thus find of nativist platform of the PRR appealing. The *unemployed dummy* is coded 1 if the respondent is out of work and 0 otherwise. Wealthier natives feel less pressure from immigrant presence and are thus less likely to be responsive to PRR rhetoric. I include household *income*, measured in deciles<sup>32</sup> (to facilitate cross-national comparison). Finally, I include *female* coded 1 (0 for male), to account for the finding that women are less likely to support PRRs.

At the country survey-wave level, I include measures of income per capita (GDP/Capita), and in the robustness check, I control for Unemployment and % Foreign-Born. All these data are

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<sup>32</sup> 12-categories of income were recorded for 2002, 2004, and 2006 waves. In 2008 and 2010 the top-three categories were collapsed into one effectively recording income in deciles. To assure cross-wave comparability I collapse the top three categories into one for the first three waves.

provided in ESS's cumulative data file and are sourced from OECD's, World Bank's and United Nations' statistical portals (ESS 2013).

**Table 4.3.** Voting for populist radical right, ideological predispositions and PRR catchall position

|                                      | Ideological Predispositions |                       | Ideological Predispositions<br>& L/R |                       |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|                                      | (1)                         | (2)                   | (3)                                  | (4)                   |
| PRR Catchall (GALTAN-Economic L/R)   | 0.420**<br>(0.157)          | 0.552**<br>(0.165)    | 0.412**<br>(0.163)                   | 0.747**<br>(0.198)    |
| Egalitarian Predisposition           | 1.655**<br>(0.125)          | 2.859**<br>(0.353)    |                                      |                       |
| Egalitarian Predisposition (L/R)     |                             |                       | 4.901**<br>(0.268)                   | 7.048**<br>(0.742)    |
| PRR Catchall × Egalitarian Pred. L/R |                             | -0.428**<br>(0.118)   |                                      | -0.763**<br>(0.245)   |
| Authoritarian Predisposition         | 1.012**<br>(0.178)          | 1.020**<br>(0.178)    | 1.879**<br>(0.409)                   | 1.887**<br>(0.409)    |
| Unemployed                           | 0.327**<br>(0.123)          | 0.326**<br>(0.123)    | 0.345**<br>(0.133)                   | 0.347**<br>(0.133)    |
| Highest level of education           | -1.472**<br>(0.104)         | -1.473**<br>(0.104)   | -1.485**<br>(0.109)                  | -1.489**<br>(0.109)   |
| Female                               | -0.425**<br>(0.057)         | -0.425**<br>(0.058)   | -0.378**<br>(0.060)                  | -0.375**<br>(0.060)   |
| Age of respondent                    | -1.778**<br>(0.203)         | -1.778**<br>(0.203)   | -2.045**<br>(0.211)                  | -2.043**<br>(0.211)   |
| Income                               | -0.509**<br>(0.119)         | -0.507**<br>(0.119)   | -0.662**<br>(0.124)                  | -0.663**<br>(0.124)   |
| GDP/Capita                           | 7.490**<br>(1.852)          | 7.685**<br>(1.885)    | 7.880**<br>(1.917)                   | 7.962**<br>(1.945)    |
| Constant                             | -80.867**<br>(19.289)       | -83.274**<br>(19.636) | -86.425**<br>(19.969)                | -88.209**<br>(20.270) |
| $\rho$ (ICC)                         | 0.175                       | 0.181                 | 0.186                                | 0.191                 |
| AIC                                  | 9756.59                     | 9745.60               | 8903.22                              | 8895.47               |
| BIC                                  | 9853.35                     | 9850.42               | 8999.50                              | 8999.78               |
| Prob > chi2                          | 0.000                       | 0.000                 | 0.000                                | 0.000                 |
| N (country-wave)                     | 23458(25)                   | 23458(25)             | 22546(25)                            | 22546(25)             |

\*\* p<0.05, two-tailed test; coefficients obtained from logistic hierarchical models with random intercepts for


country-wave (standard errors in parentheses); models include fixed effects for each survey wave.

### **Findings: Direct Effect of Ideological Orientation on PRR Voting.**

Table 4 presents models regressing individual level radical right-wing support on the Cultural-Economic Distance of the PRR parties and two operationalizations of individual ideological positions. First, parties' *Cultural-Economic Distance* is positively and significantly associated with radical right-wing support across all models providing a strong support to hypothesis 2. It seems that parties that espouse a moderate economic position while maintaining their radical right cultural identity ('PRR catchall position') on average receive higher support than parties with smaller difference between economic and cultural positions. In substantive terms, a party with a difference between its GALTAN and Economic left/right of 1.7 (e.g. Austrian *FPO* in 2002) has a probability of receiving a vote equal to 0.026. In comparison, a party with a Cultural-Economic Distance of 2.6 (French *Front National* in 2006) has a 50% higher probability of receiving a vote (0.039). While these values may seem small in absolute, it should be noted that they predict a 'rare event' (reporting to have voted for a PRR party) with a baseline probability of just 0.012.

Results also support expectations of hypotheses 3a and 3b that those who are more right wing on either authoritarian or anti-egalitarian dimensions are more likely to vote for the radical right parties. These positive effects are depicted in figure 4. For instance, when authoritarian predisposition increases from one standard deviation below (0.032) to one standard deviation above (0.046) the mean, the probability that an individual votes for PRR increases by 43% (model 1). For the analogous change in the anti-egalitarian predisposition, the probability of voting for PRR increases by 97% (from 0.027 to 0.053).





Note: Dots depict the size of the direct effect of ideological predispositions on probability of PRR voting, whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval for the direct effect.

**Figure 4.4.** Voting PRR: Direct effect of economic and cultural ideological predisposition

### ***Conditional Effect of Party Position on PRR Voting***

Above, I argue that the effect of the PRR's ideological catchall position is not uniformly distributed across citizens with diverse ideological predispositions. Instead, I suggest that the effect of PRR catchall position increases the likelihood of voting for the radical right-wing for those individuals who hold moderate (left—of—center, center, and right—of—center) egalitarian values (hypothesis 4). The results of models 2 and 4 conform to this expectation. Both measures of the economic ideological orientation, when interacted with the party cultural-economic distance, return significant and negative. Specifically, the positive effect of the economic catchall position on the probability of PRR vote is lower for individuals who hold

stronger anti-egalitarian ideological predispositions.<sup>33</sup> Since it is difficult to imagine the effect of the interaction between two continuous variables by looking at the coefficients, I create two plots reflecting the conditional effects found in models 2 and 4.


Figure 5 shows that the relationship between PRR party cultural-economic distance and the probability of receiving a vote vary depending on the economic ideological orientation of a respondent. In both panels, dots represent the marginal effect of cultural-economic distance on the probability of voting for PRR at different levels of anti-egalitarian predisposition. In particular, a dot marks by how much the main effect of egalitarian position is changed (increased or decreased) by PRR catchall position. The whiskers indicate 90% confidence intervals around the estimates. The effects for which whiskers cut across the 0 y-line are not statistically significant. These estimated ‘distance’ effects are plotted across the full spectrum of individual egalitarian orientation while holding continuous covariates at their means and categorical at modal values.

In both models, the effect of the PRR economic catchall position is most pronounced for those individuals who are located on the left and in the center of egalitarian/anti-egalitarian spectrum. In contrast, those who are strongly anti-egalitarian (right-side of egalitarian scale) do not seem to be more likely to support populist radical right if these parties adapt a PRR catchall

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<sup>33</sup> It is important to note that the conditional, interactive relationships are symmetrical (cite) and thus, the results also mean that the effect of economic right-ward orientation decreases as the cultural-economic distance of a party position increases in size. This suggests perhaps that the positive effect of the party cultural-economic distance decreases in effect as one’s economic orientation is more right-ward. This makes sense since the effect of this party position should be strongest for those in the center of the ideological orientation. Those on the right of the economic ideological orientation should not be attracted to PRR assuming more moderate position on economic spectrum.

strategy (larger cultural-economic distance). In other words, in line with the expectations of hypothesis 4, PRR parties that moderate their economic position are able to attract center and left-of-center voters. In contrast, such moderation has no apparent effect on those voters who are located on the right and far right of the economic ideological spectrum.



Note: Dots depict the size of the conditional effect of PRR catchall position at different levels of ideological predispositions, whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval for the estimates.

**Figure 4.5.** Voting PRR: the effect of PRR catchall conditional on egalitarian predisposition

Another pattern we can glean from figure 5 is that the effect of the distance varies non-monotonically across egalitarian predisposition. For those who are on the low (left) and high (right) end of the anti-egalitarian scale, the effect of PRR catchall is smaller than for those who are in the center of egalitarian predisposition. This pattern makes intuitive sense. The moderation of economic position by PRR should increase the probability that those who are not radical

would vote for these parties and not those who are on the extreme (left or right) of egalitarian predisposition.

Cumulatively, the individual-level analyses of PRR vote provide support for the theoretical expectations that respondents are more likely to support radical right parties, which assume a more moderate economic ideological position while maintaining their core radical right cultural position. Moreover, results also show that this effect is strongest for those individuals who identify themselves in the center and left—off—center of the economic ideological scale and has no effect on individuals who are economically far right.

The effects of control variables reflect the findings of extant literature (e.g. Rydgren and Ruth 2011). Better educated and wealthier individuals are less likely to vote for the radical right party since such parties represent illiberal positions (*education*) and may be threatening those who are relatively well off in the status quo (*income*). Female and older respondents are also less likely to vote for these parties, which reflect their less chauvinist attitudes and wariness of too radical change (McGann and Kitschelt 2005). Finally, countries with higher real GDP per capita are on average more likely to have successful radical right wing parties, as they are also more likely to experience the brunt of immigrants seeking higher wages.

Additionally, all the models include fixed effects for survey-years to assure that the residual dynamics from temporal variance (in the form of the five survey waves) are controlled for. The models also included dummy controlling for the effect of being a Western European country (EU-15 and EFTA members) to assure that the effects are not driven by cross-regional idiosyncrasies.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Models which only include western European states did not vary substantively from the full sample models and are presented in the online appendix table A2

**Table 4.4.** Attitudes based measures of ideological positions (Van Der Brug and van Spanje (2009))

|   |          |
|---|----------|
| In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?                                  | Economic |
| The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.   |          |
| Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.  |          |
| Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best describes your position? | Cultural |
| Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?  |          |

### ***Robustness Check***

I perform several additional analyses to test the robustness of the above results. First, I add control variables for the country level of unemployment and immigrant flow (both not significant, appendix table 4.1). Second, I use Van Der Brug and Van Spanje's (2008) operationalization to measure individual ideological position. They find that general left/right self-placement (0-10 scale) and a question about support for redistributive programs (5-point Likert scale) define the economic dimension. To measure individual position on the cultural dimension, they use attitudes towards immigrants, homosexuality, and EU integration (for details see Table 4 and Van Der Brug and van Spanje 2008).

The results conform to the above analysis (see table 4.2 in the appendix). As in the above analyses, the cultural economic distance increases probability that a radical right party is supported in the elections. Also, economic left/right is associated with support for these parties. Further conforming to the values based results (table 3), the conditional effect of the 'distance'

on economic predisposition is negative, suggesting that the increase in probability of voting for PRR is weaker for those natives who are more economically right-wing.

Finally, I retest all the models with a less restrictive definition of PRR family than that of Mudde (2007). The resulting list of parties is expanded with the addition of True Finns (2008, 2010) and Lega Nord (2002). The results for this less restrictive sample conform to the main results and can be seen in table A4.3 in the appendix.

## **Discussion and Conclusion**

This chapter considered whether the supply-side ideological positions of the populist radical right parties affect their electoral success. It theorized that contemporary PRRs will be most electorally successful when they assume the ‘PRR catchall position,’ that is embrace the radical right cultural ideology while being, by comparison, moderate on the economic platform. Specifically such PRR parties can attract voters primarily concerned with a cultural threat born out by globalization (e.g. immigration), but also not alienate the economic centrists by assuming anti-welfarist or radically neoliberal positions. My findings provide evidence in support of this thesis. Populist radical right parties, which exemplify the PRR catchall position are on average more electorally successful than parties which are far right on both cultural and economic platforms. Moreover, analyses confirmed that the PRR catchall position increases the probability that economically centrist individuals support populist racial right parties, while such a party position has no effect on individuals located at the far right of economic ideological dimension.

These findings have several important implications for the existing literature. First, this research adds to the literature on the supply-side causes of radical right wing success, which as of yet, lacks a significant consensus. This is important since the demand-side of radical right

movements has been explored in some detail and has arrived at several conclusions (e.g. role of unemployment, immigration, etc.). Ultimately, the complete model has to recognize that the supply and demand sides work in conjunction. However, since the effects of globalization are not too different across Europe (demand-side), the supply-side factors hold much promise in explanations of cross-national variations in PRR successes. This chapter examined ideological positions of PRR parties as one of the most significant supply-side factors.

The closest previous research has come to consensus was to determine that the new PRRs were able to emerge by presenting ‘new’ more moderate positions than their fascist predecessors (cf. Cole 2005; Ignazi 1992). I agree with these assertions, but suggest a much more specific model of contemporary PRR success. I see the ‘new moderation’ as a facet of economic position, which adds to the flexibility of political rhetoric concerning the salient economic policies. At the same time, successful PRRs do not present such moderation of the core socio-cultural nativism. In fact, the source of success is the ability to advance the core nativist policies while simultaneously projecting, moderate in comparison, economic position.

Additionally, the empirical model successfully showed that individual ideological differences can be captured by analyzing core human values, rather than relying on self-reported ideological positions or salient political opinions (see Feldman and Johnston 2014). In particular, this research was careful not to treat individual level ideology as equivalent to expressed attitudes, since such an approach is prone to an endogeneity in a political reality where as ideological positions are communicated bi-directionally between the public and the party elites. Consequently, this research opted for authoritarian and anti-egalitarian values-based ideological predispositions as antecedents of expressed ideological positions. To test the basic validity of values-based measures, the results were also tested with a more canonical, attitudes-based

measures of economic and cultural ideological dimensions (cf. Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). The results remain comparable across these specifications. In the end, true causal testing, utilizing experiments and longitudinal data, should shed more light on how individually held ideological positions (demand) respond to ideological positions of available parties (supply). For instance, future research would do well to investigate how stable individual traits affect party support when party positions change.

Perhaps even more importantly, the two-dimensional model reveals that individuals who have authoritarian or anti-egalitarian predispositions vary in how sensitive they are to the rhetoric of the populist radical right parties. It further suggests that these parties, quite shrewdly, exploit the dominant nativist concerns of European societies by presenting a relatively moderate economic position. Whatever the origin of this perceived moderate economic posture (see discussion above), it can tell us a lot about the target electorate. In fact, the electorates of the radical right have traditionally been composed of two dissimilar groups—blue-collar workers and small business owners, each favoring a distinct vision of the state economy (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2005), but united by their concern over the cultural challenge posed by immigration. I have shown that the move to the center of the economic spectrum can benefit these parties, but what exact mix of neoliberal-welfarist policies this center movement takes is probably a question that can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. This very observation also motivates the use of party specific distance between its cultural and economic positions and not just the economic L/R position. The ‘distance’ variable is more sensitive to the party specific and party system specific positions of populist radical right parties, than a simple single dimensional economic L/R measure.



Currently, the successful model focuses on the cultural issue of the day – nativist resistance to immigration – and a relatively moderate economic position, aimed at not discouraging those voters who are not strongly neoliberal or anti-welfarist. This formula is most certainly bound to change. What is less likely to change is the general model where these radical parties emphasize a strong (radical) position on an issue or grievance of the day and moderate or blur on other positions to broaden their electoral appeal. Thus a generalization of this model can shed light on the successful political messaging of all parties. In other words, my model suggests that political entrepreneurs strategically exploit the dominant issue of the day, emphasizing some while deemphasizing other points to effectively mobilize broader segments of the electorate. This strategy is equally important for parties on the left and right of political spectrum. The results of my analysis provide a preliminary illustration how this approach benefits some PRR parties.

Third, as Mudde (2007) notes, there are many studies, which develop theories at the aggregate level and then test them using survey data (also the reverse is true). These results invite questions about the ecological fallacy and illustrate that focusing on the aggregate level only paints an incomplete picture of how individual preferences interact with the behavior of the parties. To remedy this potential deficiency, present research begins with an aggregate level theorizing and utilizes party- and individual-level variables to more fully model individuals political behavior.

The findings also hold important implications for European societies. The diversity of the ideological predispositions of the natives suggests that with strategic messaging radical parties, can garnish significant support outside of their traditional radical electorate. This ability to attract voters becomes easier as immigration becomes subject of greater political and media focus.

Increasing scrutiny of immigration due to an economic slowdown or dramatic events involving non-native populations, such as the assassination of Theo Van Gogh or the Charlie Hebdo attack, result in stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (Hopkins 2011). It is also important to note that as immigration control and immigrant integration become more salient, other parties are likely to step in and syphon some of the support away from PRRs by assuming some of the ‘anti-immigrant political positions. This right-ward drift of immigration related policy can be seen in many European countries (Tory in England, Vestre in Denmark, CDU in Germany). Clearly the social cleavages resulting from immigration are an important element of politics across the political spectrum of many European societies.

Indeed, this entire chapter signals something fundamental about the importance of multidimensional party competition. Emerging parties have an opportunity to exploit the split between cultural and economic positions of native publics. This is especially true as mainstream parties persist in a mode of traditional single-dimensional political frames. ‘Newer’ parties can use the multi-dimensional structure of publics’ values to more precisely target voters who would previously be clustered across the single ideological dimension. As I show above, the ‘right-wing’ voters vary in how responsive they are to nativist messaging (authoritarian values) or affirmation of neoliberal socio-economic order (anti-egalitarian values). When possible, aligning party economic and cultural positions to reflect the contemporaneous zeitgeist can create a broader coalition, one that can transform fringe parties into major political players. Future analyses should examine the ideological reaction of traditional mainstream parties across economic and cultural dimensions.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Immigration remains one of the greatest challenges of the European societies. The rise of social tensions, Islamophobia, the end of the welfare state, and the emergence of the populist radical right-wing parties are just some of the most newsworthy consequences of the increasing immigrant presence in European societies. The crux of this challenge lies in the conflicting pressures that characterize the flow of contemporary immigration. On one side, labor markets demand immigration in a graying Europe. On the other, native domestic publics resist continual inflows of outsiders who redefine host countries' identities. These processes are manifest in two contrasting initiatives. Many European countries have been revamping their immigration laws aiming at restricting immigration, making immigrants' access to state services more costly, and experimenting with the 'integration' of immigrants into the host societies.<sup>35</sup> At the same time, European governments, recognizing that European markets could benefit from immigration, introduced the Blue Card<sup>36</sup> program that fast-tracks the EU-wide work permit applications of highly skilled migrants.

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<sup>35</sup> See for instance British *Immigration Act of 2014* (<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/immigration-bill-becomes-law>); 2013 Danish *Aliens Consolidation Act* [https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/ronlyres/2A42ECC8-1CF5-4A8A-89AC-8D3D75EF3E17/0/aliens\\_consolidation\\_act\\_863\\_250613.pdf](https://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/ronlyres/2A42ECC8-1CF5-4A8A-89AC-8D3D75EF3E17/0/aliens_consolidation_act_863_250613.pdf))

2006 French, Immigration and Integration Law

([https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working\\_papers/WP\\_2007/WP0745-Chou.pdf](https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2007/WP0745-Chou.pdf))

<sup>36</sup> Blue Card program directive of the Council of the European Union. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:155:0017:0029:EN:PDF>

Adding to the confusion, immigrant presence has been linked to an increasing intergroup threat (Quillian 1996), but also to greater acceptance and reduced prejudice (e.g. Wagener et al. 2006). In an attempt to reconcile these contrasting findings the literature has recently turned towards modeling the contextual effects as conditional on ideological orientation (cf. Sibley et al. 2013; Karreth, Singh and Stojek *forthcoming*). This dissertation labors within this – ideological values  $\times$  context – approach to shed light on three salient aspects of the immigration question.

In particular, I examine the effects of multi-dimensional ideological orientation as one of the most commonly analyzed individual differences. Ideological proclivities seem quite a logical place to start the analyses of natives' immigration-related political attitudes and behavior. It is thus perhaps surprising that relatively few studies have examined the role of ideology in shaping immigration sentiments or even voting for ideologically extreme populist radical right parties. Ideology has long been the foundational concept in comparative political science (Downs 1956, Converse 1964; Sartori 1979) and the conventional wisdom would suggest that those on the right ('conservatives') are less acceptant of immigration, express stronger opposition to welfare redistribution, and are likely to vote for parties on the far right of ideological spectrum. However, contemporary political science commonly accepts that the ideological space of parties and individuals is multidimensional (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2006; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Starting with these basic observations, the question underpinning this dissertation is whether individuals who are on the 'right' side of economic and cultural ideological dimensions hold similar immigration-related attitudes.

To answer this question, I analyze authoritarian and (anti-)egalitarian predispositions as antecedents of cultural and economic ideological dimensions respectively. Indeed, the focus on these ideological value-predispositions is one of the most important contributions of this

dissertation. Present analyses, however, go beyond the direct effects of ideology and consider how individuals holding diverse ideological values react to contextual factors. In chapters 2 and 3, I model ideological predispositions as conditioning how the presence of immigrants affects natives' immigration and welfare attitudes. Chapter 4 considers political *behavior* of the natives as a product of individual right-wing predispositions and populist radical right wing parties' platforms.

In sum, this dissertation considers some of the most salient attitudes of contemporary European politics. In doing so, it brings the weight of individual ideological orientation, defined in terms of two – authoritarian and egalitarian – predispositions. Most importantly, this dissertation models ideological predispositions as screens through which contextual pressures (e.g. immigrant presence) filter to form politically salient attitudes. The validity of this approach is manifest in that results confirm some well-established associations. For instance, I find that those who hold right-wing predispositions hold more negative immigration attitudes than their less right-ward predisposed compatriots. However, the findings also challenge some conventional wisdoms. For example, I find that anti-egalitarians and authoritarians hold opposite attitudes towards redistribution and react differently to immigrant presence. In other words, this dissertation examines important socio-political questions, utilizes novel measures of ideological positions, accounts for contextual conditions, and delivers findings that expand understanding of right-wing predispositions, immigration attitudes and political behavior.

## **Discussion of Empirical Findings**

Chapter 2 examined the ways in which right-wing ideological predispositions influence anti-immigration attitudes in varying immigration contexts. As expected, both authoritarian and

anti-egalitarian values show strong positive association with negative opinion on immigrants and support for stricter immigration limits. I also show, however, that these predispositions differ in how they react to immigrant presence. In particular, authoritarians, due to their resistance to diversity, deepen their negative immigration attitudes in contexts with higher proportion of immigrants. Anti-egalitarians, since they do not *a priori* object to diversity, actually hold slightly less negative immigration attitudes in higher immigration contexts. This effect is presumably due to the well-documented acceptance that comes with increased intergroup contact (e.g. Pettigrew and Tropp 2008, Wagener et al. 2006). In general, these findings challenge a conventional wisdom and show that ‘right-wing’ natives do not uniformly react to contextual pressures. In fact, the term ‘right-wing’ may be too blunt of a tool when describing complex ideological predispositions. It also suggests that, as social diversity increases, there is a higher potential for very diverse attitudes on the right side of the ideological spectrum.

In chapter 3, I turn to the analyses of welfare chauvinism, a set of attitudes capturing the support general redistribution and opposition immigrant welfare participation. Not surprisingly, I find that those who value *status-quo* and personal achievement over change and equality oppose redistribution and negatively perceive immigrant welfare use. In contrast, I find that support for redistribution is higher among the authoritarian oriented, as redistributive programs promote desirable sameness and cohesion while decreasing social cleavages. Authoritarians, however, also hold very negative perception of immigrant welfare participation. Most interestingly, findings indicate that higher immigrant presence increases *status-quo conservatives*’ resistance to redistribution, but has no effect on their negative perception of immigrant welfare use. Contrary to the way it affects conservatives, authoritarian support for redistribution seems to be unaffected

by immigrant presence. Their negative perception of immigrant welfare participation, however, is sharply higher in contexts with more immigrants.

Chapter 3 has one additional crucial insight, suggesting that the *status-quo conservative* predisposition is composed of resistance to change and anti-egalitarianism, both of which have discrete associations with welfare chauvinist attitudes. In particular, those who resist change support redistribution, as opposing it would mean undesirable change to the system, but this support weakens in high immigration contexts. Anti-egalitarians, consistently resist the promotion of equality, and negatively view immigrant participation, but the latter effect weakens in high immigration contexts.

Chapter 4 tackles one of the most studied electoral phenomena of recent years, the success of the populist radical right (PRR) parties. I analyze contextual and individual level factors related to two-dimensional ideological positions of these parties and their potential voters. First, using the expert party placements across socio-economic and socio-cultural ideological domains, I develop a ‘populist radical right catchall’ hypothesis. Building on previous work (Kitschelt 2007, de Lange 2007), I show that PRRs that hold moderate economic position while maintaining the far-right cultural position (i.e. PRR catchall) are more electorally successful, than are PRR parties that are far-right on both cultural and economic policies.

The microfoundations of this supply-side approach imply that successful parties exploit widespread concern about immigration by attracting voters to their nativist, anti-immigrant stance. These PRR catchall parties, simultaneously assume a comparatively more moderate economic position, broadening the appeal of their nativist platform to include those individuals who are not economically radical. To examine this argument, I use five-waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) and test whether the PRR catchall position has greater influence over those

who are in the center and left-of-center than those on the right. I find strong support for both supply-side hypothesis at both national-election and individual levels. Parties that assume the PRR catchall position receive a higher percentage of votes in national elections, and, at individual level, are more likely to be supported by natives. Moreover, at individual level, I find that the effect of the PRR catchall is strongest for those voters who hold centrist and left—of—center socio-economic predispositions.

These findings add significant detail to the study of radical right-wing parties in contemporary Western Europe. They underscore the importance of supply-side party positioning and show how well crafted two-dimensional party positions can attract voters previously disinclined to support ‘radicals.’ This is perhaps the most significant contribution of this chapter. Many studies make aggregate level claims about electoral successes of PRRs and then test them with individual level survey data only. Other research analyzes the aggregate level explanations of PRR support and assumes the individual level choice mechanisms. Chapter 4 took care to develop aggregate level hypotheses and then substantiate them at both aggregate— and individual—levels. Finally, inline with the rest of the chapters, findings clearly illustrate the theoretical and empirical benefits of the values-based, two-dimensional ideology.

## **Discussion and Implications**

This dissertation presented a more complete model of immigration-related attitudes and the formation of electoral choices in the age of migration. It argued for the importance of looking at a two-dimensional ideological identification of natives, and in particular, at enduring value-predispositions (authoritarianism and anti-egalitarianism) rather than expressed political attitudes.



Moreover, it argued that ideological predisposition is only part of the equation, which interact with salient contextual factors to influence natives' attitudes and electoral choices.

Theoretical and empirical modeling of this dissertation as well as its findings suggest several important implications. First, the most important social scientific outcome of my analysis is the development of a novel conceptual and empirical method for capturing two-dimensional ideological profiles of individuals. My method improves on previous attempts relying on the political opinions of respondents, which may be contaminated by the positions of political elites (Lewis-Beck et al. 2009, Elis and Stimson 2012). Many existing measures of two-dimensional ideology rely on questions about support for redistribution to operationalize economic dimension and immigration attitudes in operationalization of cultural dimension (e.g. Van Der Brug and Van Spanje 2008, Kriesi et al. 2008, Bakker et al. 2012). Consequently, such measures of an ideological position cannot in turn be applied to explanations of welfare and immigration attitudes.

My conceptualization and operationalization utilize advances in political psychology to capture ideological predisposition based in deep-seated values (cf. Feldman and Johnston 2014). Relying on the antecedents of ideological opinions allows me to bring ideology directly into the analyses of socio-economic opinion. These value-predispositions are isolated from the specific political questions and thus unlikely to reflect the rhetoric of the political elite. Moreover, opinions may be affected by salient events and media attention (Hopkins 2011), while values have been shown to be stable over time and valid across diverse national contexts (Davidson et al., 2008).

The results inspire some confidence in the potential of my values-based measures of ideological predispositions. In analyses of immigration and welfare attitudes value-

predispositions performed as would be expected in the extant literature. Additionally, conforming to expectations based on dispositional motivations of anti-egalitarian and authoritarian value-predispositions, I found that they display consistently divergent associations with immigrant presence (cf. Sibley et al. 2013).

Second, this research also provides important insight into European societies. The primary findings of conditional modeling reveal that immigrant presence exerts varying influences over natives' attitudes, depending on their ideological values. This finding, while not revolutionary, contributes to a more complete picture of how immigration is related to natives' political and social opinions. This varying effect, however, was found not only across diverse social groups, but within a population of natives who on the surface hold decidedly right-wing predispositions. These findings are far from trivial. As immigrant presence is becoming a reality in most, if not all, European communities, the evidence accumulated in this dissertation suggests that increased native-immigrant tensions are not only likely, but also that natives themselves may become increasingly divided over the role of immigrants in their society.

These social implications are paramount. For instance, it seems that blanket statement such as that natives with right-wing proclivities are strongly resistant to immigration is a gross oversimplification. Indeed, according to the findings of this dissertation, we can expect a bifurcation of 'right-wing' attitudes towards immigration. This process may be already visible in the competition of right wing parties, which increasingly seem to project distinct positions across cultural and economic ideological space (Rovny 2014, Kriesi et al. 2010). Consequently, we can expect that larger immigrant presence is likely to produce countervailing social forces, increasingly splitting natives in their immigration related attitudes and political allegiances.

Also, in the area of welfare state support and access, immigrant presence interacting with ideological values leads to nonobvious implications. The future of the welfare state, does not seem to be nearly as threatened as is often assumed (e.g. Allesina and Glaeser 2004). Findings, instead suggest a complex relationship between right-wing values and welfare attitudes in the European context. This is especially evident since the right-wing predisposed seem to react to immigrant presence in diverse ways. Indeed, this complex conditionality underscores the inaccuracy of a simplistic model linking the ideological right with opposition to welfare. For instance, right-wing natives valuing unity and cohesion (authoritarians) seem to express strong support for redistributive policies of the state, even when immigrant proportion in their states is quite high. In contrast, anti-egalitarian natives, not surprisingly, oppose the redistributive function of the state and this resistance is amplified, albeit modestly, by larger immigrant presence. Indeed, as figure 2 (page 55) demonstrates, over the last decade, the aggregate level of support for redistribution does not show a declining trend in any country in Western Europe, with the notable exception of Norway. Perhaps, the societal base of support for the welfare state is more secure than is popularly projected.

For example, I found that both authoritarian and anti-egalitarian predisposed see immigrants as strong net consumers of state resources. This can reasonably lead to demand for changes in how and when welfare state access is granted to these societal newcomers. Interestingly, where there are more immigrants, authoritarians – consistent with their value predispositions – see immigrant welfare participation more negatively. Anti-egalitarians seem to improve their perception of immigrant welfare consumption, but this effect is substantively very small. In other words, while there may be a broad coalition supporting restrictions on the

universality of the welfare system, such a coalition is far less certain when supporting reduction in redistributive policies.

Third, this dissertations' findings also inform analyses and practice of politics. The above discussion should not be interpreted as suggesting that the future of immigration attitudes or welfare state support promises tolerance and stability. Beyond their demographic surroundings and predispositions, individuals are confronted with the political persuasion of parties competing for their support. Attitudes by themselves may paint a picture that is rosier than a reality in which political entrepreneurs exploit public insecurities and grievances. For instance, in the context of political mobilization, the future of welfare may depend on a broad coalition of the pro-redistributive left, welfare chauvinist authoritarians, and those who simply dislike changes to the status quo. Such an alignment of political support for welfare schemes suggest that its demise is unlikely. There is, of course, the other side of the coin, which suggests that immigrant welfare access is strongly negatively viewed by the same broad and diverse coalition. As such, the same political capital protecting the welfare state, in theory, is also likely to favor its selectiveness rather than universality. If this is the case, the welfare system may endure, but the politics of inclusiveness are likely to undergo significant changes.

These broad-based coalitions may already be visible in the anti-Islamization demonstration such as those led under the name of PEGIDA in Germany and other countries in Europe. Observers note that demonstrators are of very diverse background in terms of socio-economic and political standing. One thing seems certain; the diverse membership of these demonstrations cannot easily be explained within the traditional single dimensional model of ideology. In contrast, if we analytically separate the egalitarian and authoritarian values of the public, the 'diversity' of anti-Islamization campaigners may be much less puzzling. Perhaps the

political entrepreneurs behind these protests have skillfully portrayed Muslim immigrants as both ushering major socio-cultural diversity and as ravenous welfare consuming newcomers. If such a political argument, combining nativist and welfare positions, is successful, it may attract a broad segment of voters, both authoritarian and anti-egalitarian.

There are many existing examples of such strategic political positioning. For instance, in the American context, political messaging used racial priming to connect African-Americans to crime and welfare abuse in an effort to increase appeal of conservative candidates to cultural and economic conservatives (Valentino 1999, Valentino et al. 2002). In another example, Dan Hopkins illustrated how salient national-level political rhetoric combines with immigration inflow to mobilize more negative immigration attitudes in native populations (2011). This ‘politicized places’ hypothesis underscores the importance of political elite and media messaging about the immigration associated issues.

Confirming the important role of political actors, I find evidence that populist radical right parties can strategically manipulate their political programs to capture broad-based concern over immigration (chapter 4). This is accomplished by exploiting one of the most salient issues of contemporary European societies – immigration – while presenting a broad, non-controversial economic position, and thus becoming acceptable to a broader audience. Such positioning is bound to be consistent with the values of the authoritarian predisposed, while not alienating those who are less ‘right-wing’ on the economic dimension, but share the negative view of immigration.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that while the evidence presented in this dissertation is compelling, it is just a first set of tests. Before more definitive statements are made, much empirical testing needs to confirm the patterns here discovered. If, however,

operationalizations and models here presented withstand empirical scrutiny, the field would have gained an intuitively appealing and relatively easy-to-use method for capturing individual ideological proclivities and their influence on salient socio-political attitudes.

For instance, ideological values can and should be tested as individual-level factors conditioning natives' response to a variety of contextual factors beyond immigrant presence. Previous studies have identified contextual factors, such as unemployment, welfare generosity, and income levels as structuring natives' immigration and welfare attitudes. This dissertation illustrated that contextual factors should not be assumed to stimulate constant responses from citizens holding heterogeneous values. The logical next step is to examine how ideological predisposition structure salient political attitudes across various contextual indicators.

Another avenue of research is the exploration of salient political attitudes not covered in this dissertation. In particular, I hope to analyze how immigrant presence structures natives' satisfaction with democracy, conditional on their ideological predispositions. This is important since the emergence of 'illiberal' radical right-wing parties may be an early sign of trouble in European democracies. Related to this, I am also interested in how perceptions of European Union and the future of European integration differ across these diverse right-wing predispositions. This would be especially interesting when confronted with contextual factors such as immigrant proportion and unemployment, which signal social and economic change.

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## Appendix A

**Table A1.1** Anti-Immigrant Attitudes – Scale Construction

| Question Wording   | Measurement Scale   |
|--|---|
| Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? Still use this card.  | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here? Use the same card.                     | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| <b>Support for Stricter Immigration Control (Scale)</b>  | <b>Range:</b> (-1.75; - 2.02)<br><b>Mean:</b> 0.0001<br><b>Std. Dev.</b> 0.89                           |
| This scale reports a Cronbah's Alpha of 0.85. The resulting variable was standardized around the mean of 0.  |   |

**Table A1.2** Support for Stricter Immigration Control – Scale Construction

| Question Wording   | Measurement Scale   |
|--|---|
| Now, using this card, to what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country] people to come and live here? | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most [country] people? Still use this card.  | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| To what extent do you think [country] should allow people from the poorer countries outside Europe to come and live here? Use the same card.                     | Allow many to come and live here (1)<br><br>Allow some (2)<br><br>Allow a few (3)<br><br>Allow none (4) |
| <b>Support for Stricter Immigration Control (Scale)</b>  | <b>Range:</b> (-1.75; – 2.02)<br><b>Mean:</b> 0.0001<br><b>Std. Dev.</b> 0.89                           |
| This scale reports a Cronbah’s Alpha of 0.87. The resulting variable was standardized around the mean of 0.  |   |

**Table A1.3** Summary Statistics

|                              | <b>N</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>Std. Dev.</b> | <b>Min</b> | <b>Max</b> |
|------------------------------|----------|-------------|------------------|------------|------------|
| Anti-immigrant Attitudes     | 121680   | -0.012      | 0.838            | -2.276     | 2.119      |
| Support for Stricter         |          |             |                  |            |            |
| Immigration Control          | 120612   | 0.031       | 0.861            | -1.746     | 2.018      |
| Unemployed                   | 122829   | 0.050       | 0.217            | 0          | 1          |
| Highest level of education   | 122283   | 2.947       | 1.401            | 1          | 5          |
| Age of respondent            | 122447   | 48.448      | 18.551           | 14         | 123        |
| Female                       | 122787   | 0.528       | 0.499            | 0          | 1          |
| Income                       | 93488    | 6.315       | 2.522            | 1          | 10         |
| Left/Right Orientation       | 109881   | 0.507       | 0.209            | 0          | 1          |
| Anti-egalitarian             |          |             |                  |            |            |
| Predisposition               | 116625   | 0.214       | 0.204            | 0          | 1          |
| Authoritarian Predisposition | 117113   | 0.640       | 0.178            | 0          | 1          |
| % Foreign-born               | 102355   | 11.309      | 5.361            | 2.8        | 34.43      |
| % Unemployed (country)       | 103107   | 7.185       | 3.108            | 2.5        | 20.1       |
| GDP/capita                   | 103107   | 39496.720   | 14270.750        | 13310.84   | 93156.84   |

Country  $N = 17$ , Country survey wave  $N = 74$

## Appendix B

Table B1. Summary Statistics for Individual and Country-Level Variables

| Variable                                      | N (respondents) | Mean      | Std. Dev. | Min      | Max      |
|---|-----------------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|
| Support for Redistribution                    | 126624          | 3.784583  | 1.042865  | 1        | 5        |
| Perception of Immigrant Welfare Participation | 49557           | 5.877273  | 2.131027  | 0        | 10       |
| Unemployed                                    | 128941          | 0.051605  | 0.2212291 | 0        | 1        |
| Highest level of education                    | 128354          | 2.948821  | 1.408099  | 1        | 5        |
| Age of respondent                             | 128436          | 48.43747  | 18.53436  | 14       | 123      |
| Female  | 128848          | 0.5294999 | 0.4991309 | 0        | 1        |
| Income  | 97554           | 6.287041  | 2.546677  | 1        | 10       |
| Left/Right Orientation                        | 115211          | 0.5080565 | 0.2046941 | 0        | 1        |
| Conservative Predisposition                   | 121894          | 0.3806426 | 0.1687191 | 0        | 1        |
| Authoritarian Predisposition                  | 121853          | 0.6392668 | 0.1790841 | 0        | 1        |
| % Foreign-Born*                               | 111542          | 11.44992  | 5.231484  | 2.8      | 34.43    |
| GDP/Capita*                                   | 100055          | 39840.74  | 14337.46  | 12653.63 | 93156.84 |
| % Unemployed (country)*                       | 100055          | 7.258906  | 3.120148  | 2.5      | 20.1     |

Country  $N = 17$ , county-wave  $N = 76$ ; \*country-wave level

**Table B2. Description of Individual Level Variables**

| <b>Variable</b>                               | <b>Measure</b>  | <b>Source</b> |
|---|---|---------------|
| Support for Redistribution                    | “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels” 5-point scale, from "Disagree strongly" (1) to "Agree strongly" (5)  | ESS           |
| Perception of Immigrant Welfare Participation | “Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out” 11-point scale, from "Generally put in more" (0) to "Generally take out more" (10). | ESS           |
| Unemployed                                    | Binary, (1 Unemployed - actively looking for job or not looking for a job, 0 employed)  | ESS           |
| Highest level of education                    | 5 categories, 0 (less than lower secondary) to 5 (tertiary completed)   | ESS           |
| Age (Years)                                   | Expressed in years  | ESS           |
| Female  | Binary (1 Female, 0 Male)   | ESS           |
| Income (Deciles)                              | 10 household income categories  | ESS           |
| Left/Right Orientation                        | 11 categories, 0 (far left) to 10 (far right)   | ESS           |
| Conservative Predisposition                   | 4 items scale, see manuscript for details   | ESS           |
| Authoritarian Predisposition                  | 4 items scale, see manuscript for details   | ESS           |

**Table B3.** Testing alternative authoritarian predisposition measure, adding GDP/capita, and unemployment rate.

|                                 | Residribution<br>Authoritarian 3-<br>Item | Immigrant<br>Consumption<br>Authoritarian 3-<br>Item | Residribution<br>Unemployment | Immigrant<br>Consumption<br>Unemployment | Residribution<br>GDP/Capita &<br>Unemployment | Immigrant<br>Consumption<br>GDP/Capita &<br>Unemployment |
|---------------------------------|---|--|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| Unemployed                      | 0.161**<br>(0.018)                        | 0.200**<br>(0.061)                                   | 0.163**<br>(0.018)            | 0.202**<br>(0.061)                       | 0.163**<br>(0.018)                            | 0.203**<br>(0.061)                                       |
| Highest level of education      | -0.073**<br>(0.003)                       | -0.152**<br>(0.010)                                  | -0.070**<br>(0.003)           | -0.146**<br>(0.010)                      | -0.070**<br>(0.003)                           | -0.145**<br>(0.010)                                      |
| Age of respondent               | 0.003**<br>(0.000)                        | -0.003**<br>(0.001)                                  | 0.003**<br>(0.000)            | -0.004**<br>(0.001)                      | 0.003**<br>(0.000)                            | -0.004**<br>(0.001)                                      |
| Female                          | 0.147**<br>(0.007)                        | 0.052**<br>(0.024)                                   | 0.146**<br>(0.007)            | 0.051**<br>(0.024)                       | 0.146**<br>(0.007)                            | 0.051**<br>(0.024)                                       |
| Income                          | -0.049**<br>(0.002)                       | -0.022**<br>(0.006)                                  | -0.048**<br>(0.002)           | -0.020**<br>(0.006)                      | -0.048**<br>(0.002)                           | -0.020**<br>(0.006)                                      |
| Left/Right Orientation          | -1.248**<br>(0.018)                       | 1.189**<br>(0.059)                                   | -1.259**<br>(0.018)           | 1.162**<br>(0.059)                       | -1.259**<br>(0.018)                           | 1.163**<br>(0.059)                                       |
| Conservative Predisposition     | -0.147**<br>(0.058)                       | 0.660**<br>(0.180)                                   | -0.118**<br>(0.058)           | 0.724**<br>(0.180)                       | -0.118**<br>(0.058)                           | 0.725**<br>(0.180)                                       |
| Authoritarian Predisposition    | 0.278**<br>(0.050)                        | 0.213<br>(0.154)                                     | 0.427**<br>(0.054)            | 0.409**<br>(0.168)                       | 0.428**<br>(0.054)                            | 0.411**<br>(0.168)                                       |
| <i>Cross-Level Interactions</i> |   |  |                               |  |   |  |
| % Foreign-Born                  | 0.004<br>(0.007)                          | -0.005<br>(0.015)                                    | 0.006<br>(0.006)              | -0.013<br>(0.015)                        | 0.005<br>(0.006)                              | -0.015<br>(0.014)  |
| Conservative X % Foreign-Born   | -0.008*<br>(0.005)                        | -0.013<br>(0.016)                                    | -0.008*<br>(0.005)            | -0.015<br>(0.016)                        | -0.008*<br>(0.005)                            | -0.015<br>(0.016)  |
| Authoritarian X % Foreign-Born  | 0.002<br>(0.004)                          | 0.036**<br>(0.014)                                   | 0.002<br>(0.005)              | 0.049**<br>(0.015)                       | 0.002<br>(0.005)                              | 0.049**<br>(0.015)                                       |
| GDP/Capita                      | -0.000**<br>(0.000)                       | -0.000**<br>(0.000)                                  |                               |  | 0.000<br>(0.000)                              | -0.000**<br>(0.000)                                      |
| % Unemployed                    |   |  | 0.038**<br>(0.008)            | 0.023<br>(0.019)                         | 0.046**<br>(0.012)                            | -0.016<br>(0.027)  |
| Constant                        | 4.675**<br>(0.106)                        | 5.758**<br>(0.206)                                   | 4.188**<br>(0.103)            | 5.280**<br>(0.246)                       | 4.071**<br>(0.159)                            | 5.769**<br>(0.342)                                       |

\*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1 two-tailed test;



## Appendix C

**Table C1.** Adding unemployment rate and % foreign born

|                                      | (1)                            | (2)                            | (3)                            | (4)                              | (5)                             | (6)                              | (7)                              | (8)                              |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| PRR Catchall (GALTAN-Economic L/R)   | 0.492**<br>(0.154)             | 0.652**<br>(0.166)             | 0.470**<br>(0.162)             | 0.991**<br>(0.206)               | 0.490**<br>(0.160)              | 0.657**<br>(0.173)               | 0.471**<br>(0.168)               | 0.988**<br>(0.215)               |
| Economic Dimension                   | 1.654**<br>(0.132)             | 3.005**<br>(0.395)             |                                |                                  | 1.651**<br>(0.135)              | 3.010**<br>(0.400)               |                                  |                                  |
| Egalitarian Predisposition (L/R)     |                                |                                | 4.645**<br>(0.279)             | 7.944**<br>(0.829)               |                                 |                                  | 4.796**<br>(0.287)               | 7.963**<br>(0.845)               |
| PRR Catchall × Egalitarian Pred. L/R |                                | -0.483**<br>(0.134)            |                                | -1.180**<br>(0.278)              |                                 | -0.495**<br>(0.139)              |                                  | -1.158**<br>(0.289)              |
| Authoritarian Predisposition         | 0.963**<br>(0.188)             | 0.973**<br>(0.187)             | 1.624**<br>(0.429)             | 1.633**<br>(0.428)               | 0.842**<br>(0.193)              | 0.853**<br>(0.192)               | 1.449**<br>(0.442)               | 1.431**<br>(0.441)               |
| Unemployed                           | 0.316**<br>(0.129)             | 0.316**<br>(0.129)             | 0.306**<br>(0.139)             | 0.307**<br>(0.139)               | 0.315**<br>(0.131)              | 0.315**<br>(0.131)               | 0.345**<br>(0.141)               | 0.340**<br>(0.142)               |
| Highest level of education           | -1.549**<br>(0.107)            | -1.551**<br>(0.108)            | -1.564**<br>(0.112)            | -1.572**<br>(0.112)              | -1.547**<br>(0.110)             | -1.549**<br>(0.110)              | -1.561**<br>(0.114)              | -1.568**<br>(0.115)              |
| Female                               | -0.417**<br>(0.061)            | -0.416**<br>(0.061)            | -0.377**<br>(0.063)            | -0.373**<br>(0.063)              | -0.416**<br>(0.062)             | -0.416**<br>(0.062)              | -0.371**<br>(0.065)              | -0.369**<br>(0.065)              |
| Age of respondent                    | -2.019**<br>(0.215)            | -2.012**<br>(0.215)            | -2.232**<br>(0.223)            | -2.224**<br>(0.223)              | -1.985**<br>(0.219)             | -1.980**<br>(0.219)              | -2.182**<br>(0.227)              | -2.175**<br>(0.227)              |
| Income                               | -0.502**<br>(0.124)            | -0.496**<br>(0.124)            | -0.651**<br>(0.128)            | -0.649**<br>(0.128)              | -0.508**<br>(0.126)             | -0.501**<br>(0.126)              | -0.662**<br>(0.131)              | -0.660**<br>(0.131)              |
| GDP/Capita (log)                     | 10.258**<br>(2.406)            | 10.690**<br>(2.484)            | 11.030**<br>(2.531)            | 11.228**<br>(2.555)              | 9.895**<br>(2.437)              | 10.349**<br>(2.519)              | 10.657**<br>(2.553)              | 10.834**<br>(2.568)              |
| <b>% Unemployment</b>                | <b>0.163</b><br><b>(0.097)</b> | <b>0.170</b><br><b>(0.100)</b> | <b>0.197</b><br><b>(0.102)</b> | <b>0.202**</b><br><b>(0.103)</b> | <b>0.096</b><br><b>(0.118)</b>  | <b>0.102</b><br><b>(0.122)</b>   | <b>0.121</b><br><b>(0.124)</b>   | <b>0.121</b><br><b>(0.124)</b>   |
| <b>% Foreign-born</b>                |                                |                                |                                |                                  | <b>9.910</b><br><b>(11.610)</b> | <b>10.447</b><br><b>(11.997)</b> | <b>11.638</b><br><b>(12.154)</b> | <b>12.555</b><br><b>(12.225)</b> |
| Constant                             | -0.902**<br>(0.398)            | -0.837**<br>(0.396)            | -0.801**<br>(0.395)            | -0.781**<br>(0.394)              | -0.893**<br>(0.409)             | -0.824**<br>(0.407)              | -0.800**<br>(0.407)              | -0.789<br>(0.406)                |
| $\rho$ (ICC)                         | 0.11                           | 0.116                          | 0.12                           | 0.122                            | 0.111                           | 0.118                            | 0.12                             | 0.121                            |
| BIC                                  | 8821.24                        | 8818.42                        | 8151.03                        | 8142.74                          | 8417.67                         | 8414.93                          | 7767.80                          | 7761.52                          |
| N                                    | 20218(21)                      | 20218(21)                      | 19589(21)                      | 19589(21)                        | 19424(20)                       | 19424(20)                        | 18803(20)                        | 18803(20)                        |

\*\* p<0.05

**Table C2.** Testing less restrictive definition of PRR party family


|   | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3-L/R)             | (4-L/R)             |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| PRR Catchall (GALTAN-Economic L/R)      | 0.437**<br>(0.153)  | 0.554**<br>(0.160)  | 0.428**<br>(0.160)  | 0.696**<br>(0.193)  |
| PRR Catchall × Egalitarian Pred.<br>L/R |                     | -0.380**<br>(0.116) |                     | -0.612**<br>(0.240) |
| Egalitarian Predisposition (L/R)        | 1.675**<br>(0.124)  | 2.753**<br>(0.348)  | 4.977**<br>(0.267)  | 6.708**<br>(0.731)  |
| Authoritarian Predisposition            | 0.999**<br>(0.176)  | 1.007**<br>(0.176)  | 1.839**<br>(0.407)  | 1.845**<br>(0.407)  |
| Unemployed                              | 0.328**<br>(0.123)  | 0.328**<br>(0.123)  | 0.354**<br>(0.132)  | 0.356**<br>(0.132)  |
| Highest level of education              | -1.439**<br>(0.104) | -1.440**<br>(0.104) | -1.452**<br>(0.108) | -1.455**<br>(0.108) |
| Female                                  | -0.419**<br>(0.057) | -0.419**<br>(0.057) | -0.376**<br>(0.060) | -0.373**<br>(0.060) |
| Age of respondent                       | -1.729**<br>(0.201) | -1.729**<br>(0.201) | -1.987**<br>(0.209) | -1.985**<br>(0.209) |
| Income                                  | -0.495**<br>(0.118) | -0.494**<br>(0.118) | -0.642**<br>(0.123) | -0.643**<br>(0.123) |
| GDP/Capita (log)                        | 7.510**<br>(1.801)  | 7.680**<br>(1.829)  | 7.906**<br>(1.879)  | 7.966**<br>(1.900)  |
| Constant                                | -0.420<br>(0.363)   | -0.387<br>(0.362)   | -0.330<br>(0.362)   | -0.306<br>(0.361)   |
| $\rho$ (ICC)                            | 0.166               | 0.171               | 0.179               | 0.183               |
| <i>BIC</i>                              | 9985.748            | 9985.093            | 9101.298            | 9104.803            |
| N                                       | 23458(25)           | 23458(25)           | 22546(25)           | 22546(25)           |

\*\* p&lt;0.05

**Table C3.** Attitudes-based measures of economic and cultural ideological positions

|                                     | (1)                 | (2)                 |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| PRR Catchall (GALTAN-Economic L/R)  | 0.534**<br>(0.178)  | 0.755**<br>(0.211)  |
| PRR Catchall × Economic Orientation |                     | -0.502**<br>(0.257) |
| Economic Orientation                | 2.843**<br>(0.241)  | 4.192**<br>(0.734)  |
| Cultural Orientation                | 7.544**<br>(0.350)  | 7.546**<br>(0.350)  |
| Unemployed                          | 0.333**<br>(0.135)  | 0.336**<br>(0.135)  |
| Highest level of education          | -1.305**<br>(0.113) | -1.313**<br>(0.113) |
| Female                              | -0.339**<br>(0.064) | -0.338**<br>(0.064) |
| Age of respondent                   | -2.640**<br>(0.223) | -2.635**<br>(0.223) |
| Income                              | -0.463**<br>(0.129) | -0.465**<br>(0.129) |
| GDP/Capita (log)                    | 10.527**<br>(2.708) | 10.679**<br>(2.698) |
| % Unemployment                      | 0.000<br>(0.132)    | 0.002<br>(0.131)    |
| % Foreign-born                      | 13.797<br>(12.950)  | 14.201<br>(12.896)  |
| Constant                            | -0.665<br>(0.391)   | -0.674<br>(0.391)   |
| $\rho$ (ICC)                        | 0.135               | 0.134               |
| BIC                                 | 7940.325            | 7946.383            |
| N                                   | 19535(20)           | 19535(20)           |


\*\* p&lt;0.05



Graphs by Country

Note: In all countries, with a possible exception of Portugal (PT), the anti-egalitarian predispositions are heavily left-skewed indicating relative consistency of within country distribution of this predispositions in Western European context.

**Figure C1.** Within Country Distribution of Anti-egalitarian Predisposition



Graphs by Country

Note: the graphs present the within country distribution of authoritarian predisposition. In all states except for Sweden (SE), Norway (NO), and Netherlands (NL) the density of attitude seem to be bimodal with first modus registering at .7 and second at .9 of 0 to 1 authoritarian predisposition scale.

**Figure C2.** Within Country Distribution of Anti-egalitarian Predisposition