

THE DIVERGENCE OF THE U.S. ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY:
NEW RELATIONSHIPS WITH SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN AFTER THE COLD WAR

by

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(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

The United States alliance with South Korea and Japan faced new challenges in the post-Cold War period. The recent tendency shows that U.S.-South Korea alliance is weakening while U.S.-Japan alliance strengthened showing divergence in the level of alliance solidarity. This study argues that the domestic politics of the allied state frequently influences the U.S. foreign policy decision-making which affects the level of alliance solidarity. I established two hypotheses which are that based on the public opinion perceptions towards the United States and the government ideology policy line of the allied state, the level of alliance solidarity will be determined by the U.S. government. The findings show that the public opinion and government ideology affects the U.S. government perception. Based on this relationship, the outcome is reflected in the degree of alliance solidarity. As a result, this study provides an alternative explanation of the explanatory factors in determining the alliance solidarity.

INDEX WORDS: Alliance solidarity, Government ideology, Public opinion, U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S.-South Korea alliance, U.S. government perception

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To my family: Wooduck Seo, Gueyoung Koo, Eunbee Seo, Donggul Seo

For their love, support, and prayer.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION ..	1
2 THEORY	6
Literature Review	6
Theoretical Framework	17
Methodology	27
3 ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD	32
U.S.-South Korea Alliance	32
U.S.-Japan Alliance	35
4 FINDINGS	40
Level of Alliance Solidarity	40
Government Ideology and Public Opinion	54
5 CONCLUSIONS	74
REFERENCES	79
APPENDICES	91
A TABLE AND GRAPH OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH	91

B	QUESTION OF THE POLLS (SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN)92
C	CODING OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH (JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA)93

LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 4.1 Total Number of Summits between the United States and South Korea and Japan ...	44
Table 4.2 Variation in the President's Speech on South Korea and Japan by 2 years (%/100) ..	46
Table 4.3 Partisanship of South Korean Presidents	55
Table 4.4 Partisanship of Japan Prime Minister	56

LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 2.1 Linking Domestic Political Competition to Foreign Policy	23
Figure 2.2 Causal Mechanism	23
Figure 4.1 U.S.-South Korea Summit Timeline	44
Figure 4.2 U.S.-Japan Summit Timeline	44
Figure 4.3 Variation by 2-year term	47
Figure 4.4 Alliance Solidarity of South Korea and Japan	48
Figure 4.5 Absolute Value of the difference between South Korea and Japan in each Tone Category	53
Figure 4.6 Attitude of South Korea toward the U.S., 1993-2008	58
Figure 4.7 Attitude of Japan toward the U.S., 1993-2008	58
Figure 4.8 Opinion on the State of U.S.-South Korea Relations, 1993-2008	59
Figure 4.9 Opinion on the State of U.S.-Japan Relations, 1993-2008	59

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States requested military support from its allies in order to carry out the campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. Due to the request, South Korea and Japan dispatched ground troops to support the United States. South Korea sent a relatively large number of troops – total 19,105 personnel – to Iraq, and Japan sent only 600 personnel. Considering the figures, it is likely that both states should be acknowledged for the efforts of supporting the U.S. military actions, but the U.S. Vice President, during his visit in East Asia,¹ disregarded the accomplishment of South Korea and showed gratitude to Japan for its support in Iraq, which gives some doubt to the relations between the United States and South Korea.

Based on the recent events, the foreign policy of the U.S. relations with the East Asian states have gradually shown more clarity. The senior officials and policies in the U.S., South Korea, and Japan show that the relations between the U.S. and Japan tend to be more cooperative than during any other era, while the U.S. and South Korea relations remain status quo or rather are growing apart from each other. Why is there a change in an alliance center-of-gravity in the East Asian region? What are the causes that affect the characteristics of the alliance? The relations do not show extreme change but a minimum shift that can be observable to indicate that some difference in the alliance is taking place.

During the Cold War period, the major purpose of the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances was to maintain peaceful order in response to the Soviet and Chinese threats in the East

¹ Muzi.com News. (2007, February 20). Cheney begins Asia visit in Japan. *Muzi.com News*. Retrieved from <http://lateline.muzi.net/news/ll/english>.

Asian region. For South Korea, the U.S.-South Korea alliance aimed more at deterring aggression by North Korea (Kim, 2008). Many of the U.S. senior officials in every administration have emphasized the importance of the East Asian alliance and have kept reassuring that the relations will continue and will stay firm. Of course, there were several concerns regarding the U.S.-South Korea alliance in the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations, for they laid out a policy of withdrawing the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) or reducing the numbers which gave concern to the Korean government in weakening the alliance. For the South Korean government, the relocation of the U.S. troops could lead to aggressiveness from North Korea. Other than these incidents, the U.S. relations with South Korea remained very solid throughout the Cold War period.

Since the Cold War period, most of the realists of international relations have predicted that the U.S.-Japan alliance would become weak compared with that during the Cold War period. According to realism, states tend to form alliances in order to balance the power or threat of the opposing states (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1985). Japan was strategically a very important ally to the U.S. because the alliance could deter the former Soviet Union and China, the leading states of the Communist bloc. The U.S. relied on Japan's economic and military capability along with the geographic proximity for the use of military bases in order to balance the former Soviet Union. However, after the former Soviet Union disintegrated, realists assumed that the U.S.-Japan alliance would become weak. Even though Japan needed the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter a likely threat from Russia and China, it was regarded that the Japanese economy and military capability were sufficient enough to defend itself against the remaining communist states without the assistance from the U.S., of course, in the limitation of Article IX of the Japanese

Constitution.² Furthermore, the economic power relationship between Japan and the United States, which was an equally competitive one rather than a hierarchically subservient relation, was also expected to contribute to the disintegration or weakening of the alliance (Hurst, 1997).

However, in the post-Cold War era, the policies and the actions that Japan showed toward the U.S. were different from the prediction of the realist argument. The United States forming uni-polarity and a sole hegemon in the world required Japan's more active cooperation in order to sustain and spread out the U.S. global hegemony in the East Asian region, along with deterring the rising China's power. In fact, after the Gulf War in the early 1990s, in response to the U.S. request, Japan switched its long-lasting security policies so that Japan could contribute more to the alliance and so that the alliance would be rebuilt as a more equal one rather than the previous subservient one (Kim, 2008).

In August 1994, the Japanese Prime Minister's Advisory Group on Defense Issues called for a new comprehensive strategy in its report, "The Modality of the Security Defense Capability of Japan," also known as the Higuchi Report, arguing that "Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order." Japan's post-Cold War strategy should rest on heightened multilateral cooperation, continued alliance with America, and well-balanced, ready, and mobile military forces.³ In the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, Japan began to consider the

² Article IX of Japanese Constitution: *(1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.* This article was made in a reformation in the structure of Japan by the U.S. military after World War II. Adopting a new constitution, also known as the 'MacArthur Constitution', on October 6, 1946, this ninth article is famous for the 'no-war clause'. Because of this 'no-war clause', Japan was restricted from forming military forces. However, gradually, re-interpreting the constitution, Japan formed a Self-Defense Force (SDF) in the ostensible reason for defending only their homeland. There are many debates on Article IX whether to amend or maintain the article, for it impedes Japan of its military use in the international affairs. The troops dispatched to Iraq to support the U.S. military warfare has been one of the recent acts of aggressiveness shown by Japan, which was blamed by the neighboring states because of concern about Japan's ambition that was shown during World War II.

³ http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/jfq_pages/jfq0707.pdf

support of the United States as essential to its growth of political power in the world, and the United States also regarded Japan as an essential partner for undertaking its strategies in the Asia-Pacific region (Kim, 2008). Japan's aggressiveness in foreign military affairs became clear after the September 11 terrorist attack in the U.S. Japan proclaimed that they would support and give cooperation to the U.S. in its war against terrorism.⁴ As a result, Japan sent 600 Self Defense Force (SDF) personnel to Iraq in support of the U.S. military warfare, even though there was a substantial amount of opposition and criticism from South Korea and China.

In contrast, the U.S.-South Korea alliance showed a different path compared with the U.S.-Japan alliance. After the Cold War, even though the major Communist threat – the former Soviet Union - was eliminated, South Korea had North Korea as a critical existing security threat. Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, due to the increasing threat of North Korea with its nuclear program, the U.S.-South Korea alliance was expected to remain strong.⁵ Both the U.S. and South Korea considered the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that North Korea possessed as a threat. However, throughout the post Cold War period and after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the U.S.-South Korea alliance seems to have weakened, contradicting the realist's prediction. Both states began to show friction in the first North Korea nuclear crisis (1993-1994).⁶ An interesting phenomenon that developed in South Korea is that the government and the public began to recognize North Korea not as an imminent threat to the security but rather as a one-nation state based on nationalism. The anti-American emotions dominated the South Korean public, giving a negative perception toward the United States. The significant

⁴ After the 9/11 terrorist attack, Prime Minister Koizumi stated during his meeting with President Bush that, "we Japanese firmly stand behind the United States to fight terrorism... It will no longer hold that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) should not be sent to danger spots. There is no such thing as a safe place." Press Releases 2001, Embassy of Japan in Washington D.C., Retrieved from <http://www.us.emb-japan.go.jp/english>.

⁵ For more discussion, see Victor D. Cha & David C. Kang. 2003. *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*. Columbia University Press.

⁶ Robert Manning quotes "[the North Korea nuclear crisis] has created the deepest distrust alienation between the United States and South Korea." in 'The U.S., ROK, and North Korea: Anatomy of a Muddle,' October 1995, at www.nautilus.org.

groups of the public believed that the security tension on the Korean Peninsula was due to the U.S. rather than North Korea.

The relationship with the United States had been firm throughout the Cold War period and the U.S. still understands the strategic importance of both states in East Asian Affairs. Yet, unlike the realist's prediction, the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances are going in different directions. How do we account for these different directional changes in the ties with the U.S. in the two military alliances after the end of the Cold War? How could we argue the weakening of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance? Why has the United States pursued different expectations and policies toward the two states? These are the intriguing questions that guide this study.

The theoretical explanation in alliance is dominated by the realist perspective. Yet, the main purpose of this study is to examine the limitations of the existing arguments in the field. The main argument here lies in the domestic political approach which assumes that there are relations between domestic and international affairs (Putnam, 1988). The approach of domestic politics will be able to explain the change of the U.S. behavior in the East Asian alliances. In other words, domestic factors constituting the ideology of the government and public opinion affect the alliance policies of the United States, leading to different alliance behaviors in South Korea and Japan.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY

1. Literature Review

Very few studies have thoroughly examined the comparison of the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances. Rather, studies were either looking at the U.S.-South Korea alliance and U.S.-Japan separately or explaining American prospects in East Asia as a region. The alliance solidarity could be explained with realism. According to the neorealist perspective, alliance is defined as “a limited set of states acting in concert at [some]time regarding the mutual enhancement of the military security of the members” (Fedder, 1968). The formation or maintenance of alliances is determined by the imbalanced power distribution in the international system – balance of power – or the emergence of external threats – balance of threat (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Snyder, 1984).

In terms of balance of power, Waltz (1979) argued that states’ relative capabilities decide alliance behaviors: states prefer joining the weaker coalition, and a strong state is not likely to join the stronger coalition – balancing is preferred instead of bandwagoning. In contrast, “balance of threat” theory argues that balance applies not only against a superior power but also against a perceived threat (Walt, 1995; 1987; Keohane, 1988). Threat, unlike mere power, includes aggregate power, proximity to a target, offensive capability, and perceived intentions (Walt, 1995; 1987; Keohane, 1989). From the neorealist perspective, alliances emerge not only as a means of achieving balance against a superior power but also as a way of balancing threats posed by other actors within the international system. However, the survival of alliances depends

both on material gain and on the common perception of the threat posed by the common enemy (Walt, 1997; 1995; 1987; Levin, 2004). As mentioned above, realism gives adequate explanation in the alliance concept which is applied in many alliance studies. Yet, other schools of thoughts have additional explanations. For example, neoliberalism argues the importance of institutions in the formation of alliance. States can increase their long-term benefits despite the costs caused from being member-states in institutions (Keohane, 1984). Therefore, with similar interest and beneficial aspects, solidarity between states will be stronger within the institution which holds the alliance together.

Most recently, Kim (2008) compared the difference between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliance cohesion with the concept of constructivism. He explained Northeast Asian alliance with the theory of cultural causality and argued that critical junctures have prompted changes in security-related cultural activism in South Korea and Japan, and these cultural changes have contributed significantly to their changing alliance policies towards the United States after the Cold War.

Hinton (1981) described that due to the buildup of the former Soviet Union, the remaining tension on the Korean Peninsula, and the rising China, the United States has to provide a strong military support to East and Southeast Asian alliances in order to maintain international stability and American credibility. Pollack (2004) explained the change of American foreign strategy in Asian states. He stated that major changes were afoot in U.S. relations with various regional actors, based largely on the extent to which regional allies were prepared to accommodate U.S. policy needs. For instance, the U.S. agreed to reduce troops and relocate U.S. military facilities in South Korea responding to Korean resentment of an overly visible footprint of U.S. forces. On the other hand, he described the active cooperation of Japan with the U.S. in

military operations, showing the difference between the two allied states (Pollack, 2004).

Cossa (2000) argued virtual alliance between U.S.-Korea-Japan for the long-term peace and stability in East Asia. In order to achieve virtual alliance, Cossa asserted maintenance of a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance and the continuation of a solid U.S.-South Korea alliance. Moreover, Cossa emphasized the importance of bilateral security cooperation between South Korea and Japan.

Finley (2002) examined the U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia, the application of Theater Missile Defense (TMD), and allied defense relationship. Explaining the situation of the U.S. and its missile defense project, she emphasizes the importance of two main bilateral alliances – South Korea and Japan. She argued that the change among the two alliances is based on the alteration of the U.S. strategy – anti-terrorist warfare – deterrence against North Korea, and concept of regional collective security. She perceived a difference between the two alliances: the U.S.-South Korea alliance has not fundamentally altered the focus, and the centerpiece of Korean security efforts remains deterrence of hostilities from the North, whereas the U.S.-Japan alliance has adjusted to a new strategic goal of promoting general regional security.

Cha (1999) argued an interesting explanation for alliance cohesion. He brought an alternative perception of the Northeast Asian cooperation with the United States that the Korean and Japanese perceptions of their common great power patron's (the U.S.) security commitment directly affect the level of political-military cooperation between the two quasi-allied states. This argument is that fears of U.S. abandonment and the level of patron commitment are a better determinant of alliance cohesion than the level of external threat. The general argument in the realist perspective is that external threat is a determinant factor for the alliance solidarity, but in the case of Korea and Japan, the fear of the loss of the state's own aggregated power due to the

loss of the alliance partner (the U.S.), whose capabilities could be aggregated with their own, is of greater significance than the level of threat from the outside. This threat is a perception of the risk of being attacked due to weakness in the face of an enemy. In other words, alliance solidarity is not directly influenced by external threat, but reflected through the perceptions of patron commitment – in this case, the U.S. commitment with South Korea and Japan.

Cha (2000) developed a concept of quasi-alliances (two states that remain non-allied but share a third power as a common ally) which argues that Korean and Japanese perceptions of their common great power patron's security commitment (the United States) directly affect the level of political-military cooperation between the two quasi-allied states. Previous studies have shown that the level of external threat is the primary determinant of alliance patterns and degrees of alliance cohesion (e.g., high threats mean high alliance cohesion and vice versa). Cha (2000) asserted that in an alliance where weaker partners are highly dependent on a common patron, the common patron's security commitment is a better determinant of alliance behavior between the two weaker partners than the level of external threat, with the cases of South Korea and Japan with the U.S. alignment.

Weinstein (1977) explained the critical moment of the alliance in the 1970s when Carter mentioned the U.S. forces withdrawal. He argued that Korea and Japan should reinforce its military capability for long-term solution of stability in Northeast Asia. Dependence on the U.S. will not last; therefore, South Korea and Japan should not view only the shortsighted view of stability but establish a long-term alliance security structure less dependent on the U.S. military power.

Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002) described the difference in the alliance formation between the East Asian bilateral relationship compared with the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) and Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) multilateral institution. They argued that the perception of collective identity played an underappreciated role in this decision. After the Cold War, cultural diversity, disparate economies, asymmetries in power, and historical animosities have brought differences between the South Korea and Japan alliances with the U.S. and operated as obstacles to multilateralism in East Asia (Duffield, 2001; Nolt, 1999; & Simon, 1993).

Moon and Suh (2008) stressed domestic politics as a factor of influencing cooperation in Northeast Asian order – which include the position of the United States. Their argument claimed that the “masses” can be mobilized at any instant under the banner of nationalism to denounce another country, undermining the chance for community building in the region. They asserted that the important task for a state to take is to prevent nationalism from being misused and abused in the name of domestic political gains and power struggles. Equally important is how to avoid a negatively reinforcing amplification of vicious nationalism across national boundaries. This task can be accomplished by cultivating transnational solidarity among liberal forces in the region as well as confronting and breaking down an unintended, inadvertent ultraconservative alliance, which earns political capital from a nationalist war of attrition. In the case of Japan, neo-nationalism has become one of the major driving forces behind Japan’s foreign and domestic policies (Moon & Suh, 2008). In South Korea, nationalism has been used to legitimize government politics and agitate the public against political and international issues. Nationalism exists and thrives as a social reality by having evolved into concrete ideas, norms, actions, and movements affecting public attitudes as well as policy behaviors (Moon & Suh, 2008). Also Moon and Suh (2008) inferred that nationalism has reacted a little differently in terms of facing the U.S. in security and economic.

Many of the studies conducted on East Asian security have focused on U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan separately, or presented the need of three states security cooperation. Cha (1997) argued that divergence was evident in the U.S.-South Korea alliance after the Cold War. This was due to the different positions from which the two states viewed security. Cha (1997) asserted that there should be ideational convergence on what security means for the two states. Bringing the ideational gap in security conceptions presents the larger challenge and opportunity for the continued vitality of the alliance.

Steinberg (2006) also examined the seriousness of the U.S.-South Korean relations. He argued that changing attitudes within the Korea power structure have negatively influenced U.S. policy makers. Also, in the relatively new Korean democracy, the opinions of the people do count, and civil society is both highly nationalistic and active and profoundly important: they shape as well as reflect popular sentiment (Moon, 2006). Moon (2006) reported that Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other interest groups have challenged and eroded the influence of the old political and bureaucratic establishment, and, as a result, the future of the alliance depends as much on these forces of democratization as on external threats. In other words, domestic interest groups can affect both allied states policy and influence the relationship.

Kong (2005) employed foreign policy approaches to explain transformation of Seoul's perceptions of the alliance. According to Kong, socio-economic and political transformations of South Korea between 1953 and 2003 have affected the change in Seoul's perception of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. He examined that the change in public opinion, democratization of the state, leadership change, proliferation of civic organization and media outlets with diverse ideological orientations has contributed to growing South Korean demand for "equal partnership" in the alliance and the need for inter-Korea cooperation.

Sneider (2006) examined the critical position in which the U.S.-South Korea alliance is situated. He asserted that the alliance needs profound re-examination and that both states have to have a “shared recognition” of what the alliances’ common threat is (Sneider, 2006). Another interesting argument from Sneider is in order to reinvigorate the U.S.-South Korea alliance, the states have to support the public opinion and policy-making elites.

Several prospects of the U.S.-South Korea alliance after 9/11 were argued by Przystup and Choi (2004). The basic assumption implied is the change in American global strategy, the existing threat from the North, and the new generation involvement in the South Korean government. Przystup contended that transformation of the U.S. military would leave a less intrusive American presence in South Korea and this could maintain alliance solidarity and relationships more equitable, sustainable, and better able to undertake bilateral security cooperation off the peninsula. Choi argued that South Korea, in terms of security strategy, should not be confined to deterrence of North Korea. South Korea should enhance the military capability and support the U.S. strategy of regional stability.

According to Cossa and Oxley (2000), the existence of the U.S.-South Korea alliance is mainly because of North Korea. The security threat from North Korea has maintained and reassured that the alliance for the U.S.-South Korea alliance is essential for continued peace and stability in East Asia. The alliance cohesion level would decrease if North and South Korea relations were not so intensive, but based on the current circumstances, they expected that the alliance would remain. They also expressed the need for an agreed, well articulated, and closely coordinated long-term strategy that enjoys bipartisan U.S. support (Cossa & Oxley, 2000).

Shin and Chang (2006) argued the effect of ethnic nationalism in South Korea. The alleged issue is that the formation of anti-Americanism is part of the ethnic nationalism. The

anti-American idea was originally limited to the student movement but has expanded into the core of the administration in the recent past. This expansion has influenced the relationship between the U.S. in many aspects which, as a result, weakened the ties with the United States and pulled the interest of South Korea to China. A resolution for the argument is that the United States has to take indigenous nationalism into consideration when fashioning a better foreign policy, and this applies particularly to its Korean policy. The reason is that the South Korean public is very sensitive when issues stimulate its nationalism, resulting in negative movements.

Studies in the U.S.-Japan relations have been more focused on East Asia security. These studies practically stress the role change of Japan in the regional and international security issues. Christensen (1999) view that the role of Japan in the U.S.-Japan alliance should change due to emerging Chinese influences. It is not that the U.S.-Japan alliance is diverging, but rather the United States is encouraging more active roles in stabilizing East Asian affairs. The alliance characteristic is argued in terms of the security dilemma scenario and spiral model dynamics for stability in East Asian region. Strengthening Japan's alliance with the United States has been strongly argued by Shintaro Ishihara, the controversial Tokyo governor, for the concerns of the threats from China, North Korea, and global terrorists (Ishihara, 2001).

Song (1995) examined the necessity of change in the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War period. Based on security dilemma and balance of threat concept, he argued that Japan is moving from the passive action, mostly relying on the United States, toward active participation in the international affairs forming a symmetrical relationship with the U.S. Song also emphasized the common threat concept in the U.S.-Japan alliance and the needs of multilateralism and collective security cooperation in East Asia. The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Special Report in 2000 examined the elements of strengthening and

restructuring the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 21st century. This report focuses on the fields of politics, security, intelligence, economy, and diplomacy. Unlike the relationship in the Cold War era, it emphasizes that the U.S. and Japan should adjust their policies in order to show favorable alliance and cooperation (INSS Special Report, 2000).

Mendel, Jr. (1966) researched public opinion of Japan on the American alliance. Giving examples of the 1966 Tokyo riot, he argued that the Japanese government should take into consideration the polls from the public. Also, the United States can improve its Japanese image by relatively minor policy adjustments. He attempts to build connections between public opinion and alliance relationship.

Moon (2008) found the challenging effect of domestic politics in foreign policy. She explained that the United States has been the missionary of spreading democracy. Several Asian states including South Korea took credit for the U.S. effort. She argued that democracy contains vibrant civil society activism and local empowerment in the historical context of over-centralization and social oppression. The constant request of assistance in participating in the U.S. policy can accumulate in the country's collective memory and become potent sources of mistrust and hostility toward the U.S. and its related issues, for instance, rebuilding the U.S.-South Korea alliance relationship in the future. She found that people's political identities and expressions may end up directing, rather than following, policies.

Harris and Cooper (2000) argued that one of the important factors of maintaining alliance is reflected in public attitudes. Policymakers in the United States and in Japan broadly agree, or if they perceive alliance burdens unfairly distributed, it will be difficult to maintain the alliance. They stress that the U.S.-Japan alliance will remain important and close as long as the United States emphasized global commitment, regional engagement, and forward deployment.

They argued that the domestic support for the alliance is strong (Harris & Cooper, 2000). Furthermore, they viewed that the conservative government of Japan has strengthened the U.S.-Japan alliance. Such argument is that some pacifists remain opposed to the United States because of its military approach to issues, but others support the U.S. alliance on the grounds that it constrains Japanese militarists.

Vogel (2002) argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance will be more contentious in the future. Compared with the ambitious plans for upgrading the U.S.-Japan security alliance by the George W. Bush administration, the Japanese opinion leaders from both right and left are showing signs of increasing nationalism and resentment toward the United States. Vogel (2002) discussed the opinions of various domestic sources influencing the policy decision in relation with the U.S. Despite the contentious argument, Vogel claimed that the war on terrorism has increased the likelihood that Japan will cooperate with U.S. plan for strengthening the alliance regardless of the domestic opinions. A similar argument was made by Perry and Yoshihara (2003). They argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance challenged confrontation before the September 11 terrorist attack, yet the war on terrorism will place greater alignment between the two states. Also, the threat of North Korea will strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance (Perry & Yoshihara, 2003).

Diverse perspectives are focused on the past, present, and future U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan. The general tone of the scholars on the East Asian alliance is that Japan is tightening the relationship with the United States, whereas South Korea is facing a serious situation with its alliance, in which the U.S.-South Korea alliance solidarity seems to be decreasing. The overall schools of thought in viewing the characteristic of the alliances is the change in American security strategy – the war on terrorism, the external threat of North Korea, and the inquiry of establishing a regional collective security. Other approaches viewed the

influence of the public opinion and the emergence of the new generation in politics in the allied states, for instance, the anti-American movement combined with nationalism. Regarding the various arguments, the present status observed by various scholars is that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is withering and the U.S.-Japan alliance is strengthening. Although many research studies have inspected the two alliances individually, in-depth research considering both alliance has not been thoroughly reviewed. Of course, scholars examined how to form a collective security for regional stability with the cooperation of the three states. However, finding an influencing factor in the difference between the alliance solidarity in the South Korea and Japan has not been precisely studied.

To examine the alliance solidarity between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances, domestic factors will be considered as the main determinant elements. The domestic factors consist of public opinion and government ideology. Public opinion will be viewed by the perception toward America in both states. This is that if the negative movement – anti-Americanism – is a general trend, it will give a negative effect in the alliance, yet if the domestic recognition toward the United States is positive, the alliance solidarity will be strong. Another domestic factor will be government ideology which refers to the leader's partisanship. Pro-American leaders will make a close relationship with the United States; on the other hand, leaders who do not follow the same policy with the U.S. will weaken the alliance. By applying the two elements, it is expected to complement the insufficient explanation in alliance solidarity in East Asia.

2. Theoretical Framework

In the post-Cold War era, Japan maintained a high cohesion and rigid relationship with the United States because they agreed over major goals and strategies, and/or had non-friction mutual cooperation on how to approach a situation and coordinate appropriately. This cooperation enabled the United States to maintain power in East Asia and deter the growing power of China along with the nuclear threat from North Korea. Japan also took advantage of the relationship in order to regain its military power in the region and on the international stage. The United States needs Japan as an ally in the East Asian region, and Japan also needs the support from the United States to come back to being a normal nation (Kim, 2008).⁷ In the Cold War period, the United States relentlessly encouraged Japan to obtain self-defense capability and participate in international warfare in favor of the U.S. After the Cold War, change in U.S. foreign policy rather stimulated Japan to change its defense foreign policy. The U.S. foreign policy was focused on military intervention and war on terrorism, and Japan gradually showed optimistic actions in supporting the U.S. movements. A series of cooperative efforts in the past few years have shown close relations between the United States and Japan.

On the contrary, South Korea and the United States had constant discord after the Cold War. The United States were aware of the threat from North Korea but South Korea had different views toward the North compared with those of the United States. The perception of the United States administration was very pessimistic toward North Korea throughout the post-Cold War period. Especially, the tension grew high when North Korea declared the possession of a nuclear weapon. Contrary to the negative perception of the U.S. government, the South Korean

⁷ The reason Japan is pursuing to be a normal state despite its economic level and state reputation is that Japan was a defeated state in WWII. Due to this fact, the United States took control over Japan and established the foundation of the Japanese Constitution, which constitutes Article IX – the no-war clause. Article IX has banned the military in Japan, thereby making Japan unable to participate in international military operations freely without the permission of the United States.

government was rather naïve facing North Korea. Supporting with a lot of economic aid even though military conflicts were in action was incomprehensible for the U.S. Also the reactions from the South Korean government that North Korea is their family based on nationalism and anti-American movement demonstrating the withdrawal of the U.S. forces brought a skeptical view between the two states. Due to the disharmony in the policies, strategies, and disagreement on the objectives, the alliance showed fractures and became less cohesive.

This study will focus on the foreign policy characteristics in alliance solidarity between the U.S.-South Korea and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Before explaining the concept of alliance solidarity, the definition of alliance should be explored. There are several views by which scholars define alliance. Some definitions are narrowly defined. The narrow-view definition explains that alliance is a “formal agreements between sovereign states for the purpose of coordinating its military capabilities in specified circumstances” (Osgood, 1968; Kegley & Raymond, 1990; Holsti, Hopmann, & Sullivan, 1973; Morrow, 1991). Compared with the narrow-view definition, other scholars view alliance in a broader definition. They defined alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states” and “involves mutual expectations of some degree of policy coordination on security issues under certain conditions in the future” (Walt, 1987; Barnett & Levy, 1991). In sum, the broader definition includes both formal and informal arrangements between two or more states under security cooperation. In this study, alliance will be defined in terms of narrow-view definition.

As discussed above, various definitions of alliance have been offered by scholars. The concept of alliance solidarity also requires clarification. Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan (1973) defined alliance solidarity (or alliance cohesion) as “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon

goals, strategy, and tactics, and to coordinate activities directed toward those ends.” They created two measures to analyze alliance cohesion: a behavioral component and an attitudinal component. The first measurement of alliance cohesion refers to the degree to which alliance members cooperate and suppress their conflicts with other members of the alliance, and the second measurement is the similarity of members’ attitudes about external threats confronting the bloc, which constitutes the degree of attitudinal consensus of perceived external threats (Holsti et al., 1973). Of the arguments made by Holsti et al., Scott suggests that the two notions in their definitions are related. They explained that “when the perceived interests of actors conflict each other, their attitudes will tend to be hostile, and their behavior will tend to involve conflict. Conversely, it suggests that when the perceived interests of actors are held in common, their attitudes will tend to be friendly and their behavior will tend to be collaborative” (Scott, 1967).

The definition offered by Holsti et al. is appropriate for this study. It clearly explains the notion of alliance solidarity in this research. The level of alliance solidarity, in other words, is the degree to which the member states agree over how to proceed, especially during moments of crisis (Weitsman, 2004). Supplementary to the argument, I will say that not only in moments of crisis, but also at other times, issues can determine the degree of alliance between states. Of course, when dealing with non-critical issues, alliance solidarity should remain static or relatively stable. However, in crisis situations, the alliance will reveal its genuine condition, whether the relations between two states are strong or not.

When states confront a policy decision and are willing to make an agreement on how to address the situation and cooperate appropriately, or when states agree on making mutual agreements, policy decisions, or strategic movements towards a mutual objective, it is likely that the relationship between the states will be closer or the cohesion will be expected to be high. In

contrast, if the states cannot reach a certain common agreement, strategy over a goal, or if they pursue policies that undermine the alliance, the cohesion is expected to be low (Weitsman, 2004). For instance, in the Cold War period, both the South Korea and Japan had a stable relationship. Of course, minor issues occurred during the period but they were not critical enough to discuss as alliance fractures.

In supporting the alliance solidarity in the research, the study will introduce foreign policy approaches to the analysis of a state's behavior in international relations. The foreign policy approach consists of several aspects such as the individual, small group, organizational, and domestic approach which implies the framework that is argued throughout the study. Briefly mentioning the foreign policy approaches, the smallest decision-making process unit is the individual level. Individual decision-making examines the leader's characteristics. Observing the individual level, it is possible to explain the factor that influenced the decision in a critical emergency-type situation. In addition, leaders are the core characters in deciding a foreign policy; therefore, examining the core element will help explain why a particular decision was made. Moreover, decisions decided by leaders have a very short decision-making procedure giving a strong dominance in the process (Hudson, 2007). Yet, it is difficult to measure the leader's perception, for it covers psychological fields. If argued to be measured, regime type, diplomatic and family background, personality, leadership style, mental and physical health, leader's interest in foreign policy, emotional assessment, time situation, etc. will be considered in analyzing the characteristics of a leader and why the decision was made. This will be a subjective approach leading to different conclusions from different points of view.

Small group and organizational politics are referred to as a group decision-making approach. The reason is that, in most countries, foreign policy decisions are always made in a

group setting (Hudson, 2007). In small group dynamics, elements of the group's structures will have important consequences for the group process. The small group members can advise or oppose the leader in certain situations in decision-making process. A model can be seen in the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC consists of a minimum of five members of the cabinet including the president. The small group is useful because it can prevent the leader from making a catastrophic decision. However, the group itself can be close-minded in that it does not support the leader with authentic and effective information. In this term, Janis (1982) asserted that groupthink groups are hard-hearted but soft-headed.

The organizational process is considered as the high-level approach to making foreign policy decisions. These large executive organizations include departments and agencies. Furthermore, the government's "sense" is that gathering of information and the initial processing of information are performed, for the most part, by organizations (Hudson, 2007). Organizations interpret orders according to their existing understandings and capabilities – for instance, collecting information, influences on the bureaucrat, budget and personnel power, autonomy, etc – which results in an implementation gap between what policymakers believe they have ordered and what organizations actually do to execute such orders (Hudson, 2007). Organizations are necessary to governments in the decision-making process, yet organizations often produce unintended negative consequences on a regular basis and often at the most inopportune moments. Examples of the group decision-making process are explicitly researched by Allison (1969; 1971) in studying the Cuban Missile Crisis and Halperin (1974).

The approaches previously mentioned are all important factors in understanding the decision-making process in a state's foreign policy decision. Each approach has its unique characteristics. However, it is likely that these groups are only limited within the groups. The

largest form of organization is limited to its specialty field, just providing adequate information to the leader. It is questionable whether public opinions are deliberated in the decision process. Therefore, arguments on domestic politics will be significant in the study, for they apply the general public's voice and can extract a more objective data from the domestic politics factor.

Actors in domestic politics vary from the executive branch of government, political groups, interest groups, media, to religious groups. Dahl (1973) points out that the nature of the regime itself – that is, its degree of inclusiveness and public contestation – may predispose the nation to particular syndromes of domestic politics. Putnam (1988) argued that international politics cannot fail to have an effect on domestic politics, and the exigencies and outputs of domestic politics will certainly have an effect on international politics. Size, proximity, and cohesiveness are some indicators to determine the relative influence of an actor on the domestic board game. Moreover, the degree of difference in viewpoint between the domestic actor and the regime should be considered – the greater the difference in viewpoint, the greater the degree of competition over an issue at hand (Hudson, 2007). Van Belle (1993) categorized several strategies for a regime in facing domestic oppositions: ignore, direct tactics, indirect tactics, and compromise. The effects of domestic political competition on foreign policy will vary according to the strategy chosen by the regime to carry on the competition. Some strategies will likely have little or no effect on regime foreign policy; others will have substantial effects (see Figure 2.1).

As reviewed, domestic politics actors give influence in the regime decision in foreign policy. Through the competition and the results of the foreign policy outcome, effects of the domestic politics are proven. These domestic politics influence can give positive or negative effects in the outcome of a state's foreign policy. Among the various domestic political actors, public opinion and government ideology will be considered in the study. Public opinion appears

through domestic interest groups, actions groups, the general masses, etc. Generally, by looking at polls, it reflects the general issues that the groups are having priority on or how they view the current issues the government is executing. Government ideology is shown by powerful/influential individuals or fractions and wings of the leader. Government ideology is likely to select the policy line that the state will follow. By observing the leaders ideology, the public is able to predict how the future policy will flow.




Figure 2.1 Linking Domestic Political Competition to Foreign Policy

Source: Hudson, 2007, *Foreign policy analysis: Classic and contemporary theory*. pp. 135




Figure 2.2 Causal Mechanism

In summary, the causal mechanism is as follows: If the public opinion and government ideology influences the U.S. government's foreign policy decision-making process and perception which will affect the level of alliance solidarity in the alliance relationship. However, there still remains an important question in the linkage of the causal mechanism: Why does the U.S. government or the U.S. president react to the domestic politics of its allied states in deciding their foreign policy? The concept of signaling and mutual communication will be able to explain this link. Lohmann (1993) argues that political action informs the political leader's decisions and thus affects policy outcomes in an individual level. In this setting, a small number of political actions may have a decisive effect for two reasons. First, the individuals' policy preferences are correlated. One individual's negative experience, if made public, affects other individuals' policy preferences. As a consequence, the information that is revealed through the political actions of very few individuals may convince a leader with majoritarian incentives to shift policies. Second, when extracting information from the observed number of political actions, the political leader takes into account the individuals' incentives to engage in political action (Nie & Verba, 1975; Lipsky, 1970; Verba & Brody, 1970).

The explanation shows that in a decision-making process, a leader takes consideration of the opponent's opinion in deciding a political policy. Applying the concept to the study, it could be expanded to the public level. A leader in a decision-making situation will react to the public opinion – which can be initiated from an individual – in deciding a policy. This reaction and the outcome of the leader's policy will be considered as a response towards the public from the leader. This mutual communication and reciprocal interaction can be conceptualized as a signaling process.

In this study, it is assumed that the U.S. president reacts to the domestic politics of its

allies through statements or agreements. This reaction of the U.S. president to its allied states is a part of a signaling towards the allied states government and the people. If the reaction and the support from the allied states are positive, the U.S. president will signal a positive tone in looking at the alliance relationship. However, if a negative atmosphere is formed in the allied states towards the U.S. in the public and government policy, the U.S. president will have a negative response in the tone, sending a signal of concerns of the behaviors of the allied state, showing worries of the alliance relationship.

Then why does the U.S. president send signals to the East Asian allies? First, the reason for the signaling process is that South Korea and Japan are both strategically important allies to the U.S. in the East Asian affairs. They have been allies for over half a century and they are in a reciprocal relationship in many fields. Also in order to deter the threat of North Korea and balance the rising power of China, the U.S. needs South Korea and Japan close to its side.

Second, briefly mentioned earlier, the signaling can be a negative or a positive tone considering the circumstances of the domestic politics of the allied states looking at the U.S. According to Lohmann (1993), a leader's response to public attitudes is implied in the policy outcomes. The impression the U.S. president feels is expressed through the speech or statement that the president makes in an official meeting or conference. The reason is that when a president makes a speech, the words are not chosen instantly by the president. The words and the expressions for the speech are carefully selected and discussed because they reflect the current impression and expectation towards the allied states. Therefore, if an allied state is very favorable in the domestic politics, the U.S. president will use a very positive expression during the speech; on the other hand, uncomfortable feelings shown in the allied states domestic politics will be reflected in the president speech. Moreover, observing the domestic political factors prior

to the U.S. president's speech or summit will help explain what the U.S. president's current impression is toward the allied states. Consequently, the signaling from the U.S. president reflects the current alliance situation which shows the status of the alliance solidarity.

Lastly, the signaling is a method of showing concerns in the alliance relationship. For instance, if one state does not have any interest or concern toward another state, the alliance relationship will not be formed or the U.S. would not care much about the relationship with the state. However, forming an alliance means that the two states are tied in a common interest in the international society. Therefore, in an alliance if the relationships are good, positive signals will be sent to each other; however, if the alliance is drifting to a negative relationship, signals of concern will be sent to the other state to warn the state that the relationship is not in a good situation. Also, by signaling, states will be able to form a mutual communication channel due to the awareness of the fracturing in the alliance, which can help improve the relationship.

In summary, the U.S. government reacts to the domestic politics of the allied states by sending them a signal or through decision of the foreign policy outcomes in order to maintain the current alliance relationship or to improve the uncomfortableness of the relationship. The signaling is shown in the U.S. president's speech or statement, concerning the present alliance relationship. This signaling concept will be able to explain the causal mechanism of the alliance relationship with the U.S.

Consequently, based on the arguments, the following hypotheses were established:

H1: When the allied state's public opinion is positive or negative towards the U.S., the alliance solidarity will grow stronger or will weaken, respectively.

H2: When the leader's ideology is similar or opposes the direction of the U.S. foreign policy, the alliance solidarity will grow stronger or it will weaken, respectively.

3. Methodology

To examine the relations between alliance solidarity and the influence of domestic political factors, the study will look over two cases, South Korea and Japan. The reason for selecting these two cases (South Korea and Japan) is that changes in alliance relationship with the United States after the Cold War provide an interesting research puzzle. At first, there are variations in the alliance solidarity between the two states. Previously mentioned, the question is as follows: Why have the two closest security allies of the U.S. in Northeast Asia been moving into different directions after the Cold War, one toward more cohesion and the other towards less cohesion? Another question is that there is a variation of alliance cohesion of a state over time: Why has the U.S.-South Korea alliance become less cohesive after the Cold War? and Why has the U.S.-Japan alliance become stronger despite the realist prediction in the post-Cold War period?

The international circumstances that South Korea and Japan have been facing are similar after WWII. The competition against the communist bloc (the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea) throughout the Cold War period, resistance against the nuclear threat of North Korea in the post-Cold War period, and after 9/11 opposition on global war against terrorism are the issues that South Korea and Japan have had in common throughout the present history. Moreover, one of the important common factors is that the two states have had mutual security agreements with the United States for over 60 years. Another minor reason is that they are democratic states and support capitalism. Summing up, South Korea and Japan had and have a common international environment after WWII: They have endured the security threat of North Korea, are democratic states, support capitalism, and have maintained alliance with the U.S. continuously.

In addition, there is little research focusing on theoretical generalization of the two countries. First of all, the realist prediction of the alliance in East Asia was skeptical because their argument is that when an external threat is removed the necessity of the alliance no longer remains. Therefore, when communism fell, the realist thought the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan would break up. However, the current situation has contradicted the realist argument. Also, there are many theoretical perspectives used to analyze the Northeast Asian region, but are complex and varied (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003). Moreover, looking at the East Asia region, culture, history, and ethnics have been revealed to be influencing elements in the decision of foreign policy. Some scholars have attempted to synthesize several theories for their research to generalize the concept of explaining East Asian affairs – called “analytical eclecticism” (Suh, Katzenstein, & Carlson, 2004). Yet, these were mainly one case study, only looking at South Korea or Japan individually, regarding the relationship with the U.S. The current study is expected to generalize the theoretical concept through a comparative case study of the U.S.-South Korea and the U.S.-Japan alliances.

In order to observe the alliance solidarity of the South Korea and Japan alliance with the United States, there needs to be a definite method to clarify the different level in alliance solidarity. In this study, alliance solidarity will be measured by studying the United States presidential speeches of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The U.S. President’s speeches consist of the “Summit talk,” “White House press conference,” and “Speech at international meeting.” Also, reviewing the Congressional Report Service (CRS) Report will give sufficient data for the study. When examining these documents, searching for negative and positive words and nuances will be carefully focused – for example, for the positive words will include “close,” “cornerstone,” “friendly,” “cooperation,” “foundation,” “basis,” “important,” “essential”, and

other related words; the negative words will include “bad,” “break,” “crack,” “unbalance,” etc. Through this process, the frequency of the mentioned documents will be counted. Based on the data, it could be assumed that the more the data are mentioned in a positive tone, the higher the alliance solidarity between the states; yet, the more the data mentions negative nuances, the lower the alliance solidarity will be among the states. By looking at the presidential speech throughout the term, it will show the big picture of change in the U.S. government’s perception and also will make it possible to differentiate the cohesive level of alliance between South Korea and Japan.

When variation in alliance solidarity appears, definite explanations are needed on the influential elements of domestic politics. This study reveals the importance of domestic politics in international relations. Some have argued the importance of the domestic win-set, and that governments have to consider its win-set support (Putnam, 1988; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Some examine the president’s use of force in the foreign policy decision-making process (Ostrom & Job, 1986; James & Oneal, 1991). Others have emphasized the interaction of the domestic structure with foreign policy considering various domestic elements (Gourevitch, 1978; Fearon, 1998; Rogowski, 1998).

The domestic politics considered in the study will be public opinion and government ideology. Public opinion and government ideology are important elements in domestic politics because these elements can influence the government’s foreign policy decision-making directly and indirectly (Hudson, 2007). The influence of public opinions is argued in many ways. Some have argued the media effect on foreign policy (Hill, 2003; Gilboa, 2002; Seib, 2000; Snyder, 2004). Others have argued that the growth of democracy has influenced public opinion and enhanced the importance of civil society in the policy-making process of a state (S. J. Lee, 2004;

Lister et al., 2004 ; C. M. Lee, 2003 ; Manyin, 2003 ; S. S. Kim,. 2003). Risse-Kappen (1991) argued the interaction between mass public opinion and elites in the foreign policy-making process of liberal democracies. Emphasis on public opinion itself has been studied (Diamond, 1994; Kong, 2005). Public opinion will be measured by surveying the polls. Public polls are shown through newspapers, internet, and other professional organizations, such as the Gallup Poll data. The contents that will be reviewed will reflect the attitudes of the South Korean and Japanese people toward the United States. The polls will indicate whether the public is favorable to the U.S. or not. If the public do not like the United States, this will infer the degree of the anti-Americanism in the state. This is connected to the anti-Americanism in both states and how this has affected the perception of the domestic public.

Government ideology is also important in influencing other states' perspective in policy relationship. Government ideology indicates a rough perspective of a state in its direction in policy outcomes. Government ideology can be identified as either the conservative and progressive party. Other scholars have explained government ideology rather related with regime type in a broader concept (Hagan, 1989; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995). Some have argued that regime change affects the nature of a state's alliance relationship (Barnett & Levy, 1991; Body & Hopple, 1987; Holsti, 1982; Morrow, 1991; Siverson & Starr, 1994; Weinstein, 1972). Another view on government ideology is in the leader's partisanship. Some scholars have argued that political leadership has an important effect on domestic and state's foreign policy decision-making (Hagan, 1994; Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Hermann & Hermann, 1989; Vasquez, 1993). This study will view government ideology as the leader's political partisanship of South Korea and Japan. In these two states, conservatives (right wing) are considered as pro-Americanist and progressives (left wing) as anti-Americanist. This cognition was implanted in the people's mind

due to the struggling competition with communism in East Asia during the Cold War. The partisanship in these two states is usually divided into the conservative or progressive party. Of course, there are other minor parties pursuing neutral policies, yet the major classification is between the conservative and progressive parties. Capturing the leader's ideology is accomplished by looking at the party that he/she was involved in before the election. This is possible because in South Korea when a president is elected, the main party of the congress is the party that the president was included in, and in Japan the prime minister is elected from the majority party of the parliament. The leader's ideology is mainly consistent throughout their term. Comparing the South Korean and Japanese leader's ideology will show the alteration of the alliance in East Asia.

The temporal domain will be focused on 1993 to 2008. The time frame will cover from the Clinton to Bush administrations. South Korea had four presidents during that time, and Japan had eleven prime ministers that served in office.

CHAPTER 3

ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

1. U.S.-South Korea Alliance

A formal relation between South Korea and the United States was not formed after the Korean War. After WWII, the United States considered the buildup of Japanese capabilities as the foremost objective in East Asia to cope with the communist bloc, and therefore South Korea was not a strategically important nation for the United States (Truman, 1956). This policy is implied in the notion of “Acheson Line”.⁸

When the Korean War broke out in June 25, 1950, the United States immediately dispatched armed forces in order to stop the invasion of North Korea. With the signing of the Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953,⁹ the United States and South Korea decided to sign a Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953, promising to provide long-term economic aid, militarily, and to allow the expansion of the ROK Army (Kim, 1996). The major purpose of the treaty was to prevent any renewal of the communist aggression in Korea by expressing a clear and unequivocal statement of common determination between the United States and South Korea (Kim, 1996).¹⁰

The combination of the military threat from North Korea and its continued backing from

⁸ U.S Secretary of State, Dean Gooderham Acheson, had drawn a U.S. defense line in the Pacific connecting the Aleutian Island-Japan-Okinawa-Philippines, leaving out South Korea and Taiwan, making an ideological front line to stop the territorial ambition of Stalin and Mao Zedong. ‘Acheson Line’ is criticized for tolerating the outbreak of the Korean War.

⁹ Armistice Agreement was signed by the United Nations, China, and North Korea. South Korea is not involved in the cease-fire agreement because South Korean President Rhee, Syngman transferred all the operational command authority to the Command in Chief of U.N. Forces General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. This matter becomes a controversial issue in the late 1990s and early 2000.

¹⁰ In Article 3, it is stated that each nation declared that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety” and that, “it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” (US Senate, 1954).

China and Soviet Union led the United States and South Korea to concentrate their policy on deterring a possible attack from North Korea, which became the core issue in the security relationship between the two states (Kim, 1996). As a part of strengthening the armed forces of South Korea, President Eisenhower was convinced of the need for massive military assistance after visiting Korea and provided more than \$3 billion worth of equipment, supplies, and services to South Korea between 1953 and 1969.¹¹ During 1953-1961, the United States gave \$4 billion to South Korea in economic and military assistance.¹² South Korean foreign policy stood in line with the anti-communist policy of the United States throughout the Cold War period.

Relations between the two states experienced some twists and turns in the Park Chung-hee presidency, yet ultimately the alliance was maintained. President Park expressed an adamant anti-communism as a national policy and promised to build up self-sufficient economic capabilities in South Korea (Kim, 2008). In the 1960s, to earn more economic aid for the development, South Korea took the request of the United States of normalizing diplomatic relationship with Japan in 1965 despite the strong opposition from the public. Also South Korea decided to send troops to Vietnam to support the warfare of the U.S. and foremost to prevent the weakening of the U.S. security commitment in Korea and, if possible, to further strengthen it (Han, 1985).

After the failure of the Vietnam War and the dispute between Soviet Union and China, the United States took a step in re-examining the foreign policy. In Guam, on July 25, 1969, President Nixon said that “in responding to future Asian crises the United States is going to encourage, and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the

¹¹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1971, pp. 146-147.

¹² Aid for International Development (AID), *US overseas Loans & Grants and assistance from international organizations*, 1975, pp. 73

responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves,” which is known as the Nixon Doctrine (Kim, 1996).¹³ In other words, Nixon emphasized that Asian states should have self-defense capability against external threats and should share military costs with the United States (Halperin, 1971; Murray & Viotti, 1994). According to the Nixon Doctrine and the détente period, the Nixon administration was optimistic about the situation on the Korean Peninsula and withdrew 20,000 U.S. troops in 1971 – the U.S. 7th Infantry Division – leaving only one infantry division. The withdrawal of the U.S. troops had a significant impact on South Korean foreign policy. With the experience in Vietnam, the reduction of economic aid and troops, and the existing threat of communism from the north, President Park began to pursue self-reliance in South Korea’s defense policy.

President Carter attempted to withdraw all the U.S. forces in South Korea. The Congress in the United States strongly opposed the plan and forced the President to reserve the troop reduction plan in Korea, emphasizing the importance of maintaining sizeable forces in the peninsula. The reason was that the international circumstances was very unstable – the invasion of Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1979, the end of détente, and Vietnam invading Cambodia. Also, the domestic situation in South Korea in the early 1980s was unstable: the assassination of President Park in 1979 and a new military junta came to power by coup d’état led by General Chun Doo-hwan in 1980. In a similar period, the alliance command structure experienced changed. In the 1977 Security Consultation Meeting (SCM) decided to change the United Nations Command (UNC) to the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) (Kim, 2008).¹⁴ The CFC changed the military relationship between the two states to a more cooperative system.

¹³ Nixon Doctrine had a two-fold purpose: to reduce America’s overseas commitment and to retain what influence the United States had attained so far but with less cost.

¹⁴ The change in the command structure was for the purpose of evaluating military burden-sharing and escaping from complete dependence upon the US forces

In the 1980s, President Reagan repealed the Nixon Doctrine and Carter's optimistic approach in the Cold War view. In the "Reagan Doctrine", he stated that U.S. policy would not only defend states threatened by communist insurgency, but it would also actively assist anti-communist freedom fighters everywhere (Buss, 1982). President Chun convinced the U.S. that a combination of strong U.S. and South Korean military forces was the only guarantee for deterrence following the U.S. foreign policy line.¹⁵

South Korea and the U.S. relationship can be described as a patron-client one in the first place. South Korea was largely dependent on the United States from nation-building to defense. Later in the 1980s, the U.S. proposed a defense-burden sharing making a more symmetrical alliance relationship. The strategic meaning of South Korea to the United States changed throughout the decades of relationship. It changed from "symbolic importance" to "containment base" and to "stabilizing factor" up to the 1990s (Kim, 1996). This means that South Korea's strategic recognition can change anytime in the future of the U.S. foreign policy which could be argued that South Korea's importance depends on the U.S. perception in foreign policy. In the meantime, South Korea made an effort to maintain close relations with the U.S. throughout the Cold War period. The U.S.-South Korean strategic relationship has been affected mainly by the strategic situation in Asia which has affected U.S. strategy, and the efforts of the South Korean government.

2. U.S.-Japan Alliance

The United States and Japan relationship started after WWII in terms of military occupation by the U.S. military. Led by General MacArthur, their objective was demilitarization and democratization (Dower, 1979). The Peace Constitution was enacted based upon

¹⁵ President Chun needed support and approval from the United States for the legitimacy of the government.

MacArthur's three principles – the preservation of the emperor system, total renunciation of war, and the abolition of the feudal system. However, experiencing the expansion of communism, the U.S. policy toward Japan changed to economic growth and remilitarization (Ward, 1968). Despite the U.S. desire, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was not pleased with the term “rearmament”, and proclaimed the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which pursues minimal rearmament and concentration on economic restructuring, provided as it was by the U.S. with an effective guarantee of Japan's military security and access to special economic dispensation, based on the U.S.-Japan security treaty signed in 1951 (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004). The 1951 treaty lacked the mutuality which had absence of an explicit commitment on the part of the U.S. to defend Japan and of any obligation for Japan to defend the U.S. in a collective self-defense arrangement (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004).

After the Korean War broke out, the U.S. needed the reinforcement of the Japanese military. Therefore, in the boundary of the Peace Constitution, the U.S. helped Japan in forming a National Police Reserve, the ground force that was to become Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in 1954 (Smith, 1999). Followed by the GSDF, with the help of the U.S. military, Japan created the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The National Defense Council, a cabinet-level body, was created to oversee the policy-making of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), also established in 1954 under the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Force Law. The U.S. military played a key role in reinforcing the SDF for Japan to participate in the collective self-defense in East Asia.

In 1960, U.S.-Japan revised the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi sought over time to persuade the United States to accept the removal of the unequal provisions relating to Japan by offering to inject a greater

degree of mutuality into the treaty (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004). This treaty set out more clearly Japan and U.S. security responsibilities toward each other.¹⁶ Even though the treaty was revised, asymmetrical characteristics of the alliance still remained, which worked more for the benefit of Japan. The reason is the U.S. attempted to persuade Japan to build its military capabilities in order to form a self-defense mechanism, and on occasions dispatch the SDF to support the U.S. territory. Yet, Japan was still reluctant in rearming the nation because of the risks of the U.S. entrapment and to preserve a degree of autonomous relationship with the United States (Kim, 2008). Also by receiving security protection and support from the United States, Japan could focus on strengthening its economy and have a solid foundation in rebuilding the country.

The Vietnam War brought a turning-point in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan did not dispatch the SDF to Vietnam to avoid entrapment of U.S. military strategy in spite of the U.S. request. After the war, President Nixon stated that its allies should increase its efforts to provide for their own defense, which is a part of the Nixon Doctrine. The implication for Japan was clear: it needed to contribute more to the security relationship with the United States (Mochizuki, 2001). The Nixon Doctrine brought the concerns of possible military abandonment despite the reassurance by Washington. The unnoticed movement in the U.S.-China relationship also shocked Japan because it felt uneasy that the U.S. was going to play a geopolitical balancing game between Japan and China (Schaller, 1997). Also the change in international economic order – the U.S. change in monetary system, rising oil price, etc – awakened the Japanese officials to reconsidering the alliance (Mochizuki, 2001). In this context, Japan moved to nurture a domestic political consensus in favor of the SDF and the security pact with the U.S. by codifying a

¹⁶ In the 1960 treaty, Article V provides an explicit US guarantee by stating that any attack on the territory of Japan was recognized as an attack on both treaty partners Article VI pledged that Japan would supply military bases to the United States for the maintenance of security in the Far East in order to contribute to its own security. The revision treaty implies more reliance and involvement of the US military in Japan security matters, lessening Japan's burden in their defense (Hughes & Fukushima, 2004).

“strictly defensive doctrine” in the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (Mochizuki, 2001). Two years later, Tokyo and Washington formed the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (Koji, 1997). This guideline outlined more bilateral cooperation related to Japan’s immediate defense. This Japan also assured protection from the SDF of the U.S. warships deployed for Japan’s defense, yet an asymmetric relation still remained because Japan still stuck to a homeland defense doctrine and rejected the exercise of the collective self-defense right (Mochizuki, 2001).

Starting from the 1980s, the U.S.-Japan relations became closer. The fast and successful economic growth in East Asia and the smoothing Soviet-American competition induced Japan to play a key role in shaping a stable regionalism. The first time Japan participated in a joint military exercise with the U.S. was in 1980, called the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, which reflected the attitude change in Japan’s policy. Not only in security but also in economic cooperation Japan took movement in establishing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. This was due to the concern of economic dividing in the form of North American Free-Trade Area (NAFTA) and to maintain its economic influence in the Pacific community – including the U.S. and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. However, despite the closing relationship with the U.S., Japan was still reluctant to dispatch the SDF abroad, posed by the Peace Constitution. The first time Japan sent the SDF for the U.S. support was in the Iraq War in 2003. Up to the 1980s, Japan was still under the patronage of the U.S. in its security protection (Kim, 2008).

In conclusion, throughout the entire Cold War period, the U.S.-Japan alliance showed a slow increase in its cohesion and Japan took advantage of the international situation of the Soviet-American rivalry. Therefore, the relationship remained asymmetrical, more favorable to

Japan in economic and security, and Japanese military cooperation could not overcome the constraint posed by the Peace Constitution.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS

1. Level of Alliance Solidarity

The previous chapter provided a general summary of the alliance history between U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan. The main purpose of the U.S.-South Korea alliance throughout the Cold War period was to deter the threat of communism and North Korea. The existing threat made the U.S. strategically secure the relationship with South Korea; therefore, military support and economic aid have been provided consistently throughout the period. However, the maintenance of the relationship was needed more by South Korea than the U.S., and as a result the U.S. was in a position of advantage in the alliance relationship.

The U.S.-Japan alliance showed an asymmetric relationship throughout the Cold War period. The asymmetry was not formed toward the U.S. but was more favorable to Japan. The strategic and geographic importance of Japan in Northeast Asia was vital for the U.S. to maintain; therefore, the U.S. consistently encouraged Japan to rearm their military and actively participate in collective security. Yet, Japan took advantage of the situation with the excuse of the Peace Constitution and effectively carried out its policy – sufficient assistance of economic aid and security reliance from the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) with minimum defense expenditure.

In summary, both alliances have been of major concern to the U.S. since WWII. Despite the importance of both alliances to the U.S., the strength of the alliance solidarity has shown distinguishable difference after the Cold War. Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is to examine the alliance difference between the two states in the post-Cold War period. In order to

measure the alliance solidarity between U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan, I employed the Paper of the President of United States (the following will be mentioned as the Presidential Paper) documents from the Clinton to Bush administrations (1993-2008), especially focusing on the bilateral talks between the U.S. at G-7/G-8, APEC, and reciprocal visits.¹⁷ There were many summits between South Korea and Japan with the United States. Most of the summit talks covered global and regional security issues and economic relations. For instance, in the Clinton administration, the North Korea nuclear program was mostly considered in the security issues and economic redevelopment was a critical issue. In the Bush administration, the security issues focused mostly on the war against terrorism and the North Korea nuclear weapons, and the economic issues covered free trade and cooperation among industries. In this study, the summits covering the security issues were selected in the data. The summit meetings that only discuss economic issues were not considered because this study focuses only on alliance security relations (Holsti et al., 1973). In cases where transcripts were not found in the presidential papers, related documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Japan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Republic of Korea were substituted.

In order to measure the alliance solidarity, I conducted content analysis based on the transcripts of summits and viewed only the comments made by the United States President referring to the allied states. For instance, a phrase like, "... there is no more important bilateral relationship in the world than that which exists between the United States..." or similar expressions were collected. Certain degrees of tone in the sentence, categorized into three

¹⁷ The United States-South Korea-Japan are members of the APEC, and the United States and Japan are members of the G-7/G-8 summit meeting. South Korea was invited to the 34th G-8 summit meeting in 2008 (Japan). APEC and G-7/G-8 are annually held and hosted by the member states. APEC is usually scheduled between September – November and G-7/G-8 is generally held in June or July. The major agendas are global / regional security issues, world disputes management, and economic development matters.

groups,¹⁸ reflect the level of alliance solidarity: Very Strong Tone, Strong Tone, and Neutral Tone. The Very Strong Tone (VST) category captures words such as *vital*, *critical*, *extraordinary*, *cornerstone*, *pillar*, *great*, *indispensable*, *solidarity*, *unshakable*, and *unique*. For example, on June 16, 1994, during the summit with President Kim Young-sam, President Clinton stated, “America’s commitment to South Korea, our treaty ally, our trading partner, our fellow democracy, is *unshakable*” (United States Government Printing Office, 1994 Book I, pp. 1086). Also, on November 19, 1998, at the summit with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in Japan, President Clinton appreciated the alliance relationship by stating, “Our security alliance is the *cornerstone* of Asia’s stability...” (United States Government Printing Office, 1998 Book II, pp. 2055). From the examples, the words *unshakable* and *cornerstone* are viewed as having a very strong tone, indicating the highest level of alliance solidarity.

The Strong Tone (ST) category includes words such as *important*, *significant*, *special*, *foundation*, *strong*, *trust*, and *strength* and related derivatives. To name but a few, President Clinton quoted, “the *importance* of our relationship with Korea is evidenced by the fact that this is the second meeting President Kim and I have had in just a few months.....” in November 21, 1998, during a news conference with President Kim Dae-jung in South Korea (United States Government Printing Office, 1998 Book II, pp. 2066) . Likewise, President Bush was quoted as saying, “I look forward to building on our *strong* relationship to meet the challenge of our times” in May 23, 2003, on the summit with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at Crawford, Texas (United States Government Printing Office, 2003 Book I, pp. 531). The words *importance* and *strong* are viewed as having a strong tone, indicating a high level of alliance solidarity.

The last Neutral Tone (NT) contains words similar to *positive*, *partnership*, *friendship*,

¹⁸ Categorizing the degree of the words can be subjective. However, the categorized contents were acknowledged by several people. The criteria were reviewed and approved by a retired university English instructor, who also has over 30 years experience in editing, and a Ph.D graduate student in political science.

cooperate, close, support, admire, and accomplish. For instance, President Clinton made the following comment to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto during the G-8 summit on May 15, 1998, “I am grateful for the *partnership* that we have had.” In addition, during the summit in Washington D.C. on June 10, 2005, President Bush told President Roh Moo-hyun, “... and the reason why we’ve had a serious discussion on important issues is because we’re strategic *partners, and allies, and friends*” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005). Likewise, the words *partnership* and *friends* are used in a general relationship, indicating a baseline in the level of alliance solidarity.

Some words that are emphasized with adverbs or adjectives can be differently categorized. For instances, *more important* will have a stronger tone than just *important*. Such a sentence as, “Our security alliance, which is *stronger than ever*, is essential to the Asian Pacific and elsewhere”¹⁹ expresses a deeper relationship than, “a *strong friend* and ally in our fight against terror.”²⁰ Based on these criteria, I observed all the transcripts.

Table 4.1 and Figures 4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicate the total number of bilateral summits – APEC, G-7/G-8, and mutual visits.²¹

¹⁹ A speech made by President Clinton during summit with Prime Minister Hosokawa on February 11, 1994.

²⁰ A speech made by President Bush on October, 20 2001, during the summit with Prime Minister Koizumi in APEC.

²¹ Generally in APEC and G-7/G-8 summit meetings leaders have bilateral talks besides the conference. However, in several meetings, bilateral talks did not take place. Another case is that the leaders did meet, yet the conversation was not open or there was no joint statement or press conference considering the meeting. Some cases show that there was definitely a meeting but the contexts were not open or there was a lack of information. These cases are omitted from the data because they do not have efficient data to be used. Including the omitted cases, the actual number of opportunities for a bilateral meeting with the United States is 31 for South Korea and 51 for Japan (including G-7/G-8).

The following explanations are the reasons for omitting the cases.

Japan – June 27, 1996 G7 (France): Summit took place, yet only economic issues discussed

South Korea – November 19, 1995 APEC (Japan): No information or record on summit

South Korea – November 24, 1997 APEC (Canada): Had summit, but due to economic crisis only economic issues were discussed - insufficient data

Japan – June 18, 1999 G8 (Germany): Had summit, but irrelevant context (economic issues)

Japan – October 20, 2003 APEC (Thailand): Summit did not take place (no data)

Japan – June 6, 2005 G8 (United Kingdom): Summit did not take place (no data)

Japan – July 15, 2006 G8 (Russia): Summit did not take place (no data)

On November 19, 1995, APEC in Japan and November 17, 1998 APEC in Malaysia, President Clinton was not able to participate in the summit meeting. Instead, Vice President Al Gore participated in the summit meeting representing the United States.

Therefore I counted this as a summit meeting because Mr. Gore was substituting for President Clinton.

Table 4.1 Total Number of Summits between the United States and South Korea and Japan

	South Korea	Japan	Total
Clinton	14	24	38
Bush	15	22	37
Total	29	46	75




Figure 4.1 U.S.-South Korea Summit Timeline




Figure 4.2 U.S.-Japan Summit Timeline

As shown in Table 4.1, South Korea had 27 summits and Japan had 39 summits. The reason for this difference is that Japan participates in the G-7/G-8 summits annually. By looking at Figure 4.1 and 4.2, it is obvious that Japan has more opportunity to meet with the U.S. (twice every year) than South Korea, which can meet only once annually. Also the number of mutual visits has differences in that the U.S.-South Korea had 14 bilateral summits and the U.S.-Japan had 19 bilateral talks. It could be argued that the level of alliance solidarity of the U.S.-Japan alliance is higher than the U.S.-South Korea alliance. However, this argument is quite hasty because this can be viewed by two different perceptions. On one hand, frequent meetings can infer strong alliance solidarity. On the other hand, fracture in the relationship requires frequent meetings to improve the relationship.

To supplement the controversial argument, this study standardized the number of summits by the number of speech per two year.²² This will indicate the percentage of the statements made by the U.S. President to each state giving the base condition for measurement. To view the variation throughout the years, the timeline will be divided into two-year terms. The data for the categorized speech and variation by the U.S. President toward South Korea and Japan are summarized on Table 4.2.


²² The time frame will be in two-year terms. The data will be the number of speeches per category / total summits per two years

Table 4.2 Variation in the President's Speech on South Korea and Japan by 2 years (%/100)

Term	South Korea			Japan		
	VST	ST	NT	VST	ST	NT
93-94	0 (0)	1 (33)	2 (67)	4 (67)	2 (33)	0 (0)
95-96	2 (67)	0 (0)	1 (33)	3 (43)	2 (29)	2 (29)
97-98	1 (25)	1 (25)	2 (50)	4 (67)	1 (17)	1 (17)
99-00	0 (0)	1 (25)	3 (75)	2 (40)	1 (20)	2 (40)
01-02	0 (0)	2 (50)	2 (50)	4 (44)	3 (33)	2 (22)
03-04	1 (33)	1 (33)	1 (33)	3 (50)	3 (50)	0 (0)
05-06	1 (25)	1 (25)	2 (50)	2 (67)	0 (0)	1 (33)
07-08	0 (0)	2 (50)	2 (50)	3 (75)	1 (25)	0 (0)

VST: Very Strong Tone. ST: Strong Tone, NT: Neutral
Tone Number of speeches (percentage)

The following graphs show a clear concept of the variations by tones throughout the years (Figure 4.3).






Figure 4.3 Variation by 2-year term

In the graph above, the NT category is the base in measuring the level of alliance solidarity. Variation in the VST category will affect the degree in the level of alliance solidarity more than the ST category. Of course, the NT category will be less effective than the ST category. The NT category consists of a regular relationship or a relationship that expressed uncomfortableness. According to the results, Japan is almost always higher than South Korea in the VST category. The ST category and the NT category show similar patterns. Most periods show a parallel relationship, except during the 1993-1996 periods, for which the graphs show an

inverse relationship. A common pattern can be identified that when one category is stable the other two categories show inverse relations, or two presents parallel connections while one category show inverse relations (Figure 4.4).




Figure 4.4 Alliance Solidarity of South Korea and Japan

There are several sharp increases between 1993 to 1995 and 2002 to 2003 on the South Korea VST graph. In 1993 the 1st nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula broke out and the Clinton and the Kim administration had contradicting views in the approach towards North Korea. President Clinton thought of using military force as an engagement policy, which brought strong opposition from President Kim, who insisted on an economic sanction (Yoon, 1996; Lee,

2006).²³ This shows the low percentage of the VST and a high rate in the NT, which presumes the negativity of the alliance relationship. However, after the negotiation of the nuclear crisis, the U.S. and South Korea had positive agreements in economic trade, and retracting the USFK withdrawal plans and reaffirmation of the security alliance in Korea brought a positive perception, explaining the increase between 1993 and 1995.²⁴ The increase of South Korea between 2002 and 2003 is due to reconfirming the bilateral security alliance between the two states because the two leaders were in the beginning of their administration. More importantly, the alliance relationship has been positive by the decision of President Roh to dispatch ROK military forces to Iraq for the Iraq reconstruction in Irbil.²⁵ Other than these terms, South Korea shows a constant decrease.

The declining slope in the mid-1990s to 2000 and from the mid-2000s to 2007 is due to various events. From 1995 to 2000, the VST decreased but the ST and NT increased. Even though the VST decreased, the alliance maintained a close relationship. In the last years of President Kim Young-sam's administration, there were agreements between President Clinton in order to resolve the North Korean situation. They discussed forming a four-party talk involving the two Koreas, the United States, and China for the purpose of establishing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and discussing issues of economic support in fuel and food to North Korea.²⁶ In the Kim Dae-jung administration, the alliance relationship showed a good connection in the initial office years. The Kim administration presented a new North Korea policy, a Sunshine policy. The Clinton and the Bush administration advocated the policy and the

²³ The U.S.-North Korean talks held in June 1993 generated considerable concern in South Korea about U.S. intentions. It also stimulated intense resentment at South Korea's exclusion from a process that directly affected critical South Korean interests but over which the ROK had little influence (Larson et al., 2004). Among other things, the U.S.-North Korean talks served to "remind South Korean officials of their own sense of helplessness at being sidelined from an issue that directly impinged on South Korean national interests but was beyond the control of the leadership in Seoul" (Snyder, 1999).

²⁴ *The Korea Herald*, September 3, 1993, cited from Jung-Ik Kim, *The future of the U.S.-Republic of Korea military relationship*, pp. 146

²⁵ For information, see the 'Joint statement between the United States and the Republic of Korea' in October 20, 2003

²⁶ *Presidential Paper*: The President's News Conference with President Kim Yong-sam of South Korea in Cheju. April 16, 1996

historical Inter-Korean summit in June 2000 since the events were thought to bring stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and, moreover, in the Northeast Asian affairs.²⁷

The relationship was moderate until President Roh Moo-hyun took office. All throughout the period of the Roh administration, a gradual decline can be seen in the slopes of the three tone graphs. The reason for the uncomfortable alliance is that there were considerably big differences in the viewpoint in the approach of North Korea policy. These were mentioned in the November 21, 2004 *New York Times*, which reported that, "... Mr. Bush was clearly concerned that South Korea's president, Roh Moo-hyun, might diverge from the American strategy, and offer the North more aid and investment even before it agrees to surrender its weapons..." and on September 8, 2007, *The Washington Post* reported, "the talks ended with an awkward public exchange between the two leaders over whether the 1953 truce that halted the Korean War might soon be replaced with a formal peace treaty as part of the nuclear deal" and additionally explaining that, "this is not the first time Mr. Bush and Mr. Roh have clashed over North Korea policy..." (Sanger, 2004; Fletcher, 2008). Especially at the summit in September 2007, the two leaders expressed uncomfortable feelings in the news conference. Also, fractures showed through the Six-Party Talks, where South Korea argued to sustain the economic support regardless of the nuclear issue and where the U.S. was trying to make North Korea terminate the weapon or give economic sanctions to North Korea.

The slight increase in ST in 2007 to 2008 was due to several events. In 2007, the U.S. and South Korea signed the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which eliminated virtually all barriers to trade and investments between the two states.²⁸ The 2008 period shows a sign of rebuilding of the U.S.-South Korea alliance due to the inauguration of President Lee

²⁷ Summit meeting on September 7, 2000, in New York City and joint statement on March 7, 2001.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov.

Myung-bak. President Bush and President Lee met three times in a year, which is rare in the summit history, indicating the reestablishment of the fractured alliance between the two states.

Compared with South Korea, Japan shows results in different patterns. Japan shows some decrease between 1993 to 1996 and 1998 to 1999 in the VST category. Otherwise, the frequency of the statement increases gradually. The decline on the slope is due to the economic trade disagreement between the states. After the Cold War, the United States pressured Japan to open the Japanese market and reduce the trade tariffs on import goods; for example, the U.S. pressured Japan to open the rice market. In the Cold War period, security was the priority issue, but as the main threat had been eliminated, the U.S. gradually requested economic cooperation with allied states. The negotiation process involved some frustration between the two states because the essential criteria did not satisfy the needs of the two states. Several things that the United States wanted from Japan were free and fair trade (United States Government Printing Office, 1994 Book I, pp. 229). The competitiveness of Japanese products and companies has overwhelmed the American products and companies, for instance, those in the technology fields. Therefore, opening the market could lead to development in America's economy, which could deliver more jobs for American workers (United States Government Printing Office, 1995 Book II, pp. 33). These disagreements and struggles in economic relations can show a decline of the slope for the period of 1994 to 1995. Between 1998 to 1999 there was a slight decrease in VST but an increase in both ST and NT. At this time, the Asian Financial Crisis struck most of the Asian developing states. Japan was suffering from economic depression, which at the time was called the "lost ten years." During these difficult situations, Japan needed to reform the economy to recover, and along with this the U.S. requested a more open market from Japan.

Except for these two periods, the graph shows a constant increase. Especially, after 2001, there was no decline in the slope. The reason for this phenomenon is the Bush-Koizumi connection. The two leaders held office around the same time and had interaction with each other for almost six years. Prime Minister Koizumi had held office for six years – one of the longest terms in recent Japanese political history. The idea and approaches in security and economy issues were similar between both leaders, bringing the two states very close. Moreover, the active and instant cooperation of war against terrorism connected the two leaders even closer. This could be seen in the action when Japan dispatched the JSDF Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group immediately after the request from the U.S. Also the support of the Six-Party Talks in the North Korea 2nd nuclear crisis has confirmed the close relationship. Throughout the Koizumi administration, Japan and the U.S. maintained close ties and had excessive improvement in cooperation in security and economic relations.

The essential point in interpreting the graphs is not observing the variation over the years of each state. The decrease and increase of the line does not give the necessary information of the differentiating level of alliance solidarity in U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan. In order to manifest the degree, the gap between the two states should be observed attentively. In other words, if the gap between the two lines is narrow, this infers that the alliance solidarity with the United States does not have much difference among the states. By contrast, when the gap grows larger, this infers that the level of alliance solidarity is showing divergence between the allied states. With this criterion, the degree in the level of alliance solidarity between alliances can be measured. In the VST category, the gap was large in the first place, but around 1995 to 1996 and 2003 to 2004, the gap became narrow (Figure 4.5).²⁹ Yet, after 1996, the gap gradually grew

²⁹ The graph indicates the difference between South Korea and Japan. In order to view the degree of the gap, the figures are calculated in absolute values.

larger. The ST category shows mixed results although the gap does not fluctuate much. The NT category shows similar patterns with the VST category throughout the period.




Figure 4.5 Absolute Value of the difference between South Korea and Japan in each Tone Category

Based on the results, determining the alliance solidarity according to the ST categories is difficult. The reason is the ST category shows little changes in the difference throughout the research period. Significant differences are shown in the VST and NT category. The gap grows larger over time. Consequently, the graphs lead to the conclusion that the level of alliance solidarity between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliance is growing apart from each other. As Japan is on top of South Korea in the VST category, it could be argued that the U.S.-Japan alliance is growing stronger while the U.S.-South Korea alliance is getting weaker over the period. The significant difference in the VST and the NT category reflects a meaningful degree of alliance solidarity. Moreover, the VST category shows a more implication than the NT category because the VST category indicates a definite relationship compared with the ST category and the NT category.

The explanation in the level of alliance solidarity has been analyzed. Then what are the factors that affect the alliance solidarity? The next section will discuss the effects of government ideology and public opinion in the difference in alliance solidarity.

2. Government Ideology and Public Opinion

The government ideology is the factor that indicates the leader's partisanship. In South Korea and Japan, the major party identity is classified as either conservative or progressive. The conservative party is usually characterized as "right-wing," which has a tendency of a "pro-American" or "anti-North Korean" policy. The progressive (or liberal) party is "left-wing," or "pro-North Korean" or "anti-American" line.

In Northeast Asia, the major conflicts that occurred after the Cold War were between the U.S. and North Korea. Therefore, the policy in a state has to choose where their policy should rely on: either towards the U.S. or North Korea. These kinds of circumstances happen when uncomfortable situations develop between the U.S. and North Korea. The conservative party has the tendency to be more favorable toward the U.S. policy rather than North Korea. They think that it is more beneficial to stand together with the U.S. and execute North Korea policy in favor of the U.S, for instance, a hard-line policy. However, the progressive (liberal) party gives North Korea or anti-American issues priority to those of the U.S. Therefore, policies that the progressive party presents show favorable actions that the North Korean government prefers or that negatively affect the U.S. alliance, for instance, continuous economic support to North Korea despite the nuclear threat to South Korea could be a case. Moreover, either way a state chooses a policy, it has to obtain domestic support, which is reflected through public opinion. If the public opinion is supportive, then the government policy is gaining legitimacy.

In South Korea, these two parties' characteristics are reflected in the North Korea policy. The conservative party tends to agree and match the U.S.-North Korea policy, which is mostly a hard-line and deterrence policy; on the other hand, the progressive party policies are very pro-North Korean, which support North Korea's ideology and government, pursuing a soft-line policy. From 1949 to 1998, the conservative party held office and the majority in the Congress. This implicates that in the past, the leaders were mainly favorable towards the U.S. and the policies stood in a similar line. South Korea experienced the first government party change in the contemporary political history in 1998. When President Kim Dae-jung (New Congress for New Politics/Millennium Democratic Party (MDP)) came into office, there was a change in the North Korean policy compared to the administration of President Kim Young-sam (Democratic Liberal Party (DLP)). Even though President Kim showed a very pro-American attitude, he supported the Sunshine Policy, which was a different soft-line approach toward the North compared to the former governments. President Roh Moo-hyun (MDP), a radical leftist, tried to strengthen the relations with North Korea by supporting them with a huge amount of economic aid and fuel in spite of the nuclear weapon crisis in the mid-2000s. In 2008, when President Lee Myung-bak (Grand National Party (GNP)) was elected, there was a big expectation that the relationship with the U.S. would be restored again, and was strengthened very much compared to the former administration. South Korean president's partisanship is listed in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 Partisanship of South Korean Presidents

Office years	President	Partisanship
1993-1998	Kim Young-sam	Conservative (DLP)
1998-2003	Kim Dae-jung	Progressive (MDP)
2003-2008	Roh Moo-hyun	Progressive (MDP)
2008-present	Lee Myung-bak	Conservative (GNP)

Japan also had some changes in the leader's partisanship. These changes were mostly in the early 1990s, when the party leaders held office for a very short period – maximum two years. The main majority party in Japan is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This party is a conservative political party whose goals are export-based economic growth and close cooperation with the United States in foreign and defense policies. The Japan New Party (JNP), Japan Renewal Party (JRP), and Japan Socialist Party (JSP) are liberal progressive parties, whose main policies related to security are cancellation of the US-Japan military alliance, dismantling of US bases in Japan, and replacing it with a treaty of friendship. The prime ministers of Japan had fairly a good relationship with the U.S. There were some disagreements in the mid-1990s, when the U.S. pressured Japan to open the market. Yet, Japan's leader maintained strong ties with the U.S., especially in global and regional security matters. The Japanese Prime Ministers and their partisanship are listed in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Partisanship of Japan Prime Minister

Office years	President	Partisanship
1991-1993	Kiichi Miyazawa	Conservative (LDP)
1993-1994	Morihiro Hosokawa	Liberal (JNP)
1994-1994	Tsutomu Hata	Liberal (JRP)
1994-1996	Tomiichi Murayama	Liberal (JSP)
1996-1998	Ryutaro Hashimoto	Conservative (LDP)
1998-2000	Keizo Obuchi	Conservative (LDP)
2000-2001	Yoshiro Mori	Conservative (LDP)
2001-2006	Junichiro Koizumi	Conservative (LDP)
2006-2007	Shinzo Abe	Conservative (LDP)
2007-2008	Yasuo Fukuda	Conservative (LDP)
2008-present	Taro Aso	Conservative (LDP)

Another determinant to explain the level of alliance solidarity is public opinion. Public opinion is an aggregation of individual attitudes or beliefs. Governments have increasingly found surveys to be a useful tool for guiding their public information and propaganda programs and occasionally for helping in the formulation of other kinds of policies. Therefore, the public polls are reliable sources to measure the public's perception toward a certain issue or policy. Regarding the foreign relationship, commercial pollsters in Korea and Japan regularly conduct a survey on the public's attitudes toward an alliance country.

By asking questions like, "Regardless of your opinion of the U.S., how would you describe relations between the U.S. and South Korea (or Japan) at the present time – very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or very poor?" the survey tried to capture collective attitudes of the country. Governments are aware of the importance of these simultaneous reactions coming from the public and they consider these opinions for their further decision-making process. Simply, the public polls indicate the level of domestic support to foreign policy. Because the polls indirectly or directly influence policy decision-making or positioning processes, especially in the relationship with other countries, the results of the polls should be considered as a critical element for analyzing foreign policy. In this study, U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea relationships have been developed differently. The general trend of the two alliances shows reverse relations as time flow. To explain the difference of alliance solidarity level, the public polls are analyzed.³⁰ Hypothetically, having a negative domestic perception toward the U.S. in South Korea or Japan will negatively influence the level of the solidarity. The public poll that surveyed the favorable perceptions toward the U.S. in Japan and South Korea are presented in

³⁰ The poll data was collected from various organizations: U.S. State Department, Yomiuri Shimbun, The Japan Times, Dong-A Ilbo, Joong-Ang Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, Gallup Korea, Gallup organization, Shin Joho Center, Cabinet Office of Japan, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) press, East Asian Institute (EAI), and Center of Strategic and International Studies - Research and Development (CSIS-RAND). I averaged the numbers of the same year to fit the time frame.

Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.




Figure 4.6 Attitude of South Korea toward the U.S., 1993-2008

Source: CSIS-RAND, Dong-A Ilbo, Joong-Ang Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, Gallup Korea, EAI, and AEI




Figure 4.7 Attitude of Japan toward the U.S., 1993-2008

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Inc., Shin Joho Center, and Cabinet Office of Japan.

The public opinion towards the relationship between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances is shown in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9.³¹

³¹ I eliminated the answers that showed moderate or fair responses because these respondents are considered not of having a clear position in viewing the U.S. and the relationship.




Figure 4.8 Opinion on the State of U.S.-South Korea Relations, 1993-2008

Source: CSIS-RAND, Dong-A Ilbo, Joong-Ang Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, Gallup Korea, EAI, and AEI




Figure 4.9 Opinion on the State of U.S.-Japan Relations, 1993-2008

Source: Yomiuri Shimbun, Gallup Inc., Shin Joho Center, and Cabinet Office of Japan.

1) South Korea

The general opinion of South Korea shows negative perception towards the U.S. as time flows and the recognition towards the alliance relationship also shows negative understanding. Up to 2001, South Korea's attitude of the public opinion was fairly stable and was higher than the negative opinions. However, in 1995 and 2002 the line dropped rapidly, reversing the

perceptions. The negative opinions were higher than the positive opinions from 2002 to 2007. Although the positive attitude exceeded the negative attitude in 2007, the negative opinions still remained high compared to the previous years. Yet, in 2007 to 2008, the positive opinion was higher than the negative opinion. In sum, the overall perception shows a decrease in positive opinion and an increase in negative opinion. Related to the alliance solidarity of South Korea VST category in Figure 4.4, the public opinion poll of Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.8 shows an overall similar trend throughout the period (by comparing the regression line of positive opinion and the VST line).

As shown in the figures, there have been several periods (June 1995, February 2002, December 2002, and December 2004) where the Korean attitudes were more unfavorable than favorable toward the U.S. The sudden decline in June 1995 occurred due to the U.S.-North Korea agreement in Kuala Lumpur on provisions for implementing the Agreed Framework.³² The negotiation was not the reason but the process has stimulated the South Koreans toward negative cognitions. The reason was that the negotiation was a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, leaving out South Korea in which the South Koreans thought that their government should take the central role in the North Korean issues. The Kim administration, as well as the South Korean public, was irritated and angry with the decision of the United States' own authority on the light water reactor (LWR) project. This can be compared to the favorable view toward the U.S. at the height of nuclear crisis in 1993, which was above 60 percent. One other reason for the decline was the economic policy of the U.S. After the Cold War, the U.S. pressured South Korea to further open its markets. The U.S. took a more assertive, even confrontational, approach to international economic negotiations and explicitly sought to recast

³² Agreed Framework (October 1994) is a negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea, which froze North Korea's overt nuclear program and allowed international inspections of its existing nuclear plants in exchange for two light water reactors and 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually.

the entire intellectual basis of U.S. trade policy to locate trade more at the center of U.S. foreign policy (Garten, 1993; Larson et al., 2004). In the case of South Korea, the U.S. policy manifested itself in strong market-opening pressure, particularly in the agricultural and automotive sectors, which were the major industries of South Korea. Especially the market-opening of the rice market drew enormous criticism from the South Koreans. These two events affected the public opinion to decline in this period.

Despite the decline in the public opinion, the alliance solidarity showed fairly strong alliance cohesion (Figure 4.4 – VST). After the bilateral negotiation between the U.S.-North Korea without South Korea, President Kim had a summit in July 1995 and showed regret by the process of the negotiation. In spite of the uncomfortableness of President Kim, President Clinton stressed that closer cooperation would be promised in the future.³³ Afterwards, in the April 1996 summit in Cheju, Korea, President Clinton agreed to jointly propose a “Four Party Meeting,” which laid a basis for alleviating the strains in U.S.-South Korea relations (Larson et al., 2004). Throughout President Kim’s term, he repeatedly sought reassurances concerning its security commitment and military presence in Korea. These emphases, together with close policy coordination, communicated an awareness of the fundamental importance of the U.S.-South Korea relationship (Larson et al., 2004). Therefore, the public opinion and the government’s demand affected the U.S. government to change its policy of constructively involving South Korea and not to carry out dogmatic decisions in the North Korea related issues. This eventually led to ensuring a close bond between the U.S. and South Korea relationships.

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 had a positive effect on the South Korean public in identifying the U.S.-South Korea relations. With the help of the U.S., South Korea recovered rapidly from the IMF crisis and this is reflected in the public poll that the favorable opinion

³³ United States Government Printing Office, 1995 Vol. II. pp. 1155-1159.

increased from 65 percent in 1998 to 71 percent in 1999, and unfavorable opinion decreased from 32 percent to 28 percent in the same period. This period also marked the highest cohesion in the alliance in the Kim Dae-jung administration. During the Inter-Korea Summit in June 2000, President Kim emphasized again the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the U.S. presence in the Korean peninsula for the South Korea security. However, after the Inter-Korea Summit, the public poll began to decrease. This is due to the changing threat perceptions of the South Korean public towards North Korea. Also, in order to legitimize and achieve the summit meeting, President Kim actively urged South Koreans to view North Korea as “brothers and sisters” not as “enemies,” stimulating the nationalism aspect. Based on the nationalism emotion in South Korea, the attitude toward the U.S. began to decrease, while a favorable perception towards North Korea began to grow.

There were series of events that brought negative attitudes toward the U.S., reversing the positive opinion starting in 2001. In March 2001, in the summit, President Bush expressed his deep distrust of North Korea.³⁴ Also, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, President Bush commented the “axis of evil” states in the 2003 State of Union, deepening the South Korean’s antipathy towards the U.S. Despite the rising tension of anti-Americanism in South Korea, President Kim expressed South Korea’s full support for the U.S. war on terrorism. However, more severe events raised anti-American perception. For instance, the rebuilding of houses on the Yongsan military base in the center of Seoul and the pressure to choose a U.S. aircraft for the next-term (FSX) fighter project, which the South Korean government did, worsened the emotions of the public (Niksich, 2002). Moreover, in June of 2001, a U.S. military vehicle on a training exercise crushed two South Korean schoolgirls to death, and this event stirred up enormous public antipathy

³⁴ This was the first summit meeting with President Bush and President Kim; yet, the summit meeting was almost universally portrayed as a diplomatic disaster (Levin & Han, 2002).

toward the U.S. while reopening broader societal fissures over the U.S. military role in Korea (Larson et al., 2004). The following Ohno skating incident made the antagonistic feeling of the South Koreans to last even longer.³⁵ The public opinion marked the lowest point since the end of the Cold War.

Eventually, the seriousness of the anti-Americanism affected the 2002 South Korean presidential election. President Roh Moo-hyun, a liberal party, promised to remove the U.S. troops from South Korea and support North Korea with economic aid maintaining good relations, stimulating the anti-Americanism and nationalism of the South Korean public (Niksich, 2003). This campaign strategy worked and he was elected as the president in 2002. The Roh administration is considered to have fractured the U.S.-South Korea alliance severely throughout his term. The public opinion showed more negative opinion than positive opinion during the Roh administration.

During the Roh administration, the positive opinion was very low. It was either below the negative opinion or similar to it. There are a few reasons in explaining the phenomenon. Immediately after the inauguration of President Roh, he argued that South Korea should take over the wartime operation command from the U.S.³⁶ President Roh claimed that the wartime operation issue runs to the core of South Korean sovereignty and that South Korea would take the role as a “balancer” in the East Asian affairs. The public supported the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the return of wartime operation command, reflecting a very high anti-American emotion. Actually, the U.S. did not have the intention to return the wartime operation command. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld planned a realignment strategy to relocate the U.S. troops

³⁵ This is an incident that happened in the 2002 winter Olympics when a South Korea short track skater lost the gold medal to an American because of an unreasonable decision from the referee. This would not have been a big issue; but by coincidence, it happened after the tragic accident of the two school girls, which involved the nationalism stirring anti-Americanism.

³⁶ The wartime operation command was under the U.S. command in the Combined Forces Command (CFC). The peacetime operation command was returned to South Korea in 1994.

in South Korea for the support of the warfare in the Middle East and the war against terrorism. This included a reduction in the number of U.S. troops in South Korea and relocation to the south of Han River, not a withdrawal of all USFK. However, due to the high anti-American emotion and a great desire of the Roh government, the U.S. decided to return the wartime operation command by 2009. Many of the conservative party and military officials strongly opposed the suggestion, fearing deterioration of the alliance. However, after consideration in the Security Council Meeting (SCM), the decision was made that on April 17, 2012, the wartime operation command will be returned to South Korea.

Another event that created a high negative reaction was the dispatch of Republic of Korea (ROK) troops to Iraq in March 2005. There were strong oppositions in the dispatch of troops to Iraq. This issue was combined with anti-Americanism, showing a very high negative opinion in viewing the relationship between the two states. However, during the high degree of negative perception and divergence in the government policies, there was one point where the U.S. showed appreciation towards South Korea. This is when South Korea decided to dispatch troops to Iraq in support of Iraq reconstruction in 2003.

The policy difference towards North Korea resulted in lessening the alliance solidarity. President Roh, who was an extreme leftist, supported North Korea with economic aid despite the nuclear weapon threat, which contradicted the U.S. strategy of economic support after terminating the nuclear weapon and related programs. This was clearly mentioned in the *New York Times*, which reported, "...[President] Bush was clearly concerned that South Korea's president, Roh Moo Hyun, might diverge from the American strategy, and offer the North more aid and investment even before it agrees to surrender its weapons, halt its production of new weapons and allow open inspections" (Sanger, 2004).

In sum, from 2002 to 2007, the anti-American movement and emotions were very high. This was reflected in the poll which showed a negative attitude towards the U.S. and perception to the alliance through this period. The nationalism and anti-Americanism have influenced the 2002 South Korean presidential election, resulting in a highly progressive leader to take the office. Also the mass anti-American movement and negative opinion triggered an unexpected decision of transferring the wartime operation command. Lee Jung-hoon of Yonsei University said, “There is an element in Washington which is saying ‘to hell with the alliance, we have had enough of this barrage of anti-Americanism’” (Khang, 2006). Another professor from the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security said, in showing the U.S. concern of the upcoming presidential election in 2007, that “the U.S. also seems to be seeking to head off the spread of anti-American sentiment in advance of South Korea's presidential elections in December”, which infers the hope of a pro-American leader to get elected in the future (Yonhap News Agency, 2007).

In a poll result conducted by East Asia Institute (EAI) in 2004, 31.2 percent of the South Korean respondents replied and recognized that the decision of relocating U.S. troops south of Han River was a response of the anti-Americanism towards the U.S. (EAI, 2004). The government ideology of Roh's administration also brought the change in the U.S. policy. A statement from the U.S. Defense Department official, on condition of anonymity in a meeting with Korean correspondents, said, “if the Korean government demanded the pullout of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the U.S. could withdraw its troops even by tomorrow as it is the will of the Korean people” (Yonhap News Agency, 2003). This dialogue infers the influence of the public opinion and the government ideology of South Korea in the decision of a wartime operation command handover.

Consequently, the overall change of alliance solidarity showed a decrease in the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Especially marking periods of the alliance solidarity, there were signs of strong relations in 1995 in the Kim Young-sam administration. President Kim Dae-jung started with a fairly strong relationship but it decreased over time. President Roh showed the lowest solidarity most of his term except in 2003. In the Lee administration, there were signs of recovery. Related to the public opinion, the general tendency was positive in the 1990s except for a slight decrease in 1995. From 2001, a negative perception dominated most of the public. The favorable emotion in the U.S. started to recover in 2007; yet, negative opinions were still high.

Government ideology has experienced several rotations. President Kim Young-sam, a conservative party leader, implemented a consistent North Korea policy and security cooperation with the U.S. except when he expressed regret for being left out in the negotiation process in handling the 1st North Korea nuclear crisis. Later, President Kim Dae-jung presented an entirely new Sunshine policy towards North Korea, which was supported by the Clinton administration but had divergence in the Bush administration. Although President Kim was a progressive leader, he emphasized the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the presence of the USFK for the security of South Korea. Yet, the different view of President Bush on the North Korea policy produced a crack in the alliance solidarity. Throughout the Roh administration – frequently characterized as very liberal or pro-North Korea – the fracture of the two alliances grew deeper. It showed entirely different approaches in the North Korea policy, especially during the 2nd North Korea nuclear crisis and in the Six-Party Talks. After President Lee took over the Blue House from the most liberal administration in the Korean political history, alliance solidarity recovered fast, but the relations with North Korea got worse.

As a result, the hypotheses are significant in the study. However, it is hasty to conclude that public opinion has a definite influence on alliance solidarity. Rather, government ideology is shown to be more influential than public opinion. That is, when the two factors show inverse relations, the solidarity level shows more positive relations with the government ideology compared with the public opinion factor.

2) Japan

In the Japanese Prime Minister history, the LDP leaders mostly held office after WWII. After the Cold War, with the exception of the term from 1993 to 1996 when the liberal party held office, the conservative LDP party held the office. The party ideology of Japan is similar to that of South Korea. However, there is a slight difference in distinguishing the government ideology. South Korea's party or government ideology is divided as to whether they are pro-America or pro-North Korea. On the other hand, in Japan, anti-America is an attitude that has a different perception against the U.S. interest. In detail, while the U.S. intervened in Japan's domestic affairs, Japan realized the strength of the U.S. and allied with U.S. interests – usually letting the United States lead – as they pushed for their own change. This is considered as pro-American in Japan. The interests under attack are inclined to see the United States as their enemy and to let loose, charging it with arrogance and interference – which is anti-American (Glosserman, 2005). This definition implies the domestic political, security, and national identity issues in Japan. Therefore, in Japan, the conservative party (LDP) is inferred as pro-American and the liberal party as anti-American.

Looking at the results in the public opinion polls, the Japanese public has generally had a stable attitude towards the U.S. At certain points – in 1994, 1995, 1998, 2003, and 2007 – pro-

Americanism in the polls decreased; despite these periods, the polls recovered to a similar percentage in short times. There is almost no point – except in 1995, 2003, and 2007 – where the positive opinion and the negative opinion reversed. In sum, viewing the U.S.-Japan relations, the positive opinion shows a stable pattern while the negative opinion shows a slight decrease in the poll overall. Related to the level of alliance solidarity of Japan in the VST category in Figure 4.4, the public opinion tends to be stable compared with the increase in the alliance solidarity. The regression line in Figure 4.9 demonstrates this phenomenon.

The first drop in 1994 was caused by worsening bilateral economic friction, in which a Japan backlash occurred against the Clinton administration for its pressure to open Japanese markets. The pressure from the U.S. to open the economic market in East Asia was common to the allied states in this period where most of the states showed inclination towards the U.S. but had to cooperate in some way. During the economic negotiation in 1994, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, a liberalist in JSP, struggled in reaching an agreement with the U.S. government. In fact, the U.S. was strongly willing to open the Japanese domestic market to provide more opportunities to the U.S. economic sectors, but these opportunities inversely could hurt the Japanese domestic. This anxiety stimulated a negative public opinion in Japan towards the U.S. as we see in the VST line in Figure 4.3 where the line declines in 1994.

The second drop in the poll is marked in 1995. The decline point was due to a rape incident of a twelve-year-old school girl by three U.S. servicemen in Okinawa, which triggered a mass anti-American movement in Okinawa and the mainland of Japan. Within weeks of the rape, 85,000 Okinawans took to the streets, demanding the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and bases from the island. This feeling was echoed by other citizens throughout Japan. The rape created one of the most serious crises in U.S.-Japan relations in the postwar era (Globerman, 2005). The

public poll that asked how the Japanese viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance reflected this incident by showing the decrease of opinions from 53 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 1995. The incident occurred when Prime Minister Murayama was in office but the bilateral agreement in resolving the Okinawa incident was held during the term of Prime Minister Hashimoto (LDP) in early 1996, who regained the office from the liberal party in three years. The immediate reaction he took was to resolve the Okinawa incident with President Clinton, which showed efforts of recovering the U.S.-Japan relationship. President Clinton also expressed his sincere regret towards the victim and the family, reaffirming favorable cooperation to relieve the Japanese public anger (United States Government Printing Office, 1995 Book II, pp. 1763). As the incident settled down with the cooperation between the two states, the alliance solidarity level began to recover. The alliance solidarity level reached the lowest point of 43 percent and started to increase during the Hashimoto administration.

Another drop in 1998 was due to a series of incidents in security and economy. The poll displays a drop from 68 percent in 1997 to 48 percent in 1998 (Figure 4.7). In this period, the Asian Financial Crisis occurred throughout Asia. Japan was not severely influenced by the financial crisis. However, the U.S. pressured Japan to take a leading role in solving the financial crisis. Moreover, President Clinton bypassed Japan during a trip to China, which sparked fears of “Japan passing” in the Japanese government. Furthermore, the speculation of the diverging interest in dealing with the North Korea issue gave fear of being abandoned by the U.S. in Northeast Asian affairs. These events prompted anti-Americanism in the government and through the public. This actually shows a 20 percent decrease in the positive opinion towards the U.S.-Japan relationship. However, in the alliance solidarity level, it reached the peak during this time, which the public opinion and the alliance solidarity level illustrated an inverse relationship.

The inverse relationship can be explained by viewing the international situation. The U.S. ignorance in the visit, different interest in North Korea approach, and the external pressure towards Japan's economy have affected the public giving an unfavorable perception; yet, the international crisis forced the U.S. to emphasize the relations with Japan, whom was considered to be a very important actor in managing the financial crisis. Accordingly, the international expectation from the U.S. has strengthened the U.S.-Japan relationship despite the decreased positive public attitude towards the alliance. Moreover, the positive public perception has decreased, but this did not mean that the negative perception reversed the positive opinion and the perception did not last long. The positive opinion recovered from 42 percent to 70 percent in 1999 as soon as the international crisis was dissolved.

The 2003 public opinion drop brought a reverse in the opinion poll, but with a minimum difference. This overturn happened due to the decision to dispatch 600 JSDF forces to Iraq. The Japanese public reflected worried views on President Bush's war against the terrorism policy – specifically that the United States was provoking crisis in the world. Also, the negative perception exceeded the positive opinion when two Japanese diplomats were shot and killed near Tikrit, Iraq, in 2003, while preparations for the deployment of Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group were in their final stages (Tokyo, 2003). In spite of the poor perception of the relationship and of the U.S., the alliance solidarity gradually showed an increase in the cohesion level. This phenomenon can be explained through the government ideology factor. Shortly after President Bush's inauguration, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi took office in Japan. The close friendship between President Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi is very well known. For instance, in the summit statement in 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi said, "... President Bush has shown his strong determination and commitment, and he is a man of determination. So with President

Bush, we would like to maintain our Japan-U.S. cooperation in order to come up with peace and stability in the world” (United States Government Printing Office, 2004 Book I, pp. 1010). In the summit in October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that, “... Japan would fulfill its role in providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for the sake of Japan itself, for attaining stability in the region and for the world. Japan would do so based on its own decision from the standpoint of the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global context” (MOFA, 2003). This implies that Prime Minister Koizumi was an extreme pro-American, which reflects the increase in alliance solidarity during his term. Therefore, similar to the drop of public opinion in 1998, the 2003 decline expressed antipathy in the actions of the U.S., but the government ties had more influence in determining the level of alliance solidarity.

After the Koizumi administration in 2006, the public opinion dropped suddenly in 2007 to around 30 percent. This was a big change in the perception of the Japanese public compared with that of the previous year when the rate was around 70 percent. This sudden decrease reflects the dissatisfaction over the U.S. decision to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism despite the lack of progress on the issue of Japanese abducted by North Korean agents (Song, 2007; Halloran, 2008). In addition, the current financial crisis triggered by subprime mortgage loan problems in the United States caused the international community to lose confidence in the U.S. economy, another factor contributing to a loss of trust among Japanese in the United States (Yomiuri, 2008). These events have caused about a 20 percent increase in the negative opinion in the Japanese public. Domestically, the post-Koizumi government was succeeded by the LDP leaders – Abe, Fukuda, and Aso – who were very conservative and consistent with Koizumi’s pro-American policy. However, the government was dissatisfied with the U.S in the decision of removing North Korea from the terrorist state list, because of the one-

way notice to Japan without any prior discussion about the issue. The reason Japan was sensitive to the North Korea issue was the unsolved abduction problem with North Korea. Japan wanted to take advantage of resolving the issue through the Six-Party Talks, which did not turn out to be very successful. Yet, regardless of the antipathy towards the U.S. in both the public and the government, the alliance solidarity level remained strong according to Figure 4.4. After the Koizumi government, Japan experienced an annual change of prime ministers and this frequent change of the government required the U.S. to reaffirm the close relationship of the alliance security. This attitude of the U.S. is reflected in the speech of the President in every first summit meeting with the prime ministers. The reconfirmation from the U.S. President contained strong tones in the alliance relationship with Japan. Therefore, the level of the alliance solidarity continues to be positive despite the poor opinion from the public.

Consequently, the overall change of alliance solidarity showed an increase in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In contrast to the results, there were several periods showing negativity in public opinion. The declined relations in 1994 and 1995 were due to economic friction and the Okinawa rape incident. The serious impact of anti-Americanism due to the Okinawa rape incident influenced both governments to revise the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The incident was settled by reaching a mutual agreement with Prime Minister Hashimoto in 1996. The 1998 drop is known to be caused by the international financial crisis and different interest in dealing with North Korea. The poll of 2003 reflects the negativity of the Japanese public towards the U.S. due to the dispatch of JSDF to Iraq. The reaction got worse with the casualties in Iraq. The 2007 decline resulted because the U.S. removed North Korea from the terrorist state list without any discussion with Japan even though they were trying to take advantage of the situation to pull beneficial agreements considering abduction problems. Moreover the current economic crisis

originating in the U.S. caused the antipathy to remain high, which is unusual in Japan public poll history. This showed the lowest point in the timeframe.

Government ideology was mainly pro-American in Japan. From 1996 to the present, the LDP party leader held office. They commonly supported the U.S. security and economic relationship. Especially, the Koizumi administration, with his personal friendship with President Bush and the similar thoughts in the security policy line, formed a stronger relationship in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the Abe, Fukuda, and Aso administrations, the divergence in the North Korea policy gave dissatisfaction in the perception towards the U.S. Yet, the U.S. appeased the concerns of the Japanese government by offering their support to resolve the abduction problem, regardless of erasing North Korea from the list. This was confirmed by the U.S., resulting in a continuous maintenance of strong alliance solidarity.

As a result, the hypotheses can be explained through the study. However, it is ambiguous to conclude the effect of public opinion on alliance solidarity because, in Japan's case, the public opinion did not experience dramatic change. Only several points showed a difference which was stimulated by certain events in that particular situation. Rather, government ideology was shown to be more influential than public opinion. The long dominance of Koizumi and the LDP party led to a firm pro-American security policy aligning closely with the U.S. strengthening the alliance solidarity level. Therefore, both public opinion and government ideology has influence but government ideology has more explanatory power in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

In this study, I primarily examined the influence of the government ideology and the public opinion in the U.S. government perception towards South Korea and Japan. The basic assumption was that a clear difference exists between South Korea and Japan regarding the alliance solidarity with the U.S. The analysis evidently proves the differentiable gaps in the U.S. government perception towards the two states in security matters. Also, the gap between two states has consistently widened. For example, both the U.S. and Japan continue to value the basic arrangement by recognizing Japan's status as an equal partner. In contrast, recently the U.S. views the relationship with South Korea as unstable and sometimes uncomfortable, especially under the Roh administration. These different perceptions are reflected in the alliance solidarity gap. Furthermore, this obvious trend allows us to examine the influence of two domestic factors. Therefore, the basic argument in this study was to determine causes of diverging alliance solidarity in the East Asia and employ the two main factors – the government ideology and the public opinion – to analyze this new tendency of solidarity.

In the case of South Korea, public opinion supported the government policy, especially in the early 2000s. A series of incidents impacted the anti-Americanism among the people, making the unfavorable emotion to last for several years. Government ideology shows a clear difference in the relationship with North Korea. The conservative presidents showed a hard line in the North Korea policy which was in line with that of the U.S.: North Korea must terminate the nuclear weapons and program in order to receive economic aid, investment, and diplomatic

improvement. The progressive (liberal) presidents presented an appeasement policy towards North Korea, which separated economy and politics (security) – continuous economic support and investment even though the nuclear threat had not been resolved. However, this eventually did not favor the U.S. administration. Of course, President Kim's Sunshine policy was supported in the first place, but showed a different interest when President Bush held office.

In Japan's case, public opinion was rather stable with several declines. The issues related with the decrease are mostly military, security, and economy discords between the two governments. The Okinawa incident represents a case in which the public extracted the revision of the SOFA, affecting the U.S. government perception. Also the unsatisfactory decision of the U.S. in 2007 occurred in a drop which enlightened the U.S. to reassure the relationship with Japan and that the U.S. was fully supportive in the abduction issue. It can be argued that the government ideology was mostly stable after the Cold War. Especially in the Bush-Koizumi period, the two states were closer than ever showing a constant increase in alliance solidarity every year.

An interesting finding is that public opinion has certain effects influencing both the U.S. and its domestic policies. In some cases, the U.S. responds to the public opinion in the allied state. In the allied state, the government tries to obtain public support to legitimize the policies. Another point considering public opinion is that a certain degree of perception against the U.S. always exists in the allied states. In both cases, the positive opinion towards the U.S. was normally higher than the negative opinion. However, there are incidents that stimulate the emotions of the public, which result a rise in the negative perception, triggering anti-Americanism. The anti-Americanism tends to calm down in a short time; however, when a series of incidents happens involving the U.S., the negative public opinion lasts longer, as in the case of

South Korea. For example, the 1995 decrease in positive opinion recovered in 1996. However, in 2001 to 2006 the negative opinion was higher than the positive opinion in viewing the U.S.-South Korea relations, which lasted longer. The series of incidents in early 2000 – the tragic accident of two school girls being killed, the Ohno incident, the comment of “axis of evil” by President Bush, etc – caused the South Korean public to have a constant negative perception towards the U.S. In Japan’s case, even though there were declines in the positive opinions, it recovered to the previous percentage level, maintaining a high degree of positive opinion. The difference in the opinion movement can help explain the increasing gap in the level of alliance solidarity between the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliance, especially after 2001.

Another finding is that government ideology can be characterized differently in the two states. In South Korea, the government ideology is based on the views towards North Korea. Generally, the conservative parties establish policies that are more pro-American while the progressive parties tend to be more pro-North Korea in making a policy. For example, President Roh favored supporting North Korea with consistent economic aid and investment even during the period of the 2nd nuclear crisis. At the time, President Bush kept pressuring North Korea to terminate the nuclear weapon or warned that international sanctions would be enforced. In the case of Japan, the conservative and liberal parties are distinguished according to whether they have positive or negative perception towards the U.S. policies and military presence in Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi was very favorable in cooperating with President Bush. He supported the U.S. in the Six-Party Talks and the war against terrorism. For instance, he immediately dispatched the JSDF to Iraq at the U.S. request.

Lastly, the findings draw an explanation that the U.S. perception towards its allies changed after the Cold War. During the Cold War period, the U.S. and the East Asian allies were

facing a common threat – the former Soviet Union. Therefore, security was considered the most priority issue between the alliances and this did not change throughout the period. The high politics – emphasizing domestic and international security – affected the alliance solidarity to remain rather stable throughout the Cold War. However, in the post-Cold War period, low politics – considering economy, cultural issues – emerged as issues that began to influence the perception in the alliance relationship.³⁷ Rather in the post-Cold War era, economic relations have affected the U.S. government's perception in viewing its allies. Other than security matters, these issues began to influence the alliance solidarity bringing change in the U.S. approach. Therefore, the U.S. government consciously considers the public opinion of the allied states in establishing a policy.

The study provides valuable findings that help to understand the relation between public opinions, government ideology, and alliance solidarity. Also, it is interesting to see how these factors are related to the U.S. government perception. With these factors combined, the findings explain the deepening fracture of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. This shows the divergence in the alliance solidarity between the two alliances.

The implication of this study is that it provides a clear explanation of the alliance solidarity concept. Many scholars and politicians have realized and have repetitively argued that the U.S.-South Korea alliance has shown fracture and the U.S.-Japan alliance has strengthened. Furthermore, they suggested diverse elements in examining the relationship and predicted the direction of the future dynamics. Despite the significant studies, there are several drawbacks. First, there are many policy suggestions regarding the current alliance relationship in East Asia,

³⁷ High politics – military security, alliance formation, sovereignty, territoriality, prestige.
Low Politics – trade, investment, the environment, law, culture, health, sports (Welch, 2005)

while the causal mechanism has been rarely examined in the academic field (Kim, 2008). Second, the measurement of alliance solidarity has not been clearly defined. This study employed a definite method to measure the level of alliance solidarity through content analysis. There were difficulties in finding the entire transcripts of the summit meeting, especially the closed-private summits. However, these problems were solved by analyzing the news articles and the official government announcements. Therefore, the reliable measurement can contribute to the future research on alliance solidarity.

I believe that this study suggests a valuable causal mechanism of alliance solidarity. However, there are potential factors that should be considered in future studies, for instance, the effect of the emergence of China in East Asian affairs. The U.S.-China relations have changed throughout the post-Cold War era. China's relationship with South Korea and Japan has also experienced significant change. It is expected that the existence of China can alter the U.S. government's perception towards the two allied states. This study did not include the external fact of China; however, for future research this potential element should not be disregarded.

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
APENDICES A

TABLE AND GRAPH OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Variation in the President's Speech on South Korea and Japan by 4 – 8 years (%/100)

Term	4 year term						8 year term					
	South Korea			Japan			South Korea			Japan		
	VST	ST	NT	VST	ST	NT	VST	ST	NT	VST	ST	NT
Clinton 1 st	2 (33)	1 (17)	3 (50)	7 (54)	4 (31)	2 (15)	3 (21)	8 (57)	6 (25)	2 (13)	7 (47)	7 (32)
Clinton 2 nd	1 (13)	2 (25)	5 (63)	6 (55)	2 (18)	3 (27)						
Bush 1 st	1 (14)	3 (43)	3 (43)	7 (47)	6 (40)	2 (13)						
Bush 2 nd	1 (13)	3 (37)	4 (50)	5 (72)	1 (14)	1 (14)						

VST : Very Strong Tone, ST : Strong Tone, NT : Neutral Tone



APENDICES B

QUESTION OF THE POLLS (SOUTH KOREA< JAPAN)

1) Please tell me your feelings about various countries. Overall, do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the U.S.?

2) Regardless of your opinion of the U.S., how would you describe relations between the U.S. and South Korea (or Japan) at the present time – very good, fairly good, fairly poor, or very poor?

The questionnaire is almost similar in various survey organizations: U.S. State Department, Dong-A Ilbo, Jungang Ilbo, EAI (East Asia Institute), Yomiuri Shimbun, The Japan Times, Gallup Korea, Gallup, Shin Joho Center, etc.

APPENDICES C

CODING OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

1. Japan

Category	Times	date	context
Very Strong Tone	1	16-Apr-93	There is no more important relationship for the United States than our alliance with Japan.
		16-Apr-93	Our security partnership is strong. The United States intends to remain fully engaged in Asia and committed to our strategic alliance and our political partnership with Japan
	2	06-Jul-93	no more important relationship to the United States than our relationship with Japan.
		06-Jul-93	It bears repeating again that the United States has no more important bilateral relationship than our relationship with Japan
		07-Jul-93	Our relationship with Japan is the centerpiece of our policy toward the Pacific community.
	3	11-Feb-94	No relationship in the world is more important today. Our security alliance, which is stronger than ever...
		11-Feb-94	I am absolutely convinced that the relationship between the United States and Japan, will, as it must, remain vibrant and strong.
	4	08-Jul-94	... let me reaffirm my view that there is no more important bilateral relationship in the world than that between the United States and Japan.
	5	11-Jan-95	... a time when we must move to strengthen the vital partnership between our peoples for the 21st century
		11-Jan-95	We know America has no more important bilateral ties than those with Japan.
		11-Jan-95	... the extraordinary bonds between Japan and the United States will only grow stronger in the years, the decades ...
	6	15-Jun-95	Never have the ties between our nations been more important, and never have they been closer.
		15-Jun-95	Our security ties have never been closer.
	7	17-Apr-96	The relationship between the United States and Japan is better and stronger than ever.
		17-Apr-96	I'm here primarily to celebrate the extraordinary partnership between our two nations over the last 50 years ...

Category	Times	date	context
Very Strong Tone	7	18-Apr-96	... the United States and Japan began to forge what is perhaps the modern world's most remarkable partnership for peace,
		18-Apr-96	The security alliance between our two nations is the cornerstone of stability throughout Asia
	8	25-Apr-97	Our security alliance remains the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
	9	15-May-98	The partnership we have had with Japan is obviously one of the most important relationships the United States has had and will have in the future
	10	22-Sep-98	The United States has no more important relationship in the world than our relationship with Japan
	11	19-Nov-98	The relationship between our two countries has always been important, but never more important than now.
		19-Nov-98	Our security alliance is the cornerstone of Asia's stability.
		20-Nov-98	The relationship between the United States and Japan is the cornerstone of stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
	12	05-May-00	President Clinton responded by saying that the Japan-U.S. partnership was of utmost importance ...
	13	21-Jul-00	The strength of our alliance is one of the great stories of the 20th century.
	14	30-Jun-01	There's no question in my mind our relationship will never be stronger than under our leadership.
		30-Jun-01	... the U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.
	15	25-Sep-01	... my personal friend and a friend of the United States has come all the way from Japan to express his solidarity ...
		25-Sep-01	It's vital that we have a cooperative relationship.
	16	20-Oct-01	And we have no stronger friend in the fight against terror than the Prime Minister of Japan.
	17	18-Feb-02	I believe the U.S.-Japanese alliance is the bedrock for peace and prosperity in the Pacific.
	18	23-May-03	Our meeting today affirms the close and unique relationship between our two nations.
		23-May-03	... we have gone from strangers to adversaries to the very best of friends ... on our strong relationship
	19	02-Jun-03	The Japan-U.S. relationship has never been better.
	20	17-Oct-03	... the alliance between Japan and the US is very strong and has been contributing to world peace.
	21	15-Nov-05	President Bush also called the two countries friendship "a strong and vital relationship " ...
	22	18-Nov-06	The two leaders concurred to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance on the basis of their shared universal values.
	23	06-Jun-07	... Abe stated ... strengthen ... Japan-U.S. alliance. President Bush responded he was always ready to talk, whenever and wherever.
	24	08-Sep-07	President Bush expressed his gratitude for Japan 's support thus far, saying that Japan 's support has been indispensable to the United States ...
	25	06-Jul-08	President Bush shared the view that the Japan-US alliance is a cornerstone not only for Japan ...

Category	Times	date	context
Strong Tone	!!!	10-Jul-93	... must strengthen our friendship. Our security relationship is firm.
	1	19-Nov-93	And it's an indication that we'll be able to make more progress in the months ahead.
	2	14-Nov-94	Agreed that we must maintain our close cooperation as we begin to implement the agreement.
	3	19-Nov-95	Gore, "made a particular point of reiterating to the prime minister the importance to the United States of our bilateral security relationship.
	4	23-Feb-96	... our friendship and partnership with the Japanese in security matters is an important part of maintaining freedom and peace ...
	!!!	17-Apr-96	In this time of challenge and change, the partnership between our two nations is more important to our people and to the world than ever.
	5	19-Jun-97	Japan to resolve this matter and to build a strong partnership
	!!!	22-Sep-98	We are very interested in deepening our partnership in the security area, in the political area ...
	6	03-May-99	as well as the solid mutual trust that so strongly binds our alliance and partnership .
	!!!	22-Jul-00	I think, will be very positive for Japan's economy and our relationship.
	7	19-Mar-01	We view Japan as a very strong friend and ally, and that's the way it's going to be during my administration.
		19-Mar-01	... U.S.- Japan relationship is rooted in friendship, mutual trust , and shared democratic values.
		19-Mar-01	Noting that their two countries are the world's largest aid donors, the leaders agreed to strengthen joint efforts ...
		19-Mar-01	... noted that the U.S.-Japan alliance is the foundation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
	!!!	30-Jun-01	... enduring alliance and as close friends .
	!!!	20-Oct-01	He's a strong friend and ally in our fight against terror.
	!!!	18-Feb-02	President Bush stated that Japan-US relations are important not only for the two countries, but also for the entire world.
	8	25-Jun-02	, the two leaders reaffirmed that Japan and the United States would further strengthen their ties to combat international terrorism
	9	12-Sep-02	... the close bilateral relationship that has long existed ... in the U.S.-Japan Partnership for Security and Prosperity, ... mutual trust and friendship ...
	10	08-Jun-04	It's my honor to welcome my friend and a strong leader ...
	11	22-Sep-04	President Bush stated that he was always referring to his strong alliance relationship with Prime Minister Koizumi ...
	12	21-Nov-04	... mentioned the importance of the close coordination between Japan and the US ...
	!!!	15-Nov-05	During the summit meeting, both leaders, who enjoy close personal ties, emphasized the significance of the U.S-Japan alliance.
	13	22-Nov-08	President Bush stated that the Japan-U.S. alliance was the foundation for peace and prosperity ...

Category	Times	date	context
Neutral Tone	!!!	09-Jul-93	I think they are interested in moving our relationships forward .
	1	24-Sep-96	He also proposed that Japan and the United States maintain close cooperation
	2	24-Nov-96	Hashimoto and Clinton also confirmed the need ...
	3	24-Nov-97	We just want to be in a position to be supportive when we can,
	!!!	15-May-98	I am grateful for the partnership that we have had.
	4	12-Sep-99	The three leaders reconfirmed their commitment to continue to act in close coordination at all times.
	5	16-Nov-00	Mori and Clinton agreed that cooperation ...
	6	20-Jul-01	Bush established a real rapport with the leader of the key U.S. ally in Asia.
	7	27-Oct-02	... leaders reaffirmed that continued close consultations ...
	8	29-Jun-06	The two leaders agreed that the U.S.-Japan partnership stands as one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history
		29-Jun-06	... that the U.S.-Japan friendship and global cooperation shall continue to grow stronger
	!!!	06-Jun-07	Their talks, on a first name basis, reflected the growing friendship between the two leaders
	!!!	22-Nov-08	Both leaders confirmed that the Japan-U.S. alliance had deepened over the 8 years of the Bush Administration ...
<p>“!!!” indicates that the statements on the day were mentioned in a higher category on the same day. Bold font are the words that were analyzed for classification.</p>			

2. South Korea

Category	Times	date	context
Very Strong Tone	1	27-Jul-95	the bonds between our people... have only grown stronger with time .
		27-Jul-95	And it stands as evidence of an unshakable alliance between our two nations ...
	2	16-Apr-96	I pledged to him that America would always stand by the unshakable alliance between our two countries...
		16-Apr-96	Ours is an alliance for all times, good and bad, and it is stronger than ever .
	3	21-Nov-98	America stands by its unshakable alliance with the Republic of Korea.
	4	20-Oct-03	We've got a very important and close relationship with South Korea.
	5	10-Jun-05	I would say the alliance is very strong ,

Category	Times	date	context
Strong Tone	1	10-Jul-93	Our relationship has made this region more secure, more prosperous, and more free.
		10-Jul-93	I think we established a very good personal relationship and a very good bond between our two countries.
	!!!	27-Jul-95	We focused on the clear and common goals ... to strengthen our alliance ...
	2	09-Jun-98	We also discussed the situation on the Korean Peninsula and reaffirmed the importance of our strong defense alliance
	!!!	21-Nov-98	The importance of our relationship with Korea is evidenced by the fact ...
	3	07-Sep-00	... I have strongly supported it. I will continue to strongly support it.
	4	07-Mar-01	... today reaffirmed the fundamental importance and strength of the U.S.-ROK security alliance,
		07-Mar-01	And so I look forward to strengthening our relationship , first and foremost.
	5	20-Feb-02	We had a very frank exchange and that's important when you're friends ...
	6	14-May-03	The two leaders ... have built a personal foundation of mutual trust and respect that will enhance U.S.-ROK coordination
	!!!	20-Oct-03	President Bush and President Roh noted that the strong alliance between the ROK and the U.S.
	!!!	10-Jun-05	It's my honor to welcome the President of our very close ally to the Oval Office.
	7	17-Nov-05	Reaffirming that the alliance is strong ,
		17-Nov-05	Korea's interest in participating in the VWP reflects our strong bilateral partnership and will contribute to enhance exchanges and mutual understanding
	8	20-Apr-08	The meeting was an important chance to strengthen the bilateral relationship. [translation]
	9	06-Aug-08	Both leaders, based on the long lasting friendship and mutual trust, agreed to strengthen the future U.S.-ROK alliance.[translation]
		06-Aug-08	I believe that our relationship is important [translation]

Neutral Tone	1	23-Nov-93	Our friendship was forged in the heat of war as our forces fought shoulder to shoulder to turn back aggression.
		23-Nov-93	I enjoyed working with President Kim to deepen the historic friendship between our two nations.
	!!!	10-Jul-93	we reviewed our mutual efforts to ensure the security and peace of the people living on the Korean Peninsula
		10-Jul-93	And so I come, along with our party, to Korea to discuss, in the spirit of friendship , the challenges that lie ahead ...
		10-Jul-93	Tonight we celebrate the warm friendship between our two nations.
	2	14-Nov-94	Agreed that we must maintain our close cooperation as we begin to implement the agreement
	!!!	27-Jul-95	It is a country America is proud to claim as an equal partner and ally ...
	!!!	16-Apr-96	The partnership between the U.S. and South Korea is grounded in our shared security concerns ...

Category	Times	date	context
Neutral Tone	3	24-Nov-96	... he said, made "an equally strong presentation on the need to contain these types of disagreements."
	4	26-Jun-97	The bilateral meeting was in a pleasant mood.
	5	17-Nov-98	Kim and Gore agreed that Korea and the United States will continue their efforts to push North Korea on to the path of openness and reform while maintaining their close security alliance.
	!!!	21-Nov-98	we are committed to maintaining and improving our partnership in security, in economics, in the pursuit of freedom and democracy
	6	02-Jul-99	we will talk more in our meeting after this of our security partnership .
	7	12-Sep-99	The three leaders reconfirmed their commitment to continue to act in close coordination at all times.
	!!!	07-Sep-00	It has been very impressive to me, and I have strongly supported it. And I will continue to strongly support it.
	8	15-Nov-00	I think we're going to work together. We've always worked in partnership with South Korea and we will continue do so.
	9	19-Oct-01	I'll confirm our support for the President's Sunshine Policy with North Korea.
	10	27-Oct-02	Three leaders reaffirmed that continued close consultations and trilateral coordination remain vital to the success of their efforts towards North Korea
	!!!	14-May-03	It's my honor to welcome our good friend the President of South Korea to Washington, DC, and the Oval Office and now the Rose Garden.
		14-May-03	We will work to have the best possible relations between our countries, and it's based upon close consultation on a wide variety of issues
	!!!	20-Oct-03	At the meeting, the two Presidents noted with satisfaction that there has been smooth progress in building a comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship between the two countries...
	11	20-Nov-04	But Mr. Bush was clearly concerned that South Korea ... might diverge from the American strategy ...
	!!!	10-Jun-05	And the reason why we've had a serious discussion on important issues is because we're strategic partners, and allies, and friends .
	!!!	17-Nov-05	both men hailed the strength of their alliance, and Mr. Bush said he would "see a peninsula one day that is united and at peace."
	12	14-Sep-06	U.S. president stated that the U.S.-ROK alliance will be strengthened for a more comprehensive and future oriented relationship. [translation]
	13	18-Nov-06	I appreciate your commitment to peace and I appreciate our mutual friendship
	14	07-Sep-07	The talks ended with an awkward public exchange between the two leaders
	15	22-Nov-08	The President said ... N. Korea tries to test the alliance, our relationship should stay close . [translation]
<p>“!!!” indicates that the statements on the day were mentioned in a higher category on the same day.</p> <p>Bold font are the words that were analyzed for classification.</p>			