ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY: AN ADAPTATION OF LIBERAL IDEALS

by

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Under the Direction of Sherry Lowrance

ABSTRACT

The thesis contributes to the debate of gauging support for democracy within the Middle East, and begins to examine the type of democracy that individuals support. It explores the degree to which religiosity effects overall support for democracy. Using Arab Barometer data from 2006-2007 this thesis separates support for democracy into two different forms; secular and Islamic democracy. These values are the dependent variables and the independent variables are religiosity and the liberal values of tolerance and equality. The findings establish that religiosity is not a deterrent in the support of liberalism as the literature suggests, but does influence the type of democracy that is supported. The overall contribution of this research is that there are different types of democracy that are supported in the Middle East, which needs to be a factor in the promotion of democracy in the region.

INDEX WORDS: Democracy, Islam, religiosity, liberalism, Islamic democracy, and secular democracy

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my mother for all of her love and support.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Democracy promotion in the Middle East has been a major part of United States foreign policy, yet there is still a stark divide between the political regimes of the Middle East and the liberal democracies of the West. Promoters of liberal democracies emphasize the importance of equality, tolerance, free and fair elections, and other such systems and traits. For the duration of President George W. Bush's administration there were major pushes in United States foreign policy to promote democratic institutions in the Middle East. During the Bush administration, Ambassador Richard Haass stated, "The United States government is deeply involved in many ways in helping many Muslim majority countries develop democratic institutions and the societal infrastructure necessary for democracy to take root" (Haass, 2002). Both academics and policy makers struggle with the idea that democracy will be grasped in the Middle East and what it would resemble.

The goal of this study is to examine general levels of support for democracy and then to further explore individual responses in order to accurately assess what type of democracy and ideals it is that individuals support. It is imperative to examine the type of democracy in this manner as societies with a high degree of religiosity may have different expectations for democracy, which may be a departure from the liberal democracies of the West. Expanding the literature on the subject of democratic support will better allow nations that desire a democratic transition to assess what their constituents find important. This research can also help foreign governments target methods and programs that will allow for the promotion of democracy and

liberal ideals. Currently this research is applicable to nations such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya as these nations appear to be transitioning to democracy. In these nations democracy may resemble something very different from the liberal democracies of the West and therefore by gauging support for different types of democracy it will give insight into how democracy may in fact evolve in the Islamic nations of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya.

In order to conceptualize what democracy would resemble in the Middle East it is important to examine the dynamics of majority consensus on support for democracy and what that should entail. To clearly evaluate individuals' attitudes and support for democracy one must examine not only overall support for a democratic regime, but also ideals that are often associated with liberal democracies. In order to measure level of support for democracy as well as differences in liberal ideas this research will use Arab Barometer data from Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen.[1] When examining the data there are large amounts of individuals who do in fact believe that a democracy is in fact the best form of government, which is at an overall rate of 86 percent (Table 1).

Table 1: Individuals that support democracy (percentage)

Strongly Agree/Agree that democracy is better than any other form of government	
All Countries	86.2
Algeria	82.9
Jordan	85.76
Kuwait	88.42
Lebanon	91.91
Morocco	91.76
Palestine	82.64
Yemen	78.09

The support for democracy however does not necessarily mean support for liberal democracy. In many instances this type of divide amongst support for democracy but not the ideals often

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[1] The surveys were carried out from 2006-2007.

associated with liberalism runs counter to democratic transition/ democratization theory. Even those scholars who admittedly state that the Middle East does not follow democratic theoretical assumptions argue over ways to gauge support and overall compatibility between Islam and democracy (R. Inglehart, 2003; Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Robbins, 2009; Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005).

While the relationship between Islam and democracy is filled with disagreement amongst scholars Islam will continue to play an important and integral part in any type of political regime in the Middle East. One reason there is concern over compatibility is that some individuals feel as if democracy goes against the fundamental aspects of Islam. These individuals feel there can be no other laws other than those in the Quran. This type of interpretation and long tradition of Islam being intertwined with the politics can cause some to feel as if democracy is not compatible with the Muslim societies of the Middle East. However, this has not deterred the United States promotion of democracy or organizations that examine Islam's compatibility with democracy. Various academics throughout the world created the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in 1999 and since have held annual conferences on various matters pertaining to the democratization of Islamic nations. The overall mission of this Center is to show that Islam is not antidemocratic and that Islam is compatible with democracy (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy). Some academics have begun to use data from various surveys to show Muslims do support democracy (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Robbins, 2009; Tessler & Gao, 2005). This thesis argues that Islam and democracy do not need to be exclusive of one another. An Islamic component could be incorporated into a type of democracy that although different from liberal democracies would still be "democratic" in the basic sense of free and fair elections.

There are large discrepancies in attitudes and beliefs regarding democracy in the Middle East compared to norms and customs in the liberal democracies of the West. When examining the level of correlation between the liberal values of tolerance and equality with support for democracy it is only at 0.085, which is a low level of correlation. This is a large departure from the liberalism because these ideals of tolerance and equality are the main components of liberal democracy. By examining the discrepancies amongst support for democracy and support for liberal ideals it will allow Western democracies whose focus is the promotion of liberal democracy to reassess policy strategies and types of democracy promotion that are currently being promoted in the region.[2] The ongoing promotion of liberalism leads to the central research question in this thesis: By promoting the liberal values of tolerance and equality are democracy promoters hoping to garner increased support for secularism rather than Islamic democracy? With the ongoing promotion of democracy in the Middle East and what appears to be a democratic transition in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya it is important to examine this research question and see what democracy in the Middle East would in fact resemble.

This thesis aims to show the differences amongst those who support secular democracy and Islamic democracy and the effect both have on the acceptance of liberal ideals. Understanding the ideals associated with liberal democracies requires one to understand the theoretical parameters of liberalism. Based on these parameters one will be able to consider whether religiosity or the support for liberal ideals does in fact influence the level of support for democracy type. By focusing on differences in support for democracy type, either secular or

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[2] During the Bush Administration various members of his cabinet spoke openly about the promotion of Democracy in the Middle East. Most recently there have been protests demanding social, economic, and political reform in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. The Obama administration has had to decide whether to support governmental allies in some of these nations or to support the people and their effort to achieve these reforms. It is interesting to see if the Obama administration will attempt to support long lasting military and economic allies or support people in the hopes of achieving democracy in the Middle East.

Islamic democracy, this research will be able to broaden literature on democratization in the Middle East. This thesis finds that support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality is supported by those who supported secular democracy rather than Islamic democracy. Also, religiosity is shown to be a good predictor as to what type of democracy it is that religious individuals support.

This thesis will begin with a literature review regarding democracy, liberal ideals, and religiosity. Secondly, the theoretical framework and hypotheses will be discussed. Thirdly, the research design is explained and a statistical analysis of the seven nations is conducted. Lastly, the conclusion will discuss the thesis's overall results and the implications this could have for democracy in the Middle East as well as foreign policy.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The existing literature on democratization is vast and expansive, yet it rarely focuses on how to gauge support for democracy. Inglehart and Norris discuss this problem as they state, "Although nearly the entire world pays lip service to democracy, there is still no global consensus on the self-expression values . . . that are crucial to democracy. Today, these divergent values constitute the real clash between Muslim societies and the West" (R. Inglehart & Norris 2003, 68). With this lack of consensus it is important to examine a vast amount of literature to explore the guiding principle of democracy and to also focus on the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality. By examining the relevant literature regarding liberal ideals it allows for two of the independent variables to be examined as to why they are important to liberalism. Then there will be a discussion of religiosity's effect on the support for democracy type. Religiosity is an independent variable because the literature suggests that it deters an individual from supporting democracy. To conclude the literature review I look at the relevant literature that offers methods for gauging support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality.

Democracy

Although there are differing opinions in the conditions that must be met in order to call a nation democratic there are some basic principles that are agreed upon. In order to be a democracy a government must have a rule of law that provides the mechanism in which government officials can be changed by popular elections (Lipset, 1959; Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Rustow, 1970). These popular elections must allow for others to openly dissent against

government factions without fear of persecution, which will legitimize the democratic institution. The reason for this basic definition of democracy is that there are arguably other facets of importance. However, this research will be examining tolerance and equality as liberal ideals in order to explore different types of democracies in this research.

Liberal ideals

The examination of liberal ideals is important to explore separately from democracy because Western democracies are liberal democracies whose liberal values may not be popularly supported in the Middle East. By examining liberal ideals this research aims to see if tolerance and equality are supported at different rates by those individuals who support secular or Islamic based democracy.

Tolerance is an integral part of liberal democracies and needs to be supported by the majority of individuals in order for democracy to occur. Exhibiting intolerant behavior can be an inhibitor to democracy because in order to democracy to work all individuals must have the ability to compromise with one another so that the society can govern itself (Griffith, Plamenatz, & Pennock, 1956). Inglehart and Norris discuss how support for tolerance needs to be exhibited otherwise out-groups will not receive fair treatment in criminal proceedings (Ronald Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

Although these scholars agree that tolerance in a society is important to gauge they measure tolerance and interpret the level of tolerance in a society in different ways. Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock argue that tolerance is an effect of democracy and measures "other things besides democracy." Therefore it is not a requisite, but will allow for democracy to be more effective and stable (Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock 1956, 127). There has been a more recent transition in the literature as seen by Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, and James Gibson.

They measure tolerance by examining one's perceptions of unpopular groups and feel that support for democracy and liberal ideals is correlated as they represent a liberal democracy (Gibson, 1998; Ronald Inglehart & Norris, 2003). In this thesis I examine tolerant behavior by examining respondent's feelings and acceptance of minority factions and unpopular groups. It is important to measure levels of tolerance in the nations sampled and see if it does correlate with the overall level of support for secular versus Islamic based democracy.

In addition to tolerance a liberal ideal that is often discussed is equality. Inglehart and Norris find that support democracy tends to be correlated with individuals that support equality and tolerance. It is important to see if those who support liberal ideals support a certain type of democracy or if levels of support remain the same for secular or Islamic democracy. This would allow scholars to see what an Islamic democracy or secular democracy would resemble in the Middle East and if it would be similar to liberalism.

The literature does not tend to vary on the definition of equality, but rather on how to quantify and measure it. Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock define equality as, "The proposition that each vote should count for one and none for more than one is doubtless sufficiently implied by the word 'equality'" (Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock 1956, 131). As survey questions and data varies across region or study there are often varying ways to measure if equality exists within a nation. Support for equality tends to use measures regarding an individual's attitudes towards gender equality (Esposito & Voll, 1996; R. Inglehart, 2003; Ronald Inglehart & Norris, 2003; Park, 1984). Equality in this research will be measured using gender equality due to data limitations; Inglehart and Norris also employed this same measure in their research. They state, "A society's commitment to gender equality and sexual liberalization proves time and again to be the most reliable indicator of how strongly that society supports principles of …

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egalitarianism" (R. Inglehart and Norris 2003, 65). The study continues with a discussion of increasing women's equality: "Industrialization brings women into the paid work force and dramatically reduces fertility rates. Women become literate and begin to participate in representative government but still have far less power than men. Then, the postindustrial phase brings a shift toward greater gender equality as women move into higher-status economic roles…" (R. Inglehart and Norris 2003, 68). It is not only equality in the workplace, but also the opportunity of being involved in the political realm and impacting society. Egalitarianism is a liberal ideal and therefore in a liberal democracy individuals must support the notion that women have equal opportunities throughout all sectors in society. Unfortunately there is not a threshold that has been established in the literature that depicts the percentage of the population that must have support for equality and tolerance in order for democracy to be supported. The depictions of inequality amongst women and men in the Middle East is abundantly clear in some nations, such as Saudi Arabia that prohibit women from driving or even conversing with opposite sex if there are not male family members present. Yet, many nations do not require the veil to be worn, allow women access to education and jobs. The lack of uniformity for women's equality makes it appear as if this variable will differ amongst nations. It is important to measure equality as it is one of the cornerstones of liberal ideals. It is essential to examine possible differences in levels of support for egalitarianism from those individuals that support a secular or Islamic based democracy so that we can see if desires for Islamic democracy make a difference towards views on equality.

Religiosity

There have been various disagreements in the literature regarding the relationship between religiosity and democracy. Canetti-Nisim measures an individual's "religiosity" by

religious attendance or time devoted to religious text (Canetti-Nisim, 2004). Mosque attendance in this study would be gender biased and not an accurate measure of religiosity. The Arab Barometer survey data does ask individuals the number of times they read the Quran per week, which will be a way to measure religiosity in this thesis.

Islam's compatibility with democracy is an ever pressing question. A possible reason for this influx is that the United States has been attempting to promote democracy in the Middle East and some feel this is an incompatible dream. The reason for these sentiments is that scholars, such as Samuel Huntington feel as if Islam deters democracy and liberal democratic ideals from taking ahold in an Islamic nation (S. Huntington, 1996; S. P. Huntington, 1984). Mark Tessler discusses how many scholars feel in regards to the incompatibility issues of Islam and democracy, "So far as democracy is concerned, some observers, particularly some western observers, assert that democracy and Islam are incompatible. Whereas democracy requires openness, competition, pluralism, and tolerance of diversity, Islam, they argue, encourages intellectual conformity and an uncritical acceptance of authority" (Tessler 2002, 340). Tessler touches on an important aspect by stating that others feel incompatibility is drawn from such factors as Islam's inability to have "tolerance of diversity," which can be examined by the acceptance and tolerance of individuals from different nationalities or religions. A key reason that scholars may feel that Islam is unable to have "tolerance of diversity" is that there is a long standing history of Islam being the religion of the majority in the region. In this research tolerance is used a liberal ideal in order to examine if in fact an Islamic democracy is not congruent with this liberal ideal.

When examining Islamic doctrines, speeches, and interviews from important religious or fundamentalist leaders will often see that these messages state that democracy goes against

fundamental aspects of Islam (Garnham & Tessler, 1995). According to many strict traditionalists there can be no other laws other than those given by God. Secular democracy allows laws to be created by individuals with no Islamic underpinnings, which according to traditionalists is against Islamic doctrine. Garnham and Tessler state, "In the eyes of such traditionalists, Western concepts of democracy, secularization, and the nation-state represent a direct contradiction of Islamic religious and political thought since they rely for their authority on human rather than divine legislation and are formulated through secular rather than God-given laws" (Garnham & Tessler, 1995, 120). The Quran is where traditionalists state all laws need to be derived from and there is not a need for other laws as the Quran is what God dictated to Mohammed and will never be changed. Stepan cites the Quran as the rationalizing mechanism behind the historical precedent of unity amongst church and state in Muslim majority nations (Stepan, 2000, 46). The Quran not only gives religious guidance and laws it gives opinions covering every facet of life (AbuKhalil, 1994). This type of traditional interpretation is why the Quran remains the governing force of society and is also used to legitimize the governing bodies of many nations throughout the Middle East. Rulers want to ensure there is not secular or religious opposition as this may cause citizens to demand reforms or change putting their claim to power in a state of uncertainty. If traditionalists are associated with high degrees of religiosity then there should be low amounts of support for secular based democracy.

Uncertainty in the political affairs in the Middle East is currently of great importance. An area although riffled with different Islamic groups, large disparity amongst classes, and growing fears of Israel and Iran has remained until recently, relatively stable. However, a key reason for the political stability in the region is that political rulers have not allowed for public dissent. Garnham and Tessler state:

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Arab rulers have not allowed secular opposition and have consequently created from their own style of governance a radical, religious opposition. Islamic groups are the only route for effective dissent in the Arab world today; a lack of institutionalized channels for political participation and the exercise of political influence has enabled underground movements calling for Islamic solutions to gain widespread support among a disaffected public seeking greater government accountability. (Garnham & Tessler, 1995, 109)

With the government preventing opposition groups from forming, individuals had no other legal choice but to gather into Islamic groups. Mosques are the only area that cannot be regulated by the state because the state cannot have authority nor make rules in regards to religious matters. The reason for this is that in Islam the Quran is the governing force for all aspects of society and if the state tried to regulate or intervene in religious matters the state would most likely lose legitimacy. Regardless of the group's façade some may desire political reforms. If there are a number of these groups then there will be groups that support Islamic democracy, secular democracy, or no democracy at all. Despite the possibility of these groups existing throughout the Middle East the region remained relatively stable with few political uprisings, with the exception of the Iranian Revolution and most recent uprisings. Therefore religious individuals that are attending these meetings may in fact support secular democracy at the same or similar rates as those that support Islamic based democracy.

Islamic nations are often categorized as a traditional society that is vastly different from the Western world; however this may be changing as individuals protest for reforms. As Lockman states, "The West was envisioned as modern, while the Non-West was pre-modern, traditional, backward, even primitive. Non-Western societies thus seemed to face a stark but inescapable choice. They could both emulate the West and become truly modern or they were doomed to stagnate and increasingly fall behind in the march of civilization" (Lockman, 2004). Currently, many individuals across the Middle East have protested for reforms and regime changes. Some nations have been successful in overthrowing the government; however a liberal

democracy has yet to replace the fallen regime. Bin Sayeed feels that there will always be an Islamic component in any type of government in the Middle East (Bin Sayeed, 1995, 85), but fails to fully explain what it would in fact resemble if in fact it should resemble a democracy of some sort. Recent protests and regime collapses in the Middle East may cause some academics, such as Samuel Huntington, to reevaluate their views on Islam's compatibility with democracy if democratic regimes are installed.

There is also literature that states Islam and democracy are not exclusive of one another, although they differ to the extent of such compatibility issues (Esposito & Voll, 1996; Hofmann, 2004; Tessler, 2002; Tessler & Gao, 2005). Despite the debate regarding the compatibility between Islam and Democracy, the United States feels as if democracy is attainable in the Middle East and continues to proceed with the promotion of liberal democracy. Colin Powell states, "We reject the condescending notion that freedom will not grow in the Middle East or that there is any region of the world that cannot support democracy" (Powell, 2002). If Islam has large differences when compared to other religions then it would be more plausible to doubt Islam's compatibility as it would be far different then the Christian religion that is the majority of the population in Western democracies, however this is not the case (Hofmann, 2004). Although the argument of compatibility between Islam and democracy has received a lot of attention, there have been limited amounts of research done on individual level support for democracy and democratic ideals in Islamic nations.

The literature fails to explore what it means for a society if individuals are deeply divided as to what type of democracy it is that a society supports. Often democratization means that liberalization, in the form of equality and tolerance has also occurred (Linz & Stephan, 1996). This may not be the case if Middle Eastern nations support democratic regimes as there may be

an Islamic democracy that is far different than the liberal democracies of the West. Rustow argues that democratization is not a homogenous process and can evolve over time (Rustow 345), which means that democratization in the Middle East may in fact show a slightly adaptive model of democracy. Islamic democracy may resemble a political regime that is intertwined with religion, but still holding true to the democratic principle of free and fair elections. As Tessler and Gao state, "…some Arabs may want not only democracy but also a political formula that incorporates Islamic influences" (Tessler & Gao 2005, 89). Therefore, this research must examine the differences in how support for tolerance and equality can differ amongst secular democracy and Islamic democracy.

Conclusion

The literature on popular support for democracy is not only expansive, but widely used as a requisite in order for democracy to occur (Almond & Verba, 1989; R. Inglehart and Norris 2003; Griffith, Plamenatz, and Pennock 1956; Lipset 1994; Park 1984; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Lipset 1959). Even if governments are overthrown or a leader is ousted from power a new government tends to fall within the majority consensus in order to gain legitimacy. This means that consensus is needed to even support the possibility of a democracy occurring (Dahl, 1956). Support for democracy alone is not enough to gauge public opinion in regards to the type of democracy they are after or the ideals they support, but it is a precondition for it to occur (Gibson, 1998). Unfortunately, the literatures does not state what percentage of the population must support democracy in order for it to be deemed an overall consensus of support and can only assume that it is a simple majority of the population and not a supermajority. In the Middle East support for democracy is a departure from liberal democracies.

If individual support for democracy increases as well as liberal ideals it will most likely be a very gradual process. Of those individuals sampled who feel that democracy is the best form of government, 90 percent feel that political reform should be introduced gradually. This would probably be the best way to introduce change in order for traditional societies to maintain their culture. Bin Sayeed states, "In most societies, such rapid economic and social changes may produce cataclysmic consequence. Social scientists like Karl Deutsch have pointed out that individuals in a traditional society, when faced with rapid changes of urbanization and economic development, tend to give up their traditional or tribal loyalties in favor of new loyalties to either urban or political groupings" (Bin Sayeed 1995, 84-85). Historically Islam has played an important role in the political life of the Middle East and it is likely that this will continue. It is important to examine which individuals support an Islamic version of democracy and which individuals desire to have a secular based democracy. There will also be an examination if the secular version is similar to the liberal democracies of the West, which will be measured by those who support secular democracy and support the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY

The theoretical framework for this research will draw largely on the literature for gauging support for democracy in the Middle East and how support does not follow democratization theory (Jamal & Tessler, 2008). Democratization theory fails to fully acknowledge that support for democracy does not always mean support for a liberal democracy. Another large issue is that the literature tends to support conflicting hypotheses about Islam's compatibility with democracy. However a key reason is that most research does not examine differences in public opinion in regards to support for a secular democracy versus an Islamic democracy. Since democratization theory hypothesizes that support for democracy requires a supportive culture of democratic ideals, it fails to acknowledge what will occur if a society is deeply divided in the type of democracy they support.

The most important contribution in the literature to this thesis is Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler's work on support for democracy in the Middle East. They begin to examine the possibility that individuals do support alternate versions of democracy. Their study draws upon individual's desire for democracy and their desire for Islamic democracy, but fails to examine religiosity's influence or examine how tolerance and equality differ amongst those who support different types of democracy (Jamal & Tessler, 2008). The goal of this thesis is to expand on Jamal and Tessler's work by increasing the number of nations studied as well as gauge support for liberal ideals to examine if more supportive values leads to a higher degree of support for secular or Islamic based democracy.

Adaptation of democracy: Islam or secular

In *The Clash of Civilizations* by Samuel Huntington he believes that liberal democracy and Islam are incompatible because there are not clear divisions amongst "church" and "state" (S. Huntington, 1996). In this research I am outlining a type of democracy that allows for Islam to remain involved in the political realm, which is a departure from the separation between "church" and "state" of Western liberal democracies. To gauge support for Islamic based democracy this thesis examines individual level data from the Arab Barometer for Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. In many ways this helps fill a gap in the literature by examining a way of gauging support for other types of democracy that better suit the needs of a particular society besides liberal democracies. This research will also help various foreign governments ensure they are promoting a type of democracy that has popular support.

The individuals sampled by the Arab Barometer survey do support democracy across all nations at an average rate of 86.2 percent.[3] Respondents who agree that democracy is better than any other form of government are then broken into two groups, those that want men of religion to be involved in government decisions, which is referred to as Islamic democracy in this research as well as Jamal and Tessler's work, and those that prefer a secular democracy without Islamic influences in government. The way secular and Islamic democracy support is determined is by a survey question that asks if "men of religion should have influence over the decisions of the government."[4] It is important to see if support for an Islamic or secular democracy is a universally accepted position throughout the nations sampled or if it is nation specific, as this may give further insight into democracy promotion in the Middle East.

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[3] See Table 1.
[4] Source: Arab Barometer survey

Overall the nations sampled are divided between an Islamic and a secular democracy, with the exception of Lebanon's citizens which support a secular form of democracy (see Table 2).

Table 2: Those that support Islamic democracy and secular democracy (percentage)

	Strongly Agree/Somewhat Agree that men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government	Strongly Disagree/Somewhat Disagree that men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government
Strongly Agree/ Agree that Democracy is better than any other form of government		
All Countries	48.1 (2,807)	51.9 (3,029)
Algeria	57.76 (428)	42.24 (313)
Jordan	52.04 (409)	47.96 (377)
Kuwait	38.92 (230)	61.08 (361)
Lebanon	17.89 (188)	82.11 (863)
Morocco	62.67 (638)	37.33 (380)
Palestine	54.54 (535)	45.46 (446)
Yemen	56.74 (379)	43.26 (379)

The N is listed in parentheses for each cell value.

Although Table 2 depicts what type of democracy individual's desire there is a stark divide amongst the populations for most nations. If the minority opinion, either secular or Islamic, was smaller such as the case in Lebanon it would be easier to promote a type of democracy that is compatible with a large faction of society, however, this would prove difficult as there are narrow margins and high degrees of fragmentation for many nations. The literature surrounding religiosity and its influence on democracy is contentious and varies largely on the scholar. Based on the literature review, religiosity is a large deterrent to democracy in the Middle East (Fukuyama, 1992; S. Huntington, 1996; Tessler, 2002), yet this is not the case (table 3). Table 3 represents the respondent's level of religiosity, which is measured by the frequency of reading the Quran. The percentage represents support for democracy in each category of religiosity. Therefore 86 percent of all individuals who read the Quran everyday feel that democracy is better than any other form of government.

Table 3: Level of religiosity and support for democracy by nation (percentage)

Strongly Agree/ Agree that Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government		Reads Quran Everyday	Several times a week	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
	All Countries	86	84.26	86.81	86.15	88.65
	Algeria	80.23	82.01	85.08	79.85	90
	Jordan	87.36	85.27	85.21	83.96	82.69
	Kuwait	88.07	88.89	87.22	95.18	71.43
	Lebanon	92.41	89.77	92.29	92.93	90.96
	Morocco	89.74	94.3	94.49	93.33	90.14
	Palestine	84.94	82.41	81.12	79.38	85.71
	Yemen	83.74	73.94	83.33	65.85	46.67

Although literature suggests that religiosity is a reason for the lack of support for democracy (S. Huntington, 1996) I do not see these expected differences amongst individuals. For all nations sampled there is little difference between the individuals that support democracy amongst those respondents that never read the Quran and those that read the Quran every day. A reason for this is that Arab rulers have hoped that by not allowing opposition from forming they would prevent the public from rising up and possibly demanding change (Garnham & Tessler, 1995). Therefore individuals created Islamic groups as this was a legal option to congregate. In these groups they are now able to discuss political reform. Individuals within Islamic groups may desire secularism or liberal reforms, but there is a vast divide amongst religious individuals as seen in Table 2. Some religious individuals may want secularism while others want to maintain the tradition of Islam being at the forefront of the political and social realm.

Liberal Ideals

Since tolerance and equality are key components of liberalism, this research describes them collectively as liberal ideals. The Arab Barometer asks a variety of survey questions that measure an individual's feelings towards tolerance of minorities as well as several questions

regarding feelings on equal access in opportunity. This section explores some of the ongoing issues of intolerance and inequality in the Middle East, which can be influential as to why some scholars perceive Islam to be incompatible with democracy. Then there is a discussion in regards to how the literature examines liberal ideals as a requisite to democracy, whereas this research expands the literature by examining how support for liberal ideals can change depending on the type of democracy that is supported.

In discussions of tolerance and equality, women's status within the Middle East needs to be addressed. Inequality can be found in most aspects of society, such as access to education, jobs, and holding political office. In the Arab world there is a large discrepancy that occurs with literacy rates between women and men. The *Arab Human Development Report* notes, "There are approximately 65 million illiterate adults in the region, most of whom are women. One of every two Arab women is illiterate…" (United Nations Human Development Programme, 2002). Women are also a disproportionate amount of the world's poor, at a rate of 70 percent, which only makes it more difficult for women to provide necessities for themselves as well as their children let alone achieve an education if that is available to them (Kumar, 1996; United Nations Human Development Programme, 2002). Women face inequality in most nations of the world, although the gap may be closing in some liberal democracies, there is very apparent inequalities in the Middle East. However, it is important to gauge individuals support for equality as this will give insight into support for the liberal ideal of egalitarianism.

In addition to the United Nation's findings on gender disparity one cannot push aside the media's sensationalism in choosing stories to air to the general public. Headlines regarding intolerance in the form of suicide bombers and inequality seen by a woman being stoned to death; spark outrage, disbelief, and cries for intervention. This type of sensationalism typically

casts the Middle East in a negative light and could be a contributing factor as to why Samuel Huntington (1996) and Francis Fukuyama (1992) feel that Islam is incompatible with liberal democracy.

Huston Smith is skeptical of literature that suggests it is Islam itself that causes intolerance and inequality. Smith states, "Islam also stresses racial equality and religious tolerance. The latter notion is exemplified by the Koranic verse 'Let there be no compulsion in religion,' as well as examples from the life of Mohammed" (Smith, 1991, 254-255). Drawing from the literature review as support for tolerance and equality decreases support for Islamic democracy increases (Canetti-Nisim, 2004; Wald, Owen, & Hill, 1988). In order to use the level of religiosity as a constant across all sampled nations I employ Michael Ross' approach. In Michael Ross' research, "Oil, Islam, and Women" he assumes that Islam is essentially identical across the Muslim world in order to hold religion as a constant in his empirical research (Ross, 2008). Robert Putnam discussed the importance of history in traditional societies in shaping institutions throughout Italy (Putnam, 1993). Although Putnam's work discusses Italian institutions one can utilize his research for traditional institutions as they have played dramatic roles in the political climate of the Middle East. Putnam discusses Catholicism as a traditional aspect of Italian history as well as shaping the political sphere in Italy. It is important to view the Middle East as a traditional society because Islam has a tradition, just like Catholicism in shaping political institutions. Therefore it may be hard to emulate a liberal democracy because Islamic nations may want to foster and keep ahold of their traditional values and incorporate an Islamic component into democracy (Bin Sayeed, 1995).

Fundamentally, examining religiosity's effect in support for democracy is interesting as there is a stark divide in the literature. An individual's degree of religiosity effects the type of

democracy supported, however, the level of religiosity does not affect the overall support of democracy as seen in Table 3. This is interesting as it is vastly different from the literature. In the following chapters logit models are run in order to see the level of influence religiosity and liberal values have on support for democracy type.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter presents the hypotheses that have been generated from the theoretical argument regarding religiosity as well as the liberal values of tolerance and equality as predictors for democracy type.

In the prior chapter there was a discussion of Islamic and secular based democracy as well as religiosity. I discussed that individuals with high levels of religiosity or low levels of support for liberal ideals would support an Islamic democracy rather than a secular democracy. The hypotheses for this research are:

H1: Individuals that have higher degrees of religiosity will be less likely to support a secular democracy.

H1a: Individuals that have higher degrees of religiosity will be more likely to support an Islamic democracy.

H2: Individuals that have higher degrees of support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality will have more support for secular democracy.

H2a: Individuals that have higher degrees of support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality will have less support for Islamic democracy.

This set of hypotheses will be tested quantitatively using the most recent round of Arab Barometer data for Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. These nations do vary economically and socially. However, these nations do share a common tradition of Islam being the religion of the majority of the population. The unit of analysis is the

individual, which will allow not only nation specific results, but also allow for general trends across a range of nations in the Middle East to be examined. The data is limited to the most recent round of surveys, conducted from the spring of 2006 to the fall of 2007. The samples from each nation do vary slightly as do some of the survey questions; however, those questions are not used in this study. The overall sample size is 8,122 and each nation with the exception of Kuwait has a sample size above 1,000. Kuwait's sample has 750 respondents and used an area probability sample with quotas for age, education and gender.[5] I use the sub sample of those individuals who support democracy in order to gauge support for secular democracy and Islamic democracy. In order to ensure that the same independent variables do not affect the entire sample including those who do not support democracy a third model is run gauging no support for democracy.

Dependent Variables

My dependent variable for H1 and H2 is support for secular democracy and the dependent variable for H1a and H2a is support for Islamic democracy. Democracy type is taken from two survey questions from within the 2006-2007 Arab Barometer. The two questions are then collapsed to a dichotomous variable that can be used in a logit model. The following survey questions were asked and the response categories given[6]:

A.) "To what extent do you agree/ disagree with the following statements?: Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government."[7]

[1] Strongly Agree
[2] Agree
[3] Disagree
[4] Strongly Disagree
[8] Can't Choose

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[5] Arab Barometer Codebook.
[6] Arab Barometer Codebook found at www.arabbarometer.org
[7] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values.

[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

B.) "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?: Men of religion should have influence over the decisions of government."[8]

[1] Strongly Agree
[2] Agree
[3] Disagree
[4] Strongly Disagree
[8] Can't Choose
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

Both of these questions are recoded as a dichotomous variable. Respondents have to respond to question A as strongly agree/ agree and question B as strongly disagree/disagree in order to be coded as a 1 in support for secular democracy. Those respondents who answer question A as strongly agree/ agree and question B as strongly agree/agree are coded as a 1 in support for Islamic democracy.

In order to examine no support for democracy respondents have to answer question A as disagree/ strongly disagree in order to be coded as 1.

Independent Variables

The independent variables are also taken from the same sample in the Arab Barometer dataset. One question is used in order to measure religiosity, which is the independent variable for H1 and H1a. The religiosity question is as follows:

A.) "How often do you read the Quran?" [9]

[1] Everyday or almost everyday
[2] Several times a week
[3] Sometimes
[4] Rarely

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[8] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values.
[9] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values

[5] I don't read
[8] Can't choose
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

The independent variable for H2 and H2a, support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality are taken from a few survey questions. When examining the questions regarding tolerance there are three survey questions that are asked.[10] If an individual expresses tolerant behavior for one of the three questions then they are highly likely to express tolerant behaviors for the other two questions. This can be stated because there is a high degree of correlation that is greater than 0.999 that all three questions are answered in a tolerant or intolerant manner. Since any of the three questions are representative of the feelings on the other two questions the following question is used:

B.) "Which of the following groups do you wish to have as neighbors?: Followers of other religions"[11]

[1] I don't wish
[2] I don't mind
[8] Don't know
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

The above question is then recoded into a dichotomous variable, 0 is used for intolerant individuals and 1 is used for tolerant individuals. Unfortunately questions regarding tolerance are not asked to individuals in Palestine and therefore this research cannot compare Palestine's level of tolerance with other nations.

The second liberal ideal is equality, which is measured by the following questions:

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[10] Survey question 303(1-3) asked "Which of the following groups do you wish to have as neighbors?" There were three different questions after this immediate question with the possible selections of "I don't wish," "I don't mind," "Don't know," or "Decline to answer." The first question was "followers of other religions." The second question was "people of different race or color." The third question was "immigrants and guest workers."
[11] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values.

C.) "The following questions are your personal opinions about the principles that should determine the behavior and situation of women in our society. For each of the statements listed below, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly"

C1: Men and women should have equal job opportunities and wages

C2: Men and women should receive equal wages and salaries

C1 and C2 are coded as follows[12]:

[1] Strongly Agree
[2] Agree
[3] Disagree
[4] Strongly Disagree
[8] Can't Choose
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

In order for equality to be measured questions C1 and C2 are combined. Those who express support for equality by selecting strongly agree or agree for both questions are coded as 1. Individuals who answered inconsistently, by selecting support for one question and not the other or select disagree or strongly disagree are coded as 0.

Controls

According to some literature scholars feel that economic factors may better predict support for democracy. One of the earliest scholars to discuss economic factors leading to democracy is Seymour Lipset. Lipset argues that the greater the amount of economic prosperity a nation has helps to establish a democracy. The reason for this argument is that an individual who is in a dire economic situation will not have the time in order to participate in the political realm. However, if the society as a whole develops economically then there will be more leisure time, which will allow for higher rates of participation and demand for input in the political affairs of that nation (Lipset, 1959; Park, 1984). I use Lipset and Park's additions to the literature and

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[12] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values.

control for levels of economic prosperity, measured by family income. The economic control variable used in this research uses a survey question that places the respondent's family income into deciles. The reason for this is that the respondents state their family income in local currency and in order to compare cross-nationally the decile categories are used.

There has been a great deal of empirical support amongst scholars that show higher levels of educational attainment leads to democracy (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Lipset, 1959; 1994; Park, 1984). Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer's article discusses how students play important roles in demonstrations and revolutions throughout Europe in the 19th century. One of the most notable student demonstrations was Tiananmen Square even though the Communist regime remained in power. Education also promotes civic involvement through the means of voting and understanding the political culture to engage in it (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Park, 1984). An education control variable is introduced and is coded as follows: 1=illiterate, 2=elementary, 3=primary, 4=secondary, 5=2 year College diploma, 6=Bachelor's Degree, and 7=Masters or higher.

Additionally, I introduced a set of attitudinal predictors, which are an individual's interest in the current state of political affairs within their nation. The following question examines individual feelings regarding ability to influence. The question is recoded dichotomously; strongly agree and agree are coded as 1, disagree and strongly disagree are coded as 0. This variable is called people's power.

A.) "Citizens have the power to influence the policies and activities of the government currently" [13]

[1] Strongly Agree
[2] Agree
[3] Disagree
[4] Strongly Disagree

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[13] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values

[8] Can't Choose
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

The next control variable examines interest in politics. The question is measured ordinally instead of dichotomously because the optional response of "little interested" did not generally support interest or lack of interest. Therefore, "not interested" is coded as 0, "little interested" is coded as 1, "interested" is coded as 2, and "very interested" is coded as 3. This variable is called political interest.

B.) "Generally speaking, how interested would you say you are in politics?" [14]

[1] Very interested
[2] Interested
[3] Little interested
[4] Not interested
[8] Can't Choose
[9] Decline to answer
[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

The next control variable is in regards to the present political situation. This question is also measured ordinally, with values ranging from 0 to 4. "Very bad" is coded as 0 and "very good" is coded as 3. This variable is called political situation. The reason why the political situation is being used as a control variable is that if individuals feel that their country is in a good political situation they would most likely not want to change the government by supporting a different type of political regime.

C.) "Generally speaking how would you describe the present political situation in our country?"

[1] Very good
[2] Good
[3] Bad
[4] Very bad
[8] Can't Choose
[9] Decline to answer

---

[14] Values that were coded as 8 or 9 were also coded as missing values

[96/97/98/99] Missing Values

I also control for the effects of age[15] and gender, which is measured dichotomously: women are coded as 0 and men are coded as 1.

The next chapter discusses the statistical results of this model and there will be an interpretation of what the results mean for this thesis.

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[15] Age is broken into seven categories in the survey, 1 is for 18-24 years, 2 is for 25-34 years, 3 is for 35-44 years, 4 is for 45-54 years, 5 is for 55-64 years, 6 is for 65-74 years, and 7 is for 75 and older. The reason for this was out of necessity as Morocco did not have a numeric string variable option, they were already binned into the above categories.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH FINDINGS

In the previous chapters I presented two main hypotheses, predicting a relationship between religiosity and support for democracy type as well as how support for the liberal ideals of tolerance and equality determines support for democracy type. This chapter presents my research findings and will discuss the substantive meanings for this research.

Hypothesis testing

In order to test hypotheses 1, 1a, 2, and 2a I conducted three logit models for support for secular democracy, support for Islamic democracy, and no support for democracy. The logit models are then clustered by country. In each model I used country clustered robust standard error to avoid underestimating panel specific heteroskedasticity. Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regression estimating support for secular democracy, Table 5 presents the results of the logistic regression estimating support for Islamic democracy, and Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regression estimating no support for democracy. Additionally in order to show predicted probabilities I graphed a pooled analysis predicting support for democracy type by religiosity (Figure 1), tolerance (Figure 2), and equality (Figure 3). Predicted probabilities are needed in order to show the variation across variables as some variables are nonlinear. Crosstabs are also used in order to examine the quality variable for support of Islamic democracy and secular democracy as there is variation amongst the coefficients in the logit models.

Table 4: Logistic Regression Models Estimating Support for Secular Democracy

	All nations	Algeria	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Yemen
Religiosity	0.09	0.12	0.02	-0.01	0.11	-0.01	0.26**	0.30**
	(0.062)	(0.094)	(0.067)	(0.140)	(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.107)
Tolerance	0.86**	0.66**	0.41*	0.99**	0.43	0.77**		0.32
	(0.141)	(0.214)	(0.167)	(0.303)	(0.402)	(0.151)		(0.230)
Equality	0.50**	0.72**	0.19	0.35	0.52*	-0.03	0.20	0.71**
	(0.185)	(0.220)	(0.159)	(0.307)	(0.224)	(0.176)	(0.150)	(0.219)
People's power	0.03	-0.24	-0.81**	1.25**	0.05	-0.01	-0.35*	0.50*
	(0.219)	(0.203)	(0.152)	(0.286)	(0.184)	(0.149)	(0.159)	(0.226)
Political interest	0.09	-0.09	-0.14	0.03	0.10	0.11	-0.01	0.20
	(0.049)	(0.112)	(0.079)	(0.155)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.123)
Political situation	-0.14	0.22	0.35**	0.49**	-0.10	0.07	-0.30**	-0.14
	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.113)	(0.174)	(0.161)	(0.065)	(0.096)	(0.137)
Age	0.05	0.07	0.07	-0.03	-0.06	-0.06	0.13*	0.11
	(0.028)	(0.086)	(0.060)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.120)
Sex	-0.09	0.09	-0.23	-0.55*	-0.16	0.35*	-0.06	0.05
	(0.121)	(0.212)	(0.160)	(0.258)	(0.210)	(0.159)	(0.141)	(0.230)
Education	0.08*	-0.02	0.00	-0.14	0.14*	-0.02	0.15**	0.07
	(0.041)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.087)
Family Income	-0.02	0.05	0.04	-0.15**	0.02	0.08**	0.08**	-0.06
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.039)
Constant	-1.63**	-1.94**	-1.28**	-0.89	-0.65	-1.79**	-2.10**	-2.46**
	(0.272)	(0.642)	(0.477)	(0.753)	(0.618)	(0.450)	(0.402)	(0.634)
Log likelihood	-2371.43	-286.49	-512.80	-202.41	-374.40	-553.14	-623.32	-270.54
Pseudo R²	0.0560	0.0621	0.0528	0.1282	0.0288	0.039	0.0467	0.0745
Observations	3,640	450	805	337	695	900	1,001	453

Table presents logit coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
**$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$

According to the model, going from 0 to 1 religiosity increases the odds of supporting secular democracy by 0.09. The results of the analysis suggest religiosity is not statistically significant, however there needs to be an examination of the predicted probabilities for religiosity as this may give greater insight into the relationship, which will be discussed later on in Figure 1.

When examining the level of support for tolerance on the effect of support for secular democracy all of the coefficients are positive. There is statistical significance for Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and the all the nations pooled together.[16] This supports Hypothesis 2 as this hypothesis states that a higher degree of support for tolerance is associated with a higher degree of support for secular democracy.

While exploring the level of support for equality on the effect of support for secular democracy all nations with the exception of Morocco exemplify a positive coefficient. Statistical significance is achieved for Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen, and the nations pooled together. Of the nations that achieved statistical significance it does support Hypothesis 2 as well. Hypothesis 2 states that a higher degree of support for equality is associated with a higher degree of support for secular democracy.

A few of the control variables also show significance. People's power to influence government as well as the current political situation both achieved significance in Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine. However, there are differences in the signs of the coefficients. In Jordan going from 0 to 1 people's power increases the odds of supporting secular democracy by -0.81. Palestine also has a negative coefficient at -0.34. When examining the political situation variable Kuwait and Palestine's coefficient sign stays the same, however, Jordan's sign switches. Lastly family income proves to be significant for Kuwait, Morocco, and Palestine. Kuwait has a negative coefficient whereas Morocco and Palestine has positive coefficients. The reason that people's power as well as political situation may be influential is if individuals feel negatively towards their political situation or feel as if they do not have power then they will be more likely

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[16] Questions regarding tolerance in Palestine are not asked and therefore Palestine's level of tolerance is not in the pooled results.

to want this to change by supporting a different type of government, such as secular democracy in this case.

Economic factors are also significant in some nations as the literature suggested. Family income is significant in Kuwait, Morocco, and Palestine. Going from 0 to 1 family income increases the odds of supporting for secular democracy by 0.08 times in both Morocco and Palestine. However, a one unit increase in family income leads to a -0.15 change in Kuwait. The reason for the negative coefficient in Kuwait is that if a family makes a lot of money under the current regime they do not have an economic incentive to change the type of political regime.

In order to test Hypothesis 1a and 2a logistic regression model is run estimating support for Islamic democracy, which is seen below in Table 5.

Table 5: Logistic Regression Models Estimating Support for Islamic Democracy

	All nations	Algeria	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Yemen
Religiosity	-0.1	0.00	-0.08	-0.26	-0.26**	-0.01	-0.20**	-0.31**
	(0.075)	(0.091)	(0.066)	(0.148)	(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.103)
Tolerance	-0.72**	-0.61**	-0.30	-0.83**	-0.52	-0.54**		-0.13
	(0.162)	(0.203)	(0.159)	(0.296)	(0.445)	(0.141)		(0.214)
Equality	-0.21	-0.38	-0.04	-0.04	-0.13	0.05	-0.14	-0.23
	(0.121)	(0.209)	(0.155)	(0.318)	(0.271)	(0.166)	(0.143)	(0.209)
People's power	0.05	0.18	0.68**	-1.27**	0.32	-0.04	0.62**	0.38
	(0.216)	(0.198)	(0.149)	(0.276)	(0.225)	(0.142)	(0.161)	(0.212)
Political interest	-0.10*	0.05	0.03	0.18	-0.04	-0.02	0.04	-0.37**
	(0.041)	(0.109)	(0.078)	(0.158)	(0.101)	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.118)
Political situation	0.14	-0.12	-0.41**	-0.35*	0.25	-0.07	0.35**	0.28*
	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.110)	(0.175)	(0.180)	(0.061)	(0.091)	(0.132)
Age	-0.06**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.07
	(0.015)	(0.085)	(0.059)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.114)
Sex	0.12	0.13	0.38*	0.04	0.11	-0.07	0.34*	-0.13
	(0.102)	(0.209)	(0.156)	(0.268)	(0.252)	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.216)
Education	-0.13**	0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.26**	0.02	-0.09	-0.11
	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.061)	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.081)
Family Income	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.08	0.05	-0.07*	-0.04	0.06
	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.037)
Constant	0.88**	0.44	0.57	1.49	0.18	1.15**	0.00	1.08
	(0.204)	(0.624)	(0.464)	(0.794)	(0.703)	(0.424)	(0.384)	(0.591)
Log likelihood	-2361.89	-297.81	-529.54	-189.55	-287.66	-597.11	-658.82	-294.33
Pseudo R^2	0.0462	0.0301	0.045	0.1237	0.0471	0.0210	0.0470	0.0619
Observations	3,640	450	805	337	695	900	1,001	453

Table presents logit coefficient with standard error in parentheses.
**$p<0.01$, *$p<0.05$

According to the model, going from 0 to 1 religiosity increases the odds of supporting Islamic democracy by -0.1 times for all nations pooled together. The results of the analysis suggest religiosity is not statistically significant in four of the nations, but is significant in Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen. Therefore predicted probabilities need to be examined to better explain the relationship (Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3).

When examining tolerance there are three nations as well as the pooled nation category that show statistical significance. All that nations sampled have a negative coefficient.[17] The coefficients that are significant are -0.72 change for all nations, -0.61 change in Algeria, -0.83 change in Kuwait, and -0.54 change in Morocco. The results support Hypothesis 2a because individuals who support tolerance have lower amounts of support for Islamic democracy.

Equality is not significant in any of the nations, although all nations have a negative coefficient with the exception of Morocco. Without statistical significance being achieved this research cannot confirm or deny that Hypothesis 2a is correct when accounting for equality as an independent variable.

As seen in the secular democracy model the same control variables as well as nations show statistical significance. People's power and political situation variables show statistical significance for Jordan, Kuwait, and Palestine all show significance for both variables however the coefficients vary across nations. In Jordan going from 0 to 1 people's power increases the odds of supporting Islamic democracy by 0.68, but going from 0 to 1 political situation increases the odds of supporting Islamic democracy by -0.41. In Kuwait there is significance for both variables and the coefficient remained negative as well. In Palestine there is also significance for both variables, however there was a positive coefficient for both variables. Unlike the secular democracy model the economic variable only reaches statistical significance in Morocco and no other nations.

In addition to running models for secular and Islamic democracy for hypothesis testing this research also examines the same variables and the effects they have on individuals that do not support democracy (table 6).

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[17] Once again Palestine does not have a tolerance variable because the question was not asked. Therefore it is not involved in the pooled assessment.

Table 6: Logistic Regression Models Estimating No Support for Democracy

	All nations	Algeria	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Yemen
Religiosity	0.00	-0.08	0.04	0.36	0.11	0.06	-0.02	0.27*
	(0.030)	(0.095)	(0.074)	(0.194)	(0.096)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.111)
Tolerance	-0.16**	-0.07	0.05	-0.18	-0.43	-0.47*		-0.05
	(0.063)	(0.217)	(0.182)	(0.397)	(0.527)	(0.216)		(0.240)
Equality	-0.53**	-0.23	-0.31	-0.48	-0.97**	-0.33	-0.09	-0.42
	(0.123)	(0.223)	(0.177)	(0.407)	(0.283)	(0.235)	(0.169)	(0.240)
People's power	-0.21	-0.11	0.14	0.07	-0.57*	0.03	-0.50**	-1.20**
	(0.225)	(0.213)	(0.172)	(0.388)	(0.249)	(0.218)	(0.172)	(0.241)
Political interest	-0.16*	-0.04	-0.01	-0.76**	-0.21	-0.43**	-0.08	0.09
	(0.069)	(0.116)	(0.089)	(0.231)	(0.112)	(0.126)	(0.076)	(0.132)
Political situation	0.03	-0.08	0.06	-0.10	-0.42	0.10	-0.06	-0.29
	(0.066)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.226)	(0.260)	(0.093)	(0.108)	(0.155)
Age	0.04**	0.07	0.04	-0.04	0.10	0.02	-0.07	0.02
	(0.016)	(0.086)	(0.066)	(0.118)	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.134)
Sex	0.01	-0.14	-0.21	0.85*	0.21	-0.55*	-0.25	0.17
	(0.139)	(0.227)	(0.180)	(0.365)	(0.281)	(0.231)	(0.163)	(0.244)
Education	0.05	-0.09	-0.10	0.19	0.08	-0.02	-0.17*	-0.05
	(0.045)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.111)	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.088)
Family Income	-0.07**	-0.04	-0.06*	0.18**	-0.12*	-0.08*	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.042)
Constant	-0.88**	-0.08	-0.76	-3.13**	-0.64	-0.89	0.46	-0.67
	(0.252)	(0.648)	(0.530)	(1.013)	(0.816)	(0.636)	(0.456)	(0.691)
Log likelihood	-1727.97	-279.75	-444.44	-128.96	-233.70	-315.79	-515.93	-241.55
Pseudo R²	0.0239	0.0159	0.0192	0.1063	0.0713	0.0491	0.0287	0.0952
Observations	3,982	533	900	355	724	966	1,051	504

Table presents logit coefficients with standard error in parentheses.
**p<0.01, *p<0.05

The logit output for the no support for democracy model show statistical significance in some nations for each of the three independent variables. The only nation to show statistical significance for religiosity is Yemen. For the tolerance variable there is a negative coefficient for

Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the pooled nations.[18] For the equality variable all nations have a negative coefficient. The negative coefficients for both tolerance and equality are indications that increased support for no democracy is associated with less support for tolerance and equality.

In order to see the range of the religiosity variable box plots are used in order to examine where most individuals lie on the scale when supporting Islamic or secular democracy (figure 1, figure 2).

**Figure 1: Box plot of religiosity and Islamic Democracy**

Graphs 0=does not support Islamic Democracy 1=support for Islamic Democracy

In figure 1 those individuals that support Islamic democracy tend to be read the Quran more often, showing there are higher degrees of religiosity. Also the data shows that the range in religiosity and support for Islamic democracy is much more compact and centralized than those who do not support Islamic democracy.

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[18] Tolerance is not measured in Palestine.

**Figure 2: Box plot of religiosity and secular democracy**

Graphs 0=does not support secular Democracy 1=support for secular democracy

In figure 2 there is a greater degree of variation for those that support secular democracy than those that support Islamic democracy in figure 1. Those that support secular democracy tend to have a wide range of religiosity scores, but the median is that individuals read the Quran "sometimes." When comparing figure 1 and figure 2 it is apparent that those who support Islamic democracy have a median level of religiosity that is higher than those that support secular democracy.

After seeing the range of the variable it is also important to examine the predicted probability graphs that were discussed earlier. In order to fully examine and easily interpret religiosity's effect on support for secular democracy, Islamic democracy, as well as no support for democracy I use predicted probabilities from the aforementioned logit models (figure 3).

Figure 3: Predicted Probability of support for secular democracy (left), Islamic democracy (center), and no support for democracy (right), by religiosity (Smoothed In-Sample   s and 95% Confidence Intervals)


Scale for religiosity (reading the Quran per week): 1= Everyday; 2=Several times a week; 3=Sometimes; 4=Rarely; 5=I don't read.

In the predicted probabilities above, support for secular democracy increases as religiosity decreases. However since religiosity did not reach statistical significance in most nations so the predicted probabilities are used to examine where the data falls. When examining the predicted probability figure for Islamic democracy more religious individuals do support Islamic democracy at higher rates than those who only read the Quran "sometimes," which is the category in secular democracy that shows the highest level of support. Those individuals that do not support democracy remain largely unaffected as religiosity decreases.

The predicted probability models for tolerance are seen below in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Predicted Probability of support for secular democracy (left), Islamic democracy (right), and no support for democracy (bottom), by support for tolerance (Smoothed In-Sample   s and 95% Confidence Intervals)

Examining the predicted probability graph for support for secular democracy and support for tolerance it is evident that as support for tolerance increases it is likely that support for secular democracy also increases, which supports Hypothesis 2. The predicted probability graph of support for Islamic democracy also support the hypothesized relationship in 2a because as support for tolerance increases the support for Islamic democracy decreases. The predicted probability graph for no support for democracy shows a slight association in which increases in support for tolerance show less support for no democracy. There could be no relationship between no support for democracy and tolerance because the 95 percent confidence bounds show that the results could actually be a straight line showing no relationship.

Predicted probabilities are also graphed for equality with each type of democracy as well as no support for democracy (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Predicted Probability of support for secular democracy (left), Islamic democracy (right), and no support for democracy (bottom), by support for equality (Smoothed In-Sample s and 95% Confidence Intervals)

Similar to the predicted probability graphs for tolerance, support of equality also shows a positive with secular democracy and negative relationship with Islamic democracy. However the steepness of the line changes indicating different levels of support for regime type. In the predicted probability graph for secular democracy no support for equality still reflects a 0.4 support for secular democracy. Increases in support for equality also suggest that there are increases in the level of support for secular democracy, which support Hypothesis 2. The graph for the predicted probability of support for Islamic democracy does not show the same steepness as the predicted probability graph for Islamic democracy and tolerance, yet still shows a negative relationship. There could be no relationship between support for Islamic democracy and equality because the 95 percent confidence bounds show that the results could actually be a straight line showing no relationship. Therefore Hypothesis 2a cannot be supported within the confidence

bounds. Lastly, the predicted probability graph for no support for democracy shows that increases in support for equality show less support for no democracy.

In addition to the predicted probability graphs crosstabs are also used to examine cross tabs between equality and Islamic democracy as well as secular democracy (table 7, table 8).

Table 7: Cross tab between equality and type of support for Islamic democracy

equality	Does not support Freq (Percent)	Supports Freq (Percent)	Total
0	1,224 (55.36)	987 (44.64)	2,211 (100.00)
1	2,733 (60.26)	1,802 (39.74)	4,535 (100.00)
Total	3957	2789	

0= Does not support equality, 1= Supports equality

The cross tab between equality and type of support for Islamic democracy shows that those individuals that support Islamic democracy remain divided as to if they support equality or not. The majority of individuals that support Islamic democracy do not support equality, which is at a rate of 44.64 percent.

Table 8: Cross tab between equality and type of support for secular democracy

equality	Does not support Freq (Percent)	Supports Freq (Percent)	Total
0	1,395 (63.09)	816 (36.91)	2,211 (100.00)
1	2,339 (51.58)	2,196 (48.42)	4,535 (100.00)
Total	3,734	3,012	

0= Does not support equality, 1= Supports equality

The cross tab between equality and type of support for secular democracy shows that those individuals that support secularism tend to support equality at higher rates than not supporting democracy at a rate of 48.42 percent.

Although the statistical significance of support for equality was discussed earlier it is important to see what role gender plays in the support for secular or Islamic democracy. Another model is run for the pooled nations to see if there are differences between male and female in support for secular democracy or Islamic democracy (table 9).

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Table 9: Logistic Regression Models Estimating Support for Democracy Type, by sex

	Secular - Male	Secular - Female	Islamic- Male	Islamic- Female
Religiosity	0.06	0.12	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.039)	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.089)
Tolerance	0.79**	0.91**	-0.73**	-0.70**
	(0.167)	(0.131)	(0.176)	(0.149)
Equality	0.60*	0.46*	-0.19	-0.24
	(0.273)	(0.187)	(0.210)	(0.126)
People's power	-0.00	0.06	-0.03	0.11
	(0.268)	(0.191)	(0.207)	(0.231)
Political interest	0.14*	0.06	-0.18*	-0.04
	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.070)	(0.061)
Political situation	-0.13	-0.13	0.13	0.15
	(0.140)	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Age	0.05	0.05	-0.07*	-0.05**
	(0.047)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.018)
Education	0.10*	0.07	-0.17**	-0.10
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.053)
Family Income	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.04
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Constant	-1.83**	-1.59**	1.40**	0.55
	(0.101)	(0.409)	(0.142)	(0.328)
Log likelihood	-1078.91	-1289.51	-1081.61	-1275.80
Pseudo R²	0.0545	0.0580	0.0540	0.0392
Observations	1,662	1,978	1,978	1,662

By looking at the variables that are statistically significant it is important to see if it is gender specific. The reason this additional model is run is to see if equality, a main independent variable of this study is supported by one gender or the other. Surprisingly gender did not change the type of support for equality. Equality is not statistically significant for Islamic democracy; however they are both negative coefficients.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has explored how support for democracy does not necessarily mean support liberal democracy. It is important to recognize that liberal values are not universally supported and may not be principles that are held by members of society in a democracy. The literature on religiosity tends to focus on overall support for democracy, which can change depending on the type of democracy that is supported by individuals. The dynamics of support for democracy in the Middle East are complex and are not universal for the region. Even in the nations sampled there were differences in the type of democracy supported and what variables proved to be significant determinants.

The research findings suggest that those who support democracy are divided as to having a secular democracy or Islamic democracy. Therefore either type of democracy could in fact receive support depending on the nation. However, there is variation amongst the liberal values and religiosity level in those that support secular democracy versus Islamic democracy. More research needs to be done on religiosity as a determinant of support for democracy type since religiosity proved to be significant in only some nations. Therefore individual case studies may need to be employed to see if there are cultural reasons or other factors causing religiosity to have more of an impact in those nations. Those that supported tolerance and equality were more likely to support secular democracy and those individuals that were intolerant and did not support equality supported Islamic democracy.

If democracy promotion is leading to support for secularism then foreign governments may be pleased as this is in lines with liberalism. Foreign governments may increase funding on programs relating to equality and tolerance in order to increase support for secularism. However authentic Islamists may be displeased with attempts from foreign governments to secularize the political sphere as this goes against a traditional view that the Quran is the governing force of all aspects of society. Islamic democracy will have popular elections, but may not offer universal freedoms exhibiting tolerant behaviors or equality of all members of society as those individuals that supported Islamic democracy did not support equality or tolerance at high rates. Therefore an Islamic democracy may not offer universal freedoms for both genders, but it also took the United States and other Western democracies many years until women had the right to vote and have equal opportunities. An Islamic democracy may not resemble modern Western democracies immediately, but at least those nations will have the basic underpinnings of democracy with free and fair elections.

With any research there are often limitations. In order to further explore attitudes towards democracy in the Middle East it would be necessary to include other nations in the study. The Arab Barometer will be expanding the nations surveyed in the upcoming year, which would allow for broader based claims to be made. This research could also be improved by asking more questions regarding feelings on equality because currently the questions regarding equality are all concerning gender equality. Lastly it would be interesting to examine other types of democratic values synonymous with liberalism and see if those who support secular or Islamic based democracy differ on what the functions of government should be.

The research contributes to the literature on democratization in the Middle East. The findings suggest that societies are deeply fractionalized in regards to support the type of

democracy they support. Promoters of democracy need to account for this type of fractionalization. Democracy promotion will have more success by promoting common values shared between those individuals that support secular democracy and those that support Islamic democracy. Yet, it is important to acknowledge that a working democracy does require support from the majority of the citizens and will take time for successful implementation.

In the Middle East, a democratic transition is beginning to evolve, but is far too premature to theorize what type of democracy it is that will be created. There have been successful protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya that show that democratic reform is at the very least possible. The type of democracy installed in these three nations and the success of their regimes may prove to be a catalyst for individuals to either emulate or reject certain types of democracy in the region.

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