William James and John Dewey on pragmatic religion

In this dissertation I compare the American Pragmatists William James and John Dewey on their respective conceptions of religion. I examine what each philosopher takes to be the essential features of religious attitudes, as well as how these features subsequently determine the criteria for what may be counted as religious. I look at what both James and Dewey see as philosophical problems with the traditional definition of religion and of religious institutions, as well as how their redefinition of religion may resolve those problems. I also analyze the theoretical and pragmatic defensibility of both definitions. I focus on the philosophical criticisms which arise both from Deweys insistence on removing supernatural features from the conception of religion and from Jamess insistence on retaining them. I argue that Jamess emphasis on supernaturalism in a religious attitude entails certain epistemological and ontological commitments which are difficult to defend and detract from the functionality of his definition of religion in common practice. While Deweys definition may be more functional, it may be more problematic in that Deweyan attitudes seem to suffer from an enthusiasm gap compared to the intensity often associated with traditional religious attitudes.