

EXPLORING NETWORK-LEVEL PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN COLLABORATIVES

by

BOYUNG SUH

(Under the Direction of Karen E. Watkins)

ABSTRACT

A group of organizations forms an interorganizational collaborative to pursue a shared mission and tackle enormous challenges and issues that cannot be solved by individual organizations. Although some scholars tried to examine the relationship between driving factors, such as antecedents or key processes, with the performance level of interorganizational collaboratives, little consensus was found on the dimensions of organizational performance at the network level in the nonprofit literature. Therefore, this study aimed to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives.

The target population for this study was a group of people with extensive experience with interorganizational humanitarian networks, and the locations of the sample groups from different international humanitarian interorganizational networks were in Switzerland and UK. The data consisted of nine exploratory semi-structured interviews with the participants to address the study's purpose, and this study employed a qualitative research methodology and critical incident interview technique. This study yielded a total of 27 critical incidents. In-depth thematic analysis using both deductive and inductive data analysis approaches was conducted.

The findings of this study corroborated three well-established dimensions of organizational performance (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance), conceptualized by a priori theoretical frameworks on organizational performance theories, which included the learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and strategic nonprofit performance framework (Kaplan, 2001). Additionally, a fourth and new network-level performance dimension, relational performance, was inductively derived from participants' understanding and experiences about organizational performance outcomes pertaining to the relational aspect of interorganizational collaboration in the humanitarian sector.

The addition of the fourth dimension is a significant contribution to the human resource and organization development literature. This study has exemplified the efficacy of a qualitative research approach using Flanagan's (1954) CIT method to examine organizational performance at the network level. Also, practical implications on how to make an interorganizational collaboration more effective concerning the four organizational performance dimensions at the network level are presented. The results of the study could aid leaders and managers serving in an interorganizational collaborative in deepening their understanding of critical organizational performance dimensions at the network level.

INDEX WORDS: network-level organizational performance, interorganizational collaboration, humanitarian network, nonprofit, mission performance, relational performance, knowledge performance, financial performance, qualitative study, critical incident technique

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DEDICATION

Lord, I offer this dissertation to you,
and I praise your sovereignty and love.
You are my strength and my loving God.

My love, my everlasting friend, Jihye,
I will always love you and be there for you,
as you have always been there for to me.

The most amazing gift from God,
Yejun, Yehun, and Joy, I love you!
And, I am always proud of you!

Mom, Dad, Mother Seo, and Father An,
I am always grateful to you for your
amazing support and encouragement.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

In May 2015, the Nepal earthquakes struck countries in the Himalayan region killing more than 8,800 people and affecting more than eight million people (World Vision, 2015). As the scale of the disaster was so enormous, governmental resources from the impacted nations could not resolve the catastrophe. Immediately, numerous organizations engaged in aid projects to support the people and communities in Nepal affected by the calamity. International organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, such as the United Nations and World Vision, quickly deployed emergency response strategies and provided humanitarian assistance, and they formed a humanitarian network to collectively respond to the disaster more effectively. They did so because such an interorganizational collaboration enables them to identify critical issues and take action at multiple sites more strategically through the utilization of its network of expertise and resources in conjunction with local authorities and organizations (Goyens, Porignon, Soron'gane, & Tonglet, 1996; Seybolt, 2009).

When there is a disaster or ongoing problem in a country or a region, there is an affected population in need of emergency response and supplies to sustain their lives. To save lives and to relieve their suffering, networks of humanitarian organizations initiate operations and start providing services to the affected populations. To fulfill the mission of responding to affected populations, such networks must have an understanding about how they will serve, what they need and when, how they should deliver what they need, and what would happen if they do the

work. If they do not achieve this mission, all or part of their efforts could even do additional harm to the affected population rather than helping them, for instance, raising the complexity level in a refugee camp or increasing the vulnerability of the most vulnerable groups, particularly women and children. In order to avoid such mistakes and advance the effectiveness of the response and services to the affected population, it is necessary to learn from the experiences and lessons of experts and those who have done extensive work during disasters across the globe.

As shown in the example above, a group of organizations often forms an interorganizational collaborative to pursue a shared mission. This type of a multiple organization system merges to tackle huge challenges and issues that cannot be solved by individual organizations (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Gulati, Wohlgezogen, & Zhelyazkov, 2012; Guo & Acar, 2005; Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; Provan & Sydow, 2008; Ring & van De Ven, 1994; Schermerhorn, 1979). Oftentimes, organizations collaborate to create and enhance their products and services through interorganizational relationships, sharing their resources and expertise (Drucker, 2008). Some additional examples of organizational constellations or multiple organization systems studied by various scholars include collaborations of multiple humanitarian organizations working to tackle global issues (Goyens et al., 1996; Seybolt, 2009), the United Nations and partnering organizations working towards Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (Nelson, 2007), a partnership between nonprofit organizations and public agencies to provide better social services and businesses for the public (Amirkhanyan, 2009; Esteve, Boyne, Sierra, & Ysa, 2013), mergers and acquisitions of multiple firms to enhance market competitiveness (Ragozzino & Moschieri, 2014), joint ventures to offer new services and products to the market (Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Yan & Gray, 1994),

constellations of professional service firms to provide collaborative services (Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998), etc.

For any humanitarian network, saving more lives and mitigating the pain of the affected population in a disaster situation must be both the most pressing and desirable organizational performance goal and outcome. To achieve their goals for the client group, humanitarian networks set and undertake complex strategic missions to provide service and products to an affected population (Bealt, Fernández Barrera, & Mansouri, 2016; Kapucu, 2005; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Ryu & Johansen, 2017), innovate the service delivery process (Goes & Park, 1997; McDonald, 2007), enter into a cross-sector collaboration (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011), and assess the output or outcome of their efforts (Beamon & Balcik, 2008; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). Furthermore, effective collaborations among partnering humanitarian organizations and cross-sector alliances not only promote the expeditious distribution of aid supplies over a wide range of regions through more efficient and integrated supply chain management (Maon, Lindgreen, & Vanhamme, 2009; Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006), but also advance humanitarian relief coordination performance, avoiding redundant delivery of relief assistance (Kovács & Spens, 2007).

Statement of the Problem

A group of organizations forms an interorganizational collaborative to pursue a shared mission and tackle enormous challenges and issues that cannot be solved by individual organizations (Guo & Acar, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Ring & van De Ven, 1994; Schermerhorn, 1979; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Despite their motivations, meaningful underlying processes, and fruitful outcomes, unfortunately, only a few interorganizational collaboration networks, particularly in the business sector, seem to successfully accomplish their

common goals, with failure rates often exceeding 50% (Gulati et al., 2012). Alliances in the nonprofit sector are not an exception.

To address these alliance deficiencies in practice and to understand the key issues around the alliance's core more comprehensively, scholars from various disciplines, such as business management, social work, or public administration, have examined different aspects of interorganizational collaborations. Some of the topics frequently discussed in both theoretical and empirical studies on interorganizational collaborations are: the manifestation of pertinent theories (Anderson, 1999; Malatesta & Smith, 2014; Reitan, 1998), motivations to form a collaboration (Guo & Acar, 2005; Sowa, 2009), links between collaboration and innovation (Goes & Park, 1997), social processes (Das & Bing-Sheng, 2002; Tsasis, 2009), generation of proto-institutions (Lawrence et al., 2002), the role of trust (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), the dynamics of the collaboration process (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Bagherzadeh, 2014), and developmental processes (Chertow & Ehrenfeld, 2012; Ring & van De Ven, 1994). Despite their significant contribution to our understanding of the topic, these studies do not address the issue of organizational performance at the network level sufficiently.

Understanding the dimensions of interorganizational collaboratives' performance is of particular interest to a group of scholars and practitioners who want to manage, assess, and enhance the effective performance outcomes of such collaboratives' works. Scholars widely discussed the significance of interorganizational performance from different perspectives, such as strategic alliance performance (Ariño, 2003; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012; Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002), joint R&D performance (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), joint venture performance (Yan & Gray, 1994), and alliance management capability (Schilke & Goerzen, 2010). But, in these studies, the performance measures used are

mostly simple financial metrics, and there is little consensus on how the performance outcomes should be understood or studied. Thus, these studies lack a comprehensive view on organizational performance dimensions at the network level.

Questions about what interorganizational collaboratives do and how significantly they impact our society can be addressed by intellectually reviewing multiple branches of knowledge in different disciplines. However, due to these collaboratives' inherent structural and operational complexity created by multiple subjective organizations with their own autonomy and orientation, and, additionally, loosely consolidated and sustained by interdependency and collective aspirations, field studies can bring greater depth to understanding performance. Although a number of scholars tried to examine the relationship between driving factors, such as antecedents or key processes, with the performance level of interorganizational collaboratives (e.g., Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Beamon & Balcik, 2008; Goes & Park, 1997; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003; Kaplan, 2001; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Sowa, 2009; Tsasis, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015), little consensus was found on the dimensions of organizational performance at the network level in the nonprofit literature. Despite the confusion and uncertainty, addressing the gap in the literature is necessary because having a better understanding of organizational performance dimensions helps gauge the success of interorganizational collaborations, establishes a framework for comparing different networks, and examines factors contributing to favorable outcomes (Provan & Sydow, 2008).

Purpose of the Study and Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

Theoretical Framework

Concerning the complex structure, internal dynamics, and continuous interaction with its environment, it is assumed that the performance outcome of such interorganizational collaboratives cannot be understood profoundly with a simple dimension of organizational performance such as financial performance. Many organizational scholars have arrived at such an understanding (e.g., Kaplan, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Sowa, 2009). It is assumed that this study requires a particular conceptual orientation (Merriam & Simpson, 2000) that situates the study properly in the nonprofit context. Therefore, as "the underlying structure, orientation, and viewpoint" of this study (Merriam & Simpson, 2000), I adopted a group of theories on organizational performance that best serve the purpose of the study, which includes Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit balanced scorecard framework and Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997, 1996) and McHargues' (2003) learning organization performance theory.

Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit balanced scorecard framework guides the current study by supporting the concept of the multidimensionality of organizational performance, which includes mission, customer and/or donor, internal process, learning and growth, and financial

performance perspectives. Additionally, this framework suggests strategically aligning and prioritizing different organizational performance perspectives to reflect the organizational orientation of nonprofit organizations, for instance, promoting and putting the mission perspective at the top of an organizational strategy map, while putting the financial perspective at the bottom. The learning organization performance theory, developed by Watkins and Marsick (1993, 1997, 1996) and McHargue (2003), also guides this study, substantiating the construct of organizational performance using three distinct performance dimensions, including knowledge, financial, and mission performance. Learning organization performance theory guides the fundamental framework of this study with strong empirical evidence corroborated by studies on the construct validity (Yang, Watkins, & Marsick, 2004) and on the relationship between the distinct performance dimensions (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Dirani, 2013; Watkins, Milton, & Kurz, 2009; Wetherington & Daniels, 2013).

Significance of the Study

Theoretical Significance

This study contributes to the knowledge base of organization development around the topic of organizational performance at the network level, where insufficient research has been conducted from the nonprofit perspective. Therefore, this study addresses a gap in the literature regarding the performance outcome dimensions of nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives, advancing the literature both theoretically and empirically. The study advances the theoretical understanding of the topic of network-level organizational performance by adopting well-established theories on multidimensional organizational performance, such as the learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and strategic nonprofit performance framework (Kaplan, 2001), thus providing a strong theoretical

justification of the dimensions of organizational performance unlike other studies (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009). For instance, theoretical perspectives currently used in the nonprofit management literature, such as resource dependence theory (e.g., Austin, 2000; Goes & Park, 1997; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Sowa, 2009; Tsisis, 2009), systems theory (e.g., Varda & Retrum, 2015), or institutional theory (Goes & Park, 1997; Lawrence et al., 2002; Sowa, 2009), focus on other domains of the interorganizational collaboration topic, such as antecedents or key processes, rather than underpinning the multidimensionality of organizational performance. Also, the importance of this study becomes discernable as it empirically examines the current theories of organizational performance at the network level, rather than at a single organizational level. This is important, because the utility and capacity of the theories are extended to the network level, thus assuring scholars the use of these theories in their interorganizational network studies.

Practical Significance

From a practical stance, the results of the study could aid leaders and managers serving in an interorganizational collaborative in deepening their understanding of key organizational performance dimensions at the network level. Such an understanding will help them reflect on the organizational goals of and the areas of organizational performance in their humanitarian networks, thus motivating them to make decisions on the direction and the scope of their business domain for a better strategic focus. Secondly, if leaders and managers serving in a humanitarian network adopted the four dimensions of organizational performance at the network level, they would be able to manage and evaluate the collective results of the humanitarian network better, guided by the distinct dimensions and sub-dimensions of the construct. For instance, the performance guide could help them reevaluate the mission-specific service quality for their target population or help them gauge the strength of the relationship among the

collaborating organizational members. Thirdly, the leaders and managers serving in a humanitarian network can manage the issue of organizational accountability and transparency, if they design the organizational performance management framework based on the findings of the study. This is important, because a well-structured performance management evaluation process will yield better performance and will yield stronger evidence for mandated actions, thus satisfying the expectations the donor and support group have toward nonprofit actors. This string of actions that lead to a better understanding and the adoption of an advanced organizational performance framework will aid interorganizational collaboratives in sustaining and enhancing their performance in their practices to advance our global society.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized into six chapters. The current study, using the CIT method (Flanagan, 1954), aims at better understanding the dimensions of performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives from the nonprofit perspective. Chapter 2 reviews the current body of literature on the topic of interorganizational collaborations and their performance, including fundamental concepts, theoretical perspectives, and empirical studies. Chapter 3 describes the qualitative research methodology and methods used in the study in detail, and the chapter topic covers the design of the study, philosophical considerations, participants, data collection, data analysis, trustworthiness, researchers' subjectivity, and limitations of the study. Chapter 4 displays the interview data in the form of a critical incident. Chapter 5 presents the research findings on the two research questions, comprised of both deductive analysis results on pre-existing organizational performance dimensions (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance) and inductive analysis results on the new performance dimension (i.e., relational performance) at the network level. Lastly, Chapter 6 discusses the key findings of the study,

reflecting on the current literature, presents a plan for future studies, and finally concludes with implications for the theory and practice of human resource and organization development.

Definition of Terms

Definitions of key terms central to this study that will be used throughout the chapters of the study are presented in this section. There are multiple terms used to describe the complex networks that were the focus of this study. These definitions clarify how I used these terms in this study.

Humanitarian interorganizational networks/collaboratives: Interorganizational collaboratives of different humanitarian organizations united to accomplish their common mission, sharing organizational resources and expertise in response to global issues impacting humankind. The term, humanitarian interorganizational network, also often called a humanitarian network, is identified by different names in the literature and in practice, including a nonprofit collaborative, cluster, project, alliance, collaboration, etc.

Interorganizational collaboration: “A cooperative, interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process and that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control” (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 282). This definition highlights the process and the collaborative nature of interorganizational relationship, thus differing from the previous one that signals a kind of entity that is like an organization.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

A group of organizations forms a strategic alliance to pursue a shared mission, and such a multiple organization system merges to tackle huge challenges and issues that cannot be solved by individual organizations. Topics related to interorganizational collaboration have long been central themes in the fields of management and sociology with the increasing acknowledgement that individuals, organizations, and interorganizational networks are in a relational context of interconnectedness. Although a great deal of literature from different fields has made subsequent and substantial contributions to the understanding of the topics, scholarly interest has been underestimated, and little effort has been devoted to exploring the aspects of interorganizational collaborations and their performance, particularly in the literature of organization development. Therefore, this review of the literature aims to understand what is currently known about

interorganizational collaborations and their performances, particularly in the nonprofit and the humanitarian sector.

A comprehensive search of the literature on the topic of this study, effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives, was performed to locate relevant theoretical and empirical studies. The literature review first identified key search words for accessing relevant and valid research. Particular subject keywords, such as interorganizational collaboration and organizational performance, were entered into electronic library searches via the Web of Science Core Collection to retrieve publications from the last three decades. Using these keywords, the search retrieved 163 articles. Further, 139 additional studies were retrieved using a Google Scholar search with the following search terms: interorganizational collaboration, strategic alliance, organizational performance, non-profit, and humanitarian. Also, using a snowball-sampling method, by scanning the reference sections of the initially selected literature, more studies were added to the literature pool for review. Giving priority to peer-reviewed journal articles when reviewing and selecting the literature based on the title and abstract of the literature pool, 31 relevant articles were finally selected and used for the current literature review.

The first two sections of this literature review introduce a range of definitions and major factors that influence interorganizational collaboration from various disciplines and perspectives for a broader understanding. After discussing key theoretical underpinnings of interorganizational collaboratives, the review then investigates selected empirical studies to discuss the topic of organizational performance at the network level in the nonprofit and humanitarian context.

Key Definitions of Interorganizational Collaboration

The purpose, meaning, and outcome of interorganizational collaboration can be understood by studying various definitions of the concept. Terms related to interorganizational collaboration vary greatly according to practitioners, scholars, or different sectors in society (Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & Ring, 2008). In this section of the paper, the review investigates key definitions, and concepts for grasping the complex ideas related to the topic of this study within the broader boundary of interorganizational relations are discussed.

Starting from a definition with a broader perspective on the term, Ring and van De Ven (1994) define collaborative interorganizational relations as “socially contrived mechanisms for collective action, which are continually shaped and restructured by actions and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved” (p. 96). Incorporating transaction cost theory, exchange theory, social comparison theory, and agency theory, the authors accentuate the idiosyncrasy of a multiple organizational collectivity epitomized by its continuously evolving complexion, symbolic interaction, and socially constructed system. Narrowing down its focus from interorganizational relations in general to the concept of interorganizational collaboration, based on institutional theory, Lawrence et al. (2002) define interorganizational collaboration as “a cooperative, interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process and that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control” (p. 282). In this definition, the authors emphasized the dynamic and interactive nature of interorganizational collaboration that involves continuous consultation and communication. Another definition provided by Guo and Acar (2005), “Nonprofit collaboration occurs when different nonprofit organizations work together to address problems through joint effort, resources, and decision making and share ownership of the final product or service” (pp. 342-343), specifically denotes

characteristics of collaborations among different nonprofit organizations. Influenced by resource dependency theory, transaction cost theory, and institutional theory, this definition emphasizes the notion of collective maneuvers, shared resources, and co-management efforts on organizational outputs. Mandell and Steelman (2003), who provide multiple terms related to the topic, including partnerships, networks, cooperatives, coalitions, and innovation, claim that different terms, types, and dynamics of interorganizational innovation exist based on the variables of “relative stability, degree of interdependence and/or number of organizations involved in the effort” (pp. 198-199). Definitions, examples of organizational joining, the rationale for the relationships, and driving forces of many collaborative networks differ according to individual organizations and different contextual factors in which the entities operate. Table 2-1 provides definitions related to the topic of interest, inter-organizational collaboration and development, found in the literature from various fields of study and practice such as business management, nonprofit, public administration, professional services, organizational innovation, etc. The categories allow us to compare and distinguish the different perspectives and domains around the terms and concepts of interorganizational collaboration.

Reviewing different definitions of interorganizational collaboration along with similar terms, such as interorganizational relations and interorganizational development, this review found that the boundaries of the topic areas of these terms are often vague and overlapping. However, distinguishing the differences among the key terms and understanding the relationships among them is viable. First, interorganizational relations are established among multiple organizations that collaborate to accomplish their common goals. Second, the inter-organizational collaboration process itself is not an organization development intervention; however, member organizations could experience an organizational capacity building effect

during the process with possible organizational learning opportunities and learning and information transfer. Third, interorganizational development is the process of applying organization development concepts and expertise to a collaborative network to facilitate and promote collaboration processes and activities for better interorganizational performance.

Table 2-1

Definitions Related to Interorganizational Collaboration

Author	Definition	Key Components	Underlying Theories
Schermerhorn (1979)	Interorganizational cooperation is defined as an activity in which two or more organizations combine their efforts in deliberate relationships for the purpose of jointly accomplishing individual operating goals (p. 22).	Combining efforts; deliberate relationships; joint accomplishment	(Not specified)
Schermerhorn (1979)	Interorganizational development (IOD) is defined as the application of social science knowledge to the creation of planned, systematic, and mutually beneficial cooperative relationships between otherwise autonomous organizations (p. 23).	Application of social science knowledge; creation of relationships	(Not specified)
Cummings (1984)	Transorganizational systems are social collectives composed of organizations which have joined together for a common purpose (p. 370).	Social collectives; Common purpose	Resource dependence theory; Organization theory
Cummings (1984)	Transorganizational development is concerned with improving system effectiveness related to task performances, wider environmental relationships, and member satisfactions (p. 398).	System effectiveness; task performance; environmental relationships, member satisfaction	Resource dependence theory; Organization theory
Ring and van De Ven (1994)	Cooperative IORs [i.e., Interorganizational Relations] are socially contrived mechanisms for collective action, which are continually shaped and restructured by actions and symbolic interpretations of the parties involved (p. 96).	Socially contrived; collective actions; continual shaping and restructuring; symbolic interpretations	Transaction cost theory; exchange theory; social comparison theory; agency theory
Jones et al. (1998)	[Constellations is a] group of firms that interact directly and reciprocally to coordinate their efforts for a complex service or product during a finite period of time, which may last from several weeks to several years (p. 398).	Interaction; coordination; complex service or product; finite period of time	(Not specified)

Author	Definition	Key Components	Underlying Theories
Reitan (1998)	Calls for increased interagency coordination are an answer to the negative side effects of fragmentation and lack of coherence in specialized human services (p. 303).	Interagency coordination; coherence	Transaction cost theory; resource dependence theory; institutional theory
Lawrence et al. (2002)	Interorganizational collaboration [is] a cooperative, interorganizational relationship that is negotiated in an ongoing communicative process and that relies on neither market nor hierarchical mechanisms of control (p. 282).	Cooperative; negotiated; ongoing communicative process	Institutional theory
Mandell and Steelman (2003)	[Interorganizational innovations] denote the variety of interorganizational arrangements that can develop among public, private and non-profit groups to work together on mutual problems (p. 198).	Working together; mutual problems	Interorganizational theory; transaction costs theory; game theory; resource dependency theory
Gulzar and Henry (2005)	Two organizations transacting resources to achieve mutually benefiting goals through agreed upon structures and processes (p. 1931)	“willingness to cooperate, a need for expertise and funds, and adaptive efficiency” (p. 1930)	(Not specified)
Guo and Acar (2005)	Nonprofit collaboration occurs when different nonprofit organizations work together to address problems through joint effort, resources, and decision making and share ownership of the final product or service (pp. 342-343).	Working together; joint effort, resources, and decision making; ownership sharing	Resource dependency theory; transaction cost theory; institutional theory
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006)	Network orchestration [is] the set of deliberate, purposeful actions undertaken by the hub firm as it seeks to create value (expand the pie) and extract value (gain a larger slice of the pie) from the network (p. 659).	Deliberate and purposeful actions; hub firm; value creation	Network theory

Author	Definition	Key Components	Underlying Theories
Cummings and Worley (2009)	Transorganizational development (TD) is a form of planned change aimed at helping organizations develop collective and collaborative strategies with other organizations (p. 479).	Planned change; collective and collaborative strategies	(Not specified)
Burke (2011)	Larger-system [i.e., interorganizational level] change comes about by way of mergers and acquisitions, strategic alliances, joint ventures, and the like (p. 125).	Larger-system change	(Not specified)
Anderson (2012)	A special circumstance in organization development [i.e., transorganization or interorganization development] describes the application of OD concepts to situations in which multiple organizations join together in networks or collaborative relationships with a shared purpose (p. 295).	Organization Development	(Not specified)
Ryu and Johansen (2017)	Collaborative networks are a set of governmental and non-governmental actors that act together in order to achieve public goods, services, or values that cannot be provided by a single governmental organization (p. 207).	Acting together; uncertainty management	Organizational theory; resource dependence theory

Influencing Factors of Interorganizational Collaboration

In this section of the paper, major influencing factors of interorganizational collaboration projects in the nonprofit sector will be introduced by examining both theoretical and empirical studies, which include: (1) antecedents, (2) success factors, (3) threatening factors, and (4) interventions for interorganizational development.

Antecedents

While Jones et al. (1998) listed task complexity, extreme time limits, lack of resources in the individual organization, and an uncertain environment as reasons for joining a constellation, Reitan (1998) noted the growing demand for interorganizational coordination in response to the undesirable effects of fragmented and inconsistent human services. Reitan explained these reasons for interorganizational relationships:

Inter-organizational relations come about for a number of reasons: as a result of mandates, because everyone else does it, because it is cheaper to externalize production, because professionals like to talk to their equals, because agencies are located nearby, or because organizational boundaries are passé in a postmodern world. Inter-organizational relations emerge for different reasons, serve different purposes, and probably produce different outcomes. (pp. 303-304)

Vernis, Iglesia, Sanz, and Saz-Carranza (2006) identify several contextual factors, such as the advent of complex social issues or increasing public demand for accountability and collaboration, as influencing many nonprofit organizations' decisions to collaborate with other nonprofit organizations. In addition, they discussed some motivational factors for a cross-sector collaboration, such as a nonprofit-business partnership: (1) diversification of funding sources rather than excessively depending on public agencies or foundations, (2) public exposure and

communication that help nonprofit organizations to reach business circles and new partners, (3) knowledge transfer and acquisition of advanced management skills, and (4) exchange and enrichment of organizational values and culture.

Sowa (2009) examined nonprofit organizations' decisions to collaborate. Through qualitative and quantitative data analyses on 20 interagency collaborations in the field of early care and education, the study found that multiple nonprofit organizations form collaborative networks for two common reasons: to improve service quality and to secure organizational sustainability (Sowa, 2009). With respect to the quality of service, it is found that "institutional and resource pressures lead organizations to examine their services to determine existing gaps in the services that could be closed or fixed through an interagency collaboration" (Sowa, 2009, p. 1013). The study also discusses that nonprofit organizations that identify service gaps likely form collaborative networks to tackle these gaps by providing improved services together (Sowa, 2009). About the organizational sustainability motives, a number of factors that influence organizations to establish a multiple organization system were identified: (1) to avoid financial resource instability and constraint, (2) to meet increasing institutional pressure from donors to collaborate, and (3) to strengthen the organizational competitive advantage or expand the organization's influence within the community. Related to such isolation of the two substantial motives for inter-organizational collaborations, it helps to understand the impacts of the network relationships in terms of intended and unintended ones (Sowa, 2009).

Tsasis's (2009) study, *The Social Processes of Interorganizational Collaboration and Conflict in Nonprofit Organizations*, examines factors influencing multiple organizations systems by investigating 41 senior level directors and managers of selected nongovernmental organizations implementing HIV/AIDS programs in Canada. In the study, interviews with

research participants identified through a snowball sampling method were conducted, and organizational document analyses were conducted, which included: annual reports, a list of affiliated organizations, policy manuals, minutes of meetings, etc. Different from many of the scholars discussing outcomes of inter-organizational collaborations, this study focuses on social processes related to the multiple organization systems. In the study, the importance of domain consensus, goal complementarity, and shared organizational focus that promote collaborative partnership through mutual support was discussed (Tsasis, 2009). Also, it is discussed that collaborating organizations “become oriented toward aiding one another in accomplishing each other’s goals, and they do so by coordinating their actions so that they continue to exchange resources in support of their coalition” (p. 11) when all of them fully understand each organization’s goals and interests as aiding them to attain common goals.

Success Factors

The characteristics of a high-performing collaborative network of multiple organizations are the clear goals and objectives of the network, effective communication, firmly established core values and mutual expectations, and a high level of trust (Reitan, 1998). Kapucu’s (2005) study of inter-organizational coordination and interaction among a disaster response network suggests that a successful collaboration is driven by effective coordination of multiple organization systems and trust among the member organizations within the network during a national emergency response period. In the study, the dynamics of inter-organizational collaborations among the nonprofit, public, and private sectors in response to the terrorist attacks that happened on September 11, 2001 in New York were systematically investigated. Not only the major response measures taken by governmental agencies were examined, but also the interactions and supports shown among multiple organizations. With the assumption that “the

increased efficiency that would likely accrue in mitigation and response to disaster if agencies collaborate more productively” (p. 33), a case study was conducted using situation reports from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and interview data acquired from selected nonprofit managers that participated in the response event. Using UCINET’s application program that performs network examinations, the author analyzed the characteristics of the rescue network to explain patterns of a communication framework and information interchange among the involved multiple organizations. The multiple variables used in the data analysis process were: group centrality (major players), closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, flow betweenness (dynamics of inter-organizational networks), and cliques and sub-groups (groupings of organizational networks). In addition, the use of both network and complexity theories might be helpful to establish, manage, and understand inter-organizational collaboration networks (Kapucu, 2005).

According to Tsasis’s (2009) study about social processes in multiple organization systems in the nonprofit sector, the author reveals that “The majority of NGO participants in this study noted reciprocal exchanges among organizations as beneficial in that they ultimately produce an effective, estimable, and worthwhile relationship, with positive gains for all parties involved” (p. 10), and such reciprocity exists as all the member organizations in a coalition wish to benefit from each other. It is important to note that domain consensus can be attained by coordinated reciprocity, and impartiality prevents inter-organizational competition rather than effective collaboration (Tsasis, 2009). Also, social interactions and interpersonal relationships can be considered as critical success factors that foster trust, solidarity, and interdependence among cooperating organizations (Tsasis, 2009). Under such positive relationships, one organization can expect that “other organizations in the collaboration will respect its interests,

exchange reliable information, and observe norms that put collective interests ahead of organizational self-interests” (p. 15).

Threatening Factors

Despite the identified benefits of the collaboration of nonprofit-business sectors, a number of difficulties and risks exist as well, which include: a cultural gap; lack of shared values; an imbalance of power; excessive dependency on either side, etc. (Vernis et al., 2006). More specifically, Reitan (1998) pointed out that there are a number of threatening factors that human service organizations should be aware of in their efforts to better serve their client groups through the collaborative network, which are: (1) diminished responsibilities of individual organizations within a collaborative network, (2) clientele mistrust against the security of sensitive personal information shared by multiple organizations, (3) limited clientele selection of human services due to the uniformity and integration of homogeneous organizations, (4) restricted clientele access to human services caused by restrictions from the too tightly coupled network, (5) lowered human service qualities owing to less market competition, and (6) decreased innovation and heterogeneity.

In Tsasis’s (2009) study of the social process of inter-organizational collaborations in the nonprofit sector, the author identifies a few factors that cause difficulties and conflicts within collaborative networks, which include: meaningless contribution and a manipulative attitude. About meaningless contribution, many respondents expressed that any activity that is not centered on common goals (to tackle HIV/AIDS) leads to distraction and unsatisfactory outcomes within the network (Tsasis, 2009). With respect to manipulative attitudes, such tendencies most likely cause inter-organizational competition and even the end of a relationship when “NGOs perceive their goals to be threatened by the activities of other NGOs” (Tsasis,

2009, p. 11). Also, the fragile nature of a collaborative network can be a source of hostility among member organizations, which includes: “value differences, divergent goals, and personality clashes among individuals in interorganizational interactions” (Tsasis, 2009, p. 18).

Interventions for Interorganizational Development

Vernis et al. (2006) stressed the development of collaboration, trust, and innovation in nonprofit organizations as core elements of capacity building initiatives, and they suggested some ideas of how to promote collaborations among organizations, which included (1) the transformation of mindsets toward collaborative work with other organizations not only as a fundraising opportunity but also as an ultimate strategy to better serve their clients and their community, (2) fulfillment of appropriate technology and designation of personnel for better communication and administration of collaboration projects, (c) design and co-planning of required training programs related to certain co-owned projects under the cooperation of network members, and (3) support and empowerment efforts from the public sector such as government funding projects for joint initiatives that promote inter-organizational collaboration among nonprofit organizations.

However, despite organizations’ willingness to cooperate to address huge issues more effectively rather than trying to overcome them individually, it is quite daunting that only a few inter-organizational collaboration networks seem to successfully accomplish their common goals (Gulati et al., 2012). They are often hindered by factors such as unclear goals, power disparity, insufficient control, failure to arrange key roles and responsibilities between the organizations, etc. In line with these issues causing difficulties in the management of a collaborative organizational network, a reason for the organizational ineffectiveness of such alliances could also be found in the current state of organization development – being reluctant to address

organizational issues within a collaborative inter-organizational relationship (Cropper & Palmer, 2008). Notwithstanding the current insufficient contribution to the field, OD, as a field specializing in and responsible for the planned change and development of organizations, has an unequivocal capacity to strengthen the effectiveness of inter-organizational collaborations. Aimed at organizational learning and transformation and through its participatory intervention strategies, such as action research, organizational diagnosis, feedback, and analysis, OD has already been implemented by multiple organization systems to some extent (Cummings & Worley, 2009; Gray, 2008).

Similar to the fact that an individual organization has a complicated social system (Swanson & Holton, 2009), the level of complexity of an interorganizational network as a social system involving individuals, groups, and member organizations, along with other connected networks in the global context, is very high. Perceiving such a complex organizational context, scholars have introduced different organizational models dealing with both multiple players in an interorganizational network (e.g., member organizations, representative agents, HRD practitioners, etc.) and domains (e.g., both internal and external activities of IORs, etc.).

Theoretical Frameworks

Understanding why an interorganizational collaborative is formed, how it works, and what it does in society requires multiple theories (Guo & Acar, 2005), as such antecedents, processes, and outcomes of interorganizational collaboration involve a high level of complexity at all levels in a network, such as with individuals, member organizations, and the whole network system, as well as the external system, to which the network is connected. Therefore, scholars studying interorganizational collaboration adopted different theoretical perspectives, and oftentimes, many used more than one theory to explain the phenomena. For instance, Goes and

Park (1997) used resource dependence theory and an institutional perspective to examine the influences of different types of inter-organizational links on service innovations of secondary healthcare organizations, and Lawrence et al. (2002) adopted institutional theory to explore the institutional effects of an interorganizational partnership on generating *proto-institutions*. Hardy et al. (2003) employed a combination of five different theories, including strategic management, organizational learning, social constructivist theory, network theory, and political perspectives, to examine the relationship between the effect and the nature of an interorganizational collaboration. In addition, Nolte and Boenigk (2013) applied an extended theory of transaction-cost economics to an interorganizational network in their study of the 2010 Haiti earthquake response network. Kapucu (2005) used both dynamic network theory and complex adaptive systems theory in his study of the evolution of interorganizational collaboratives in response to the 2001 September 11th terror attack.

Multiple theoretical lenses are needed to understand the complex nature and dynamics of major constituents, both the visible (i.e., field activities in a disaster situation) and invisible (i.e., communications and negotiations between the key constituents) collaborative processes and the result of such interorganizational collaboratives. These significant areas can be examined according to the three key domains of an interorganizational collaboration, such as antecedents, key processes, and performance outcomes, and each of the domains is substantiated by different theoretical underpinnings (see Figure 2-1).




Figure 2-1. Theoretical underpinnings on key domains of interorganizational collaboration.

To better understand the performance dimensions of interorganizational collaboratives, it is essential to use theoretical perspectives that underpin the domain of performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboration. The two organizational performance theories used in this study were Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit balanced scorecard framework and Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997) and McHargues' (2003) learning organization performance theory. These theories are selected from among a number of different organizational theories, such as resource dependence theory, political perspectives, institutional theory, or systems theory, that are developed and examined in different contexts (e.g., business management or public administration) with different orientations (e.g., the control and management of environment and stakeholders), unlike the current study that focuses on better serving the affected population in a disaster situation.

In brief, the former theory lays a conceptual groundwork of strategic multidimensional organizational performance from a nonprofit perspective (i.e., learning and growth, internal process, customer, finance, and mission), and the latter theory substantiates the significant

distinct dimensions (i.e., financial, knowledge, and mission) of organizational performance based on empirical results across different organization types and cultural contexts.

Nonprofit Balanced Scorecard Framework

Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit balanced scorecard (BSC) framework originated from Kaplan and Norton's (1992, 1996) work on their strategic management system and performance measures, which involves four perspectives of organizational performance: *financial*, *customer*, *internal process*, and *learning and growth*. Arguing that "success for nonprofits should be measured by how effectively and efficiently they meet the needs of their constituencies," Kaplan broached a controversial point about nonprofit performance management, where most nonprofits focus solely on financial measures, similar to profit organizations (Kaplan, 2001, p. 353). What Kaplan (2001) did while he was conducting action research with nonprofit organizations was to adapt the for-profit version of BSC to the nonprofit context, add a new perspective, organizational *mission*, and promote the *mission* and *customer* perspectives at the top of the strategy map of nonprofit organizations, since the author and many nonprofit leaders believe that nonprofit organizations should serve the needs of society rather than achieving financial goals (e.g., fundraising or expense management). Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit BSC framework also provides empirical evidence of its effectiveness. In his multiyear action research of five nonprofit organizations, including an international relief organization, Kaplan (2001) found that (1) implementing the nonprofit version of the BSC, nonprofit organizations put more emphasis on *Mission* and *Customer/Donor* performance perspectives in their strategy, (2) the BSC helped nonprofit organizations shift their focus from programs and initiatives to organizational strategy and performance outcomes, and (3) the BSC helped nonprofit organizations align their strategic initiatives, departments, and employees for better performance.

Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit BSC framework successfully provides a foundational conceptualization of organizational performance involving multiple perspectives, and it keeps a balance between the perspectives. This is a significant point, as relying on a single performance perspective, such as the *Financial* perspective, can mislead a nonprofit network about its performance outcome that does not reflect other important areas such as *Customer/Donor* or *Mission* perspectives. Second, the nonprofit BSC highlights the strategic alignment of different performance perspectives toward the mission of the organization. For instance, the nonprofit BSC strategically aligns five different performance perspectives, starting from the employees' learning and communication (the *Learning & Growth* perspective) to enhancing internal work *Processes* to better satisfy multiple constituencies, which leads to the transformation of how they look to both the *Customer* and *Donor* groups, which ultimately enables the organization to fulfill its *Mission* (Kaplan, 2001). Such a strategic alignment of organization performance perspectives is not only beneficial to a nonprofit network in constructing a theoretically strong performance system, but also to apply the system to transform the network into a more strategically aligned interorganizational collaborative: (1) leaders and managers can diagnose and take clear actions when there is a gap in attaining the goal of a specific performance perspective (e.g., *Customer* and *Donor* perspective), as different performance perspectives (e.g., *Internal Process* or *Mission* perspective) are connected logically and are shown in an organizational strategy map, and (2) all member organizations in a nonprofit network and all people in a member organization can easily understand the strategic performance system if the corporate strategy cascades effectively and is communicated from the top to the bottom levels within the network.

Despite the capacity to provide multidimensional organizational performance perspectives and of strategically aligning the performance perspectives, Kaplan's (2001)

nonprofit BSC framework has several limitations. First, it lacks empirical evidence on performance measures and their alignment supported by theoretical examination and validation, as a strategic performance management system is implemented for operational improvement and the fulfillment of an organizational mission rather than for the theoretical examination of the effectiveness of the system. Second, the performance management system comprised of different performance perspectives and measures implemented in an organization is less likely to be directly applicable to another organization, because the perspectives and measures are highly situation-specific and customized, thus making it hard to compare the effectiveness of the system across organizations (Richard et al., 2009). Thus, on account of such limitations, in spite of its conceptual power, a complementary theoretical perspective, the learning organization performance theory, adds theoretical and construct validity of organizational performance dimensions and measures to the nonprofit BSC framework.

Learning Organization Performance Theory

Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997, 1996) and McHargues' (2003) learning organization performance theory successfully complements the shortcomings of the nonprofit BSC framework, embracing its notion of multidimensional organizational performance and strategic alignment of performance dimensions and measures. Additionally, the learning organizational performance theory adds profound theoretical and construct validity to organizational performance dimensions and measures. Furthermore, the theory substantiates the significant distinct dimensions (i.e., financial, knowledge, and mission) of organizational performance, based on broad empirical investigations across different organization types and cultural contexts. The conceptual fit of the learning organization performance framework with respect to the performance of interorganizational collaborations, is promising in many other ways, due to: (1)

the proven construct validity of distinct organizational performance dimensions (i.e., mission, knowledge, and financial performance) in the nonprofit context, (2) the availability of a valid and reliable measurement scale to assess the level of organizational performance, and (3) both the theoretical and practical consideration of a multilevel organizational system within the interorganizational collaborations (i.e., individual, group, member organizations, and the network).

In their study validating the construct of Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1996) learning organization model, Yang et al. (2004) defined the learning organization concept as "one that has the capacity to integrate people and structures in order to move toward continuous learning and change" (p. 34). The authors discussed some of the general assumptions of the learning organization concept. First, organizations have learning capabilities like individuals, and such capabilities are the ultimate source of sustainable organizational competitiveness in the market. Second, there is a fundamental difference between the two concepts, a learning organization and organizational learning. The former one describes an organizational learning culture that reflects aspects of continuous learning, the systems approach, and organizational transformation, and the latter one designates pooled learning experiences and processes of the people in the organization focused on acquiring new information and skills. Third, the learning organization concept should be examined at all levels of an organizational entity: individual, team, and the entire system. The authors further explained the four distinctive characteristics of Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1996) learning organization framework: (1) a clear definition of the concept, (2) comprehensive coverage on the dimensions of a learning organization across all three levels (i.e., individual, team, and organization), (3) identification of key dimensions of the construct and integration of

the dimensions into a theoretical framework, and (4) applicability to learning culture development practices with an action orientation (Yang et al., 2004).

In addition to the conceptual fit of the theory to the current study, the following construct validation studies that used Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997, 1996) learning organization performance theory support empirical evidence of the theory in explaining distinct multidimensional organizational performance. Yang et al. (2004) constructed and investigated organizational performance dimensions, such as financial and knowledge performance, "to establish a nomological network among organizational performance and the dimensions of a learning organization" (p. 37). The reliability estimates (coefficient alpha) of the two performance outcome measures were .74 and .77 respectively, based on 836 study participants' responses from various organizations. In addition, the two-factor model was confirmed with moderate level model fit indices: a goodness-fit-index (GFI= .91), root mean square effort of approximation (RMSEA= .11), and comparative fit index (CFI= .88). The factor structure of organizational performance has shown its validity in a more recent study, too. Kim (2016) investigated the construct validity of three distinct organizational performance dimensions, adaptive, knowledge, and financial performance. The author confirmed that the three-factor model was satisfactory (RMSEA: .078, CFI: .968, and TLI: .963) for a further confirmation of the significant relationship between the dimensions of a learning organization and the performance dimensions.

Also, learning organization performance theory has been investigated and confirmed by a number of studies on multidimensional organizational performance and learning in the nonprofit context, thus proving its utility for explaining organizational performance dimensions in the

current study. What follows is a summary of select nonprofit DLOQ studies. See Table 2-2 for a summary.

Table 2-2

Correlations Between DLOQ Dimensions

Authors	Performance	CL	DI	TL	ES	EP	SC	PL	Sample, Significance, and Coefficients
McHargue (1999)	Financial	.13	.13	.14	.24	.15	.19	.18	$N = 264$ $p < .001, R^2$
	Knowledge	.19	.12	.14	.22	.14	.18	.18	
	Mission	.11	.06	.10	.09	.07	.08	.08	
Watkins et al. (2009)	Financial	.54	.51	.55	.59	.63	.66	.63	$N = 675; p < .01$
	Knowledge	.62	.56	.61	.68	.69	.69	.66	
	Mission	.51	.48	.54	.62	.60	.63	.61	
Wetherington (2010)	Financial	.47	.49	.50	.50	.51	.47	.53	$N = 131; p < .001$
	Knowledge	.51	.52	.57	.62	.63	.56	.64	
	Mission	.39	.36	.46	.45	.47	.39	.48	

Note. CL: Continuous Learning, DI: Dialogue and Inquiry, TL: Team Learning, ES: Embedded Systems, EP: Empower People, SC: System Connections, PL: Provide Leadership, FP: Financial Performance, KP: Knowledge Performance, and MP: Mission Performance

McHargue (2003) used Watkins and Marsick's (1997) *Dimensions of Learning Organization Questionnaire (DLOQ)* instrument with a new performance dimension, mission performance, developed by the author. After the rigorous task of modifying the survey items to fit a nonprofit context and the development of a new performance dimension, the author distributed the customized DLOQ survey to 617 nonprofit organizations in the U.S. meeting the sample qualifications (i.e., five or more years of service, net assets equal to or more than \$1 million, etc.). With the 44% adjusted response rate from the sample population, the author acquired data from 264 nonprofit organizations (McHargue, 2003), and the data were analyzed to examine a set of research questions which inquired about the relationships between the three

major study variables that involve: an organizational learning culture, nonprofit performance, and organizational resources. Using the multivariate regression analysis technique, the author found that all of the learning dimensions were significantly related to the performance variables (McHargue, 2003).

Watkins et al. (2009) examined the learning culture of public health agencies to determine the perceptions of a learning organization in selected public health organizations and the relationship between an organizational learning culture and organizational performance. In this study, the DLOQ was administered, and 675 participants responded with a response rate of 67.6%. Major findings from Watkins et al.'s (2009) study are reported in accordance with their two research interests: (1) the extent to which four selected local public health departments displayed seven dimensions of a learning culture and (2) the relationship between dimensions of a learning culture in a public health department setting and organizational performance variables. Specifically, they found that the mean scores of all dimensions of a learning organization and performance from the sample group were lower than the cumulative DLOQ study data set ($N=3,253$), based on a t-test ($p < .01$). They also found that all dimensions of the DLOQ were positively correlated with the three performance dimensions, such as financial, knowledge, and mission performance ($p < .01$).

Wetherington and Daniels (2013) also confirmed the relationship between Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997, 1996) seven dimensions of a learning organization and multidimensional performance measures based on a survey of 131 leaders from nonprofit organizations in the U.S. To measure the performance of these organizations, the authors used distinct performance measures, such as knowledge, financial, and mission performance (McHargue, 1999, 2003; Watkins & Kim, 2017), third-party ratings, and operational performance. It was found that all

seven dimensions of a learning organization had statistically significant positive relationships with all three conventional performance dimensions (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance).

In brief, a group of theoretical underpinnings was used in this study, the nonprofit BSC framework (Kaplan, 2001) and learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) formed the theoretical framework of this study. Based on the assumption of the multidimensionality of organizational performance at the network level, these theories helped this study to attain the purpose of better comprehending the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives.

Organizational Performance at the Network Level

Interorganizational collaboration in the nonprofit sector has been utilized as a powerful social intervention strategy to serve individuals, families, communities, countries, and the global village. In this section, drawing from select empirical studies on nonprofit interorganizational collaborations, organizational performance at the network level is discussed in terms of three distinct dimensions: mission, knowledge, and financial performance. Table 2-3 summarizes the empirical studies used in this review chapter.

Mission Performance

Changes in lives as a mission accomplishment is strong evidence of nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives' success. When organizations work together for a common mission, they establish goals and try to attain the goals through collective actions as the goal attainment is the ultimate interest and purpose of interorganizational collaboratives. Studies on nonprofit performance at the network level highlight the following key positions to corroborate the organizational mission related success of nonprofit networks: meeting organizational

objectives, timely and a quality service, overcoming the service gap, and a strengthened community.

Meeting organizational objectives. Sowa's (2009) study of cases in the early childhood education field found that organizations enter into an interagency collaboration to improve their strategic position in the market, which helps organizations achieve their missions better and also helps them gain a better reputation in the market. For instance, a child care institution entered into an interagency collaboration with the state government to both better serve the client group while strengthening its reputation of running innovative programs supported by a government agency (Sowa, 2009). Another example discussed for enhancing strategic position in the market included a child care center that initiated its partnership with a local school district to advance its service quality and recognition of its program in the market (Sowa, 2009). Thus, from an organizational perspective, enhancing one's strategic position in the market through an interagency collaboration is considered a key factor for success, and the performance measure, a strategic market position, is used to gauge the degree of success in the market.

Moshtari (2016) examined the effect of member organizations' characteristics and relationship management capability on the dyadic network's *collaborative performance*, adopting multiple theoretical perspectives on interorganizational fit and management capability. In the study, the author investigated and confirmed that both mutual trust and reciprocal commitment between two NGOs has a positive effect on collaborative performance, supported by the partial least square (PLS) path coefficients, $.364, p < .01$ and $.398, p < .01$, accordingly (Moshtari, 2016). To assess the degree of collaborative performance, the author used four items (i.e., meeting objectives, partner's satisfaction on CP, organization's satisfaction on CP, and successful association with a partner), but only the first item, "The objectives for which the

collaboration was established are being met,” directly addressed the goal attainment of the dyadic NGO partnership (Moshtari, 2016). The study also found that the effects of both resource complementarity and relationship management capability on collaborative performance are mediated by mutual trust and reciprocal commitment in NGO partnerships.

Timely and quality service. Nolte and Boenigk (2011) identified and categorized critical factors affecting the performance of such partnerships according to four dimensions: input, structure, output, and outcome. Adopting a single case design for the study, the authors conducted seven semi-structured interviews with both public and nonprofit organizations which collectively responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Regarding the output of the partnership, for which the authors had a priori conceptions (i.e., about appropriate response time and service quality), the study confirmed that all participants acknowledged the significance of both time and quality as critical performance measures. Participants collectively emphasized factors such as timeliness, quicker response, or being on time (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Participants also agreed on the importance of delivering quality service to the affected population in Haiti, mentioning the insurance of a certain quality of relief products that meet relief norms (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Additionally, the authors sought participants’ agreement on survey items around the measures of time and quality and tried to corroborate the content validity of the survey items. For instance, regarding the measure of disaster response time, the items covered two organizational output measures (i.e., reaching the disaster site on time and service given to the target population on time) and one partnership output measure (i.e., the effect of collaboration on the provision of faster service and products) (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). And, the scale items on the quality of the service highlighted “appropriateness, effectiveness, acceptance, and efficiency” (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, p. 1397).

As an extended study of their previous one on public-nonprofit partnerships during the 2010 Haiti earthquake response, Nolte and Boenigk (2013) further conceptualized the factors influencing ad hoc networks' performance and analyzed enablers, performance, and outcomes of such networks, adopting an extended theory of transaction-cost economics. Surveying 288 Haiti earthquake responders of both public and nonprofit organizations, the researchers found that most network enablers are positively related to network performance, such as timely and quality aid (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). More specifically, survey items that gauged the performance level of such an ad hoc network were: (1) "The collaboration with other organizations helped us to reach the disaster region fast," (2) "The collaboration with other organizations helped us to provide products and services fast," (3) "The collaboration with other organizations helped us to complete our projects on time," and (4) the influence of public-nonprofit partnership on its service provision, such as disaster response appropriateness, having the wanted effect, service acceptance, maintaining the quality, and efficiency (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013, p. 168). Based on the study's partial least square regression analysis using a structural equation model, statistically significant path coefficients of the network enabler constructs on the network output construct (i.e., network performance) were: *task coordination* (.18, $p < .05$), *mutuality* (.29, $p < .001$), *collaboration experience* (.18, $p < .05$), and *openness to collaborate* (.20, $p < .01$), also identifying that the effect of several constructs, such as *communication* and *relational norms*, on network performance was insignificant (Nolte & Boenigk, 2013).

Bealt et al. (2016) identified *service delivery speed* and *service quality* as a performance measure of a partnership of humanitarian organizations and logistics service providers, as they identified *cost management* as a financial performance measure based on interviews with the study participants for their study. Bealt and his colleagues (2016) found the two performance

measures when asking their study participants about strategies and techniques they use as logistics service providers to measure the performance of a disaster response. Since the two measures deal with the critical service to be delivered to the affected population in a disaster in a timely and a quality manner, they signify the fulfilment of a mission of a humanitarian network.

Overcoming the service gap. Interorganizational collaboratives aim to address the gap in the service for their client group in a situation where a single organization can hardly undertake such a mission. To examine the determinants, arrangements, and outcomes of interorganizational collaboration among local healthcare NGOs in Pakistan, Gulzar and Henry (2005) conducted qualitative interviews with 51 participants from three NGO dyads. The study found that the client level outcomes of IOC were the availability and use of health services and clients' participation in individual development programs as individual (or client) outcomes of NGO partnerships (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). For instance, the study described a program of female skill training and income generation in a local community initiated by an NGO partnership, where the partnership monitored the participation, continued use of the skills learned from the program, and the quality of the program as outcome measurements (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). Another example of improved service access in the study concerned the effect of a healthcare professional training program offered by another NGO partnership, which enhanced the overall health service quality and the practice of patient referrals to a partnering health service provider (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). The last case of client level outcomes showed that there was increased use of birth control measures in a local community through a reproductive health care program where there was no community medical center in the region (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). All these examples in the study suggest that an effective NGO partnership, a collaborative dyadic relationship, pursues improved service access and availability to the

customer (or client) group and measures the level of service access and the outcomes of the service related to the mission and performance of the partnership. One limitation of the performance outcome measure, clients' access to service, is the condition of the study of a dyadic partnership where a relatively low level of complexity of collaboration, compared to a collaborative network of three or more parties, is involved.

Sowa (2009) aimed at understanding the perceived benefits of nonprofit organizations joined in an interagency collaboration. Based on the assumption that achieving program-specific goals (i.e., serving both parents and children) is a signal of the effectiveness of a nonprofit organization, the study found that nonprofit collaboratives overcome a service gap through improved service technology, facing institutional and resource pressures (Sowa, 2009). Regarding the improved service that helped agencies overcome the service gap in the parent client group, the agencies who entered into collaboration with other agencies, sharing institutional resources, were able to extend their service periods from part-day and part-year into full-day and full-year to better serve the parents. Also, agencies that were experiencing education quality issues overcame the issue through efforts such as hiring better qualified teachers and adopting new curricula, and other agencies improved the depth of their services by acquiring government support (e.g., health service) through collaboration with other agencies (Sowa, 2009). Although the study intended to identify the benefits of interagency collaboration, the study not only found the perceived benefits of joining such a collaboration, but it also substantiated the significance of the performance outcomes of the collaboration, overcoming the service gap, in the cases of the agencies' efforts to provide better service to the client groups.

Varda and Retrum (2015) conducted a network study of 98 state or local public health project networks to identify factors affecting the success of interorganizational collaboratives in

the public health sector. The study found that the perceived success of the public health project networks was directly related to the higher values of trust ($r = .66, p < .001$), mutual recognition among member organizations ($r = .25, p < .01$), number of resource types ($r = .34, p < .001$), and the degree of agreement on and the number of reported outcomes ($r = .24, p < .02$), based on responses from 1,098 public health organizations. In addition, participants in the study reported “more education, policy change, and improved services” as system-level change outcomes when they were asked to indicate their selections on a list of outcome measures (Varda & Retrum, 2015, p. 642).

Strengthened community. Another outcome of an interorganizational humanitarian collaboration related to mission achievement is the increased capacity and resilience of the local community that experienced a disaster and received aid and services from such a collaborative. Nolte and Boenigk (2011) found that all participants who were the representatives of the disaster response network considered community strengthening as an important outcome of the work of a humanitarian network. For instance, the participants highlighted the importance of community projects, such as shelter construction or cooperation, among aid networks and the local community population, as well as long-term outcomes such as “healthy development, social stability, and the protection of the community from disaster, and learning” (p. 1397). These community level outcome measures can guide humanitarian networks to the fulfillment of their mission and to a more effective assessment of their mission performance.

Additional evidence of a strengthened community as a performance outcome of interorganizational collaboration is found in cases of school networking in Texas. Ryu and Johansen (2017) found that school districts where superintendents had active engagement with partnering superintendents (i.e., three or more networking activities) were less likely to be

affected by a natural disaster, thus better sustaining student learning outcomes. More specifically, the authors found that there was a statistically significant moderation effect between collaborative networking and experience with the large shock of the 2005 hurricane, Rita, showing the statistically significant regression coefficient: 2.121, $p < .01$ (Ryu & Johansen, 2017). Despite the limitations that the context of the study, school districts, and the client outcome, students' academic achievement scores (i.e., Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills), are too situation-specific to be simply applied to other organizational settings, the study empirically informs interorganizational collaboratives regarding how the effect of a drastic external environmental shock on organizational performance is influenced by partnership or networking, thus substantiating the significance of interorganizational collaboration. Also, the study gives insight to community strengthening as an organizational performance outcome measure, which relates to several derivative measures, such as the client group's performance (e.g., academic performance), disaster preparedness level, or disaster resilience at the community level.

Knowledge Performance

The literature on nonprofit network performance on knowledge outcomes (i.e., organizational learning, innovation, and adaptiveness) underlines the following key positions as substantiating organizational success: service innovation, new knowledge creation, continuous organizational learning, and more adaptive disaster response.

Service innovation. Goes and Park (1997) examined the influences of different types of interorganizational links on service innovations of secondary healthcare organizations. The researchers found that acute care hospitals that develop a collaborative hospital network (i.e., *structural link*), utilize associational environments (i.e., *institutional link*), and exchange

organizational resources (i.e., *resource link*) are more likely to nurture their *service innovations* on medical technology, design, or service delivery. And, the standardized regression coefficients of four interorganizational links (i.e., structural, administrative, institutional, and resource links) on innovation were: .09, -.04, .05, .08 respectively, based on the second model of the study (Goes & Park, 1997). Based on an expert group's ratings on innovative healthcare services, Goes and Park (1997) identified 15 innovative hospital services using two categories, technical innovations (e.g., laser surgery or magnetic resonance imaging) and administrative innovations (e.g., home nursing or hospice care), and a measured innovation level using a diffusion-based approach, which takes into consideration the market-wide innovativeness level.

New knowledge creation. As a result of interorganizational collaborations, highly effective humanitarian networks create new knowledge and practices within the network and disseminate the new knowledge and practice on a broader scale. To understand the institutional effects of interorganizational collaboration, Lawrence et al. (2002) conducted a qualitative study interviewing managers, employees, and board members of an international NGO branch in Palestine. In their study that used a multi-case study design and a three-staged analysis of the data (i.e., collaboration summary, data coding, and pattern analysis of the relationship among categories), Lawrence et al. (2002) found that interorganizational collaborations tend to create *proto-institutions* (e.g., new practices, policies, technologies, and rules) when partnering organizations have high levels of involvement (i.e., interaction, arrangements for partnership, and information flow among a dyadic partnership) and embeddedness (i.e., out-of-network interactions, arrangements for representation, and information flow among more than three partnering organizations). For instance, the collaborative relationship between Mère et Enfant, the research site and an international NGO working for child nutrition, with the University of

Oslo's School of Nutrition involved various joint activities, such as co-training and joint research projects, and their partnership both rich in involvement and embeddedness criteria resulted in the creation of new proto-institutions (e.g., a new intermediary consultation process involving multiple organizations, new nutritional policies, and a new structure for governance) and diffusion of the new proto-institutions among collaborating organizations (Lawrence et al., 2002). Such *proto-institutions*, "practices, technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely institutionalized," are generated and developed in the process of interorganizational collaborations (Lawrence et al., 2002, p. 283). Although the immediate effect of the generation and development of *proto-institutions* was limited to a single organization, the Mère et Enfant's partnership, where the organization gained larger legitimacy of its expertise in the field due to the generation and diffusion of the *proto-institutions* (Lawrence et al., 2002), substantiates the need for interorganizational collaboratives to create new knowledge (e.g., *proto-institutions*) and set clear goals of the significant performance measure.

Continuous organizational learning. Learning at the network level, or *network learning*, is another concept of a network performance (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). As member organizations in a network collaborate and perform collectively, they acquire knowledge from each other (Austin, 2000; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013). Austin (2000) conceptualized and confirmed the framework of a cross-sector collaboration, employing theories of resource dependence, social exchange, and strategic collaboration. After discussing the major findings of the study on cross-sector partnership frameworks (i.e., collaboration continuum evolution and collaborative value construct process), the study also highlights *continual learning* as a driver of a cross-sector partnership (Austin, 2000) along with other driving factors such as the strategic

alignment of mission and values, interpersonal relationships, and mutual benefit and vision. More specifically in the study, *continual learning* as an alliance driver, a force “that provide[s] the primary power for strategic cross-sector collaboration,” occurs among partners in the process of a highly collaborative relationship, fueled by a desired outcome acquired from such interorganizational learning activities (Austin, 2000, p. 71). For instance, in the case of the City Year-Timberland partnership, who recognized their alliance as a “learning laboratory,” the two collaborating organizations explored and tried new partnership activities in their efforts to understand each other through a continuous willingness and from a long-term perspective, thus reducing the risk of the short-term operational failure of their partnership (Austin, 2000, p. 85). Continual learning (or continuous learning in other studies, e.g., Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1996), even though it was considered an alliance driver that determined the performance and dynamics of an interorganizational collaboration in the study (Austin, 2000), can also be considered a measure of the alliance’s performance from the viewpoint of the procedural effectiveness of a partnership, where two organizations acquire new knowledge about each other and the market environment changes to nurture their relationship and to enhance the operational excellence of the partnership. Therefore, managing and evaluating the engagement level and outcomes of such continual learning activities, as an organizational performance measure, becomes an important task for partnering organizations.

Similar to Austin’s (2000) finding of *continual learning* in cross-sector collaboration cases, it is also found that there is additional evidence on the importance of continuous learning among collaborating organizations as an organizational outcome (Provan et al., 2007). Nolte and Boenigk (2011) found that member organizations create new knowledge and adapt the new knowledge to themselves while they collaborate with other organizations in a network. In the

study, a representative of a member organization in the network said, “Organizations will follow different strategies ... [and] processes to address the disaster. You can see how the others do it. There are positive things everywhere and you can think about adapting it for your own organization” (p. 1398).

More adaptive disaster response. A more adaptive disaster response enabled the disaster response network to save more lives at the beginning of the response throughout the entire collaborative response process, and such an adaptive capability was developed through planning and training on disaster preparedness done after the Trade Center explosion, which occurred in 1993. Kapucu (2005) conducted a mixed-methods study to examine interorganizational coordination and interactions that progressed during the disaster response period related to the World Trade Center terror attack, which occurred in 2001. In the study, Kapucu (2005) mathematically investigated the emergency response network’s patterns using different social network analysis measures: group centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, flow betweenness, and cliques and sub-groups. While the study found that organizations with similarities interacted primarily with each other (i.e., nonprofit organizations interacting with another nonprofit organizations), it also found that disaster planning and training enhanced the capacity of organizations, thus responding to the disaster in an adaptive way (Kapucu, 2005). As Watkins and Kim (2017) discussed that system-level organizational learning (i.e., organizational system connection to the environmental factors) significantly affects the level of organizational performance, particularly in knowledge creation and innovation areas, the significant learning experience (i.e., planning and training) of the tenants and organizations at the World Trade Center on disaster response effectively helped them respond more adaptively in a chaotic situation, thus substantiating learning organization performance theory. Therefore, for

interorganizational collaboratives, particularly in disaster response efforts, it is critical to manage adaptive performance well, as an intangible organizational performance dimension (Watkins & Kim, 2017), since it fosters conditions absolutely indispensable to the success of their humanitarian mission.

Financial Performance

Unlike for-profit organizations, a majority of nonprofit organizations consider financial performance, achieved by acquiring financial resources or managing expenses with accountability, as an enabling factor of organizational success, rather than putting it as the ultimate organizational goal (Kaplan, 2001). To attain and sustain the “state of financial health and resources available for growth” (Watkins et al., 2009, p. 70) and to provide financial assistance to the affected population in a disaster situation (Bealt et al., 2016), nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives strive to acquire financial resources (Goes & Park, 1997; Sowa, 2009) and to increase operational efficiency (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Kapucu, 2005; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). Studies on nonprofit performance at the network level pay attention to the following key positions as upholding the financial performance of interorganizational collaboratives: critical resource acquisition, better cost-management, organizational survival, and increased productivity.

Critical resource acquisition. Collaborating organizations in a network gain access to critical resources, thus increasing their influence on the market. To examine the relationship between the effect and the nature of an interorganizational collaboration, Hardy et al. (2003) conducted a qualitative study that adopted a comparative multi-case study design and using multiple theories, such as strategic management, organizational learning, social constructivist theory, network theory, and political perspectives. Based on their interviews with managers,

employees, and board members at an international NGO, the researchers found that the increased involvement of partnering organizations is associated with high strategic effects (i.e., acquired critical resources) (Hardy et al., 2003). Hardy et al. (2003) distinguished the significance of distinctive resources from non-distinctive resources, such as funds or service materials, as the distinctive resources enabled collaborating partners to enhance their organizational capacity to carry on their missions. The researchers' view on critical resource acquisition as a strategic effect is significant and unique, because they see the connection between resource acquisition and the development of organizational capacity, which enables an organization or partnership to carry on its mission more effectively (Hardy et al., 2003); such a viewpoint helps us understand the importance of acquiring organizational resources, regardless of its form of financial or non-financial resources, in relation to organizational performance. The "pooling and transfer of resources of all kinds" for a higher organizational competitive advantage (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 325) is these authors' review of financial performance.

In addition to the strategic effect of interorganizational collaborations being considered as a financial performance in the current discussion, the political effect of an organization in a partnership is also related to gaining critical resources for the operation of a partnership. When there is high embeddedness in a partnership (i.e., interactions with external parties, representation of the partnership, and information flows in multi-directions), Hardy et al. (2003) found that the enhanced organizational influence of *Mère et Enfant* on other organizations (i.e., political effect) increased and enabled the organization to gain access to external parties, such as new donors and community health service providers, which resulted in gaining organizational resources and expertise. Hardy et al. (2003) also highlighted the significance of maintaining such

external relationships regardless of the existence of an intermediary organization, which connected Mère et Enfant to third-party agencies.

Better cost-management. Bealt et al. (2016) identified *cost management* as a performance measure of such partnerships. To identify the performance measure, the researchers asked their study participants to evaluate the partnership process about techniques they use to measure the performance of the partnership, and the participants responded that they use techniques, such as *cost management*, as a financial measure, along with *order lead time* or *service error* or *return monitoring*, which can be considered process evaluation measures (Bealt et al., 2016). The appropriateness of using the measure, cost management, in the practice of interorganizational collaboratives relates to the efficient use of organizational resources in a humanitarian partnership. However, the measure lacks both theoretical and practical evidence, since the term, *cost-management*, was simply mentioned by a participant in the study without further description of the technique he or she used to assess the performance of the partnership.

Organizational survival. Nonprofit organizations and partnerships often compete with others in the marketplace to acquire necessary financial resources and to attract clients, which play a key role in organizational survival. Sowa (2009) examined the motivations of nonprofit organizations entering into a partnership and found that organizations do so to ensure the sustainability of their services to the client group and institutional operation, for the continued survival of the organization. The study found that preschool institutions in the states of New York and Virginia entered into interagency collaborations due to an urgent need to seek external funding sources, resulting from instability in their resource base while serving low income families in the region (Sowa, 2009). In one case, encountering a cease in government funding, a small early childhood education center sought another external grant, and when it found a

different revenue source, the center could continue its service to the client group, low-income and at-risk families. In these examples, the continuation of the institutions' services and operations was only possible as long as the institutions survived in the marketplace through the acquisition of necessary resources, mostly through an interagency collaboration. Assuming that there is no organization that has unlimited resources and control over its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Sowa, 2009), interorganizational collaboratives, facing the same challenge, try to continue their services to their target population collectively. Although organizational survival is understood as a strong motivation for interagency collaboration in Sowa's (2009) study, it can also be considered a significant organizational performance measure, in accordance with different scholars who underlined the significance of the survival of a nonprofit network as an organizational performance or outcome (e.g., Hardy et al., 2003; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Tsisis, 2009).

Increased productivity. Gulzar and Henry (2005) identified *productivity* as an outcome at both the organizational and interorganizational level. Additionally, the study found that an NGO dyad with a more formalized decision making process showed higher *productivity* and overall performance compared to ones with a low level of formalization (Gulzar & Henry, 2005). Although the organizational performance measure, productivity, was identified in the study, it lacks further explanation or exemplification. While requiring extra information on the measure, particularly in the study, it is still a significant financial performance measure that is widely applicable in various types of interorganizational collaborations, since the *productivity* measure is used to assess the operational efficiency of such NGO dyads or larger interorganizational collaborations in their work of delivering service to affected populations in the field, minimizing

the use of internal resources while maintaining or maximizing the level of service delivery output.

Table 2-3

Select Empirical Research on Nonprofit Performance at the Network Level

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Goes and Park (1997) Interorganizational links and innovation: The case of hospital services	To examine the influences of different types of inter-organizational links on service innovations of secondary healthcare organizations	388 acute-care hospitals in CA (1981-1990)	Resource dependence theory and an institutional perspective	Mixed Methods (Interview, observation, survey, and document analyses; multiple regression analysis)	Standardized regression coefficients of four interorganizational links (i.e., <i>structural, administrative, institutional, and resource links</i>) on innovation: .09, -.04, .05, .08 respectively (model #2) Acute care hospitals that develop a collaborative hospital network (i.e., structural link), utilize associational environments (i.e., institutional link), and exchange organizational resources (i.e., resource link) are more likely to nurture their service innovations in the areas of medical technology, design, or service delivery.
Austin (2000) Strategic collaboration between nonprofits and businesses	To conceptualize and confirm the framework of a cross-sector collaboration	15 nonprofit-business alliances	Theories of resource dependence, social exchange, and strategic collaboration	Qualitative (Five initial case studies followed by ten corroborative case studies; structured interviews)	A collaboration continuum evolves through three phases: philanthropic, transactional, and integrative. A collaborative value construct process involves value- definition, creation, balance, and renewal. Alliance drivers include the strategic alignment of mission and values, interpersonal relationships, mutual benefit and vision, and continuous learning. Alliance enablers include focused intention, effective and open communication, support systems and incentives, and reciprocal accountability.

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Lawrence et al. (2002) Institutional effects of interorganizational collaboration: The emergence of proto-institutions	To explore “the institutional effects of collaboration, focusing on the immediate local effects of individual collaborations that may form the basis for broader, longer-term, field-level change” (p. 281)	Indefinite number of interviewees (managers, employees, and board members at an international NGO, representatives from collaborating agencies, etc.)	Institutional theory	Qualitative (Comparative multi-case study design; 3-staged analysis: collaboration summaries-data coding-pattern analysis of the relationship among categories)	The three dimensions of characteristics of interorganizational collaborations are: interactions (depth and scope), structures (donation, partnership, and representation), and information flow (unidirectional, bidirectional, and multidirectional), and the two new aggregate dimensions (involvement and embeddedness) can be substituted for the previous dimensions. “Collaborations that have high levels of involvement among partners and that are highly embedded in their institutional field will be positively associated with the creation of new proto-institutions” (p. 288).
Hardy et al. (2003) Resources, knowledge and influence: The organizational effects of interorganizational collaboration (An extension of Lawrence et al., 2002)	To examine the relationship between the effect and the nature of an interorganizational collaboration	Indefinite number of interviewees (managers, employees, and board members at an international NGO, representatives from collaborating agencies, etc.)	Strategic management, organizational learning, social constructivist theory, network theory, and political perspectives	Qualitative (A comparative multi-case study design; 3-staged analysis: collaboration summaries-data coding-pattern analysis of the relationship among the categories)	The high involvement of partnering organizations is associated with high strategic effects (i.e., acquired critical resources and developed organizational capacity to provide better competitive advantage to the organization). When there are both high levels of involvement and high levels of embeddedness in a partnership, high knowledge creation occurs (e.g., new knowledge influencing the nutrition policy or new knowledge on local personnel training). The influence of an organization increases when there is high embeddedness in a partnership (e.g., access to new donors or community health service providers).

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Gulzar and Henry (2005) Interorganizational collaboration for health care between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Pakistan	“To describe collaboration between three pairs of NGOs providing community-based health services to women in Karachi” (p. 1930)	51 participants from three NGO dyads	(Unspecified)	Qualitative (Descriptive research design; interview, observation, and record review guides)	Client level outcomes of the IOC were identified as the availability and use of health services and participation in individual development programs. Organizational and network level outcomes of the IOC were organization development, worthwhileness, productivity, reciprocity, and staff satisfaction.
Kapucu (2005) Interorganizational coordination in dynamic context: Networks in emergency response	To examine “the interactions among organizations that evolved in response to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City” (p. 34).	43 participants (staff, managers, and director of disaster response organizations)	Dynamic network theory, Complex adaptive systems theory	Mixed Methods (Case study, descriptive research design; interview, document, social network analyses)	Organizations with similarity interacted primarily with each other (i.e., nonprofit organizations interacting with other nonprofit organizations). The emergency response networks’ patterns were examined mathematically using different social network analysis measures: group centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, flow betweenness, and cliques and sub-groups. Disaster planning and training enhanced the capacity of organizations; thus, they responded to the disaster in an adaptive way.

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Sowa (2009) The collaboration decision in nonprofit organizations: Views from the front line	To understand the perceived benefits of nonprofit organizations joining in an interagency collaboration	20 interagency collaboration cases in the early childhood education field	Theories of resource dependence, institutional, and strategic management	Mixed Methods (Interview, survey, observation, client assessment, and document analyses)	Facing institutional and resource pressures, nonprofit collaboratives overcome service gaps through improved service technology. Organizational motivations are: “the desire to prolong organizational survival, the need to achieve institutional legitimacy, and the desire to improve the strategic position of organizations within their organizational field” (p. 1014).
Nolte and Boenigk (2011) Public-nonprofit partnership performance in a disaster context: The case of Haiti	“To identify the factors that require evaluation in determining whether public–nonprofit partnerships have performed well during their disaster response operations” (p. 1386)	Seven representative s of a Haiti disaster response network (four public and three nonprofit organizations)	Theories of voluntary failure, third-party government, interorganizational networks, and network governance	Qualitative (A single case design: interview)	Input: communication, trust, experience, and mutuality Structure: lead organization, administrative organization, and shared governance Output: time (i.e., faster response), quality (appropriateness and desired effect), and cost Outcome: community (strengthening, development, and protection), network (growth and service range increase), and organization actor (new knowledge, risk diffusion, and survival) A set of survey items measuring public-nonprofit partnership outputs and outcomes was developed.

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Nolte and Boenigk (2013) A study of ad hoc network performance on disaster response	To identify factors influencing ad hoc networks' performance and to analyze enablers, performance, and outcomes of such networks	288 Haiti earthquake responders of both public and nonprofit organizations	Theory of interorganizational networks [an extended theory of transaction-cost economics theory (Park, 1996)]	Quantitative (Survey; Partial Least Square modeling to SEM)	Most network enablers are positively related to the network performance (i.e., timely and quality aid). Path coefficients of the network enabler constructs on the network output construct (i.e., network performance) are: communication ($-.01$), task coordination ($.18, p < .05$), mutuality ($.29, p < .001$), relational norms ($.03$), collaboration experience ($.18, p < .05$), and openness to collaborate ($.20, p < .01$). The network output (i.e., network performance) positively affects the network outcome (i.e., network growth, increased network influence and reduced service duplication) (path coefficient = $.59, p < .001$) and the organization actor outcome (i.e., legitimacy to donors; knowledge and resource acquisition) (path coefficient = $.59, p < .001$).
Varda and Retrum (2015) Collaborative performance as a function of network members' perceptions of success	To identify factors affecting the success of interorganizational collaboratives in the public health sector	98 state or local public health project networks (responses from 1,098 public health organizations)	Systems theory	Quantitative (Network survey; bivariate correlation, stepwise regression)	Trust ($r = .66, p < .001$), value ($r = .25, p < .01$), total resources ($r = .34, p < .001$), and total outcomes reported ($r = .24, p < .02$) had direct relationships with perceived success (i.e., more education programs, policy change, and service improvement, as system-level changes). The contribution of trust ($\beta = .285, p < .001$) and resources ($\beta = .264, p < .001$) was significant to the network's success (<i>Adjusted R</i> ² = $.18, p < .001$). A higher resource level ($\beta = .229, p < .05$) and higher diversity level ($\beta = .438, p < .001$) predicted a higher level of disagreement on success (<i>Adjusted R</i> ² = $.17, p < .001$).

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Bealt et al. (2016) Collaborative relationships between logistics service providers and humanitarian organizations during disaster relief operations	To understand motivations and barriers in the relationship between humanitarian organizations (HOs) and logistics service providers (LSP)	85 survey participants from HOs, LSPs (50% response rate), and academics; 2 interviewees from a HO and a LSP; 28 second survey participants	(Unspecified)	Mixed Methods (Survey, interviews; descriptive statistics, t-test, qualitative analysis)	<p>Top three factors of LSPs collaborating with HOs are: strategic decisions, corporate social responsibility, and publicity ($t(27) = 3.576, p < .01, test\ value = 3.0$).</p> <p>Barriers of successful LSP-HO collaborations are: cost of logistics ($t(27) = 1.362, p < .1, test\ value = 3.0$), HOs' unstructured work process, and LSP employees' limited engagement and preparedness to collaborate.</p> <p>66% of the participants indicated that they did not utilize a performance evaluation system in their humanitarian responses.</p> <p>Some performance measures used by the participants included: delivery speed, service quality, and cost-management.</p>
Moshtari (2016) Inter-organizational fit, relationship management capability, and collaborative performance within a humanitarian setting	To examine the effect of member organizations' characteristics and relationship management capability on the network's performance	191 directors and managers from international NGOs in a dyadic relationship (13% response rate)	Perspectives of interorganizational fit and relationship management capability	Quantitative (Survey; Partial Least Square [PLS] methods in hypotheses testing, effect size analysis, and power analysis)	<p>The PLS path coefficients (standardized beta coefficients of Ordinary Least Squares) of antecedent factors on dependent variables are: mutual trust (MT) on collaborative performance (CP: i.e., meeting objectives, partner's satisfaction on CP, organization's satisfaction on CP, and successful association with a partner) ($.364, p < .01$); reciprocal commitment (ReC) on CP, ($.398, p < .01$); resource complementarity (RC) on mutual trust (MT), ($.191, p < .01$); RC on ReC, ($.199, p < .01$); relationship management capability (RMC) on MT, ($.403, p < .01$); and RMC on ReC, ($.351, p < .01$).</p> <p>Compatibility of collaborating organizations in a dyad network (i.e., mission and values) does not affect MT or RC in relation to the success of the network.</p>

Study	Study Purpose	Participants	Theoretical Framework	Methodology/ Method(s)	Findings
Bealt et al. (2016) Collaborative relationships between logistics service providers and humanitarian organizations during disaster relief operations	To understand motivations and barriers in the relationship between humanitarian organizations (HOs) and logistics service providers (LSP)	85 survey participants from HOs, LSPs (50% response rate), and academics; 2 interviewees from a HO and a LSP; 28 second survey participants	(Unspecified)	Mixed Methods (Survey, interviews; descriptive statistics, t-test, qualitative analysis)	<p>Top three factors of LSPs collaborating with HOs are: strategic decisions, corporate social responsibility, and publicity ($t(27) = 3.576, p < .01, test\ value = 3.0$).</p> <p>Barriers of successful LSP-HO collaborations are: cost of logistics ($t(27) = 1.362, p < .1, test\ value = 3.0$), HOs' unstructured work process, and LSP employees' limited engagement and preparedness to collaborate.</p> <p>66% of the participants indicated that they did not utilize a performance evaluation system in their humanitarian responses.</p> <p>Some performance measures used by the participants included: delivery speed, service quality, and cost-management.</p>
Ryu and Johansen (2017) Collaborative networking, environmental shocks, and organizational performance: Evidence from hurricane Rita	"To examine how collaborative networking with the purpose of preparing for a natural disaster moderates the negative impact of Hurricane Rita on school performance in Texas" (p. 208)	74 superintendents of school districts in the state of Texas (59% response rate)	Organizational theory, resource dependence theory	Quantitative (Network survey; Two-stage least-squares regression analysis)	<p>There is a statistically significant moderation effect between collaborative networking and experience with a large shock. (Regression coefficient: 2.121, $p < .01$)</p> <p>"Districts that did not engage in collaborative networking in preparation for an emergency experienced a decrease in their TAKS [Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills] pass rate by 4.4% when they experienced a large shock" (p. 218)</p> <p>"Above-average collaborative networking (i.e., values that are at least one standard deviation above the mean) can buffer the organization from the effects of a large shock" (p. 218).</p>

Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to review the current literature regarding collaborative interorganizational networks and their performance. The chapter was divided into four major sections. First, a summary of relevant definitions of interorganizational collaboration was provided to deepen the understanding of the topic. Second, key influencing factors of interorganizational collaboration, such as antecedents, success factors, threatening factors, and interorganizational development were reviewed. Third, pertinent theories (i.e., the nonprofit BSC framework and learning organization performance theory) that underlie the topic were introduced. Fourth, the topic of organizational performance at the network level was discussed in three distinct dimensions, mission, knowledge, and financial performance, drawing from select empirical studies of nonprofit interorganizational collaborations.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

In accordance with Creswell's (2014) criterion of selecting a research methodology that acknowledges "the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation" (p. 4), a qualitative research approach ensured the best means of addressing the gap in the literature. What follows in this chapter are detailed descriptions of qualitative methodology and methods I employed to conduct the study, adopting Creswell's (2014) qualitative research procedures using a constructivist perspective which include: the design and the philosophical assumptions of the study, participants, data collection procedures, data analysis procedures, trustworthiness, and the researcher's subjectivity. The chapter concludes with the limitations of the study.

Design of the Study

Denzin and Lincoln (1994) wrote, "all research is interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied" (p. 13). Calling such

an interpretive paradigm a worldview, Creswell (2014) defined it as “a general philosophical orientation about the world and the nature of research that a researcher brings to a study” (p. 6). With an understanding that such a paradigm incorporates three elements (i.e., ontology, epistemology, and methodology, (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998); I describe these elements related to this study.

Ontology

The discussion of ontology as an element of the research paradigm pertains to the researchers’ beliefs about “the nature of reality”(Denzin & Lincoln, 1998, p. 185) or “the nature of the social world and what can be known about it” (Snape & Spencer, 2003, p. 1). Among a number of ontological stances, such as realism, materialism, and idealism, this study takes relativism, a form of idealism, as its ontological foundation with an acknowledgement that we can describe reality through people’s perceptions and their own meanings constructed socially (Snape & Spencer, 2003). According to a relativist’s belief, “realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature..., and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 206). And, such a belief leads and warrants constructivist researchers to probe people’s both personally and socially constructed meanings on their own experiences through qualitative approaches. Trying to answer several ontological questions, such as “how things really are” and “how things really work” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 201), regarding the topic of this study, I, as a qualitative researcher, probed the issues of the existence of an interorganizational collaboration in the humanitarian sector and the efforts of such networks as actual actions of the existing social entity. Based on such an ontological acknowledgment of a reality as a context and a subject of this study, I shift to the

next logical step of epistemological consideration for which a constructivist researcher examines the meanings of the reality as “created, negotiated, sustained, and modified within a specific context of human action” (Schwandt, 1998, p. 225).

Epistemology

One’s belief about epistemology – the relationship between a researcher and knowledge – determines “how the qualitative researcher sees the world and acts in it” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 13). Accepting the belief that how we understand the world is not a pure recognition of reality but a constructed framework offers us a lens to better understand “what people perceive and believe is shaped by their assumptions and prior experiences as well as by the reality that they interact with” (Maxwell, 2013, p. 43), and it guides a researcher to probe people’s experiences and assumptions on a specific but complex reality (Maxwell, 2013). Adopting a constructivist framework, this study aims to understand how study participants construct meaning of effective performance outcomes of humanitarian networks based on their own experiences.

Similarly, but more specifically, social constructivists suppose that people “seek understanding of the world in which they live and work” and “develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things” (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). Also, as such subjective meanings are constructed and negotiated as people interact with others and sociocultural contexts (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 2003), a researcher should examine these meanings using open ended interview questions and consider the cultural situations of the participants (Creswell, 2014). Perceiving the notion of participants’ subjective meanings constructed in relation to others is particularly important in this study, because it influences a researcher to think about the complex situation of a participant as a representative of a member

organization in a humanitarian network interacting with other representatives of different member organizations in the same network or many times in different networks. Without recognizing the multi-layered organizational context in which the participant lives, it is not possible for a researcher to understand the phenomenon or to carry out a research project of understanding the favorable outcomes of collaborative interorganizational relationships. In this sense, to probe participants' complex views and meanings on the topic, I mainly relied on the participants' own experiences and how they made meaning of their experiences related to the topic of the study (Creswell (2014).

Therefore, as I endeavored to better understand the effective performance outcomes of collaborative interorganizational relationships in the humanitarian sector based on research participants' critical experiences related to the study topic, I adopted a social constructivist framework as the interpretive paradigm of this study. The constructivist framework provided me with a perspective on how I construct and interpret the meaning of interorganizational settings, key stakeholders, performance outcomes at the network level, in the humanitarian sector, based on the study of participants' critical incident stories.

Methodology

Denzin and Lincoln (1994) explained the significance of a research design:

A research design describes a flexible set of guidelines that connects theoretical paradigms to strategies of inquiry and methods for collecting empirical material. A research design situates researchers in the empirical world and connects them to specific sites, persons, groups, institutions, and bodies of relevant interpretive material, including documents and archives. (p. 14)

For one who seeks to understand the complex phenomena of both the conceptual and existential complexity of an interorganizational collaboration, a qualitative research approach provides a perspective and a means, as the approach “crosscuts disciplines, fields, and subject matter” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 1), lays stress on “processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 4), helps a researcher “get closer to the actor’s perspective through detailed interviewing” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 5), and makes an inquiry “endlessly creative and interpretive” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 14), thus effectively assisting the inquirer to gain the necessary knowledge. Furthermore, regarding the unique characteristics and value of conducting a qualitative study, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) explain:

Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Such researchers emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning.” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 4)

In brief, I chose a qualitative approach as a research methodology as such an approach is particularly useful for comprehending and examining “the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (Creswell, 2014, p. 4). Within an exploratory qualitative research approach based on constructivism, I conducted a qualitative critical incident study which used critical incident interviews to gain a deep understanding of participants’ specific experiences (deMarrais, 2004), within interorganizational collaboratives.

Participants

The target population for this study was a group of people with extensive experience (i.e., five or more years) with interorganizational humanitarian networks. For instance, such a network

refers to a system of interorganizational collaboration among different humanitarian organizations united to accomplish their common mission, sharing organizational resources and expertise in response to global issues impacting humankind. The term, humanitarian interorganizational network, also often called a humanitarian network, is identified by different names in the literature and in practice, including a cluster, project, alliance, collaboration, etc. To make an inference about the target population with respect to the focus of this study, a group of leaders and managers working at humanitarian interorganizational networks were selected as a participant group of the target population. In total, nine semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted using Flanagan's (1954) critical incident technique (CIT), and the interviews were transcribed for data analysis according to Roulston's (2010) qualitative interview process guide.

Participant Selection

Influenced by the study purpose, two criteria for the sample selection were considered prior to collecting the data (deMarrais, 2004). First, the participants should possess sufficient experience and knowledge to describe significant dimensions of humanitarian interorganizational networks' performance. Second, the participants should be able to understand the key terms in the study (e.g., humanitarian interorganizational network, organizational performance, network level operation and evaluation, etc.). The participants in the sample group met the criteria. The locations of the sample groups from different humanitarian interorganizational networks were in Geneva, Switzerland (e.g., the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent [IFRC], Child Protection Working Group, Gavi CSO Constituency, UNICEF Geneva, etc.) and in London, UK (e.g., the Humanitarian Leadership Academy).

A combination of two different participant selection strategies was used to select study participants, a blend which included both reputation-case-selection and network selection

methods (deMarrais, 2004). So that I might select and meet people complying with the selection-criteria discussed above, first, the founder and CEO of the Geneva Learning Foundation, an organization supporting the study located in Geneva, Switzerland, offered me an opportunity to contact a potential study participant group. As an international learning consultant who has collaborated with a number of individuals, organizations, and networks in the humanitarian sector, the CEO scanned his personal list of experts in the sector who had extensive experience in a context similar to that of the study and who might be interested in participating in the study. After selecting 73 experts from the list and introducing me as the principal researcher of the study, he contacted them to ask about their interest in the study and also to request that they recommend appropriate persons who might be willing to participate in the study. Following his request in late March 2016, 20 experts replied and showed their interest in the study. I sent out study recruitment emails to them with a brief summary of the study, including the study purpose, the research questions, the significance of the study, and the research participation process. During the participant recruitment process, which took place between late March and May of 2016, I started building an initial relationship with the potential participant group through communicating with them by email. Some of the potential participants gave me feedback indicating that the findings of my study would help them better understand the performance outcomes of humanitarian networks. They showed great interest in the study because of its practical relevance in terms of their roles in humanitarian networks and because of the time relevance as Ki-Moon Ban, the former UN secretary general, was about to convene the first World Humanitarian Summit where global leaders would emphasize interorganizational collaboration. For instance, a director of an international humanitarian leadership network educating people to prepare for humanitarian crises, replied to me in an email:

It's quite interesting research that is of absolute relevance to the work the Humanitarian Leadership Academy is facilitating, but more importantly to the Humanitarian Sector. Building an effective and sustainable non-profit capacity is a pressing need. In fact, most of the discussions that will be taking place in the World Humanitarian Summit, May 2016 will be on this. In addition, ensuring that such capacity is institutionalized at the very community level is another key aim that we all are keen on achieving. (Amelia, personal communication, April 1, 2016)

In addition, the CEO of a nonprofit organization promoting social change through mobile platform service, wrote:

Our theory of change is that by working in partnership with implementing organizations and by supporting and embodying a habit of collaborative learning and knowledge exchange, we can better serve our mission of supporting organizations to use inclusive technologies in their work. This is therefore very relevant for us. (Michael, personal communication, March 27, 2016)

Whenever a potential participant requested that I provide additional information about the research, I responded promptly so that he or she could feel comfortable engaging in the study. The relationship that I built with the participant group helped me schedule interviews with some level of flexibility and to get referrals to other experts in the humanitarian sector for me to meet for interviews during my visits to the UK and Switzerland. These visits were funded by the Humanitarian Leadership Academy.

Table 3-1 describes the participants' profiles and the major networks they referred to during the interviews. Although I acquired permission from all the study participants to use their actual names and the names of their workplaces in this study, to avoid potential confidentiality

issues that could harm the study's participants, pseudonyms for the interviewees are used (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014). But, the humanitarian networks' names were retained in the study to portray the scope of the participants' critical incidents better in various humanitarian disaster situations and to describe the efforts of humanitarian networks to deal with affected populations more vividly.

Table 3-1

Participant and Major Network Profiles

No	Participant	Humanitarian Network	Focus Area
1	Kian	Sudan Polio Vaccination Network	Public Health and Polio Immunization
2	Leo	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Humanitarian Response in Disasters and Emergencies
3	Rachel	Child Protection Working Group (CPWG)	Child Protection Responses in Emergencies
4	Stanley	Good Neighbors International	International Relief and Development
5	Daisy	Gavi CSO Constituency	Immunization and Child Health
6	Charlie	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)	Urban Search and Rescue in Earthquake Response
7	Lily	UNICEF	Child Survival, Development, Protection, and Advocacy
8	Amelia	Zaatari Refugee Camp Network	Refugee Protection and Service Provision
		Humanitarian Leadership Academy	Community Resilience and Humanitarian Leadership Development
9	Callum	Paris Terror Attack Response Network	Protection, Social Welfare, Prevention, Education and Health Care

In critical incident studies, the actual *N* of the study is not the number of interviewees, but rather the number of critical incidents. This study yielded a total of 27 critical incidents.

Although the circumstances of each of the participants' incidents were different from site to site, all their stories provided common insights on how member organizations within an effective humanitarian network work together and impact affected populations through their collective actions.

Risks and Benefits

Even though any negative impact from participating in this study is not significant, possible risks might be exposure of personal identity from both critical incident stories and the research findings of the study. Thus, I used pseudonyms for all study participants, and any personal information stored or used during the study process was treated confidentially. As another measure to minimize study participants' potential financial burden to participate in the study, I used emails as a primary communication tool with them and used a teleconferencing tool, such as *Skype*, for online audio/video interviews, which in turn kept the participants from incurring any overseas telephone charges. During each of the interviews I had with the participants, I promised that I would provide a summary report of the study findings to the participants. (See Appendix B)

Data Collection

I collected data from nine leaders and managers who have extensive experience (i.e., five or more years) with humanitarian interorganizational networks in Geneva, Switzerland and London, UK. Prior to the data collection process, I acquired permission from the participating organizations and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and Human Subjects Office, since the study involves human subjects participating in intellectual investigation processes. The interview

protocol (see Appendix A), the recruitment letter, and the participant consent form were thoroughly reviewed, revised, and confirmed during the review process.

Critical Incident Technique

Considering the rarity of the conceptualization of the study's construct in the humanitarian sector, I employed the critical incident technique (CIT), a qualitative research method developed by John C. Flanagan (1954), which has been widely used during the last 60 years to systematically capture critical behaviors or incidents of key informants due to its flexibility to adapt the procedures in specific situations and its wide applicability, particularly in exploratory research such as this study (Butterfield, Borgen, Amundson, & Maglio, 2005; Flanagan, 1954). The CIT involves five major procedures: (1) identification of the primary purpose of a critical incident to be evaluated, (2) planning of specific instructions for the data collection process, including areas of incident context, aim relevance, the significance of the incident, and observer and selection, (3) data collection using interviews, surveys, or documents, (4) data analysis of the incidents involving a frame of reference, category induction, and specificity determination, and (5) the interpretation of the data and reporting the findings to make inferences and for generalizations (Flanagan, 1954).

In their review of the development and the use of the CIT in qualitative research, Ellinger and Watkins (1998) defined the CIT as “a systematic and sequential method for collecting observed incidents, or observations previously made which are reported from memory” (p. 286). As for some of the strengths of using this method, the CIT focuses on situational behavioral aspects either recollected by participants or external researchers, generating a whole and vivid story of a phenomenon and developing criteria for a certain behavior or phenomenon (Ellinger & Watkins, 1998). The CIT not only aids us in understanding behavioral subjects (e.g.,

organizational interventions) using retrospective data collection, but the methods also empower us to better understand cognitive subjects (e.g., perceptions on management effectiveness). Thus the CIT, from a constructivist perspective, can uncover and reconstruct study participants' experiences and understanding of a topic at a deeper level, probing into participants' mental models and contextual factors which affect a certain behavior (Ellinger & Watkins, 1998).

Interview Preparation

The preparatory step for data collection began with constructing an interview protocol, which guided me in determining what topics to address and how to involve participants in actual interviews (deMarrais, 2004). Having multiple meetings and conversations with expert scholars in qualitative research and organizational performance studies, I constructed an interview protocol and revised it multiple times before actually going out to the interview sites. As deMarrais (2004) highlighted, interview questions were designed to be concise to get participants' specific responses on critical incidents that they experienced on the topic of the study. Also, I formed questions that were more open-ended rather than closed-ended so that the questions could enable the participants to describe their experiences thoroughly (deMarrais, 2004). One of the main topics I discussed during the interviews concerned network performance. I asked participants to, "think about a specific time when this network was really effective? What happened? Why was this significant? Can you tell me about it in detail?" To probe further and obtain more details about their experiences, I asked the following questions during the interview as well: Who was involved? How did you contribute to a humanitarian network's success? What was the outcome of the work? What do you think led to this outcome? Can you walk me through the whole process from your perspective? How did the dynamic inside the network impact its outcomes? Although I prepared these descriptive questions beforehand, I used them only as a

guide during the interviews so that I could focus more on “prompting and probing” participants’ lived experiences (deMarrais, 2004, p. 63). See the full interview protocol in Appendix A.

On-Site Interviews

To acquire quality data during my multi-phased interviews with the participants, I paid particular attention to getting ready for each interview, using active listening and probing skills, and closing the conversation with each participant appropriately (deMarrais, 2004). My typical interviews with participants started with greetings, more complete introductions than those of previous email communications, a search for a quiet place, such as a meeting room or a café area, an explanation of the study, and the presentation of the consent form to the participant. After getting permission to record our conversation, I turned on two voice recorders and began recording to ensure data storage and backup. To have a focused interview, I started with open-ended questions, often asking additional probing questions to obtain more details and richer data regarding participants’ experiences on the study topic in-detail (deMarrais, 2004). Whenever a participant mentioned an acronym frequently used among humanitarian workers, I asked them for the meaning of the acronym, trying not to disrupt our ongoing conversation. Also, noting some ideas or topics shared by a participant for further investigation or elaboration was also useful and helped me better understand the participant’s experiences during the interview. When each interview came to an end, I thanked the participant with a small gift. Thankfully, all the interviewees showed great interest in the study and offered to provide additional support for my research. Oftentimes, participants provided supplemental documents, proposed another meeting to continue our conversation, recommended that I meet another person at a different humanitarian network for an interview, or directly connected me with a colleague to schedule a meeting for me. Some memorable moments or influential events related to my interviews with

each of the study participants are described in the following chapter as I present critical incidents collected from the participant group. Interviews ranged from one hour to three hours.

Post-Interview Actions

After doing an interview, I reflected on how the interview conversation went, from preparation through completion. Among all nine post-interview reviews, the first review in collaboration with my major professor was the most influential. After the first interview and the transcription of the interview were completed, I sent the data to her by email with several emerging questions about conducting interviews. She then responded with feedback on the transcription and her thoughts on how to improve the quality of my interviews. Her interview skill coaching and the clarification of emerging issues during the data collection process played an important role as an effective research calibration, significantly influencing the quality of the remaining interviews. Besides the coaching review, some of the points that I checked and recalled after the interview were as follows: how well I focused on the conversation with the participant (e.g., leading the interview by asking good questions as well as listening actively), the level of my preparedness for the interview (e.g., understanding the interviewee's role and the work of a particular humanitarian network), the number and completeness of critical incidents described by the interviewee, and the environment of the interview (e.g., having a meeting place well suited for an interview without interference or noise). By examining these review points involving multiple methods (i.e., an interview transcript, recorded audio, an experienced researcher's coaching) during the post-interview reviews, I was able to find examples of how I interfered with the natural flow of the conversation (deMarrais, 2004), thus improving how I conducted interviews throughout the rest of the data collection process.

Data Analysis

The three steps taken to analyze the critical incident data, using the thematic analysis method, included (1) data configuration and preliminary analysis, (2) deductive data analysis, and (3) inductive data analysis. Figure 3-1 illustrates the data analysis process of this study.




Figure 3-1. Data analysis process.

Data Configuration and Preliminary Analysis

Before thematically analyzing the critical incident data, I took three preliminary data configuration steps, which included (1) data screening, (2) an initial coding activity, and (3) drafting and naming the critical incidents. The initial step was to examine the entire qualitative interview dataset by comprehending the meaning of the participants' answers, stories, and reactions to the interview questions (Ruona, 2005). Also, this step helped me understand what was relevant or irrelevant to the purpose and research questions of the dissertation research. Data screening and cleaning included identifying quotations relevant to the incident and making certain changes or reordering for clarity. For example, when grammatical and phraseological errors were found during this stage (e.g., missing articles and conjunctions, incorrect tense, subject-verb agreement errors, sentence fragments, etc.), changes were made so that the passage in question could deliver a clearer message without altering the participants' original story or

intention. For example, a participant mentioned in an interview, “The truck company, the polio manufacturer, the fridge stores the vaccine, doing completely different businesses,” and I corrected the sentence to “The truck company, the polio manufacturer, and the fridge that stores the vaccine—they are all doing completely different businesses.

The dataset was then ready to be systematically analyzed, so I initially hand coded several interview transcripts. Once the coding process became more established, I continued using *NVivo8 for Mac*, a type of qualitative data analysis (QDA) support software. I coded the entire dataset to identify critical incidents. Whenever I encountered a portion of a critical incident story or a longer critical incident story related to the topic, I assigned a case title to the specific incident. Usually, a participant related two or more critical incidents. At the third step of the data configuration stage, I drafted and named critical incidents based on the stories shared by research participants. Elements of critical incidents in the dialogue existed either in a fragmented or a long form, but mostly in the former. For instance, when I asked an interviewee, “Think about a specific time when an interorganizational network was really effective. Can you tell me about it in detail?” the interviewee did not directly provide a complete and detailed story of an effective operation of such a network. Rather, interviewees often started with a general statement and impression about the incident they remembered and then told fragments of the incident described by a series of mini-stories within the larger incident as the interviewee and I continued the interview. From these, I generated 27 critical incidents. Each of the 27 incidents was then crafted into a story to represent and to narrate an effective performance outcome of different humanitarian interorganizational networks. Also, I gave each of the incidents a unique title to make the story essence more vivid. Table 3-2 gives the titles for each incident.

Table 3-2

Critical Incidents and Assertions

No	Interviewee	Humanitarian Network	Critical Incident Title	Assertion
1	Kian	Sudan Polio Vaccination Network	<i>Many people are in networks without even knowing it.</i>	When driven by such a mission, people in the interdependent network perform their duties without even realizing the existence of the network.
2	Amelia	Zaatari Refugee Camp Network	<i>There's no way to do that unless you work with others.</i>	The collaborative efforts of humanitarian organizations enable them to work as a network to better serve the complex needs of an affected population, which an independent organization can scarcely achieve.
3			<i>It is all about the flow of information.</i>	Member organizations in an effective humanitarian network share information about resources they have individually to streamline their collective actions, thereby serving the affected population with more agility and flexibility.
4			<i>Managing the relief effort in partnership with the refugees themselves: You manage to restore the affected population's dignity and to empower them.</i>	To manage the dynamics of the affected population in a trustful relationship, an effective humanitarian network involves the affected population as part of the team in its operations and services.
5		Humanitarian Leadership Academy-Unilever Partnership	<i>We want to see what would be the return on investing upfront.</i>	The disaster preparedness work of an effective humanitarian network raises the resilience of the community at the local level.

No	Interviewee	Humanitarian Network	Critical Incident Title	Assertion
6	Charlie	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)	<i>We're like a country club. Teams from different countries come together and speak a common language.</i>	The network becomes stronger as a band of collective response teams, where people come to meet, do exercises, learn from each other, and make friends through networking.
7			<i>We are like a fire station; you must be fast.</i>	The faster a network responds in a disaster, the more people it saves.
8			<i>When everyone is snatching for little to do in one area, we coordinate and deploy other teams elsewhere.</i>	A successful coordination of rescue team deployment in different areas helps a network to save more lives in a disaster situation.
9			<i>Learning and sharing is the culture of this network.</i>	An effective humanitarian network nurtures a culture of learning and sharing to help members in the network advance to the next level.
10	Stanley	Good Neighbors International	<i>That must have been possible only because we continuously participated in the national level networking efforts between NGOs.</i>	An effective humanitarian network responds to a disaster and provides its services to affected populations in a minimum amount of time, utilizing collaborative internetwork relationships pre-established by member organizations participating in local humanitarian networks, for better operational outcomes.
11		United Nations Cluster Network	<i>Having exact and proper data about the situation in the field and transparency is the key.</i>	In a disaster, an effective humanitarian network identifies and directs the most necessary services and aids the affected population based on the exact information gathered in the field.
12	Leo	INSARAG	<i>International standards lead to changes in the way you operate at a national level.</i>	Using an international set of standards, an effective humanitarian network enhances the operational excellence of member organizations at both the global and local levels.

No	Interviewee	Humanitarian Network	Critical Incident Title	Assertion
13		INSARAG-World Health Organization Partnership	<i>They [WHO's EMT] will take over, and we [INSARAG] will start learning from them.</i>	An effective humanitarian network transfers its knowledge and competence to its partnering organizations and helps accelerate their learning and operation processes.
14		United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)	<i>We have 20 different organizations that we are cooperating with around providing technical support.</i>	Identifying any operational deficiency during a humanitarian response, an effective humanitarian network continuously improves its organizational capability through creating partnerships with other organizations with such expertise.
15		UNDAC-International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) Network	<i>We built a subnetwork with them, a partnership.</i>	By partnering with a number of regional organizations to get support with resources, an effective humanitarian network creates a sub-network of the partnering organizations so that the new network can autonomously support the network.
16		OCHA-Jordan-Israel-Palestine Preparedness Project Network	<i>They now trust each other.</i>	An effective humanitarian network nurtures a culture of trust; thus, the network members and external partners understand each other and collaborate through a strong relationship.
17	Rachel	Child Protection Working Group	<i>We came together around a joint product.</i>	Having a compelling reason to collaborate makes the ties among member organizations within a humanitarian network even stronger.
18			<i>The only way we could do it was to work together.</i>	Showing a collaborative leadership, member organizations in a thriving humanitarian network advance together against risks involved in their mission and tasks.

No	Interviewee	Humanitarian Network	Critical Incident Title	Assertion
19			<i>We asked the UNICEF director general's office, their highest level, to write a letter to all the agencies.</i>	Facing overwhelming problems in affected populations, an effective humanitarian network actively mobilizes support from its partnering organizations to maximize its impact through collective actions.
20	Daisy	Gavi CSO Constituency	<i>The Civil Society platform was holding the government accountable.</i>	When there is a delay in a government-led project, an effective humanitarian network continuously petitions the government for discharging its obligation until the completion of the project.
21			<i>The women of childbearing age accepted the vaccine.</i>	Confronting the challenges of local authorities, an effective humanitarian network is actively involved in the negotiation process and comes up with a solution that benefits its service population the most.
22			<i>Bringing to the attention of key global actors</i>	To strengthen its impact in the field through involving more stakeholders in a coordinated way, an effective humanitarian network continuously mobilizes support on a global level.
23	Callum	IFRC-INSARAG Collaboration	<i>The efficiency of the networks is really good when people know each other.</i>	Better efficiency in a humanitarian response can be achieved through the group of people showing team spirit and knowing each other within an effective humanitarian network.
24		Paris Terror Attack Response Network	<i>Two hours after, all of the teams were at the hospital. It was good organization.</i>	Through co-exercise and active collaboration during a disaster, an effective humanitarian network accomplishes its mission more efficiently.

No	Interviewee	Humanitarian Network	Critical Incident Title	Assertion
25	Lily	UNICEF	<i>We've gained momentum, and we've gained more support.</i>	An effective humanitarian network incorporates a guiding principle into the management and field operations of the network for better results.
26			<i>A safe space for women was opened to be able to be heard, and terrible evidence was found.</i>	By strictly applying a better guiding principle of its own throughout all of its activities, rather than following old guidelines, an effective humanitarian network finds a new way of serving and evidence to better serve the affected population.
27			<i>Found a way to access the population in a way that they are comfortable with</i>	Overcoming barriers at the local level, an effective humanitarian network proactively figures out a way to hear the voice of the served population.

Deductive/Inductive Data Analysis

The data configuration steps discussed above resulted in a set of critical incidents that needed to be further analyzed to answer the study's research question. I undertook in-depth thematic analysis using both deductive and inductive approaches at different data analysis phases (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Snape & Spencer, 2003), constantly and comprehensively comparing the critical incident data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Each critical incident was coded and placed in conceptual categories that became the themes delineated in the research findings (Roulston, 2010). While I was analyzing the data, I tried to find a link that logically substantiated the true meaning of the identified themes as they related to the research purpose. I examined the entire interview data "repeatedly to test the validity of the assertions" and "to establish an evidentiary warrant for the assertions" (Erickson, 1986, p. 146). As noted in Erickson, an assertion is a statement that connects the essence of the incident to a research question—a statement of what the incident conveys about the research purpose. Whenever necessary, I revisited critical incidents already coded and saved in *NVivo* to clearly understand both the evident and connotational meaning of each critical incident. See Table 3-2 for a list of assertions generated based on critical incidents.

To answer the first research question, a deductive strategy was used, as I had a priori guiding constructs (i.e., conventional organizational performance dimensions—knowledge, financial, and mission performance) to be examined using the critical incident data (Miles et al., 2014), drawing on learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and Kaplan's (2001) balanced scorecard framework adapted to nonprofit settings as guiding theoretical frameworks in the analysis. Calling such a deductively oriented qualitative design a "tighter design," Huberman and Miles (1994) explained that such a

design is “indicated when the researcher has good prior acquaintance with the setting, has a good bank of applicable, well-delineated concepts, and takes a more explanatory and/or confirmatory stance involving multiple, comparable cases” (p. 431). Also, acknowledging Huberman and Miles’ (1994) discussion that stated an analysis with conceptual analytic themes is justifiable and constructive, in the first step of the deductive critical incident data analysis using *NVivo*, I reviewed the nodes (or codes in general) and cases assigned in the preliminary data analysis phase and began assigning codes to the critical incidents in a thematic analysis. I analyzed the critical incidents extracted and synthesized from the interview transcripts, employing the constant comparison method (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For instance, an organizational learning and performance scholar and I conducted a physical card-sorting activity to categorize analytic codes (Roulston, 2010). This physical card-sorting activity well portrayed the three performance dimensions of the a priori theories and thus answered the first research question. Later, another round of virtual card sorting activity reconfirmed the data analysis result.

After analyzing the critical incident data using a deductive approach, the remaining portion of the data was not explained by the a priori theories of organizational performance. Therefore, another thematic analysis using an inductive approach was conducted (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Miles et al., 2014; Snape & Spencer, 2003) to examine how the remaining data might extend the current theories of organizational performance, assuming that “inferences can be developed by examining empirical data for patterns” (Roulston, 2010). The coded critical incident data were categorized through a virtual card sorting activity using a nonlinear concept mapping tool, *Scapple*. And, the categories were restructured into a theme to represent the meaning of the remaining portion of the data. The thematic representation of the data involved various degrees of qualitative data analysis, such as description, analysis, and interpretation, and

the inductively derived theme was substantiated by “evidence from the data set in the form of excerpts from interviews that link the researcher’ assertions to what was said by speakers in interview context” (Roulston, 2010, p. 151). Figure 3-2 depicts the result of virtual card sorting activities performed both deductively and inductively.




Figure 3-2. The result of virtual card sorting activities.

Trustworthiness

Regarding the aspect of practical quality standards of qualitative research, Miles et al. (2014) proposed five topic areas to address quality aspects, which included the following: objectivity, reliability, internal validity, external validity, and action orientation. Although these five topic areas may overlap somewhat in dealing with the methodological issues of a qualitative research study, great benefit comes from verifying how these topic areas are addressed in this study to prove their trustworthiness. Thus, in this section of the study, I discuss methodological validity and reliability aspects of this study, taking Miles et al.'s (2014) guide into account, but I leave some of the elements directly related to the conclusion and discussion of the study for the last chapter, including the fifth aspect, action orientation.

Objectivity

Accordingly, all these measures should ensure the objectivity and confirmability of the study (Miles et al., 2014). For example, to address the issue of the objectivity or confirmability of this study, in other words, “[a] relative neutrality and reasonable freedom from unacknowledged researcher biases” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 311), I described the overall procedures and methods used in the study as thoroughly as possible so that an external researcher can see a complete depiction of the entire process (Merriam & Simpson, 2000; Miles et al., 2014). This description includes step-by-step procedures of data collection, configuration, and analysis, as well as the presentation of the data analysis using various qualitative research aids (i.e., *NVivo*, *MS Word*, and *Scapple*). Also, I described the researcher’s subjectivity clearly, because a researcher’s subjectivity can affect how a study is conducted. Further, as previously mentioned, the IRB office at UGA approved the overall plan for this study, including research materials, such as the interview protocol, the study invitation letter, and the participant consent

letter, as the study takes into account human subjects. Lastly, a significant portion of the collected interview data was co-reviewed and analyzed with the guidance of experienced researchers to verify the overall quality of the data analysis in accordance with the purpose and design of the study.

Reliability

The research process of a reliable and dependable study is “consistent [and] reasonably stable over time and across researchers and methods” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 312). To make the overall process of this study more reliable and auditable, I took the following measures. First of all, I tried to make the purpose of the study and the related research questions as clear as possible. I explicitly described my role as a researcher as I interacted with study participants in both the data collection section of this chapter. A meticulous description of the researcher’s role and position in research sites is extremely useful to an external researcher in that it may help him or her understand what it takes to be a human instrument in a qualitative study process (Kain, 2004; Preissle & Grant, 2004). Finally, to be able to collect data “across the full range of appropriate settings, times, respondents” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 312), I conducted three practice interviews using the predeveloped interview protocol with experts from different areas: university emergency response, interdepartmental collaboration at a university, and English language education. Once I completed each one of the three practice interviews, the interview was transcribed for an after-interview review, and expert qualitative researchers and I examined the transcript of the practice interviews together to identify aspects of my interviewing skills that might need to be improved and to tweak some interview questions to obtain better results. And then, I interviewed as many participants as needed to try to reach saturation (Creswell, 2014; Morse, 1994), collecting document data whenever possible in three cases, meeting a participant

multiple times at every opportunity to collect more data, and using best-available methods (e.g., face-to-face or via *Skype*). Lastly, faculty members and I co-examined the quality of the interview data in various steps, which included reviews of the first several on-site interviews and examination of the richness of every critical incident story described by each participant. These four methodological measures and rigor help ensure the integrity of the data and the overall quality of the study (Miles et al., 2014).

Internal Validity

Although internal validity has more to do with the findings of the study, making good sense of the data, and making the study more credible to readers (Miles et al., 2014), I discuss the internal validity of the study here focusing more on methodological matters. First, as described in the data analysis section above, I verified that the data were well connected with a priori theories, such as Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1996) learning organization theory and Kaplan's (2001) nonprofit performance framework, in the deductive data analysis phase. Additionally, an inductively identified organizational performance dimension, *relational performance*, supported the unexplained area of organizational performance in an interorganizational network in previous studies. After the interviews were completed, I searched for and located additional supporting data related to the study topic on the internet. I found news articles, annual reports, and technical reports on various humanitarian networks. These data were initially used to confirm the name and major works of humanitarian networks mentioned and described by the participants during the interviews. Although there was no chance for direct observation of how interorganizational humanitarian networks work together to yield specific organizational performance at the network level, as the networks typically work with affected populations in disaster situations, the document data—mostly including pictures and in-depth descriptions—assisted me to become a

more reliable interpreter of the data to validate some of the critical incident data collected from the participants.

External Validity

To ensure the external validity or transferability of a qualitative study, a researcher must make a case cogent enough that the research findings of the specific case are generalizable and transferable (Miles et al., 2014). To add to the sampling in the study, it is evident that the study ensures a good level of external validity, because the nine participants with their experiences in sector-leading humanitarian networks yielded 27 critical incidents. Also, the findings of the study show a clear connection of the theories used in the study (Miles et al., 2014), especially the three existing performance outcome dimensions: financial, knowledge, and mission performance.

Researcher's Subjectivity

Highlighting the importance of a researcher's understanding of his or her own subjectivities regarding the research topic and the study participants, Roulston (2010) claimed that the researcher "explores how these [subjectivities] related to the research findings in representations of research, thereby demonstrating researcher reflexivity" (p. 88). Adopting the social constructivist's worldview as I conducted a study of interorganizational collaborations and their effective performance outcomes, I recognize that my own background influences my understanding of the topic based on the participants' experiences and how they make meaning of the topic. I also understand that this study takes my positionality in the study, acknowledging how I interpret their experiences is also shaped by the history of my personal, organizational, and cultural experiences (Creswell, 2014). In this section of the study, I describe my subjectivities, which influenced the design and carrying out of the study and which included the following roles: an enthusiastic novice scholar in the human resource and organization development field

and a former organizational strategy and performance manager in an interorganizational collaborative.

As an enthusiastic novice scholar in the field of HRD, I was motivated to learn deeply about the study topic throughout the entire research process. Among a few motivational forces, the most significant one was my belief that people in a successful interorganizational network with common goals establish a sophisticated infrastructure so that the members of the network can operate and collaborate well, thus yielding great operational outcomes. This long-held belief supported by the literature influenced many facets of my study. It affected how I developed the interview protocol. Another aspect of my subjective self is as a former organizational strategy and performance manager at both a for-profit and nonprofit network with different timeframes, and this slightly discouraged me from conducting this study. During my years of full-time work with various organizations, I realized that well-developed organizations and their management teams tended to exploit individuals, in their rapacity, with advanced systems and technology, like whipping a horse. As a matter of fact, many of the exploited became completely exhausted, and some of them finally left the organization. Additionally, I had always worked closely with the top managers, dutifully supporting their decisions at the for-profit company—planning, managing, and evaluating organizational performance at all levels in organizations. In the nonprofit organization, my role was to develop an organization-wide strategy, to implement strategic initiatives across the organization, and to assess organizational performance outcomes using key performance indicators. I saw people's frustration about and opposition to the implementation of new strategic management systems with more sophisticated performance evaluation criteria that demanded a higher level of employee commitment to meet the new job standards. Such measures resulted in higher organizational performance and expanded the impact

to the client group; however, concomitant with the organizational excellence was the internal competition among individuals, teams, and departments, rather than collaboration for hard-to-reach goals or acknowledging the whole in recognition of an organizational achievement instead of praising individuals and separate teams. Thinking of these personal experiences in two different giant organizations, I can't deny that I sometimes became skeptical about studying a highly effective interorganizational network that operates with great efficiency and effectiveness based on advanced organizational infrastructures and innovative internal work processes, as I could imagine similar examples of what I had experienced before. But, this subjectivity did not significantly affect the design of the study or how I conducted interviews with the participants. Fortunately, I did not find evidence of such negative aspects of humanitarian networks from them. Instead what I found from conversations with the participants was that they poured themselves into better serving affected populations and to strengthening humanitarian networks and the sector, overcoming various obstacles and limitations in their workplaces.

Limitations of the Study

My evolving interview skills can also be a limitation of this study. The trustworthiness and reliability of a study are improved through a researcher's interview skills (deMarrais, 2004). To improve my interview skills, I conducted practice interviews until I was able to interview a participant with confidence. However, still, conducting a good interview as a novice scholar in the field was the most prominent challenge I had to overcome during the data collection activity in this study. Reflecting on deMarrais' (2004) barriers to a successful interview, some of my questions asked to participants were complicated, vague, and leading, and they hindered us from having a quality dialogue, although much of the barriers were corrected as I continued conducting more and more interviews. Sometimes, I asked a question to a participant on the

interview protocol even though the participant had already answered it during our previous conversation. Asking clarifying questions too frequently was another barrier to having a quality interview with the participants. It happened when some participants were using so many acronyms that were used in a specific organization or in the humanitarian sector that I was not familiar with at all. Clarification of unfamiliar terms and acronyms slowed down the pace of the interview meeting. Despite these problems, most of the interviews I conducted went well. Additionally, it is possible that I could not reach saturation as I interviewed participants, even though I tried, given the complexity of organizational performance at the network level and the limitation of time and financial resources.

Chapter Summary

This chapter describes the research strategy I used to fulfill the aim of the study in detail. To better understand the dimensions of performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives, I chose a qualitative research approach to conduct a critical incident study using the CIT as a research method and with a constructivist's worldview. The criteria and strategies for participants' selection are reported as well as the risks and benefits to the participants. This chapter also describes the data collection process in detail, which includes interview preparation, on-site interviews, and post-interview actions. The chapter then explains specific steps that I took to analyze the critical incident data using QDA tools, and these steps were: data configuration, preliminary data analysis, and deductive/inductive data analysis. Then, the chapter discusses the trustworthiness of the study addressing issues of objectivity, reliability, internal validity, and external validity, to provide a sound grounding for the research findings presented in Chapters Five. Lastly, the chapter describes the researcher's subjectivity and limitations of the study.

CHAPTER 4

PARTICIPANTS AND CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

To answer the research questions, I conducted nine exploratory semi-structured interviews with experts involved in a variety of international humanitarian networks in London, UK and in Geneva, Switzerland. The study participants shared their lived experiences working with effective humanitarian networks during the interviews. The participants' experiences cover the areas of field operations in the humanitarian sector such as international emergency relief efforts, disaster prevention activities, and global health promotion projects. The job positions and responsibilities the participants had in different international humanitarian networks varied; for instance, the interviewees included executive directors, senior managers, senior officers, and deputy coordinators. Although the circumstances of each of the participants' incidents were different from site to site, all their stories provided common insights on how member organizations within an effective humanitarian network work together and have impacts on

affected populations through their collective actions. Table 4-1 offers a presentation of participant and network profiles, identical to Table 3-1.

Table 4-1

Participant and Major Network Profiles

No	Participant	Humanitarian Network	Focus Area
1	Kian	Sudan Polio Vaccination Network	Public Health and Polio Immunization
2	Leo	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Humanitarian Response in Disasters and Emergencies
3	Rachel	Child Protection Working Group (CPWG)	Child Protection Responses in Emergencies
4	Stanley	Good Neighbors International	International Relief and Development
5	Daisy	Gavi CSO Constituency	Immunization and Child Health
6	Charlie	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)	Urban Search and Rescue in Earthquake Response
7	Lily	UNICEF	Child Survival, Development, Protection, and Advocacy
8	Amelia	Zaatari Refugee Camp Network	Refugee Protection and Service Provision
		Humanitarian Leadership Academy	Community Resilience and Humanitarian Leadership Development
9	Callum	Paris Terror Attack Response Network	Protection, Social Welfare, Prevention, Education and Health Care

As a part of the analytic process of this study, I display the interview data in the form of a critical incident, considering it “as an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and/or action taking,” because the generation and display of a critical incident assist us in examining the entire corpus of qualitative data in reduced and

condensed arrangements, thus finally to make meaning of it (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 429). Critical incidents, as focused ways of displaying qualitative data (Huberman & Miles, 1994), are retrospectively garnered “portraits of significance” (Kain, 2004, p. 78), aimed to depict vivid descriptions of participants’ lived experiences relating to a research topic.

In this chapter, as I present key critical incidents reported by each of the participants in their exact words, I begin each critical incident with contextual information about meeting the participants and the interview process in narrative vignettes to give readers “a sense of *being there* in the scene” (Erickson, 1986, 2012).

Kian

I arrived at the Geneva international airport to start conducting a series of interviews with experts from various humanitarian networks around noon on June 6, 2016. As soon as I found lodging near the United Nations headquarters in Geneva, I departed the airport to meet the first participant in Geneva. It was a bright day, where the sunlight played gently on everything around as I walked to the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and I could see Lake Lemman and the Alps in the distance. Walking down the street, I remembered the time I initially contacted Kian in April 2016 to schedule an interview with him. He said that he would be available only after the first World Humanitarian Summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey in May 2016. When I sent him another message saying that I would visit London, UK and Geneva, Switzerland for my research trip in June, he agreed to meet with me in Geneva. After a short time, we met together and sat on a bench in the Institute’s lobby around 3 PM to begin our interview. After about half an hour of conversation, he had to leave our meeting to attend a conference held at the Institute. I requested a continuation of our interview after the conference, so he came back after his conference meeting, and we continued our conversation. The extended

session was successful, because he explained his experiences and knowledge about an effective humanitarian network in a more focused manner with rich detail. During our conversation, Kian shared his experiences as a senior director at the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) as well as when he served a UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan with me. Our interview lasted about 80 minutes in total, and we took a photo together on the school's porch with the Genève-Sécheron transit stop behind us.

Sudan Polio Vaccination Network:

Many people are in networks without even knowing it.

If you all believe that children around the world should not get polio and that you are driven by that mission, whether you're a truck driver or whether you're a scientist, or whether you are a fridge manufacturer or a solar panelist who is making the solar energy for the fridge in the desert in Sudan, all of that, then many people in organizations are in networks without even knowing it because of the interdependency that they have. They don't even realize [the existence of a network], so the truck driver is going around driving trucks. He doesn't even realize that he's part of a network, which is working together to eradicate polio in the world. [The success of the program] depends on the manufacture of the polio vaccine, the transport system, [and] the healthcare worker. It depends on the funders or funding, paying the health worker and the truck driver to take the vaccine. It [also] depends on the company that makes the energy for the fridge in which you store all your vaccine, and there's connectivity to that infrastructure that delivers a child who is protected against polio. You can't measure whether the polio vaccine manufacturing's more important than the truck driver, than the government health minister or the Gates Foundation, which gives the money to resource it. [Within such] networks, individual organizations in the network have differentiated roles. The truck company, the polio manufacturer, the fridge stores the vaccine, doing completely different businesses. They are very important parts of the polio network, without which the world would not rid itself of polio.

Leo

A director of a humanitarian organization in Geneva, Switzerland, supporting humanitarian efforts through providing critical situation information, introduced me to Leo, the second participant, who worked at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). During my 10-day data collection trip in Geneva, I met with him three times. Saying that he loves to share his experiences as a senior officer at OCHA with others

interested in humanitarian operations, he generously offered to meet with me several times, as we thought that we needed additional conversations on the study's topic. The first meeting occurred on Monday, June 8th, 2016 at 11 AM. For me to enter the European United Nations Headquarter office area, Leo's team member pre-registered me as a guest in the security system a week before our meeting. Realizing the main security gate, the Pregny Gate, was located far away from Leo's office and experiencing a delay in acquiring a guest pass at the gate, I had to run fast for about five minutes to get to his office on time. After finding his office at the complex UN headquarters building, we sat down together and had our first interview. I remember vividly the moment we started our conversation. When I asked him if he has in his mind which interorganizational network in the humanitarian sector, he instantly answered to me, "I do." His first short answer touched me at the moment, as I could feel his hospitality and interest in my research. Our first meeting lasted about half an hour until he was called to a meeting with his chief. He suggested we meet again on Monday, June 13th at 4 PM. On the second day of the interview, I took a look around inside the complex UN building before our meeting. While I was at a cafe inside the building waiting for Leo, he met with me there, and we had an informal conversation, discussing key issues about humanitarian networks and their effectiveness. After moving back to his office, our second interview lasted for approximately another hour, extended from the first one in the morning. The third interview was conducted at a conference Leo was attending with his colleagues from the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group on Wednesday, June 15 at 9:30 AM. He cut out of the conference for about 70 minutes to discuss more about the effectiveness of humanitarian coordination mechanisms. Leo generously and pleasantly offered a series of meetings with me, and I learned a great deal about his experiences at multiple humanitarian networks throughout our 160 minute-interview in total.

International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG):

***International standards lead to changes
in the way you operate at a national level.***

What we [INSARAG] have developed is an international set of standards. It's called the INSARAG Guidelines. It's, in the humanitarian world, you need, because this is the only place where you have an applied standard for how you do the work to ensure the quality. Further to that, because the guidelines are to ensure the quality and to ensure the interoperability and the coordination of the teams, ten years ago, it was decided, "Let's go a step further. Let's take the guidelines and go out and certify the teams." The team can apply to be certified. Then, they get a diploma or a sticker on their badge on their uniforms. When they're deployed, they demonstrate like ISO 9001. We each get certified by this community. It's a peer review. We now have 46 teams globally that are certified.

The Danish Disaster Management Agency went through this [INSARAG] reclassification last year. It was thought it would be good if I would be there to give them certification and be their representation of this entire network. I met a lot of former colleagues. I said to them, "I can see that the ground and layout and the training that you're providing has changed significantly. What has made you make these changes?" They said, "INSARAG [Guidelines], because we are taking the international standards that you have developed and bringing them into national standards." For me, that's such an amazing impact that you, through an informal network, have created standards and a normative approach that is now being introduced as national standards and leading to changes in the way you operate at a national level.

INSARAG-World Health Organization Collaboration:

***They [WHO's EMT] will take over,
and we [INSARAG] will start learning from them.***

This approach is now being ... We work with the World Health Organization for the past two years, with the Emergency Medical Teams. We are basically taking, the approach we [INSARAG] are taking, I think, gets the Members on board, organizes them at a regional level, does a normative approach for guidelines, which is done, and does a certification process to ensure the quality control. They are in the process of setting that up. Now, they are some years behind us. They're working very fast. Eventually, they will take over, and we will start learning from them, because they see it's quite a difference. There are different things today than there was 25 years ago when we started that...lessons they have learned they don't need to relearn. We do joint exercises, and we do cross-training. We operationalized the partnership. In the field, in emergencies, it will become, over time, a natural way of cooperating. We do simulation exercises at the regional level, where we are ... Last month's in Istanbul. We did a simulation exercise with the Turkish authorities, where we brought in teams that were playing or responding to an earthquake in eastern Istanbul. Then, we checked it. We verified the contingency plan for Istanbul. We did it jointly with WHO. There were medical teams and rescue teams.

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC):

We have 20 different organizations that we are cooperating with around providing technical support.

In Iran, in 2003 [the Bam earthquake], we discovered other gaps that we had in our capabilities, where we saw that there were other organizations of people on the ground that could do things more effectively than we could do ourselves, but we were having that gap. We entered in a cooperation with a British NGO called MapAction. It's a group of volunteers and experts in GIS and mapping that commits, so they're a member. That network, you meet once or twice a month, and they do training around mapping in emergencies. Then, they commit their spare time to be deployed. When we have emergencies, they deploy two or five or more mapping experts that sit with our team and do all the GIS mapping. That idea has expanded, so we have now 20 different organizations that we are cooperating with around providing technical support in emergencies.

UNDAC-International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) Network:

We built a subnetwork with them, a partnership.

We [UNDAC] worked with a number of civil defense type of organizations, started in Northern Europe with Sweden, Denmark, and England. We created this network called IHP [the International Humanitarian Partnership]. It's a subnetwork. We built a network with them, a partnership. That network is now eight countries here in Europe. [The IHP is] supporting us in emergency operations by deploying technical equipment. That can be satellite phones or tents or whatever, and training staff, their own staffs that are trained to operate the equipment and operate in this type of environment. They cooperate, and when we ask for support, then they identify who can deliver that support. For example, in Haiti, this subnetwork deployed the camp where all the UN staffers were accommodated. They accommodate now 300 people and supported the work of 300 people. You imagine the scale, the size of this. Other partners will go out and fix problems that, for example, energy. Not necessarily for us, but to ensure that the affected community is assisted. By having this network of partnerships, we make sure it's done in a coordinated way. There is a trust and an information exchange throughout. The way they [IHP] mobilize today is basically a phone call. I say, "We need a module to go to this emergency," and it's coming. There's no official request or anything. It's a phone call and an email.

In Aceh [province in Indonesia affected by the tsunami in 2004], the way they [IHP] did was to bring in people from other countries in the network that had not deployed and, then, also cross-fertilizing [the network]. They realized it is actually much better that we operate across organizations and not in individual modules. Now, today, when we operate, when IHP goes out, it's always mixed teams. It's always from different nations. What we [the UNDAC-IHP Partnership] have been very adamant about when we do training is they're not only coming as technical experts to support our training, but we also come and train their technical experts. We have done training with them to ensure that the experts have the knowledge and understanding of the environment that they're going into. We do, every year, a number of training courses on their invitation. Like the big exercises I just talked about, it's a part of capacity building there.

Now, this [the International Humanitarian Partnership] network is so recognized, and in this technical field, also, the private sector, for example, provides us, those of living facility equipment. There is an appreciation of the network in the member states and the funding sources and the trust in the quality of what is happening. Last year, [IHP] negotiated an arrangement [with] the European Union [although] IHP is not a legal entity. ECHO [European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation] sponsors IHP, not as individual member organizations, [which] make mistakes, but as a network, to cover costs of operations.

OCHA-Jordan-Israel-Palestine Preparedness Project:

They now trust each other.

We are working in support of the sub-regional network of three countries [Jordan, Israel, and Palestine] to facilitate, exchange, and [to do] capacity building [activities] between these three countries. They're very earthquake- and flood-prone. It all started with a big forest fire in 2010 in Israel. The Israelis came back to us and said, "Can you ask member states of the UN if they can support with firefighter personnel to come?" No member state reacted to that, but Palestine. Palestine said, "We can send two brigades of firefighters." They did, so they were transferred over the border. They operated hand-in-hand with the Israelis and went back again. They now trust each other. They know that they're human beings, and they want to cooperate. They're very eager to meet each other, and they're beyond the mistrust. We couldn't do that in the beginning. It's become very strong.

Rachel

After spending a full week doing interviews in Geneva, I became more familiar with the region. On the day I met Rachel at World Health Organization (WHO), I chose to walk to get there as I did for all other interviews. Estimating about 40 minutes to walk to the WHO building, I left my lodge around 8:50 AM. The path to the building was uphill, but I enjoyed the walk on the clear spring day, until I found that I was lost around the building. I realized that I passed the building and was about to the top of the hill. After checking the internet map service, I had to run downhill to the building for about five minutes to get there on time again. As soon as I arrived at the building, I sent her an email to tell her what I looked like and was wearing so that she would recognize me without a problem. Checking in the security gate at the building was smooth, too. After greeting each other, Rachel guided me to a cafe area on the first floor of the building. She

bought a cup of latte for me, and we sat down at a table there to begin our conversation. When I found that the cafe was a bit too loud for conducting an interview, I asked her if there would be a quieter space to be. Leaving the cafe area, Rachel kindly took me to her office, as there was no meeting room available at the moment, and we continued our talk there. Her office was a compact size, as she was working alone, but was a quiet and good space for an uninterrupted meeting. About a half hour into our interview, one of her colleagues visited her to notify her that her superior wanted to have a meeting with her. So, we had to bring our meeting to an end, but she shared her experience at the Child Protection Working Group where she had served as a senior manager and about her current responsibilities at another humanitarian network. At the end of our meeting, she connected me with some other members at the United Nations' International Children's Emergency Fund to support my research.

Child Protection Working Group (CPWG):

We came together around a joint product.

There was the Haiti earthquake. We failed miserably as a sector. We just, you know, children were being taken out for adoption. There was a lot of children being raped. Children being included, you know, used as slaves for in households, work. So, we came together, and we said, "We have to change something." But, we needed that big dip, like that big shock in the system. Then, we agreed to develop these minimum standards. We came together around a joint product. This was a key moment, having come together around something central.

The only way we could do it was to work together.

In 2013, we had to do an assessment of the situation of child protection in Syria. Super complicated. You can't get in country, but you do need to know who are the actors in country and what are the problems that children are facing. So, rather than saying, 'Well, I'm not going to do it. It's too complicated,' the group and she [my boss] said, "We have to do it; we have to do it together. We have to take on this challenge." So, they managed. They took all their ... They set up a whole system, where it was from technical expertise, where they were able to interview children that had just escaped Syria into Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. All agencies contributed. You know, to make a long story short, after 18 months, we had a strong assessment of the situation of child protection in Syria. I think that's a good example of where the only way we could do it was to work together because everybody had different bits of information. We

knew we needed to do it together in a very confidential way. I think that's where you see the massive added value of some of this work.

To improve programming, you need to know what are the problems children are facing across the country [in Syria]. But, you know, the country's split in two, right? The bottom was Syrian, and the top was rebel groups. So, the North didn't know what the South was doing in terms of programming. You had, for example, World Vision programming in the North, but you had IRC [International Rescue Committee] programming in the South. Then, even 10 kilometers to the left, you didn't know what other agencies were doing. Everybody was working in complete isolation with each other. Because the Syrian government said, "We'll kick you out if you're working in the rebel group." Or, the rebel group said, "We'll kick you out if you're working in Damascus." So, there was a lot of confidentiality to be....

The idea was to get a mapping of: What are the problems, and which agencies are doing what? Once we have that, then we can improve our programming. Then, maybe, you can go there, and maybe, you should be working on this and not on this. Maybe, you should be working on, you know, reunifying children rather than on psychosocial distress. Or, maybe, you should be working on releasing children from armed groups rather than psychosocial distress.

I think what happened was that agencies changed their programs based on the problems that were in country and based on knowing what the others were doing. [The action] also made sure that a coordination mechanism was set up in country. Where now, five years later, now, they are allowed to talk. Before, they weren't allowed to talk. Even on Skype. Now, they're ... It also pushed for advocacy. [The collective action] was actually the only way we could unblock this, the only way we could move forward. Kind of like the partnership now. It's like, we've all tried on our agency level. We've done what we could at an agency level to make things more forward. Or, a sector-level.

***We asked the UNICEF director general's office,
their highest level, to write a letter to all the agencies.***

In the Central African Republic, I've never seen such a terrible situation [the civil war started in 2012] in terms of needs for children. Thousands... Millions of children, you know? There are huge families there, 10 to 12 children, and all the children were being just abandoned. Left behind. There were a lot of abused children being recruited into armed groups. I was like, "Where is everyone?" I was there to support coordination, but there was like 4 international organizations and like 20 national organizations. Because nobody went to this Central African Republic, they were all busy in the Philippines and South Sudan handling other emergencies, but nobody wanted to go to the Central African Republic, because it's super expensive to set up operations there. The problems are so massive, and they've been going on for 20 years, 50 years. That... Agencies are like, "Pfft! It's too difficult. Forget it."

So, what we did as a collective action, I came back and told my boss. I said, "We have to make a change. We have to make sure that agencies are coming." So, we asked the UNICEF director general's office, their highest level, to write a letter to all the agencies. Individually, to the CEO of the agency or the director general, explaining, "This is the situation in Central African

Republic. We need you to come and act in these and these areas." That was, again, because we had, you know... We knew exactly who to write to and who was doing what and how we could get them on board. That worked. World Vision expanded their operations. IRC expanded their operations. War Child came; Islamic Relief came because of the letters that were sent. If there's more... If World Vision comes with, you know, 50 staff, that there'll be an impact for children. I think that had a big impact.

Stanley

I learned about Stanley, the fourth participant, through my former colleague at World Vision Korea, who was studying international agricultural development in his Master's program in the Netherlands. More specifically, his wife, who studied international politics at a university with Stanley in Switzerland, actually connected me for him. Hearing about my dissertation research topic, Stanley showed a great interest in my study, saying:

As my job in Geneva is closely related to NGO networking, United Nations Human Rights Council, collaborations with the UN, I am particularly interested in your study. Furthermore, I have always questioned about why some humanitarian aid organizations, solely operating instead of affiliating with a coalition in the sector, are not willing to establish a partnership with other organizations or do not perform well. (Stanley, personal communication, February 12, 2016)

When I contacted him to ask for his participation while I was visiting London and Switzerland, he pleasantly agreed to have a meeting with me right after he came back to Switzerland from his multi-site international travel as a manager of the Good Neighbors International network. It was June 13th, 2016 at 11 AM when Stanley and I met at his office in Geneva, Switzerland, located right across from the UN Office at Geneva. Having lunch with him, we learned more about each other, our research interests, work experiences in nonprofit organizations, and the humanitarian sector landscape. After our pleasant lunch, we had our interview in a tidy conference room beside his office space. Stanley shared his experiences in

multiple humanitarian networks, Good Neighbors International and UN Cluster Network, for about 100 minutes, and I shall never forget the impression I formed of how passionate and knowledgeable he was about successful collaborative humanitarian operations, utilizing both international and local network capacity.

Good Neighbors International (GNI):

That must have been possible only because we continuously participated in the national level networking efforts between NGOs.

In the earthquake of Nepal last year, almost weekly, we were sending about 10 up to 30 members from other country offices to help out the relief efforts that were being managed by the Nepal country offices. We had one control tower, which existed in Kathmandu, and probably another control tower, which coordinates the international support in Seoul, [Korea]. We were shifting many experts into sector of logistics, PTSD support, psychosocial support, medical support, so they could provide timely and very much needed relief services to the people affected in Nepal. Usually, there are formal and informal discussions within the regions and between the country offices to solve country specific or sector specific issues, like for projects. In terms of operation as an official network, I would say that is usually an emergency relief situation, which shows the biggest fruits of the existence of such a network.

Gorkha. G-O-R-K-H-A. That was the epicenter of the earthquake. One of them was a hardly hit area. We were co-lead for one of the clusters, and we had a very prominent role in the education and the health cluster, as well, because we were one of the first ones to deliver temporary learning centers, psychosocial support, as well as temporary medical centers in very remote places of this region in Nepal. That's it. That must have been possible only because we continuously participated in the national level networking efforts between NGOs. I think that's possible systematically, because we suggested each country office to get more active in participating in national networks of the NGOs.

United Nations Cluster Network:

Having exact and proper data about the situation in the field and transparency is the key.

One of the key issues for the short-term, but especially the long-term reaction for humanitarian assistance, is having exact and proper data about the situation in the field. For example, when we went to Gorkha, because the earthquakes were really massive, we saw that the needs for the infrastructure were not as massive as the magnitude of the earthquake. We saw that the needs were more into the software side, like education and health. If we didn't have that and if you just look into the CNN and see the buildings, you might have channeled a lot of the resources only for bricks and tin sheets for roofs, maybe so that there was a lot more of that than we needed to re-establish the network of health services. Bring on as soon as possible a new education system that is operating. This kind of information, it's always crucial in a situation.

Whenever we were...may get in a more working group kind of decision making, we ask the delegation from other stakeholders. We will make this small meeting. "Can we make a decision there?" We were bringing that decision to the general meeting, and all this being endorsed by other stakeholders. We always announce transparently when the meeting will be there, and this is one of the processes that OCHA requires to the clusters. There is always much transparency, and we try to put as much accountability down there in the decision-making process, so it doesn't either sideline anyone nor ignore anyone's decision.

Daisy

The first time I learned about Daisy, the fifth participant, was in March 2015, when my advisor mentioned Gavi CSO Constituency, a global vaccination project network, and her essential coordination role at the network. When I first contacted her with the help of the executive director of the Geneva Learning Foundation in November 2015, she was taking parental leave, but when I contacted her again in March 2016, she agreed to participate in my study, offering several dates for an interview at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) headquarters office where the Gavi CSO Constituency network office is situated. On the interview day, the morning of June 14th, 2016, I got on the bus to meet with her. On the top floor of the IKEA building near the Geneva International Airport, I could look down on the landscape of Geneva covered in shades of green. Her office was at the far corner of the IFRC office from the entrance. Sitting in a fairly large conference room, we started having our conversation. While she and I talked about 70 minutes, she shared with me many stories about the global vaccine project network, its effectiveness, challenges, the role of the international coordination office, and her understanding of a civil society. As I was listening to her stories, I could feel how much she loves working for the people who need proper vaccination and how hard she tries to build the capacity of platform-based interventions at the local level across the world.

Gavi CSO Constituency:

The Civil Society platform was holding the government accountable.

The Malawi platform has done a great job of advocacy towards the government. For example, there was ... the country was meant to be constructing cold storage facilities, and for some reason, that work was taking quite a long time. The platform lobbied and lobbied and lobbied to have that sped up and completed. Same thing with the country's annual immunization plan. Again, it was dragging, and the platform did a lot of lobbying towards the government to see that that was finalized. The Civil Society platform was holding the government accountable to what it had promised to deliver in the case of the cold storage facility and the case of finalizing the annual immunization plan.

The [Malawi] platform advocated with the National Immunization Program to switch from the use of the measles vaccine to the combined measles rubella vaccine. In other words, the children would be protected not just against the measles but also against rubella. In the case of going with the bivalent vaccine, that's a great example, because that shows that the CSO platform was able to have enough technical information on immunization such that they were able to get a hold of the various data showing the efficacy of the bivalent vaccine and showing that rubella was an issue in the country and showing that children were more likely to be protected against both diseases if the bivalent vaccine was used. They went to the EPI manager with that information and convinced him. I think that shows tremendous success. We were able to put information in the hands of non-government actors, who were then able to approach their government with it and say, "Look, we think this will better protect our children." That's exactly what we are meant to be doing here at the global level when we work with our country level counterparts.

The women of childbearing age accepted the vaccine.

In Kenya, the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops was vocally opposed to a recent maternal tetanus immunization campaign that WHO and that the Kenyan government were conducting. Unfortunately, the Catholic Bishops in the country were telling people not to accept the vaccine, because they, in their opinion, they feared that it would contain birth control in the vaccine, which of course was not the case. Our CSO platform there was instrumental in communicating with the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops in, kind of, brokering a solution that was acceptable to them to allow the maternal tetanus campaigns to go forward. We were able to ... in the end, the campaign, the immunization campaign, went forward and to a high acceptance rate. The Kenya Catholic Conference of Bishops agreed to an approach whereby the vaccine samples would be tested, both by labs in the country and labs outside of the country, then there were letters sent out by WHO, by UNICEF, by the Minister of Health in Kenya, all the time saying the vaccine is safe. The vaccine is safe. What's important is that the pregnant, the women of childbearing age, accepted the vaccine, most of them, during the campaigns and that it, as far as we know, didn't have a long-term deleterious impact.

Bringing to the attention of key global actors.

What we [Gavi CSO Steering Committees] have done there is we have shared those as very specific examples when we have other big international organizations ... the Global Partnership for Social Accountability. It's run out of the World Bank, and what they do is they provide grants to, I think, there are up to like 50 CSOs, now, to increase country level accountability in health and education programs. I was there presenting our country platforms project and highlighting specific examples of where we've seen some real impact. Letting them know that they're there, because, of course, we would like more entities in the countries and in the regions to be working with them. To be working with them as the coordinated, a coordinated CSO element that has the capacity to support health and, within that, immunization programs in their countries. We have received quite a bit of interest, especially from USAID in working with the platforms. The World Bank, through the GPSA, is showing interest. That's moving in a positive direction.

Charlie

When my research supporter, the executive officer of Geneva Learning Foundation, sent out an initial research invitation letter to a group of experts in the humanitarian sector, Charlie, the fifth participant, responded to it. Having several email communications to schedule a meeting with him, I could feel how fast and efficiently he works and communicates with others. When I met with him in person at his office, two of his other colleagues were present. As he wanted to show how an International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) operates with its international network members through the INSARAG Marking and Signaling System, we decided to conduct our interview in the office. Charlie showed me how the 24-hour monitoring system works in various stages of a disaster, such as an earthquake, and explained how certified rescue teams in different countries utilize the system in a coordinated way. During our interview, when he mentioned several words, such as a fire station or friendship, as he described the INSARAG network, I could instantly grasp a special sense of readiness and interdependency dwelling within the network. Even though our interview was a bit short, about 50 minutes, because of his meeting after the interview, I could not relax my efforts throughout our conversation. I was immensely impressed by his commander-like character, confidence in the

global team, and willingness to learn continuously to save more people in highly stressful disaster situations.

International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG):

***We're like a country club.
Teams from different countries come together
and speak a common language.***

INSARAG exhibits its effectiveness when teams from different countries come together and can speak a common language in operations. For example, marking a building so that everybody looks at this marking, if they are part of INSARAG, they know what this marking is saying. How many people are trapped? What is the hazard? But, if you are not INSARAG, when you look at that, it looks like alien language, for example. I look at Nepal, as the most recent earthquake where I was also on the field coordinating international search and rescue teams, and they understand the system. They come for the meetings; they work in accordance with the INSARAG guideline standards. That is the key. You must have a common globally agreed [upon] set of standards that is understood across the world, contributed by likeminded practitioners across the world, and then they themselves wanting to follow the standards when they deploy.

The network [INSARAG] is alive and well. We have, annually, a very comprehensive program running across all three regions in the world: the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe, Middle-East. These are the three key regions that we in the secretariat manage. We have officers looking after each region and intern. The regions have their own regional meetings, work plans, exercises, training, customized to the region. At the global level, we have the governance system; we have the steering group meeting in Geneva every February. We have the annual technical team leaders' meetings; we have working groups that work on technical issues. Every year, we have meetings coming together, learning from each other, going for exercises. In another analogy, we're like a country club. You get the most benefit by coming to the club and meeting people, networking, strengthening friendships, so that when the real disaster happens, you are prepared. You look at the person, you put a name to a face, and then, you are responding together. That's how we become strong as a network.

We are like a fire station; you must be fast.

[In] Haiti, it's a miracle we save 100 people, because the responses were very fast. That is something about INSARAG. We must be fast, because there is only a golden window of 72 hours for life saving. Anything to do with INSARAG is like a fire station; you must be fast. You must go quickly; you must get the job done. There must not be any red tape at customs, at immigration.

In Nepal, we received a red alert within an hour of the earthquake. That means wake up, do something, respond. Then, the rest of the world will receive this, and they start going to our platform called the virtual on-site operations coordination center and then start either sharing information or start informing us or informing the network that they are ready to go.

***When everyone is snatching for little to do in one area,
we coordinate and deploy other teams elsewhere.***

Twenty-five years ago, in Armenia, every team wants to go to the market that has collapsed, because it's Sunday, and there are a thousand people under the market. There will be chaos, because no one is going to the villages that have also people trapped. You can't have 60 teams in one spot, and then, the rest of the places, there is no one. What you have is just chaos. Everybody is snatching for the little to do in one area. What OCHA does is coordinate to make sure the first arriving team with that capacity goes to the market for the rescue, and once there is sufficient teams there, we deploy other teams elsewhere.

[In] Nepal, there were 65 teams coming. Instead [of] 65 people talking to the government official that is already stressed up or maybe his own family is under the rubble, we don't know, she talks to one person, the under team, the UN Coordinator that coordinates the 65 teams. That is where we respond quickly and effectively, and then, we coordinate with the teams jointly to support the government. Today when we deploy them, we meet again, what is the outcome, tomorrow, redeploy them to different parts to do rescue work.

Learning and sharing is the culture of this network.

After Haiti [earthquake response], there was a big after-action-review, where we had brought back the responders and had a meeting. Of course, there will be lessons learnt, and those are put back into the guidelines for improvement, and then, the guidelines are revised and improved, and then, we become better not to make some of the same mistakes again, so we do have regular such [a after action review] after a big earthquake. [Learning and sharing] is very important, because for one...every earthquake is different. As they say in the firefighting world, no two fires are alike. So, there is always something new to learn. For a 20-year rescuer, there is always something new to learn from a younger rescuer who has just been to an Ecuador earthquake. This learning and sharing has to continue to allow everybody to move on to the next level, and that is the culture of this network, that we have an annual technical meeting where the team leaders are always sharing information.

Lily

I have known Lily since November 2015, when she connected me with a Master's student group at the London School of Economics and Political Science, as they were working on an evaluation project related to UNICEF's coordination strategy, which had a matter of common interest with my research topic. Lily was not in my initial interviewee list for this study until the third participant, Rachel, referred me to Lily, an officer at UNICEF's Global Cluster Coordination Unit, for an interview. When I contacted her to invite her for an interview, she was

on a business trip in Florida. While she was still there, she offered me a Skype meeting to discuss which of her experiences in humanitarian networks would be beneficial for my study and mentioned a few of them, including UNICEF led-Clusters, Private Fundraising and the Partnerships Section. She agreed to meet with me an hour after she came back to her office in Geneva from the US business trip. We met at a small cafe area on the top floor of the UNICEF building on June 15th, 2016 at 3 PM. The view from the cafe was stunning, and I could see many sites where I had interviews with other participants. As people were having meetings and conversations at the cafe, it was not a completely calm place, but we were still able to complete the interview. During our 70-minute interview session, she shared her experiences at the UN Education Cluster network and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) Task Team on Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). After our meeting, I got on the bus to go the Geneva International Airport to head to London, UK where my last interview in Europe was awaiting.

UNICEF Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) Task Team:

We've gained momentum, and we've gained more support.

The goal of the [Accountability to Affected Population (AAP)] project is to maintain accountability in all UNICEF web clusters. We have two people deployed, one in Jordan and one in DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. They are using, since we believe that the core humanitarian standards (CHS) should be the guiding principle, they're using the CHS in all of their meetings. They're trying to enforce it within the clusters within the country offices. We have results that we feed back to this task team, and eventually, we've gained momentum, and we've gained more support to really go behind the CHS as a guiding principle. What I've seen in the year that I've been in the task team, that from the first meeting, that was a "No." Now, we have actually support. The CHS is part of the task team now. We have other people trying to do programming in their organizations to push for the CHS, bringing back results that are obviously, we hope, are positive to try to make the whole task team embrace the CHS as the guiding principles for AAP.

***A safe space for women was opened to be able to be heard,
and terrible evidence was found.***

So, every other organization uses the old form of accountability, which is, you know, you go, you meet with the elders. They give you the feedback. You take it back. What we've tried is that we've actually, one of the CHS [core humanitarian standards] is to open a safe space for women, specifically to be able to and separate them from the men, for them to be able to be heard. What happened with our mission, which was different from the others, is that when we meet only with women, what we found out is there's grave violations of exploitation of GBV [gender-based violation], of rape, of terrible, terrible evidence that we've found that wouldn't have been found otherwise. Had we not made the extra effort of really going with the CHS and going by the principles, then perhaps, we would have never heard these stories.

What we do is that since we're not in charge of bringing those [gender-based] violations, we can't as UNICEF say, "Okay, we're going to take care of you." We go to our partners in the field who deal with exploitation, sexual exploitation and abuse, rape, and we tell them, "Listen, there's a group of women in this town that are saying this about organizations. There's people from your organization that are asking sexual favors in return for food. You need to tackle the situation." Then, we go back, and we check, "Did you do it? Have you talked to them?" We go back to the women. "Did they get results?" That's how we have seen, I mean, we've only been up for about six to eight months or half of the project, and we've already seen some change. Not only that, but also an attitude change in country offices.

Found a way to access the population in a way that they are comfortable with.

The AAP [Accountability to Affected Population (AAP)] task team has pushed for a Somali based feedback mechanism, where they figured out that, I mean, in Somalia, nobody wants to give you feedback. It's a cultural thing. One fact, one data said that there's about a hundred and twenty percent of cell phone ownership in Somalia. The task team grabbed this data, and with organizations on the ground, managed to create a partnership with a cell phone company that gave them free messaging and said, "If you message any feedback to this number, it's free." So, if WFP [World Food Programme] is giving out food, and suddenly, all of these old women are not able to access it, because they were stopped by a road block 20 kilometers down, they text, and they say, "Food isn't reaching us." Or, you know, "What you're getting us is not what I need" or whatever. We found a way to access the population in a way that they are comfortable with.

We found a way to partner with an organization, like a company, a for-profit company, which is difficult in Somalia, and they gave us free messaging services. Then, we managed to get feedback from the affected population on programming on the ground. Finding a solution to a problem which was we're not able to get feedback from these people. How can we access them? It was through the task team that has a number of people sitting on the table that says, "Oh, why don't you try a cell phone? We have a partnership with a cell phone company." They come together, make it happen. It is about partnership. It is about coming to a table and speaking to each other. It's about open communication, trusting other organizations, funding obviously.

Amelia

My last interview in Europe took place in the center of London, UK, where the Save the Children UK office was based. The eighth participant, Amelia, a senior manager at the Humanitarian Leadership Academy, was an interviewee that I sincerely wanted to meet, because she was the one who decided to support this research in a partnership with Geneva Learning Foundation. When I contacted her to request her participation in this research, she gladly agreed to help out.. Since she had a number of international business trips before and after the World Humanitarian Summit held in Turkey in May, I had to exchange many emails with her and her team to schedule a meeting with her. We were only able to confirm the date and time for an interview just six days before the actual meeting occurred, as she decided to come back to London from her urgent trip to Dubai on the day I was scheduled to go back to Korea. As all other interviews were scheduled with the help of undeniable invisible power and generous support of people from the humanitarian sector, the interview with Amelia was arranged in much the same way. After all the interviews done in Geneva, Switzerland, I travelled to London to meet Amelia, taking a train and a bus to get to the Save the Children UK office, I passed many of London's famous spots such as Big Ben, London Eye, and the National Gallery. As soon as I arrived at the building, I was guided to the inner office space of the Humanitarian Leadership Academy, hosted by Save the Children. There I met Amelia, and she and I had a deep conversation on the research topic and about the transformation and future of the humanitarian sector at a small quiet glass-walled meeting room space. During our meeting, Amelia shared her 10 years of field experience in the Syrian Refugee Camp in Jordan and the cross-sector partnership of the Humanitarian Leadership Academy and a global corporation. When we were about to end our conversation, she thoughtfully told me, "I really look forward to reading your

research, and consider us your family here. If there's anything we can do to help facilitate, please let us know.” Throughout our meeting, I could feel her warmest support and willingness to partner with others to advance the humanitarian sector to better serve the affected population in a new way. Our conversation lasted about 90 minutes.

Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Network:

There's no way to do that unless you work with others.

The [Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Network] is a fenced big city where people don't work, so they do not generate income. They are fully dependent on aid, so imagine yourself running a city on aid. There's no way to do that unless you work with others, because no single organization can provide all the services. Think of yourself as a normal being; you're not a refugee; you're living where you're living. What you need is what these people need. They need access to drinking water; they need clean toilets; the drainage system should be set; they need shelter; their children must go to school; they need food; they need clothes. They need everything that you and I need.

When we [Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Network] started the camp, more than 22 organizations came to the camp, and every organization started doing what they thought they knew best. Of course, we failed miserably in the first 4 months, because there wasn't enough coordination. I think we could not run the camp as a city and make sure that each and every individual had access to all the necessary services until we sat around the table, and we became a network, particularly around this purpose, inside the camp. We said, "This is not going to work. Let's have a master plan. Who's doing what, where?" We started coming up with this action plan that shows exactly the accountability per organization and the area of specialty that each organization's going to do. That became the coordination body of the [Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp Network], which is one of the most efficient networks.

When it rains it floods there. We agreed after the first winter, where people were literally drowning in their tents, because the camp flooded, that pre-positioning and warehouse management is critical. We have to have enough to do evacuation, enough to replace damaged tents, clothes and food. We started sharing information and having those thorough inventories of who can bring what to the mix so that when it's needed it doesn't need approvals from anywhere. It can be mobilized immediately to save lives.

It is still there, up and running, functioning really well, and they're still running the camp as a city. It's run smoothly. Now, food is being distributed on time, water is tanked and brought into the camp on time, schools are operational, child-friendly spaces that provide psychosocial support and child protection services to children are operational.

It is all about the flow of information.

Access to updated information became more of the pattern of work. Regular coordination meetings and update meetings. Reports. Sharing reports on time with the camp management that we'd kept disseminated every morning and identifying the person in charge in the camp who can be brought in to respond to an extra piece of crisis inside the camp like a fire, or a flood, or a drought, or what have you. It was really about the administrative and logistical details and making sure that they're systemized in a way where finding the information or the needed data doesn't take forever. It is all about the flow of information.

In the very early days of the camp, people would be literally fighting to collect their food, and it was very violent. Then, gradually, I think not necessarily only because of the flow of information between us as organizations, but the flow of information between us and the affected population as well, saying, "Look, there's enough food, there's enough water, and the distribution's going to happen in this order, from this hour to this hour on these days." Gradually, they started to understand that, wait a minute, they know what they're doing. We can trust them. Of course, they test you before they trust you, and you can't fail them, because if you fail them and you lose their trust, the chaos will be hard to control. Everyone can sense it that the camp in general calmed down and became easier to manage and easier to manage in partnership with the refugees themselves. That was critical; that was very important.

When any camp gets violent, the most affected are the most vulnerable, who happen to be children and women. You start intentionally or unintentionally causing a lot of harm to the people that you are there to protect. It is about this, you know, the general sense of calmness or stability in a camp means that the most vulnerable populations are not being exposed to any acts that may increase their level of vulnerability. This is very critical.

Managing the relief effort in partnership with the refugees themselves: You manage to restore the affected population's dignity and to empower them.

The regular meetings with the refugees, the sharing of information with them. Hiring them as part of the teams. Making sure that they are part of the teams so that they hear the kind of discussions that we're having, because in camps, word of mouth is very important. If you have 10 refugees working per organization and you have 12 organizations, that's great. You have 120 messengers who can leave after the work day to their little neighborhood or cluster of tents and say, "Look, they know what they're doing. Today, in fact, they met and they discussed x, y and z." You start doing these things intentionally, and then, you start engaging with them in a positive way. Saying, "Okay, I'm going to replace some of the workers with volunteers from the camp, because keeping the population productively busy means they don't have a lot of free time to do disruptions or to do negative things." It is about positive engagement with the refugees and making sure that they have a daily routine where they wake up in the morning. Kids go to school; mothers do what they do; fathers go and earn income. It's about dignity, positive engagement and structured routine for the day. It was very critical. It changed the whole dynamics in the camp.

What happens in crisis is that affected populations lose one thing that none of us can provide, which is their sense of dignity. When they participate in the process of assessing the service providers' quality, efficiency and effectiveness, they start feeling that they are more in control.

They have a say. They're not just a group of poor people who ended up living in tents. No, they matter. They're opinions matter. That's very critical, because if you manage to restore the affected population dignity, you manage to empower them so that they are not broken beyond fixing, so when they go back home, they go back home with dignity, clear understanding, and they can recover from the crisis.

Now, in Zaatari we started something called the complaint mechanism. The complaint mechanism started, actually, with children. It was very impressive. Every child-friendly space would have a box, and children can drop [in] a piece of paper with whichever complaint they have. The complaint doesn't have to be only about the service provider. It could be about lack of safety around toilets or areas in the camp that have high risk and are not cared for, or someone who harassed or abused the child on their way to the child-friendly space, or name it, whatever. It was very, very useful. An eye-opener, actually, by all means, because you start to realize that these young children have a lot to say, and if we, the service provider, listen to them tentatively, there's a lot that we can learn from them. We can improve the quality of our services when we engage them in the process of assessing the quality of the service.

HLA Cross-sector Partnership:

We want to see what would be the return on investing upfront.

We went to [Corporation A], and we met with them, and we said, "Look, you have a business almost anywhere, and when Haiyan happened last year, your business got affected drastically." They said, "Yes." "Why?" They said, "Because our supply chain got interrupted, so our factors that are dependent, or the distribution process that's dependent on the supply chain, stopped." So, "Okay, how can we train individuals within your supply chain so that when a crisis happens next time, they do not shut down and close, but know what to do so that your business is not affected?" Actually, they funded the [network F], and now, we are implementing a joint project in the Philippines. It's a pilot, and we want to see what would be the return on investing upfront, in strengthening and increasing the level of resilience of the supply chain. These are practical things.

Some partners, they give you money, but they don't engage after that. With [the Corporation A], it's different. You feel that you become part of their team, as well, so that exchange of knowledge between a great leading organization from the private sector and a learning organization like us is critical. Because, you know, charities are always accused of not being sustainable, not running themselves as a business. I think partnerships, like the one we're having with [the Corporation A], help us learn business from the business and then contextualize it so that it's fit for the purposes of our business. Otherwise, we'd be spending loads of money to do things in a business way. That's another by-product of the partnership, learning to do things from a business point of view – building business cases, not only case studies, using evidence to provide analytical information that can better inform your next decisions. It's the complete shift in mindset from doing good to doing good in a fashionable business way.

Callum

The ninth participant, Callum, showed much interest in my research when I asked him to participate in the study in March 2016. Mentioning that experts in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) gave him “very positive feedback concerning the content,” Callum asked me to specify my need for support for the research and kindly provided six potential study participants who would be interested in my research project. When I arrived in London to start conducting interviews with experts in the humanitarian sector, I tried to reach him to see him in person in Paris on June 3, 2016; however, we were unable to meet as he was traveling abroad for a sudden business trip. After exchanging several scheduling emails, we finally met by Skype on June 21st at 10 PM, after I came back to Korea from London. Contrary to a face-to-face interview, our online interview did not go smoothly due to a poor network connection and unavoidable time lags in the online meeting. But, during our conversation, I could feel his passion for saving more lives in a disaster response and for developing the capacity of the humanitarian sector through pioneering collaborations between two international humanitarian networks. As a manager at the Global Reference Centre for First Aid at IFRC, Callum shared his experiences at an inter-network collaboration between IFRC and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) on co-creation of guidelines on first aid and resuscitation. He also shared a multi-sectoral collaboration example of the Paris terror attack response with me. Our online conversation lasted about 80 minutes.

IFRC-INSARAG Partnership:

*The efficiency of the networks is really good
when people know each other.*

This collaboration was very fruitful, because, of course, the Red Cross and Crescent are experts, especially in first aid and resuscitation training. Of course, this INSARAG network were specialists in disaster, and that's a very positive collaboration for each of them, to give the

specificity of our competencies to the other and to be better prepared for the possibilities of action in the field, in case of earthquake, for example. We have done a basic book for the people who will be on the ground in case of disaster and to give them the guidelines for first aid and resuscitation, to have the right answer in the minimum amount of time. The discussion we had was taking into account the evidence base for this manual. Each five year, we are updating these guidelines on an international level. We work with INSARAG to put it inside the training documents of the teams, the best techniques in first aid they have to use in case of earthquake. Now, the basic manual for first aid, for the team, now includes the curriculum of INSARAG participants, and it's really, now, printed material.

I think the outcome is to know each other. It's an important outcome, because when I have a discussion with my colleague of the United Nations, it's very important to know the people. Most of the big organizations are working in parallel – not with that spirit, for sure, just a lack of time to know each other. When you have some common topic, to work together is very good, because I think the efficiency of the networks is really good when people know each other, before the crisis and not during the crisis. During the crisis, you don't have enough time. Of course, if all teams are working together before the crisis, there will, probably, be a possibility for better efficiency during the crisis.

INSARAG organizes in-table exercises concerning big disasters. All the teams are working together during these exercises. The preparation of the efficiency of the teams is very important to have, before the crisis, the time to work together. Of course, it's a case study. It's not reality. But, it's the first aspect of collaboration and sharing competencies. In fact, during this exercise, at the table, there is some measure of the efficiency of the team. Of course, the time when the exercise began, you put on the screen what happened. It is, for example, an earthquake for a region. You ask for each team to exercise in their home countries. They have to come to the ground, realize themselves, to collaborate all together. For that, people who are managing the UN, this sort of exercise, use scales and measures of efficiency. You have to do a debriefing to underline where are the strengths, where are the weaknesses during a situation that is not real, to avoid that in real life.

Paris Terror Attack Response Network:

***Two hours after, all of the teams were at the hospital.
It was good organization.***

[November 2015 Paris attacks] was the first time we had such important terrorist attacks with so many TNT bomb fighters. It's very clear that the exercise of the past, where everyone was working together, fire brigade, and Red Cross and civil protection, during the exercise before, has gotten very good results, even though we had so many people dead. The collaboration was very good. After two hours, when the police had killed the terrorists, two hours after, all of the teams were at the hospital. It was good organization.

Since November [2015 Paris attacks], we have done new exercises everywhere in France, because we try to push the different emergency organizations to work together, including military service or police, fire brigade, emergency medical assistance and volunteers. The

outcome is to take into account the rules of intervention of each step of each team. First of all, the police are the first actors. They have to securitize. It's very important for the health professionals to not intervene before the securitization of each service, since the beginning of the action of the terrorists to the end, where the casualties arrive at the hospital. That's very important, to have this articulation between all the services. It is very significant, because it saves lives – lives of first aiders, lives of nurses or doctors.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, to create vivid descriptions of the participants' lived experiences, I introduced nine study participants' critical incident stories related to the effective performance outcomes of leading interorganizational collaboratives in their disaster responses and local preparedness projects in disaster-prone countries. At the beginning of each of the participants' critical incidents, I introduced the participants and described the contexts of each interview meeting. Although the participants explained their experiences at different humanitarian networks, some evident and significant dimensions of organizational performance at the network level were identified during the analysis of the critical incidents and assertions derived from the incidents. In the next chapter, research findings according to the order of the two research questions are reported.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

This chapter presents the research findings of the current study. The former part of this chapter answers the first research question. As a guiding theoretical perspective in the data analysis, learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and Kaplan's (2001) strategic nonprofit performance framework were used. These a priori theoretical frameworks contributed to deductively confirming organizational performance dimensions at the network level, existing in the current organizational performance literature (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance). Then, the chapter reports findings on the second research question. The relational performance dimension as an addition to the organizational performance literature inductively emerged during the latter part of the data analysis process.

Research Question 1. How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?

Using deductive analysis to answer research question one, I confirmed that the three performance dimensions identified in previous studies of organizational performance (i.e., knowledge, financial and mission performance) were also present in these data. Figure 5-1 summarizes the research findings and includes the three identified performance dimensions and sub-themes belonging to each of the dimensions, and the hypothesized relationship among the different dimensions.




Figure 5-1. Knowledge, financial, and mission performance.

Knowledge Performance

Knowledge performance at the network level primarily deals with the enhanced collective learning capacity for the better creation, sharing, and application of knowledge; before, during, and after a humanitarian effort. Such an enhancement of the collective intellectual

capacity of a humanitarian network is explained by three distinct sub-dimensions under the construct: (1) the development, application, and enhancement of global response guidelines, (2) an enhanced collective organizational learning capability, and (3) revamped response methodologies for better results.

The Development, Application, and Enhancement of Global Response Guidelines

Charlie's experience at the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) included working with a group of international rescue organizations and their members that develop global standards and make them available to the humanitarian sector, thus international members comply with the standards. More importantly, the international members use the same field operation language to operate more effectively in humanitarian responses. Charlie noted that the INSARAG as a global emergency rescue network demonstrates its *"effectiveness when teams from different countries come together and can speak a common language in operations."* Charlie explained, for instance, *"marking a building so that everybody looks at this marking, if they are part of INSARAG, they know what this marking is saying. How many people are trapped? What is the hazard?"* But, any rescue team or individual who does not belong to the network cannot understand the marking in the field, making such a rescue effort less efficient. Again, highlighting the importance of using the same operational language in the field, Charlie explained the necessity and the role of commonly accepted humanitarian guidelines to act in the field as an informed team taking collective action:

I look at Nepal, as the most recent earthquake [in 2015], where I was also in the field coordinating international search and rescue teams, and they understand the system. They come for the meetings; they work in accordance with the INSARAG guideline standards. That is the key. You must have a common globally agreed [upon] set of

standards that is understood across the world, contributed by likeminded practitioners across the world, and then they themselves wanting to follow the standards when they deploy.

Leo, a senior manager at the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), also supported the significance of having an effective humanitarian guideline that accelerates collaborative efforts in a disaster and that strengthens the humanitarian community. He described:

What we have developed is an international set of standards. It's, in the humanitarian world, you need, because this is the only place where you have an applied standard for how you do the work to ensure the quality. Further to that, because the guidelines are to ensure the quality and to ensure the interoperability and the coordination of the teams, ten years ago, it was decided, "Let's go a step further. Let's take the guidelines and go out and certify the teams." The team can apply to be certified. Then, they get a diploma or a sticker on their badge on their uniforms. When they're deployed, they demonstrate like ISO 9001. We each get certified by this community. It's a peer review. We now have 46 teams globally that are certified ... The Danish Disaster Management Agency went through this [INSARAG] reclassification last year. I met a lot of former colleagues. I said to them, "I can see that the ground and layout and the training that you're providing has changed significantly. What has made you make these changes?" They said, "INSARAG [Guidelines], because we are taking the international standards that you have developed and bringing them into national standards." For me, that's such an amazing impact that you, through an informal network, have created standards and a normative approach

that is now being introduced as national standards and leading to changes in the way you operate at a national level.

Regarding the enhancement of global guidelines and standards, Charlie told about a “*big after-action-review*” that took place after the emergency response to the Haiti earthquake which occurred in 2010. Bringing back the earthquake responders who worked together in Haiti, the INSARAG network members discussed lessons learned during the response, and “*those [lessons] are put back into the guidelines for improvement.*” He added that the network conducts an after-action-review after a big earthquake, as it is “*better not to make some of the same mistakes again.*”

Similar to the previous examples, but in a larger scale of an internetwork partnership, Callum, a senior manager at the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), explained a collaboration between IFRC and INSARAG networks on a disaster response guideline and the use of it:

We have done a basic book for the people who will be on the ground in case of disaster and to give them the guidelines for first aid and resuscitation, to have the right answer in the minimum amount of time. The discussion we had was taking into account the evidence base for this manual ... To use, really, the best techniques, the simplest ones, for each casualty, in case of hemorrhage, in case of fracture, in case of burns ... It was important for the teams to have the best first aid in mind and, also, to take a regular refresher course, with rules, with a broader content, and with some advice in terms of the integrity as a team, to have in mind that they have to refresh their ... Each five years, we are updating these guidelines on an international level. We work with INSARAG to put it inside the training documents of the teams, the best techniques in first aid they have to

use in case of earthquake. Now, the basic manual for first aid, for the team, now includes the curriculum of INSARAG participants, and it's really, now, printed material.

Enhanced Collective Organizational Learning Capability and Operational Efficiency

An effective humanitarian network nurtures a culture of learning and sharing to help members in the network advance to the next level. Acknowledging the significance of the learning and sharing capacities of the INSARAG network, Charlie described an aspect of a strong organizational learning culture in the network and how the culture impacted the members in the network:

Every earthquake is different. As they say in the firefighting world, no two fires are alike. So, there is always something new to learn. For a 20-year rescuer, there is always something new to learn from a younger rescuer who has just been to an Ecuador earthquake. This learning and sharing has to continue to allow everybody to move on to the next level, and that is the culture of this network, that we have an annual technical meeting where the team leaders are always sharing information.

In a disaster response effort of the United Nations Protection Cluster network during the Nepal earthquake in April 2015, Stanley, as a representative of the lead organization in the network, underscored the importance of “*having exact and proper data about the situation in the field*” as a key success factor of both the short-term and long-term humanitarian efforts. When his team reached Gorkha, Nepal, what the team saw there was not a massive destruction of infrastructure; instead, the team learned that “*the needs were more into the software side, like education and health.*” Again, stressing the importance of acquiring correct information about the situation, he further explained:

If we didn't have that and if you just look into the CNN and see the buildings, you might have channeled a lot of the resources only for bricks and tin sheets for roofs, maybe so that there was a lot more than that that we needed to re-establish the network of health services, bringing on as soon as possible a new education system that is operating.

Also, Callum described a specific exercise designed to prepare them for an earthquake situation in the INSARAG-IFRC collaboration. He described:

INSARAG organizes in-table exercises concerning big disasters. All the teams are working together during these exercises. The preparation of the efficiency of the teams is very important to have, before the crisis, the time to work together. Of course, it's a case study. It's not reality. But, it's the first aspect of collaboration and sharing competencies. In fact, during this exercise, at the table, there is some measure of the efficiency of the team. Of course, the time when the exercise began, you put on the screen what happened. For that, people who are managing the UN, this sort of exercise, use scales and measures of efficiency. You have to do a debriefing to underline where are the strengths, where are the weaknesses during a situation that is not real, to avoid that in real life.

Similarly, recalling the Paris terror attack that happened in November 2015, which resulted in 137 casualties, Callum described the terror attack involved both a lot of “*TNT bomb fighters*” for the first time in the country and a network of responding organizations. He explained, “*It's very clear that the exercise of the past, where everyone was working together, fire brigade, and Red Cross and civil protection, during the exercise before, has gotten very good results, even though we had so many people dead,*” indicating the high efficiency of the humanitarian response through previous collective trainings. Callum added, “*The collaboration*

was very good. After two hours, when the police had killed the terrorists, two hours after, all of the teams were at the hospital. It was good organization.”

Additional evidence of improved organizational efficiency at the network level was also apparent in Leo’s experience at the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP). About a “joint deployment” of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and the IHP network in response to the 2016 Ecuador earthquake, where the country suffered almost 7,000 casualties, Leo looked back both on the things that went well and the things that did not go well during the collective action. In an after-action-meeting, he said that he questioned the collaboration, *“Are we too different? Can we, with some adjustment, training, understanding, clear protocols, make this work in the future?”* Mentioning that such a joint deployment yielding a successful outcome during their first attempt is a rare case, he further explained, *“Most important is all of these arrangements have been built on the basis of meeting in the emergency environment. We met in the field in the emergency.”* This is an example of the collective development of operational efficiency, where member organizations collectively improve the collaboration process together in the field to become a more efficient network in emergency response collaborations.

Revamped Response Methodologies for Better Results

Lily, a manager at UNICEF, described how UNICEF’s Accountability to the Affected Population (AAP) task team approached better serving an affected population using a new humanitarian standard, the core humanitarian standards (CHS):

The goal of the [AAP] project is to maintain accountability in all UNICEF web clusters. We have two people deployed, one in Jordan and one in DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. They are using, since we believe that the core humanitarian standards

should be the guiding principle, they're using the CHS in all of their meetings. They're trying to enforce it within the clusters within the country offices. We have results that we feed back to this task team, and eventually, we've gained momentum, and we've gained more support to really go behind the CHS as a guiding principle. What I've seen in the year that I've been in the task team, that from the first meeting, that was a "No." Now, we have actually support. The CHS is part of the task team now. We have other people trying to do programming in their organizations to push for the CHS, bringing back results that are obviously, we hope, are positive to try to make the whole task team embrace the CHS as the guiding principles for AAP.

So, every other organization uses the old form of accountability, which is, you know, you go, you meet with the elders. They give you the feedback. You take it back. What we've tried is that we've actually, one of the CHS is to open a safe space for women, specifically to be able to, and separate them from the men, for them to be able to be heard. What happened with our mission, which was different from the others, is that when we meet only with women, what we found out is there's grave violations of exploitation of GBV [gender-based violation], of rape, of terrible, terrible evidence that we've found that wouldn't have been found otherwise. Had we not made the extra effort of really going with the CHS and going by the principles, then perhaps, we would have never heard these stories.

Regarding rules of intervention, Callum, as a senior manager at French Red Cross, described a different response approach to a national disaster since the Paris attack in November 2015. By conducting nationwide exercises involving various emergency response organizations, such as “*military service or police, fire brigade, emergency medical assistance and volunteers,*”

he mentioned that the outcome of the exercises was “*to take into account the rules of intervention of each step of each team.*” About the specific procedures pertaining to the new rule, to save more lives of first responders and healthcare professionals, he explained:

First of all, the police are the first actors. They have to securitize. It's very important for the health professionals to not intervene before the securitization of each service, since the beginning of the action of the terrorists to the end, where the casualties arrive at the hospital. That's very important, to have this articulation between all the services.

Drawing attention to the nature of humanitarian work because of the “*very narrow window of opportunity to save life,*” Leo explained how the new disaster response network using different approaches was formed, starting from responders from only three European countries (i.e., Austria, Switzerland, and Germany) after the Armenian earthquake in 1998:

They started a cooperation. They reached out and brought 40 different organizations together and to discuss. In that discussion, the outcome of that was we need to be a bit ... We need to coordinate better, too, because we have this very narrow window of opportunity to save life. We need to be super effective, to be super effective. We need to have good coordination. We need to have common standards, so we speak the same language, even though we speak different languages.

Revamping an existing disaster methodology through collective efforts between two leading international humanitarian networks was also witnessed. Leo described the multi-year process of enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of their cooperation in the field:

We've [INSARAG] worked with the World Health Organization for the past two years, with the Emergency Medical Teams. We are basically taking, the approach we are taking, I think, gets the Members on board, organizes them at a regional level, does a

normative approach for guidelines, which is done, and does a certification process to ensure the quality control. They are in the process of setting that up. Now, they are some years behind us. They're working very fast. Eventually, they will take over, and we will start learning from them, because they see it's quite a difference. There are different things today than there was 25 years ago when we started that ... lessons they have learned they don't need to relearn. We operationalized the partnership. In the field, in emergencies, it will become, over time, a natural way of cooperating. Last month in Istanbul, we did a simulation exercise with the Turkish authorities, where we brought in teams that were playing or responding to an earthquake in eastern Istanbul. Then, we checked it. We verified the contingency plan for Istanbul. We did it jointly with WHO. There were medical teams and rescue teams.

Financial Performance

Another performance dimension of highly successful interorganizational collaboratives in the humanitarian sector found in this study is related to financial performance, which involves mobilizing critical resources for their continuous service to the affected population in a disaster situation and for covering their operational cost.

Mobilizing Support Resources for Sustainable Action

An effective humanitarian network acquires critical resources, including both financial and non-financial forms, and mobilizes partners' support for collective action to initiate, sustain, or expand their disaster response efforts. Sometimes, such a network secures sponsorship from its supporters (e.g., intergovernmental constituency) to cover its operation costs.

An example that Leo relayed was the formal negotiation and agreement between the European Union (EU) and the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) in which the EU

would fund the disaster response activities of the IHP, a voluntary multinational network of seven European countries, which has an informal and adaptable network that can quickly deploy its resources (e.g., experts and modularized housing units) to disaster sites. He considered the arrangement a significant success and explained the detail of a negotiation process for resource securing:

We had a reach with the IHP, what we wanted. They [European Union] took us, sat down in Brussels for two days, and negotiated this arrangement that ECHO [European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations] can actually sponsor IHP, not as individual member organizations, [which] make mistakes, but as a network, ECHO can give money to the network to cover costs of operations.

Highlighting the acquiring of ECHO's financial support on the IHP operation as a significant financial achievement, Leo also explained about the enhanced strategic position of the network in the humanitarian sector, thus attracting more partners and their resources:

Now, this [the International Humanitarian Partnership] network is so recognized, and in this technical field, also, the private sector, for example, provides us, those of living facility equipment. They're coming to this network and asking them to test equipment, because this has become a brand somehow. There is an appreciation of the network in the member states and the funding sources and the trust in the quality of what is happening.

Another example of acquiring external support is found in a case of the Gavi CSO Steering Committee and the global coordinator, Daisy, visiting Washington, D.C. to present the mission performance of local CSO network on immunization. There, they appealed their case to acquire future support to international organizations. Daisy explained:

What we [Gavi CSO Steering Committees] have done there is we have shared those as very specific examples when we have other big international organizations showing interest in the work. For example, I was just in Washington a few weeks ago, actually, presenting those two examples, from Malawi and from Kenya, to the Global Partnership for Social Accountability. It's run out of the World Bank, and what they do is they provide grants ... to increase country level accountability in health and education programs. I was there presenting our country platforms project and highlighting specific examples of where we've seen some real impact. Letting them know that they [local CSO networks] are there ... a coordinated CSO element that has the capacity to support health and, within that, immunization programs in their countries. We have received quite a bit of interest, especially from USAID in working with the platforms. The World Bank, through the GPSA, is showing interest. That's moving in a positive direction.

Confronting the issue of limited resources available both internationally and locally, Rachel explained her experience at the Child Protection Working Group that operated in the Central African Republic where a civil war started in 2012, thus affecting “*Thousands... millions of children*” there. She further explained the terrible situation: “*There were a lot of abused children being recruited into armed groups.*” As she arrived to support the coordination of the humanitarian efforts, she noticed that there were only “*four international organizations and like 20 national organizations,*” because of the high cost to operate in the area where massive problems have been going on “*for 20 years, 50 years.*” Realizing that a change had to be made by making sure that additional organizations were also involved in this collective action, Rachel reported to her superior, and then, the head of UNICEF individually asked the CEOs or the directors of other humanitarian organizations for help, explaining, “*This is the situation in*

Central African Republic. We need you to come and act in these and these areas.” About the successful support mobilization, she explained:

We knew exactly who to write to and who was doing what and how we could get them on board. That worked. World Vision expanded their operations. IRC [International Rescue Committee] expanded their operations. War Child came. Islamic Relief came because of the letters that were sent. If there's more... If World Vision comes with, you know, 50 staff, that there'll be an impact for children. I think that had a big impact.

Mission Performance

In this study, mission performance was to effectively serve the needs of the affected population better and faster, oriented and supported by a strong mission and shared values in a humanitarian network. Mission performance consists of (1) rapidly providing quality vital services, (2) a strong mission and shared values, and (3) increased stability and resilience in the affected population.

Rapidly Providing Quality Vital Services

The faster a humanitarian network responds in a disaster, the more people it saves. Regarding timely service to the affected population, Charlie put great emphasis on the speed of emergency rescue efforts saying:

[In] Haiti, it's a miracle we save 100 people, because the responses were very fast. That is something about INSARAG. We must be fast, because there is only a golden window of 72 hours for life saving. Anything to do with INSARAG is like a fire station; you must be fast. You must go quickly; you must get the job done. There must not be any red tape at customs, at immigration. In Nepal, we received a red alert within an hour of the earthquake. That means wake up, do something, respond. Then, the rest of the world will

receive this, and they start going to our platform called the virtual on-site operations coordination center and then start either sharing information or start informing us or informing the network that they are ready to go.

Also, Leo explained how a collaboration between two networks, OCHA and the International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP), comprised of multiple actors from different sectors (e.g., government, for-profit, and nonprofit), promptly respond to a disaster and provided needed services to affected populations and the work of humanitarian networks and organizations. He described:

Some partners, they deliver; like the IHP, delivers directly to us and enables us. Other partners will go out and fix problems that, for example, energy. Not necessarily for us, but to ensure that the affected community is assisted. By having this network of partnerships, we make sure it's done in a coordinated way. There is a trust and an information exchange throughout.

Stanley, as a senior manager at Good Neighbors International, recalled the rapid emergency response performed by the network during the April 2015 Nepal earthquake. Having two control towers for a coordination purpose, one in Kathmandu in Nepal and another one in South Korea, the Good Neighbors International network best utilized its resources to save and help the affected population in Nepal. In this case, it is evident that an effective humanitarian network fosters ongoing dialogue and collaboration among local member organizations to best prepare themselves against an emergency at the local level, thus equipping itself for the best delivery of service. Stanley added, *“We were shifting many experts into sectors of logistics, PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] support, psychosocial support, medical support, so they could provide timely and very much needed relief services to the people affected in Nepal.”*

Stanley also said that Good Neighbors International participated in the United Nations' coordinated disaster response in Gorkha in Nepal, where the earthquake originated. He gave an example of prompt services provided by the Education and Health Cluster to the affected population in Nepal, saying, "*We were one of the first ones to deliver temporary learning centers, psychosocial support, as well as temporary medical centers in very remote places of this region in Nepal.*" Again, he pointed out that such an accomplishment could have only been possible, because people from local offices of the network "*continuously participated in the national level networking efforts between NGOs.*" About the effectiveness of the active participation of numerous actors, such as UN agencies, international NGOs, and local governments, in the coordinated response to the Nepal earthquake, Stanley further explained:

The outcome we could say, of course, we have numbers of the people assisted, especially in the sectors of health and shelter. No food items as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction of temporary learning centers (TLCs), and psychosocial support for the children, especially for children who are affected by the earthquake. This will be the operational resource outcomes of our operation.

Daisy presented a good example of people getting such services from a humanitarian network. In Kenya, the Civil Society Organization platform (CSO), a group of civil organizations in a country working collectively to promote immunization in the country affiliated with the Gavi CSO Constituency network, campaigned to inform the public and use a new maternal tetanus immunization in collaboration with WHO and the Kenyan government. However, the Kenya Catholic Conference of Bishops took a stand against the vaccine, assuming that it had the effect of birth control. So, the CSO platform adopted an initiative to negotiate a solution for the use of the new vaccine. Daisy explained:

We were able to ... in the end, the campaign, the immunization campaign, went forward and to a high acceptance rate. The Kenya Catholic Conference of Bishops agreed to an approach whereby the vaccine samples would be tested, both by labs in the country and labs outside of the country, then there were letters sent out by WHO, by UNICEF, by the Minister of Health in Kenya, all the time saying the vaccine is safe. The vaccine is safe. What's important is that the pregnant, the women of childbearing age, accepted the vaccine, most of them, during the campaigns and that it, as far as we know, didn't have a long-term deleterious impact.

A Strong Mission and Shared Values

Based on an understanding of the transformational and purpose-driven nature of a humanitarian network, Kian, former director at the UN agency in Sudan, explained the role of a strong mission and shared values to a successful humanitarian network:

There has to be a reason why you come together, and if the reason is strong enough, you will stay strong together. [Also,] there has to be some shared values. If you all believe that children around the world should not get polio and that you are driven by that mission, whether you're a truck driver or whether you're a scientist, or whether you are a fridge manufacturer or a solar panelist, which is making the solar energy for the fridge in the desert in Sudan, all of that, then many people on organizations are in networks without even knowing it, because of the interdependency that they have. They don't even realize [the existence of a network], so the truck driver is going around driving trucks. He doesn't even realize that he's part of a network, which is working together to eradicate polio in the world.

Indicating the peculiarity of interorganizational collaboration, Kian also noted that an effective humanitarian network is transformational and purpose-driven:

Networks can be hidden, [or] they can be visible; they can be temporary; they can be formed, reformed, [or] deformed, because networks are not necessarily permanent, may not be permanent. When the job is done, they should disband and form new networks with some other purpose that has to take place.

Increased Stability and Resilience in the Affected Population

During an emergency response, keeping the affected population calm and maintaining a safe environment are significant goals for a humanitarian network to achieve. Unless the affected population has a level of stability, no humanitarian effort can be effective and have a long-term impact. From a key informant of the study, the following two factors were identified to assure the effective performance of humanitarian responses in terms of keeping a level of stability in the affected population, which include: protection of vulnerable populations and trust between the affected population and service networks.

Vulnerable groups of people (e.g., women and children) are kept safe from violence when a humanitarian network effectively maintains the stability of the affected population. In Amelia's humanitarian responses in the Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp in Jordan, she focused her attention on keeping the camp as stable as possible to protect the vulnerable groups there, including women and children. If such a refugee camp, a fenced city with 100,000 Syrian refugees that is run on aid, gets violent, the vulnerable group, "*particularly women head of households, children, unaccompanied children, they tend to get much less services than they should in order to live a good life.*" And, any unexpected events, such as a flood, fire, or drought in a camp, as well as

mistrust between stakeholders (i.e., the affected population and service providers) within the camp can be a reason for derangement. She further explained:

When any camp gets violent, the most affected are the most vulnerable, who happen to be children and women. You start intentionally or unintentionally causing a lot of harm to the people that you are there to protect. It is about this, you know, the general sense of calmness or stability in a camp means that the most vulnerable populations are not being exposed to any acts that may increase their level of vulnerability. This is very critical.

About trust between the affected population and the service networks, Amelia recalled the early days in the Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp, where people were fighting to acquire food. The refugees did not initially trust the service providers when the camp did not have the capacity to operate with appropriate operational efficiencies and information flow mechanisms, which would have assured the affected population's trust in the humanitarian network. When the refugee group realized that there was enough food and supplies to be distributed to them fairly and steadily by the network, they gradually began to understand the operation of the camp and to trust the service providers, finally acknowledging, "*We can trust them.*" She described the trust formation process in a simple story and how significant it was to make the refugee camp more stable and manageable based on the trust between the affected population and the service providers as follows:

In the very early days of the camp, people would be literally fighting to collect their food, and it was very violent. Then, gradually, I think not necessarily only because of the flow of information between us as organizations, but the flow of information between us and the affected population as well, saying, "Look, there's enough food, there's enough water, and the distribution's going to happen in this order, from this hour to this hour on these

days." Gradually, they started to understand that, wait a minute, they know what they're doing. We can trust them. Of course, they test you before they trust you, and you can't fail them, because if you fail them and you lose their trust, the chaos will be hard to control. Everyone can sense it that the camp in general calmed down and became easier to manage and easier to manage in partnership with the refugees themselves. That was critical; that was very important.

Even when there is no humanitarian disaster, an effective network provides training on and knowledge about disaster prone countries to maintain a high level of preparedness at the local level. Charlie, a global disaster coordinator at the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), explained disaster preparedness work as a regular activity of the network, which involved “training” and “equipping” governments and countries at the local level. He further explained the process of preventative measures performed internationally:

Just like a fire station, what they are doing, there is not fire now, but they are not sleeping. They are training; they are preparing themselves. They are going to the chemical industry so that they prepare contingency plans. This morning, I just met the Ambassador of Bhutan, and we're already talking about what happens, God forbid, when something happens in Bhutan, because it's in an active Himalayan Region. How can we as INSARAG offer support, offer training, you know, share with disaster prone countries the methods, the procedures so that they can be self-sufficient at the national level?

Such disaster preparedness work of an effective humanitarian network raises the resilience of the community at the local level. As a key coordinator for the partnership between the Humanitarian Leadership Academy (HLA) and a global consumer goods company, which strengthens supply chain resilience at the local level against a natural disaster, Amelia

highlighted the importance of mobilizing support. Addressing the massive local supply chain's disruption that occurred during the hurricane Haiyan that hit the Philippines in 2013, she proposed a joint project of "*strengthening and increasing the level of resilience of the supply chain*" by training individuals working at this supply chain in the Philippines so that the people "*know what to do*" when there is a crisis to keep the supply chain running, which the organization was dependent on, thus its business stream would remain unaffected. The partnering organization actually funded the pilot project, and as the project continues, the partnership is expecting a significant "*return on investing upfront*" at this local supply chain. This type of "*practical*" partnership between a humanitarian network and a for-profit organization is important, because not only does the success of acquiring a funding source from a partnering corporation help the network sustain and even expand its service at the local level, but at the same time, the successful implementation of the project also has an impact on the lives of people in a disaster-prone country in a positive way.

In brief, to answer the first research question of the current study, the findings using a deductive data analysis approach described each of the three significant dimensions of performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives, mainly from the cases of the humanitarian sector. And, the findings corroborated the three distinct dimensions of organizational performance (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance), conceptualized by a priori theoretical frameworks on organizational performance theories, which included learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and Kaplan's (2001) strategic nonprofit performance framework. In the following section of this chapter, findings for the second research question of this study are presented.

Research Question 2. How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

Relational Performance

In this study, it was found that a successful humanitarian network develops and extends relational capacity of the network with multiple stakeholders for better collaboration. The new performance dimension implying such a capacity was named as *relational performance*. Three distinct sub-themes under the relational performance dimension emerged: (1) a coordinated and mutually appreciative intra-network relationship, (2) extended partnerships outside the original network, and (3) a well-established relationship between the network and the affected population. Figure 5-2 summarizes the research findings and includes the inductively identified relational performance dimension and sub-themes belonging to the dimension.




Figure 5-2. Relational performance.

A Coordinated and Mutually Appreciative Intranetwork Relationship

Member organizations in a highly successful interorganizational collaborative put their efforts into performing more effectively and efficiently and into serving the affected population better through establishing and developing an effective intra-network relationship, and the evidence of its performance can be found in the following four areas: collaborative leadership at

all levels, establishment of a coordinated body, a strong collective culture embedded in the network, and a firmly established and continuously evolving relational constitution and interconnectivity.

Collaborative leadership at all levels. When there is a collaborative leadership evident both at the individual and the member organization level, a humanitarian network can achieve its mission and thrive, therefore serving the affected population better. Acknowledging her superior as “*a wonderful coordinator*” and “*a neutral broker*,” Rachel said: “*It's so easy to pull the blanket towards UNICEF if you're sitting in UNICEF and your boss is UNICEF and your salary is UNICEF, but she never did that.*” As a leader in the CPWG network, Rachel’s superior had a clear vision of the network, decided to remain neutral, and worked hard, rather than taking a particular position, as she managed the network. Rachel, stressing the importance of leadership and modeling in a collaborative network, told an anecdote about her, “*when somebody had to take notes at an interagency meeting, she took the pen. She took the notes. She didn't say, ‘Oh, I'm not going to do this.’ I think having a good coordinator is essential, a very good manager.*”

In 2013, the members of the CPWG collectively undertook the project of assessing the child protection status in Syria. Rachel, recollecting the project as “*a super complicated*” mission, explained the dangerous situation in the country at the time. The mission of the CPWG network members was “*to know who are the actors in country and what are the problems that children are facing*,” but they were unable to get into the country. She described how the leader and members of the network managed the situation to accomplish this seemingly impossible mission:

So, rather than saying, ‘Well, I'm not going to do it. It's too complicated,’ the group and she [my boss] said, ‘We have to do it; we have to do it together. We have to take on this

challenge.’ So, they managed ... They set up a whole system, where it was from technical expertise, where they were able to interview children that had just escaped Syria into Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. All agencies contributed. You know, to make a long story short, after 18 months, we had a strong assessment of the situation of child protection in Syria. I think that's a good example of where the only way we could do it was to work together. Because everybody had different bits of information. We knew we needed to do it together in a very confidential way. I think that's where you see the massive added value of some of this work.

Rachel shared another story at CPWG in Syria, where she set up a *program coordination mechanism* to improve the program’s effectiveness on child protection there. Because the Syrian government and the rebel groups confronted each other in the south and the north, accordingly, humanitarian agencies in the “*North didn’t know what the South was doing in terms of programming.*” For example, even though World Vision was running their programs in the North and the IRC [International Rescue Committee] was programming in the South, they did not know what other agencies were doing, because “*the Syrian government said, ‘We’ll kick you out if you’re working in the rebel group.’ Or, the rebel group said, ‘We’ll kick you out if you’re working in Damascus.’ So, there was a lot of confidentiality...*” Under such a harsh situation, the CPWG underwent a mapping process of identifying such problems and each agency’s programs to improve the effectiveness of the programs (e.g., reunifying children, psychosocial distress treatment, releasing children from armed groups, etc.) with a coordination mechanism set up in the country. Rachel, then, explained:

Agencies changed their programs based on the problems that were in country and based on knowing what the others were doing. [The action] also made sure that a coordination

mechanism was set up in country. Where now, five years later, now, they are allowed to talk. Before, they weren't allowed to talk. Even on Skype. Now, they're ... It also pushed for advocacy. [The collective action] was actually the only way we could unblock this, the only way we could move forward. Kind of like the partnership now. It's like, we've all tried on our agency level. We've done what we could at an agency level to make things more forward. Or, a sector-level.

Establishment of a coordinated body. The collaborative efforts of humanitarian organizations enable them to work as a network to better serve the complex needs of an affected population, which an independent organization can scarcely achieve. The following critical incidents of the study participants' experiences substantiates the significance of the existence of such a coordination mechanism as an aspect of the relational performance of humanitarian networks.

After the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, a number of humanitarian organizations started their own programs to assist the Syrian refugee group fleeing to Jordan. Amelia explained the significance of the establishment and management of an effective coordination body run by all the member organizations in the network, thus transforming the humanitarian network seamlessly, making its operational services available to an affected population:

It [the Zaatari camp] is a fenced big city where people don't work, so they do not generate income. They are fully dependent on aid, so imagine yourself running a city on aid. There's no way to do that unless you work with others, because not a single organization can provide all the services. When we started the camp, more than 22 organizations came to the camp, and every organization started doing what they thought they know best. Of course, we failed miserably in the first four months, because there

wasn't enough coordination. I think we could not run the camp as a city and make sure that each and every individual have access to all the necessary services until we sat around the table, and we became a network, particularly around this purpose, inside the camp. We said, 'This is not going to work. Let's have a master plan. Who's doing what, where?' We started coming up with this action plan that shows exactly the accountability per organization and the area of specialty that each organization's going to do. That became the coordination body of the Zaatari camp, which is one of the most efficient networks. It is still there, up and running, functioning really well, and they're still running the camp as a city. It's run smoothly. Now, food is being distributed on time, water is tanked and brought into the camp on time, schools are operational, child-friendly spaces that provide psychosocial support and child protection services to children are operational.

Charlie also provided an example of successful coordination of rescue team deployment in different areas helping a network to save more lives in a disaster situation. During the earthquake response in Armenia in 1988, he noted there were many rescue teams that only wanted to go to the “*collapsed*” market area, where thousands of people were covered by rubble in the market on Sunday. In such a tragic situation, what made the situation even worse was that there were few teams that went to village areas where people were also “*trapped*” due to the earthquake’s destruction there. Expressing his concern for such a disorderly situation, explaining, “*You can't have 60 teams in one spot, and then, the rest of the places, there is no one. What you have is just chaos. Everybody is snatching for the little to do in one area,*” Charlie explicated the expected performance of a coordinated body of a response system, for instance, where there is a

coordinator to make sure the first arriving team with that capacity goes to the market for the rescue and to “*deploy other teams elsewhere*” once there are “*sufficient teams*” at the market.

A strong collective culture embedded in the network. Lily explained the significance of having an organizational culture that brings the UN’s Education Cluster network members together:

The education cluster has cluster coordinators that are part of a rapid response team (RRT). Each RRT has about ten to twelve people in it. They're all funded by other organizations, which means that we pay the other organizations for their salaries, or the other organizations give us in kind donations, basically a person. It's very interesting, because all of these come from different administrations, different organizational cultures. They make different amounts of money. They live in different cities. They all have one culture, which is the education cluster. That's why it's very important, when you introduce yourself, you don't introduce yourself as UNICEF. You introduce yourself, 'I'm an education cluster coordinator.' That's how it comes together. They have a very, very good capacity.

Another example of organizational culture in the UNICEF network includes member organizations communicating openly to find a solution to better serve the affected population, trusting each other. Lily mentioned the Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) task team that aimed to maintain accountability in all of UNICEF’s clusters. The network established a partnership with a telecommunication company in Somalia to better communicate with the affected population living in rural communities through the free messaging service provided by the company. She said, “*They [the network members] come together, make it happen. It is about*

partnership. It is about coming to a table and speaking to each other. It's about open communication, trusting other organizations.”

About the UN’s Protection Cluster Network’s unique collective decision-making process, Stanley explained that whenever there is a working group decision making meeting, member organizations “ask the delegation from other stakeholders” and deliver a collective opinion “endorsed by other stakeholders” to a general meeting to make a decision. Stanley further explained the culture:

We always announce transparently when the meeting will be there, and this is one of the processes that OCHA requires to the clusters. There is always much transparency, and we try to put as much accountability down there in the decision-making process, so it doesn't either sideline anyone nor ignore anyone's decision... You really need that kind of transparency and that kind of accountability and engagement inside the group if you want to really hold the group.

Firmly established and continuously evolving relational constitution and interconnectivity. Kian stressed the invisible infrastructural connectivity and role differences among different member organizations. Using the same polio project in Sudan, he explained the importance of having an interconnectivity and interdependency among key players in a humanitarian network, which affects the success of a project:

[The success of a program] depends on the manufacture of the polio vaccine, the transport system, [and] the healthcare worker. It depends on the funders or funding, paying the health worker and the truck driver to take the vaccine. It [also] depends on the company that makes the energy for the fridge in which you store all your vaccine, and there's connectivity to that infrastructure that delivers a child who is protected against

polio. You can't measure whether the polio vaccine manufacturing's more important than the truck driver, than the government health minister or the Gates Foundation, which gives the money to resource it. [Within such] networks, individual organizations in the network have differentiated roles. The truck company, the polio manufacturer, the fridge stores the vaccine, doing completely different businesses. They are very important parts of the polio network, without which the world would not rid itself of polio.

A mechanism that regards the success of the network collectively, rather than giving attribution to an individual member organization, makes a humanitarian network and its members more effective and appreciative as a collaborative. Kian asserted that any “*attribution*” of a network’s effort and performance “*is to the network as opposed to the individual organization.*” Strongly signifying the importance of “*merging the results of collectivity,*” he further explained, in general, drawing on his extensive experience with international interorganizational collaboratives:

Collective results mean, everyone sitting around the table gets a share of the praise for delivering the result. That's an incentive for a collective network to work collectively is to set up arrangements which does not give individual organizational attribution, otherwise why work in a network? If I'm going to get my incentive, by delivering myself, then I will maximize selfishness and not connectivity. If I'm rewarded for being a good member of a network, then I'm interested in making the network a success compared to myself a success.

Indicating the peculiarity of an interorganizational network, Kian explained, “*Networks can be hidden, [or] they can be visible; they can be temporary; they can be formed, reformed, [or] deformed, because networks are not necessarily permanent, may not be permanent.*” He

added that member organizations in a network “*should disband and form new networks*” upon the completion of the mission of the network, as such a consideration applies to all businesses “*in the world.*”

Charlie said that the INSARAG was “*alive and well*” and described how the network kept its performance level high and constant at all times. Regarding the governance of the network, he explained that there are three key regions that run a “*very comprehensive program*” and get support from Geneva’s secretariat office. The regional offices have “*their own regional meetings, work plans, exercises, training, customized to the region,*” whereas there is a “*governance system*” and “*the steering group*” at the global level. In addition to the governance system, Charlie also explained how annual meetings make the network stronger as a band of collective response teams:

We have the annual technical team leaders’ meetings; we have working groups that work on technical issues. Every year, we have meetings coming together, learning from each other, going for exercises. In another analogy, we’re like a country club. You get the most benefit by coming to the club and meeting people, networking, strengthening friendships, so that when the real disaster happens, you are prepared. You look at the person, you put a name to a face, and then, you are responding together. That’s how we become strong as a network.

Extended Partnerships Outside the Original Network

To broaden the influence of the humanitarian network, member organizations actively establish external partnerships with parties outside the original network. The two major external parties are government agencies and individual NGOs at the local level. Working with the government body involves a humanitarian network both coordinating aid operations together

with the local government and lobbying the local government to better serve the affected population. On the other hand, collaborating with local organizations and networks in a partnership requires a humanitarian network to keep in close contact with them at the local level and to continuously search for potential collaborators with resources and expertise necessary to the original network. These extended partnerships in relation to external parties at the local level are considered as another key relational performance of a humanitarian network, according to the study participants.

Daisy offered a good example of providing preventative medication services to children and women in developing countries and of advocating for new vaccines to local governments and authorities through a partnership of country level CSOs coordinated by each country's platform. She said, "*The [Malawi] platform advocated with the National Immunization Program to switch from the use of the measles vaccine to the combined measles rubella vaccine.*" Through the advocacy work in relation to the governmental body in the country, she explained that the children in Malawi are to be protected against both measles and rubella. As an example of the success of the Gavi CSO Constituency in collaboration with the local vaccine network platform, Daisy explained negotiating as well as working with the local government:

The CSO platform was able to have enough technical information on immunization such that they were able to get a hold of the various data showing the efficacy of the bivalent vaccine and showing that rubella was an issue in the country and showing that children were more likely to be protected against both diseases if the bivalent vaccine was used. They went to the EPI [Expanded Programme on Immunization] manager with that information and convinced him. I think that shows tremendous success. We were able to

put information in the hands of non-government actors, who were then able to approach their government with it.

Daisy provided another example of working with the local government in Malawi. She explained:

The country was meant to be constructing cold storage facilities, and for some reason, that work was taking quite a long time. The platform lobbied and lobbied and lobbied to have that sped up and completed. Same thing with the country's annual immunization plan. Again, it was dragging, and the platform did a lot of lobbying towards the government to see that that was finalized. The Civil Society platform was holding the government accountable to what it had promised to deliver in the case of the cold storage facility and the case of finalizing the annual immunization plan.

Then, Daisy gave an example of successful bargaining between the local immunization CSO platform supported by the global network and the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops on a “maternal tetanus immunization campaign that WHO and that the Kenyan government were conducting.” Since the Catholic Bishops were warning people in Kenya “not to accept the vaccine,” in fear of birth control matter in the vaccine, the immunization campaign came to a deadlock. Then, Daisy further explained how the leadership of the local CSO platform comprised of a number of local immunization organizations resolved the issue and led to a positive outcome:

Our CSO platform there was instrumental in communicating with the Kenyan Conference of Catholic Bishops in, kind of, brokering a solution that was acceptable to them to allow the maternal tetanus campaigns to go forward ... in the end, the campaign, the immunization campaign, went forward and to a high acceptance rate. The Kenya

Catholic Conference of Bishops agreed to an approach whereby the vaccine samples would be tested, both by labs in the country and labs outside of the country, then there were letters sent out by WHO, by UNICEF, by the Minister of Health in Kenya, all the time saying the vaccine is safe. The vaccine is safe. What's important is that the pregnant, the women of childbearing age, accepted the vaccine, most of them, during the campaigns and that it, as far as we know, didn't have a long-term deleterious impact.

Similar to the global immunization network case, Leo explained the case of the (INSARAG where the network helped the Ecuadoran government establish a coordinated national rescue system and guidelines so that the government could organize the certification process of a local rescue team that meets national standards and “*the process of mobilizing and deploying in country.*” Leo expressed his excitement at the achievement and partnership of the informal network stating, “*That becomes fascinating how far you can take it. Now, suddenly, an informal network of organizations now goes in and directly influences the way you operate in a member state.*”

Leo, facilitating the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) network, expounded on the UNDAC’s vital partnership with a number of organizations with expertise supporting UNDAC’s field operations in humanitarian responses. Giving an example of the Bam earthquake in Iran in 2003, he said that the UNDAC network identified operational gaps in its capability, thus it looked for “*other organizations*” that “*could do things more effectively*” than the UNDAC network could perform. As a result of continuously partnering with technologically advanced and committed organizations, Leo said, “*we have now 20 different organizations that we are cooperating with around providing technical support in emergencies,*” which enabled the network to perform more effectively in the field. He expounded on the

establishment of such an extended partnership of the UNDAC network with MapAction, a British NGO:

It's a group of volunteers and experts in GIS [Geographic Information System] and mapping that commits, so they're a member. That network, you meet once or twice a month, and they do training around mapping in emergencies. Then, they commit their spare time to be deployed. When we have emergencies, they deploy two or five or more mapping experts that sit with our team and do all the GIS mapping.

Leo, describing the limitations of the UN's humanitarian coordination body in humanitarian responses, which cannot possess all the resources for a field operation (e.g., communication, accommodation, transportation), emphasized partnerships with other organizations that could fill the resource gap but “*didn't have a purpose*” to utilize the asset. To get operational support from the organizations, the UNDAC network started building a partnership with civil defense organizations in Northern Europe and then created a sub-network, the IHP. Instead of managing the partnership with the individual civil defense organizations in different European countries, the UNDAC network established the IHP so that the sub-network could manage and operate by itself, thus supporting the UNDAC's work as a partnering network. Leo described how the UNDAC network extended its operational capacity by partnering with the IHP, which provided expertise and resources during humanitarian crises, thus positively impacting the field operations:

These are basically civil defense type organizations that are supporting us in emergency operations by deploying technical equipment. That can be satellite phones or tents or whatever, and training staff, their own staffs that are trained to operate the equipment and operate in this type of environment. They cooperate, and when we ask for support,

then they identify who can deliver that support. For example, in Haiti, this subnetwork deployed the camp where all the UN staffers were accommodated. They accommodate now 300 people and supported the work of 300 people. You imagine the scale, the size of this.

A Well-Established Relationship between the Network and the Affected Population

To manage the dynamics of the affected population in a trustful relationship, an effective humanitarian network involves the client group as part of the team in its operations and services. When Amelia was assisting the Syrian refugees in Jordan, the humanitarian network running the refugee camp there had regular meetings with the refugees, and some of the refugee groups were hired to be team members of the network as volunteers so they could be part of running the camp in partnership with the affected population. A group of volunteers whom Amelia and the aid network hired played an active role, and she described the engagement with the affected population:

Making sure that they are part of the teams so that they hear the kind of discussions that we're having, because in camps, word of mouth is very important. If you have 10 refugees working per organization and you have 12 organizations, that's great. You have 120 messengers who can leave after the work day to their little neighborhood or cluster of tents and say, 'Look, they know what they're doing. Today, in fact, they met and they discussed x, y and z.' You start doing these things intentionally, and then, you start engaging with them in a positive way. Saying, "Okay, I'm going to replace some of the workers with volunteers from the camp, because keeping the population productively busy means they don't have a lot of free time to do disruptions or to do negative things." It is about positive engagement with the refugees and making sure that they have a daily

routine where they wake up in the morning. Kids go to school; mothers do what they do; fathers go and earn income. It's about dignity, positive engagement and structured routine for the day. It was very critical. It changed the whole dynamics in the camp.

Amelia went on to say how important it was to include the affected population in various areas of the refugee camp management activities. She said, “*What happens in crisis is that affected populations lose one thing that none of us can provide, which is their sense of dignity.*” She also stressed the significance of empowering the affected population by involving them during the evaluation process:

They have a say. They're not just a group of poor people who ended up living in tents. No, they matter. Their opinions matter. That's very critical, because if you manage to restore the affected population's dignity, you manage to empower them so that they are not broken beyond fixing, so when they go back home, they go back home with dignity, clear understanding, and they can recover from the crisis.

Similar to the case of involving the affected population in managing the refugee camp, Amelia and her collaborating organizations started a child-oriented “*complaint mechanism*” in the Zaatari Syrian refugee camp network to take heed of their opinions in an efforts to improve its services. With confidence, she said, “*We can improve the quality of our services when we engage them in the process of assessing the quality of the service.*” About specific steps taken and the effective outcome of the complaint mechanism in the camp involving the children’s group, she explained:

It was very impressive. Every child-friendly space would have a box, and children can drop [in] a piece of paper with whichever complaint they have. The complaint doesn't have to be only about the service provider. It could be about lack of safety around toilets

or areas in the camp that have high risk and are not cared for, or someone who harassed or abused the child on their way to the child-friendly space, or name it, whatever. It was very, very useful. An eye-opener, actually, by all means, because you start to realize that these young children have a lot to say, and if we, the service provider, listen to them tentatively, there's a lot that we can learn from them.

Taking a radically different method to hear the voices of the affected population from Zaatari camp network, Lily described how the AAP task team strategically approached people in Somalia where no one wants to give feedback to others, relating to the local culture. Once the team found out that there was “about a hundred and twenty percent of cell phone ownership in Somalia,” it launched a “Somali based feedback mechanism” in collaboration with a mobile network company that pledged to provide free mobile text service to the AAP team. So, the team communicated to the local people saying, “If you message any feedback to this number, it's free.” Lily further explained about the feedback mechanism:

So, if WFP [World Food Programme] is giving out food, and suddenly, all of these old women are not able to access it, because they were stopped by a road block 20 kilometers down, they text, and they say, “Food isn't reaching us.” Or, you know, “What you're getting us is not what I need” or whatever. We found a way to access the population in a way that they are comfortable with.

In this latter section of the chapter, the fourth and new performance dimension, relational performance, was inductively unfolded by participants’ understanding and experiences about organizational performance outcomes pertaining to the relational aspect of interorganizational collaboration in the humanitarian sector. The primary focus of the dimension is to nurture and expand the relational capacity of a humanitarian network involving multiple constituencies such

as local and international organizations that can partner with the network for a common purpose, thus solidifying the networks' sphere of influence for better performance in all other dimensions.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I presented the research findings that became apparent after examining the data gathered from the study participants in different humanitarian interorganizational networks. These findings spotlight four major performance dimensions of a humanitarian interorganizational network (i.e., knowledge, financial, mission, and relational performance). The first dimension, knowledge performance, is described by three distinct sub-themes: the development, application, and enhancement of global response guidelines; an enhanced collective organizational learning capability and operational efficiency; and revamped response methodologies for better results. The second dimension, financial performance, is explained by a single sub-theme, secured support resources for sustainable action. The third dimension, mission performance, is explained by four discrete sub-themes: rapidly receiving quality vital services, a role of a strong mission and shared values, and increased stability and resilience in the affected population. Moreover, the last performance dimension, relational performance, is an inductively emerging dimension, and it is described by three sub-dimensions: a coordinated and mutually appreciative intra-network relationship, extended partnerships outside the original network, and a well-established relationship between the network and the affected population. In the next chapter, I discuss key findings of the study, implications, and future studies.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The following research questions guided the study:

- 1) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiate current theories of organizational performance?
- 2) How does leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance extend current theories of organizational performance?

The purpose of this chapter is to conclude the current study. This final chapter is divided into four sections. First, the chapter summarizes the entire study. Second, the chapter discusses key findings of the study reflecting on the literature reviewed in the second chapter of the study, "to place the findings in a broader perspective" (Merriam & Simpson, 2000, p. 218). Third, the chapter also discusses the implication of the study findings on theory and practice. Lastly, the chapter presents future research ideas that extend the significance and implications of the study.

Summary of the Study

This study used a qualitative research methodology to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. The study adopted Kaplan's (2001) the nonprofit BSC framework and Watkins and Marsick's (1993, 1997, 1996) and McHargues' (2003) learning organization performance theory, as a theoretical framework, to

substantiate and extend the multidimensionality of organizational performance at the network level. A group of leaders and managers who have extensive experience (i.e., five or more years) with interorganizational humanitarian networks was selected as the participant group for the study. I used Flanagan's (1954) CIT method for the interviews. The critical incident data collected from the participants were thematically analyzed using both deductive and inductive approaches. Figure 6-1 summarizes the research findings and includes the four identified performance dimensions, sub-themes belonging to each of the dimensions, and the hypothesized relationship among the different dimensions.




Figure 6-1. The performance dimensions of effective humanitarian networks.

Conclusions and Discussion of Findings

Based on findings of the study, two broad conclusions related to the purpose of the study were identified. First, the study confirms the theories of multidimensional organizational performance (Kaplan, 2001; McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and extends them to the network level from a nonprofit perspective. Second, the relational performance of interorganizational collaboratives involving multiple groups of constituencies informs a unique perspective of understanding the performance of nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives. What follows is a discussion of how the research findings on the four dimensions of organizational performance at the network level: knowledge, finance, mission, and relational performance, are reflected in the literature.

Conclusion 1. Conventional organizational performance outcome dimensions, such as knowledge, financial, and mission performance, are manifested in the context of an interorganizational network.

The research findings corroborated the three performance outcome dimensions at the network level, knowledge, financial, and mission performance, currently supported by multidimensional organizational performance theories (Kaplan, 2001; McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996). The following discussion relates to the first conclusion with the three performance dimensions at the network level.

Knowledge performance. A majority of the study participants noted the importance of organizational learning as an outcome of humanitarian networks (Hardy et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2002; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011), and some of the examples of organizational learning mentioned by the participants that were congruent with the literature on nonprofit networks were training (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et

al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Sowa, 2009), capability building (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Tsasis, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015), and enhancing operational methods for better service (Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Varda & Retrum, 2015), based on the creation, sharing, and application of collective knowledge and learning. These attributes of organizational learning are consistent with Watkins and Marsick's (1997; Watkins & Kim, 2018) construct of knowledge performance.

Four cases in the study highlighted the importance of the development, application, and enhancement of global response guidelines, whereas, in the literature, the term was often used as standards, operational procedures, and policies. In addition, some of the key aspects of such guidelines were developing and using the guidelines in operations (Austin, 2000; Moshtari, 2016), making the guidelines available to other organizations (Bealt et al., 2016), testing and improving guidelines (Bealt et al., 2016), systematically updating the guidelines (Gulzar & Henry, 2005), etc. Such findings are congruent with the study conducted by Lawrence et al. (2002) that used institutional theory to explore “the institutional effects of collaboration, focusing on the immediate local effects of individual collaborations that may form the basis for broader, longer-term, field-level change” (p. 281). The study found that an interorganizational collaboration with a certain condition creates and disseminates proto-institutions, such as new policies or a new consultation process, which substantiates the findings of the current study on the development and utilization of global response guidelines. The literature also emphasizes that network managers use guidelines to identify strategies for success (Varda & Retrum, 2015).

Enhanced collective organizational learning was also a significant sub-dimension of knowledge performance (Hardy et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2002; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Congruent with studies conducted by Austin (2000) and Nolte and Boenigk (2011), member organizations in a humanitarian network acquired knowledge from each other. For instance, Charlie's notion of learning and sharing as a culture of the INSARAG network, which advanced the network to the next level is consistent with the literature. Austin's (2000) findings revealed that continuous learning was a key driving factor of a cross-sector collaboration, and Nolte and Boenigk (2011) found that organizations learn from how other organizations addressed a disaster using various strategies, thus substantiating the INSARAG's learning culture case. Participants in this study also mentioned that member organizations in an effective humanitarian network collaborate and share their competencies to increase the efficiency of their collective actions. For example, a co-exercise was performed by IFRC and INSARAG to make the two international humanitarian networks more efficient in disaster response situations (Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Kapucu, 2005; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013).

Some of the participants in this study highlighted the significance of revamping response methodologies which was also mentioned in other studies (Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Varda & Retrum, 2015), and was similar to the finding of the importance of disaster planning and training for a more adaptive response in Kapucu's (2005) study. Also, the findings of this study relate to Goes and Park's (1997) study on an acute care hospital network that nurtured its service innovation, using its structural, institutional, and resource links. Participants in this study gave examples of various methods they used to improve service to their client group through the collective efforts of member organizations in a network, which included: applying a better

principle in the field operation (Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Gulzar & Henry, 2005), systemizing the rules of intervention within a response network (Hardy et al., 2003; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011), creating a better coordination mechanism (Goes & Park, 1997; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011), and renovating the service delivery methodology (Goes & Park, 1997; Lawrence et al., 2002; Sowa, 2009).

Financial performance. Participants in the study understood the action of mobilizing critical resources as a significant dimension of financial performance (Goes & Park, 1997; Hardy et al., 2003; Kaplan, 2001; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Sowa, 2009; Watkins et al., 2009), because these resources enable humanitarian networks to sustain and expand their actions to serve the affected population in a disaster situation. In this study, it was reported that three humanitarian networks (i.e., IHP, Gavi CSO, & CPWG) explicitly sought critical external resources. The acquisition of critical resources, such as covering operational costs (Bealt et al., 2016) and getting access to the support group (Hardy et al., 2003; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013), were considered beneficial for sustaining and extending the humanitarian networks' services for the client groups. More specifically, it was found that the sponsorship arrangement between the IHP and EU covered the IHP's operating cost in disaster responses, thus enabling the IHP to manage its budget and cost in a more sustainable way (Bealt et al., 2016). Additionally, the IHP received external funding, gifts-in-kind, and trust in the humanitarian sector based on its success in field operations. Such recognition helped the network enhance the sustainability of the network and strategic position in the sector (Hardy et al., 2003; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Sowa, 2009; Tsisis, 2009). From the case of the Gavi CSO network, presenting the success of local CSO networks on immunization projects to global support actors such as the USAID and World Bank attracted the donor group and helped the network get access to the necessary resources (Hardy et al., 2003;

Nolte & Boenigk, 2013). From the CPWG network case, the evidence of resource mobilization through partnership was found (Austin, 2000; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Tsasis, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015), by which the network could successfully extend its service to the affected population in the Central African Republic.

Although the current body of nonprofit literature on financial performance and the research findings of the current study agreed on the importance of critical resource acquisition, there was also a gap in perspectives on the consequence of resource acquisition. The biggest difference was that the participants of this study understood such a resource acquisition to be the motor of a continued service provision and an expansion of the service to the affected population. However, a few studies implied that nonprofit organizations gain a better chance of organizational survival and competitiveness in the market (Hardy et al., 2003; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Sowa, 2009). What makes the difference in the perspectives on the financial performance outcome between the participants and the literature? One possible answer would be the difference in the study context. The participants in this study were from leading international humanitarian networks involving numerous organizations and member states where the access to the donor group and financial resources is relatively easier than in smaller nonprofit networks because of their past achievements and high brand recognition in the charitable market, thus they are better able to consider expansion or sustaining their services rather than surviving in the market. On the contrary, interorganizational partnerships examined in the nonprofit literature were mostly in the form of dyadic partnership or relatively small networks (Austin, 2000; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Sowa, 2009) where the competitiveness and the strategic position in the market was considered

to be more critical for an organization's survival, compared to these international humanitarian networks.

Mission performance. In this study, a majority of the participants highlighted the significance of attaining the shared purposes of interorganizational networks (Moshtari, 2016; Sowa, 2009). More specifically, many participants reported that it was important to serve the needs of the affected population better and faster (Bealt et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Sowa, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015), and they considered the fulfillment of the mission as the primary performance outcome of an interorganizational collaborative in a disaster situation.

Participants in this study emphasized how the affected population was able to receive quality vital services without delay in the following international humanitarian network cases. First, INSARAG responded faster to save more people (Bealt et al., 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013). Second, IHP enhanced operational excellence to better attain their mission which was also noted by other scholars (Bealt et al., 2016; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016). Third, GNI coordinated response efforts using local and international resources and experts to enhance their mission performance, which was also seen in other studies (Goes & Park, 1997; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Also, GNI fostered ongoing dialogues and collaborations at the local level to better prepare for an emergency, and member organizations in the UN Protection Cluster network engaged heavily in a coordinated response to achieve the utmost collaborative outcomes. These findings correspond to nonprofit performance research that examined the importance of providing timely and quality service to affected populations (Bealt et al., 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013) and overcoming the service gap in the served population (Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Sowa, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015).

The literature examining the performance of interorganizational collaboration gives insight into what these collaboratives aim to attain through their collective efforts (e.g., Austin, 2000; Goes & Park, 1997; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Sowa, 2009; Tsasis, 2009; Varda & Retrum, 2015). Among many reasons to collaborate, meeting organizational objectives is a primary concern of such interorganizational collaboratives (Moshtari, 2016; Sowa, 2009). And, the literature manifests the importance of having a strong mission and shared values in an interorganizational network (Austin, 2000; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013) to meet organizational objectives. Congruent with the literature, a participant emphasized that the role of a strong mission and shared values in an interorganizational network was of great significance in this study. Describing a folio-vaccine-network in Sudan as an example of an interorganizational collaborative, the participant noted that member organizations perform effectively if a network has a strong mission and shared values and also stressed the transformational nature of interorganizational collaboratives (Austin, 2000; Hardy et al., 2003; Tsasis, 2009).

Strengthening local communities in a disaster situation is another key performance focus of humanitarian networks (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Ryu & Johansen, 2017). Some of representative performance outcomes of the local community development and strengthening include increased disaster preparedness levels in disaster prone regions (Ryu & Johansen, 2017) and protection of the affected population (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). What makes it so important to strengthen the local community is because the stability of an affected population is increased when such interventions are effectively implanted (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Consistent with the literature, increased stability and resilience in the affected population was also considered as an important outcome of a humanitarian network as seen in three different cases in this study. In the

Zaatari Syrian Refugee Camp network case, the stability in the affected population in the camp was attained through building trust between the camp management team and the served population. Because of the stability in the population, vulnerable groups of people, such as women and children, in the camp were kept safely from violence. Additionally, INSARAG and HLA independently provided training and knowledge to people in disaster prone countries to maintain high levels of preparedness at the local level (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Sowa, 2009).

Conclusion 2. Relational performance as a new network-level performance dimension informs a unique perspective of understanding the performance of nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives

A theme emerged inductively in the data that did not fit the initial a priori models of interorganizational performance I had used for deductive coding of the data. Indeed, many of the coded critical incidents fell in a clearly different category that I eventually identified as relational performance. To more effectively and efficiently serve the affected population in disaster situations, interorganizational collaboratives, comprised of multiple constituencies relationally connected together, strengthen the network, expanded the network's influence, and engaged the affected population in their programs and services. Despite the fact that there are few tangible infrastructural components in a humanitarian network, such as bylaws and program facilities, what makes it carry on its mission appears to be more intangible dimensions such as strong and appreciative relationships in- and outside of the network. Such relationships represent relational performance as a key performance dimension of interorganizational collaboratives.

Relational performance concerns developing and extending the relational capacity of an interorganizational network with multiple stakeholders, and it is comprised of three sub-

dimensions, which include: (1) a coordinated and mutually appreciative intra-network relationship, (2) extended partnerships outside the original network, and (3) a well-established relationship between the network and the affected population. What follows is a discussion of each of the sub-dimensions and their relationship to prior research on nonprofit performances.

A coordinated and mutually appreciative intra-network relationship. Many participants in this study reported the importance of building a strong relationship among member organizations in a humanitarian network. Therefore, it became evident that this state of an interorganizational collaborative is manifested by a coordinated and mutually appreciative intra-network relationship. The literature substantiates such an intra-network relationship (Austin, 2000; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Tsasis, 2009). More specifically, studies agree on the significance of positive relationships at the individual level within an interorganizational network, which fosters mutual trust among organizations (Austin, 2000; Tsasis, 2009). In his study of nonprofit-business partnerships, Austin (2000) highlighted the importance of interpersonal relationships for establishing and managing a cross-sector partnership, and as a driver of this kind of partnership as well:

Institutional partnerships are created, nurtured, and extended by people. Social purpose partnerships appear to be motivationally fueled by the emotional connection that individuals make both with the social mission and with their counterparts in the other organization ... The mission connect is the motivational driver, and the personal relationships are the glue that binds the organizations together ... the connections [between top leaders] need to permeate all levels of the organizations. (pp. 82-83)

Similar to Austin's (2000) conclusions, Tsasis (2009) also found that a successful interorganizational collaboration is rooted in positive social interactions and trust among

organizations and individuals. Furthermore, it was also found that member organizations can develop and nurture positive relationships if they have compatible goals, shared interests, mutual exchanges, and consensus in work areas (Tsasis, 2009).

Some participants in this study reported the importance of having a strong collective organizational culture embedded in a network (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011; Varda & Retrum, 2015). Specifically, demonstrating the capacity of a network by developing a unique culture and embracing people from diverse backgrounds were noted by study participants. It was also found that trust and open communication among collaborating members helped a network become more successful (Austin, 2000; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). Another aspect of a collective culture was to lay stress on the culture of transparency (Bealt et al., 2016; Moshtari, 2016) and accountability (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016). These findings were congruent with Gulzar and Henry's (2005) and Moshtari's (2016) findings on reciprocity in a network. Gulzar and Henry (2005) found that trust and reciprocity of dyadic NGO partnerships in community health was "enhanced with openness, conflict recognition, and conflict management" (p. 1940). And, Moshtari (2016) confirmed the positive relationship between the reciprocal commitment of a collaborative partnership and collaborative performance, in his study of dyadic NGO relationships. Also, the literature notes that when there are no available guidelines or in a situation where a standard procedure cannot be followed, social capital and trustworthiness among collaborating actors can also play an important role in keeping a disaster response project moving (Kapucu, 2005).

Extended partnerships outside the original network. Working with external partners extends the capacity of an organization and its influence on the environment (Austin, 2000; Bealt

et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Tsasis, 2009). Nonprofit organizations perform boundary spanning as a powerful tool to address issues and conflicts (Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002), to acquire necessary information and resources (Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Tsasis, 2009), and to form relationship with external parties (Austin, 2000; Tsasis, 2009). To better perform such a task, a boundary spanner must understand “people’s needs and the operation of external systems, especially those with resources to share in collaborative arrangements” (Gulzar & Henry, 2005, p. 1940). Boundary spanning mechanisms are evident in interorganizational networks as well (Austin, 2000; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Varda & Retrum, 2015). As the number of actors in a humanitarian network grows over time, the level of complexity in managing such a network increases as well (Bealt et al., 2016). Therefore, the task of building and managing relationships with external actors becomes more important for the better performance of a humanitarian network. Congruent with the literature, the participants in this study understood that establishing extended partnerships outside the original network was a significant performance of a humanitarian network. The participants highlighted the engagement between a humanitarian network and the local government agency in a country. Additionally, they also considered having an active partnership with local NGOs as a significant aspect of relational performance.

A well-established relationship between the network and the affected population.

For a humanitarian network, to establish a good relationship with the affected population (also called a target population, population of interest, local community, or local population) is another key performance outcome (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011). It is important because humanitarian aid work is not only about providing necessary service to the affected population, but it is also about working with the local community (Austin, 2000; Kapucu, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Sowa,

2009; Tsasis, 2009) in a democratic and harmonious way. By working together, the humanitarian network is able to gain trust and legitimacy from the public and the affected population (Austin, 2000; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013), better protect the local community (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013), promote social stability (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011), help the local community learn (Austin, 2000; Hardy et al., 2003; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013), and respect the affected population's rights and dignity (Tsasis, 2009), thus strengthening the affected population (Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013). Similarly, participants in the study reported that a well-established relationship between a humanitarian network and the affected population promoted the engagement of the affected population in the program and service provided by the network. More specifically, the active engagement of the affected population in the program and services transformed the dynamic of the affected population and the network. Also, hearing the affected population's voice helped improve the service quality of the network.

Conclusion 3. The interpenetrability of organizational performance outcomes makes it difficult to measure and categorize them.

The term, interpenetrability (or interpenetration), in organizational studies is used to explain a blurring of boundaries between two different organizational domains. For instance, Evans (1999) defined the term as “a state where two differentiated poles become part of a larger whole” and exemplified the concept with an alignment and fusion of human resources functioning in various business areas instead of separating HR from them (p. 335). Arogyaswamy and Byles (1987) used the term to explain the importance of customer involvement as a merging of the activities of service providers and the organizational environment in service industries such as airlines or hospital services. But, such an interpenetration is not limited to an observable integration of organizational behaviors or

deliverables, but it is also found in blurring organizational boundaries in strategic interorganizational relationships (Mahama, 2006). And, in this study, interpenetrability (or multicollinearity) between different network-level organizational performance dimensions was found, thus adding a greater level of complexity to understanding the topic of the study.

To identify performance outcomes within a specific organizational performance dimension is prerequisite knowledge to develop a measure for organizational performance studies. However, the interpenetrability of organizational performance outcomes makes it difficult to measure and categorize them. This is because many performance outcomes are not only implicitly connected, but they also influence each other. For instance, a hard decision had to be made whether to categorize data about the cross-sector collaboration of HLA with a global consumer product company that brought both funding for a local resilience project and significant organizational learning to HLA as either financial performance or knowledge performance since the example included elements of both.

The interpenetrability of organizational performance is evident when we examine the relationship between different performance dimensions. For instance, it can be hypothesized that the effect of relational performance on mission performance can be affected by both knowledge and financial performance, which also means that relational performance strengthens the level of both knowledge performance and financial performance, thus finally advancing mission performance. Alternatively, it can be hypothesized that the effects of knowledge and financial performance on mission performance can be amplified by relational performance, implying that the strength or direction of the causal relationship between the two antecedent performance variables and the outcome performance variable can be changed by viewing relational performance as the moderating variable.

Therefore, a theorist or a practitioner could conclude that only the mission performance dimension should be considered and managed as an ultimate performance outcome, disregarding other performance dimensions. This would be comparable to the negligence of multidimensional performance measures at many nonprofit organizations solely focused on financial performance, which neither considers “how effectively and efficiently they meet the needs of their constituencies” and “communicate[s] little about long-term value creation” (Kaplan, 2001, pp. 353-354).

The conundrum of the interpenetrability of organizational performance at multiple levels seems to make both the conceptualization and measurement of organizational performance more difficult. However, on the other hand, it produces evidence of the multidimensionality of organizational performance, thus inspiring us to continuously seek new performance dimensions that take us to the next level of understanding of organizations or networks of organizations and their performance. Then, we need to ask ‘what might be the fifth organizational performance dimension at the network level?’ It may be related to an infrastructural capacity (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Tsisis, 2009), which supports interorganizational systems that enable member organizations in a network to better connect, think, learn, and perform collectively toward a common mission. Additionally, what waits for us, as a band of scholars to find would be the sixth, seventh, and maybe more dimensions of network-level organizational performance until we have the complete pieces of a puzzle and better understanding of the performance of interorganizational collaboratives. For the present, what is left now is to take the new knowledge of strategically aligned performance dimensions into a humanitarian context and make sure we improve and examine the way we save the lives of affected populations and mitigate their suffering more effectively and efficiently.

Implications for Learning, Leadership, and Organization Development

In addition to the foundational work of examining the four distinct performance dimensions, in this section of the study, theoretical implications for learning, leadership, and organization development are discussed in terms of theoretical and methodological implications.

Theoretical Implications

Finding a fourth dimension of organizational performance underscores the multidimensionality of organizational performance. This addition of another dimension is a significant contribution to the organization development and nonprofit literature, as the addition of performance dimensions expands the domain of organizational performance. In their review of the multidimensional nature of organizational performance, Richard et al. (2009) addressed the significance of having a robust theory that substantiates organizational performance measures and examined the domains of organizational performance, which included relevance to key stakeholders, environmental factors of organizational performance, and a timeframe for performance measurement. According to Richard et al. (2009), organizational performance “encompasses three specific areas of firm outcomes: (1) financial performance (profits, return on assets, return on investment, etc.); (2) product market performance (sales, market share, etc.); and (3) shareholder return (total shareholder return, economic value added, etc.)” (p. 722), and the authors limit their discussion on organizational performance mainly to the financial domain. However, in this study, the definition and discussion of organizational performance is extended to the sphere of organizational effectiveness, which is also defined by Richard et al. (2009):

Organizational effectiveness is broader and captures organizational performance plus the plethora of internal performance outcomes normally associated with more efficient or effective operations and other external measures that relate to considerations that are

broader than those simply associated with economic valuation (either by shareholders, managers, or customers), such as corporate social responsibility. (p. 722)

Considering these definitions, the focus of this dissertation research reaches to the domain of organizational effectiveness as it deals with four different organizational performance dimensions, including financial performance, similar to the studies discussed in this study (e.g., Kaplan, 2001; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Watkins et al., 2009; Wetherington & Daniels, 2013). Although Richard et al. (2009) pointed out that “the narrower domain of organizational performance provides the useful potential to make meaningful comparisons across firms and industries” (p. 722), this study modeled a methodology of better understanding the multidimensionality of organizational performance at the network level through both substantiating and extending the current theories of organizational performance.

There is a line of connection between this study and many other organizational studies that have paid attention to a multidimensional approach in measuring organizational performance in the nonprofit sector (e.g., Kaplan, 2001; McHargue, 2003; Watkins et al., 2009; Wetherington & Daniels, 2013). This study prepared the ground for a conceptual understanding of relational capacity of interorganizational collaboratives in the organization development and nonprofit literature. The contribution of this study in this regard is significant because the conceptual understanding of relational capacity can provide new insights on the definition, concepts, and performance indicators of the construct in various nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives.

The application of the new relational performance dimension in organization development and nonprofit studies is promising. First, we can apply the relational performance framework to different nonprofit network settings. Although the framework was found in a humanitarian response setting, we can explore its applicability to a different nonprofit

collaborative, if we consider a nonprofit collaborative as a network of nonprofit organizations that collaborate and interact synergistically with each other to attain their common mission in a local community. The relational performance framework, with its three sub-dimensions, can also be applied to the nonprofit collaboration context, which includes: the intra-network relationships, the extension of the relationship outside of the original network, and the relationship between the network and its immediate client groups. Second, we can also apply the relational performance framework to different interorganizational collaboratives in various contexts, such as business and public settings. This is a significant contribution to the organization development and management literature, because a majority of previous studies underscored the importance of relationships and trust among individuals or among member organizations within the original network (e.g., Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Tsisis, 2009).

Methodological Implications

Finally, this study has significant methodological implications for research in learning, leadership, and organization development for understanding an important facet of interorganizational collaboratives. This is because qualitative data offers a rich window into how high level, experienced leaders of interorganizational collaboratives understand organizational performance at the network level. This study has exemplified the efficacy of a qualitative research approach using Flanagan's (1954) CIT method to examine organizational performance at the network level. Although a quantitative research approach is often used in contemporary studies on organizational performance, such as construct scaling, validation, or the investigation among variables (e.g., Bealt et al., 2016; Goes & Park, 1997; Kapucu, 2005; Moshtari, 2016;

Nolte & Boenigk, 2013; Ryu & Johansen, 2017; Varda & Retrum, 2015; Watkins et al., 2009; Wetherington & Daniels, 2013), this study adopted an exploratory qualitative approach to gain deeper understanding from study participants on the topic of the research and to examine long-established organizational performance theories in the interorganizational network context where the theories have rarely been applied.

Implications for More Effective Interorganizational Collaborations

In this section of the current chapter, practical implications on how to make an interorganizational collaboration more effective concerning the four organizational performance dimensions at the network level are presented.

Knowledge Performance

To more effectively aid the affected population in a disaster response and to ensure the population's well-being, humanitarian networks must pay attention to developing and transforming their interorganizational learning process. In this study, knowledge performance at the network level is found to enhance the collective learning capacity for better knowledge creation, sharing, and application to better serve the target population. To attain such a capacity, many leading international humanitarian networks developed evidence-based guidelines and response methodologies that helped groups of organizations in the field collaborate in more effective ways. They made the collectively created new knowledge open to the humanitarian sector to disseminate the knowledge out of the original network. To accelerate the speed of knowledge dissemination, humanitarian networks can utilize a massive open online course system and inclusive communities of practices, where any individuals and organizations from diverse backgrounds can learn, educate, and contribute to the system. To make such efforts succeed, it is necessary to establish a shared office to manage extended training and learning of

the guidelines so that organizations or different network members can upskill themselves through this wide-open learning opportunity. Another strategy for applying these guidelines to more humanitarian assistance situations is to establish a professionalization system that certifies aid workers, nonprofit organizations, and networks for better management of the quality of humanitarian work, which will ultimately benefit the affected population. However, such an initiative cannot be accomplished without a collective vision and the commitments of many participating humanitarian organizations and networks.

Financial Performance

Financial performance, the organizational capacity of acquiring critical resources and utilizing the resources more strategically and efficiently, has been considered a significant performance dimension both in the literature and in practice. The concept and the empirical findings on financial performance at the network level were described both in the research findings chapter and the discussion section of this study. Similar to a single organization, the core of the performance dimension in this study was to mobilize critical resources necessary for interorganizational collaboratives to continue their service to the target population and to offset their operation costs. The critical resources for continued service come from donors and supporters of a nonprofit network in terms of financial assets, gifts-in-kind, or voluntary participation. Resources also come from a participating network, in the form of “the direct transfer of assets, the sharing of key equipment, intellectual property, or personnel” (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 324). The offset of operational costs can occur in two ways. First, a donor or a support group covers all or a certain portion of the total operating costs of a humanitarian network. Second, a humanitarian network can minimize its operation costs using diverse strategies, such as collaborating with a corporate business that has needed expertise (e.g., financial risk

management, artificial intelligence, or big-data analytics) or with other humanitarian networks that offer different resources, as shown in the internetwork collaborations, such as the INSARAG-WHO or OCHA-IHP collaborations.

A humanitarian network must maintain the highest level of transparency and accountability with the public to become more visible and attractive in the philanthropic market. Regardless of the size or work area, all nonprofit networks compete for support from donors, as corporations compete with each other to win customers' interests and encourage the purchase of their products and services in the market. Many successful humanitarian networks that have already proven the effectiveness of their field operation and long-term outcomes to the target population, such as the UN agencies (e.g., OCHA, UNICEF), may not have difficulty acquiring support from the donor group; however, the risk of losing donors' trust and participation always exists when there is depravity in utilizing public support (e.g., embezzlement or the private use of organizational budget) or misconduct in the field operations engaging the affected population (e.g., sexual abuse). If such depravity is known to the public, the related humanitarian network will experience a significant loss of donor loyalty and support, which can cause the network to fail in a severe case. To avoid such a situation, humanitarian networks must offer up all possible financial statements public help achieve this transparency. Implementation of lean six sigma in their field operation can be considered to minimize errors and failure of service delivery during field operations, thus minimizing the unnecessary spending of donors' support. Also, leaders in humanitarian networks can collaborate more closely to plan and execute a disaster response together to share their expertise, knowledge, and resources, which can be a sign of co-responsible accountability to the public. Also, the more they collaborate, the less they compete

with each other to access donors' support, as they can pool resources from the donor group for a collective action.

Mission Performance

Oftentimes, the people being assisted in a disaster situation are in dire straits, for instance, warfare, poverty, famine, or infringement upon human rights. In the work of nonprofit organizations and their collaborative networks that tackle humanitarian issues, effective deployment of their mission is considered very seriously, because many people in a disaster situation can live or die in accordance with a single decision made by such a network. Therefore, it is extremely important for humanitarian networks to understand the significance of making the best decisions all the time, reflecting on their missions to best serve the target population. The research findings of the current study can help humanitarian networks, including leaders and managers of such networks, adjust the focus and the boundary of their organizational mission. Once an adjustment to the organizational mission is made, they need to realign the mission throughout all levels of the network, and the level of such networks can include the leadership team and the staff at the headquarters, regional network and offices, local network and offices, and individuals belonging to the local network and offices. In addition, the specifics of a mission at all levels can include an overarching vision, mission, shared values, strategic objectives, key performance indicators, action targets, and strategic initiatives to obtain the goal (Kaplan, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996).

Leaders and managers at nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives must understand how member organizations work together as a network to attain the mission and goals. The collective endeavors of a humanitarian network to achieve its mission and goals differs significantly from how a bureaucratic organization works with a complex hierarchy and an

internal control system. Often, a nature of informality, supported by little legal binding or formalized organizational structure, is manifested in humanitarian network settings, which can be perceived as a sign of ineffectiveness of an organization from the perspective of public or for-profit sectors. However, Kian's case of a successful polio vaccine network, driven by the strong mission and values in this study, was a highly effective loosely-coupled informal organizational structure and system. Mintzberg (1980), in his study of the five organizational structural configurations, such as *Simple Structure*, *Machine Bureaucracy*, *Professional Bureaucracy*, *Divisionalized Form*, and *Adhocracy*, identified a possible organizational structural configuration which resembles the informal but mission embodied structure of a humanitarian network:

It relies for coordination on socialization—in effect, the standardization of norms; it uses indoctrination as its main design parameter; and its dominant part is ideology, a sixth part, in fact, of every organization, representing a pull toward a sense of mission. Perhaps the *Missionary Configuration* will emerge as the fashionable structure of the post-adhocratic age. (p. 339)

Therefore, leaders and managers at humanitarian networks should attend to how much the member organizations in the network are committed to the shared mission and values. Encouraging all the personnel working at a humanitarian network by regularly sharing success stories of the target population in a disaster response or assessing the degree of the personnel's dedication to the shared mission and values are practical strategies to make the network more mission-aligned.

In brief, highly effective interorganizational collaboratives understand the distinct and interconnected nature of performance dimensions at the network level. Also, they can

strategically align the performance dimensions to better serve the target population. Developing such a strategic capacity starts from organizational strategic planning at the network level. The purpose of strategic planning is to set a shared vision, mission, and values that all member organizations appreciate and to which they prioritize as they work closely together. Another purpose for having strategic meetings is to form a consensus on how to measure performance outcomes of a network using the four performance dimensions and relevant objective measures. Having such a consensus at the earliest stages of an interorganizational collaboration is critical, because it gives a clear orientation of the network, thus preventing the squandering of the network's resources due to unclear goals.

Relational Performance

Interorganizational collaboration is a powerful strategy for addressing social challenges (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Sowa, 2009; Tsisis, 2009). Many nonprofit organizations join a network to fill the service gap in the target population and, at the same time, to fill the gap in the organizational capacity of the participating organization (Sowa, 2009). However, such organizations encounter numerous difficulties as soon as they enter a collaboration, and the difficulties they experience within such a network includes things such as diminished organizational autonomy, clashes between organizational cultures, lack of interoperability, or less recognition of performance outcomes as a single organization to the public, etc. If they cannot embrace or overcome such difficulties in collaborating with other participating member organizations, it will not only be daunting for a network to fulfill its mission and goals, but also, a member organization would hardly be able to address the gap they

planned to address. Furthermore, many aspects of such challenges that occur within an interorganizational collaboration can be understood and managed from a relational perspective.

Therefore, this study would give leaders and managers new insights into a better understanding of the relational performance dimension of interorganizational collaboratives. If a leader representing an interorganizational network where only a good intra-network relationship is valued over building an extended partnership outside the original network, the leader would be able to see the added value of such an extended partnership through the findings of this study. Similarly, if a manager at a humanitarian network does well nurturing both its intra-network relationship and extending its partnership but does not have a constructive relationship with the target population, the incidents this study that show a desirable social outcome based on the good relationship and engagement between the aid network and the affected population serve as models.

Future Research

This study involved exploratory semi-structured interviews with the participants from leading international humanitarian networks to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. To extend the current understanding of the topic, future research might include: (1) a second qualitative study involving a different population, (2) an ethnographic study of affected populations, (3) the operationalization and validation of the construct of relational performance, and (4) the investigation of the effect of an organizational learning culture on the relational performance, involving several additional managerial variables using quantitative research methods. What follows is a brief synopsis of each of the extended studies.

A Second Qualitative Study Involving a Different Population

This study examined cases of humanitarian networks to substantiate and extend the current theories of organizational performance with the purpose of forming a better understanding of the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. More specifically, interview data were collected from the study participants with experiences in humanitarian networks that deliver services directly to affected populations during their disaster responses. As a result of this study, three performance dimensions supported by the current theories of organizational performance were confirmed (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance), and a new performance dimension (i.e., relational performance) was identified. But, a question from the study still remains; would a different study format effectuate more substantive research findings? (Merriam & Simpson, 2000).

To answer the question, a second qualitative study involving a different population can be conducted, adopting a similar research methodology as the current study, but using a new set of interview data from indirect humanitarian networks that provide auxiliary services to the humanitarian actors. Such indirect humanitarian networks assist humanitarian organizations that directly serve the target population in the field, aka direct service networks, by providing helpful information in a humanitarian disaster (e.g., information on the migration of refugees or the analytics of humanitarian disasters) or by developing humanitarian standards and principles. A few examples of such indirect service networks include a consortium of leading international aid networks (e.g., a steering committee for Humanitarian Response) and a global platform for collaboration and coordination among NGOs and humanitarian actors (e.g., the International Council for Voluntary Agencies).

An Ethnographic Study of Affected Populations

An ethnographic study can be conducted to better understand the actual impact of humanitarian networks' efforts to serve affected populations, acknowledging the value of a qualitative approach in understanding interorganizational collaboratives. According to Merriam and Simpson (2000), "Ethnographic techniques are the methods researchers use to uncover the social order and meaning a setting or situation has for the people actually participating in it" (p. 104), and this explanation suggests the significance of learning more about affected populations' experiences and sensemaking processes in a disaster situation with humanitarian assistance by immersing oneself in the context. First hand observation of interorganizational collaboration in a crisis situation, participation and personal involvement would provide a deeper understanding of performance in these networks.

Operationalization and Validation of the Performance Constructs

Previous studies examined the performance or accountability of strategic alliances, mostly in the business context; however, what is lacking in the literature is the operationalization of the concept of relational performance of an interorganizational collaborative. Thus, it is necessary to operationalize and validate the construct of relational performance at the network level. Research questions guiding such a study include: (1) What are the key indicators of the relational performance at the network level? and (2) What is the psychometric quality of the network level relational performance? The development of such a scale could be guided by the result of the current study. The output of the instrumentation process would be a complete list of survey items involving sub-dimensions of the construct and a six-point Likert-type measurement scale to match the existing scales in the DLOQ.

A Study Investigating an Integrative Model of Nonprofit Network Performance

The current study contributed to the enrichment of the organization development literature by identifying performance dimensions of interorganizational collaboratives. After completion of the construct operationalization and validation study, an additional study investigating an integrative model of nonprofit network performance could provide deeper insights into the multidimensionality of IOC performance. Such a study would investigate the effect of select antecedent variables on organizational performance at the network level. Numerous studies have already examined the influence of organizational learning culture on organizational performance at the organizational level to date (Dima, Yusuf, & Charbel, 2009; Kim & Han, 2015; McHargue, 2003; Watkins et al., 2009; Wetherington & Daniels, 2013; Yang et al., 2004), but rarely across multiple collaborating organizations. Furthermore, what is also lacking in the literature is an investigation of the effect of network structure and interorganizational coordination on organizational learning culture and the performance of a nonprofit network.

Chapter Summary

Research on the performance of humanitarian interorganizational networks from a network level perspective is lacking in the literature on the nonprofit sector. Therefore, this study aimed to better understanding the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives. In this study, cases of highly successful international humanitarian networks were examined, and it was first found that leaders' understanding of interorganizational collaboratives' performance substantiates current theories of organizational performance, involving three conventional organizational performance dimensions, such as knowledge, financial, and mission performance at the network level. It was also found that a new

network-level performance dimension, relational performance extends beyond current theories of organizational performance.

Based on the interviews and the analysis of the data, this study concludes that: (1) conventional organizational performance outcome dimensions, such as knowledge, financial, and mission performance, are manifested and applicable in the context of an interorganizational network, (2) relational performance as a new network-level performance dimension extends current theories of organizational performance, and (3) the interpenetrability of organizational performance outcomes makes it difficult to measure and categorize them. Each of these conclusions was discussed reflecting on the current body of the nonprofit network literature. Also, implications for learning, leadership, and organization development research as well as practical implications for more effective interorganizational collaboration were discussed. Lastly, suggestions for three future studies were offered to extend the current understanding of the topic of this study, organizational performance at the network level, from a nonprofit perspective.

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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Interview Protocol

[Background Questions]

1. Could you tell me about your organization?
 - Tell me about the network of organizations you belong to...
 - What organizations are members of the network?
 - How did your organization come to join this network?
 - How do you think it's going?
2. I wonder if you could tell me your role in your organization? What responsibilities does your organization have in the network?

[Main Questions]

3. Think about a specific time when this network was really effective? Can you tell me about it in detail?
 - Who was involved?
 - How did you contribute to it?
 - What was the outcome of the work?
 - What do you think lead to this outcome?
 - Can you walk me through the whole process from your perspective?
 - How did the working inside the network impact its outcomes?
4. Think about a time the network had a challenging time? Can you tell me about it in detail?
 - (Use similar prompt question in question no. 3)
5. How do you know when the network is working well? How do you know when the network doesn't work well? Where does your organization fall?
 - For example, what metrics (expectations) would you collect (have) to determine that it (the relationship) is effective (strong or beneficial)?
 - What outcomes does the director or board members of the network look for to assess whether the network is working well?
6. In light of what you have now talked about, is there anything else you would like to tell me (or you think that I should know) about performance outcomes of the network?

APPENDIX B
A SUMMARY REPORT

EXPLORING NETWORK-LEVEL PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COLLABORATIVES

A group of organizations forms an interorganizational collaborative to pursue a shared mission and tackle enormous challenges and issues that cannot be solved by individual organizations. Although some scholars tried to examine the relationship between driving factors, such as antecedents or key processes, with the performance level of interorganizational collaboratives, little consensus was found on the dimensions of organizational performance at the network level in the nonprofit literature. Therefore, this study aimed to better understand the dimensions of effective performance outcomes of interorganizational collaboratives.

The target population for this study was a group of people who have extensive experience with interorganizational humanitarian networks, and the locations of the sample groups from different international humanitarian interorganizational networks were in Switzerland and UK. The data consisted of nine exploratory semi-structured interviews with the participants to address the study's purpose, and this study employed a qualitative research methodology and critical incident interview technique. This study yielded a total of 27 critical incidents. In-depth thematic analysis using both deductive and inductive data analysis approaches was conducted.

The findings of this study corroborated three well-established dimensions of organizational performance (i.e., knowledge, financial, and mission performance), conceptualized by a priori theoretical frameworks on organizational performance theories, which included the learning organization performance theory (McHargue, 2003; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1997, 1996) and strategic nonprofit performance framework (Kaplan, 2001). Additionally, a fourth and new network-level performance dimension, relational performance, was inductively derived from participants' understanding and experiences about organizational performance outcomes pertaining to the relational aspect of interorganizational collaboration in the humanitarian sector.

The addition of the fourth dimension is a significant contribution to the human resource and organization development literature. This study has exemplified the efficacy of a qualitative research approach using Flanagan's (1954) CIT method to examine organizational performance at the network level. Also, practical implications on how to make an interorganizational collaboration more effective concerning the four organizational performance dimensions at the network level are presented. The results of the study could aid leaders and managers serving in an interorganizational collaborative in deepening their understanding of critical organizational performance dimensions at the network level.

Figure 1 summarizes the research findings and includes the four identified performance dimensions, sub-themes belonging to each of the dimensions, and the hypothesized relationship among the different dimensions.




Figure 1. The performance dimensions of effective humanitarian networks.

Implications for More Effective Interorganizational Collaborations

In this section of the current chapter, practical implications on how to make an interorganizational collaboration more effective concerning the four organizational performance dimensions at the network level are presented.

Knowledge Performance

To more effectively aid the affected population in a disaster response and to ensure the population's well-being, humanitarian networks must pay attention to developing and transforming their interorganizational learning process. In this study, knowledge performance at the network level is found to enhance the collective learning capacity for better knowledge creation, sharing, and application to better serve the target population. To attain such a capacity, many leading international humanitarian networks developed evidence-based guidelines and response methodologies that helped groups of organizations in the field collaborate in more effective ways. They made the collectively created new knowledge open to the humanitarian sector to disseminate the knowledge out of the original network. To accelerate the speed of knowledge dissemination, humanitarian networks can utilize a massive open online course

system and inclusive communities of practices, where any individuals and organizations from diverse backgrounds can learn, educate, and contribute to the system. To make such efforts succeed, it is necessary to establish a shared office to manage extended training and learning of the guidelines so that organizations or different network members can upskill themselves through this wide-open learning opportunity. Another strategy for applying these guidelines to more humanitarian assistance situations is to establish a professionalization system that certifies aid workers, nonprofit organizations, and networks for better management of the quality of humanitarian work, which will ultimately benefit the affected population. However, such an initiative cannot be accomplished without a collective vision and the commitments of many participating humanitarian organizations and networks.

Financial Performance

Financial performance, the organizational capacity of acquiring critical resources and utilizing the resources more strategically and efficiently, has been considered a significant performance dimension both in the literature and in practice. The concept and the empirical findings on financial performance at the network level were described both in the research findings chapter and the discussion section of this study. Similar to a single organization, the core of the performance dimension in this study was to mobilize critical resources necessary for interorganizational collaboratives to continue their service to the target population and to offset their operation costs. The critical resources for continued service come from donors and supporters of a nonprofit network in terms of financial assets, gifts-in-kind, or voluntary participation. Resources also come from a participating network, in the form of “the direct transfer of assets, the sharing of key equipment, intellectual property, or personnel” (Hardy et al., 2003, p. 324). The offset of operational costs can occur in two ways. First, a donor or a support group covers all or a certain portion of the total operating costs of a humanitarian network. Second, a humanitarian network can minimize its operation costs using diverse strategies, such as collaborating with a corporate business that has needed expertise (e.g., financial risk management, artificial intelligence, or big-data analytics) or with other humanitarian networks that offer different resources, as shown in the internetwork collaborations, such as the INSARAG-WHO or OCHA-IHP collaborations.

A humanitarian network must maintain the highest level of transparency and accountability with the public to become more visible and attractive in the philanthropic market. Regardless of the size or work area, all nonprofit networks compete for support from donors, as corporations compete with each other to win customers’ interests and encourage the purchase of their products and services in the market. Many successful humanitarian networks that have already proven the effectiveness of their field operation and long-term outcomes to the target population, such as the UN agencies (e.g., OCHA, UNICEF), may not have difficulty acquiring support from the donor group; however, the risk of losing donors’ trust and participation always exists when there is depravity in utilizing public support (e.g., embezzlement or the private use of organizational budget) or misconduct in the field operations engaging the affected population (e.g., sexual abuse). If such depravity is known to the public, the related

humanitarian network will experience a significant loss of donor loyalty and support, which can cause the network to fail in a severe case. To avoid such a situation, humanitarian networks must offer up all possible financial statements public help achieve this transparency. Implementation of lean six sigma in their field operation can be considered to minimize errors and failure of service delivery during field operations, thus minimizing the unnecessary spending of donors' support. Also, leaders in humanitarian networks can collaborate more closely to plan and execute a disaster response together to share their expertise, knowledge, and resources, which can be a sign of co-responsible accountability to the public. Also, the more they collaborate, the less they compete with each other to access donors' support, as they can pool resources from the donor group for a collective action.

Mission Performance

Oftentimes, the people being assisted in a disaster situation are in dire straits, for instance, warfare, poverty, famine, or infringement upon human rights. In the work of nonprofit organizations and their collaborative networks that tackle humanitarian issues, effective deployment of their mission is considered very seriously, because many people in a disaster situation can live or die in accordance with a single decision made by such a network. Therefore, it is extremely important for humanitarian networks to understand the significance of making the best decisions all the time, reflecting on their missions to best serve the target population. The research findings of the current study can help humanitarian networks, including leaders and managers of such networks, adjust the focus and the boundary of their organizational mission. Once an adjustment to the organizational mission is made, they need to realign the mission throughout all levels of the network, and the level of such networks can include the leadership team and the staff at the headquarters, regional network and offices, local network and offices, and individuals belonging to the local network and offices. In addition, the specifics of a mission at all levels can include an overarching vision, mission, shared values, strategic objectives, key performance indicators, action targets, and strategic initiatives to obtain the goal (Kaplan, 2001; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1996).

Leaders and managers at nonprofit interorganizational collaboratives must understand how member organizations work together as a network to attain the mission and goals. The collective endeavors of a humanitarian network to achieve its mission and goals differs significantly from how a bureaucratic organization works with a complex hierarchy and an internal control system. Often, a nature of informality, supported by little legal binding or formalized organizational structure, is manifested in humanitarian network settings, which can be perceived as a sign of ineffectiveness of an organization from the perspective of public or for-profit sectors. However, Kian's case of a successful polio vaccine network, driven by the strong mission and values in this study, was a highly effective loosely-coupled informal organizational structure and system. Mintzberg (1980), in his study of the five organizational structural configurations, such as *Simple Structure*, *Machine Bureaucracy*, *Professional Bureaucracy*,

Divisionalized Form, and Adhocracy, identified a possible organizational structural configuration which resembles the informal but mission embodied structure of a humanitarian network:

It relies for coordination on socialization—in effect, the standardization of norms; it uses indoctrination as its main design parameter; and its dominant part is ideology, a sixth part, in fact, of every organization, representing a pull toward a sense of mission. Perhaps the *Missionary Configuration* will emerge as the fashionable structure of the post-adhocratic age. (p. 339)

Therefore, leaders and managers at humanitarian networks should attend to how much the member organizations in the network are committed to the shared mission and values. Encouraging all the personnel working at a humanitarian network by regularly sharing success stories of the target population in a disaster response or assessing the degree of the personnel's dedication to the shared mission and values are practical strategies to make the network more mission-aligned.

In brief, highly effective interorganizational collaboratives understand the distinct and interconnected nature of performance dimensions at the network level. Also, they can strategically align the performance dimensions to better serve the target population. Developing such a strategic capacity starts from organizational strategic planning at the network level. The purpose of strategic planning is to set a shared vision, mission, and values that all member organizations appreciate and to which they prioritize as they work closely together. Another purpose for having strategic meetings is to form a consensus on how to measure performance outcomes of a network using the four performance dimensions and relevant objective measures. Having such a consensus at the earliest stages of an interorganizational collaboration is critical, because it gives a clear orientation of the network, thus preventing the squandering of the network's resources due to unclear goals.

Relational Performance

Interorganizational collaboration is a powerful strategy for addressing social challenges (Austin, 2000; Bealt et al., 2016; Gulzar & Henry, 2005; Hardy et al., 2003; Kapucu, 2005; Lawrence et al., 2002; Moshtari, 2016; Nolte & Boenigk, 2011, 2013; Sowa, 2009; Tsisis, 2009). Many nonprofit organizations join a network to fill the service gap in the target population and, at the same time, to fill the gap in the organizational capacity of the participating organization (Sowa, 2009). However, such organizations encounter numerous difficulties as soon as they enter a collaboration, and the difficulties they experience within such a network includes things such as diminished organizational autonomy, clashes between organizational cultures, lack of interoperability, or less recognition of performance outcomes as a single organization to the public, etc. If they cannot embrace or overcome such difficulties in collaborating with other participating member organizations, it will not only be daunting for a network to fulfill its mission and goals, but also, a member organization would hardly be able to address the gap they planned to address. Furthermore, many aspects of such challenges that occur within an interorganizational collaboration can be understood and managed from a relational perspective.

Therefore, this study would give leaders and managers new insights into a better understanding of the relational performance dimension of interorganizational collaboratives. If a leader representing an interorganizational network where only a good intra-network relationship is valued over building an extended partnership outside the original network, the leader would be able to see the added value of such an extended partnership through the findings of this study. Similarly, if a manager at a humanitarian network does well nurturing both its intra-network relationship and extending its partnership but does not have a constructive relationship with the target population, the incidents this study that show a desirable social outcome based on the good relationship and engagement between the aid network and the affected population serve as models.