

A CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH FOR SOCIAL INQUIRY:
ELUCIDATING JAPANESE STATE BEHAVIOR ON 'ARMS' EXPORT CONTROLS

by

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(Under the Direction of Gary Bertsch)

ABSTRACT

International Relations (IR) theories contain much of theoretical confusion. The issues are not merely methodological, yet rather epistemo-ontological. Intentionality is the key to understand the social reality. It can be defined as constitutive processes of meaning-giving, as opposed to causality of constituted entities of given-meaning. Much researched, calculatedly or not, overlooks this simple fact that ontology in the social reality is not compatible with positivist epistemology. In elucidating state behavior, thus, it is of assistance to set up a framework for the constitutive approach in social scientific epistemology. The approach could be structured into three phrases: logics of situation; of selection; and of transformation. Through an exploratory examination, a new framework is applied to analyze state behavior in the case of Japanese 'arms' export control policy during 1952, 1967, and 1976.

INDEX WORDS: Intentionality, Causality, Ontology, Epistemology, Constructivism,
 Japan, Arms Export Controls

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CHAPTER 1

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND PURPOSE OF STUDY

The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no knowledge of the forces that determine policy; the first and second images describe the forces in world politics, but without the third image it is impossible to assess their importance or predict their results.¹

Kenneth Waltz 1954/1959

International Relations (IR) theories have found themselves trapped in the muddle of theoretical confusions. The issues are not merely methodological, yet rather epistemological. Scholars in IR have had to face with a simple fact that ontology in the social reality contradicts with positivist epistemology.² The puzzlement of IR theories, in other words, is rooted in how to treat agent's intentionality. The aim of this thesis is, thus, to sort out the confusions while identifying problems with extant analytical frameworks in IR and to provide a research project in which epistemology and ontology are compatible in explaining state behavior in a social scientific manner. Through an exploratory examination, a new framework is applied to analyze state behavior in the case of Japanese 'arms' export control policy during 1952, 1967, and 1976.

¹ Waltz 1954/1959, 238.

² Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 765. Balzacq and Jervis 2004. Mercer 2005.

Half a century ago, in his first book, *Man, the State and War*, Kenneth Waltz, who later became *the* neorealist, clearly appreciated the importance of understanding the nature and behavior of *man*, of internal structures of *state*, and of *international environment* in IR.³ In explaining state behavior, he suggested that “special reasons” and “permissive causes” should both be reflected and at the same time should be treated differently.⁴ The former, contained in the first and second images, explains why an agent wants to take (or not to take) a certain action. The latter, in the third image, explains why the environment can not restrain an agent from doing a certain action, or why the environment lets an agent do it, which he later called “structural causes.”⁵ A quarter of a century later, in his celebrated book, *Theory of International Politics*, he made his standpoint even clearer by insisting that the study of international politics should be about “structural causes,” which could *objectively* be deduced, as opposed to “special reasons” based upon agents’ *subjective* perspectives, which therefore can only be induced at best. Perceiving the limitation of “reductionist”⁶ explanatory power, he enclosed “special reasons” in the black-box of the so-called political realist assumption⁷ in order to focus exclusively upon “structural causes” in his “systemic theory,”⁸ which he believed

³ In his book, Waltz seemed to understand John Locke’s perspective that “Men make states, *and* states make men.” And he uttered, “states are shaped by the international environment”(1954, 230). However, he seemed not to take the position that states construct the international environment. This viewpoint of his became more prominent in his later book (1979). His standpoint on this matter is criticized notably by Alexander Wendt in his article (1992) *Anarchy Is What States Make of It* and elsewhere. This issue will be discussed later in this paper.

⁴ Waltz 1954/1959, 231-33.

⁵ Waltz 1979, 129-93.

⁶ Ibid., 18-37. Reductionist theory deals with “special reasons” in the first and second images in his first book’s terminology.

⁷ In this assumption, a state-centric rational agent is driven by security maximizing interests defined by power in the anarchic world. This undifferentiated unitary actor, or “like unit” in his term, would take universally the same action in a given setting. See Waltz 1979, 93-7.

⁸ Waltz 1979, 60-78.

more *scientific*. It is no exaggeration to say that this Waltzian neorealist scheme has become a starting point for discussion on IR in the past quarter-century. Without any reference to this scheme, new studies cannot identify their theoretical standpoints, and without any sense of it, new theories can hardly be developed. Just as Richard Ashley expresses, “thanks to the emergence of a neorealist orthodoxy, students must prepare themselves to retell and carry forward yet another lore.”⁹

Students in IR know that it is inevitable to draw an arbitrary bottom line at some level in social scientific study. The Waltzian scheme of the black-boxing assumption is indeed a result of Waltz’s compromise in order to be *scientific* in explaining international politics in the social reality. As Waltz admits, certainly, “The assumption is a radical simplification made for the sake of constructing a theory. The question to ask of the assumption, as ever, is not whether it is true but whether it is the most sensible and useful one that can be made.”¹⁰ In order to establish another lore, therefore, some students have discussed and attempted to deduce different structural causal inferences within the Waltzian scheme. Others have analyzed and argued each element of the Waltzian assumptions while others have disagreed with the Waltzian way of theorization itself and tried to form a new framework of theorization.

In the 1980s, a consequential critique on neorealism emerged from the liberalist side, the so-called neoliberal institutionalism or just neoliberalism.¹¹ This school of thought emphasizes the functional utility of institutions consisting of norms and rules that would lead to reducing the innate potentiality of conflict in the anarchic system even based on the Waltzian

⁹ Ashley 1986, 260.

¹⁰ Waltz 1979, 91.

¹¹ For example, Keohane 1984; and Axelrod 1984.

assumption. In neoliberalism, reciprocity¹² between selfish agents is the key element expecting long-term mutual gains. Reciprocity in the anarchic world, thus, makes agents take in the utility of institutions, initiated from a superior type of rationality. While spotlighting the nature of rationality in the incessant interactions based on this neoliberalist argument, many students have come to realize the importance of agents' *subjective* perspectives¹³ and the importance of the transformational model¹⁴ over the objectified positional model of neorealism.

Accepting these realizations, in the late 1980s, another seminal approach was introduced in IR, later called constructivism.¹⁵ As Alexander Wendt defines, the tenet of constructivism is “a cognitive, *intersubjective* conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction.”¹⁶ The origin of constructivism was, as David Dessler explains, “a set of largely ‘metatheoretical’ arguments that identified problems with existing analytical frameworks in the study of world politics and sketched the architecture of a new orientation.”¹⁷ It might be safe to say, in other words, that the aim of constructivism was to open up the box in which Waltz tried to contain social realities for the sake of his systemic theorization. In this way, as Yosef Lapid expresses, “the expanding acceptance of a polymorphic image of science and the growing popularity of methodological pluralism... would lead to a reexamination of scientific dissensus and its relationship to scientific progress.”¹⁸ Many students in IR, thus, set in motion to the idea that the bifurcation between

¹² Axelrod 1984, 169-91.

¹³ One, for example, is the utility of the cognitive approach. See Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 6-7; Wendt 1992. Another example is prospect theory. See Levy 1992; Farnham 1994; Berejekian 1997; and McDermott 1998.

¹⁴ For detail, see Dessler 1989.

¹⁵ See Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986; Wendt 1987; and Onuf 1989. Onuf introduced the term *constructivism* in IR.

¹⁶ Wendt 1992, 394.

¹⁷ Dessler 1999, 123.

¹⁸ Lapid 1989, 244.

reductionist and systemic approaches was one what Steve Smith described the “forty-year detour.”¹⁹ In the 1990s, this movement seemed to be transforming into a certain research project.

Similar to neoliberalism that takes the “hypothetico-deductive mode,”²⁰ however, some constructivists, called “thin constructivists,” including Wendt himself who tries to adjust his standpoint on “the Via Media,” have started to identify themselves as epistemologically positivists.²¹ Since Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie in the early days of constructivism called attention to the point that “positivist epistemology simply cannot accommodate itself to so intersubjective an ontology,”²² most students in IR have fully understood the incompatibility as “the deepest problem”²³ in the social scientific study. Some of them are, therefore, sensitively and disappointedly aware that the “attempt to develop a scientific realist meta-theory on which to ground it is less successful.”²⁴ Nevertheless, why do students in IR feel obligated to adjust themselves into the alleged mainstream methodology of *scientific (causal) inference*²⁵ that is contained in the epistemological and ontological contradiction? The blame would naturally go to the post-positivist negligence of methodological contribution, in addition to the excessive stress or persecution complex to be *scientific*. As Colin Wight precisely insists,

¹⁹ See Smith 1992.

²⁰ Ruggie 1998a, 879.

²¹ Wendt 2000; and Dessler 1999. Also as Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro in the volume point out, authors in *The Culture of National Security*, edited by Peter Katzenstein 1996, typically take ‘norms,’ a key independent variable, as exogenous, or given, in order to carry out their qualitative research.

²² Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 765.

²³ Smith 2000, 156.

²⁴ Chernoff 2002, 189.

²⁵ King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.

“the tenacity of the view that science equals positivism is a serious obstacle to any serious evaluation of alternative views of science.”²⁶

Students in IR, thus, may benefit from exploring another lore in construction of a new framework in which epistemology and ontology are compatible. In the next section the significance of *intentionality* in the social scientific study will be confirmed. Centering *intentionality*, I will investigate the strong and weak points of three approaches: systemic; scientific inference; and constructivist approaches, in terms of their epistemology and ontology. Based on the understanding of these three approaches, in the third section, a new framework in which epistemology and ontology are compatible will be introduced. The framework organizes the sequential processes of three logics—of situation, of selection, and of transformation—in order to provide an effective workshop to elucidate state behavior. In the fourth section, the new framework is applied to analyze state behavior in the case of the transformation of Japanese ‘arms’ export control policy during 1952, 1967, and 1976. Japanese presumably anti-militaristic and export-oriented state behavior since its defeat in the Word War II is one of the two most popular case studies along with German state behavior. Neorealism as well as neoliberalism could claim a certain causal effect on Japanese export-oriented state behavior. Thin constructivists or culturalists²⁷ could also assert the significance of anti-militaristic cultural variables. It is quite possible for students in IR to deduce any kind of *scientific/causal* inference concluding with remarks like “structure matters,” “reputation matters,” or “culture

²⁶ Wight 2002, 35. For more detail, see Potomaki and Wight 2000.

²⁷ For example, Berger 1993; 1996; 1998; Duffield 1998. And for a severe criticism on culturalists, see Desch 1998. He claims, “Although everyone agrees that culture matters, the critical question is how much independent explanatory power it has. We can answer that question only when we have a clear sense of whether culture is often an independent causal variable (as most culturalists believe) or mostly an intervening or dependent variable (as realist theories would maintain).” And I maintain in this paper that it is impossible to have a clear sense between them and therefore that it is fruitless to discuss which is which.

matters,” in a way that John Ruggie describes as “neo-utilitarianism” or “mono-causal mania.”²⁸ It is possible simply because they all matter, indeed. As Friedrich Kratochwil points out, however, “an actor’s move has different meanings depending on the background of expectations.”²⁹ Hans Morgenthau once said, “Any single cause in the social sphere can entail an indefinite number of different effects, and the same effect can spring from an indefinite number of different causes.”³⁰ I believe that Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba are sincere when they express that their “emphasis on the methodology of [causal] inference is not intended to denigrate the significance of the process.”³¹ Japanese state behavior concerning its ‘arms’ export control policy has seemed to be unswerving while the domestic and international environment has not been consistent. The new framework for constitutive inquiry introduced in this thesis provides a research project in which epistemology and ontology are compatible in explaining state behavior in a social scientific manner. In the final section, then, a brief summary and concluding remarks are presented.

²⁸ The term quoted in Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 50.

²⁹ Kratochwil 1982, 27.

³⁰ Morgenthau 1946, 127.

³¹ King, Keohane, Verba 1994, 37.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: THREE APPROACHES TOWARD INTENTIONALITY

Theorization in IR can be divided into three categories, shown in Table 1 on the next page. The categorization, after all, depends upon how to treat *intentionality*, the key in the social reality, but not in the natural reality. The notion of *intentionality* was introduced to contemporary philosophy by Franz Brentano in the 19th century.³² His ‘intention’ was to provide the distinction between physical and mental phenomena. The so-called Brentano school,³³ later reinforced by Edmund Husserl who took “the transcendental scheme,” defines *intentionality* as:

a process of constitution, of meaning-giving, and so must be radically distinguished from that which has been given meaning, the object. Physical things, objects of nature, and causal processes, as constituted entities, are dependent for their meaning on a transcendental Intentionality which cannot therefore, on pain of circularity, be reduced to, or explained by, any physical process. Transcendentalism, then, involves a dualism...between Intentionality on the one hand and nature and causality on the other. It is this dichotomy that any attempt at a naturalistic theory of Intentionality must overcome.³⁴

³² Thompson 1986, 84.

³³ See, for example, Albertazzi, Libardi, and Poli 1996.

³⁴ Thompson 1986, 85 (underlines added).

An intentional state³⁵ holds intentional contents that settle on conditions of satisfactions for the state. And “a single intentional content can have very different behavioral effects, depending on its relation to the state who has the content.”³⁶ Enormous effort has been made in IR to disclose some distinction among agent’s *subjective* perspectives such as ideas, norms, beliefs, preferences, interests, strategies, and reasons. When intentionality is understood as “a process of constitution of meaning-giving,” it would be no surprise that the attempt to distinguish these agent’s *subjective* perspectives has been problematic. In natural scientific study, a causal relationship exists between separate objects, in which the cause precedes the effect. And separate objects are indeed “out there” in the natural reality. In the social reality, however, “human agency is the only moving force behind the actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and human agency can be realized only in concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for action and influence its course.”³⁷ In other words, an agent’s intention always lies somewhere in the social reality. Therefore, there are no separate objects in the social reality in a strict natural scientific sense, as Transcendentalists understand. Since “international relations are always, necessarily, social,”³⁸ how students in IR can treat intentionality is: (1) to objectify exogenous ‘causes’ by containing intentionality within the assumption box; (2) to consider intentionality as if it were causality; or (3) to concede the incompatibility between natural scientific epistemology and intentionality of the social reality.

³⁵ Some examples of Intentional state are: beliefs, desires, norms, preferences, interests and so on. See Searle 1983, 4-5.

³⁶ Block and Segal 1998, 20.

³⁷ Dessler 1989, 443.

³⁸ Onuf 1997, 7.

	1. Systemic approach	2. <i>Scientific</i> Inference approach	3. Constitutive approach
Ontology	objectivism (natural scientific)	Subjectivism (<i>as-if</i> social scientific)	Intersubjectivism (social scientific)
Epistemology	exogenous causal inquiry (natural scientific)	endogenous causal inquiry (<i>as-if</i> natural scientific)	constitutive inquiry (social scientific)
Typical Scholars	Waltz Wallerstein	Keohane Wendt	Ruggie Morgenthau
Problem	Can assumption be valid?	Can intentionality be causal?	Can induction be scientific?

Table 1: Three Approaches for Social Inquiry in IR

In Approach 1 the ontological standpoint is modified as a natural scientific one (objectivism) in order to take natural scientific epistemology (exogenous causal inquiry). In Approach 2, while supporting its *as-if* social scientific ontology (subjectivism), the epistemology is fabricated into an *as-if* natural scientific one (endogenous causal inquiry). And students in Approach 3 sacrifice natural scientific epistemology (causal inquiry) and instead take social scientific epistemology (constitutive inquiry) in order to maintain coherence with social scientific ontology (intersubjectivism). As shown in Table 1, Approaches 1, 2, and 3 are named: Systemic; *Scientific* Inference; and Constitutive approaches, respectively.³⁹ In each category, two typical scholars are exemplified. As discussed, the categorization is not of the conventional schools of thought, such as realism, liberalism and so on. It is of the methodological approaches. Thus, Kenneth Waltz who is normally labeled as a neorealist and Immanuel Wallerstein who is often called a neomarxist are both in the Systemic Approach. In the

³⁹ The systemic approach is named after Waltz 1979. And the *scientific* Inference approach is named after King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.

Scientific Inference Approach, Robert Keohane, a neoliberal institutionalist,⁴⁰ and Alexander Wendt, a thin constructivist,⁴¹ are typified here. Then, John Ruggie, a thick constructivist, and Hans Morgenthau, a classical realist, are both in the Constitutive Approach.

A. Systemic Approach

Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* is the most influential publication suggesting the systemic approach. It has become an orthodox methodological treatment not only in this approach but even in the whole field of IR. "Perhaps the most useful way to judge the power of a social scientific paradigm is by examining what it is able to exclude,"⁴² as Jeffery Legro and Andrew Moravcsik suggest. In term of this, one of Waltz's most significant contributions is delineating a fundamental distinction between what he defined as structural and reductionist arguments. Waltz was aware when he devised this systemic approach that it was influenced by domestic political factors, yet he theorized that neorealism was only concerned with the assignment of power between states.⁴³ In the on-going social reality where intentionality always lies, however, there is "a potentially endless means-ends chain in which any given end can be seen as means to some other ends depending on what question is being asked."⁴⁴ As Jennifer Sterling-Folker explains, "One of the reasons systemic realism has a reputation for ignoring process is that an environment-based theory treats as a means to an end rather than an

⁴⁰ Keohane's ontological standpoint shifted from objectivism to subjectivism in the 1990s. See Goldstein and Keohane 1993. In this sense, he should be typified here as an ideationalist rather than a neoliberal institutionalist.

⁴¹ Wendt started making his epistemological understanding clear into this category lately. See Wendt 2000.

⁴² Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 53.

⁴³ Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 671.

⁴⁴ Fearon and Wendt 2002, 64.

end in itself.”⁴⁵ This Waltzian methodological technique to enable the natural scientific epistemology in the social scientific reality is, I would call, ‘the third image reversed.’⁴⁶ More concretely, in order to contrive to objectify a causal relationship in the social reality where the inherent problem of endogeneity exists, Waltz treats external structure as if it were the only one-way cause on agent’s behavior, by supposing that the intentional content of all the undifferentiated unitary agents is always into the same direction to maximize their security utility. Based on this supposition, then, we can deduce an inference that an agent’s behavioral change made is caused by a certain type of external structure.

This systemic approach is so sophisticated that it has been a principal theory in IR. It is probably the best way to link natural scientific epistemology with the social reality. It is, therefore, very difficult to falsify its methodological treatment itself. It is, however, apparently vulnerable when the assumption is falsified. The sophisticated theorization is after all based on its vulnerable assumption, skewed ontologically. For example, as Robert Keohane states, “This assumption, like that of perfect rationality, is a theoretically useful simplification of reality rather than a true reflection of it.”⁴⁷ Alexander Wendt also points out, “The problem is that just because a process can be modeled ‘as if’ it works a certain way does not mean that it in fact works that way.”⁴⁸ Because structure is reified in this scheme, it is unable “to account for or to explain structural transformation,”⁴⁹ as Robert Cox insists. Neorealist ontology is always positional, in the two-dimensional world, in which external structure is always given. It is

⁴⁵ Sterling-Folker 1997, 16.

⁴⁶ Similarly, Peter Gourevitch 1978, in *The Second Image Reversed*, argues structural causes have significant effects on domestic politics.

⁴⁷ Keohane 1984, 108.

⁴⁸ Wendt 1999, 61.

⁴⁹ Cox 1986, 242.

clearly not in reality. Neorealist arguments seem to relate that given order as the primitive order, to limit rather than expand debates, to invalidate the significance of variety in time and place, to practice degrees of control, to form an idea of a social power beyond reproach, and therefore allows social learning and creative change likely.⁵⁰ Another dissatisfaction with neorealism comes from Wendt in his well-titled article *Anarchy Is What States Make of It*.⁵¹ As the title says, Wendt claim is associated with the significance of an agent's intentionality. These criticisms here could be called "the third image re-reversed" in this sense. Arguments like these, in other words, are within Waltz's prearranged falsification. Waltz realized that these were weak points, but believed that they "have to be made."⁵² In order to adapt the natural scientific epistemology to the social reality, these are necessary costs that must be paid, as discussed earlier. Most criticisms are misfiring; they are just to elucidate the difficulties of the social scientific study. In order to account for the points made by the criticisms, another epistemological treatment is necessitated.

Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system or capitalist world economy analysis⁵³ is in a unique position in IR. Just as in the title of one of his publications, *Unthinking Social Science*,⁵⁴ his way to treat intentionality is much more simple than the Waltzian scheme; that he just ignores it. He has never called his own research project a theory, probably because he does not take the hypothetico-deductive mode that is initiated from the physicist type of methodology, but takes a more biological-like methodology. Modifying Karl Marx's idea of structural analysis, thus, he takes the position that the world-system is the only relevant unit of analysis.

⁵⁰ Ashley 1984, 228.

⁵¹ Wendt 1992.

⁵² Waltz 1986, 339.

⁵³ For example, Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1989.

⁵⁴ Wallerstein 1991.

The dynamics, not intentionality, of capitalist world development determines the relationships between the divisions of labor: core; semi-periphery; periphery; and external regions.⁵⁵ He objectifies the class struggles as one-way causes on individual political state and economy, by always modeling the dynamics of the world capitalist system in the same direction. He believes that the world capitalist system is the one and only one that could surpass and therefore could explain any individual and particular behaviors in the long-term perspectives. The strong point of this approach is its simplification. However, in addition to reasonable criticisms on its deterministic way of analysis and its excessive reification,⁵⁶ its simplification is considered as its weak point as well. On balance, this is how intentionality is treated in the systemic approach—the Waltzian scheme and Wallerstein’s analysis—that prioritizes its natural scientific epistemology over ontology of the social reality.

B. Scientific Inference Approach

While virtually all the students in IR give at least some credits to the methodological treatment of the systemic approach, there are still many students who are dissatisfied with the approach. They are dissatisfied basically because the ontology of the approach is not to portray the social reality. They know that its ontology is skewed for the sake of its epistemology. Many students understand, for example, that at the most basic level ideas and thoughts characterize a universe of possibilities into actions.⁵⁷ Alexander Wendt asserts: “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and (2) that

⁵⁵ In this world-system, predatory core states exploit peripheral states. Semi-peripheral states cushion between them.

⁵⁶ Wendt 1986, 344-49. He claims that Wallerstein’s world system has “no theory of the system,” as opposed to Waltz’s theory that has “no theory of the state.” See Gauld 1998, 84-86.

⁵⁷ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 8.

the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”⁵⁸ In other words, students who take the *Scientific* Inference approach admit or moreover emphasize that the significance of agent’s subjective perspectives and the existence of intentionality are “irrefutable”⁵⁹ in the social reality. This is a so reasonable assertion that should rather be wondered why it has been alienated in IR. The reason why it has been alienated is quite reasonable, however, when the coherence between ontology and epistemology in this approach is questioned. In order to stay in the alleged mainstream position in IR, students here reluctantly take natural scientific epistemology—causal inquiry—while accepting the social scientific ontology—subjectivism. In doing so, both its epistemology and its ontology are distorted. Intentionality is considered as if causality, and therefore subjectivity is treated as if given in this approach. A well-known assertion “epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology!”⁶⁰ made by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie would prophetically target onto this approach.

Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba’s *Designing Social Inquiry* offers “a unifying perspective” of “systematic empirical investigations”⁶¹ for the *Scientific* Inference approach. Bruce Russett recommends this book as “Essential reading for any serious analyst of international relations.”⁶² The authors admirably elucidate the fact that “In principle and in practice, the same problems of inference exist in quantitative and qualitative research.”⁶³ While doing so, they imply that the causal inference approach is the way to be *scientific* for social

⁵⁸ Wendt 1999, 1.

⁵⁹ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 5.

⁶⁰ Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764.

⁶¹ Keohane 1988, 393.

⁶² King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, in the back cover.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 229.

inquiry throughout the volume. As discussed earlier, the fundamental problem lied in any social inquiry is, not in the bifurcation between quantitative and qualitative researches that they clarify, but in the dichotomy between causality and intentionality that they do not fully comprehend. They practically, however, notice this inherent problem in a causal inference approach in the social reality as the following:

Insofar as the ideas *reflect the conditions* under which political actors operate—for instance, their material circumstances, which generate their material interests—analysis of the ideas’ impact on policy is subject to omitted variable bias: actors’ ideas are correlated with a causally prior omitted variable—material interests—which affects the dependent variable—political strategy... And insofar as ideas serve as *rationalizations* of policies pursued on other grounds, the ideas can be mere consequences rather than causes of policy. Under these circumstances, ideas are endogenous: they may appear to explain actors’ strategies, but in fact they result from these strategies.⁶⁴

The authors suggest in the same page, “To show that ideas are causally important, it must be demonstrated that a given set of ideas held by policymakers, or some aspects of them, affect policies pursued and do not simply reflect those policies or their prior material interests.”⁶⁵ It should be argued here, however, if or not it is really possible to do so within a hypothetico-deductive causal inference approach, and moreover if or not it could still be classified as a causal inference approach when successfully done. One of the authors, Robert Keohane, along

⁶⁴ Ibid., 191. (Italic letters are original)

⁶⁵ Ibid., 191.

with Judith Goldstein, in another volume, suggest in its conclusion, “Policy changes can be influenced by ideas because new ideas emerge and as a result of changes in underlying conditions affecting the impact of existing ideas. Ideas matter, as a result of a system of interacting multiple causes of which they are a part.”⁶⁶ This inference would be the utmost to be deduced by a causal inference approach in the social reality consisted categorically of intentionality.⁶⁷ As John Ferejohn in the same volume acknowledges, “the problem of understanding the role of ideas in social action is, then, that ideas are supposed both to play a causal role in the genesis of actions and at the same time rationalize or make actions intelligible. These two explanatory requirements inevitably conflict.”⁶⁸ One can even say that actions have various inadvertent effects on the actor, others, or the system and so one cannot ascertain from wants and expectations.⁶⁹ Hence, King, Keohane, and Verba’s viewpoint that “ideas as well as interests have causal weight in explanations of human actions”⁷⁰ crucifies students in IR pressured by the authors’ emphasis on the *scientific* virtue of a causal inference approach, ironically.

Alexander Wendt is one of the leading scholars who attempt to introduce the logic of social constructivism into IR. His emphasis on the process-based ontology, ‘inter’-subjectivism, is the key to his understanding of social constructivism. He explains, “Agents are inseparable from social structures in the sense that their action is possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures cannot have causal significance except insofar as they are

⁶⁶ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 29-30. They provide a seminal framework—ideas as road maps—for a constitutive inquiry. It is not a causal inquiry anymore, but a constitutive one that could avoid the innate problem of endogeneity in the social reality. This issue will be discussed later in this paper.

⁶⁷ On this point, see Ruggie 1998b, 18-22.

⁶⁸ Ferejohn 1993, 228-9.

⁶⁹ Jervis 1997, 61.

⁷⁰ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 4. (the underline added)

instantiated by agents. Social action, then, is ‘co-determined’ by the properties of both agents and social structures.”⁷¹ He argues, “Waltz’s three-part definition of structure... seems underspecified. In order to go from structure to action, we need to add a fourth: the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system.”⁷² Wendt, however, suggests: “Scientific realism” that “offers an alternative to the standard positions in the *Positivismusstreit*, one which enjoins social scientists to think ‘abductively’ about ‘causal mechanisms’ to build their theories, instead of trying to find law-like generalizations about observable regularities.”⁷³ For Wendt, identity is “a property of international actors that generates motivational and behavioral dispositions.”⁷⁴ His perspective on identity as “given” makes his entire argument gravely problematic, just as in Maja Zehfuss’s assertion “Wendt’s constructivism does not work.”⁷⁵ Fred Chernoff points out, “There is neither *the prima facie* appeal nor any orthodoxy on [social science realism] and...the move from [natural science realism] to [social science realism] is an exceedingly difficult one that Wendt does not fully justify.”⁷⁶ Wendt’s ambiguity would be ascribed to his indistinguishable understanding on the dichotomy between Intentionality and causality. He refers to John Searle’s definition on Intentionality as “that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.”⁷⁷ This definition is actually introduced by Franz Brentano, whose followers—Edmund Husserl, among them—have later developed into transcendentalism that shed light on the dichotomy between causality and intentionality, as

⁷¹ Wendt 1987, 365.

⁷² Wendt 1992, 401.

⁷³ Wendt 1987, 370.

⁷⁴ Wendt 1999, 224.

⁷⁵ Zehfuss 2001, 340. See also Suganami 2002; Zehfuss 2002, 38-93.

⁷⁶ Chernoff 2002, 193. See also Smith 2000.

⁷⁷ Wendt 1999, 172. Searle 1983, 1.

discussed earlier. Husserl examines the notion of intersubjectivity in terms of ontology by corresponding with the constitutive process of meaning-giving of Intentionality in terms of epistemology.⁷⁸ Wendt seems to understand that “Causation is a relation in nature not in logic.”⁷⁹ He explains, however, “The human brain is a causal mechanism generating intelligent behavior, but it is also a condition of possibility for being human.”⁸⁰ At the same time, he decisively maintains “reasons as causes.”⁸¹ Claiming that “what matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology,”⁸² he argues, “causal and constitutive theories are alike.”⁸³ With his assertion, it is quite confusing or moreover contradictory that his actual methodological argument is to forfeit his ontological standpoint from ‘inter’-subjectivism to subjectivism in order to accept natural scientific epistemology. Steve Smith precisely criticizes on this point:

Wendt’s position is most clearly expressed in the following quote: ‘social life is continuous with nature, and as such social science must be anchored to the world via the mechanisms described by the causal theory.’⁸⁴ In short, Wendt sees constitutive theorizing as explaining the social world only when linked up to causal theory, and as such he readily talks of norms, socialization, social interactions, and reasons as causal.⁸⁵

⁷⁸ See, for example, Thompson 1986; Crossley 1996; and Zahavi (trans. by Behnke) 2001.

⁷⁹ Wendt 1999, 81.

⁸⁰ Wendt 1998, 117.

⁸¹ Wendt 2000, 170-1.

⁸² Wendt 1998, 115.

⁸³ Ibid., 117.

⁸⁴ Wendt 1999, 58.

⁸⁵ Smith 2000, 157.

Wendt's arrangement like these might be convincing for scholars like Robert Keohane, who thinks "that one does not have to swallow the contaminated epistemological water of postmodernism in order to enjoy the heady ontological wine of constructivism."⁸⁶ While putting his foot on natural scientific epistemology, Keohane emphasizes agents' subjective perspectives, which leads to an endogenous causal inquiry epistemologically. While developing from intersubjective ontology of the social reality, Wendt seeks the "via-media" approach, which results in the non-'inter'-subjectivism ontologically. It is, certainly, equitable and therefore agreeable with Goldstein and Keohane's comment that "a potentially rich debate is consigned to the purgatory of incompatible epistemologies."⁸⁷ It should be wondered, however, whether or not an endogenous causal inquiry (*as-if* natural scientific epistemology) based on given subjectivism (*as-if* social scientific ontology) should still be sustained as the mainstream methodology in IR and moreover whether or not it could still be identified as *scientific*.

C. Constitutive Approach

When students illuminate ontology, the constitutive approach would be the most persuasive. When they talk about epistemology, however, this approach is the least influential in IR. John Ruggie explains, "constructivism rests on an irreducibly intersubjective dimension of human action" and therefore "is about human consciousness and its role in international life."⁸⁸ What constructivists, thus, attempt to capture in its ontology is the social reality, just as how Nicholas Onuf illustrates as the following:

⁸⁶ Keohane 2000, 129.

⁸⁷ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 26.

⁸⁸ Ruggie 1998a, 856.

The co-constitution of people and society is a continuous process. General, prescriptive statements, hereafter called *rules*, are always implicated in this process. Rules make people active participants, or *agents*, in society, and they form agents' relations into the stable arrangements, or *institutions*, that give society a recognizable pattern, or *structure*. Any change in a society's rules redefines agents, institutions, and their relation to each other; any such change also changes the rules, including those rules agents use to effectuate or inhibit changes in society.⁸⁹

As discussed earlier, students who take this approach insist on the points like what Friedrich Kratochwil made, "There is a crucial difference between causal explanations in the world of observational facts and that of intentions."⁹⁰ Succinctly, the constructivist approach is to shed light on the constitutive process of intentionality that constructs the intersubjective social reality. From the ontological perspectives, constructivism is, indeed, the most likely. The problem is, however, as Ruggie just admits, "international relations constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory of their own."⁹¹ Since they markedly emphasize on the ontology of the social reality and on the incompatibility with the natural scientific causal inquiry, its epistemology has to be, as Ted Hopf ambitiously asserts, that "Constructivism is no shortcut."⁹² Ruggie claims, in fact, constructivism addresses "issues that neo-utilitarianism treats by assumption, discounts, ignores, or simply cannot apprehend within

⁸⁹ Onuf 1997, 7. (Italic letters are original)

⁹⁰ Kratochwil 1989, 25. Smith 2000, 158-60.

⁹¹ Ruggie 1998a, 856.

⁹² Hopf 1998, 198.

its ontology and/or epistemology.”⁹³ Their ambition is admirable; as a result, however, the constructivist approach has tended to be, just as commonly criticized, descriptive or even worse narrative. Without any remedy, indisputably, the constructivist approach would remain “more an expression of understandable frustration than a working research program,”⁹⁴ as Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane harshly condemn. This is, in fact, a huge part of the reason why some of the so-called thin constructivists started to identify themselves epistemologically positivists while they understood the incompatibility. In order to avoid falling into such a sterile situation, then, Ruggie attempts to provide the basic standpoints for the constitutive approach as: (1) “not a theory of international relations, ...but a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations;” (2) not “the hypothetico-deductive mode” but “by necessary more ‘realistic,’ ...or inductive in orientation;” (3) concepts “intending to tap into and help interpret the meaning and significance that actors ascribe to the collective situation in which they find themselves;” and (4) no “explanatory forms” but “constitutive rules” providing “appropriate and adequate, albeit noncausal, explanatory accounts.”⁹⁵ Whether or not constructivists could form these standpoints into a framework is the crucial point whether the constructivism could be a research project of the social reality or it would end in just grumblers like critical theorists or postmodernists, as a matter of fact.

Finding the constructivist epistemology and the classical realist approach are corresponding, J. Samuel Sarkin claims, “constructivism—whether understood as a methodology, epistemology, or ontology—should not be understood as a paradigm in the way

⁹³ Ruggie 1998a, 878.

⁹⁴ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 6.

⁹⁵ Ruggie 1998a, 879-80.

that realism and liberalism and, for that matter, Marxism are.”⁹⁶ Randall Schweller and David Priess recognize, furthermore, “a current movement away from the starker, more rigorous, neorealist model of international politics toward the richer analytic framework of traditional realism.”⁹⁷ Richard Ashley also characterizes, Morgenthau’s “practical realism” is “hermeneutical,” and “its primary approach to inquiry and grounding corresponds to that of the historical and cultural sciences.”⁹⁸ In fact, Has Morgenthau asserts, “The principles of scientific reason are always simple, consistent, and abstract; the social world is always complicated, incongruous, and concrete. To apply the former to the latter is either futile, in that the social reality remains impervious to the attack of that ‘one-eyed reason, deficient in its vision of depth’; or it is fatal, in that it will bring about results destructive of the intended purpose.”⁹⁹ Morgenthau understands intentionality as the constitutive processes of meaning giving: “there is no single cause by the creation of which one can create a certain effect at will.”¹⁰⁰ He explains the relationship between reason and human action as the following:

Reason fulfils a fourfold harmonizing function for human action. It tends to toward creating harmony among several conflicting irrational impulses. It brings ends and means into harmony with irrational impulses. It establishes harmony among several conflicting ends. It brings means into harmony with ends.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Barkin 2003, 338.

⁹⁷ Schweller and Priess 1997, 23.

⁹⁸ Ashley 1981, 210.

⁹⁹ Morgenthau 1946, 10.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 127.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 157-58.

He describes, “All action is, therefore, at the same time means and ends; and it is only by an arbitrary separation of a certain chain of actions from what precedes and follows it that we can attribute to certain actions the exclusive quality of means and ends.”¹⁰² This understanding of the constitutive process is indeed the one of constructivism. Unsurprisingly, he claims, “Political power is a psychological relation.”¹⁰³ He maintains, therefore, “Political realism is based upon a pluralistic conception of human nature.”¹⁰⁴ As Barkin depicts, in this way, “To realist, it says not only that constructivism can be a useful research methodology, but that addressing constructivist epistemological and ontological premises can provide a useful corrective to the assumptions of individual rationalism and materialism that have been confusing definitions of realism for the past few decades.”¹⁰⁵

In the constitutive approach, the notion of rationality is also to be scrutinized. For Edmund Husserl in the Brentano school, rationality “is not an individual but an intersubjective attribute.”¹⁰⁶ It is important to remind here that rational theories are much more like methods to provide the insight of “intentionality and the explanation of actions in terms of beliefs, desires, reasons and meanings.”¹⁰⁷ In other words, “A sophisticated rationalist view could agree that interests are always interpreted through psychological processes, yet hold that knowledge of these interests, thus interpreted, enables the observer to understand behavior.”¹⁰⁸ It has been perplexingly misunderstood, for example, like in a sense that neorealists were rationalists. Neorealism is just to assume, in order for its theorization, as if the actors embraced the perfect

¹⁰² Ibid., 184.

¹⁰³ Morgenthau 1967, 27.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 13.

¹⁰⁵ Barkin 2003, 338-39.

¹⁰⁶ Crossley 1996, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Fearon and Wendt 2002, 55.

¹⁰⁸ Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 7.

rationality. In an actual sense, however, rational theories are to be considered as epistemologically opposite of empiricism.¹⁰⁹ Hence, rationalist theories, or, more specifically, the study of rationality, is not only compatible but also collaborative with the constructivist approach. On the account for the relationship between the constructivist approach and the study of rationality, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner explanatorily put:

[the constitutive approach] as a central research project and [the study of rationality] as a background condition—that human beings operate in a socially constructed environment, which changes over time. Hence, both analytical perspectives focus in one way or another on common knowledge—[the constitutive approach] on how it is created, [the study of rationality] on how it affects strategic decision making. The core of the constructivist project is to explicate variations in preferences, available strategies, and the nature of the players, across space and time. The core of the rationalist project is to explain strategies, given preferences, information, and common knowledge. Neither project can be complete without the other.¹¹⁰

Hans Morgenthau quotes Max Weber's observation: "Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the 'image of the world' created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving."¹¹¹ As Robert Keohane admittedly expresses, "the most sophisticated

¹⁰⁹ Wight 2002, 37. For more detail, see Haack 1993.

¹¹⁰ Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998, 682.

¹¹¹ (Weber 1926, 347-8) quoted in Morgenthau 1967, 8.

formulations of both classical realism and institutionalism have explicitly followed Max Weber in recognizing that ideas, not determined by material reality, play a major role in international relations, as in the rest of social life.”¹¹² Christian Reus-Smit explains, for example, “The notion of ‘empathetic rationality’ acknowledges that actors are not always egoistic, that their interests are often other-regarding. But altruistic interests remain subjective; while they might be based on intersubjective beliefs about justice and morality, they constitute an attitude toward the other, not a value that we necessarily share with the other.”¹¹³ Indeed, As Robert Jervis says, “All social life is permeated by interpretations, many of which are reflective, being products of each actor’s estimate of others’ beliefs. States as well have to attend to the impressions they are making, impressions that are driven by the implicit theories that others hold about the connections between behavior and the internal dispositions that are thought to influence what the state will do in the future.”¹¹⁴ On balance, in order to maintain compatibility with the ontology of the social reality constituted of intentionality, what the constructivist approach should emphasize is in “interpretive epistemologies that stress the intimate relationship between validation and the uncovering of intersubjective meanings.”¹¹⁵

As discussed, the methodological scheme of the systemic approach would be the best way to engage natural scientific epistemology in social scientific study in IR. Students who take the systemic approach know that a causal inference cannot be deduced in the social reality without any treatment on intentionality that leads to the innate problem of endogeneity.

¹¹² Keohane 2000, 130.

¹¹³ Reus-Smit 1999, 161.

¹¹⁴ Jervis 1997, 255.

¹¹⁵ Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 765.

Therefore, they consider external structure as the one-way cause by sacrificing individual agent's subjective perspectives. This is certainly a sophisticated technique; however, there are many students who cannot relinquish the significance of intentionality in the social reality. Then, students who take the *scientific* inference approach, calculatedly or not, disregard the incompatibility between natural scientific epistemology and social scientific ontology. This approach seems to satisfy both the wishes of social reality seekers and the needs of *scientific* obligation. As a result, however, this could only treat *as-if* social scientific ontology with *as-if* natural scientific epistemology in a compromised and contradicted scheme. Thus, a new framework that maintains the compatibility between ontology and epistemology in the social reality may necessarily be of use for students in IR. The constructivist approach might be the one that can respond to the claim. In the next section, I will attempt to develop a research design for constitutive inquiry based on the understanding of the points discussed in this section.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL NATURE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH

Intentionality is the key in the social reality. It is defined as constitutive processes of meaning-giving, as opposed to causality of constituted entities of given-meaning. There is the tenacious inappropriateness in natural scientific epistemology with social scientific study. In explaining state behavior, thus, it is of assistance to set up a framework for constitutive inquiry in social scientific epistemology, while steering clear of being narrative. One scheme to develop the constructivist framework could be to formulate the phases of constitutive processes on state behavior. By elucidating to what extent the constitutive processes have grown with the on-going social reality, the approach could be structured into three phrases.




Figure 1. Three Logics in Social Scientific Epistemology¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ This schema was introduced by James Coleman to illustrate methodological individualism. See Coleman 1986, 1322. It has been gradually modified and employed to deepen the conception of rationality. With adroit adjustment, Zenonas Norkus applies the schema to Max Weber’s interpretive sociology. According to him, the figure “can be found in all introductory accounts of the leading principles of [Rational Choice Approach].” See Norkus 2000, 260-261.

Taken as a provisional explanandum, the three logics are situated in the schematic image provided in Figure 1. The agent in the social reality always gropes for its own situation in the international and domestic environment, explained in the logic of situation. Based on its perceived situation, the agent picks out a preferable action through the logic of selection. And the action taken by the agent is carried into the environment, explicated in the logic of transformation. Neither logic is disregarded to accomplish elucidating the provisional explanandum. It is important to keep in mind that a provisional explanandum can always be explanans for another provisional explanandum in the continuous processes of the social reality. The agent is aware of the continuity; therefore, moreover, the cyclical processes are often calculatedly conveyed by the agent.




Figure 2. Sequential Processes of Three Logics

The frequency that agent's intention involves concerning a certain explanandum is arbitrary, as shown in Figure 2. Sometimes another three-logic-process takes place immediately after the previous one, and sometimes it dawdles. The figure is just to simplify the image of the process. In an actual sense, the length of each arrow of the three logics would be diverse, and the dotted line would also be more winding than straight, depending on how the three logics are carried out. Many studies abided by the compulsion of causal inquiry in the social reality struggle to explain a "causal relationship" between provisional explanandum and explanans, while

ignoring the three logics. In the constructivist approach, however, three logics are clarified to witness how winding the dotted line is.

A. Logic of Situation

he relationship with the environment is the essential consideration for any agent as a social being. Many students in IR have attempted to explicate this logic by using many different terms. Arthur Stein concludes in his book, for example, “the nature of states’ calculations must be more precisely stipulated. Because nations confront situations in which there are compelling logics for opposed courses of action, it may be impossible to ascertain their behavior without knowing their decision criteria and that they perceive accurately.”¹¹⁷ Similarly, Richard Herrmann and Vaughn Shannon describe the importance of “the construction of situations” to deal with “the construction of interests and norms.” The authors conclude, “the features of the situation [they] have found to have an important impact on decisions to defend a norm are precisely those features of the situation that in most real-world cases provoke intense debate.”¹¹⁸ For Andrew Moravcsik, “What states do is primarily determined by strategic considerations—what they can get or what they know—which in turn reflect their international political environment.”¹¹⁹ It is imperative, just as in an old wisdom highlighted in Sun Tzu’s first chapter, “Estimates,” to “Know the enemy and know yourself.”¹²⁰ This does not mean, as discussed throughout this study, that external condition is a cause on agent’s action. On the logic of situation in the sequential process, importantly, not only positional–international and

¹¹⁷ Stein 1990, 182.

¹¹⁸ Herrmann and Shannon 2001, 650.

¹¹⁹ Moravcsik 1997, 522.

¹²⁰ Sun Tuz. (translated by Griffith) 1963, 22.

domestic—situation but also chronological situation of agent should give explanation for its action and consequently for the researched explanandum. Agent, as Jeffrey Legro contends, “interacts with prior collective ideas to influence future ideas and behavior.”¹²¹ The past data of its own and others, as a matter of fact, is only information available to agent.

In this sense, norms, identity, and even culture, which constructivists tend to prefer using, would be expounded on this logic as well. These terms, after all, indicate agent’s sense of value acquired from its successful and unsuccessful experiences in the past. According to Peter Katzenstein, for example, norms convey agent’s perspective that “influences behavior not only directly, by setting standards of appropriateness for behavior, but also indirectly, through selective prefabricated links between values that individuals or collectivities habitually rely upon to address specific problems.”¹²² As Mark Granovetter explicates, moreover, “culture is not a once-for all influence but an ongoing process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction. It not only shapes its members but also is shaped by them, in part for their own strategic reasons.”¹²³ The logic of situation is the phase in which agent confirms its own sense of value. Agent develops its own sense of value in consequences of its cumulatively made experiences through iterative interactions. Agent, consciously or unconsciously, considers its own positional and sequential situation in the outset of taking a certain action. And students in IR, deliberately, should take into account for the logic of situation in the social scientific epistemology.

In examining state behavior, it is indispensable here to recognize who the agent is. Agent would not be standardized in the constructivist approach. It would rather be nonsensical

¹²¹ Legro 2000, 430.

¹²² Katzenstein 1993, 267.

¹²³ Granovetter 1985, 486; Schoppa 1999, 317.

to determine one particular decision-maker as the agent on state behavior. It could sometimes be the political leader, sometimes be bureaucrat elites, and sometimes be the public, on account for a provisional explanandum. For example, Richard Sobel concludes in his in-depth study, “Public opinion may constrain policy, but policymakers need not always be constrained by public attitudes. There are times when leaders should heed opinion, time when they should lead opinion, and time when they should proceed despite opinion.”¹²⁴ Bruce Bueno de Moesquita claims, alternatively, “I cannot help but reflect on the extent to which American policy toward the Kyoto Protocols, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, engagement or disengagement in Europe, and commitment to nation-building or defensive security have been framed for at least the period 2001-2005 by the hole-punching skills of a few hundred Floridian voters with diverse interests regarding prescription drugs and, perhaps, little interest at all in foreign policy or international affairs.”¹²⁵ These claims, however, pay no heed to the sequential process of the social reality. The public in the United State, for instance, is the agent on state behavior at least every four years. In the example above, the public as the agent in the 2000 election takes the action choosing its new president, while some of the public expect tax-cuts and others support the candidate’s debate skills. The taken action—no matter what each of the public expects on the pick of the Bush administration—contains various expected and unexpected effects. One of the effects that most of the public as the agent did not expect in the election was, for example, “the connection members of the Bush administration have with the oil and gas, aluminum and automotive industries,”¹²⁶ and this might have led to the US decision to repudiate the Kyoto

¹²⁴ Sobel 2001, 240.

¹²⁵ Bueno de Mesquita 2002, 7.

¹²⁶ Lisowski 2002, 106. He claims, “President Bush himself pursued a career in the oil and gas industry for 11 years, and the CEO of Enron hosted a fundraising event that raised a record \$21.3 million, and Vice President Dick Cheney made in excess \$30 million as the CEO of Halliburton, the world’s largest oil fields services

Protocol, as Michael Lisowski affirms. It is just the same as any agent on account for another explanandum takes a certain action that contains a variety of expected and unexpected effects.¹²⁷ In the sequential processes of the social reality, agent changes, depending on what a provisional explanandum is taken. The switches happen incessantly. There are more than a few switches of agent in the course of taking a certain action. The clearest switch, for example, would be elections. As another example, “When a foreign policy decision evokes vigorous elite debate, media coverage will be indexed to reflect the ‘legitimate controversy,’”¹²⁸ Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz point out. Or Robert Putnam calls the switch as “the win-set” in the iterative two-level game.¹²⁹ As Charles Lipson claims, each level “is analytically distinct but needs not be treated as mutually exclusive... *The real problem,... is to integrate choice and structure*, not to depreciate or conflate the distinction.”¹³⁰ In the constructivist approach, the level of analysis is by design transferable, because the social reality is. It is important to remind here, in the intersubjective social reality, that the purposive agent often takes a tentative action in order to see others’ reactions domestically and internationally and to assess the possible outcome of an actually aimed action. In the actual sense, therefore, the logic of situation is inseparable with the logic of selection. The aim here is not to draw a clear and absolute line between them, as discussed earlier. Rather, it is to underline the integrated decision-making process, by shedding light on the logics.

company... and many other members similarly worked as senior executives for companies likely to be adversely affected by GHG emissions reductions and some received significant campaign contributions from the automotive industry.

¹²⁷ This issue—expected and unexpected effects of action—will be discussed later in the logic of transformation.

¹²⁸ Powlick and Katz 1998, 52.

¹²⁹ Putnam 1988. In two-level game, decision-making takes place in the win-set balancing between international and domestic negotiations.

¹³⁰ Lipson 1993, 81.

B. Logic of Selection

The study of rationality would appropriately assist revealing the logic of selection. The term rationality in IR, however, has been so inconsistent that many students have exploited it in a mixture of concepts knowingly or not. It has been so in devious confusion that “much of the antagonism between rational choice and its critics is misplaced.”¹³¹ The study of rationality here is not to assume as if there were the perfect rationality; rather, it is in search of the limitation of rationality. The study is “the approach that explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints.”¹³² On the logic of situation, domestic, international, and chronological constraints are discussed. As James D. Morrow affirms, “uncertainty and sequence shape strategic choice.”¹³³ The logic of selection, therefore, is the phase that examines the so-called bounded rationality, based on the understandings clarified in logic of situation. The idea of “bounded rationality,” Christian Reus-Smit puts in plain words, “recognizes the psychological and organizational limitations that constrain the choices that individuals and collectivities make...limitations; they are constraints internal to the mental processes or decision making procedures of actors.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ Snidal 2002, 79.

¹³² Ibid., 74.

¹³³ Morrow 1999, 112.

¹³⁴ Reus-Smit 1999, 161. He argues the bounded rationality is not intersubjective but subjective. I, however, disagree with his opinion. At the moment when an action is actually taken based on the bounded rationality, the decision is, indeed, subjective. However, the bounded rationality itself is a result of iterative intersubjective interactions domestically and internationally. The comprehension of the on-going process is essential in social scientific ontology and epistemology.

Cognitive psychology in IR, for instance, “has identified a series of systematic deviations from the norms of rational choice,”¹³⁵ defines Janice Stein. Contending the importance of cognitive psychology for the constructivist approach, he explains, “Unlike realists and liberals, constructivists do not take identities and interests as given, but rather as created largely through interaction with others...The cognitive mechanisms that produce group identification—social identity—are categorized and social comparison. Categorization sharpens inter-group boundaries and produces stereotyping.”¹³⁶ The stereotyped images of its own and others influence on agent’s decision-making. According to J.M. Goldgeier and P.E. Tetlock, “From a cognitivist point of view, all causal inferences and policy lessons are the product of mental constructions of what would, could, or might have happened had a different set of antecedent conditions held or policies been tried.”¹³⁷ It would be, however, problematical to distinguish psychological effect in intentionality in the social reality, as discussed. On this point, Friedrich Kratochwil plainly maintains:

rules and norms are not simply the distillation of individual utility calculations but rather the antecedent conditions for strategies and for the specification of criteria of rationality. Norms not only establish certain games and enable the players to pursue their goals within them, they also establish inter-subjective meanings that allow the actors to direct their actions towards each others,

¹³⁵ Stein 2002, 293.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 303-4.

¹³⁷ Glodgeier and Tetlock 2001, 83.

communicate with each other, appraise the quality of their actions, criticize claims and justify choices.¹³⁸

Concerning intentionality, agent in the social reality, intends en route for, and interprets about, its own situation, intersubjectively. The study of rationality is, after all, to point toward to learn the logic how agent makes a better choice confined by the situation; or more precisely, how agent considers a made decision as a better one. Hence, the logic of selection is to elucidate the considerations behind a taken action.

C. Logic of Transformation

“We can never do merely one thing,” as Robert Jervis asserts, “the chains of consequences extend over time and many areas: The effects of action are always multiple. Doctors call the undesired impact of medications ‘side effects.’”¹³⁹ On the logic of transformation, as follows, the ‘side effects’ are the critical ingredient to be investigated. The term ‘side’ effects, however, might be mystifying in the intersubjective social reality, in which agent’s interpretive perspectives would reason whether a certain effect is ‘side’ or ‘main.’ On the one hand, agent often provides some substitutable effect manipulatively in order to achieve its real aim, by camouflaging the distinction of the multiple effects of a certain action. According to Harvey Starr, this “substitutability” of a certain action makes political technique more dexterous.¹⁴⁰ Judith. Goldstein also makes a case on this point, “International institutions facilitate

¹³⁸ Kratochwil 1993, 75-6, quoted in Zehfuss 2002, 18.

¹³⁹ Jervis 1997, 10.

¹⁴⁰ Starr 2000.

cooperative behavior among nations: as well, they may serve a number of specific political purposes for policymakers at home.”¹⁴¹ Similarly, as Robert Putnam exemplifies of a Japanese policy, some additional domestic stimuli were pushed for, “using U.S. pressure as one of their prime arguments against the stubborn resistance of the Ministry of Finance (MOF).”¹⁴² Leonard Schoppa argues, in this vein, “international bargaining gives negotiators the chance to employ a variety of synergistic strategies in an effort to reshape domestic politics to their advantage.”¹⁴³ On the other hand, however, the agent’s ability to control over transformational process of the social reality is limited in a longer span. As Jennifer Sterling-Folker insists, “Creation may largely be a matter of historical accident, but once created processes take on a life of their own by reinforcing identities and behavior and hence propagating the process itself.”¹⁴⁴ In Karl Marx’s well-known assertion, similarly, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under conditions chosen by themselves.”¹⁴⁵

Institutionalization of norms, for example, generally extends the expire-date of effects.

Institutions “are tools of statecraft,” as Robert Jervis articulates, but once they are established, “they may then shape what actors seek and want, usually in ways that were not contemplated at the start.”¹⁴⁶ It is indubitable that an action contains compound effects in the intersubjective environment. That is, agent is driven in the sequential process of the social reality on the endeavor to manage the unmanageable effects. On the logic of transformation, therefore, the

¹⁴¹ Goldstein 1996, 562. He deduce this inference from the case study of the “North American ‘unfair’ trade laws of the Free Trade Agreement. He concludes that “the FTA became an international solution to a domestic problem.”

¹⁴² Putnam 1988, 429.

¹⁴³ Schoppa 1993, 383.

¹⁴⁴ Sterling-Folker 1997, 16.

¹⁴⁵ Quoted in Wight 2002, 24.

¹⁴⁶ Jervis 1999, 63.

consequences springing from purposed actions in the constitutive process of the social reality are explicated.

The constructivist approach recognizes intentionality in the social scientific study in which epistemology and ontology are compatible. In order for the ‘explanation’ on state behavior in the sequential process of the social reality, thus, the framework is to have appreciation for three logics—of situation, of selection, and of transformation. In nature, the logics are intertwined; however, diligent efforts to clarify each logic would offer convincing contentions in the social scientific study. Only on the endeavors could improvement be made in the social scientific study of IR. In the next section, accordingly, I will apply the constructivist framework of three logics to state behavior in the case of Japanese export controls on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies during 1952, 1967, and 1976.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES: JAPANESE STATE BEHAVIOR ON ‘ARMS’ EXPORT CONTROLS

The critical question about Japan is not whether it will become a major recipient of arms, but the extent to which it will become a significant exporter. There has already been pressure for this from industrial and other defense-oriented quarters, which thus far has been resisted.¹⁴⁷

Andrew Pierre 1982

Japan has fashioned its own style on the international export control regimes in the post-war period.¹⁴⁸ It would be no overstatement that Japan has been playing not merely a signer but one of the leading roles on all the extant international export control regimes related to the weapons of mass destruction since their outsets.¹⁴⁹ The reason of Japan’s stance on this has sometimes been ascribed to its cultural norms, the so-called “antimilitarism,” or sometimes to its public

¹⁴⁷ Pierre 1982, 218.

¹⁴⁸ For the legal framework and licensing of Japanese export controls in detail and for the evaluation on them, see <http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/html/nat_eval_japan.htm>. According the evaluation, Japan maintains the world highest standard in international export control regimes.

¹⁴⁹ These are regimes related to unconventional weapons: Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Suppliers Group; Biological Weapons Convention; Chemical Weapons Conventions; Australia Group; and Missile Technology Control Regime. See, for example, SIPRI 2002, 743-758.

“nuclear allergy,” initiated from the ruinous experience.¹⁵⁰ More intriguingly, Japan’s unique attitude can be witnessed in the international export control regime on conventional arms in particular. Japan refrains itself from benefiting in the \$ 20 billion world conventional weaponry market, enjoyed by all the major states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, et cetera, shown in Table A on Appendix.

Concerning conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, there was the international export control regime, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (hereafter CoCom), in the West of the Cold-war milieu.¹⁵¹ CoCom was one that the United States designed to maintain the technological advantages of the West against the Soviet-led Communist bloc, under the so-called ‘containment’ strategy.¹⁵² The controlled items in CoCom, therefore, were principally high-tech goods. As the successor of CoCom in the post-Cold war era, the former CoCom members with the former targeted states—Russia and East European States—agreed on the establishment of a new international export control regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement (hereafter WA).¹⁵³ “The WA was designed to promote transparency, exchange of views and information and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilising accumulations.”¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ See, for example, Berger 1993; 1996; 1998. Also see Katzenstein 1993; 1996.

¹⁵¹ “CoCom is not the name officially agreed upon among the member countries. It is noted that CoCom was made public only after 1953; also interestingly, it had maintained a status of unofficial international institution until its dissolution on March 31, 1994.” Yamamoto 2001, 27. Also see Adler-Karlsson 1968, 50-51.

¹⁵² See Mastanduno 1992.

¹⁵³ See <<http://www.wassenaar.org/>>. The 33 participating states of the WA are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

¹⁵⁴ <<http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/talkpts.html>>

Although there has been much controversy on controlled items among the members,¹⁵⁵ the international export control regime finds a certain agreement. Since the agreement is “to continue the use of the CoCom control lists as a basis for global export controls on a national level,”¹⁵⁶ the concerned items are essentially high-tech goods.¹⁵⁷




Figure 3. Different Covered Areas of Export Controlled Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies

Figure 3 shows that the different objectives of controlled items between Japanese ‘arms’ export controls and the international regimes on conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Since Japan has been a member of both the regimes, Japanese export controls also cover the circled white area in the figure. Japan’s distinct stance on export controls is, therefore, embodied in the grey area in the figure. In other words, the \$20 billion world weaponry market exists in this grey area from which Japan abstains and the other states in the international export control regimes benefit.

¹⁵⁵ Anthony 2002, 621-5.

¹⁵⁶ <<http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/History.html>>

¹⁵⁷ See the list. <http://www.wassenaar.org/list/wa-list_03_tableofcontents.html>

Japan today is the world second largest and basically export-oriented economy with the capability of highly advanced technology. The public in Japan has been particularly inquisitive about technologies in general and often has found some national self-esteem in its technological development. As Richard Samuels affirms, “Technology was central to the Japanese developmental ideology,” credited to the catchphrase *gijutsu rikkoku*, technology-based nation-building.¹⁵⁸ There is, moreover, “a belief that mastering military high technology is the key to modern industrial competence.”¹⁵⁹ Then, there must be reasons that Japan has overlooked such an important opportunity in which other major states have enjoyed.

As discussed earlier, it would be quite attainable here to deduce any alleged causal inference. In the constructivist framework, however, the reasons are elucidated in constitutive inquiry. The reasons are not constructed nor constituted over a night. Accumulated factors through sequential processes should be disentangled in the three logics—of situation, of selection, and of transformation. There have been three turning points related to Japanese export controls since its defeat in WWII; 1952, 1967, and 1976. In 1952, Japan decided to join to CoCom. In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made a statement on ‘Three Principles of Export Controls’ at the Diet session. In 1976, Prime Minister Takeo Miki manifested ‘Three Principles of ‘Arms’ Exports.’ In what follows, I will apply three logics to each of these three turning points, as shown Figure 4.




Figure 4. Three Turning Points of Japanese Export Controls

¹⁵⁸ Samuels 1994, 33-78.

¹⁵⁹ (Alexander 1993, 1) quoted in Samuels 1994, 48.

A. 1952 *The Entry to CoCom.*¹⁶⁰

Logic of Situation. Under the Allied Nations occupation, virtually all the post-war Japan's political and economic activities were instructed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Power (hereafter SCAP). In particular, any types of military were physically exterminated, and *zaibatsu* consisting of major military industries that had led pre-war Japan's development were dismantled. In November 1946, the Japanese constitution instructed by SCAP was promulgated, including Article Nine.¹⁶¹ In the environment the US-Soviet confrontation was intensifying especially after the Soviet nuclear tests and the Chinese communization in 1949, the United States started taking the strategy of 'containment' against the communist bloc including East Asia. Japanese export controls were consequentially incorporated in the US strategy because the SCAP in Japan consisted dominantly of US officers. In December 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean War, SCAP gave an order to the Japanese government to proscribe all the exports to the People's Republic of China (hereafter PRC), Hong Kong, Macao, Manchuria, and North Korea, whose markets were the major clients of Japanese private companies, as a replacement for the economic merit of becoming a logistic base of the US military operations in the Korean Peninsula. Based on the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ References to historical events in this section are: Mastanduno 1993; Samuels 1994; Yasuhara 1996; and Yamamoto 2001.

¹⁶¹ Article Nine: Aspiring sincerely, to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

¹⁶² The Soviet did not sign on this treaty. Neither PRC nor the Republic of China (Taiwan) was invited to this treaty.

and the 1951 US-Japan Mutual Security Assistance Act,¹⁶³ after the seven year Allied Nations occupation, Japan obtained its own authority on international trade from SCAP in March 1952. In the very same month, on March 25 1952, the United States requested Japan for the considerations to join CoCom, which had been agreed by the United States and Western European states.¹⁶⁴ It is clear by now that the Japan's situation at this point was woven into the US-led Western bloc with or without Japanese will. As Takehiko Yamamoto describes, the Japanese officials "did not have enough knowledge and intelligence to calculate gains and losses if and when they would decide to join the existing multilateral export control regime."¹⁶⁵ They were feeling its situation as that "if Japan did not join CoCom, Japan would suffer from the excessive export controls and that situation might be disadvantageous to Japan's foreign trade not only with Communist countries but also with the friendly countries."¹⁶⁶ Thinking of its relationship with the United States, it is understandable that Japanese officials as the agent at this time perceived this way on its situation.

In the already started CoCom in Europe, however, there was a disagreement between the United States and Western European countries: the United States wanted the regime as strict as possible for the sake of its own grand strategy; and European countries generally aimed the controlled items as leniently as possible for the sake of their own economic recovery.¹⁶⁷ Perceiving the environment like this, Ambassador Hagiwara at the Overseas Office of the

¹⁶³ This act is "to consolidate the US alliance system through the supply of weapons and equipment, participation of allied officers in training programs in the United States, and the overall coordination of military strategies." Pyle 1992, 29.

¹⁶⁴ Yasuhara 1996, 89-90.

¹⁶⁵ Yamamoto 2001, 35.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 36

¹⁶⁷ Mastanduno 1992, 64-106.

Japanese government in Paris¹⁶⁸ sent a letter to the Director of Economic Affairs Yukawa, concerning the join to CoCom as the following:

It is needless to say that it is important for Japan to control strictly exports of strategic commodities. I think, nevertheless, Japan alone has not to be imposed excessively heavier regulations than the Western European members. ...Since the policies in CoCom mirror not only one-sided stringent views of the US but also diverse interests of other member countries, it is, I believe, most beneficial and the best policy for Japan to join CoCom and collaborate with liberal countries in a sense that we can get any technical know-how for export controls as well as for our fundamental national interests.¹⁶⁹

This suggestion was quite strategic in a calculation that Japan could be more contended in equalizing its own obligations of the export control regime with Western European members', by utilizing a small disparity between the United States and other members.

Logic of Selection. Concerning the Japan's entry into CoCom, the United States planed to establish a new committee limited to only in East Asia; however, Western European countries did not want such a distinct existence of double-standardized regimes.¹⁷⁰ After confirming the bifurcation between the members through the diplomatic channel with the UK officials, the

¹⁶⁸ The main office of this secret committee was located in Paris.

¹⁶⁹ "The letter from Ambassador Hagiwara at the Overseas Office of the Japanese Government in Paris to the Director of Economic Affairs, dispatched on April 7, 1952. (top-secret desclaasified document 14-24)," in Yamamoto 2001, 36.

¹⁷⁰ Yasuhara 1996, 88-92.

Japanese delegation was sent to the Conference in Washington in July 1952, having the instructions approved by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida as the following:

1. Export Control Organization

The Japanese government hopes to join CoCom. However, if our entry turn out to be difficult, then,

- (1) we have to avoid a creation of an independent organization only for the Pacific region which would have no relationship with CoCom.
- (2) we can accept a membership of new organization that is technically different from but closely related with CoCom (for example, an organization that deals with the issue only related to the Pacific region as a sub-committee of CoCom).

However, in this case,

- (1) this new sub-committee has to be perfectly consistent with CoCom in terms of basic policy of export controls as well as detailed procedures for export control practices; and
- (2) we, then, have to ask for participating countries to make their efforts to include as many Far Eastern countries as possible in the sub-committee.

2. Limits of Control

In terms of the limits and contents of export controls, the same standard should be applied to all members. Since currently there is, to a considerable degree, unevenness in the limits and contents of regulated items between Japan and

Western European countries, we should take an attitude to correct such unevenness in them in the Conference. In this sense, if the Conference there agreed that export controls in Western European countries would be strengthened to the same level as ours, we are ready to maintain the current level of export regulations.¹⁷¹

After several negotiations, Japanese officials confirmed that by being in the middle ground between what the United States and Western European states attempted to do, Japan could accomplish all the outcomes appealed in the instructions above: the new export controls in East Asia as the sub-committee of CoCom, not separated from CoCom; and the controlled items at the same level as other members of CoCom.¹⁷² And Japan did actually achieve them. Furthermore, Japan was agreed on the constant participation to Consultative Group (CG)-CoCom of the higher body for decision-making by other members.¹⁷³ This would be a clear example that bounded rationality worked as the agent wanted. In other words, Japan in an undesirable situation attempted to seek a better choice at an attainable level, and it worked. In what follows, what expected and unexpected effects were carried out from this successfully taken action by Japan will be illuminated.

Logic of Transformation. Japan's entry to CoCom did not make Japan's export controls more strict; rather, Japan became able to enjoy international trade at the same level as other

¹⁷¹ "Policy Proposal Regarding the Instructions to the Delegate to the Conference on Export Controls, approved on July 23, 1952 (Declassified Documents 275-8)." Quoted in Yamamoto 2001, 39-40.

¹⁷² Yasuhara 1996, 89-93.

¹⁷³ Yamamoto 2001, 49-53.

CoCom members'. Although its former major clients—the mainland China and the northern part of Korea—were targets of the embargo in the US strategy of 'containment' under CoCom, Japan could find new and better customers in South East Asia and most importantly in North America. It would be safe to say that these outcomes were just as how Japan expected in the logic of selection based on the logic of situation, discussed above. Japan, moreover, obtained the acceptance of the regular-based attendance to CG-CoCom, by befriending with both sides on the disparity between the United States and Western European states.

This successful experience brought about one of the prominent and therefore important 'side-effects,' on the Japan's later state behavior throughout the Cold-war era and even today. The Japanese delegation, Mr. Takeuchi, recapitulated "...Although we fortunately succeeded in achieving our expected results in this Conference, we will, however, be faced with difficulties and subtleties in the future CG-CoCom meetings over how to control exports to the communist countries since we have to take an intermediary stance between the U.S. and European countries. ..."¹⁷⁴ "The way Japan behaved during the negotiations," as Yamamoto emphasize, "paved the way for establishing a prototype of Japanese export control diplomacy since then."¹⁷⁵ He calls such an intermediary stance as "intended ambiguities" and insists that it even today characterizes Japanese diplomatic attitude.¹⁷⁶ A successful experience of a taken action at the very beginning initiates a certain attitude the agent believes it more rational, which could effect on the future actions.

¹⁷⁴ "The Telegram from Ambassador Araki in Washington to Foreign Minister Regarding Export Controls against Communist China, dispatched on August 5, 1952 (top secret No.847, declassified documents, p.426), in Yamamoto 2001, 51.

¹⁷⁵ Yamamoto 2001, 51.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 52-53.

*B. 1967: Three principles of export controls*¹⁷⁷

Logic of Situation. As a member of the West in the Cold war milieu, purposefully or not, Japan was incorporated in the international export control regime based on the US containment strategy against the communist bloc. Since it had no choice but being on the West side, Japan at least desired to obtain the equal authority on international trade to other members of the West in Europe. Locating itself in the middle ground of the discord between the United States and Western European states, Japan succeeded to equalize itself to other members of CoCom. Getting a jump-start by benefiting from being a logistic base of the US military operations in the Korean Peninsula, Japanese economy kept favorably the rapid growth rate through the 1950s¹⁷⁸ and got recovered to the pre-war economy level by the middle of the 1950s. In December 1956, Japan's entry to the United Nations was accepted, and in January 1960 US-Japan mutual security treaty was renewed. In the 1960s, its economic growth was even rapider under the Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's plan of *shotoku baizo* or 'income-doubling' for the people. In 1962, Japanese government reached an unofficial agreement with the government of the PRC on the minimum start of non-governmental trade. In the year of the Tokyo Olympics, Eisaku Sato became Prime Minister in 1964.

Although Japanese exports were dramatically enlarged during the period, exports related to military use kept a relatively low level in the 1960s.¹⁷⁹ The destinations of the exports related to military use were normally South East Asian states such as Thailand and Indonesia.

¹⁷⁷ References to historical events in this section are: Samuels 1994; Maeda 1995; and Fukui and Fukai 1996.

¹⁷⁸ In the *Tokuju Keiki* and *Jinmu Keiki* booms, the average growth rate of Japanese economy in the 1950s was higher than 7%.

¹⁷⁹ See Table B, in Appendix.

On such a day in a blooming economy, April 21, 1967, at the Diet session, a member of the Lower House, Chikayoshi Hanayama of the Socialist Party, raised a question about Prime Minister's standpoint concerning the export of rockets made by Tokyo University to Indonesia. Prime Minister Sato answered to the question in the following:¹⁸⁰

Yes, it is of course for Japan to be a peace-loving nation. However, it is also important to keep the self-defense in order to be peace-loving. This is why Japan indegenizes defense products, and sometime those can be exported. There are certainly export trade control regulations, so they cannot be exported to a certain place, like ones involved in or likely to be involved in conflicts. However, it would not be fair to say that any products to any places should not be exported.

Hanayama responded:

This is a huge problem. They are products to be used in conflicts. Japan should absolutely avoid exporting anything like them.

Sato answered:

I don't think it is a problem when they are for defensive purpose. Here is the regulation. It says... arms exports should not be done to

(1) communist bloc countries,

(2) countries subject to "arms" exports embargo under the United Nations

¹⁸⁰ Asahi Shinbun 22April 1967, P(2)1, or <<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/main.html>>. Both are only in Japanese.

Security Council's resolutions, and

(3) countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts.

We are very strict about these...

This is later known as 'Three Principles of Export Controls.' It is clear here that Sato's answer was not to aim to ban arms' exports; rather, he seemed more permissive for arms exports than regulative. In fact, these regulations are almost equivalent to the rules of CoCom that other members had maintained. It seems to be the case that Sato just read the existing regulations. Then, it should be wondered here why and how his blunt response reading extant regulations became distinctive Japanese export control policy later. Someone might have interpreted these in a different way on purpose or not.

Logic of Selection. The main point of the debate at the Diet session, indeed, became on how to interpret the third principle, the regulation on "countries involved in or likely to be involved in international conflicts." In the days when the US involvement got more and more deepened in Vietnam, the socialist party harshly questioned which country could totally be unlikely to be involved in international conflicts.¹⁸¹ On April 26, Sato made a statement: (1) whether the arms produced in Japan would help some country's purpose on invasion should cautiously be supervised; (2) arms should not be produced for the initial aim of exports.¹⁸² These were his last comments on arms' export at the Diet session. At the end, Sato did not agree on the idea any arms exports should be banned. He stayed on an ambiguous position. Then, Sato might not

¹⁸¹ Asahi Shinbun 27April 1967, P3.

¹⁸² Asahi Shinbun 27April 1967, P3.

be the agent in this case. He must have had some influence on the agent, but he was not the one.

On April 23, two days after Sato made his first comment on arms exports at the Diet session, Asahi shinbun (newspaper), who is normally sympathetic with the socialist party, ran a quite large piece of news on the paper that the ministry of Trade and Industry (hereafter MITI) rejected 68 items (out of 2000) going to an exhibition in Tien Ching, China, due to CoCom regulations.¹⁸³ It reported that the rejected products are machineries for transistor radios and high-quality calculators. Introducing what CoCom is, the news expressed, “it has been reported that there are many cases that England, France, and West Germany export controlled items to PRC with a lenient manner. ...it will be necessary to be in such a style for the future Japan-China relationships.”¹⁸⁴ The public started wondering why the export of obvious arms to Indonesia under dictatorship was permitted, albeit a calculator to PRC was not.

In Japanese successive economic growth since the 1950s, MITI has played a significant role, later called ‘Japanese model’ of politico-economic practices.¹⁸⁵ MITI, “is the best-known, at least outside of Japan, of all the ministries as Japan’s ‘economic general staff.’”¹⁸⁶ Since the prosperity of Japanese industries was importantly led by the instructions of MITI, industries became generally corporative with MITI on the regulations. MITI is the main authority on export controls in Japan. MITI might have perceived something from its situation. Intriguingly, indeed, the total amount of Japanese arms’ export went zero from the next year, 1968, on.

¹⁸³ Asahi Shinbun 23 April 1967, P7.

¹⁸⁴ Asahi Shinbun 23 April 1967, P7.

¹⁸⁵ See Fukui and Fukai 1996, 223-283

¹⁸⁶ Fukai and Fukai, 1996, 236

Logic of Transformation. In spite of the fact that Sato's 'Three Principles of Export Controls' are well-known, particularly as a tenet of peace-Japan, his response to the question at the Diet session was not to forbid the arms exports. Rather, he tried to be protective over defense industries. Nevertheless, from the next year on, the amount of arms export became zero. It would be suitable to speculate that MITI as the agent made the change. It is important to remember here that the change was made without any legislative alteration. It would be done only by administrative instructions. The strategic "intended ambiguities" was taken again. As the 'side effect,' MITI involvement in industries became even more considerable.

C. 1976: Three principles of 'non'arms export controls

Logic of Situation. Prime Minister Takeo Miki got in power in 1974. "Miki was notable for being a 'dove,' whose views on defense were often closer to that of the opposition Socialist Komeito and Communist parties than to other members of the LDP,"¹⁸⁷ describes Chai. He is most remembered in his successful negotiation with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in the magnitude of the Oil shock in 1973. Miki convinced King Faisal Japan as a friend of Saudi Arabia and got the agreement to start trading oil with Japan soon. His successful experience on this made him even more dovish, seeking friendly states. His dovish and clean image helped him to be in power after the muddle of Tanaka scandal in 1974. Kakuei Tanaka, Miki's previous Prime Minister, was popular and powerful but money-smeared. Miki's primal task was to clean up the milieu of Japanese politics. On February 24, 1976, moreover, an even greater scandal shocked the entire Japan: "Tanaka was arrested on suspicion of having accepted

¹⁸⁷ Chai 1997, 401.

500 million Yen in bribes from the Lockheed Corporation,”¹⁸⁸ a few months later. The public resentment went not only toward the former Prime Minister Tanaka, but also Lockheed, one of the largest military industry companies.¹⁸⁹ It would be safe to say that the image of the military industry couldn’t be worse at that time in Japan. Perceiving such an atmosphere, on February 28, 2 days after the outbreak of the Lockheed scandal, the members of the socialist party raised a question at the Diet session about Prime Minister Miki’s standpoint concerning the arms exports.¹⁹⁰

Logic of Selection. In a situation like this, Miki, as a self-determined dovish, made a clear statement: (1) the arms exports to the areas included in the Three Principles; (2) the arms exports to other areas not included in the Three Principles; and (3) direct overseas investment for the purpose of manufacturing "arms" abroad, and participation in the overseas construction projects of military facilities, will be refrained.¹⁹¹ Japanese unique ‘non’ arms export controls was now institutionalized. As Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane assert, “In general, when institutions intervene, the impact of ideas may be prolonged for decades or even generations.”¹⁹² Indeed, Japanese ‘non’ arms export controls continue today.

¹⁸⁸ Curitis 1999, 81

¹⁸⁹ See Table B in Appendix.

¹⁹⁰ Asahi Shinbun 28 February 1976 P2.

¹⁹¹ Asahi Shinbun 28 February 1976 P2. See also <<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/main.html>>.

¹⁹² Goldstein and Keohane 1993, 20.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Intentionality is the key to the social reality. In order to elucidate the social reality, there are three approaches. The systemic approach takes care of intentionality by containing it into the assumption-box in order to engage natural scientific epistemology. In this sense, students who take this approach know that the incompatibility between social scientific ontology and natural scientific epistemology. It would be the best way to treat intentionality in the natural scientific epistemology; however, there are many students who are dissatisfied with the systemic approach simply because they know that it is not to elucidate the social reality. Then, the scientific inference approach seems to provide an appropriate framework for those who tackle the social reality while having natural scientific epistemology. Disappointedly, however, the approach results in the manipulation of both epistemology and ontology. A methodological book provided by leading scholars could still not overcome the transcendental dichotomy between causality and intentionality. Therefore, a new framework that maintains the compatibility between ontology and epistemology would help students who attempt to elucidate the social reality in IR. The constitutive approach might be the one that can respond to the claims. The constitutive approach acknowledges intentionality. I, thus, attempted in this thesis to provide the basic standpoints for the constitutive approach as: (1) “not a theory of international relations, ...but a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations;” (2) not “the hypothetico-deductive mode” but “by necessary more ‘realistic,’ ...or inductive in orientation;” (3) concepts “intending to tap into and help interpret the meaning and

significance that actors ascribe to the collective situation in which they find themselves;” and (4) no “explanatory forms” but “constitutive rules” providing “appropriate and adequate, albeit noncausal, explanatory accounts.”¹⁹³

In explanation of the social reality, the framework of the sequential processes of three logics—of situation, of selection, and of transformation—could make students avoid being narrative. I applied the framework to elucidate Japanese unique ‘arms’ export controls. Table 2 summarizes three turning points of Japanese unique stance on export controls in the framework of three logics.

	Logic of Situation	Logic of Selection	Logic of Transformation
1952	The Cold-war milieu. Disagreement between the US and W. Europe.	decision to join the CoCom. Obtain the equal authority to other members	Intended Ambiguities
1967	Economic prosperity and Vietnam war	strengthening export control policy to loosen arms export control.	Turned to be strengthen arms export control
1976	Lockheed scandal	Non-arms export control	The policy Institutionalized

Table 2. Japanese Unique Export Controls in Three Logics.

¹⁹³ Ruggie 1998a, 879-80.

Thirty years ago, Brian Fay described:

Men act in terms of their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their external conditions, rather than being governed directly by them, and therefore these conditions must be understood not as causes but as warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more ‘reasonable,’ ‘justified,’ or ‘appropriate,’ given the desires, beliefs, and expectations of the actors.¹⁹⁴

Indeed, Japan’s external conditions in all the three periods—1952, 1967, and 1976—did not serve as causes. The Agent in the cases of Japanese state behavior on arms export controls intended en route for, and interpreted about, its own situation, intersubjectively. Intentionality is constitutive processes of meaning-giving, as opposed to causality of constituted entities of given-meaning. “There is no single cause by the creation of which one can create a certain effect at will.”¹⁹⁵ It is irony that scholars in IR who recognize themselves scientific calculatedly or not overlook the social reality. If we had to ignore the reality in order to be scientific, then, what is being scientific for?

¹⁹⁴ Fay 1975, 84-5.

¹⁹⁵ Morgenthau 1946, 127.

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APPENDICES:

A. THE EXPORTERS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET

		1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1997-2001
1	USA	11,277	12,930	9,957	6,095	4,562	44,821
2	Russia	2,837	1,885	3,874	3,779	4,479	17,354
3	France	2,963	3,340	1,474	743	1,288	9,808
4	UK	2,441	1,040	990	1,103	1,125	6,699
5	Germany	542	1,147	1,261	1,196	675	4,821
6	Ukraine	671	765	568	193	430	2,627
7	Netherlands	548	545	340	204	225	1,862
8	Italy	368	345	404	196	358	1,671
9	PRC	323	292	192	160	588	1,555
10	Belarus	401	57	474	253	333	1,518
11	Sweden	83	112	146	296	486	1,123
12	Israel	247	168	98	259	203	975
13	Spain	619	167	29	51	4	870
14	Canada	163	131	130	68	152	644
15	Australia	317	3	298	-	-	618
	⋮						
	⋮						
54	Japan	3	-	-	-	-	3

Source: SIPRI YEARBOOK 2002, 407-8.

Figures are trend-indicator values expressed in US\$ million at constant (1990) prices.

B. LARGEST ARMS-SALES COMPANIES IN 2000

	Company	Country	Arms Sales	Total Sales	Arms Sales as % of Total Sales
1	Lockheed Martin	USA	18,610	25,329	73%
2	Boeing	USA	16,900	51,521	33%
3	BAE Systems	UK	14,400	18,473	78%
4	Raytheon	USA	10,100	16,895	60%
5	Northrop Grumman	USA	6,660	7,618	87%
	:				
12	Mitsubishi Heavy Industries	Japan	2,850	28,255	10%
	:				
30	Mitsubishi Electric	Japan	1,120	38,318	3%
	:				
35	Kawasaki Heavy Industries	Japan	920	9,840	9%
	:				
55	Ishikawajima-Harima	Japan	500	10,344	5%

Source: SIPRI YEARBOOK 2002, 357-59.

Figures are trend-indicator values expressed in US\$ million, and italic numbers are percentages.