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Abstract

This dissertation is comprised of two essays where the unifying theme is the use of hazard models in the study of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). The first essay constructs a model of mortgage delinquency which tests the extent to which borrowers anticipate a loan modification resulting from such a delinquency. Using a sample of modified loans from CMBS pools, we estimate the present value of modified cash flows and project modification benefits each month for all CMBS loans which are weighted by each loan's survival probability up to the time of modification to proxy for a borrower's anticipation of a beneficial modification. Our results confirm a borrower's anticipation of a modification increases the delinquency hazard, and supports theory that borrower delinquency is strategically endogenous.The second essay examines the investment decisions of regulated financial institutions. Specifically, an empirical model is developed to examine the selling behavior of insurers following a rating downgrade of a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS). The regulatory environment in the insurance industry creates a setting where firms must consider not only the regulatory impact of selling a security, but also the price of the security. By modeling the selling decision using a hazard model, it is possible to capture a dynamic characterization of the firm- and bond-specific attributes which affect the selling decision. Similar to prior studies, the model controls for an insurer's aggregate portfolio risk exposure but introduces an important variable: price. Estimating each security's price allows for creation of a proxy for an insurer's unrealized gain or loss. The results provide evidence that insurers are not primarily motivated by regulatory capital, but instead are influenced by aggregate portfolio risk exposure as well as the size of an unrealized gain or loss, which is found to be asymmetric between high- and low-risk exposure insurers, when evaluating a prospective sale transaction for a downgraded holding.

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