NAÏVE REALISM, BLUR, AND SEEING SOMETHING NEW

by

DYLAN SIMS

(Under the Direction of René Jagnow)

ABSTRACT

Subjects with differing degrees of visual acuity can view the same scene from the same perspective but still have strikingly different experiences: one clear, one blurry. The existence of such contrasts and the distinctive phenomenal character of seeing blurrily pose significant challenges for naive realist theories of perceptual experience. Several recent naive realist accounts of blurry experience are premised on the idea that the subject of the blurry experience is simply acquainted with fewer of the properties actually present in the scene than the subject of the corresponding clear experience. I argue that such accounts fail to accommodate cases of blurry experience where "something new" is seen, i.e. where a property apparently present in the blurry experience is absent in the clear experience.

INDEX WORDS: Philosophy, Visual Experience, Perception, Vision, Naïve Realism, Relationalism, Blur, Acquaintance, Disjunctivism

NAÏVE REALISM, BLUR, AND SEEING SOMETHING NEW

by

DYLAN SIMS

B.A., The University of Georgia, 2011

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2018

NAÏVE REALISM, BLUR, AND SEEING SOMETHING NEW

by

DYLAN SIMS

Major Professor:	René Jagnow
Committee:	Yuri Balashov
	Beth Preston

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
August 2018

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my family.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank Brittany Norman for editing, comments, and listening to me pontificate about philosophy with very little respite. I would also like to thank Kim Pedersen for insightful and extensive written comments on an early draft. Thanks to Serena Lai for several lengthy conversations about this material. Thanks to Christopher Lay and Josue Pineiro for helpful comments after a presentation of this material at a workshop. I would like to thank my committee members René Jagnow, Yuri Balashov, and Beth Preston for all of their support and philosophical insight.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Blurry perceptual experiences pose significant challenges for a Naïve Realist theory of perception. In particular, it is far from obvious how the phenomenal character of blurry experiences could be explained in terms of visual acquaintance with features of our environment (Campbell & Cassam, 2014; Crane, 2006; Smith, 2008). However, recently, several theories of blur have been sketched which seek to explain the phenomena this way (Campbell, 2014; Fish, 2009; French, 2014; French, 2016). These various theories all treat blurry vision as a type of veridical perceptual experience and are all premised on the idea that when we see blurrily, we are acquainted with fewer of the properties actually present in the scene before us than we would be if we were to see the same scene clearly. All the same, they claim that in the blurry experience we are only acquainted with properties which are actually present in the environment.

I argue that the current Naïve Realist theories of blur do not accommodate cases of blurry experience where something new is seen; these are cases where an apparent property is visually presented in the blurry experience but absent in the clear one. Put simply, it is very hard for the Naïve Realist to explain just why the subject in the blurry experience sees something new. As a result, it may not be possible to develop Naïve Realist accounts of blur that treat blurry visual experiences as a type of perceptual experience. In addition, a disjunctive strategy, which is at present the naïve realist's standby for dealing with non-veridical experiences, is not an attractive approach to deal with blurry experiences. It is possible to adopt the disjunctivist strategy here, but only by severely limiting the scope and explanatory power of the Naïve Realist theory of

veridical perception. In sum, due to a feature of blurry experiences I have called 'seeing something new', a perceptual account of blur does not look feasible, and a disjunctive account of blur is not desirable.

In this paper I will proceed as follows. I will first introduce Naïve Realism. Subsequently, I will consider a number of possible ways a Naïve Realist could try to explain blurry experiences and will argue that they are all problematic. In particular, I will first lay out William Fish's theory (Fish, 2009), which I will call the 'diminished acquaintance' theory of blur, and propose a number of counter-examples involving the phenomenon of seeing something new. Afterwards, I will briefly consider a few alternative theories of blur that a Naïve Realist might adopt. I will argue that some of these theories fail to accommodate my counter-examples to Fish's theory; others fail for independent reasons. Lastly, I will examine two possible attempts to explain away the significance of my counter-examples and will find them each to be lacking.

Naïve Realism

Naïve Realism, or 'The Naïve View'[1], is a theory of perception that characterizes the nature of veridical perception in terms of a subject's acquaintance with mind-independent elements of the external scene before them (Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2002; Johnston, 2004; Martin, 2002; Martin, 2004). According to this theory, elements of the external scene are constituents of the subject's perceptual experience, and the qualities inherent in the scene explain just why the perceptual experience has the qualitative character that it does. John Campbell's succinct statement of the view is by now a contemporary classic:

[1] Recently the view has sometimes been called 'Relationalism' (e.g., Campbell 2002; Campbell and Cassam, 2014) and also 'The Object View' (Brewer, 2011; 2017). I prefer to use the traditional 'Naïve Realism' and my proposed variation on that traditional name, 'The Naïve View'. The terms 'Relationalism' and 'The Object View' are somewhat infelicitous as there are non-Naïve "relational" theories of perceptual experience and non-Naïve theories that appeal to "objects" of perception.

> The phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you (Campbell, 2002, p. 116).

According to the Naïve View, what it's like to have a given perceptual experience can be explained by citing:

(1) what the mind-independent elements in the scene are like in themselves,

(2) the elements of the scene with which the subject is visually acquainted, and

(3) the perspective from which the subject is acquainted with those elements.

The idea of acquaintance is that of a primitive relation of conscious awareness holding between a subject and the immediate objects of experience. The Naïve Realist further qualifies the basic idea of acquaintance by holding that visual perceptual acquaintance is a relation between a subject and mind-independent elements of an external scene. In addition, on the Naive View, a subject's perspective places limits on with which mind-independent elements of a scene a subject can be acquainted (Brewer, 2011; Campbell, 2002; Fish, 2009). In short, the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is to be explained by a subject's acquaintance with a scene from a given perspective.

As a result, we can see that Naïve Realism's explanation of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience boils down to appealing to a single relation, which I will simply call 'Naïve Acquaintance'. As described above, Naïve Acquaintance consists of the subject's conscious visual acquaintance, from a given perspective, with some mind-independent element of an external scene. Why does this idea capture the core of the theory? Naïve Acquaintance is a relation. When we cite a relation in an explanation, we thereby cite the terms of that relation. So

citing Naïve Acquaintance in an explanation of the nature of perceptual experience, thereby cites (1) the subject, (2) the world they confront, and (3) the perspective they occupy[2].

Now that we have a grip on the core idea behind the Naïve View, it is worth distinguishing between 'strong' and 'weak' versions of Naïve Realism[3]. Strong Naïve Realism claims that Naïve Acquaintance suffices to exhaustively account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. On a Strongly Naïve View, Naïve Acquaintance is all we need to adequately describe what it is like to have a perceptual experience, and it is all we need to explain just why it is like that. By contrast, a Weak Naïve Realism maintains that, in veridical perceptual experience, a subject is naively acquainted with at least some mind-independent elements of a scene and this fact plays an indispensable role in an explanation of perceptions' phenomenal character. However, Weak Naïve Realism concedes that Naïve Acquaintance does not suffice to provide an exhaustive explanation of what it's like to have a perceptual experience. So, in effect, a Weakly Naïve View must be a hybrid theory of perceptual experience: some Naïve Acquaintance plus whatever else is required to complete the explanation of perceptual experience. Some examples could include sense data, qualia, or representational properties. In what follows, I will focus on Strong Naïve Realism. Hence, from here on, 'Naïve Realism' and 'The Naïve View' will refer to Strong Naïve Realism.

---

[2] There is some controversy about whether Naïve Acquaintance should be treated as fundamentally a two-place relation (subject-scene) or a three-place relation (subject-perspective-scene). Arguably, these are often just notational differences. See (French, 2016).

[3] Craig French marks the distinction between 'ambitious' and 'modest' Naïve Realisms. I adopt this distinction here, but opt to borrow the terminology often used in discussions of representationalism. See (French, 2014).

SECTION 2

BLUR AND STRONG NAÏVE REALISM

The Naïve View explains perceptual experience in a way that lets the world do most of the work. The subject's consciousness is simply an open window onto the world. Our location in and perspective on the world serve to limit, restrict, or select the aspects of a scene with which we can be acquainted.

The Naïve Prediction

This basic idea leads to an intuitive prediction. In the words of a leading proponent of the Naive View:

> Two ordinary observers standing in roughly the same place, looking at the same scene, are bound to have experiences with the same phenomenal character. For the phenomenal character of the experiences is constituted by the layout and characteristics of the very same external objects (Campbell, 2002, p.116).

I will call this the Naïve Prediction. The Naïve Prediction says: view the same scene from the same place and one will get the same experience. However, this prediction does not sit well with some everyday facts. Even those most sympathetic to The Naïve View recognize the difficulty:

> Such a prediction looks to be falsified by the everyday observation that subjects who have different levels of visual acuity can have experiences of the same tract of the environment from the same position that differ in their phenomenal character (Fish, 2009, p.55).

My friend and I might look onto the same scene from the same place but still have two starkly different experiences. Mine is blurry, while my friend's is clear. Let's call the pair of experiences in a setup like this one a 'clear/blur pair'. The experiences in any clear/blur pair display a

phenomenal contrast. And let's call such a phenomenal contrast a 'clear/blur contrast'. If the Naïve Prediction were true, clear/blur contrasts would not occur.

So what should the Naïve Realist do? Given that the relevant contrasts obviously exist, the Naïve Realist must give up on the Naïve Prediction. But it is not as easy as simply dropping the Naïve Prediction and walking away. The Naïve Realist also owes us an account of just why they are entitled to give up the Naïve Prediction. After all, even some prominent Naïve Realists have found it a natural consequence of The Naïve View. The fundamental components of The Naïve View neither obviously predict nor obviously explain clear/blur contrasts. We are owed an explanation of how the contrasts could come about if The Naïve View were true. With this explanation in hand, the Naïve Realist would be perfectly entitled to drop the Naïve Prediction.

In addition, features of the phenomenal character of blurry experience alone are sometimes thought to challenge the Naïve View (Crane, 2006; French, 2014; Smith, 2008). How so? For clarity's sake, I'll introduce two distinct challenges related to blur: the challenge to transparency, and the explanatory challenge.

The Challenge to Transparency

The Challenge to Transparency is best thought of, not as a challenge to The Naïve View per se, but as a challenge to a popular argument in support of The Naïve View: The Argument From Transparency (Martin, 2002). The argument, very roughly stated, is that: (i) perceptual experiences are transparent, i.e., the only introspectable properties of perceptual experience are properties that seem to be properties of the mind-independent scene, and (ii) the best explanation for the transparency of perceptual experience is Naïve Realism. Therefore, the transparency argument concludes, Naïve Realism is true. Blur challenges the Argument From Transparency because blur is a counter-example to the argument's first premise, i.e. Transparency (Smith,

2008). The success of the Challenge to Transparency all depends on whether or not blur seems to us, when we inspect our perceptual experience, to be a mind-independent feature of elements in the presented scene. Despite its interest, I will not discuss this challenge any further[4]. I mention the Challenge to Transparency only to shed light on the different challenges that blur poses to The Naïve View and also to highlight what is distinctive about The Explanatory Challenge, which will be my focus in the reminder of this essay.

The Explanatory Challenge

The Explanatory Challenge takes a different tack. The first idea here is that whether or not blurriness seems to us in our perceptual experience like a feature of the mind-independent world, being blurry is not a property that mind-independent objects instantiate except perhaps in rare cases[5]. Photos, paintings, and text sometimes arguably instantiate a mind-independent property 'being blurry'—but what about coffee cups, rooms, trees, mountains, and faces in a crowd?

It is highly unlikely that, for all the things I blurrily see, no matter where I turn my head, those things just so happen to permanently and mind-independently instantiate a special property, being blurry, and it is only by the grace of my poor visual acuity that I am allowed access to this neglected feature of reality. As a result, when it comes to an explanation of the phenomenal character of blur, it would appear The Naïve View cannot employ their canonical form of explanation: Inheritance[6]. What follows is a simple example of the Inheritance form of explanation: The bluebird on the branch outside my window looks blue and round to me. Why? Well, because the bluebird is round and blue. And, due to my perspective and the bright daylight, I am acquainted with those properties of the bluebird. So, why does my perceptual experience

---

[4] See (Smith, 2008) and (French, 2016) for further discussion.
[5] See also (Smith, 2008), (French, 2014), and (French, 2016)
[6] See (Campbell, 2002) and (Campbell & Cassam, 2014).

have the particular qualitative phenomenal character it does? My experience inherits its qualitative character from the qualitative character of the scene I am acquainted with.

However, the Inheritance form of explanation just illustrated cannot work for blur. It is very natural to think that explanation here should work the other way around: the bartender's face looks blurry to me, not because he's been drinking, but because I have. And the bluebird looks blurry to me, not because I'm picking up on something about the bluebird, but because of some fact about me. Considerations like these might lead one to a conviction that the phenomenal character of blurry experiences are unlikely to be explained by The Naïve View[7].

To face up to The Explanatory Challenge, The Naïve View needs to explain the phenomenal character of seeing blurrily: (a) without postulating pervasive mind-independent blur-like properties which serve as suitable objects of acquaintance and for which the phenomenal character of blurry experience is the primary source of evidence, and (b) without helping themselves to the sorts of mind-dependent qualitative properties available to rival theories of perceptual experience, such as qualia or sense-data. Recently, a few Naïve Realists have attempted to face this explanatory challenge. I'll begin by examining a theory of blur that, in a way, provides the groundwork for others: The Diminished Acquaintance Theory.

[7] See (Smith, 2008), (French, 2014) and (French, 2016) for presentations of similar considerations. Smith is convinced; French argues the considerations can be resisted. French's Naïve Realist treatment of blur is considered below as 'The Determinable Acquaintance Theory'.

SECTION 3

THE DIMINISHED ACQUAINTANCE THEORY OF BLUR

The Naïve Realist philosopher William Fish has developed an interesting and intuitively powerful theory of blur (Fish, 2009, 54-58). While he does not title his view, I'll call it The Diminished Acquaintance theory of blur. This theory builds on a natural idea, which is that in some sense, one sees less of a scene when one has a blurry experience than someone else who sees the same scene clearly. All the same, Fish argues, despite seeing less, there is no reason to deny that everything one does see is in fact all out there to be seen[8]. As a result, Fish believes The Naïve View should treat blurry experience as a case of veridical perception, and thus blurry experience must be explained in terms of Naïve Acquaintance. To motivate his theory, Fish initially describes a scenario involving a clear/blur pair where he is unable to read the titles of books on a bookshelf but his colleague is able to do so:

> When I look up at my bookshelf, I can see that the book on the top left of my bookshelf is small, thin, and a blue-green color, but I can't make out the title. When my colleague views the same scene, she can still see all of the details I can, but she can also make out more; for example, she can see that the book is H.B. Acton's Kant's Moral Philosophy… (Fish, 2009, p.56).

This is where the idea of Diminished Acquaintance comes in. Fish develops the idea of Diminished Acquaintance in order to explain the phenomenal and functional differences between his blurry experience and his colleague's clear experience. Fish states his view as follows:

> One difference between our experiences, then, is that the presentational character of her experience – the array of features that she is acquainted with in her experience – contains a fact that mine does not…More generally, we might suggest that what distinguishes the phenomenal character of my colleague's experiences from mine is that, due to higher

[8] In addition, Fish argues there are forceful reasons Naïve Realists should resist a disjunctivist approach to blurry experience. I will discuss this issue in more detail later on.

> visual acuity, the presentational character of her experiences are more detailed or incorporate more facts. This accounts for the differences in what it is like for us to have experiences of the same tracts of the environment (Fish, 2009, p.57).

Simply put, Fish explains the clear/blur phenomenal contrast above by appealing to differences in how many facts he and his colleague are acquainted with in their experiences: his colleague is latching onto more facts than Fish himself is.

Before we can critique this view, it is necessary to make it more precise. Let us use the following abbreviations:

V: Let V stand for a veridical perceptual experience.

C: Let C stand for the clear experience in a clear/blur pair

B: Let B stand for the blurry experience a clear/blur pair:

E: Let E stand for the environmental scene viewed by a subject.

In addition, let any experience, such as V, C, and B, be treated as sets of properties. In particular, let experiences be treated as the apparent properties visually presented to the subject of the relevant experience. Finally, treat the environmental scene E as a set of properties—namely, the set of all properties instantiated in the relevant region. Note that although Fish states his own view in terms of acquaintance with facts, as a simplifying assumption I will discuss properties in the formulations below and generally restrict myself to discussions of properties in the arguments that follow. However, one's preferred ontology—facts, objects, relations, events, propositions, processes, etc. —could all be substituted for properties without undermining the arguments to come.

With these abbreviations and specifications, we can now make precise the following theses: Strong Naïve Realism, Blur as Perception, and Diminished Acquaintance:

(i) Strong Naïve Realism: All the elements of V are elements of E.

(ii) Blur as a Veridical Perceptual Experience: All the elements of B are elements of V; hence, combining with (i), all the elements of B are elements of E.

(iii) Blur as Diminished Acquaintance

a. Proper Subset Interpretation: B is a proper subset of C

or

b. Less Than Interpretation: $|B| < |C|$

Note that theses (i)-(iii) are formulated with the help of sets in order to make them a bit more ontology neutral. If we wished to redefine the theses in terms of objects, facts, events, etc., we could easily make the relevant changes in the abbreviations and definitions above.

Now for an overview. All Strong Naïve Realists are committed to (i): all the properties apparently presented to the subject of a veridical experience are also properties instantiated in the relevant environmental scene. However, this commitment alone does not determine just how a Strong Naïve Realist will go about handling blurry experience. Fish's theory of blur makes two additional commitments. Fish commits to (ii), classifying blur as a veridical perceptual experience rather than, say, a type of illusion or a type of hallucination. Given (i), this classification demands that all the properties apparently presented to a subject in a blurry experience are also properties instantiated in the relevant portion of the subject's environment. But how could that be? This is where Diminished Acquaintance comes in. The idea behind Diminished Acquaintance is intuitive, but it is somewhat difficult to make precise. At least two interpretations are possible. In (iii)(b), the 'less than' interpretation, a comparison is made between the cardinality of set B and set C. Set B has a smaller cardinality than the set C: in other words, there are fewer apparent properties in B than in C. An alternative interpretation of Diminished Acquaintance yields (iii)(a), the 'proper subset' interpretation. On this reading, the

relationship between B and C is much more demanding: all the elements of B must also be members of C, and C has at least one member which B does not have.

Which interpretation is to be preferred? The ‘less than’ view requires the size of B to be less than the size of C and so captures the idea that blurry perceptual experiences involve seeing less than clear ones. However, the ‘less than’ interpretation allows for the possibility that there is no overlap between the two sets of experiences, i.e. they may have no properties in common at all. This allowance loses something appealing about the intuitive idea of Diminished Acquaintance. If I see a scene blurrily and my friend sees it clearly; there is at least some overlap in what we see and probably a great deal of it: I am not looking somewhere else and seeing something else entirely—I am just seeing the scene in less detail than my friend is. As a result, the subset interpretation is the more plausible interpretation. It preserves the idea that a blurry experience involves seeing less than in a clear one and also hangs on to the simple fact that clear and blurry experiences, despite their differences, still have a good deal in common. Nonetheless, in my critique, I will consider both interpretations as they are both at least logical possibilities.

SECTION 4

SEEING SOMETHING NEW: PROBLEMS WITH DIMINISHED ACQUAINTANCE

If we reflect carefully on the phenomenology of blurry and clear experiences of the same scene, it turns out that, despite the intuitive appeal of Diminished Acquaintance, it does not sit well with features of these pairs of experiences. Oftentimes in a blurry experience we will see something new, i.e., we are presented with something that does not appear in the clear experience of the very same scene.

To illustrate, let us consider a few cases. There will be two recurring characters: I am one, my hawk-eyed friend is the other. My friend will be the subject of the clear experience C; I will be the subject of the blurry experience B.

The Backsplash Case

Imagine a kitchen backsplash made of many tiny white square tiles separated by thin lines of light grey grout. Now suppose my friend and I were to view the backsplash from the same point of view. My friend sees light grey grout running lattice-like between many white tiles. Due to my blurry vision, I do not see any grout, no tiny square tiles, just one large white surface.

The Night Sky Case

From the same perspective, my friend and I look up into the night sky as we wait on a comet. My friend clearly sees a number of faintly shining stars. I see a solid expanse of midnight-blue space.

The Seurat Case

My friend and I are also devoted students of Pointillism, so we make a pilgrimage to the Art Institute of Chicago to view the painting *A Sunday on La Grande Jatte* by Georges Seurat. In 1889, Seurat added a border of blue, red, and orange dots around the paining. We take turns standing close to the painting to examine the border's brushwork in detail. My friend sees all the fine dots of paint that compose the painting; they focus their attention on a region filled with dots of red paint neighboring dots of blue paint. When it is my turn to take a look, I focus on the same region of the painting, but instead of a region full of individual dots colored red or blue, I instead see an area uniformly filled with the color purple.

The Eye Chart Case[9]

My friend and I go to the optometrist. We take turns sitting and looking at the eye-chart. On one of the middle rows, I come to the letter 'E' but instead see the letter 'F'. On the next row, I come to the letter 'B' but instead see the letter 'D'. My friend, of course, sees each letter for what it is.

Reasoning from the Cases

In each of these cases, there is something present in my blurry experience that is not present in my friend's clear experience. Let's call this 'seeing something new'. What is the significance of this feature? Seeing something new potentially undermines both interpretations of Diminished Acquaintance.

[9] Cassam makes use of an Eye-Chart Case in (Campbell and Cassam 2014). He believes Naïve Realists cannot explain the clear/blur phenomenal contrasts. Cassam, however, makes no use of the idea that we can see something new in blurry experiences that is absent in clear ones.

Against the 'Proper Subset' Interpretation

As for the 'proper subset' interpretation, if there is something present in a blurry subject's visual experience that is not present in the corresponding clear subject's visual experience, then the relationship between the two experiences cannot be a subset relationship. As a result, in order to falsify the 'proper subset' interpretation of Diminished Acquaintance, we just need to find one property in B that is not in C. Each of the cases above provides a counter-example to the subset claim: the additional white patches that have filled in the places the grout should be in The Backsplash Case, the additional dark blue patches that have covered over the stars in The Night Sky Case, and the uniform purple region in The Seurat Case. Now consider The Eye-Chart Case. In the first half of this example, the subject in the clear case sees the letter 'E' while the subject in the blurry case sees the letter 'F'. This initially seems to be excellent evidence for Diminished Acquaintance; perhaps the subject of the blurry experience sees less than the subject of the clear one, since the person in the blurry case fails to see the bottom horizontal line of the letter 'E'; as a result of that failure, they instead see the letter 'F'. However, further inspection makes Diminished Acquaintance less plausible in this case as well. As in the other the cases, the subject in B fills in the region with a specific color instance that is absent in C: in this case, a white patch of color where the bottom of the letter 'E' would normally lie.

Now take the example where the blurry subject sees a letter 'D' for where a letter 'B' is located on the chart, and the subject of the clear experience sees this letter 'B' in the same location. In this example, not only has the subject of the blurry experience filled in the interior of the letter 'B' with pure white space, but they have also replaced the black curve of the right-hand side of the letter from a B-shaped curve to a D-shaped curve. Once again, the subject of the blurry experience sees something new that is completely absent in the clear experience.

In light of all these counter-examples, the proper subset interpretation cannot stand. The proper subset relationship does not capture the relationship between the experiences in clear/blur pairs.

Against the 'Less Than' Interpretation

Now consider the 'less than' interpretation. Here, it is important to make a basic distinction. We could count by kinds of properties or by instances of properties. When we think about kinds of properties such as whiteness, blueness, and redness, then C often includes more kinds than B and so the Less Than interpretation of Diminished Acquaintance seems to hold up. However, when we think about location-relative instances of properties e.g., a blue patch of color at location L for B versus a white patch of color at L for C, then the Less Than interpretation becomes problematic. In all of the cases which I have illustrated, I am having a blurry experience—but with a fully occupied visual field—this is the way it normally is in a blurry experience. In a blurry experience, I may see less kinds than a clear subject would—all the same, at the very least the focal region of my visual field is full of property instances. At every point in that focal region of my visual field, there is some property instance I see. In short, as a result of these considerations, I doubt that the Less Than Interpretation of Diminished Acquaintance captures the relationship between a blurry and clear experience of the same scene.

In conclusion, limiting the Diminished Acquaintance theory to a particular interpretation or limiting it to property kinds versus property instances cannot save it from the cases I have illustrated. In all of the cases, adopting property instances can defeat both the 'subset' interpretation and the 'less than' interpretation of Diminished Acquaintance. Furthermore, two of the cases also cause problems for Diminished Acquaintance even if we restrict ourselves to counting by property kinds. In the Seurat Case, the 'subset' interpretation cannot hold up since

the color purple appears in the blurry experience but not the clear one. In the Eye Chart Case, when the blurry experience contains the letter ‘D’ instead of the letter ‘B’, neither the ‘subset’ nor the ‘less than’ interpretation can hold up, even when we restrict ourselves to property kinds. Thus, whether we limit ourselves to the ‘less than’ interpretation or the ‘subset’ interpretation, whether we use property instances or property kinds, no version of Diminished Acquaintance can stand up against all of the cases of blur which I have illustrated.

Furthermore, the Naïve Realist cannot simply be happy with any account that says we are perceptually acquainted with property instances in places that they are not actually located. This conflicts with the core idea of Strong Naïve Realism and brings us to the next point.

Seeing Something New and Seeing What is Not There

Recall that the heart of The Naïve View of perception is that, in veridical perception, we are only seeing what is out there to be seen and we are seeing them just as they are in the given circumstance of perception. The cases discussed above illustrated that we often see something new in blurry experiences. But what does this have to do with the heart of Naïve Realism? Simply put, it is very hard to endorse the claim that the new things we see in a blurry experience are really out there for us to see. Is the blackish-blueish color that covers the stars actually in the same location as their shining lights? Are the white-patches replacing the lines of light-grey grout actually in the same location as the grey lines are too? Is the region in Seurat’s painting actually purple all while also being composed of red and blue dots—even when viewed from exactly the same perspective? The Naïve Realist has a lot of work to do if they want to convince us that the region of the painting is truly purple, or that a given point can truly be two colors at once.

In sum, there are serious problems with the Diminished Acquaintance Theory of blur. First, in blurry experiences, we often see something new. This puts pressure on both interpretations of Diminished Acquaintance, the 'Proper Subset' and the 'Less Than' reading. Second, the new things we see are most likely not out there to be seen. This puts pressure on the idea that we could actually be Naïvely acquainted with the new elements of our blurry experiences, and so starts to push the naïve realist in the direction of a disjunctive theory which treats blur separately from perception. The push is made stronger by the fact that even if we suppose that the new things seen in the blurry experience are in fact in the environment: it often looks like they are not where they should be. That is to say, arguably, seeing something new introduces error into blurry experiences. If error is involved, Strong Naïve Realism is not suited to account for this purely in terms of perceptual acquaintance. Again, disjunctivism starts to look like the more viable strategy. However, Naïve Realists still have a few more perception-based explanations of blur up their sleeves. Before moving on to disjunctivism, I will discuss these remaining explanations.

SECTION 5

MODES OF PRESENTATION: ANOTHER THEORY OF BLUR

The Modes of Presentation theory of blur is a Naïve Realist theory inspired by the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. This idea was introduced by Campbell into the recent debate between Cassam and himself (Campbell & Cassam, 2014). Cassam challenges Campbell's Naïve Realism by bringing up the optometrist's eye chart as an example. Campbell responds with the idea that the blurry experience and the clear one both acquaint the subject with the same object, but their Modes of Presentation differ, i.e., the clear subject and blurry subject are selecting different properties by which they are consciously acquainted with the same object. The perspectival character of visual experience provides a straightforward example of this idea; when I view an object from the front but my friend views it from the back, we are both aware of the very same object, but we become aware of it via different sets of properties.

There are two ways of thinking about Modes of Presentation. One is compatible with Strong Naïve Realism, while the other is not:

(1) Strong Modes of Presentation: A mode of presentation is a mind-independent property of an environmental object.

(2) Weak Modes of Presentation: A Mode of presentation can be a mind-dependent property of either a subject or the relation of acquaintance.

Any Strong Naïve Realist theory of blur must subscribe to (1). And this, it seems, is what John Campbell intends. (See also the discussion in French 2016).

Challenging the Modes of Presentation Theory

The Diminished Acquaintance theory of blur and the Strong Modes of Presentation theory of blur are simply notational variants of the same theory. Thus, any problems with the Diminished Acquaintance view carry over to the Strong Modes of Presentation view. These problems have been discussed at length above. Furthermore, much like the Diminished Acquaintance theory, the Strong Modes of Presentation Theory of blur does not specify just which types of properties the blurry ones are supposed to be. This is not the case for the next theory I will consider, Determinable Acquaintance.

SECTION 6

DETERMINABLE ACQUAINTANCE THEORY OF BLUR

Determinable Acquaintance is an extension, a refinement, and an improvement on the core idea behind both the Diminished Acquaintance theory of blur and the Strong Modes of Presentation theory of blur. To the best of my knowledge, the idea originates with Craig French (French, 2016). It retains the intuitive idea that somehow we see less in a blurry experience than a clear one, but it also goes on to specify a special set of properties that we are supposedly acquainted with in the blurry experience. The view claims that our acquaintance with these properties could plausibly explain aspects of the phenomenal character of blur. In particular, this view claims that in the blurry experience we are no longer acquainted with some of the determinate properties that we would be acquainted with in the corresponding clear experience. Instead, they claim that we are only acquainted with some of the determinables that the missing determinates fall under. This is supposed to be a general feature of the loss of visual acuity.

The best illustration of this distinction comes from a case where subjects differ in color acuity. Suppose for example, that my friend and I differ in our abilities to see different hues of red. We both look at a Rothko painting from the same location. The canvas is in fact crimson on the top and scarlet on the bottom. When my friend looks at the painting, my friend sees the top as crimson and the bottom as scarlet. However when I look at the painting I see it as simply red. I detect no difference between the top half and the bottom half of the painting. The Strong Naïve Realist might explain this phenomenal contrast between the two viewers by appealing to the idea of Determinable Acquaintance. Both subjects are, the Naïve Realist would say, acquainted with

mind-independent properties of the painting. My friend is acquainted with the determinate properties (scarlet, crimson) while I am acquainted with the determinable property (red). The Naïve Realist would say, it is true that the canvas is red; the canvas is red in virtue of instantiating two determinate hues of red (scarlet, crimson). All the same, the Naïve Realist would say that it remains true that the painting is red. As a result, they would claim that the redness of the painting, a determinable property, is a perfectly objective mind-independent property to serve as an object of my awareness.

The Naïve Realist Craig French extends this idea to the case of blurry vision, yielding a similar contrast between the blurry and clear experiences (French, 2016). Objects in the environment have locations, they have boundaries, and these boundaries have locations. When one subject differs in visual acuity from another, they claim the subject in the clear experience is acquainted with the object's determinate location and the determinate location of the object's boundaries. A subject in the blurry experience, French claims, who looks at the same scene, is only acquainted with more determinable location properties of the object and its boundaries (French, 2016). For example, when two people are playing a game of golf and both golf balls have landed at approximately the same spot on the green. The first player looks out and sees the hole in an exact location on the left side of the green 4 feet from the rough. When the second player looks out and scans the green, however, they see the hole to be somewhere over there, on the far left side near the rough. The first player sinks their putt, but the second player's goes wide. So the Determinable Acquaintance view is supposed to explain some of the distinctive features of the phenomenal character of blur while also giving us some insight into how the blurry experience affects functional roles in the way it does.

Against Determinable Acquaintance

Determinable acquaintance is the most promising theory for the Naïve Realist who hopes to explain blur, but it still suffers from significant shortcomings. This theory cannot accommodate the Seurat case or the eye chart case with the letters ‘B’ vs. ‘D’. In the Seurat case, I see purple in the blurry experience while the person in the clear experience instead sees red and blue. However, we cannot construe purple as a determinable of the colors red and blue. Likewise, in the ‘B’ vs ‘D’ eye chart case, we cannot construe the letter ‘D’ as determinable of letter ‘B’, or even a D-shaped curve as being a determinable of a B-shaped curve.

SECTION 7

COMPOUND OBJECTS

One possible strategy available to the Naïve Realist who hopes to explain blur would be to elaborate on a theory discussed by H.H. Price: the theory of compound objects (Price, 1932). Price attributes this view to Samuel Alexander, who uses the strategy in *Space, Time, and Deity* as a way of defending Naïve Realism from certain variations of the argument from illusion. After first explaining the compound object theory, I will consider its application to blur. The basic idea can be illustrated with a classic example which has been discussed many times in the literature. Suppose that I look at a wall from a given point of view, and suppose that the wall is in fact white. At first, when I look at the wall, the wall looks white to me. Next, I put on some glasses with red-tinted lenses. Now, with the glasses on, the wall looks pink to me. A sense-data theorist would say, that since there is something that looks pink, there must be a bearer of that pinkness; in their case they would claim that it must be a sense-datum that is the bearer. While many Naïve Realists agree with the sense-data theorists that when something looks pink, there must be a bearer of the pinkness, the Naïve Realist must work a bit harder to find a plausible bearer of that pinkness which is consistent with their theory, since neither the wall nor the glasses are pink. This is where the theory of compound objects comes in. The Naïve Realist posits another object, the white-wall-through-red-glasses, and says that it is this compound object which is pink. Here, they would accept the existence of mereological sums of ordinary objects.

While it is not clear to me whether Alexander is actually committed to unrestricted composition (i.e., any plurality of objects compose a further object), three commitments are

fairly clear: one, there are more objects in the outside world than we might have pre-theoretically thought; two, there are some non-obvious compound objects composed of other ordinary objects; three, these non-obvious compounds could provide Naïve Realist explanations of some difficult-to-explain experiences.

Blur and Compound Objects

I will now consider how the theory of compound objects might be applied to the case of blur. What would the compound object be? With blur, we could not resort to something like red glasses or a colored transparency. Instead, the compound object would always have to be a compound of external scenes with eyeballs. Let us investigate if this kind of compound object could plausibly explain the phenomena.

Let us consider an analogous medical condition, called ‘eye-floaters’. Regrettably, I experience these. When I look at a white wall, I see small black specks all over, despite the fact that the wall has no black specks on it. The cause is that bits of liquid in my eye have hardened for one reason or another and now block any light in that region from hitting my retina. Some people would say I’m seeing the shadow of the specks of matter in my eye. The Naïve Realist could embrace a compound object theory of these phenomena, however this is not an example of blur.

Unfortunately, blurry vision is not generally explained by the presence of a smudge or smear of some foreign viscous matter on the exterior (or interior) of the eyeball. The most common cause of blurry vision is due to the fact that light is not being focused onto the retina; the focal point is either too far forward or too far backward from the retinal surface. Thus, in the most common cause of blurry vision, blur cannot be plausibly construed as a result of a compound object.

SECTION 8

DISJUNCTIVISM – A POSSIBLE THEORY OF BLUR

Now let us consider a more radical strategy which a Naïve Realist could possibly use for an attempt to deal with the phenomenon of blurry vision. Up until this point, I have only considered theories of blur which treated blur as fundamentally a special type of perceptual experience. We saw that for the Strong Naïve Realist this entailed explaining blur by a Naïve Acquaintance. However, a Naïve Realist might try to treat blur as an entirely different kind of experience. A Strong Naïve Realist who felt that the prospects for an account of blur in terms of Naïve Acquaintance were especially grim, could take up another strategy altogether. Blurry experiences, they could say, are not fundamentally cases of perceptual experience; although they count as visual experiences, blurry experiences have a fundamentally different nature than clear ones. This strategy, which some Naïve Realists use to handle hallucinations or illusions, is known as disjunctivism[10].

According to the disjunctivist view, perceptions are one kind of thing while hallucinations and illusions are very different kinds of things. So, under this strategy the Naïve Realist makes use of Naïve Acquaintance to explain perceptions while choosing a different theory to explain hallucinations or illusions. It is conceivable that some Naïve Realists would also like to adopt the disjunctivist strategy when it comes to explaining blurry experiences versus clear ones: Naïve Acquaintance for the clear cases and some other theory for the blurry cases. A Naïve Realist might be drawn to this strategy because (1) they do not see how blur could be

[10] For more on disjunctivism in general, see (Hinton, 1973), (Martin, 2004), and (Soterion, 2016). For a Naïve Realist argument against the application of disjunctivism to blur, see (Fish, 2009).

explained in terms of naïve acquaintance, (2) they use disjunctivist strategies to deal with other cases of non-veridical experience/error[11].

Criticisms of a Disjunctivist Theory

However tempting disjunctivism about blur might be, there are some forceful countervailing considerations. For one, any theory of some class of phenomena can only be so disjunctive. So each disjunct (i.e. exception) that is added to a disjunctive theory of visual experience is a mark against that theory which weakens the theory. These remarks follow from widely accepted theoretical virtues. The more cases a theory includes the better. Generality, unity, symmetry, treating like cases alike – these are theoretical virtues. Simpler, more elegant theories are preferred to more complex ones. These theoretical virtues lead us to prefer non-disjunctive theories over disjunctive ones, and to prefer less disjuncts over more disjuncts. As a result, if one already invokes a disjunctive theory to deal with hallucinations and illusions, one should think very carefully before adopting that same method for any other groups of phenomena such as blur.

Second, a disjunctive theory of blur, (i.e., the experiences had by subjects with imperfect visual acuity) will have the odd consequence that their theory of perception covers very few subjects and experiences. In the words of William Fish:

> While it is true that my colleague can see things that I cannot, a theory of veridicality that held that experiences are veridical only if they are the most detailed experiences possible would surely be implausible…But, if the Naïve Realist declines the disjunctive option just described, an account of how two veridical experiences of the same tract of the environment from the same position might differ in phenomenal character is still owing (Fish, 2009, p.56).

[11] Here I will note that there is a difference between Disjunctivism and Weak Naïve Realism. A Disjunctivist would maintain that all veridical experience involves Naïve Acquaintance only. A Weak Naïve Realist, however, could allow even veridical experience to involve something other than Naïve Acquaintance.

That is to say, assuming the idea of "the most detailed experiences possible" is a coherent one, then, if the Naïve Realist theory only applied to subjects with such perfect visual acuity, the scope of the theory would be severely limited.

SECTION 9

COLOR PLURALISM – A POTENTIAL REPLY

Thus far I have covered all of the Naïve Realist theories of blur which attempt to explain blur in terms of Naïve Acquaintance: Diminished Acquaintance, Modes of Presentation, Determinable Acquaintance, and Compound Objects. I also considered a Disjunctivist theory of blur, which attempts to claim that blur is not a type of perception. Now I will discuss some potential Naïve Realist strategies for explaining away the significance of my cases (i.e. counter-examples) and the general phenomenon of seeing something new.

It could occur to some Naïve Realists that certain strategies which are seemingly unrelated to visual acuity could potentially assist them in providing accounts of problematic cases of blur. For example, one could suppose that certain views about color, such as Color Pluralism, could help explain the phenomena in the cases where the blurry experience contains a color that the clear experience does not, e.g. the Seurat painting case. In this case, the Color Pluralist would say that the same region of the painting is red and blue and purple.

We pre-theoretically think that a given point on a surface has one and only one true color, i.e. no point on a surface has more than one color. Surprisingly, some philosophers have cast doubt on color exclusions principles like the one I have just stated; this is known as Color Pluralism (Kalderon, 2011). Those who question the color exclusion principle question its status and strength. They say that a given point on a surface can instantiate more than one color at the same time.

Weaknesses in the Color Pluralist Reply

While Kalderon applies color pluralism to the problem of illusion (Kalderon, 2011), I will consider its potential application to certain cases of blur and will show the weaknesses in that approach. Whatever one thinks about color pluralism, one must admit that it would be a surprising solution for the Naïve Realist to adopt in order to save their theory from the phenomena that occur in blurry vision. Depending on a person's main motivations for believing Naïve Realism, the color pluralist strategy can have a paradoxical flavor. For example, if one thinks that a virtue of Naïve Realism is that it is a pre-theoretical or common-sense view, adopting color pluralism is a highly undesirable strategy.

Furthermore, the color pluralist view is unlikely to be compatible with reductive physicalism about color, i.e. Color Reductionism. Color Reductionists hope to find identities between chromatic color terms and low-level physical properties in the environment (Fish, 2009). One of their primary candidates for the low-level property is surface spectral reflectance. Any given surface has exactly one surface spectral reflectance, which would cause problems for a color reductionist who also hoped to be a color pluralist. They would be forced to find some hitherto unknown candidate for a physical property to which colors might reduce.

Although the color pluralist would be drawn to the Seurat painting example to present their arguments, even this example does not support their view upon further reflection about how the painting is made. The Pointillist painter applies dots of blue and red paint to the canvas to create the painting. But the blurry subject sees purple even though the painter did not apply any paint of that color to the canvas in that region. The Pointillist painter knows that purple is not on the painting because he did not place any paint of that color there. Similar arguments hold for

other cases where artifacts are involved, such as the kitchen tile backsplash case and the ‘B’ versus ‘D’ on the eye chart case.

SECTION 10

THE MISSCLASSIFICATION STRATEGY – A POSSIBLE REPLY

Another skeptical strategy that the Naïve Realist could potentially adopt to handle certain cases of blur is something I will call 'The Misclassification Strategy'. This is something like a kind of Disjunctivism about certain specific aspects of blurry experience. The basic idea here is that blurry perceptual experiences are perfectly veridical (meaning everything seen in B is out there in the environment to be seen); but, something about the blurry experience and the way one's cognitive faculties take it up, lead one to make erroneous judgements about the way things are.

This strategy is inspired by Bill Brewer's work on illusion (Brewer, 2008; 2001; 2017). It is similar to the one he uses to account for some kinds of illusions such as the Muller-Lyer Illusion (Brewer, 2008). A straightforward example of this kind of strategy involves viewing a scarecrow in a field. When, from some distance, I spot what is in fact a scarecrow in the middle of a field and I mistake it for a person, Brewer would say that I do this not because something in my perceptual experience is erroneous, but because there are certain objective similarities between scarecrows and people which, from a given perspective, make them look somewhat similar. If I am far away, Brewer would say, objective differences are absent in my experience and I therefore misclassify. Close up, however, I would pick up on many more details that would help me correctly classify. He would say our classification systems weight some features more heavily than others, thus certain biases hold (perhaps they develop over time or are innate). As a result, Brewer thinks that even when a perceptual experience is perfectly veridical, our conceptual system can still misclassify aspects of that experience.

The Misclassification Reply and Blur

While Brewer applies the misclassification strategy to illusions, I will consider its application to certain cases of blur and dismiss this potential strategy. Firstly, on its own, this strategy could not explain blur, because it could not explain why things could have a blurry look to them in the first place. Why not? We can misclassify things on the basis of our experience, whether or not that experience is a blurry one or a clear one. The misclassification strategy cannot explain what is distinctive about the phenomenal character of the blurry experience.

That being said, let us consider whether it could perhaps deal with the eye chart case when combined with another Strongly Naïve Realist theory of blur. One could try to argue that what happens in our experience of the eye chart is similar to what is going on in the scarecrow case. In the case where we believe we see the letter 'D' rather than the letter 'B' perhaps we go on to misclassify as the letter 'D'. Maybe our experience does not really contain a 'B' or a 'D' and instead we go on to guess what the letter is; our experience does not determinately convey either; our experience is indeterminate, so we make a guess.

This strategy may or may not work depending on the degree of certainty subjects report to have about what letter they see on the eye chart. If experimenters were to find that subjects were quite certain that the letter is a 'D', then we would infer they are in fact having a phenomenological experience of a 'D'. If they were quite uncertain, then perhaps the subjects are leaping to make a classification based on a guess. So, to some degree, the 'misclassification' strategy is hostage to empirical fortune.

Despite the fact that the Misclassification Strategy might deal with the eye chart case, it cannot explain away any of the other cases I have presented earlier in my discussion of Diminished Acquaintance. When I look at the night sky with blurry vision, I am subjectively

very confident that I see an expanse of dark blue without a star in the sky. I am not misclassifying bright dots as dark patches, I simply experience one dark expanse; there is no guessing involved. Similarly, when I look at the pointillist painting with blurry vision, I simply see purple; There is no doubt in my mind that I see any other color; it is not a misclassification nor a guess of any kind. As a result, supplementing a Naïve Realist theory of blur with the Misclassification Strategy does not fully protect the view from the challenges which I have presented.

SECTION 11

CONCLUSION

Each of the most prominent Strong Naïve Realist theories of blur still faces challenges in providing an adequate account of the phenomena. First, I considered what I call the 'Diminished Acquaintance' theory of blur and argued that it cannot explain a class of cases which share a general feature: seeing something new in the blurry experience that is not present in the clear one. I then considered alternative theories of blurry vision which are variations or refinements of the Diminished Acquaintance view: Modes of Presentation and Determinable Acquaintance. Like Diminished Acquaintance, these theories could not explain the phenomenon of seeing something new. One additional Strongly Naïve Realist theory of blur was considered: the theory of compound objects. This theory was rejected based on common causal explanations of blurry experience. A disjunctive approach to blur was considered, which is compatible with Strongly Naïve Realist theory of perception but does not explain blur by appeal to Naïve Acquaintance. Here, blurry experiences are reclassified as types of non-veridical visual experience. A disjunctive theory of blur was undesirable for two reasons; first, each time the Naïve Realist resorts to a disjunctive strategy, the result is a more complicated and less theoretically virtuous theory; second, a disjunctive theory of blur would severely limit the scope of the Naïve Realist theory of perception. Lastly, I went on to consider some possible replies: the misclassification reply and the color pluralist reply. These replies potentially undermine the significance of seeing something new. However, these replies fail to explain away the phenomenon. After all of these

considerations, one thing is clear: the prospects for a Strongly Naïve Realist theory of blurry experience are obscure at best.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, Keith, 2013, "Blur", *Philosophical Studies*, 162 (2) : 257-273.

Anscombe, G.E.M., 1965, "The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature", in R.J. Butler (ed.), *Analytical Philosophy: First Series*, 143–58, Oxford: Blackwell. [Reprinted in her *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers*, Vol. II. Oxford: Blackwell; also in Noë and Thompson (eds.) 2002].

Anthony, Louise, 2011, "The Openness of Illusions", *Philosophical Issues*, 21: 25–44.

Austin, J.L., 1962, *Sense and Sensibilia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barnes, W.H.F., 1944–45, "The Myth of Sense-Data", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 45: 89–117.

Brewer, Bill, 2008, "How to Account for Illusion", in Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) 2008.

——, 2011, *Perception and its Objects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

——, 2017, "The Object View of Perception", *Topoi*, 36 (2): 215-227.

Burge, Tyler, 2005, "Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology", *Philosophical Topics*, 33: 1–78.

——, 2010, *Origins of Objectivity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Burnyeat, Myles, 1979, "Conflicting Appearances", *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 65: 69–111.

Campbell, John, 2002, *Reference and Consciousness*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

——, 2009, "Consciousness and Reference", in McLaughlin et al (eds.) 2009.

——, 2014, *Berkeley's Puzzle* (with Quassim Cassam), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chalmers, David, 2006, "Perception and the Fall from Eden", in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 49–125.

Crane, Tim, 2006, "Is there a Perceptual Relation?", in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 126–46.

Crane, Tim and French, Craig, 2017, "The Problem of Perception", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/perception-problem/>.

Dancy, Jonathan, 1995, "Arguments from Illusion", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 45: 421–38.

Fish, William, 2009, *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Foster, John, 2000, *The Nature of Perception*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

French, Craig, 2014, "Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily", *Ratio*, 27: 393–413.

——, 2016, "Discussion: Idiosyncratic Perception", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 66(263): 391-399.

——, 2018, "Naïve Realism and Diaphaneity", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 7.

French, Craig and Walters, Lee, Forthcoming, "The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion", *American Philosophical Quarterly*.

Genone, James, 2014, "Appearance and Illusion", *Mind*, 123: 339–376.

Harman, Gilbert, 1990, "The Intrinsic Quality of Experience", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4:31–52.

Hinton, J.M., 1973, *Experiences*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackson, F., 1977, *Perception: A Representative Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Johnston, Mark, 2004, "The Obscure Object of Hallucination", *Philosophical Studies*, 103: 113–83.

Kalderon, Mark, 2011, Color Illusion, *Noûs*, 45: 751–775.

Logue, Heather, 2012, "Why Naive Realism?", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 112: 211–237.

——, 2012a, "What Should the Naive Realist Say About Total Hallucinations?", *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26: 173–199.

Martin, M.G.F., 1998, "Setting Things Before the Mind", in A. O'Hear (ed.) *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, 157–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——, 2000, “Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem”, in Crane and Patterson (eds.) 2000, 195–231.

——, 2002, “The Transparency of Experience”, *Mind and Language*, 17: 376–425.

——, 2003, “Sensible Appearances”, in Thomas Baldwin (ed.) *Cambridge History of Philosophy* 1870–1945, 521–32, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——, 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 37–89.

——, 2006, “On Being Alienated”, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 354–410.

——, 2013, “Shibboleth: some comments on William Fish’s Perception, Hallucination & Illusion”, *Philosophical Studies*, 163: 37–48.

McGinn, Colin, 1989, *Mental Content*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1945, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith, London: Routledge 2002.

Moore, G.E., 1905, “The Refutation of Idealism”, in *Philosophical Studies*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Reprinted in Moore 1993, 23–44.

Nanay, Bence, 2018, “Blur and Perceptual Content”, 2018, *Analysis*, 78 (2) : 254-260.

Noë, Alva, 2004, *Action and Perception*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Nudds, Matthew, 2009, “Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents”, *Analysis*, 69: 334–6.

Peacocke, Christopher, 1983, *Sense and Content*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Perkins, Moreland, 1983, *Sensing the World*, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Pitcher, George, 1970, *A Theory of Perception*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Price, H.H., 1932, *Perception*, London: Methuen.

Putnam, Hilary, 1999, *The Threefold Cord*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Robinson, Howard, 1994, *Perception*, London: Routledge.

——, 2013, “The Failure of Disjunctivism to Deal with "Philosophers’ Hallucinations"”, in Macpherson and Platchias (eds) 2013.

Russell, Bertrand, 1912, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Searle, John, 1983, *Intentionality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Siegel, Susanna, 2004, "Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal", *Philosophical Studies*, 120: 91–112.

——, 2008, "The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination", in Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) 2008.

——, 2010, *The Contents of Visual Experience*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A.D., 2002, *The Problem of Perception*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

——, 2008, "Translucent Experiences", *Philosophical Studies*, 140 (2): 197–212.

Soteriou, Matthew, 2013, *The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

——, 2016, *Disjunctivism*, New York, NY: Routledge.

Spener, Maja, 2003, *Gilding or Staining the Mind: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Visual Experience*, PhD thesis, University of London.

Stazicker, James, 2011, "Attention, Visual Consciousness, and Indeterminacy", *Mind & Language*, 26(2):156-184.

Stoljar, Daniel, 2004, "The Argument from Diaphanousness", in M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton and C. Viger (eds.) *New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (Supplementary Volume), 341–90, Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Tye, Michael, 2000, *Consciousness, Color and Content*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

——, 2003, "Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?", In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press.

Valberg, J.J., 1992, *The Puzzle of Experience*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.