

SHANA ALEXIS SIMON

The influence of mentor function on protégés' psychological contracts with their organizations: An exchange theory perspective.

(Under the Direction of LILLIAN T. EBY)

This study utilizes an exchange theory framework to examine the influence of mentor function on the development of protégés' psychological contracts with their organizations. Specifically, it is posited that mentoring can be conceptualized as a series of exchanges between the mentor and the protégé through which the protégé determines what he or she can expect from the organization (e.g., overtime pay, personal development). In addition, this study examines the roles of organizational justice and attributions regarding the organization as a viable exchange partner with respect to the focal relationship. The hypothesized model depicts a parallel set of relationships, which are consistent with the distinction between economic exchange and social exchange. To clarify, the model distinguishes between the quantifiable or tangible aspects of the focal relationship (which define economic exchange) and the intangible aspects of the same relationship (which define social exchange). Structural equations modeling was utilized to evaluate the hypothesized model. Results suggest that this relationship is mediated by perceptions of organizational justice and attributions regarding the organization as a viable exchange partner. Furthermore, the intangible aspects of the variables (e.g., procedural justice, affective commitment) appear to have a stronger influence on psychological contract development than the tangible aspects of the same variables (e.g., distributive justice, calculative commitment). Finally, the findings contribute to mentoring research and theory as well as to the development of a new model of career progression. In particular, the results of the present study provide a deeper examination of the differences between career-related and psychosocial mentor functions and insight

into the processes related to the evaluation of mentoring experiences. Additionally, this focus on processes responds to a need for an updated model of career progression that better represents the multiple directions and decisions that guide the development of the modern career.

INDEX WORDS: Mentoring, Psychological contract, Exchange theory,
 Organizational Justice, Commitment, Structural equations
 modeling

THE INFLUENCE OF MENTOR FUNCTION ON PROTÉGÉS'
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS WITH THEIR ORGANIZATIONS:
AN EXCHANGE THEORY PERSPECTIVE

by

SHANA ALEXIS SIMON

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SHANA ALEXIS SIMON

Approved:

Major Professor: Lillian T. Eby

Committee: Charles Lance
Gary Lautenschlager
Garnett Stokes
Kecia Thomas

Electronic Version Approved:

Gordhan L. Patel
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
December 2001

DEDICATION

As is evident from the primary focus of my research throughout graduate school, mentoring is a topic in which I hold a great deal of interest. I have been extremely fortunate to have had a true mentor at each stage of my educational career. I'd like to dedicate my dissertation to these three individuals, each of whom had a profound influence on my professional and personal development. I was a freshman in high school when I encountered my first mentor, Mrs. Mary Murley. For four years, she constantly challenged me both academically and personally, encouraging me to test my limits and to face any obstacles set out before me. Mrs. Murley, you recognized in me the strong desire to set high standards for myself, and your belief in me gave me the courage necessary to do so. I am sure that I never thanked you enough, and I want you to know how much I appreciate the guidance you gave me. The second mentor who I'd like to recognize is Dr. Marshall Duke of Emory University. Dr. Duke instilled in me a sense of academic confidence, pushing me to question others' theories and conclusions and to take risks with my own research. Dr. Duke, thank you for all of the times you forced me to figure things out on my own and for encouraging me to pursue my intellectual curiosity. Finally, I struggle to find the words to adequately convey the appreciation and admiration I have for Dr. Lillian Eby, my major professor throughout my graduate studies. Lillian, your drive and motivation are inspiring, and your dedication to your students is incomparable. As I progressed through the stages of my graduate career, your belief in me enabled me to believe in myself and motivated me to rise to the challenges that we

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Organizational research in the past decade has focused much attention on the changing nature of careers. Until the mid 1980s, young workers began their careers at entry-level positions, with the hopes of working their way up through the organizational hierarchy until they eventually retired. During the late eighties, however, words such as “mergers” and “downsizing” became commonplace, and the traditional career path was on its way to becoming the exception rather than the rule. Organizations began to reduce the number of layers in their hierarchical structure, effectively diminishing the opportunities for upward mobility once counted on by employees. With the implied guarantees of job security and continued promotions no longer a reality, the concept of a career was in need of reevaluation.

In the last decade, many researchers have brought new insight into the changing nature of work and careers (e.g., Hall & Mirvis, 1995; Herriot & Pemberton, 1996; Inkson & Coe, 1993; Ornstein & Isabella, 1993; Rousseau, 1990; Sparrow, 1998). The common thread through these examinations is the notion that the traditional model of organizational careers is no longer applicable. Rather, a new model must be constructed that provides a more accurate reflection of the manner in which individuals will build their careers in the 21st century. Herriot and Pemberton (1996) outlined four criteria for this new model. First, they suggest that a model of organizational careers must be contextualized (cf. Arthur, Hall, & Lawrence, 1989). More specifically, a model must consider not only the direct context of the organization, but it must also incorporate the

wider context within which the organization operates, as well as the social context of employees' lives. The inclusion of these multiple contexts is essential in order to account for the manifold sources of influence on modern careers. Secondly, this model must be both cyclical and processual in nature, allowing for changes in context and focusing on processes rather than outcomes. The dynamic nature of contemporary careers necessitates this emphasis on development rather than on end results. The third criterion requires the model to be subjective. Because a normative career path no longer exists and individuals have different priorities and goals, a model of careers must have the ability to be adapted to a variety of approaches. Finally, Herriot and Pemberton (1996) stress the importance of an interactive model. They posit that "any successful model...must account for relations between the organization and its representatives and individual employees...(and) needs to recognize an interactive and negotiating element as part of the employment relationship" (p. 759).

Taken together, the literature on the nature of the modern career suggests the need for a dynamic model with the ability to account for the various paths an individual may take and the decisions an individual must make while constructing his or her career. The present study embraces this challenge by examining the processes through which employees develop and evaluate their personalized relationships with their organizations. Like interpersonal relationships, employees' relationships with their organizations are defined by expectations and evaluated in terms of how well these expectations are met. The expectations an employee has regarding his or her relationship with the organization is called a psychological contract. More specifically, a psychological contract "is

individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their organization” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 9).

Rousseau (1995) further explains that psychological contracts have a self-fulfilling power, making their role in the development of careers a critical one. Exchange agreements, by definition, govern the reciprocation of behaviors or contributions between parties. As such, an individual’s psychological contract must contain terms governing one’s own behavior, in addition to those expected of the organization. Therefore, the endorsement of a psychological contract also represents an employee’s agreement to fulfill his or her obligations. In other words, a psychological contract can effectively outline a plan for an employee’s career path by identifying what an employee believes he or she must do in order to obtain desired outcomes from the organization. Consequently, the self-fulfilling nature of the psychological contract makes the explication of its development a key component in a contemporary model of careers.

Another topic that has gained attention since the mid 1980s is mentoring. Commonly defined as an intense, interpersonal relationship in which a more experienced individual provides guidance and support to a less experienced individual (Kram, 1985), mentoring is an influential factor in many people’s careers. In fact, Levinson et al. (1978) suggest that a mentoring relationship may be the most crucial relationship in a young adult’s life. It is recognized that the concept of a career has changed drastically since Levinson et al. (1978) made this statement. However, the abandonment of the traditional model of careers makes the mentoring relationship even more instrumental in an individual’s professional and personal development. Specifically, because employees can no longer count on advancing through their organization’s hierarchy, they are left to manage their own careers and to carve out their own paths to success. As such, the

guidance of an effective mentor may be heavily relied upon as individuals prepare themselves for and make decisions regarding the progression of their own careers.

Mentoring has been linked with outcome variables such as promotions, pay, and overall job satisfaction (e.g., Dreher & Ash, 1990; Fagenson, 1989; Scandura & Viator, 1994). However, the connection between mentoring and the psychological contract has not been directly examined. Given the extensive amount of research on the topics of both mentoring and the psychological contract, it is surprising that these topics have not been examined concurrently. The close association between these two variables makes intuitive sense. For example, a mentor is likely to serve as the conduit through which a new employee learns about the organization (e.g., Rousseau, 1995). Furthermore, the mentor's set of tacit knowledge is often passed to the protégé, providing a lens through which to interpret his or her new surroundings. For reasons such as these, it is clear that mentoring can have a profound influence on the shaping of an individual's expectations regarding his or her organization. The present study directly examines the link between mentoring and the psychological contract, therefore shedding some much needed light on how this highly influential relationship may affect employees' perceptions of and expectations about the organization.

As previously mentioned, psychological contracts represent the perceived terms of an exchange agreement between employees and their organizations (Rousseau, 1995). Because the present study is focused specifically on the development of the psychological contract, exchange theory will be utilized as a conceptual framework to guide the examination. A derivation from economic theory, exchange theory suggests that obligations and expectations between parties are the natural result of repeated interactions (e.g., Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974). The economics literature, for example, conceptualizes

exchange theory in terms of specific, monetizable obligations owed by one party in exchange for services provided by another (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). Much like the concept of a barter economy, economic exchange theory proposes that individuals come to expect equitable reciprocation from the receiving party.

The concept of exchange may also be interpreted in a social context to describe the development of interpersonal relationships (e.g., Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer, & Markovsky, 1995). As individuals interact with one another over a period of time, expectations develop regarding the relational obligations and parameters governing that relationship. However, unlike the quantifiable obligations resulting from economic exchange, the nature of obligations between parties resulting from social exchange is unspecified (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Masterson et al., 2000).

A logical link exists between mentoring and exchange theory. Mentoring is a bi-directional relationship, characterized by a series of reciprocated actions and resulting expectations between mentor and protégé. Although a majority of mentoring research has focused on the benefits accrued by protégés, mentors do enjoy positive outcomes as well. For example, mentors may gain a sense of satisfaction from sharing their accumulated knowledge with less experienced colleagues, which may also help foster feelings of importance to those who have reached a career plateau (Allen, Poteet, & Burroughs, 1997; Kram, 1985; Ragins & Scandura, 1993). The dual sets of expectations that characterize the mentor-protégé relationship, paired with the potential for mutually beneficial outcomes, makes exchange theory a useful framework for understanding the perceived quality of a mentoring relationship (e.g., Young & Perrewé, 2000).

Taken together, exchange theory provides a useful perspective from which to examine both psychological contracts and mentoring relationships. To reiterate, the direct association between these two concepts is theoretically sound. Both the mentoring literature (e.g., Kram, 1985) and the psychological contracts literature (e.g., Rousseau, 1995) clearly identify the mentor's role as both an information source and interpreter as a newcomer tries to make sense of organizational dynamics and politics. Certainly, the study of psychological contract development would not be complete without the inclusion of such a primary information source. The intersection between these two bodies of research, therefore, may be the key vantage point from which to interpret modern career development.

Summary

In sum, the purpose of the present study was to examine the relationship between mentor function and psychological contract within an exchange theory framework. The linking together of these constructs is a unique approach to the examination of organizational dynamics, namely the manner in which employees develop and evaluate their relationships with their organizations. Finally, with many scholars suggesting that the traditional model of careers is no longer appropriate, the findings of this study provide a meaningful contribution to the development of a contemporary model of career progression.

CHAPTER II

THE INFLUENCE OF MENTOR FUNCTION ON PROTÉGÉS’
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS WITH THEIR ORGANIZATIONS:
AN EXCHANGE THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Exchange Theory

Exchange theory, in its many forms and variations, is a guiding force in multiple bodies of literature, including economics, interpersonal relationships, leadership, justice, and organizational behavior. In its purest form, exchange theory suggests that obligations and expectations between parties are the natural result of repeated interactions (e.g., Blau, 1964). More specifically, the rendering of services by one individual to another creates an obligation on the part of the recipient, which may be discharged through the return of services to the first individual (Blau, 1964).

The premise behind exchange theory stems from Thibaut and Kelley’s (1959) theory of interdependence, which suggests that individuals consider the potential value of the outcomes associated with each behavioral option before acting. The first evaluation is the comparison level (CL), which represents the outcome value that an individual believes he or she deserves. This is considered in tandem with the comparison level for alternatives (CL_{alt}), or the lowest value of outcomes an individual will accept given the alternative options outside of the focal relationship. Therefore, an individual will remain in a relationship as long as the outcomes are at a higher value than the CL_{alt}, and his or her dependence on the relationship increases with this value differential. To illustrate,

Thibaut and Kelley (1959; Kelly & Thibaut, 1978) arrange these options in a matrix format.

In Figure 1, the columns designated by A are behavior options for Person A, and rows designated by B are behavior options for Person B. The four cells, therefore, represent the interaction of Person A's and Person B's behavior. Each cell is further bisected to indicate the outcomes for both Person A (above the diagonal) and Person B (below the diagonal), based on the combined behaviors of each. For example, if Person A chooses behavior A_1 and Person B chooses behavior B_1 , the outcome value for Person A is 0, and the outcome value for Person B is 2. Due to the criticality of CL_{alt} in determining the level of interdependence between individuals, this value is utilized as the zero point in matrix representations of interdependence theory. In other words, Person A would evaluate the outcome value (0 in this case) against the value of CL_{alt} . Although simple in design, the general relationship depicted in Figure 1 may be elaborated upon to depict and interpret more complex exchange relationships.

Economic exchange. The economics literature conceptualizes exchange theory in terms of specific, monetizable obligations owed by one party in exchange for services provided by another. Much like the concept of a barter economy, economic exchange proposes that individuals come to expect equitable reciprocation from the receiving party.

Economic exchange has also been described as “contractual” in nature (Sparrowe & Liden, 1997). More specifically, the terms of economic exchange are often bound by what is specified in the relevant interpersonal agreement. For example, the contract between a customer in a restaurant and a server is as follows. The customer is expected to pay the price of his or her meal plus 15% gratuity in exchange for a meal prepared as

described on the menu and adequate service. It would not be reasonable for the customer to deviate from his or her end of the agreement (e.g., leave without paying for the meal, give the server a 50% tip), nor would it be reasonable for the server to deviate from his or her end of the agreement (e.g., bring the customer a different meal, provide the customer with a complimentary back rub).

Further interpretation of exchange theory suggests that individuals seek to maximize the benefits they receive from an interaction. As such, economic exchange theory would dictate that the motivation behind the contributions an individual provides is the extrinsic benefits he or she would receive in return. In other words, such exchanges between parties are calculated; they serve the direct purpose of indebting the receiving party to the other.

Social exchange. Exchange theory has also been applied in a social context to describe the development of interpersonal relationships (e.g., Lovaglia et al., 1995). More specifically, the sequence of exchanges between individuals leads to the development of expectations regarding the obligations, commitments, and parameters governing that relationship. In contrast to the explicit nature of obligations that are the product of economic exchange, the terms of social exchange are generally unspecified (e.g., Blau, 1964; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Masterson et al., 2000).

Homans (1974) adapts Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) matrix representation of interdependence (see Figure 1) to illustrate the dynamics of social exchange. The distinction, however, is the influence of sequential effects (i.e., the effects of repeated exchanges) in determining matrix values (i.e., CL and CL_{alt}). In order to accurately describe Homans' position, it is necessary to introduce two concepts purported to

underlie fundamental social behavior. The first concept is the success proposition, which states that “for all actions taken by persons, the more often a particular action of a person is rewarded, the more likely the person is to perform that action” (Homans, 1974, p. 16). This notion is simply an extension of basic learning theory, however Homans (1974) argues for the distinction based on the complexity of human behavior (as compared to animal behavior). The second concept, the stimulus proposition, may also be understood as an interpretation of learning theory. It states that “if in the past the occurrence of a particular stimulus, or a set of stimuli, has been the occasion on which a person’s action has been rewarded, then the more similar the present stimuli are to the past ones, the more likely the person is to perform the action, or some similar action, now” (Homans, 1974, p. 22-23). The stimulus proposition refers to the generalizability of rewarding situations; it suggests that an individual is likely to perceive a situation to be potentially rewarding if that situation is similar to one that has been rewarded in the past.

With these two propositions in mind, the influence of sequential effects on the determination of matrix values (i.e., CL and CL_{alt}) can be examined. Specifically, Homans (1974) suggests that, in order for repeated exchanges to occur between two individuals, each individual’s actions must be rewarding to the other party. In accordance with both the success and the stimulus propositions, the likelihood that each individual will repeat the behavior with the other individual when in a similar situation would increase. As such, expectations change, which may in turn increase an individual’s CL (i.e., the outcome an individual believes he or she deserves). Similarly, an increased proclivity to exchange actions with a specific individual effectively decreases the inclination to exchange actions with an alternative individual. As a result,

the CL_{alt} (i.e., the lowest value of outcomes an individual will accept given the alternative options outside of the primary relationship) will be reduced.

It must be noted that most of the seminal work on exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974) uses the term “social exchange” to describe the general overarching exchange framework, including both economic and social aspects as described above. For example, Blau (1964) states that “social exchange can be observed everywhere once we are sensitized by this conception to it, not only in market relations but also in friendship and even in love, as we have seen, as well as in many social relations between these extremes in intimacy” (p. 88). Based on this statement, although directly referring to social exchange, it is clear that Blau is describing relations characterized by economic exchange (e.g., market relations) as well as those characterized by social exchange (e.g., friendship).

Homans (1974) provides a similar reference, as he distinguishes between impersonal and personal forms of social exchange. He suggests that impersonal social exchanges are characterized by the existence of many alternative sources, and the behaviors within an impersonal exchange are driven solely by the reward itself (i.e., not by the person who is the source of the reward). Personal social exchanges, on the other hand, are driven by the history of exchanges between individuals and are less concerned with the specific reward at hand. Certainly, the concept of impersonal exchange directly corresponds to economic exchange, as does the concept of personal exchange to social exchange.

Although this issue is purely semantic in nature, it does pose a limitation in the direct application of exchange theory to empirical exploration (Sparrowe & Liden, 1997).

More specifically, the distinction between true economic and social exchange is not always clear in previous theoretical and empirical research. However, a close examination of exchange theory suggests that economic and social exchange may influence organizational attitudes in different ways.

A basic model of exchange theory. As previously discussed, exchange theory has been conceptualized in a number of ways. Despite small differences, these models can be synthesized to create a single, generalizable model of exchange theory (see Figure 2). By definition, exchange theory provides a framework for describing the reciprocal relationship between two or more parties. As such, a general model must commence with an exchange of actions or behaviors between two parties. Following this behavioral interchange, both parties evaluate the exchange (e.g., in terms of fairness, quality, or equity) and decide whether or not to continue with the relationship. If the relationship is to continue, expectations for future exchanges are developed. Consistent with the notions of both economic and social exchange, these expectations may include specific outcomes in a limited time frame (i.e., economic) or unspecified outcomes without temporal boundaries (i.e., social). The model then proceeds with another behavioral exchange, after which the sequence continues until the relationship is terminated.

Of course, the details of this model, namely the manifestations of each component, may vary by context. In the present study, exchange theory is offered as an overarching framework through which to examine the relationship between the mentor functions received by a protégé and his or her psychological contract with the organization. More specifically, this relationship may be directly mapped onto the exchange theory model provided above. In the sections that follow, the primary

constructs of the study are introduced, followed by a presentation of the hypothesized model.

Workplace Mentoring

Since the concept of mentoring in the workplace began to gain popularity, researchers have consistently found support for its importance and potential impact on both the mentor and the protégé. For example, protégés tend to report higher levels of job satisfaction, receive higher salaries, and are promoted more quickly than those who are not in mentoring relationships (Dreher & Ash, 1990; Fagenson, 1989; Scandura & Viator, 1994). In addition, mentors often gain a sense of usefulness and satisfaction from passing on their tacit knowledge and helping less experienced individuals succeed (Allen, Poteet, & Burroughs, 1997; Ragins & Scandura, 1993). Finally, these benefits extend to the organization as both mentors and protégés report less intention to leave the organization than comparable employees who are not part of mentoring relationships (Scandura & Viator, 1994).

In recent years, however, the potentially detrimental outcomes due to negative mentoring experiences have been examined (Eby & Allen, 2001; Eby, McManus, Simon, & Russell, 2000; Simon & Eby, 2000). Specifically, research suggests that there may be negative aspects to otherwise positive relationships, and that these negative aspects vary in terms of their perceived severity, level of specificity, and the mentor function most impaired (Eby et al., 2000; Simon & Eby, 2000). As such, it may be concluded that the quality of a mentoring relationship is important to consider when mentoring is a focal variable in any research endeavor.

Although the examinations of negative mentoring have provided unique insight into the dynamics of mentoring relationships, the study of negative mentoring is still in its infancy. The number and range of variables included in these investigations is limited, rendering it possible that critically influential variables have been excluded from analysis. In response, the present study considers perceptions of justice as a potential process variable in the evaluation of mentoring behaviors. A number of researchers have suggested that perceptions of justice can have a profound impact on the continued development of interpersonal relationships (e.g., Homans, 1974; Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Mikula & Lerner, 1994; Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994; Tyler & Degoe, 1996). Therefore, the inclusion of justice in the present study may yield a more fine-grained understanding of why different mentoring experiences yield different outcomes.

Mentor Functions

Although mentoring relationships may take on multiple forms, they are generally defined as intense, interpersonal relationships in which a more experienced individual (i.e., the mentor) provides guidance and support to a less experienced individual (i.e., the protégé). More specifically, the support provided by the mentor can be broken down into two main categories or functions: career-related support and psychosocial support (Kram, 1985). It is the presence of these functions that distinguishes mentoring relationships from other workplace relationships (e.g., supervisor-subordinate relationships). While research indicates that the presence of these types of support are beneficial to both the mentor and the protégé (e.g., Allen et al., 1997; Ragins & Scandura, 1993), the focus on the protégés' psychological contracts in the present discussion necessitates an examination from the perspective of the protégé.

Because the mentor has more experience, influence, and clout throughout the organization, he or she is in the position to facilitate the protégé's professional progress (Kram, 1985). More specifically, career-related mentor functions help the protégé learn what is necessary for future career advancement. Career-related support generally includes sponsorship, exposure, coaching, protection, and the provision of challenging assignments for the protégé.

Sponsorship. Sponsorship involves the mentor's public support for the protégé, and may take place in both formal and informal arenas. For example, a mentor may nominate his or her protégé for projects or promotions during a department meeting, or s/he may casually tout his or her protégé as the best candidate for an assignment when speaking with colleagues. Because networking has become a critical component of organizational structure, those who lack an active advocate may frequently be overlooked.

Exposure. Through exposure, the mentor provides the opportunity for protégés to interact and develop relationships with powerful figures throughout the organization. As is the case with sponsorship, becoming known to those with decision-making power increases the likelihood that one will be considered when a desirable opportunity surfaces. Furthermore, exposure allows the protégé to learn about different areas of the organization, which may help the protégé to determine the most appropriate career path and to clarify his or her goals.

Coaching. At the most fundamental level, mentoring involves advising the protégé in an effort to enhance career development. Mentors possess experience-based knowledge that may be used to facilitate protégés' navigation through the organizational

hierarchy. Through coaching, the mentor provides constructive feedback and teaches strategies thought to enhance the protégé's chances of success. This component is critical, as much of the important information needed by the protégé, such as the rules governing organizational politics, is not documented in any handbook.

Protection. The protection function serves to safeguard the protégé from potentially detrimental situations. As a newcomer to an organization (or a position), the protégé's image is likely to be fragile, making the protégé highly susceptible to the damage caused by negative publicity. On the other hand, the mentor's reputation is established; he or she would be more resilient in the face of inauspicious attention. Therefore, the mentor may take the blame or provide adequate explanations for mistakes, or s/he may intervene when the protégé is faced with complicated circumstances.

Challenging assignments. Finally, in a supervisory relationship, the mentor can help the protégé by providing him or her with challenging work assignments. More specifically, the mentor is helping the protégé by creating opportunities for the protégé to learn essential skills through practice. Combined with constructive feedback from the mentor, the completion of challenging work assignments is a valuable work experience that can help the protégé develop competencies necessary for advancement.

In addition to contributing to career development, the mentor also has the ability to help the protégé develop a professional sense of self. This form of encouragement is referred to as psychosocial support. Unlike career-related support, which is somewhat dependent upon the mentor's position and influence in the organization, psychosocial support stems from the interpersonal aspects of the mentor-protégé relationship. As such, the effects of psychosocial support may extend beyond the workplace, having a positive

influence on other areas of life. For example, the sense of identity and confidence a protégé develops due to a mentoring relationship may be a valuable resource in the face of difficult life decisions. The primary components of the psychosocial mentor function include role modeling, acceptance/confirmation, counseling, and friendship.

Role modeling. Mentors serve as role models for their protégés, who often see their mentors as having accomplished the goals to which they aspire. In turn, protégés may come to identify themselves with their mentors and consequently emulate the mentors' behaviors and approaches to work-related tasks. While the both the mentor and the protégé are likely to be cognizant of this process, additional aspects of role modeling may take place without the mentor's or protégé's awareness. For example, the protégé may come to adopt the values and attitudes displayed by the mentor, making them his or her own. Finally, the highly personal nature of role modeling often results in emotional attachment.

Some researchers argue that role modeling should stand alone as a third mentor function, distinct from both career-related and psychosocial support (e.g., Fagenson-Eland, Marks, & Amendola, 1997; Scandura & Katerburg, 1988). However, such studies failed to examine mentor functions at the individual level; rather, mentor functions were considered only in their broader categories (Ragins & Cotton, 1999). Furthermore, role modeling has consistently loaded onto a psychosocial factor in multiple measures of mentor function (Chao, Waltz, & Gardener, 1992; Noe, 1988; Ragins & Cotton, 1999; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990). As such, the present study considers role modeling to be a type of psychosocial support.

Acceptance/confirmation. Through acceptance/confirmation, the protégé gains reassurance that s/he will have the mentor's support as s/he continues to develop professionally. A sense of self and competence evolves from the positive regard and affirmation imparted by the mentor. Furthermore, feelings of trust emerge, allowing the protégé to think independently, take chances, and initiate conflict without the fear of disapproval or rejection.

Counseling. Counseling refers to the process by which the mentor helps the protégé deal with personal concerns that might otherwise hinder the protégé's development. Kram (1985) identifies three primary concerns that a protégé may face in the beginning phases of career development: "how an individual can develop competence and potential while also feeling productive and satisfied in a newly chosen career; how an individual can relate to peers and superiors without compromising personal values and individuality; and how he or she can incorporate growing responsibilities and commitments at work with other areas of life" (p. 36). Of course, these personal concerns are likely to change as the protégé moves through career stages. The counseling aspect of the mentoring relationship is highly personal, as the mentor opens himself up by empathizing with the protégé's uncertainties.

Friendship. Finally, some mentoring relationships evolve into friendship as well. When the mentor and the protégé like one another and enjoy one another's company, they may well interact much like any friends do. As such, the mentor and protégé may enjoy informal interactions both inside and outside of the workplace. This peer-like quality allows the protégé to feel more like a professional equal, improving the protégé's ability to interact with more senior or advanced members of the organization. Of course,

both the mentor and the protégé must be cognizant of the boundaries inherent in their professional relationship.

As previously mentioned, mentoring relationships are primarily characterized by the presence of career-related and psychosocial support. However, all of the behaviors making up both functions may not be provided by all mentors. Rather, some mentoring relationships provide just a subset of these behaviors. It must be noted that the absence of one or more mentor behaviors, or even one type of support altogether, does not necessarily render the relationship useless or negative (Ragins & Cotton, 1999). More specifically, with the traditional career path no longer the norm, individuals may change jobs, organizations, or even careers multiple times. As such, protégés may be at different life stages as well as different career stages, and therefore have unique needs regarding the outcomes of a mentoring relationship.

Mentor functions have been differentially related to a number of outcome variables, most of which vary with regards to the type of mentoring relationship under investigation. Mentoring relationships may be formally designated by the organization, or they may evolve naturally through informal interactions. In an effort to capitalize on the many benefits of mentoring relationships, many organizations have implemented mentoring programs. Essentially, these programs serve to match mentors with protégés and to provide them with guidelines and/or responsibilities. Informal mentoring relationships, on the other hand, may develop either inside or outside of the workplace. Like most interpersonal relationships, the mentor and the protégé meet, and through a mutual liking, begin to form a relationship with one another. As such, those involved in informal mentoring relationships may not identify themselves as “mentor” and “protégé”

per se, although the same mentor functions characterize their relationship. Although there are multiple manners in which mentoring can be conceptualized, it should be noted that the present study is focused solely on informal, within-organization mentoring (i.e., mentors and protégés are employees at the same organization, and they were not formally assigned to one another).

In general, protégés in informal mentoring relationships report the highest levels of both career-related and psychosocial support when compared to protégés in formal relationships, as well as to their non-mentored counterparts (Noe, 1988; Ragins & Cotton, 1991, 1999). However, some of these findings have been inconsistent. For example, Chao et al. (1992) found the expected differences in reported levels of career-related support, but failed to find the same differences in psychosocial support. In contrast, a study by Fagenson-Eland, Marks, and Amendola (1997) yielded opposite results; the only differences found in their study were in the levels of psychosocial support reported by protégés. Finally, multiple studies have concluded that protégés in informal relationships yield the greatest benefits with regards to compensation and promotion (e.g., Chao et al., 1992; Ragins & Cotton, 1999).

To date, the general outcomes influenced by mentoring relationships have been the primary focus of researchers' attention. Interestingly, the process by which career-related and psychosocial mentoring functions differentially influence organizational outcomes is not well understood. In fact, Ragins & Cotton (1999) conclude that "...the relationship between mentoring functions and career outcomes is relatively weak and varies by the type of function" (p. 547). Furthermore, the effect of mentor function on protégés' expectations of the organization is yet to be examined.

Organizational Justice

Although primarily associated with legal issues and the resolution of disputes, the concept of justice is a critical component in the understanding of organizational behavior. Directly pertaining to the role of perceived fairness in workplace issues, organizational justice involves “the ways in which employees determine if they have been treated fairly in their jobs and the ways in which those determinations influence other work related variables” (Moorman, 1991; p. 845). Research suggests that perceptions of justice play an important role in many organizational outcomes, such as pay satisfaction, turnover intentions, performance, and organizational commitment (e.g., Martin & Bennett, 1996; Masterson et al., 2000; Scandura, 1999; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993; Tremblay et al., 2000; Welbourne, 1998). Furthermore, it is a commonly accepted conclusion that employees who feel they have received fair treatment will hold more favorable attitudes regarding not only their work and work-related outcomes, but regarding their supervisors as well (e.g., Moorman, 1991).

In most studies of organizational justice, two distinct types of justice or perceived fairness emerge. In particular, distributive justice generally refers to the fairness of outcomes, while procedural justice is concerned with the processes through which those outcomes are determined. The influence of justice on organizational outcomes is dependent upon the type of justice examined, as each type has an independent set of determinants and distinct effects (Tremblay et al., 2000).

Distributive justice. Distributive justice represents the equity or fairness of the actual amount or value of an outcome. In other words, evaluations of distributive justice are focused on the ends of an interaction or exchange, rather than the means (Sweeney &

McFarlin, 1993). The outcomes primarily related to distributive justice are commonly referred to in the literature as personal or specific outcomes (e.g., Martin & Bennett, 1996; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992), as they are considered to be personally relevant and meaningful to a specific individual. As such, appraisals of distributive justice have been associated with increased pay satisfaction and other quantifiable outcome variables (e.g., Cobb, Wooten, & Folger, 1995; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). For example, Konovsky & Pugh (1994) suggest that “distributive justice...is the typical metric for judging the fairness of transactional contracts and economic exchange” (p. 658). Additional support for this proposition was found by Tremblay et al. (2000) in their examination of the role of justice in satisfaction with pay. Specifically, the results of their study indicate that distributive justice accounted for over 25% of the variance in pay satisfaction, while, as expected, procedural justice did not account for any. Comparably, Hartman, Yrle, and Galle (1999) found distributive justice to be a key factor affecting satisfaction with raises among faculty members in a university setting.

In their 1992 book on organizational justice, Sheppard, Lewicki, and Minton offer a framework outlining the factors contributing to perceptions of justice. In general, they suggest that perceptions of justice are based on evaluations of balance, or the comparison of a given action against similar actions in comparable situations. To illustrate, Sheppard et al. (1992) present the scales of justice as the quintessential example of how justice is perceived, noting that the evaluation of different aspects of an action or situation simply requires the conceptual changing of the contents of the opposing scales. In the context of distributive justice, the three ways in which balance may be evaluated are equity, equality, and need.

One of the ways in which individuals draw conclusions regarding distributive justice or outcome fairness is closely tied to the notion of equity theory. Evaluations of equity involve a comparison of one's outcomes to those of a peer. More specifically, individuals assess their own outcomes in terms of a ratio of costs to rewards. This ratio is then compared to the ratios of others in order to determine the level of equity or fairness. Adapting Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) numeric illustration, if a person's costs and benefits are valued at 2 and 4 respectively, then that individual's cost-reward ratio would be 2. Similarly, a co-worker's costs and benefits (as assessed by the first individual) are valued at 3 and 6 respectively, also resulting in a cost-reward ratio of 2. Although the actual outcomes are quantitatively different (i.e., the co-worker received a greater reward as did the focal individual), this outcome would be deemed equitable, as both individuals are receiving rewards at twice the value of their costs. Consider a second example, in which the co-worker's costs and benefits are valued at 1 and 3 respectively. Here, although the absolute value of the rewards is higher for the focal individual, the cost-benefit ratio is lower (2 vs. 3). As such, these outcomes would not be considered equitable, and the focal individual is likely to perceive a distributive injustice.

The second type of criterion used to evaluate distributive justice is equality, or the notion that individuals receive equal outcomes regardless of differences in performance or effort (Sheppard et al., 1992). Clearly, the emphasis on the absolute value of outcomes places this concept in direct opposition with equity theory. Refer back to the example above in which the focal individual receives outcomes valued at 4 in return for costs valued at 2. In this case, equality would be achieved only if the co-worker also receives an outcome valued at 4, regardless if his or her costs were valued at

1 (cost-reward ratio of 4), 2 (cost-benefit ratio of 2, just like the first individual), or 4 (cost-benefit ratio of 1).

Finally, perceptions of distributive justice may also be based on evaluations of need. More specifically, rewards or outcomes are considered just or fair if they are distributed based on an individual's needs as compared to the relative needs of others. Like the concept of equity, it is the relative value of the outcomes that is evaluated; the cost-benefit ratio defining equity is replaced by a ratio of needs to outcomes. Turning once again to the numeric example, consider an individual who has a need valued at 2 and an outcome valued at 4 (need-outcome ratio of 2). In this case, distributive justice would be achieved only if the value of a co-worker's outcomes is twice the value of his or her needs.

Procedural justice. The concept of procedural justice gained popularity as researchers noticed that individuals valued more than the quantifiable outcomes of organizational actions (Korsgaard et al., 1995). In fact, research on the influence of justice on workplace outcomes has consistently found that the actual procedures by which particular outcomes are determined may be more important than the actual outcomes themselves (Martin & Bennett, 1996). Specifically, procedural justice describes the fairness of the processes by which outcomes are allocated or disputes are resolved.

As previously mentioned, the antecedents and outcomes associated with procedural justice differ from those associated with distributive justice. While the outcomes primarily associated with distributive justice have been described as personally relevant or specific, the outcomes related to procedural justice are organizationally relevant or global in nature (Martin & Bennett, 1996; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). In

other words, these outcomes are related to comprehensive or macro-level evaluations of the organizational system and its representatives (e.g., leaders, supervisors), rather than personally relevant outcomes such as pay. In two samples of employees at a large financial organization, Martin and Bennett (1996) found that procedural justice, but not distributive justice, was related to organizational commitment. Similar findings regarding this relationship were presented by McFarlin and Sweeney (1992), who also concluded that procedural justice was an important predictor regarding a subordinate's evaluation of his or her supervisor. Furthermore, several studies have attempted to find a link between procedural justice and tangible outcomes usually associated with distributive justice, but have failed (e.g., Martin & Bennett, 1996; Tremblay et al., 2000).

More important to the present study, however, is the role of procedural justice in interpersonal relationships. Because relationships are essentially composed of reciprocated exchanges, and procedural justice can be understood as an evaluation of this exchange process, it follows that perceptions of procedural justice would influence the quality of a given relationship. For example, Lind and Tyler (1988) propose that procedural justice is an important aspect of trust in the relationship between employee and supervisor (cf. Folger & Konovsky, 1989; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992).

Procedurally just acts are perceived as demonstrations of respect, thereby inspiring employees' trust in the overall, long-term fairness of the relationship. For these same reasons, Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza (1995) describe procedural justice as having a symbolic purpose that essentially serves to fortify the relationship between individuals and their supervisors.

Sheppard and colleagues (1992) identify three primary processes through which procedural justice is assessed. First, procedures may be evaluated in terms of the checks and balances utilized in decision making. In other words, the reliance on and reference to outside sources is thought to minimize the probability of procedural bias or prejudices. Secondly, procedural justice may be determined based on a notion known as balance of power, or the assurance that processes are not dominated by any one party. For example, in a dispute between two individuals, balance of power would be violated if the ultimate decision-making power was held by someone affiliated with one of the individuals. The final criterion offered by Sheppard et al. (1992) is the balance of inputs, which refers to the allowance of individuals to have input in a particular decision. Using the same example of a dispute, balance of inputs would be indicated if both parties were given the opportunity to make a statement regarding the issue at hand.

Leventhal (1980) also offered rules of procedural fairness that have been supported by a number of researchers (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Rousseau, 1995). These six rules are consistent with those proffered by Sheppard et al. (1992), however they are presented as a set of requirements rather than alternative methods of evaluation.

- Consistency: The procedures utilized for outcome allocation must be consistent across people and over time.
- Bias suppression: Preconceptions and self-promotion must be constrained.
- Accuracy: Valid information should be relied upon.
- Correctability: Procedures must be in place to amend decisions based on inaccurate information.

- Representativeness: The interests of all important constituents must be represented by the allocation process.
- Ethicality: The decision-making process must be congruent with existing ethical standards.

The rules described above are essentially the manifestation of Sheppard et al.'s (1992) principles of procedural justice. First, the rules of consistency, bias suppression, and accuracy fulfill the principle of checks and balances, in that these rules are aimed at removing the opportunity for bias or prejudice from the decision-making process. Similarly, correctability and ethicality represent the notion of balance of power; both ensure that the process in question is not dominated by the interests of any one party or individual. Finally, representativeness and balance of inputs both describe the assurance that the voice of all interested parties will be heard.

Further distinctions. A complete understanding of organizational justice requires that distributive and procedural justice are broken down further into their respective components. Specifically, Greenberg (1996) synthesized the literature, findings, and conclusions regarding both distributive and procedural justice and developed a taxonomy to aid in the assessment of justice for research purposes (see Table 2). Greenberg's (1996) taxonomy divides both distributive and procedural justice into two components based on the focal determinant of the justice evaluation, structural and social. Structural determinants of justice focus on the context in which a particular action occurs, which is consistent with the traditional view of organizational justice. Social determinants, on the other hand, focus on the treatment of individuals with respect to a particular action or decision.

It should be noted that the incorporation of social determinants into the concepts of procedural and distributive justice stems from the notion of interactive justice, first introduced by Bies and Moag (1986) and further examined by justice researchers such as Greenberg (1990) and Moorman (1991). Originally conceived as a dimension of procedural justice, interactive justice referred to the perceptions of fairness based on the ways in which organizational procedures are carried out (Greenberg, 1990, 1996; Moorman, 1991). In the development of the taxonomy presented here, Greenberg (1996) suggested that the interpersonal aspect underlying interactive justice was equally as relevant to distributive justice as it was to procedural justice. Incorporating this interpersonal aspect into the social determinants of justice stimulated the development of the taxonomy described below.

As can be seen in Table 2, Greenberg's (1996) taxonomy results in the distinction of four types or classes of justice: systemic justice (procedural-structural), informational justice (procedural-social), configural justice (distributive-structural), and interpersonal justice (distributive-social). Systemic justice is most similar to the classic definition of procedural justice, including the six rules necessary for imposing fair procedures proposed by Leventhal (1980). In other words, systemic justice refers to the fairness of the policies in place or the formal procedures through which decisions are made. The social aspect of procedural justice is captured in the concept of informational justice. By definition, informational justice involves the provision of knowledge about decision-making procedures that conveys a personal consideration for people's concerns. This includes providing honest information about and accounts of the procedures used to determine preferred outcomes. The class of justice referred to as configural represents

distributive justice achieved through structural mechanisms. This aspect of distributive justice encompasses most of what is commonly understood as distributive justice, including decisions based on need, equality, and equity (Sheppard et al., 1992) as well as those based on an attempt to attain a particular goal. Finally, interpersonal justice describes the social aspect of distributive justice. Greenberg (1996) explains that “interpersonal justice may be sought by showing concern for individuals regarding the distributive outcomes they received,” and it “focuses on the consequences of those outcomes directly” (p. 71). Apologies for or displays of sensitivity regarding unfortunate outcomes are examples of behaviors that may enhance evaluations of interpersonal justice and fairness.

Psychological Contract

Over time, people develop a set of expectations that essentially defines their relationship with the organization. The manifestation of these expectations is called a psychological contract, which may be defined as a set of “individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement between individuals and their organization” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 9). Individuals tend to use their psychological contracts as mental models, or conceptual frameworks to guide their expectations and to interpret organizational events. Furthermore, a psychological contract may serve as a lens through which implicit promises are evaluated.

One key aspect of a psychological contract is that it exists entirely as an individual’s perception; it is not necessarily reciprocal in nature, nor must it be recognized or acknowledged by the organization. Despite this one-sided nature, individuals believe these contracts to be implicit agreements with their organizations.

More specifically, individuals perceive themselves as having entered into a sort of exchange agreement with the organization; for example, in exchange for their hard work or loyalty, they may expect promotions or respect in return.

In her seminal book on psychological contracts, Rousseau (1995) provides a general model of contract development that may be adapted to fit a variety of situations (p. 33). The model in Figure 3 outlines the process through which an individual's psychological contract is created. As illustrated, the process is influenced by two primary forces: organizational factors (e.g., external messages, social cues) and individual processes (e.g., interpretations, predispositions). More specifically, organizational factors include "expressions and interpretations of the firm's future intent," while individual processes involve "what messages (an individual) receives, ...interpretations, and (one's) personal style of processing information" (Rousseau, 1995, p. 36).

The process of psychological contract development generally begins with message framing, or the taking in of information regarding the organization (e.g., from advertisements, recruiters). Combined with social cues such as a mentor's opinions and anecdotal accounts by co-workers, the information gathered is encoded to represent some sort of exchange agreement in the individual's mind (e.g., hard work earns promotions). In essence, encoding is the process in which information is filtered through individuals who know the organization (e.g., mentors and coworkers), resulting in the application of meaning. The manifestation of the specific terms of the agreement (e.g., staying late every night will earn me a promotion in 6 months) is the result of the decoding process. Indeed, this process may be influenced by personality characteristics or other personal predispositions (e.g., driven, ambitious, risk-averse), as well as by additional social cues.

The end result is an individual's psychological contract with the organization. As previously mentioned, the psychological contract often serves as a mental model or guide through which organizational events and information is interpreted. Therefore, individuals come to rely upon their psychological contracts to help them make career-related decisions.

Types of contracts. Psychological contracts are commonly conceptualized in terms of the concreteness of the obligations with which they are defined. More specifically, contracts are described as existing along a continuum, bounded by transactional contracts on one end and relational contracts on the other (e.g., MacNeil, 1985; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1992). Generally speaking, transactional contracts are characterized by the expectation of quantifiable returns in exchange for hard work. In contrast, relational contracts are focused on more socio-emotional obligations such as loyalty and commitment. As illustrated in Table 1, Rousseau & McLean Parks (1992) outline five characteristics that may be used to differentiate between transactional and relational contracts, including focus, time frame, stability, scope, and tangibility.

Perceptions of promises regarding specific outcomes, such as promotions or raises, in exchange for quality work or effort are prime examples of transactional contracts. These contracts are characterized by an economic focus, as the terms by which they are defined are generally quantifiable or monetizable in nature (Millward & Hopkins, 1998). Consistent with this economic focus, transactional contracts tend to operate within a specified time frame (e.g., a raise is expected after 6 months of work) and are not likely to evolve over time. Such explicit, short-term exchanges are relatively

impersonal nature, making this type of contract more likely to be present early in an employee's tenure.

These aspects of transactional contracts have consistently been supported in the literature. For example, Rousseau (1990) found that newly-hired M.B.A. graduates believed that their hard work should be rewarded by tangible returns such as pay and opportunities for career-development. Interestingly, Millward and Hopkins (1998) found a negative relationship between transactional contracts and affective outcomes such as organizational commitment, lending support to the notion that transactional contracts are characterized by specific, economic-based terms (i.e., transactional contracts are not characterized by the intangible terms associated with affective commitment). Similarly, the results of the Millward and Hopkins (1998) study also confirm the logical conclusion that transactional contracts are more likely to be found with temporary or short-term (e.g., seasonal) employees rather than permanent employees.

Over time, the psychological contract may become more personal in nature. Although economic terms may be part of a relational contract, the terms of this type of contract are fundamentally more abstract and less tangible than those defining the transactional contract. In fact, Rousseau and McLean Parks (1992) describe the focus as socio-emotional, including examples such as loyalty, friendship, and commitment. Furthermore, relational contracts are not bound by a specified time frame. Rather, they are dynamic and may evolve or change as the relationship develops. A simple example of a relational contract would be an employee's belief that the organization owes him a certain level of respect in exchange for his loyalty and commitment. Clearly, there is no

means through which respect, loyalty, or commitment can be quantified; moreover, these constructs may take on different meanings over time.

Along these same lines, there may also be a temporal component to the transactional-relational distinction. In any relationship, the investments put forth by individuals tend to have a cumulative effect. As such, expectations may move from quantifiable terms to more affective terms. For example, consider the transition from acquaintances to friends. During the acquaintance stage, the terms governing the relationship are likely to move from the exchange of greetings to the exchange of favors. Then, as the acquaintanceship turns into friendship, the terms are likely to heighten in intensity to include the exchange of emotional support and loyalty. The application of the notion to an organizational setting is described by Rousseau and McLean Parks (1992). Specifically, they state that “transactional contracts can serve as a trial run before formulation of a longer term relational agreement (e.g., probationary employment) and can evolve into relationships as in the case of organizational consultants and other independent contractors with whom organizations become dependent” (p. 11). Despite this temporal component, a relational contract does not have to take the place of an existing transactional contract. Rather, the relational terms (e.g., commitment) may take on a more primary role in the overall set of expectations outlined by the contract.

Contract violation. Because a psychological contract is a set of expectations, there are consequences when these expectations are not met. Individuals tend to interpret these violations in terms of how much control they feel the organization had regarding the situation. Generally speaking, there are three types of contract violations, each of which may result in a different set of consequences.

Contract violation can sometimes occur despite the good faith efforts made by both parties. In this type of situation, referred to as inadvertent violation, inconsistent interpretations of agreed upon terms may prevent one party from fulfilling the obligations as understood by the other party. For example, when two people misunderstand the location of an important meeting, they will inadvertently fail to uphold their commitment to attend. Because the offender's control of the violation was limited to no more than negligence (i.e., the agreement was simply misunderstood, and the only thing the violator could have done to prevent it was pay closer attention), the damage caused by inadvertent violations is usually reparable and short-term in nature, although some work is likely to be necessary.

Another type of violation is contract disruption, which occurs when one party cannot follow through with an agreement, despite honest efforts to do so. For instance, flight cancellations may prevent a sales representative from attending a meeting with an important client. In cases such as these, the culpability of the offender is minimized; as such, the damage (if any) to the relationship is barely perceptible and the relationship may carry on as normal.

The most serious type of contract violation is referred to as breach of contract or reneging. This situation transpires when one party elects not to fulfill its end of the bargain, although the party is capable of doing so. To illustrate, if a company has an exclusive distribution deal with one vendor, a breach of contract occurs when the company makes a deal with another vendor. A more personalized example would be the offering of a special assignment or promotion to one employee after promising it to another. Because the violator had a significant amount of control over the decision to

renege on the agreement, the damage to the relationship is likely to be quite severe (e.g., feelings of betrayal) and long-term in nature.

Development of Model and Hypotheses

The direct parallels that exist between the economic and social exchange distinction and similar contrasts within the concepts of psychological contract and mentoring provide the framework for the proposed model. In the following paragraphs, these similarities and the relevance of several intermediary variables will be highlighted and explored, followed by the presentation specific hypotheses and a detailed model to guide the present study (see Figure 4 for a theoretical model and Figure 5 for an empirical model). Taken together, the ultimate purpose of the present study was the explication of the relationships among these variables by demonstrating empirical support for a causal model.

Exchange and Psychological Contracts

To reiterate, psychological contracts exist along a continuum (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1992). One end of this continuum is bounded by transactional contracts, which represent short-term agreements with specified terms, and the other by relational contracts, which are more long-term, open-ended, and contain unspecified terms (Rousseau, 1995). Multiple researchers have noted the correspondence between transactional and relational contracts and the principles guiding economic and social exchange, respectively (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Millward & Hopkins, 1998; Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999; Robinson et al., 1994). Some examples include the following:

- “Employment obligations, embedded in the context of social exchange, constitute the psychological contract” (Robinson et al., 1994; p. 138).
- “This distinction between relational and transactional contracts is similar to Blau’s (1964) notion of two types of exchange, social and economic” (Robinson et al., 1994; p. 150).
- “One manifestation of economic exchange is reliance on transactional contracts...one manifestation of social exchange is reliance on relational contracts” (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994, p. 658).
- “Exchange contracts take the form of economic exchanges...relational contracts, on the other hand, take the form of social exchange” (Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999, p. 899).

By definition, the terms of an economic exchange are explicit, tangible, and quantifiable, and they are bound by specific, short-term time frames. Clearly, the substitution of the term “transactional contract” for the term “economic exchange” would not make the previous statement untrue. Similarly, both social exchange and relational contract are characterized by unspecified, intangible terms within an open-ended or long-term timeframe.

However, these constructs are distinct from one another and may be differentiated on the basis of the parties involved and the mutuality of the agreement. Specifically, both economic and social exchange refer to the development of a relationship between two parties in which both parties are privy to the existence of an agreement, whether the terms are explicitly or implicitly defined. Psychological contracts, on the other hand, exist only

as perceptions of a single party and do not require the acknowledgment or recognition of the other party.

Taken together, the concepts of exchange and psychological contract are clearly distinct, yet related constructs. In the present study, the referent for the examination of exchange relationships is the individual (i.e., between two individuals), while the referent for the examination of psychological contracts is the organization (i.e., between an individual and the organization). As such, the proposed model is predicated on a causal relationship between exchange and psychological contracts in which individual-level exchange relationships (namely, between mentor and protégé) influence the type of psychological contract an individual (i.e., the protégé) has with the organization.

Exchange and Mentor Functions

In line with the general description of the model described above, the present study suggests that mentor functions may also be differentiated along the same lines as those used to discriminate between economic and social exchange relationships. As previously discussed, there are two types of mentor functions that characterize the mentoring relationship. Career-related functions are those aimed at facilitating career advancement, and psychosocial functions serve to enhance the protégé's sense of competence and professional effectiveness (Kram, 1985). Career-related functions, for example, are directly concerned with career advancement, which, in turn, is measured in quantifiable terms such as promotions and salary increases (Kram, 1985; Noe, 1998; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990). Psychosocial functions, on the other hand, contribute primarily to the protégé's personal development. Although some quantifiable outcomes may result (e.g., a protégé's increased self-confidence may help him or her attain a

promotion), the direct effects of psychosocial support are generally abstract and intangible in nature (e.g., friendship, role-modeling) (Kram, 1985; Noe, 1988; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990).

Based on these distinctions, the present study offers mentor functions as a proxy for the exchange relationship between mentor and protégé. More specifically, the provision of career-related support by the mentor can be interpreted as a manifestation of an economic exchange agreement, and the provision of psychosocial support by the mentor is representative of a social exchange agreement. Consistent with the utilization of exchange theory to explain the development of interpersonal relationships (e.g., Blau, 1964; Lovaglia et al., 1995), the direct link between exchange agreements and mentor function is quite clear. As the relationship between mentor and protégé develops, the actions and responses of both parties are continually assessed by the other. For example, if the mentor provides his or her protégé with exposure, the protégé may respond by rising to the occasion and making a good impression during this opportunity created by the mentor. Based on the outcome, the mentor may or may not decide to champion the protégé at the next opportunity. Similarly, when a mentor provides friendship and counseling to his or her protégé, he or she may expect intangible rewards such as loyalty and trust in return. The evaluation of the actual outcomes influences the mentor's decision to provide additional psychosocial support.

Due to its abstract nature, the existence and quality of an exchange agreement cannot be directly assessed without being placed in a relational context (e.g., a mentoring relationship, a marriage). Most commonly, organizational researchers have suggested or utilized measures of leader-member exchange (LMX) as an operationalization for the

broader concept of exchange (e.g., Masterson et al., 2000; Scandura, 1999; Wayne, Shore, & Linden, 1997). LMX has been defined as “how leaders use their position power to develop different exchange relationships with different subordinates” (Yukl, 1989, p. 40) and has been closely linked with supervisory mentoring (Scandura & Schriesheim, 1994). Finally, a recent study by Young and Perrewe (2000) examined the exchange between mentor and protégé through an assessment of mentor role behaviors. Taken together, the conceptualization of mentor function as a manifestation of mentor exchange behaviors is consistent with existing research examining similar relationships.

Mentor Functions and Psychological Contracts

As a proxy for exchange behaviors, it follows that mentor functions would also be related to psychological contracts. To date, empirical research drawing a direct link between mentoring and psychological contract has been lacking, despite the conceptual clarity surrounding the association between these two organizational concepts. For example, the contracts literature suggests that a mentor may serve as a lens through which organizational events are viewed and interpreted (e.g., Rousseau, 1995). Interestingly, this notion is further supported by the mentoring literature through the definitions of behaviors such as exposure, coaching, or role modeling (e.g., Kram, 1985). As such, a protégé’s expectations regarding the terms of his or her relationship with the organization is likely to be influenced by the relationship he or she has with the mentor.

However, the focus of the present study is on the actual functions or forms of support that the mentor provides to the protégé as a component of their exchange relationship. More specifically, it is proposed that the process of exchange between the mentor and the protégé affect the development of the protégé’s psychological contract

with the organization in the following manner. First, the mentor provides some form of support to the protégé (e.g., sponsorship, counseling). What actions the protégé takes in return are not only directed at the mentor, but at the organization as well. In other words, both the mentor and the organization benefit from the protégé's hard work and loyalty (Scandura & Viator, 1994). Furthermore, the mentor is, in effect, a representative of the organization in many capacities. As the exchange between mentor and protégé continues, the protégé develops not only expectations governing his or her relationship with the mentor (as dictated by simple exchange theory; Blau, 1964), but also expectations regarding his or her relationship with the organization. Therefore, in exchange for hard work, the protégé may expect the mentor to introduce him or her to the right people, as well as expect promotions and salary increases from the organization. Similarly, in exchange for loyalty, a protégé may expect the mentor's continued friendship and counseling, as well as expect opportunities for personal development from the organization.

As can be seen in the examples provided above, the two types of mentor functions (i.e., career-related and psychosocial) are likely to differentially influence the protégé's psychological contract development. In particular, the reciprocal expectations generated from career-related support will likely lead to the development of a transactional contract, while the obligations generated from psychosocial support will likely lead to the development of a relational contract (see Figure 4). Therefore, the following hypotheses were proposed:

Hypothesis 1: Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to transactional contracts.

Hypothesis 2: Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to relational contracts.

Justice and Other Mediating Variables

In addition to the direct relationship outlined above, there may be additional variables that partially mediate the influence of mentor function on psychological contract. First, the present study posits that evaluations of justice play a mediating role in the above-mentioned relationship. Justice, like exchange theory, psychological contract, and mentor functions, can be broken down into two types. As discussed in a previous section, distributive justice describes the manner in which individuals evaluate the quantity or value of a given outcome; procedural justice demonstrates the manner in which individuals evaluate the procedures or processes through which outcomes are determined (Tremblay et al., 2000). Based on this distinction, distributive justice is proposed as the process through which career-related support is evaluated and expectations regarding a transactional contract with the organization are formed. Similarly, procedural justice is proffered as the process through which psychosocial support is evaluated and expectations regarding a relational contract with the organization are formed.

The importance of distinguishing between procedural and distributive justice when examining exchange relationships and their outcomes has been demonstrated (e.g., Masterson et al., 2000; Moorman, Blakely, & Niehoff, 1998). Masterson and colleagues (2000) posit that “justice perceptions are important inputs into employees’ judgments of the quality of their exchange relationships with their supervisors and organizations” (p. 741). Rather than considering distributive justice, Masterson et al. (2000) chose to

compare procedural justice to interactional justice. The concept of interactional justice is sometimes a topic of debate among justice researchers; however, in this particular study it was defined as a more specific form of distributive justice limited to the interactions between an employee and his or her supervisor. The findings of their study indicate that perceptions of interactional justice were related to leader-member exchange and outcome variables such as performance and job satisfaction. Procedural justice, on the other hand, was related to perceived organizational support and outcome variables such as organizational commitment and intentions to quit. Based on these findings, Masterson and colleagues (2000) warn that “studies that examine only one type of fairness or exchange relationship may lead to an erroneous conclusion...relationships (may) not exist or may change substantially in the presence of the multiple types of fairness and social exchange variables” (p. 346).

As previously discussed, organizational justice may be further defined by its structural and social components (see Table 2). More specifically, distributive justice may be broken down into configural and interpersonal justice, and procedural justice may be broken down into configural and informational justice. Taken together, the present study will assess both configural and interpersonal justice as components of distributive justice, and both systemic and informational justice as components of procedural justice (see Figure 4). Based on the conceptual links exchange relationships and justice, the following hypotheses were proposed:

Hypothesis 3: Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to distributive justice.

Hypothesis 4: Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to procedural justice.

The Mediating Role of Macromotives

In addition to perceptions of justice, there are additional variables that may play a mediating role in the influence of exchange and mentor functions on psychological contracts. Specifically, these variables, referred to by Konovsky and Pugh (1994) as macromotives, may be defined as “sets of attributions that characterize people’s feelings and beliefs about their exchange partners” (p. 658). In the present study, these variables represent the bridge between individual-level attitudes and attitudes that involve organization-level concepts. In other words, a protégé may rely upon his or her mentoring experiences to draw inferences regarding the potential relationship with the organization. As such, the referent exchange partner is the organization, and the exchange relationship is the psychological contract.

At a general level, macromotives involve concepts such as trust, loyalty, and commitment (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1992). Operating within the context of the organization as an exchange partner, macromotives more accurately describe an individual’s perceptions of whether or not the organization is trustworthy, loyalty-worthy, or commitment-worthy. In other words, macromotives are essentially labels for the attributions one makes about the organization within an exchange framework.

Like most of the concepts introduced in this study, macromotives may be further divided into two types. The first type is termed instrumental macromotives, which represent attributions suggesting that the organization is, in fact, a reliable source of

tangible or quantifiable outcomes. On the other hand, relational macromotives embody the perception that the organization can be relied upon to fulfill an individual's intangible needs, such as personal development.

Because macromotives are representative of an individual's evaluation of the organization as a potential exchange partner, one primary manifestation of both instrumental and relational macromotives is commitment to the organization. However, research has consistently indicated that commitment is a multidimensional construct (e.g., Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, & Goffin, 1989; Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982; Shore & Wayne, 1993) consisting of multiple types. Furthermore, a meta-analysis by Mathieu and Zajac (1990) indicated that commitment type plays a significant moderating effect and must therefore be taken into account when drawing organizational conclusions. It is not uncommon to find some disagreement regarding the exact terminology and definitions of organizational commitment types in the literature, however the basic concepts are not in dispute. For the purposes of this study, the two types of commitment that will be highlighted are calculative commitment and affective commitment.

Calculative commitment is the core of the instrumental macromotives. Also referred to as utilitarian, behavioral, or continuance commitment, calculative commitment is the result of positive transactions between an individual and the organization (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; Mowday et al., 1982). More specifically, calculative commitment develops when individuals "see a beneficial or equitable exchange relationship between their contributions to the organization and the rewards they receive for service" (Mowday et al., 1982, p. 21). In other words, an individual becomes committed to (and sometimes

dependent upon) the organization for the provision of tangible commodities (e.g., pay raises, bonuses). Therefore, the termination of the relationship with the organization would result in a loss of valuable outcomes. In sum, instrumental macromotives drive one's motivation to maintain a relationship with the organization by representing the extent to which an individual perceives the organization will provide the returns merited by his or her organizational contributions.

Affective commitment is one primary indicator of relational macromotives, and is generally consistent with the traditional definition of organizational commitment (i.e., unless otherwise specified, the definition of organizational commitment utilized in most studies is comparable to the definition introduced here). Defined by Meyer et al. (1989) as an "emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the organization" (p. 152), affective commitment entails an active relationship with the organization in which an individual gives of himself in order to benefit the organization. In other words, through commitment, an individual is indicating a desire to maintain membership in and therefore a relationship with the organization. The distinguishing factor between affective and calculative commitment, therefore, lies in the basis of one's attachment to the organization. With calculative commitment, one's organizational attachment is predicated on material factors, while affective commitment is based on more emotional factors.

A second attribution contributing to relational macromotives is trust. Clearly, trust is a critical aspect of any relationship, including one's relationship with his or her organization. Within the context of relational macromotives, feelings of trust are taken to represent an increased likelihood that the organization will fulfill its end of a social

exchange agreement. In other words, trust is symbolic of the faith one has in his or her continued relationship with the organization. As such, the trustworthiness one attributes to the organization may play a defining role in the development of expectations regarding one's long-term relationship with the organization.

The important questions, therefore, are how these macromotives develop and how they ultimately affect the psychological contract one develops with the organization. Within the framework of the proposed model, evaluations of justice are proffered as the primary influence in macromotive development. Specifically, the model suggests that distributive justice is an antecedent of instrumental macromotives, and procedural justice is an antecedent of both instrumental and relational macromotives (see Figure 4).

Affirming the relationship depicted in Figure 4, the influence of justice on organizational commitment has been demonstrated and supported by many researchers (e.g., Korsgaard et al., 1995; Martin & Bennett, 1996; McFarlin & Sweeney, 1992). Specifically, research suggests that evaluations of fairness are interpreted as indications of the future of a given relationship (e.g., Konovsky & Pugh, 1994). In other words, individuals tend to conclude that if the organization is procedurally and/or distributively just in one type of situation, then the organization is likely to behave justly in other situations.

Distributive justice has been linked to personally-relevant or individually-derived outcomes such as pay satisfaction and facet satisfaction (Hartman et al., 1999; Martin & Bennett, 1996; Welbourne, 1998). Such outcomes are quantifiable, tangible, and specific, and result in a dependence on the organization characterized by calculative commitment. More specifically, the individual comes to view the organization as a

reliable source of tangible rewards, and therefore the maintenance of membership guarantees certain valuable outcomes. Essentially, acts of distributive justice lead to the evaluations of the “worthiness” of the organization as a continued exchange partner.

Procedural justice, on the other hand, has more wide-spread effects, and has been linked to more global outcomes such as trust and other affective reactions towards the organization in addition to specific outcomes (Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Martin & Bennett, 1996; Pillai et al., 1999; Welbourne, 1998). Therefore, procedurally just acts motivate one to maintain organizational membership (e.g., affective commitment) and to trust the organization to reciprocate such acts of support.

The above-mentioned results have been replicated in a number of studies. For example, Martin & Bennett (1996) examined the potential influence of both distributive and procedural justice on organizational commitment and job satisfaction (e.g., pay satisfaction, benefit satisfaction). Their results indicated that procedural justice, but not distributive justice was a direct antecedent to affective commitment, but facet-specific job satisfaction was influenced by both procedural and distributive justice. It should be noted that these aspects of job satisfaction represent a contentment with tangible outcomes, often linked directly with aspects calculative commitment (cf. Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Utilizing similar definitions, Folger and Konovsky (1989) found that evaluations of procedural justice were predictive of organizational commitment, trust in supervisor, and satisfaction with pay raise decisions, while distributive justice was a significant predictor for only pay raise satisfaction. Both of these studies, however, concluded that pay-related satisfaction was more strongly influenced by distributive justice than by procedural justice.

The proposed model attempts to replicate these findings, however the referent differs from existing studies. Previously, both justice and outcome variables (e.g., satisfaction, commitment) were measured with respect to the organization. In other words, the link was established between evaluations of the organization's displays of fairness and organizational outcomes. In the present study, evaluations of justice utilize an individual-level referent (i.e., between mentor and protégé), but the outcome variables (i.e., macromotives and ultimately psychological contracts) are examined with respect to the organization. Therefore, the model examines how individuals' perceptions of the justice regarding their mentors' actions affect the development of organizational attributions (i.e., macromotives) and the evolution of individuals' psychological contracts with the organization.

The argument is made that mentor functions may have a direct effect on protégés' development of psychological contracts. Specifically, it is hypothesized that expectations governing an individual's relationship with the organization develop as a result of multiple exchanges between mentor and protégé. Because the services returned to the mentor following the provision of career-related and/or psychosocial support functions yield benefits to both the mentor (e.g., performance that bolsters the mentor's image) and the organization (e.g., productivity, reductions in turnover intentions) (Scandura & Viator, 1994), these services also become part of an exchange relationship with the organization. In other words, the protégé has given something to the organization, and now expects something in return as the relationship continues.

Furthermore, it has been suggested that the mentor serves as a representative of the organization. More often than not, the mentor's words, attitudes, and actions are

interpreted by the protégé as examples of the “way things work” in the organization as a whole. As such, a protégé who experiences justice during exchanges with his or her mentor is likely to draw the conclusion that the organization would act in a similar manner, and therefore is operates fairly in general. In other words, evaluations of justice regarding the mentor’s actions are likely to be used by the protégé as an information source when attributing exchange-related characteristics (i.e., macromotives) to the organization.

Based on these ideas, the established relationship between evaluations of justice and macromotives is likely to be found at multiple levels. More specifically, the perceptions of justice concerning the actions of the mentor should influence the exchange-related attributions one makes regarding the organization as an exchange partner. As such, the proposed model draws a direct link between distributive justice and instrumental macromotives, between procedural justice and instrumental macromotives, and between procedural justice an relational macromotives (see Figure 4).

Hypothesis 5: Evaluations of distributive justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.

Hypothesis 6: Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.

Hypothesis 7: Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to relational macromotives.

The final set of proposed relationships involves the direct influence of instrumental and relational macromotives on individual’s psychological contract with the organization. As previously discussed, contract development is influenced by both

organizational factors (e.g., interpretations of the organization's future intent) and individual processes (e.g., encoding and decoding of messages) (Rousseau, 1995; see Figure 3). Clearly, macromotives may be conceptualized as an organizational factor, as they represent individuals' evaluations of the organization as a worthy exchange partner. In other words, both instrumental and relational macromotives signify some form of commitment to the organization based on anticipated future exchanges.

A parallel may be drawn between the transactional-relational psychological contract distinction and the instrumental-relational macromotive distinction. To review, transactional contracts are a perception of an exchange agreement with the organization based on quantifiable terms. Similarly, instrumental macromotives represent a set of attributions regarding the likelihood that the organization will deliver on such terms. On the other hand, relational contracts deal with more personal, intangible, and unspecified terms that operate within an open-ended time frame. Comparably, relational macromotives are indicative of the perceived likelihood that the organization can follow through on an agreement based on such socio-emotional terms. In fact, Rousseau and McLean Parks (1992) highlight loyalty and commitment as concepts associated with relational contracts.

In accordance with the parallels outlined above, it follows that expectations regarding the organization's fulfillment of an exchange agreement would lead to the development of an individual's psychological contract (see Figure 4). More specifically, the evaluations associated with macromotives act as assurances that the contract between employee and organization will not be violated. Therefore, the proposed model is completed with the following propositions:

Hypothesis 8: Instrumental macromotives will be positively related to transactional contracts.

Hypothesis 9: Relational macromotives will be positively related to relational contracts.

The hypotheses outlined above describe the direct relationships specified in the structural model. Clearly, the consideration of several of these hypotheses in combination demonstrates expectations regarding mediated relationships among the variables in the model. More specifically, the proposed model indicates a partially mediated relationship between exchange and psychological contract, such that the influence of economic exchange on transactional contract is partially mediated by distributive justice and instrumental macromotives. Similarly, the relationship between social exchange and relational contracts is partially mediated by procedural justice and relational macromotives. Furthermore, the hypotheses suggest a mediating role of instrumental macromotives with respect to the influence of both distributive and procedural justice on transactional contracts, as well as a mediating role of relational macromotives with respect to the influence of procedural justice on relational contracts.

Summary

The model proposed in the present study utilizes an exchange theory framework to examine the development of individuals' psychological contracts with their organizations. More specifically, the model contends that mentor functions (i.e., career-related and psychosocial support) are a manifestation of the exchange relationship between mentor and protégé, and that these behaviors influence the development of psychological contracts through evaluations of justice and organizational macromotives.

Furthermore, the model suggests that there are two ways in which these relationships operate that parallel the distinction between economic and social exchange. In particular, this discussion has shown that the specific, quantifiable, and monetizable terms that characterize economic exchange play a primary role in career-related support, distributive justice, instrumental macromotives, and ultimately transactional contracts. Similarly, the intangible, socio-emotional terms that characterize social exchange are present in psychosocial support, procedural justice, relational macromotives, and relational contracts. A complete list of hypotheses is provided in Table 3.

CHAPTER III

METHOD

Participants

Participants in the present study were 212 consultants (59% male, 36% female, mean age = 34) in a large corporation, 88% of whom (186) were presently involved in an informal mentoring relationship. Participants had a mean tenure of 2.4 years with the company and 1.1 years in their mentoring relationship. The invitation to participate in the study was distributed via e-mail to approximately 1000 individuals through two corporate distribution lists to which consultants are subscribed, resulting in a response rate of 21%.

As consultants, the individuals comprising the sample are assigned to long-term projects, which are often out-of-town and extend from approximately 6 to 12 months in duration. The organization usually sends a team of consultants to work on each project, and the consultants must work with both representatives of the client organization as well as the other members of the project team. Individuals are assigned to teams on a project-by-project basis, therefore they have the opportunity to work with a different group of individuals as they move from one project to another. Informal mentoring relationships begin to develop when newcomers or less experienced individuals are assigned to a project team. More specifically, these team members tend to look to more experienced individuals for guidance and advice, which may ultimately result in the development of a mentoring relationship. The mentor and protégé pair may be assigned to the same project

in the future, however the relationship may continue to grow while the parties are assigned to different projects via phone and e-mail interaction.

Procedure

Data collection strategy. Because some of the participant sample was expected to have been traveling during the specified time frame, data were collected through a web-based survey. The use of web-based surveys as an alternative to traditional paper-and-pencil surveys has gained popularity in recent years, and research pertaining to this approach to data collection continues to grow (e.g., Hewson, Laurent, & Vogel, 1996; Lazar & Preece, 1999; Schmidt, 1997). In addition to reducing both production and distributions costs (e.g., postage), the utilization of web-based surveys enables the researcher to reach a wider population within a shortened timeframe (Kimball, 1998). Furthermore, the organization from which the sample was drawn is technically advanced, and its employees are frequently required to provide information through a web-based interface (e.g., time sheets, surveys, evaluation forms).

A technical expert with experience in web-based survey development assisted in the building of the survey webpage. The link to this internal webpage was provided in an e-mail, which also contained an explanation of the study, instructions for accessing, completing, and submitting the survey, assured confidentiality of responses, and thanked respondents in advance for their participation. In addition, participants were told that the submission of a completed survey would make them eligible for a monetary reward (i.e., three respondents were to be awarded a \$150 American Express gift certificate). The monetary incentive was included to encourage participation and therefore increase response rates (e.g., e.g., Chebat & Picard, 1991; Ransdell, 1996; Roth & BeVier, 1998;

Yammarino, Skinner, & Childers, 1991). Furthermore, this survey format has proven successful within the data source used in the present study.

The survey itself was designed such that participants were asked click on the link provided in the introductory e-mail to access the survey. Participants simply clicked on radio buttons to indicate their responses to each item. Following the completion of the survey, participants were invited to register for the monetary incentive previously mentioned. Specifically, a field was included in which participants had the option of entering their employee identification number, which would subsequently be used for the sole purpose of selecting and notifying the prizewinner. This entry was optional, as some participants, although assured of the confidentiality of their responses, may not have been comfortable providing this type of information. Following this prize registration field was a final radio button that participants clicked to submit the completed survey. The data were captured in an SPSS compatible format.

Criterion Measures

Justice. The focus of mentor functions as the referent for evaluations of justice is unique, precluding the use of an existing measure of organizational justice. As such, a four-part measure of justice (i.e., configural, interpersonal, systemic, and informational) was developed for the present study. Items were generated based on the definitions of justice provided by Greenberg (1996) as well as additional published measures (i.e., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1986; Moorman, 1991). Sample items from the configural justice subscale include “Considering his or her other obligations, my mentor devotes as much time to me as he or she can,” and “My mentor provides me with enough opportunities to advance my career.” Interpersonal justice was tapped by items such as

“My mentor does not care about what outcomes I receive (reverse coded),” and “My mentor empathizes with me when professional opportunities do not play out as expected.” Examples from the systemic justice subscale include “My mentor treats me in a consistent manner,” and “My mentor uses fair processes to make decisions regarding our relationship.” Finally, informational justice was represented by items such as “My mentor is completely candid and frank with me,” and “My mentor has explained to me the reasons for his or her actions.” For all subscales, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each item utilizing a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). A full list of items is presented in Appendix A, and reliability estimates for the present study can be found in Table 16.

Macromotives. Calculative commitment was assessed through the continuance subscale of an organizational commitment measure developed by Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993). As previously discussed, the term continuance commitment has been used interchangeably with calculative commitment. The items utilized in the present study were derived from the notion that organizational commitment can develop from an interest in gaining specific rewards, often accrued by an individual’s investment in the organization. Furthermore, this form of commitment may include the recognition that leaving the organization would result in a loss of such rewards, or that the provision of comparable rewards from another organization is unlikely.

The Meyer et al. (1993) subscale consists of six items and is measured along a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Sample items include “I feel I have too few options to consider leaving this organization” and “Right now, staying with my organization is a matter of necessity as much as desire.”

Furthermore, the measure has demonstrated adequate levels of reliability in previous studies (Cronbach's alphas range from .79 to .83), as well as convergent and discriminant validity. A complete list of items is provided in Appendix B, and reliability estimates for the present study are provided in Table 16.

Two subscales from an organizational commitment scale developed by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) (i.e., identification and internalization) were used to measure affective commitment. The conclusion that this measure would adequately assess affective commitment was primarily based on the definitions utilized in the development of the identification and internalization subscales. Based on a taxonomy constructed by Kelman (1958), O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) define identification as "involvement based on a desire for affiliation" (p. 493). More specifically, identification represents an individual's decision to establish and maintain a relationship with the organization. This is differentiated from internalization, which is defined as "involvement predicated on congruence between individual and organizational values" (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986 p. 493). Together, these subscales tap into the domain of affective commitment as defined in the present study.

Multiple studies have examined the validity of the O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) measure (e.g., O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Sutton & Harrison, 1993; Vandenberg, Self, & Seo (1994). In general, these researchers have found adequate reliability evidence for both the identification and internalization subscales (i.e., Cronbach's alphas range from .72 to .86 for the identification subscale and .79 to .89 for the internalization subscale).

The combination of these two subscales results in a total of 8 items (5 for identification, 3 for internalization). Sample items include "I feel a sense of 'ownership'

for this organization rather than being just an employee” (identification); “The reason I prefer this organization to others is because of what it stands for, its values” (internalization). Respondents indicate their level of agreement with each statement utilizing a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). A complete list of items can be found in Appendix B, and Cronbach’s alpha values for the present study are included in Table 16 .

Trust, the other aspect of relational macromotives, was measured by an 8-item scale developed for this study. Although there are a number of published scales assessing aspects of trust (e.g., Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rempel & Holmes, 1986; Rotter, 1967), these scales were not deemed appropriate for the purposes of this study. More specifically, the referent for most existing trust scales is either a specific partner (e.g., supervisor, spouse) or humankind in general. Because the proposed model involves trust in the organization as a whole, items were generated to tap directly into one’s opinions about this relationship. Sample items included “I can count on my organization to follow through with its commitments,” and “I can depend on my organization as a source of support.” Consistent with published scales, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement along a 5-point Likert type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The full scale can be found in Appendix C, and the reliability estimates for the present study are provided in Table 16.

Psychological contract. Both transactional and relational psychological contracts were assessed using items from a single scale developed by Millward and Hopkins (1998). This specific scale was chosen because, unlike most other published measures of psychological contracts, both subscales appear to demonstrate adequate construct

validity. More specifically, alternative measures of psychological contract appear to be measuring something other than individuals' psychological contracts (for example, see Larwood, Wright, Desrochers, & Dahir, 1998; Shore & Barksdale, 1998).

The original Millward and Hopkins (1998) scale consists of 31 items, 20 measuring transactional contract orientation and 11 measuring relational contract orientation. After close review of these items, it was determined that the removal of some items would minimize the potential for construct overlap and result in a cleaner measure of psychological contract orientation. Therefore, only items with factor loadings of .50 or higher were included in the present study. Two additional items on the transactional subscale were identified based on their similarity with items measuring calculative commitment. These items appeared to be more consistent with the definition of calculative commitment and were therefore removed. The final scale consists of 20 items, 12 measuring transactional contracts and 8 measuring relational contracts.

Respondents indicate the level to which they agree with each statement using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Both the transactional and relational subscales demonstrated sufficient internal consistency in previous studies, with Cronbach's alpha values of .88 and .86, respectively. Sample items from the transactional subscale include "I work to achieve the purely short-term goals of my job" and "my loyalty to the organization is contract specific." Sample items from the relational subscale include "I feel this company reciprocates the effort put in by its employees" and "I expect to grow in this organization." A full list of items can be found in Appendix D, and Cronbach's alpha values for the present study can be found in Table 16.

Predictor Measures

Mentor function. Mentor functions were measured using Ragins and McFarlin's (1990) Mentor Role Instrument (MRI). Based on Kram's (1985) theory of mentor roles or functions, the MRI contains items assessing both career-related and psychosocial support. Within each mentor role, 3-item subscales are utilized to tap into the different types of behaviors that characterize that role. More specifically, career-related support is divided into five subscales, including sponsorship, coaching, protection, challenging assignments, and exposure. Two sample items are "my mentor gives me tasks that require me to learn new skills" and "my mentor helps me be more visible in the organization." Similarly, psychosocial support is divided into four subscales, including friendship, role modeling, counseling and acceptance. Examples are "my mentor is someone I identify with" and "my mentor thinks highly of me." It should be noted that Ragins and McFarlin (1990) added two subscales, social and parenting, to the set of psychosocial mentor behaviors. Because these behaviors have not been included in most studies of mentor functions, nor are they part of Kram's (1985) original conceptualization, they were excluded from the present study. A full list of the items comprising the MRI (excluding the social and parenting subscales) can be found in Appendix E.

Each of the nine subscales described above has demonstrated more than adequate internal consistency. Cronbach's alphas range from .77 to .92 for the career-related subscales and from .82 to .89 for the psychosocial subscales. Furthermore, a second study (Ragins & Cotton, 1999) found comparable alpha values. Alpha values for the present study are provided in Table 16. Respondents indicate their level of agreement

with each item utilizing a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree).

Control Variables

In order to ensure the proper model specifications, it was necessary to take control variables into consideration. Based on the literature, the following information was obtained from each participant and considered for use as control variables: age, education level, gender, gender of mentor, length of mentoring relationship, frequency of interaction with mentor, supervisory status of mentor, number of previous mentoring relationships, organizational tenure, and tenure intentions. Items designed to solicit this information were included at the end of the questionnaire in a section entitled “Background information.” In addition, five items measuring job satisfaction (Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, & Kelsh, 1979; Hackman & Oldham, 1975) and two items measuring job security (Cammann et al., 1979) were included in the questionnaire (see Appendix F).

The control variables listed above were selected based upon their relationships with the focal variables included in the present study. For example, Mathieu and Zajac (1990) suggest that age, education level, and organizational tenure are antecedents to and job satisfaction is a correlate of organizational commitment. Several of these propositions are supported by Mowday et al. (1982), who also highlight the importance of turnover intentions in the examination of organizational commitment. In addition to the proposed relationship between job satisfaction and commitment, a number of researchers have concluded that job satisfaction is a likely result of evaluations of justice (e.g., Daily & Kirk, 1992; Greenberg, 1990; Hartman et al., 1999; Martin & Bennett,

1996). Furthermore, the contracts literature (e.g., Rousseau, 1990, 1995) describes the relationship between psychological contracts and tenure, tenure intentions, and overall job security.

Multiple studies have examined the influence of gender (of both mentor and protégé) on several aspects of the mentoring relationship, including the inherent complexities associated with cross-gender relationships (e.g., Burke et al., 1993; Kram, 1985), the barriers to obtaining a mentor (e.g., Ragins & Cotton, 1991), mentor roles (Ragins & McFarlin, 1990), and power issues (Ragins & Scandura, 1989). In addition, research suggests that supervisory mentoring relationships may be different than non-supervisory mentoring relationships (e.g., Burke et al., 1993; Green & Bauer, 1995; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990). Finally, research supports the inclusion of the number of previous mentors (Ragins & McFarlin, 1990) and the length of mentoring relationship (Burke et al., 1993; Chao et al., 1992, Ragins & McFarlin, 1990) in studies examining the organizational outcomes associated with mentoring.

Control variables were examined individually to determine their potential influence on the structural model. Specifically, the correlation between each control variable and the variables included in the model were evaluated. Based on these analyses, only job satisfaction was utilized as a control in the present study. More specifically, the predictor and criterion variables were regressed on job satisfaction, and the residual values were utilized for the remaining analyses. The items utilized to assess this variable yielded a Chronbach's alpha of .80 and are included in Appendix F.

Data Analysis

A two-stage analytic approach was utilized in the present study. The first stage involves the evaluation of the measurement model (see Figure 5) in order to ensure the adequate measurement of the latent variables (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Barry & Stewart, 1997). The examination of the measurement model prior to hypothesis testing is important, as it reduces the likelihood that the relationships among the latent variables (i.e., the hypothesized structural model) will be misinterpreted due to deficient construct measurement. The second stage of analysis is the examination of the structural model. More specifically, a target model containing the hypothesized paths is compared against models with restrictions added and removed in order to determine which model provides the best fit for the data.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Reliability Analyses

Prior to the two-step analytic approach described earlier, a reliability analysis was conducted in order to identify any poorly performing items in each of the measurement scales. Specifically, items with an item-total correlation less than .35 were removed from their respective measurement scales in an effort to increase the overall coefficient alpha associated with each scale. Only three scales required modifications: interpersonal justice (2 items removed), systemic justice (1 item removed), and calculative commitment (1 item removed). Following the removal of these four items, the coefficient alpha for each of the measurement scales was acceptable (alphas range from .75 to .97; Nunnally, 1967). Item-level statistics and correlations are provided in Tables 4 – 15, and a comprehensive list of coefficients alpha and items removed from each scale can be found in Table 16. It should be noted that the values included in Tables 4 – 19 were determined without the consideration of the control variable.

Item Parceling

Due to the potential problems associated with single-indicator and dual-indicator models, the measures utilized in the present study were broken down to create multiple indicators. An alternative strategy would involve total disaggregation, in which each item functions as an individual indicator of a latent variable. However, the inclusion of a

large number of indicators introduces unnecessary sources of error and decreases the likelihood of finding an adequate model fit (Hall, Snell, & Foust, 1999).

Several researchers (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, 2001; Hall et al., 1999; Landis, Beal, & Tesluk, 2000) have discussed two primary strategies for the parceling of items into subsets. The first strategy, isolated uniqueness, involves the grouping together of the most similar items such that the resulting subsets are not influenced by shared secondary influences. Therefore, the isolated uniqueness strategy is recommended if there is reason to believe that unmeasured secondary constructs are influencing a subset of the items within a measurement scale (i.e., the scale may be multidimensional). Through this approach, item parcels are homogenous, and do not individually represent the entirety of the latent construct; rather, they each represent a unique aspect of the focal construct.

An alternative strategy, distributed uniqueness, is recommended if the scale is understood to be unidimensional in nature (Landis et al., 2000). With this approach, items that are the most similar are distributed across the subsets, resulting in heterogeneous item parcels that are similar to one another and are each an adequate reflection of the latent construct.

Landis et al. (2000) conducted a study in which they compared the results of six different item parceling methods, four following the distributed uniqueness strategy, and two following the isolated uniqueness strategy. The first distributed uniqueness method is the single-factor method, which requires a factor analysis with the specification of a single factor. The factor loadings are examined, and the items with the highest and lowest loading are paired to form the first composite or item parcel. This process is continued until all of the items are placed into a predetermined number of parcels. The

single factor method is designed to maintain indicators that are “empirically balanced measures of the construct” (Landis et. al, 2000, pg, 188).

The second strategy is the correlational method, in which item parcels are formed based on item intercorrelations. Parcels are formed beginning with the pairing of the items with the highest correlation. This process is continued until all items are placed into the predetermined number of parcels. Similar to the previous strategy, the correlational method should result in indicators that empirically represent the construct.

Landis and colleagues also describe the random method, in which items are randomly assigned to parcels. The rationale behind the random approach is the avoidance of an intermediate analysis, as is required in the single-factor and correlational methods. The success of this strategy requires that they items are equivalent measures of the latent construct.

A final distributed uniqueness strategy, not commonly found in the literature, is the empirically equivalent approach. Utilizing this strategy, parcels are created to have equal means, variances, and reliabilities. More specifically, following the calculation of item means, item standard deviations, and item-total correlations, items that are empirically similar based on these statistics are paired and placed into a predetermined number of parcels.

Landis et al. (2000) describe two very different isolated uniqueness approaches. The content method develops item parcels without the reliance on empirical relationships. Based on existing theory or rational judgment, items that are similar to one another are grouped together. More specifically, item parcels are designed to capture sub-dimensions within the focal construct.

Alternatively, one might conduct an exploratory factor analysis to create homogeneous item parcels. With this method, the number of parcels is not predetermined. Parcels are created from the factor solution that best fits the data (i.e., if a three factor solution is the best fit for the data, then there will be three corresponding item parcels). Similar to the content approach, the resulting item parcels each represent an aspect of the latent construct.

Landis et al. (2000) found that the distributed uniqueness strategies (single factor, correlational, random, and empirically equivalent) were consistently superior to the isolated uniqueness strategies (content and exploratory factor analysis) methods with regards to model fit. More specifically, the results of the Landis et al. (2000) study suggest that, assuming the unidimensionality of the measurement scale, item parcels should be an accurate representation of the latent construct. Landis and colleagues (2000) admit that the total disaggregation strategy (i.e., each item as an indicator) is optimal, however, should that option not be feasible, they recommend utilizing the single factor approach.

Consistent with the recommendations of Landis et al. (2000) and others (e.g., Bandalos and Finney, 2001), the single factor approach was utilized in the present study. Specifically, a principal components analysis in which a single factor was specified was conducted for each of the criterion measures. The items with the highest and lowest factor loadings were paired in sequence and placed into a predetermined number of item parcels until all items were allocated. The configural justice and interpersonal justice scales were each divided into two parcels, resulting in a total of four manifest indicators for distributive justice. This was mirrored for procedural justice, as the systemic justice

and informational justice scales were each divided into two parcels as well. The calculative commitment scale was broken down into three item parcels, creating three manifest indicators for instrumental macromotives. Both the affective commitment and the trust scales were grouped into two parcels, totaling four manifest indicators for relational macromotives. Finally, the transactional contract and relational contract latent variables are each represented by three manifest indicators, as the items comprising each scale were grouped to form three item parcels. The resulting item parcels are listed in Table 18, and parcel-level statistics are provided in Table 19.

It should be mentioned that the predictor measures (i.e., career-related support and psychosocial support) were already broken into subscales by the Mentor Role Instrument's original authors (Ragins & McFarlin, 1990). Because each of these measures was believed to be multidimensional in nature, the subscales are similar to what would have resulted had an isolated uniqueness approach been taken to create item parcels from the full measurement scales. These subscales are included in Tables 18 and 19.

Evaluations of Fit

The propositions and conclusions of multiple researchers (i.e., Bandalos, 1997; Hu & Bentler, 1998; Marsh, Balla, & McDonald) were reviewed in order to determine the most appropriate fit indices for the present study. Consistent with the recommendations of Hu and Bentler (1998) and Lance (Personal communication, March 23, 1999), a number of fit indices were evaluated for each model. First, three basic stand-alone indices, χ^2 , standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMSR), and the root-mean-square error approximation (RMSEA) were evaluated for each model. Because stand-

alone indices may be affected by factors such as sample size, these estimations were supplemented by the Tucker-Lewis fit index (TLI; a non-normed fit index) and the comparative fit index (CFI; a non-centrality fit index). These two types of fit indices are less susceptible to sample size effects and have been recommended by multiple researchers (e.g., Bentler, 1990; Hu & Bentler, 1998; Marsh et al., 1988).

Stage One: Measurement Model

As previously discussed, the first step in the analytic process was to examine the measurement model to ensure that the items comprising the measurement scales and their resulting parcels provided accurate representations of the latent constructs. This is a critical aspect of the analysis, as the interpretability of the structural model (i.e., the hypothesized relationships) is dependent upon the how well the manifest variables perform as indicators of their respective latent variables. In the present study, each latent variable was examined individually using a confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) approach. More specifically, a series of analyses was conducted in which a single latent variable (ξ) was specified along with X 's equal to the number of items on a particular measurement scale. The individual factor loadings can be found in Table 20.

As can be seen in Table 21, the fit indices for the measurement scales were not uniformly up to the desired standards. Because it is not unlikely to find a significant χ^2 with a large sample size, it is necessary to review additional fit indices in order to more accurately assess the model's fit to the data. For the present analyses, the two goodness-of-fit (TLI, CFI) and two badness-of-fit (SRMSR, RMSEA) indices described above were evaluated utilizing the following cutoff values as guidelines: TLI and CFI = .95, SRMSR = .08, and RSMEA = .06.

The measure of Career-related Support employed to assess Economic Exchange did not perform as well as anticipated. Although it was not surprising to find a significant χ^2 value (475.21, $df = 90$, $p = .00$), the TLI and CFI values (.85 and .87, respectively) were lower than expected. Furthermore, despite an acceptable SRMSR of .053, the model yielded a RMSEA of .15. The measure of Psychosocial Support used to assess Social Exchange produced more positive results. Again, a significant χ^2 value (259.11, $df = 54$, $p = .00$) was to be expected. Although the TLI and CFI values (.91 and .93, respectively) did not quite meet the .95 cutoff, they did meet a less stringent .90 cutoff that is commonly deemed acceptable. Similar to the previous scale, a satisfactory SRMSR (.037) and a disappointing RSMEA (.15) were found.

The models approximating distributive justice and procedural justice both yielded decent fit indices. For distributive justice ($\chi^2 = 209.97$, $df = 54$, $p = .00$), TLI and CFI values (.91 and .93, respectively) met the more lenient cutoff described earlier, with an SRMSR of .038 and a RSMEA of .13. The findings for procedural justice were quite similar, including χ^2 of 238.03 ($df = 44$, $p = .00$), TLI = .89, CFI = .91, SRMSR = .039, and RMSEA = .15.

One of scales producing a poor model fit was the calculative commitment scale used to assess instrumental macromotives. In addition to a χ^2 of 60.62 ($df = 5$, $p = .00$), the model resulted in a TLI of .57 and a CFI of .78, followed by a SRMSR = .110 and RMSEA = .25. These estimates of fit suggest that the calculative commitment scale may not be measuring instrumental macromotives in the manner in which it was designed to do. The relational macromotives model, which includes the affective commitment and trust measurement scales, produced a better fit than its counterpart. Despite the improved

fit, the model did not reach the relaxed cutoff values associated with the TLI and the CFI (.86 and .88, respectively). Like many of the other models, the SRMSR was acceptable (.065), but the RSMEA was not (.14). Finally, the model yielded a significant χ^2 value of 400.09 (df = 104, p = .00).

The next models under review were transactional contract and relational contract. Because the scales tapping into these constructs had been previously used in published studies, the results for the transactional contract model were extremely disappointing. More specifically, the model resulted in a χ^2 of 311.74 (df = 54, p = .00) TLI of .47, a CFI of .56, a SRMSR of .130, and a RMSEA of .18, bringing into question the adequacy with which this construct was tapped. Fortunately, the relational contract model yielded far more encouraging results. Fit values included $\chi^2 = 77.30$ (df = 20, p = .00), TLI = .89, CFI = .92, SRMSR = .056, and RMSEA = .12, suggesting a moderate level of model fit.

Finally, a parcel-level omnibus model containing all of the latent factors was examined. Specifically, a CFA was conducted in which item parcels were assigned to their respective factors, allowing all factors to be mutually correlated. Unlike the previous models, which examined the adequacy with which a construct was measured by the items comprising a particular measurement scale, this model was conducted at the parcel level of analysis. A demonstration of good fit would indicate that the parcels are correctly assigned to their respective constructs. The model yielded fit values that were marginally acceptable [$\chi^2 = 1061.89$ (df = 377, p = .00), TLI = .87, CFI = .89, SRMSR = .066, and RMSEA = .09], rendering the conclusion that the parcels are correctly assigned tentative at best.

To review, all of the models yielded a significant χ^2 value. However, due to the large sample size, the evaluation of the remaining fit indices allow for a clearer picture to emerge. Although none of the models met the more stringent (and more desirable) standard of .95 for the TLI and the CFI, most models met or came close to meeting the more lenient standard of .90. Similarly, all but three models met the .08 cutoff value commonly deemed indicative of good fit for the SRMSR. Interestingly, none of the models came close to meeting the .06 cutoff value associated with the RMSEA.

Taken together, these fit indices suggest that the social exchange (psychosocial support), distributive justice, procedural justice, and relational contract measurement scales demonstrated good fit to their respective models; economic exchange (career-related support) and relational macromotives demonstrated a moderate level of fit to their respective models; and instrumental macromotives and transactional contract demonstrated poor fit to their respective models. Finally, results provided support for the assignment of parcels to their respective constructs. These results, while somewhat disappointing, still allowed for the continuation of the analyses. However, it is imperative that these results be taken into consideration when interpreting the relationships among the latent variables in the structural model.

Stage Two: Structural Model

The second stage of analysis was latent variable structural equation modeling (LVSEM). LVSEM involves the examination of a series of nested models, such that each model is a special case of the previous model. Specifically, models with restrictions added and removed are compared to the target (i.e., hypothesized) model in terms of the change in χ^2 and other fit indices (i.e., TLI, CFI, SRMSR, and RMSEA). The target

model contains the links between the latent variables and their manifest indicators, correlations among exogenous latent variables, and the hypothesized (correctly specified) relations among the latent variables.

Through an evaluation of the fit indices described earlier (see Table 22), it appears that the target model provides a marginal fit to the data. The model resulted in a χ^2 of 1172.68 ($df = 395$, $p = .00$), TLI = .86, CFI = .88, SRMSR = .078, and RMSEA = .098. Although the only index to meet the pre-established criteria for good fit is the SRMSR, these values not far off from the recommended values. As such, it may be concluded that the model provides a marginal, yet less than desirable fit for the data.

The second model (T+X) contained the same specifications as the target model, with the addition of two extra paths not initially proposed. First, a path was added linking Procedural Justice to Distributive Justice. The primary reason for the addition of this path is the ongoing debate in the organizational justice literature regarding the exact nature of the relationship between procedural justice and distributive justice (e.g., Cropanzano & Ambrose, 2001; Lind, 2001; Martin & Bennett, 1996). While some researchers suggest that these are two distinct constructs, others maintain that there is too much overlap between the concepts to make an accurate distinction.

Furthermore, it has been proposed by some that the effects of procedural justice can compensate for or override evaluations of distributed justice (e.g., Hartman et al., 1999; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Martin & Bennett, 1996). More specifically, the evaluation of fairness or justice associated with the procedures by which particular outcomes are determined may be more important than the actual outcomes themselves (Martin &

Bennett, 1996). Therefore, a path was added to indicate a direct influence of procedural justice on distributive justice.

A second path was added linking Relational Macromotives to Transactional Contracts, with the expectation that this estimate would be negative. The rationale for this modification is partially based upon the uncertainties regarding the relationship between transactional and relational contracts. Specifically, most researchers suggest that these constructs exist along a continuum, such that the presence of one type of contract necessarily reduces, but does not preclude, the presence of the other (e.g., Millward & Hopkins, 1998; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1992). Although research to contradict this position is not prevalent in the research, the relationship remains a question that is deserving of further examination. If the conception that psychological contracts exist along a continuum is an accurate representation of reality, then it follows that Relational Macromotives would be negatively related to transactional contracts.

A secondary, yet empirically-driven reason for the addition of this path was the disappointing results of the CFA for the assessment of Transactional Contracts. More specifically, the poor fit of the model to the data brings into question the extent to which the items were actually measuring transactional contract. While the items clearly appear to be tapping into aspects of respondents' psychological contracts, a post-hoc factor analysis was conducted in order to more closely examine the factor loadings of the items. Results indicated that several of the items from the Transactional Contract scale loaded negatively on the relational contract factor. This finding provides additional support for the decision to add a negative path from Relational Macromotives to Transactional Contracts.

The T+X model yielded marginally positive evaluation of fit. The model resulted in a χ^2 of 1090.55 (df = 393, $p = .00$), TLI = .88, CFI = .89, SRMSR = .072, and RMSEA = .089. These values suggest similar, yet slightly superior fit to the data than did the target model, $\Delta\chi^2 = 82.13$ (df = 2), $p \leq .01$.

The third model is the saturated structural model, which includes specifications for all unidirectional paths between the latent variables. In other words, a model containing the 14 possible paths not included in the target model (12 paths plus the two added in the previous step) was examined in comparison to the T+X model. The resulting fit indices for the saturated model include $\chi^2 = 1061.89$ (df = 377, $p = .00$), TLI = .87, CFI = .89, SRMSR = .066, and RMSEA = .090, with a $\Delta\chi^2 = 28.66$ (df = 16), n.s. The non-significant result of the chi-squared difference test indicates that no significant improvement or worsening of fit is present when comparing the two models. Like the previous models, these results suggest a marginal fit to the data.

Before the examination of the remaining models, it is necessary to return to the target model as a starting point. Unlike the models described above, the remaining models require the deletion of paths originally specified in the target model. The fourth model (T-X) examined excluded one of these paths. Specifically, the path between Procedural Justice and Instrumental Macromotives was eliminated from the model. This path was chosen because its deletion would create a “parallel” model that isolates the relationships among economic or quantifiable variables from the relationships among the socioemotional variables. The model resulted in a χ^2 of 1174.01 (df = 396, $p = .00$), TLI = .86, CFI = .88, SRMSR = .078, and RMSEA = .098, with a $\Delta\chi^2 = 1.33$ df = 1, n.s.

Once again, the model suggests a marginal fit to the data with no indication of an improved or worsened fit.

Finally, the structural null model was examined in comparison to the T-X model. Specifically, this model contains no unidirectional relationships among the latent variables. As such, the specification of this model required the deletion of all 9 paths originally hypothesized (8 paths plus the one deleted in the previous step). This model resulted in a χ^2 of 2265.62 ($df = 404$, $p = .00$), $TLI = .68$, $CFI = .70$, $SRMSR = .350$, and $RMSEA = .120$, with a $\Delta\chi^2 = 1091.61$ ($df = 8$), $p \leq .01$. Clearly, the chi-squared difference test indicates a worsening in fit, and the fit indices confirm that this model provides the poorest fit to the data.

Table 22 summarizes the changes in fit associated with the addition and removal of specified paths. To review, the move to the T+X model from the saturated model results in a $\Delta\chi^2$ of 28.66 ($\Delta df = 16$), which is not significant at the .01 level. Therefore, it may be concluded that the T+X model does not provide a worse fit to the data than does the saturated model. Because it is more parsimonious, the T+X model is the more desirable model.

The move to the target model from the T+X model results in a significant $\Delta\chi^2$ (82.13, $\Delta df = 2$), indicating that the target model provides a decreased level of fit to the data. This finding highlights the importance of the path from procedural justice to distributive justice and the path from relational macromotives to transactional contracts, as the exclusion of these parameters (as seen in the target model) results in an inferior model. Looking again at the target model, the fit to the data is not worsened further by the deletion of an additional path, as represented by the T-X model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 1.33$, $\Delta df =$

16). More specifically, the path linking procedural justice to instrumental macromotives does not appear to be a critical component of the structural model. Finally, the structural null model (i.e., a model without paths among the latent variables) does yield the worst fit to the data ($\Delta\chi^2 = 1091.61$, $\Delta df = 8$), indicating that the latent variables are in fact related to one another at some level. Taken together, the serial examination of the nested models points to the T+X model as providing the closest approximation to the data collected in the present study.

Evaluation of hypotheses

A review of the path estimates provided in Figure 6 allows for a direct examination of the hypothesized relationships. Hypotheses 1 suggested that economic exchange would be positively related to transactional contracts. The data do not support this hypothesis, as this path was not significant. Similarly, the positive relationship between social exchange and relational contracts (Hypothesis 2) was not supported. Taken together, these findings indicate that any relationship between exchange and psychological contracts are fully mediated, rather than partially mediated as originally hypothesized. Support was found for both Hypotheses 3 and 4, suggesting a direct positive relationship between economic exchange and distributive justice (Hypothesis 3) and social exchange and procedural justice (Hypothesis 4), respectively.

The proposed relationships among justice and macromotives were outlined in Hypotheses 5, 6, and 7. Specifically, Hypothesis 5 posited that distributive justice would be positively related to instrumental macromotives; Hypothesis 6 suggested that procedural justice would be positively related to instrumental macromotives; and Hypothesis 7 proposed a positive relationship between procedural justice and relational

macromotives. The results provide support for the relationship between procedural justice and relational macromotives, but fail to provide support for the relationships between justice and instrumental macromotives.

A positive relationship between instrumental macromotives and transactional contracts was described in Hypothesis 8, and a positive relationship between relational macromotives and relational contracts was described in Hypothesis 9. Both of these paths yielded significant results, providing support for these hypotheses. A complete listing of hypotheses and results can be found in Table 23.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The present study was designed to examine the relationship between mentor function and psychological contract within an exchange theory framework. Through a 2-stage analytic process, the relative fit of a series of nested models was compared in sequence to determine the model that provided the best approximation of the data. The model that provided the best fit contained two additional paths not included in the hypothesized model and is illustrated in Figure 6.

One of the primary postulations of the present study was the existence of a parallel set of relationships mirroring the distinction between economic and social exchange. In particular, it was suggested that the specific, quantifiable, and monetizable terms that characterize economic exchange would play a primary role in career-related support, distributive justice, instrumental macromotives, and ultimately transactional contracts. Similarly, the intangible, socioemotional terms that characterize social exchange were expected to be present in psychosocial support, procedural justice, relational macromotives, and relational contracts. The results provided partial support for these parallel relationships. Specifically, the socioemotional side of the model yielded significant relationships as expected, suggesting the existence of a socioemotional thread connecting these concepts to one another and a fully mediated relationship between social exchange and relational contracts.

Results were not as clear with respect to the economic or quantifiable aspects. The weak link appears to be between distributive justice and instrumental macromotives, which was a critical component of the model. More specifically, this is the link that represents a change in the level of reference from the individual (i.e., the mentor) to the organization. Without this link, it is not possible to conclude that the character of the economic exchange (career-related support) that occurs between mentor and protégé has an influence on the transactional contract between this protégé and his or her organization as a whole.

One reason for the non-significance of the hypothesized path from distributive justice to instrumental macromotives may be the disappointing performance of the calculative commitment measurement scale. As is reported in Table 21, a CFA of the measurement model for instrumental macromotives yielded a poor fit to the data. These results call into question the extent to which the items (or item parcels) were actually measuring instrumental macromotives in the manner in which it was intended. More specifically, it is possible that these items failed to adequately tap into the latent construct. The reason that the CFA is performed prior to the analysis of the structural model is for this purpose in particular, to ensure that the variables included in the structural model are actually being assessed as represented in the measurement model. It should be noted that the link between distributive justice and instrumental macromotives is still supported by theory, and while the relationship was not supported in the present study, it may be a function of the measure used in the current study.

Another factor that should be taken into consideration may be the larger context in which these data were collected. More specifically, at the time of data collection, the

state of the job market was such that employment opportunities for individuals in the industry in which the sample worked was limited. Therefore, it is possible that the lack of employment alternatives affected individuals' conceptualization of calculative commitment, resulting in the variable's poor performance in the measurement model.

However, if a significant relationship between distributive justice and instrumental macromotives does not exist, the possibility that career-related mentoring does not affect perceptions of transactional contract must be considered. Although career-related mentoring has a transactional or economic component as previously described, this type of mentor function is still an aspect of a mentoring relationship. By definition, a mentoring relationship is interpersonal, and therefore may be more effectively described in terms of social exchange than economic exchange. Furthermore, the results of career-related support may be more easily quantifiable than the results of psychosocial support, but they also remain somewhat intangible (e.g., professional competence) and therefore relational in nature.

The pattern of findings also suggests that the socioemotional aspects of organizational relationships may be dominant in comparison to the quantifiable or tangible aspects. Referring again to Figure 6, it can be seen that procedural justice has a significant impact on distributive justice, and relational macromotives have a significant impact on transactional contracts.

With respect to the importance of the mentoring relationship, the results suggest that both career-related and psychosocial support can have positive effects on protégés' perceptions of organizational justice. Consistent with the parallel model described earlier, career-related support is related to distributive justice and psychosocial support is

related to procedural justice. Furthermore, psychosocial support has indirect effects on both relational contracts and transactional contracts, highlighting the impact that mentoring may have on individuals' relationships with their organizations.

As previously discussed, there is some debate in the psychological contracts literature concerning both the relationship and the distinction between relational and transactional contracts. Although the items utilized to assess psychological contracts were pulled from a published and validated scale (Millward & Hopkins, 1998), the transactional contract scale did not perform as well as anticipated. In fact, the CFA of the transactional contract measurement model failed to produce an adequate fit to the data (see Table 21). However, researchers suggest that psychological contracts exist along a continuum, bound on one end by transactional contracts and by relational contracts on the other (e.g., Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & McLean Parks, 1992). As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is a possibility that the way that the items comprising the transactional contract scale were written failed to assess transactional contracts per se; rather, they may be a direct (albeit negative) measure of relational contracts. This would be consistent with the finding that relational macromotives have a significant negative relationship with transactional contracts and a significant positive relationship with relational macromotives.

Item parceling strategies

There were a number of alternatives to the item parceling strategy utilized in the present study. In particular, there were several levels of aggregation (i.e., partial aggregation, partial disaggregation, total disaggregation), two ways to deal with potential commonalities between items (i.e., distributed uniqueness, isolated uniqueness), and

multiple approaches to the parceling itself (e.g., single factor, correlation, empirically equivalent). Several researchers (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, 2001; Hall et al., 1999; Landy et al., 2000) have warned that different item parceling strategies may be more appropriate than others in a given situation (e.g., a unidimensional vs. a multidimensional measurement scale). Therefore, it is important not to dismiss the possibility that any of the available alternatives to the parceling strategy utilized in the present study may have produced slightly different results. For example, if the assumption that a given scale was unidimensional was incorrect, and there was an unmodeled secondary factor linking the items to one another, then the adoption of an isolated uniqueness approach may have produced more accurate results.

Post Hoc Analyses

In order to conduct a more thorough examination of the data, several post hoc analyses were performed. The first set of analyses included a re-evaluation of the measurement model for three of the latent constructs: Economic Exchange (Career-related Support), Social Exchange (Psychosocial Support), and Relational Macromotives (Affective Commitment and Trust). To review, the purpose of examining the measurement model is to ensure that the manifest variables are adequately representing the constructs they are purported to represent.

The measurement scale utilized to assess exchange and mentor functions was an established scale (Mentor Role Instrument; Ragins & McFarlin, 1990) that has been utilized in a number of independent studies. As designed, this scale is made up of multiple subscales, five of which measure career-related support, and four measure psychosocial support. Although the original single-factor CFAs may be considered

appropriate (i.e., the collection of items is purported to measure a single latent construct), additional CFAs were conducted in which items were assigned to their respective factors. Path estimates can be found in Table 24, and fit indices are listed in Table 25. As can be seen in the results, both the Economic Exchange (Career-related Support) model and the Social Exchange (Psychosocial Support) model provide a good fit to the data, suggesting that the items are adequately measuring the multiple facets of the constructs.

A similar analysis was conducted for the Relational Macromotives model. This construct was assessed through the combination of 2 measurement scales: Affective Commitment and Trust. The specification of a 2-factor model (i.e., items assigned to their respective scales) yielded remarkably positive results (see Tables 24 and 25), suggesting that the items effectively measured the two aspects of the construct.

An additional set of post hoc analyses was performed to determine whether the extent to which protégés perceived their mentors to be representatives of their organization had an effect on the results. Specifically, moderated regression analyses were conducted for the 7 hypothesized paths that have the mentor as the referent (i.e., analysis did not include paths from the macromotives to the contract variables because the organization is the referent). It should be noted that two items were included in the present study to assess the perception of mentors as organizational representatives (see Appendix F). However, because these items yielded different distributions of results and were correlated at a value less than .5 ($r = .467$), they were not combined for this set of analyses. Rather, a single item (i.e., My mentor would be a good example of an employee who represents our organization's values) was utilized as the moderating variable.

For each dependent variable, two regressions were performed. First, a simple regression model with both the predictor variable and the potential moderator was calculated. The second regression model contained the variables listed above, with the addition of an interaction term to represent the moderation. These models were compared in terms of the incremental variance accounted for (ΔR^2) by the model containing the interaction term. The results (see Table 26) suggest that responses to this item did not have a moderating effect on most of the hypothesized paths. Although the incremental variance accounted for is larger for the analyses in which psychological contract was the criterion, the regression weights for the interaction term were not significant.

A final set of post hoc analyses was designed to more closely examine the overall measurement model. Due to the model's marginal fit to the data, it was suggested that a problematic manifestation of one or more latent variables may be present. In particular, Instrumental Macromotives and Transactional Contracts provided poor fits to the data when examined individually (see Table 21). Therefore, these latent variables were the focus of this exploration.

The items utilized to assess each of these latent variables were closely reviewed from a content point of view. Based on this analysis, it was determined that Instrumental Macromotives could be conceptualized as a combination of both Life Disruption (e.g., It would be very hard for me to leave my organization right now, even if I wanted to) and Availability of Alternatives (e.g., I feel that I have too few options to consider leaving this organization). Similarly, Transactional Contracts may be comprised of three components: Job Involvement (e.g., It is important not to get too involved in your job),

Turnover Intentions (e.g., My long-term future does not like with this organization), and Contractual Obligations (e.g., I expect to be paid for any overtime I do).

Based on these notions, a new omnibus measurement model was examined. Specifically, each of the new variables described above was included as a latent variable with their respective items, grouped into parcels, as their manifest indicators. In addition, the dual-factor representation of Relational Macromotives described above (separate factors for Affective Commitment and Trust) was included in this exploratory measurement model as well. This model yielded a χ^2 of 943.19 ($df = 311$; $p = 0.0$), TLI = .87, CFI = .90, SRMSR = .055, and RMSEA = .093. Referring once again to Table 21, it appears that these modifications did not improve upon the fit of the model to the data. Unfortunately, the results of this examination did not shed light on the questions concerning the measurement of Instrumental Macromotives or Transactional Contracts in the present study.

Implications

The findings of the present study add support to the conclusion that mentoring may have a profound influence on protégés' lives. However, unlike the research that began in the mid 1980's suggesting that having a mentor was a critical factor in an individual's professional success, the present study posits that the exchange between mentor and protégé (operationalized as mentor functions) can have a profound effect on the decisions one makes with regard to his or her personal career progression. Similarly, the likely importance of perceptions of justice, namely procedural justice, on employees' evaluations of their organizations as exchange partners (i.e., macromotives), implies that organizational justice may also have an influence on career-related decisions.

The potential of these two factors to impact the development and evaluation of the relationship between employees and their organizations reveals an opportunity for organizations. More specifically, the model examined in the present study can be viewed as existing along a continuum, becoming increasingly subjective and individualized throughout the move from mentor functions to psychological contract. Mentor functions are representative of exchange; although not necessarily objective per se, the concept of exchange represents a series of “this for that” interactions that are far more objective than are the remaining concepts in the model. The next pair of variables constitute organizational justice. Again, evaluations of equity and fairness clearly involve a subjective component, but these evaluations are likely to be agreed upon by others and therefore maintain a shared or collective reality. In contrast, the concept of commitment (the predominate aspect of macromotives) is, by definition, subjective and individualized. Finally, psychological contract is the quintessential example of subjectivity and individuality, as the defining aspect of the psychological contract is that it exists completely as an individual’s perception. Using this continuum as a frame of reference, organizations can capitalize on the potential influence of the more objective components (i.e., mentoring and organizational justice) on the more subjective components (i.e., commitment/macromotives and psychological contract). In other words, organizations can take actions to increase the likelihood that effective mentoring takes place and/or that fair and equitable practices are enacted both within and outside of the mentoring relationship.

The current study’s findings make several direct contributions to the theory and research on mentoring. The state of research regarding negative mentoring was described

earlier as being in its infancy. Due to the limited amount of research on this topic, there is a possibility that critically influential and relevant variables have not yet been considered. One such variable may be perceptions of justice. As a process variable, perceptions of justice (or injustice) may be one reason why different mentoring experiences yield different outcomes. The results of the present study support the notion that perceptions of justice are intimately related to mentoring functions (see Figure 6). Specifically, career-related mentor functions appear to influence perceptions of distributive justice, and psychosocial mentor functions appear to influence perceptions of procedural justice. It would follow, therefore, that negative mentoring experiences that impair the provision of psychosocial support (e.g., credit-taking, deceit) may contribute to perceptions of procedural injustice. Given the role of procedural justice in the model supported by the present study, it is possible that these types of negative mentoring experiences may reduce levels of affective commitment and trust, but may not influence levels of calculative commitment. Although not directly supported in the model, a parallel relationship may be true with respect to negative mentoring experiences that inhibit the provision of career-related support.

Because negative mentoring experiences appear to vary in terms of outcome severity, specificity (i.e., whether or not the action is targeted at a particular individual), and the mentor function most impaired (Simon & Eby, 2000), the propositions described above may make a direct contribution to the advancement of research and theory development on this topic. Bacharach (1989) identifies three questions that a theory serves to answer: how, why, and when. Due to its recent introduction to the mentoring literature, the research on negative mentoring is still working towards the point at which

it can adequately answer these questions. More specifically, research in the area of negative mentoring has resulted in the development of a taxonomy (Eby et al., 2000) and a typology (e.g., Simon & Eby, 2000), which together begin to answer the question of how negative mentoring manifests itself. The present study may be useful in discerning why and when such negative mentoring experiences occur, thereby encouraging the progression of the research and ultimate theory development.

The present study also contributes to the advancement of research and theory of mentoring in general. Mentoring research has consistently found a number of outcome variables positively linked with mentoring experiences, such as increased job satisfaction, higher salaries, and higher promotion rates (Dreher & Ash, 1990; Fagenson, 1989; Scandura & Viator, 1994). However, the process through which career-related mentoring and psychosocial mentoring differentially affect these and other outcomes is not well understood (Ragins & Cotton, 1999). The focus on parallel processes (i.e., one involving career-related mentoring and one involving psychosocial mentoring), including the points at which these processes may cross, introduces an alternative research design with which to examine such potential differences. For example, in order to examine the differential effects of mentor functions on job satisfaction, it may be useful to break job satisfaction down into multiple facets and formulate hypotheses concerning which facets are more strongly related to each mentor function. Furthermore, the allowance for both individual-level and organization-level variables in the model may help account for contextual factors that may influence the processes under examination.

The results of the present study can also be used to facilitate in the development of a new model of careers. As discussed earlier, there has been a consensus among

careers researchers that the traditional model of organizational careers is no longer applicable, and that there is a need for a new model that provides a more accurate reflection of the manner in which individuals will build their careers in the 21st century. (e.g., Hall & Mirvis, 1995; Herriot & Pemberton, 1996; Rousseau, 1990; Sparrow, 1998).

As previously discussed, Herriot and Pemberton (1996) outlined four criteria for a new career model. The first criterion called for a contextualized model that considers both the direct context of the organization as well as the social context of the employees' lives. The findings of the present study meet this criterion, as the model under examination involves individual-level (i.e., mentoring and justice) and organization-level (i.e., commitment and psychological contracts) variables. The second criterion specifies that the model be cyclical in nature, focusing on processes rather than on outcomes. The present study accomplishes this by examining the processes through which employees develop and evaluate their personalized relationships with their organizations. More specifically, the model indicates that individual-level experiences such as mentoring and organizational justice may influence the decision-making processes of employees with respect to the directions they take as they shape their careers. Third, the new model of careers should be subjective. This criterion is addressed through the focus on individuals' psychological contracts as a critical component of the modern career model. As previously mentioned, psychological contracts are entirely subjective in nature, as they exist solely as the perceptions of an individual. Finally, Herriot and Pemberton (1996) recommend that this model be interactive, "account(ing) for relations between the organization and its representatives and individual employees...(and) recogniz(ing) an interactive and negotiating element as part of the employment relationship" (p. 759).

Again, the focus on psychological contract introduces a negotiating component between the individual and the organization, and this negotiation is influenced by the relationship between the protégé and his or her mentor.

Limitations and directions for future research

In order to adequately interpret the findings described above, there are several limitations that must be considered. The first limitation of the present study concerns the sample. While a power analysis deemed a sample of 212 is deemed adequate for this particular study (Dudgeon, 1999; MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996; see Appendix G), a larger sample would have been desirable. With a larger sample, additional post-hoc analyses comparing various subgroups (e.g., gender, tenure) could be conducted.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the sample was drawn from a single organization, therefore limiting the generalization of the results. Future research would benefit from the replication and extension of the present study with a larger sample from various organizations and industries.

A second limitation stems from the actual extent to which protégés perceive their mentors as reflections of their organizations. The questionnaire utilized in the present study contained two questions designed to assess this perception (i.e., “My mentor would be a good example of an employee who represents our organization’s values”; “My relationship with my organization is an extension of my relationship with my mentor”). Although respondents tended to agree with the first item ($M = 3.51$), they were neutral with regards to the second item ($M = 3.03$). However, it is possible that the manner in which the second item was worded may have contributed to the neutrality of the responses. More specifically, the use of the word “extension” to draw the connection

between the respondents' relationships with their organizations and their relationships with their mentors may have caused some confusion, leading participants to indicate a neutral response. If this study were to be replicated, it would benefit from a clearer means by which to assess the extent to which respondents identify their mentors with their organizations.

A final set of limitations concerns the possibility of additional variables that may be missing from the present study. While it is necessary to refine one's research to include a reasonable number of relevant variables, there always remains the possibility of excluding a variable that may play an important role in a structural model. Three such variables that come to mind are person-organization fit, perceived similarity (with one's mentor), and quality of mentoring relationship.

An understanding of person-organization fit concerns "the antecedents and consequences of compatibility between people and the organizations in which they work" (Kristof, 1996, p. 1). More specifically, person-organization fit has been closely linked with Schneider's (1987) attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) framework, with the notion that people are more likely to be attracted to, join, and maintain membership in organizations with which they share similar goals and values. In line with this conceptualization is the presence of an exchange relationship. For example, Witt, Hilton, and Hellman (1993) utilized a social exchange framework to explain the relationship between person-organization fit and job satisfaction. Although job satisfaction was not included in the present study *per se*, its influence was partialled out, suggesting that job satisfaction was related to several of the study's focal variables. Furthermore, person-organization fit has been closely linked with socialization (e.g., Cable & Parsons, 2001;

Kristof, 1996). In particular, research suggests that effective socialization experiences are related to an increased fit with the organization. As such, it may prove interesting to examine the potential role that person-organization fit may have in the model presented in the present study.

A second variable that may have a place in the model presented in this study is perceived similarity. A critical aspect of Byrne's (1971) similarity-attraction paradigm, perceived similarity between individuals is believed to give rise to attraction and a desire for interaction. At some level, this attraction may mirror the desire to maintain membership in an organization, as is characterized by organizational commitment. Furthermore, perceived similarity may be an important aspect of the mentoring relationship (e.g., Burke, McKeen, & McKenna, 1993; Ensher & Murphy, 1997; Ragins & Cotton, 1999), a critical component of the model examined in the present study.

Finally, quality of the mentoring relationship may have a moderating influence on the relationships described throughout the study. More specifically, a protégé involved in a negative exchange relationship with his or her mentor may not develop a perception of justice, commitment, or psychological contracts in the same manner as might an individual engaged in a positive or effective mentoring relationship. The present study was unable to assess whether or not respondents believed their relationships with their mentors to be effective and/or mutually beneficial.

In a similar vein, future research may also benefit from the examination of negative mentoring experiences. Research has suggested that mentoring relationships, like all interpersonal (exchange) relationships, may contain negative aspects or undergo negative experiences (Eby et al., 1999; Simon & Eby, 2000). Such negative experiences

may be perceived as unfair by the affected protégé, thereby having an influence on justice perceptions as operationalized in the present study. Consequently, the consideration of negative mentoring experiences as a moderating factor may lend insight into the complex relationship between mentor function and protégés' psychological contracts with their organizations.

Conclusions

The proposed model did not provide the best fit to the data, resulting in the adoption of a model with two additional paths not initially specified. The results support the proposition that social exchange relationships (i.e., the provision of psychosocial support) between mentors and protégés have an indirect effect on protégés' development of a relational contract with their organization. Unfortunately, an ineffective measurement of a critical variable precludes the conclusion of whether or not a parallel relationship exists linking economic exchange (i.e., the provision of career-related support) to the development of protégés' transactional contracts with their organizations. However, the findings do suggest that organizations may be able to exert an influence on employees' commitment and psychological contract through the endorsement of mentoring relationships and the enactment of fair and equitable processes and outcomes both within and beyond the mentor-protégé relationship. Finally, the results of the present study provide a significant contribution to development of a new model of career progression that is necessary for the continued advancement of organizational research.

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APPENDIX A
JUSTICE SCALES

Configural Justice (Distributive-Structural)

1. My mentor gives me as much attention as I deserve.
2. Considering his/her other obligations, my mentor devotes as much time to my professional development as he/she can.
3. My mentor devotes a fair amount of time to my career development.
4. My mentor makes little effort to help me advance professionally. (R)
5. My mentor distributes his/her resources fairly.
6. My mentor allocates his/her time fairly.
7. My mentor provides me with enough opportunities to advance my career.
8. My mentor makes fair decisions regarding my career development.

Interpersonal Justice (Distributive-Social)

1. My mentor recognizes when he/she cannot spend a fair amount of time with me.
2. My mentor has acknowledged when professional opportunities do not play out as well as expected.
3. My mentor has told me when he or she disagrees with the outcomes I receive.
4. My mentor does not care about what career-related outcomes I receive. (R)
5. My mentor genuinely wants me to succeed professionally.
6. My mentor will not admit when the work-related outcomes I receive are not ideal. (R)

Systemic Justice (Procedural-Structural)

1. My mentor uses fair processes to make decisions regarding our relationship.
2. My mentor treats me in a consistent manner.
3. My mentor makes ethical decisions regarding our relationship.
4. My mentor takes my opinion into consideration when making decisions that will affect me.
5. I am not comfortable expressing disagreement with my mentor's decisions. (R)
6. My mentor solicits my opinion when resolving issues that affect our relationship.

Informational Justice (Procedural-Social)

1. My mentor has explained to me the reasons for his or her actions.
2. The information provided to me by my mentor is always accurate.
3. My mentor provides me with complete information.
4. My mentor makes an effort to ensure that I understand why he or she has made certain decisions.
5. My mentor is completely candid and frank with me.
6. My mentor has kept important information from me. (R)

R indicates reverse scored item

APPENDIX B

COMMITMENT SCALES

Calculative Commitment

1. Right now, staying with my organization is a matter of necessity as much as desire.
2. It would be very hard for me to leave my organization right now, even if I wanted to.
3. Too much of my life would be disrupted if I decided I wanted to leave my organization now.
4. I feel that I have too few options to consider leaving this organization.
5. If I had not already put so much of myself into this organization, I might consider working elsewhere.
6. One of the few negative consequences of leaving this organization would be the scarcity of available alternatives.

Affective Commitment

1. If the values of this organization were different, I would not be as attached to this organization.
2. Since joining this organization, my personal values and those of the organization have become more similar.
3. The reason I prefer this organization to others is because of what it stands for, its values.
4. My attachment to this organization is primarily based on the similarity of my values and those represented by the organization.
5. What this organization stands for is important to me.
6. I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.
7. I talk up the organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.
8. I feel a sense of “ownership” for this organization rather than being just an employee.

APPENDIX C

TRUST SCALE

1. I can count on my organization to follow through with its commitments.
2. I can depend on my organization as a consistent source of support.
3. I trust that my organization acts in my best interests.
4. My organization takes care of its employees.
5. I would describe my organization as trustworthy.
6. My organization would not let me down.
7. I think of my organization as a dependable resource.
8. Overall, I trust my organization to make the right decisions.

APPENDIX D

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT SCALES

Transactional Contract

1. It is important not to get too involved in your job.
2. I expect to be paid for any overtime I do.
3. I come to work purely to get the job done.
4. I intend to stay in this job for a long time (i.e., over 2 to 3 years). (R)
5. My long-term future does not lie with this organization.
6. My loyalty to this organization is contract-specific.
7. I only carry out what is necessary to get the job done.
8. As long as I reach the targets specified in my job, I am satisfied.
9. I work only the hours set out in my contract and no more.
10. I work to achieve the purely short-term goals of my job.
11. My commitment to this organization is defined by my contract.
12. I will work for this company indefinitely. (R)

Relational Contract

1. I expect to develop my skills (via training) in this company.
2. I expect to gain promotion in this company with length of service and effort to achieve goals.
3. I expect to grow in this organization.
4. I feel part of a team in this organization.
5. I feel this company reciprocates the effort put in by its employees.
6. The organization develops/rewards employees who work hard and exert themselves.
7. I am motivated to contribute 100% to this company in return for future employment benefits.
8. I have a reasonable chance for promotion if I work hard.

R indicates reverse scored item

APPENDIX E

MENTOR FUNCTION SCALES

Career-Related Support

Sponsorship:

1. My mentor helps me attain desirable positions.
2. My mentor used his/her influence in the organization for my benefit
3. My mentor uses his/her influence to support my advancement in the organization.

Coaching:

4. My mentor suggests specific strategies for achieving career aspirations.
5. My mentor helps me learn about other parts of the organization.
6. My mentor gives me advice on how to attain recognition in the organization.

Protection:

7. My mentor protects me from those who may be out to get me.
8. My mentor “runs interference” for me in the organization.
9. My mentor shields me from damaging contact with important people in the organization.

Challenging assignments:

10. My mentor gives me tasks that require me to learn new skills.
11. My mentor provides me with challenging assignments.
12. My mentor assigns me tasks that push me into developing new skills.

Exposure:

13. My mentor helps me be more visible in the organization.
14. My mentor creates opportunities for me to impress important people in the organization.
15. My mentor brings my accomplishments to the attention of important people in the organization.

Psychosocial Support

Friendship:

1. My mentor is someone I can confide in.
2. My mentor provides support and encouragement.
3. My mentor is someone I can trust.

Role Modeling:

4. My mentor serves as a role model for me.
5. My mentor is someone I identify with.
6. My mentor represents who I want to be.

7. Counseling:

8. My mentor serves as a sounding board for me to develop and understand myself.
9. My mentor guides my professional development.
10. My mentor guides my personal development.

Acceptance:

11. My mentor accepts me as a competent professional.
12. My mentor sees me as being competent.
13. My mentor thinks highly of me.

APPENDIX F
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES

Job Satisfaction

1. All in all, I am satisfied with this job.
2. In general, I don't like my job. (R)
3. In general, I like working here.
4. I am satisfied with the amount of pay and fringe benefits I receive.
5. I am fairly paid for what I contribute to this organization.

Job Security

1. I am satisfied with the amount of job security I have.
2. Things look secure for me in the future of this organization.

Mentor as Representative

1. My mentor would be a good example of an employee who represents our organization's values.
2. My relationship with my organization is an extension of my relationship with my mentor.

R indicates reverse scored item

APPENDIX G

POWER ANALYSIS

In order to determine the appropriateness of the sample size for the present study, a power analysis was conducted. Following the recommendations of MacCallum et al. (1996), the power associated with the sample was estimated based upon the RMSEA fit index. Specifically, this approach involves the evaluation of a confidence interval as a means of hypothesis testing, and it can be used to estimate power (if sample size is known) or to estimate the necessary sample size for a desired level of power. Because these estimations involve the subjective designation of values, the analysis was conducted several times utilizing different values.

The values necessary for this power analysis include a RMSEA null value, a RMSEA alternative value, an alpha significance level, degrees of freedom, and either sample size or the desired level of power. For the present analysis, the null hypothesis was one of not-close fit (i.e., accepting the null hypothesis would suggest a not-close fit of the data). As such, the RMSEA alternative value was .06 (the commonly accepted cutoff value) for all analyses, and the RMSEA null value was either .10 (conservative) or .07 (more stringent). Furthermore, all analyses were conducted with respect to the target model ($df = 395$).

The values described above were input into a computerized program developed by Dudgeon (1999). As can be seen in the abbreviated output that follows, the 212 sample size used in the present study is able to evaluate the model with a relatively high level of power (.745), even with the more stringent confidence interval. This result is supported by the second set of analyses in which the necessary sample size was estimated based on a desired level of power. To achieve a high level of power (.800), a sample size of 237 would have been necessary. However, the sample size obtained in the present study is only 25 cases less than this recommended value. Taken together, it can be concluded that the evaluations of model fit in the present study can be conducted with a relatively high level of power. This is consistent with MacCallum et al.'s (1996) suggestion that "for studies with moderate to large df , reasonable power is achieved with moderate sample sizes, and very high power is achieved with large samples" (p 139).

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .10
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Sample size = 212

 Estimated power = 1.000

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .07
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Sample size = 212

 Estimated power = .745

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .10
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Desired power = .800

 Estimated sample size = 34

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .07
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Desired power = .800

 Estimated sample size = 237

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .10
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Desired power = .500

 Estimated sample size = 22

----- CSM Power Analysis -----

RMSEA Null Value = .07
 RMSEA Alternative Value = .06
 Alpha significance level = .05
 Degrees of freedom = 395
 Desired power = .500

 Estimated sample size = 133

APPENDIX H

LISREL PROGRAMS

TARGET MODEL

DA NI=30 NO=212 MA=CM

CM FU

*

0.989473684	0.805224142	0.662428052	0.765007375	0.850606327
0.726558959	0.705774516	0.80213978	0.730925011	0.778720834
0.875232838	0.74987643	0.748991681	0.68213402	0.761001059
0.649341163	0.743810675	0.035785129	0.040899448	0.021363948
0.186474806	0.128199787	0.056006954	0.057222595	0.056049028
0.118542254	0.089240713	-0.021692179	0.177436201	0.041589655
0.805224142	0.989528796	0.63544558	0.757884409	0.817527185
0.765969986	0.760485945	0.871023133	0.72536055	0.785875753
0.869425258	0.770751819	0.815801234	0.723461685	0.794216692
0.706616591	0.822059488	0.003681556	0.035805506	0.029298052
0.193393491	0.163040314	0.105115823	0.167180747	-0.011766714
0.077612908	0.053886054	0.016920351	0.246292648	0.126835618
0.662428052	0.63544558	0.989690722	0.600024599	0.644472395
0.501672363	0.466700224	0.582932631	0.486664191	0.468645836
0.626834209	0.620443549	0.497159658	0.583391947	0.553449527
0.335234533	0.53211443	0.138390249	0.155053917	0.044096129
0.090725249	0.122212265	-0.007702783	0.050890363	0.137858823
0.082387951	0.120535087	-0.105567895	0.096503073	-0.011994823
0.765007375	0.757884409	0.600024599	0.989361702	0.774306589
0.689600856	0.646075945	0.735070893	0.69234013	0.719564095
0.802943546	0.736323479	0.757777426	0.668454045	0.70743051
0.587145407	0.700583678	0.045454665	0.071043844	-0.022925291
0.126158447	0.125870039	0.053709757	0.08855202	0.042870435
0.128570881	0.102596776	-0.028083663	0.248997941	0.060178847
0.850606327	0.817527185	0.644472395	0.774306589	0.989361702
0.665662508	0.652534654	0.770220435	0.691260192	0.733789286
0.803805137	0.718511005	0.712237155	0.61606325	0.703812117
0.602008794	0.696218686	0.047064668	0.090546364	0.043234964
0.201907808	0.169840792	0.097048084	0.138430367	0.014957571
0.038781281	0.071451614	-0.034669829	0.216078566	0.100131956
0.726558959	0.765969986	0.501672363	0.689600856	0.665662508
0.98974359	0.864363102	0.804191909	0.870203797	0.801091259
0.790206182	0.756827687	0.876127424	0.770006747	0.855893006
0.754314897	0.889445589	0.071390271	0.043304377	0.061881865
0.203857768	0.156170682	0.138475747	0.155377493	-0.06166615
0.096064589	0.053315434	0.114063306	0.303510131	0.162013488
0.705774516	0.760485945	0.466700224	0.646075945	0.652534654
0.864363102	0.989417989	0.840572052	0.81779887	0.777011414
0.782391721	0.688266619	0.775313499	0.706768519	0.800188494
0.775519467	0.850663116	0.00819477	0.02362931	0.036085402
0.239013674	0.16110494	0.1160851	0.123309559	-0.015326844
0.101077614	0.061317227	0.108696411	0.293149568	0.126553377
0.80213978	0.871023133	0.582932631	0.735070893	0.770220435

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 0.174836847 0.160911859 0.117854759 0.157106575 -0.03067315
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 0.730925011 0.72536055 0.486664191 0.69234013 0.691260192
 0.870203797 0.81779887 0.771609131 0.989473684 0.790907919
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 -0.10324448 0.005624228 0.321308561 0.314432605 0.558974754
 0.056049028 -0.011766714 0.137858823 0.042870435 0.014957571
 -0.06166615 -0.015326844 -0.03067315 -0.071091798 -0.005550954
 0.041491955 0.052298709 -0.074459323 -0.042532543 -0.017908764
 -0.067927193 -0.095130188 0.199129864 0.110741182 0.116678701
 -0.268576901 -0.216211073 -0.129716373 -0.095434172 0.98989899
 0.525513714 0.425902938 -0.078418974 -0.18504808 -0.14954705
 0.118542254 0.077612908 0.082387951 0.128570881 0.038781281
 0.096064589 0.101077614 0.081996122 0.062485165 0.081860293
 0.116874559 0.116612722 0.069228146 0.091666176 0.063513764
 0.039096025 0.068755944 0.16150233 0.138455455 0.135008599
 -0.220531199 -0.199989838 -0.172005227 -0.10324448 0.525513714
 0.989795918 0.455148836 -0.038032423 -0.058744896 -0.210044416

```

0.089240713 0.053886054 0.120535087 0.102596776 0.071451614
0.053315434 0.061317227 0.066221455 0.074765912 0.059950766
0.077510262 0.176418146 0.031660844 0.156035974 0.112728808
0.031987237 0.072040993 0.275674846 0.19018467 0.12412276
-0.055828835 -0.050350179 -0.122679169 0.005624228 0.425902938
0.455148836 0.989847716 -0.024893914 -0.000107964 -0.095689798
-0.021692179 0.016920351 -0.105567895 -0.028083663 -0.034669829
0.114063306 0.108696411 -0.003490391 0.068352077 0.003178946
-0.007640448 -0.069324651 0.069919229 0.021508332 0.041585558
0.030034633 0.082688827 0.066858782 0.078798632 0.088045087
0.277806075 0.291788674 0.380171742 0.321308561 -0.078418974
-0.038032423 -0.024893914 0.989847716 0.336319591 0.478658763
0.177436201 0.246292648 0.096503073 0.248997941 0.216078566
0.303510131 0.293149568 0.248039465 0.279847147 0.267354686
0.22706155 0.212276345 0.309084931 0.257342779 0.260828125
0.198414762 0.303824586 0.131783311 0.135953387 0.099500977
0.272618519 0.331753863 0.311238562 0.314432605 -0.18504808
-0.058744896 -0.000107964 0.336319591 0.990147783 0.438171455
0.041589655 0.126835618 -0.011994823 0.060178847 0.100131956
0.162013488 0.126553377 0.10135107 0.141438375 0.068488263
0.065799933 0.092302335 0.17783981 0.118713301 0.180755815
0.102482424 0.192966303 0.014574679 0.096731328 0.177336523
0.365680392 0.543408484 0.609693688 0.558974754 -0.14954705
-0.210044416 -0.095689798 0.478658763 0.438171455 0.98989899
LA
'CRS_1' 'CRS_2' 'CRS_3' 'CRS_4' 'CRS_5' 'PSS_1' 'PSS_2' 'PSS_3'
'PSS_4' 'CJ_1' 'CJ_2' 'INTJ_1' 'INTJ_2' 'SJ_1' 'SJ_2' 'INFJ_1'
'INFJ_2' 'CC_1' 'CC_2' 'CC_3' 'AC_1' 'AC_2' 'T_1' 'T_2' 'TC_1'
'TC_2' 'TC_3' 'RC_1' 'RC_2' 'RC_3'
SE
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/
MO NY=21 NX=9 NK=2 NE=6 LX=FR LY=FR TD=DI,FR TE=DI,FR BE=FU c
PH=SY,FR PS=DI
PA LX
*
5 (1 0) 4 (0 1)

```

PA LY

*

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

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0 1 0 0 0 0

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0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

FI LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

VA 1.0 LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

PA PH

*

0

1 0

FI PH 1 1 PH 2 2

VA 1.0 PH 1 1 PH 2 2

PA BE

*

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

MA BE

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

.16 -.12 0 0 0 0

0 .12 0 0 0 0

0 0 .26 0 0 0

0 0 0 .96 0 0

PA GA

*

1 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

1 0

0 1

```
MA GA
.89 0
0 .83
0 0
0 0
.06 0
0 -.02
OU AD=OFF RS MI SS SC SE TV
```

T+X MODEL

DA NI=30 NO=212 MA=CM

CM FU

*

(see Target Model for covariance matrix)

LA

'CRS_1' 'CRS_2' 'CRS_3' 'CRS_4' 'CRS_5' 'PSS_1' 'PSS_2' 'PSS_3'
'PSS_4' 'CJ_1' 'CJ_2' 'INTJ_1' 'INTJ_2' 'SJ_1' 'SJ_2' 'INFJ_1'
'INFJ_2' 'CC_1' 'CC_2' 'CC_3' 'AC_1' 'AC_2' 'T_1' 'T_2' 'TC_1'
'TC_2' 'TC_3' 'RC_1' 'RC_2' 'RC_3'

SE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/

MO NY=21 NX=9 NK=2 NE=6 LX=FR LY=FR TD=DI,FR TE=DI,FR BE=FU c

PH=SY,FR PS=DI

PA LX

*

5 (1 0) 4 (0 1)

PA LY

*

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

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0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

FI LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

VA 1.0 LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

PA PH

*

0

1 0

FI PH 1 1 PH 2 2

VA 1.0 PH 1 1 PH 2 2

PA BE

*

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

MA BE

0 .56 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

.23 -.20 0 0 0 0

0 .12 0 0 0 0

0 0 .32 -.50 0 0

0 0 0 .94 0 0

PA GA

*

1 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

1 0

0 1

MA GA

.45 0

0 .83

0 0

0 0

.09 0

.06 0

OU AD=OFF RS MI SS SC SE TV

SATURATED MODEL

DA NI=30 NO=212 MA=CM

CM FU

*

(see Target Model for covariance matrix)

LA

'CRS_1' 'CRS_2' 'CRS_3' 'CRS_4' 'CRS_5' 'PSS_1' 'PSS_2' 'PSS_3'
'PSS_4' 'CJ_1' 'CJ_2' 'INTJ_1' 'INTJ_2' 'SJ_1' 'SJ_2' 'INFJ_1'
'INFJ_2' 'CC_1' 'CC_2' 'CC_3' 'AC_1' 'AC_2' 'T_1' 'T_2' 'TC_1'
'TC_2' 'TC_3' 'RC_1' 'RC_2' 'RC_3'

SE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/

MO NY=21 NX=9 NK=2 NE=6 LX=FR LY=FR TD=DI,FR TE=DI,FR BE=FU c

PH=SY,FR PS=DI

PA LX

*

5 (1 0) 4 (0 1)

PA LY

*

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0

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0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

FI LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

VA 1.0 LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

PA PH

*

0

1 0

FI PH 1 1 PH 2 2

VA 1.0 PH 1 1 PH 2 2

PA BE

*

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 1 0 0 0 0

1 1 1 0 0 0

1 1 1 1 0 0

1 1 1 1 1 0

PA GA

*

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

OU AD=OFF RS MI SS SC SE TV

T-X MODEL

DA NI=30 NO=212 MA=CM

CM FU

*

(see Target Model for covariance matrix)

LA

'CRS_1' 'CRS_2' 'CRS_3' 'CRS_4' 'CRS_5' 'PSS_1' 'PSS_2' 'PSS_3'
'PSS_4' 'CJ_1' 'CJ_2' 'INTJ_1' 'INTJ_2' 'SJ_1' 'SJ_2' 'INFJ_1'
'INFJ_2' 'CC_1' 'CC_2' 'CC_3' 'AC_1' 'AC_2' 'T_1' 'T_2' 'TC_1'
'TC_2' 'TC_3' 'RC_1' 'RC_2' 'RC_3'

SE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/

MO NY=21 NX=9 NK=2 NE=6 LX=FR LY=FR TD=DI,FR TE=DI,FR BE=FU C

PH=SY,FR PS=DI

PA LX

*

5 (1 0) 4 (0 1)

PA LY

*

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

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0 0 1 0 0 0

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0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

FI LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

VA 1.0 LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

PA PH

*

0

1 0

FI PH 1 1 PH 2 2

VA 1.0 PH 1 1 PH 2 2

PA BE

*

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 0 1 0 0 0

0 0 0 1 0 0

MA BE

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

.05 0 0 0 0 0

0 .12 0 0 0 0

0 0 .26 0 0 0

0 0 0 .96 0 0

PA GA

*

1 0

0 1

0 0

0 0

1 0

0 1

MA GA

.89 0

0 .83

0 0

0 0

.06 0

0 .02

OU AD=OFF RS MI SS SC SE TV

STRUCTURAL NULL MODEL

DA NI=30 NO=212 MA=CM

CM FU

*

(see Target Model for covariance matrix)

LA

'CRS_1' 'CRS_2' 'CRS_3' 'CRS_4' 'CRS_5' 'PSS_1' 'PSS_2' 'PSS_3'
'PSS_4' 'CJ_1' 'CJ_2' 'INTJ_1' 'INTJ_2' 'SJ_1' 'SJ_2' 'INFJ_1'
'INFJ_2' 'CC_1' 'CC_2' 'CC_3' 'AC_1' 'AC_2' 'T_1' 'T_2' 'TC_1'
'TC_2' 'TC_3' 'RC_1' 'RC_2' 'RC_3'

SE

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9/

MO NY=21 NX=9 NK=2 NE=6 LX=FR LY=FR TD=DI,FR TE=DI,FR BE=FU c

PH=SY,FR PS=DI

PA LX

*

5 (1 0) 4 (0 1)

PA LY

*

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 0

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0 0 1 0 0 0

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0 0 0 1 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1

FI LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

VA 1.0 LY 1 1 LY 5 2 LY 9 3 LY 12 4 LY 16 5 LY 19 6

PA PH

*

0

1 0

FI PH 1 1 PH 2 2

VA 1.0 PH 1 1 PH 2 2

PA BE

*

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0

PA GA

*

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

OU AD=OFF RS MI SS SC SE TV

Table 1. The Continuum Between Transactional and Relational Contracts (Rousseau & McLean Parks (1992))

Contract Characteristics	Transactional Contracts	Relational Contracts
Focus	Economic Extrinsic	Economic Socio-emotional Intrinsic
Time Frame	Close-ended Specific duration	Open-ended Indefinite duration
Stability	Static	Dynamic
Scope	Narrow	Pervasive and comprehensive
Tangibility	Public Easily observable	Subjective Understood

Table 2. A Taxonomy of Justice Theories (Greenberg, 1996)

	Distributive	Procedural
Structural	Configural Justice	Systemic Justice
Social	Interpersonal Justice	Informational Justice

Table 3. List of Study Hypotheses

Hypotheses	
Hypothesis 1:	Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to transactional contracts.
Hypothesis 2:	Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to relational contracts.
Hypothesis 3:	Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to distributive justice.
Hypothesis 4:	Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to procedural justice.
Hypothesis 5:	Evaluations of distributive justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.
Hypothesis 6:	Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.
Hypothesis 7:	Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to relational macromotives.
Hypothesis 8:	Instrumental macromotives will be positively related to transactional contracts.
Hypothesis 9:	Relational macromotives will be positively related to relational contracts.

Table 4. Item Level Means and Standard Deviations

Item	Mean	SD
CRS1	3.16	.890
CRS2	3.17	.914
CRS3	3.23	.865
CRS4	3.16	.925
CRS5	3.27	.993
CRS6	3.31	1.023
CRS7	2.88	.847
CRS8	2.84	.888
CRS9	2.77	1.000
CRS10	3.30	.979
CRS11	3.20	.971
CRS12	3.27	1.027
CRS13	3.18	.964
CRS14	3.16	1.004
CRS15	3.25	.939
PSS1	3.52	1.081
PSS2	3.66	.985
PSS3	3.68	1.061
PSS4	3.47	.987
PSS5	3.48	1.000
PSS6	3.22	.995
PSS7	3.34	.956
PSS8	3.39	1.016
PSS9	3.06	1.035
PSS10	3.65	.988
PSS11	3.63	.982
PSS12	3.61	.941
CJ1	3.43	.993
CJ2	3.35	1.025
CJ3	3.19	.940
CJ4	3.44	.953
CJ5	3.35	.872
CJ6	3.42	.923
CJ7	3.14	.926
CJ8	3.25	.945
INTJ1	3.36	.961
INTJ2	3.34	.864
INTJ3	3.36	.860
INTJ5	3.77	1.003
SJ1	3.53	.970
SJ2	3.57	.961
SJ3	3.46	1.181

Item	Mean	SD
SJ4	3.43	.921
SJ6	3.47	.983
INFJ1	3.38	.929
INFJ2	3.48	.904
INFJ3	3.39	.987
INFJ4	3.42	1.017
INFJ5	3.56	1.015
INFJ6	3.67	.868
CC1	2.80	1.159
CC2	2.77	1.223
CC3	2.68	1.202
CC4	2.32	1.143
CC6	2.40	1.145
AC1	3.55	1.011
AC2	3.09	.936
AC3	3.57	1.021
AC4	3.32	1.045
AC5	4.06	.824
AC6	4.15	.761
AC7	3.93	.901
AC8	3.49	1.080
T1	3.32	1.088
T2	3.28	1.049
T3	3.18	1.080
T4	3.35	1.117
T5	3.51	1.007
T6	2.91	1.006
T7	3.80	.947
T8	3.40	1.019
TC1	2.91	1.180
TC2	3.06	1.079
TC3	2.66	1.144
TC4	2.17	.960
TC5	2.76	1.037
TC6	2.24	.872
TC7	2.03	.963
TC8	2.75	1.020
TC9	1.59	.734
TC10	2.13	.769
TC11	2.45	.935
TC12	3.08	1.095

Item	Mean	SD
RC1	4.01	.836
RC2	3.74	.927
RC3	4.05	.809
RC4	3.59	1.057
RC5	3.12	1.146
RC6	3.42	1.122
RC7	3.70	1.056
RC8	3.69	1.119
JS1	4.08	.717
JS2	2.92	1.180
JS3	3.18	1.078
JS4	4.09	.898
JS5	3.81	.928
SEC1	3.67	.880
SEC2	3.50	.896
REP1	3.51	1.026
REP2	3.03	.936

Ns range from 186 – 212 due to missing data.

Note: CSS = Career-Related Support; PSS = Psychosocial Support; CJ = Configural Justice; INTJ = Interpersonal Justice; SJ = Systemic Justice; INFJ = Informational Justice; CC = Calculative Commitment; AC = Affective Commitment; T = Trust; TC = Transactional Contract; RC = Relational Contract; JS = Job Satisfaction; SEC = Job Security; REP = Mentor as Representative

Table 5. Career-Related Support Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	--														
2	.783	--													
3	.829	.751	--												
4	.805	.737	.773	--											
5	.713	.629	.700	.766	--										
6	.701	.647	.668	.764	.742	--									
7	.584	.593	.477	.550	.584	.520	--								
8	.543	.562	.420	.459	.407	.565	.568	--							
9	.572	.567	.496	.530	.449	.506	.496	.593	--						
10	.761	.696	.738	.762	.651	.658	.498	.413	.541	--					
11	.727	.721	.709	.756	.607	.618	.508	.448	.524	.876	--				
12	.663	.638	.621	.741	.597	.643	.548	.473	.536	.815	.805	--			
13	.798	.809	.746	.795	.734	.741	.682	.498	.512	.737	.762	.719	--		
14	.735	.729	.702	.697	.702	.678	.616	.493	.496	.672	.654	.635	.830	--	
15	.793	.740	.827	.757	.690	.698	.539	.477	.475	.748	.742	.641	.806	.784	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 6. Psychosocial Support Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	--											
2	.751	--										
3	.806	.849	--									
4	.740	.797	.835	--								
5	.777	.792	.793	.801	--							
6	.648	.736	.755	.821	.792	--						
7	.707	.754	.757	.774	.775	.780	--					
8	.689	.754	.743	.804	.767	.705	.743	--				
9	.558	.609	.620	.649	.628	.645	.665	.725	--			
10	.739	.827	.829	.777	.807	.699	.746	.726	.581	--		
11	.741	.823	.835	.774	.840	.702	.771	.739	.565	.897	--	
12	.698	.781	.743	.693	.725	.623	.675	.670	.567	.788	.822	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 7. Configural Justice Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	--							
2	.721	--						
3	.744	.767	--					
4	.425	.447	.574	--				
5	.802	.741	.807	.555	--			
6	.850	.755	.745	.460	.845	--		
7	.682	.608	.781	.382	.725	.665	--	
8	.693	.685	.808	.523	.797	.758	.789	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 8. Interpersonal Justice Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	5
1	--			
2	.705	--		
3	.647	.657	--	
5	.703	.710	.636	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 9. Systemic Justice Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	6
1	--				
2	.780	--			
3	.735	.626	--		
4	.814	.842	.651	--	
6	.884	.746	.705	.785	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 10. Informational Justice Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	--					
2	.622	--				
3	.782	.715	--			
4	.836	.627	.794	--		
5	.731	.749	.825	.797	--	
6	.504	.390	.469	.429	.405	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 11. Calculative Commitment Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	6
1	--				
2	.308	--			
3	.431	.513	--		
4	.292	.329	.225	--	
6	.369	.351	.284	.665	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 12. Affective Commitment Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	--							
2	.322	--						
3	.512	.525	--					
4	.463	.489	.721	--				
5	.414	.332	.529	.491	--			
6	.440	.475	.577	.438	.491	--		
7	.478	.571	.657	.541	.475	.756	--	
8	.473	.417	.593	.493	.471	.560	.545	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 13. Trust Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	--							
2	.654	--						
3	.707	.686	--					
4	.752	.653	.700	--				
5	.832	.657	.700	.741	--			
6	.751	.662	.749	.740	.773	--		
7	.674	.574	.537	.646	.685	.614	--	
8	.807	.645	.766	.720	.815	.788	.670	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 14. Transactional Contract Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1	--											
2	.224	--										
3	.172	.222	--									
4	.115	.020	-.021	--								
5	.302	.123	.055	.557	--							
6	.186	.216	.266	.224	.329	--						
7	.172	.249	.391	.050	.120	.286	--					
8	.078	.221	.276	-.226	-.135	.182	.305	--				
9	.243	.173	.205	.107	.196	.412	.472	.248	--			
10	.319	.168	.295	.215	.362	.506	.450	.210	.391	--		
11	.094	.228	.327	-.012	.195	.470	.208	.279	.273	.369	--	
12	.276	.090	-.064	.589	.638	.262	.017	-.194	.081	.213	.027	--

Note: Correlations of .186 or higher are significant at the .01 level; correlations of .182 and higher are significant at the .05 level.

Table 15. Relational Contract Item-Level Correlations

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	--							
2	.267	--						
3	.481	.584	--					
4	.307	.503	.559	--				
5	.360	.437	.419	.579	--			
6	.391	.460	.485	.643	.709	--		
7	.386	.370	.531	.558	.459	.507	--	
8	.273	.463	.444	.580	.544	.648	.470	--

Note: All values are significant at the .01 level.

Table 16. Item Analysis Results

Latent Construct	Scale	Items Removed	Alpha	# Items	# Parcels
Economic exchange	Career-related support	--	.96	15	(5)
	▪ Sponsorship	--	.91	3	
	▪ Coaching	--	.90	3	
	▪ Protection	--	.79	3	
	▪ Challenge	--	.94	3	
	▪ Exposure	--	.93	3	
Social exchange	Psychosocial support	--	.97	12	(4)
	▪ Friendship	--	.92	3	
	▪ Role model	--	.92	3	
	▪ Counseling	--	.88	3	
	▪ Acceptance	--	.94	3	
Distributive justice	Configural justice	--	.95	8	2
	Interpersonal justice	INTJ4 INTJ6	.89	4	2
Procedural justice	Systemic justice	SJ5	.94	5	2
	Informational justice	--	.92	6	2
Instrumental macromotives	Calculative commitment	CC5	.75	5	3
Relational macromotives	Trust	--	.89	8	2
	Affective commitment	--	.95	8	2
Transactional contract	Transactional contract	--	.76	12	3
Relational contract	Relational contract	--	.88	8	3

Table 17. Scale-Level Correlation Matrix

	CRS-S	CRS-C	CRS-P	CRS-CA	CRS-E	PSS-F	PSS-R	PSS-C	PSS-A	CJ	INTJ	SJ	INFJ	CC	T	AC	TC	RC
CRS-S	.910																	
CRS-C	.827	.900																
CRS-P	.685	.659	.790															
CRS-CA	.800	.780	.637	.940														
CRS-E	.886	.837	.671	.793	.930													
PSS-F	.747	.785	.541	.714	.695	.920												
PSS-R	.730	.780	.483	.667	.682	.875	.920											
PSS-C	.823	.880	.596	.745	.786	.811	.861	.880										
PSS-A	.759	.762	.533	.717	.719	.886	.837	.782	.940									
CJ	.874	.881	.585	.811	.823	.840	.824	.879	.839	.950								
INTJ	.805	.852	.608	.812	.778	.870	.784	.846	.870	.883	.890							
SJ	.791	.820	.620	.748	.740	.882	.816	.813	.909	.896	.889	.940						
INFJ	.771	.831	.493	.713	.734	.891	.874	.846	.880	.890	.857	.893	.920					
CC	.111	.068	.188	.080	.123	.107	.063	.044	.058	.083	.088	.129	.019	.750				
T	.312	.323	.209	.267	.361	.335	.296	.311	.359	.357	.283	.352	.378	.184	.890			
AC	.307	.337	.231	.280	.352	.340	.286	.328	.342	.329	.321	.343	.381	.213	.767	.950		
TC	.023	-.042	.070	.059	-.030	-.052	-.017	-.025	-.041	-.016	.015	-.010	-.087	.174	-.491	-.404	.760	
RC	.272	.329	.174	.302	.321	.358	.302	.299	.357	.322	.313	.342	.359	.193	.782	.837	-.439	.880

Note: CRS-S = Career-Related Support: Sponsorship; CRS-C = Career-Related Support: Coaching; CRS-P = Career-Related Support: Protection; CRS-CA = Career-Related Support: Challenging Assignments; CRS-E = Career-Related Support: Exposure; PSS-F = Psychosocial Support: Friendship; PSS-R = Psychosocial Support: Role Model; PSS-C = Psychosocial Support: Counseling; PSS-A = Psychosocial Support: Acceptance; CJ = Configural Justice; INTJ = Interpersonal Justice; SJ = Systemic Justice; INFJ = Informational Justice; CC = Calculative Commitment; T = Trust; AC = Affective Commitment; TC = Transactional Contract; RC = Relational Contract

Correlations of .193 or higher are significant at the .01 level; correlations of .174 and higher are significant at the .05 level. Scale reliabilities are included along the diagonal.

Table 18. Parcel Composition

Scale	Parcel 1	Parcel 2	Parcel 3	Parcel 4	Parcel 5
Career-related Support	CRS1, CRS2, CRS3	CRS4, CSR5, CS6	CRS7, CRS8, CRS9	CRS10, CRS11, CRS12	CRS13, CSR14, CRS15
Psychosocial Support	PSS1, PSS2, PSS3	PSS4, PSS5, PSS6	PSS7, PSS8, PSS9	PSS10, PSS11, PSS12	
Configural justice	CJ5, CJ4, CJ6, CJ2	CJ3, CJ7, CJ8, CJ1			
Interpersonal justice	INTJ2, INTJ3	INTJ1, INTJ5			
Systemic justice	SJ1, SJ3	SJ6, SJ2, SJ4			
Informational justice	INFJ3, INFJ6, INFJ1	INFJ5, INFJ2, INFJ4			
Calculative commitment	CC6, CC1	CC4, CC3	CC2		
Affective commitment	AC3, AC1, AC6, AC5	AC7, AC2, AC4, AC8			
Trust	T5, T7, T1, T3	T8, T2, T6, T4			
Transactional contract	TC10, TC8, TC9, TC4	TC6, TC2, TC7, TC12	TC5, TC3, TC11, TC1		
Relational contract	RC6, RC1	RC4, RC2, RC8	RC5, RC7, RC3		

Note: See Table 4 for scale abbreviations.

Table 19. Parcel Means and Standard Deviations

Parcel	Mean	SD
CRS_1	3.17	.82
CRS_2	3.24	.89
CRS_3	2.83	.76
CRS_4	3.26	.93
CRS_5	3.19	.90
PSS_1	3.62	.96
PSS_2	3.39	.92
PSS_3	3.25	.90
PSS_4	3.63	.91
CJ_1	3.39	.80
CJ_2	3.25	.86
INTJ_1	3.35	.78
INTJ_2	3.57	.91
SJ_1	3.49	1.01
SJ_2	3.48	.89
INFJ_1	3.47	.79
INFJ_2	3.48	.88
CC_1	2.60	.95
CC_2	2.50	.92
CC_3	2.77	1.22
AC_1	3.84	.72
AC_2	3.44	.80
T_1	3.45	.91
T_2	3.22	.94
TC_1	2.16	.53
TC_2	2.61	.62
TC_3	2.70	.69
RC_1	3.71	.85
RC_2	3.67	.85
RC_3	3.62	.82

Ns range from 186 – 212 due to missing data.

Note: See Table 4 for scale abbreviations. Underscore and number following each scale name represents a parcel number (e.g., CRS_1 = Career-Related Support parcel 1)

Table 20. Measurement Model CFA Factor Loadings

LV	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8	V9	V10	V11	V12	V13	V14	V15	V16
ξ_1	.79	.78	.73	.82	.79	.82	.56	.51	.62	.84	.82	.83	.88	.84	.81	
ξ_2	.91	.89	.97	.88	.90	.81	.80	.86	.72	.90	.90	.78				
η_1	.86	.85	.82	.52	.79	.83	.75	.82	.79	.70	.65	.84				
η_2	.89	.85	.89	.81	.88	.78	.72	.88	.91	.90	.40					
η_3	.56	.61	.52	.86	.94											
η_4	.51	.60	.77	.69	.43	.50	.69	.67	.96	.77	.86	.92	.90	.85	.71	.91
η_5	.47	.36	.48	.29	.50	.59	.53	.29	.42	.56	.48	.37				
η_6	.39	.58	.54	.83	.87	.93	.69	.83								

Note: ξ_1 = Economic Exchange (N=192); ξ_2 = Social Exchange (N=196); η_1 = Distributive Justice (N=190); η_2 = Procedural Justice (N=190); η_3 = Instrumental Macromotives (N=198); η_4 = Relational Macromotives (N=196); η_5 = Transactional Contract (N=196); η_6 = Relational Contract (N=194)

Table 21. Fit Indices for Measurement Model

Model	N	df	χ^2	TLI	CFI	SRMSR	RMSEA
EE	192	90	475.21	.85	.87	.053	.15
SE	196	54	259.11	.91	.93	.037	.15
DJ	190	54	209.97	.91	.93	.038	.13
PJ	190	44	238.03	.89	.91	.039	.15
IM	198	5	60.62	.57	.78	.110	.25
RM	196	104	400.09	.86	.88	.065	.14
TC	196	54	311.74	.47	.56	.130	.18
RC	194	20	77.30	.89	.92	.056	.12
OMNI	212	377	1061.89	.87	.89	.066	.09

Note: EE = Economic Exchange (Career-related support); SE = Social Exchange (Psychosocial support); DJ = Distributive Justice; PJ = Procedural Justice; IM = Instrumental Macromotives; RM = Relational Macromotives; TC = Transactional Contract; RC = Relational Contract; OMNI = Omnibus (single model); TLI = Tucker-Lewis fit index; CFI = Comparative fit index; SRMSR = Standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation

Table 22. Fit Indices for Structural Model

Model	df	χ^2	TLI	CFI	SRMSR	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	p-value
M _{SS}	377	1061.89	.87	.89	.066	.090	--	--
M _{T+X}	393	1090.55	.88	.89	.072	.089	28.66 (16 df)	n.s.
M _T	395	1172.68	.86	.88	.078	.098	82.13 (2 df)	$\leq .01$
M _{T-X}	396	1174.01	.86	.88	.078	.098	1.33 (1 df)	n.s.
M _{SN}	404	2265.62	.68	.70	.350	.120	1091.61 (8 df)	$\leq .01$

N = 212 for all analyses

Note: M_{SS} = Saturated Structural model; M_{T+X} = Target model with additional paths; M_T = Target model; M_{T-X} = Target model with a path removed; M_{SN} = Structural null model; TLI = Tucker-Lewis fit index; CFI = Comparative fit index; SRMSR = Standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation

Table 23. Hypotheses and Results

	Hypotheses	Supported?
Hypothesis 1:	Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to transactional contracts.	No
Hypothesis 2:	Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to relational contracts.	No
Hypothesis 3:	Economic exchange, as measured by career-related support, will be positively related to distributive justice.	Yes
Hypothesis 4:	Social exchange, as measured by psychosocial support, will be positively related to procedural justice.	Yes
Hypothesis 5:	Evaluations of distributive justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.	No
Hypothesis 6:	Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to instrumental macromotives.	No
Hypothesis 7:	Evaluations of procedural justice will be positively related to relational macromotives.	Yes
Hypothesis 8:	Instrumental macromotives will be positively related to transactional contracts.	Yes
Hypothesis 9:	Relational macromotives will be positively related to relational contracts.	Yes

Table 24. CFA Path Estimates for Post Hoc Analyses

LV	V1	V2	V3	V4	V5	V6	V7	V8
CRS-S	.82	.79	.75					
CRS-C	.85	.83	.86					
CRS-P	.65	.65	.73					
CRS-CA	.92	.90	.90					
CRS-E	.90	.87	.83					
PSS-F	.92	.90	.99					
PSS-R	.90	.90	.84					
PSS-C	.83	.90	.78					
PSS-A	.93	.94	.81					
AC	.60	.61	.85	.76	.51	.58	.75	.76
T	.97	.78	.88	.93	.91	.87	.71	.92

Note: CRS-S = Career-Related Support: Sponsorship; CRS-C = Career-Related Support: Coaching; CRS-P = Career-Related Support: Protection; CRS-CA = Career-Related Support: Challenging Assignments; CRS-E = Career-Related Support: Exposure; PSS-F = Psychosocial Support: Friendship; PSS-R = Psychosocial Support: Role Model; PSS-C = Psychosocial Support: Counseling; PSS-A = Psychosocial Support: Acceptance; AC = Affective Commitment; T = Trust

Table 25. Fit Indices for Post Hoc Measurement Models

Model	N	df	χ^2	TLI	CFI	SRMSR	RMSEA
EE (5 factor)	192	80	250.44	.93	.94	.037	.11
SE (4 factor)	196	48	122.53	.96	.97	.024	.078
RM (2 factor)	196	103	244.81	.93	.94	.044	.085

Note: EE = Economic Exchange (Career-related Support); SE = Social Exchange (Psychosocial Support); RM = Relational Macromotives (Affective Commitment and Trust)

Table 26. Moderated Regression Results

	DJ step1	DJ step2		PJ step1	PJ step2		IM step1	IM step2		IM step1	IM step2
CRS	.642	.666	PSS	.865	.848	DJ	.150	.258	PJ	.133	.236
REP	.370	.395	REP	.082	.060	REP	-.104	.029	REP	-.096	.029
CRS*REP		-.046	PSS*REP		.039	DJ*REP		-.237	PJ*REP		-.225
R ²	.888	.888	R ²	.897	.897	R ²	.020	.023	R ²	.015	.017
ΔR ²		0	ΔR ²		0	ΔR ²		.003	ΔR ²		.002

	RM step1	RM step2		TC step1	TC step2		RC step1	RC step2
PJ	.353	.249	CRS	.235	<i>.421</i>	PSS	.306	.146
REP	-.152	-.276	REP	-.130	.060	REP	-.138	<i>-.340</i>
PJ*REP		.225	CRS*REP		-.358	PSS*REP		.360
R ²	.664	.666	R ²	.258	.264	R ²	.620	.626
ΔR ²		.002	ΔR ²		.06	ΔR ²		.06

Note: Table values are standardized regression weights at step. Bolded values are significant at the .01 level; italicized values are significant at the .05 level. CRS = Career-Related Support; PSS = Psychosocial Support; DJ = Distributive Justice; PJ = Procedural Justice; IM = Instrumental Macromotives; RM = Relational Macromotives; TC = Transactional Contract; RC = Relational Contract; REP = Mentor as Organizational Representative

Table 27. Correlations Between Job Satisfaction and Model Variables

Model Variable	Correlation
CRS_1	.242
CRS_2	.234
CRS_3	.161
CRS_4	.191
CRS_5	.278
PSS_1	.232
PSS_2	.221
PSS_3	.245
PSS_4	.229
CJ_1	.262
CJ_2	.249
INTJ_1	.206
INTJ_2	.167
SJ_1	.216
SJ_2	.218
INFJ_1	.345
INFJ_2	.237
CC_1	-.039
CC_2	.078
CC_3	.310
AC_1	.685
AC_2	.679
T_1	.714
T_2	.744
TC_1	-.320
TC_2	-.436
TC_3	-.451
RC_1	.667
RC_2	.696
RC_3	.723

Ns range from 177 – 198 due to missing data.

Note: See Table 4 for scale abbreviations. Underscore and number following each scale name represents a parcel number (e.g., CRS_1 = Career-Related Support parcel 1).

Correlations of .191 or higher are significant at the .01 level; correlations of .161 or higher are significant at the .05 level.

		Person A	
		A_1	A_2
Person B	B_1	0 2	4 4
	B_2	4 4	2 2

Figure 1. Matrix Representation of the Theory of Interdependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).




Figure 2. A General Model of Exchange Theory.




Figure 3. Development of the Psychological Contract (Rousseau, 1995).




Figure 4. Proposed Structural Model (Target Model)




Figure 5. Measurement Model

$X_1 - X_5$ = Career-related support
 $X_6 - X_9$ = Psychosocial support
 $Y_1 - Y_2$ = Configural justice
 $Y_3 - Y_4$ = Interpersonal justice
 $Y_5 - Y_6$ = Systemic justice
 $Y_7 - Y_8$ = Informational justice
 $Y_9 - Y_{11}$ = Calculative commitment
 $Y_{12} - Y_{13}$ = Trust
 $Y_{14} - Y_{15}$ = Affective commitment
 $Y_{16} - Y_{18}$ = Transactional contract
 $Y_{19} - Y_{21}$ = Relational contract




Figure 6. Path Estimates for Structural Model: T+X

Note: * Significant at .01 level. Path coefficients represent unstandardized estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.