

MOVING ON UP: POLITICAL AMBITION AND THE TIMING OF DECISIONS TO
RUN FOR HIGHER OFFICE

by

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(Under the Direction of Jamie Carson)

ABSTRACT

In American politics there is a trend of progressive ambition, where lower offices become a natural stepping-stone for higher ones. Previous studies of ambition have cited an internal emergence calculus as the gauge used by politicians for deciding when to run for higher office (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Rohde 1979). However, by accounting for characteristics officials hold that increase their viability, ones increasing visibility and attractiveness as a candidate, we may be able to explain unexpected cases of emergence. In addition, this dissertation improves the study of progressive ambition by increasing the scope of officeholders analyzed, including multiple levels of offices, as well as sitting and former members. Accounting for the potential for duration dependency, analysis of Binary Time-Series Cross-Section data tests the probability that an officeholder acts on his progressive ambition, while a Cox proportional hazard model determines what affects the rate of emergence. The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of when and why some elected officials run for higher office.

INDEX WORDS: ambition, elections, strategic politician, emergence calculus

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Early in 2006, Republican Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum was asked if he would contend in the 2008 Presidential Election. His coy response was simply, “Never say never.” It certainly appeared that Santorum was eyeing the White House: frequenting states such as Iowa and New Hampshire; moving up the ranks within the party leadership of the Senate; and even penning a book about conservative values. His presidential aspirations came to a screeching halt that fall when he lost reelection to his Senate seat by a substantial margin. In appealing to the conservative base needed to win the Republican presidential nomination, the “red state Republican” alienated his “blue state” constituency of Pennsylvania. However, just a few years later, Santorum’s political ambition drove him to officially throw his hat in the ring for the 2012 Presidential Election. Why? At first glance, this second bid appears unlikely to succeed, and the traditional emergence calculus political scientists use would not predict the Santorum candidacy. He has been a polarizing figure who resides in the ideologically extreme wing of his political party; he has no claims to the improvement or reform of a state, and most importantly, he failed to convince the voters in his own state to reelect him.

However, upon taking a second look, there are a number of reasons his announcement is less surprising. His earlier success at running against incumbents to win his House and Senate seats demonstrates his comfort at taking risks and his progressively

ambitious tendencies. His 2008 bid for the White House, coupled his extremely conservative positions and his time as chairman of the Senate Republican Conference Committee have gained him significant name recognition. As a former (and not current) officeholder, Santorum has been able to spend time, appearing on talk shows and making appearances in states with early, influential nomination contests. Finally, his tenure in Congress also lends him significant experience working on issues like the War on Terror and national security. Using traditional emergence calculi, many political commentators question his decision to enter the race, doubting his ability to overcome his political shortcomings. But there are interesting things to learn about ambition from looking at the actions of this candidate and others like him.

This dissertation strives to explain such progressively ambitious behavior when circumstances indicate an individual is not likely to emerge for higher office. In attempting to explain such unexpected candidacies, this dissertation aims to improve the existing emergence calculus used by political scientists today, as well as address a number questions that have not been addressed in the field. It utilizes the theory of political ambition and melds it with the theories of candidate emergence and rational entry to determine the individual and institutional factors that encourage or stifle bids for higher office. In addition, the dissertation examines the timing of progressively ambitious actions (bids for higher office) by determining the factors that speed up or slow down a decision to emerge. This study will compare the ambition and emergence patterns of both current and former officeholders at three levels: (1) state legislators running for the U.S. House, (2) representatives running for the U.S. Senate, and (3) senators running for the presidency.

The study of progressive ambition among elected officials is a noteworthy endeavor, as its effects influence a number of facets of American government. Electorally, it shapes who runs for office and how competitive races are. From a legislative perspective, it influences the daily activities of lawmakers, both in Washington and back at home in their districts. Additionally, ambition influences an officeholder's approach to representation and democracy by pitting their current position needs against what is required to obtain a new office. Simply put, we should care about ambition because its manifestation affects almost every decision made by an officeholder.

It seems important to clarify upfront the concept of political ambition, specifically *progressive* political ambition as discussed in this dissertation. In American politics there appears to be a trend of progressive ambition, where lower offices become a natural stepping-stone for higher office. Since 1976, over sixty senators have decided to run for the office of president. Similarly, more than 200 U.S. Representatives have emerged to run for the Senate. Over six hundred state legislators have contested for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives in the last two decades alone. Arthur Schlesinger, whose seminal book, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States* is at the base of every discussion of political ambition, asserts, "Ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrives on the hopes of preferment and the drive for office" (1966, 1). Ambition shapes who runs for elected office, which in turn effects the election itself, and the office thereafter.

Progressive ambition is an observable political behavior that occurs when officeholders emerge as candidates for higher office. When U.S. representatives emerge to run for the U.S. House or senators make a presidential bid, we witness the

manifestation of their progressive ambition. As illustrated by Santorum's actions described earlier, progressive ambition has multiple effects on the *electoral* and *legislative* behavior of officeholders.

During the elective process, progressive ambition drives candidates to enter races where they might not otherwise contend. Traditionally, we see state legislators waiting until a House seat becomes open before contesting for the elevated position. However, if a legislator's progressive ambition is strong enough, he may not be willing to wait for such a circumstance to arise. Rather, he will be more willing to take the risky route of challenging a sitting incumbent. This political drive cannot only encourage emergence where we might not see it otherwise, but it can influence the outcome of the race, as research has found that the type of candidates most likely to beat incumbents are quality challengers like the officeholders analyzed here. These quality candidates, who possess greater levels of name recognition and experience, are able to negate some of the advantages inherent with incumbency (Jacobson 1989).

Legislatively, having progressively ambitious tendencies can affect a candidate's behavior while in office. A representative considering a move to the Senate may not be as ideologically extreme in his House floor votes if he knows he will soon be soliciting support from a more diverse state constituency. Similar behavior has been noted in senators seeking the White House (Treul 2009). In determining what encourages emergence among officeholders, this dissertation can potentially reveal the motives behind officeholders' actions while in their current position. For example, serving on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may make members feel like they are relevant, and therefore responsible and experienced, in the realm of U.S. foreign affairs. Given the

weight voters place on foreign policy credentials when evaluating candidates making a bid for the presidency, we may be able to understand why some senators lobby the hardest for a seat on the committee and the resulting experience.

Additionally, focusing on what motivates ambitious actions may explain how elected officeholders approach their role as representatives. Take, for example, the Santorum case study discussed above. Santorum was a conservative Republican representing a Democratic-leaning Pennsylvania. As his run for the presidency became public, he took a noticeable step towards the conservative end of the spectrum, a step that was far from his more liberally minded constituency. Confident after defeating incumbents for both his House and Senate seat (in 2000 by a substantial margin), Santorum chose a style of representation that would appeal to the conservative base of the nation and less in a way that would appease his Pennsylvania voters. In the end, studying ambition helps us understand how a rising star in the Republican Senate, a presidential frontrunner, could lose reelection to his Senate seat.

As much as ambition is accepted as an important part of understanding American electoral and representational behavior, there are a number of important questions yet to be addressed by the field of political science. Specifically, this dissertation addresses three broad topics and their subsequent research questions: The probability of emergence, the rate of emergence, and the differences between emergence behaviors at multiple office levels.¹ The first two topics will be used to understand ambition at the three levels of officeholders studied here, and the third topic will compare the results found.

¹ I should note from the outset I use the terms ambition and emergence interchangeably. While obviously not the same in meaning, I utilize the term emergence to mean a manifestation of ambition.

Probability of Emergence The first research question asks, what influences the probability of an officeholder acting on their progressively ambitious tendencies? More specifically, are they using some sort of preconceived framework to determine whether to run, and if so, what goes into that framework? Certain factors should encourage an officeholder to run because they increase the likelihood of success. These would surely include increased name recognition and experience, or other circumstances that might give them an electoral advantage. Likewise, there are a number of unfavorable factors that could be associated with a candidate, and possession of these should quell any ambitious aspirations. These detractors would include anything that might indicate unelectability or have the tendency to leave a bad taste in voters' mouths, such as a scandal.

Rate of Emergence In an effort to understand unexpected bids for higher office, whether they come earlier or later than anticipated, the second research question utilizes results from the first research question to address the rate of emergence. Specifically, it asks how do the significant factors affect the rate or *speed* in which an officeholder acts on their ambitious predispositions. Factors that encourage emergence should theoretically speed up the rate of emergence. If a factor indicates increased potential for success, the candidate might be more willing to act in that moment. This analysis may help explain unexpected candidacies like Barack Obama, who ran successfully for both the Senate and presidency despite being a relatively inexperienced political unknown. However, if there are factors that decrease a candidate's likelihood of emergence, because it hurts their odds of victory, they may be less inclined to run. Even so, officeholders will still run despite having serious flaws in their candidacy, namely

because they have ambition. In such cases an officeholder may choose to delay their action. They may hold off, hoping the issue goes away or fades from voters' memories.

Comparison across Offices One theme that runs throughout this dissertation is how emergence is influenced by the individual and how it is influenced by the office. The final major topic will look at how progressively ambitious actions compare across three different offices. As hinted at above, the office a candidate is seeking plays a role in how they act on their progressive ambition. Generally, we operate under the suspicion that all officeholders are progressively ambitious, should the higher office come without cost or risk (Rohde 1979). However, individuals themselves can influence the direction and tone of their careers positively or negatively. Legislators, representatives, and senators can choose to vote ideologically extreme, they can strategically claim credit for things like pork barrel legislation, and they can find themselves involved in scandals. Similarly, officeholders can choose to take advantage of a situation, such as running for office when political conditions favor their party or their candidacy. However, just as much as ambition is shaped by the individual, so too does the institutional structure under which they operate. Term lengths and concurrent elections present certain officeholders with additional factors to consider. For U.S. senators thinking about running for president, being up for reelection the same year as the presidential election may be a major deterrent against running because of the amount of money, time, and challenges involved in a senate election. Running two simultaneous campaigns at this level is too costly and the potential for failure in both is too great. A U.S. representative or state legislator, however, faces reelection every two years, and if they want to hold higher

office, they will eventually have to run simultaneous campaigns or step down from their current position.

The opportunity for leadership within their current institutional structure or chamber may be another institutional factor that may make running for higher office less attractive. The power and control offered by certain leadership positions in the Senate may be more attractive than the costliness of running for the presidency. The following analysis will address these institutional impacts, taking care to highlight how offices, as well as officeholders, influence progressive ambition.

To answer these research questions, I operate under a general rational choice theory purported by the likes of Schlesinger (1966), Black (1972), and Rohde (1979), where ambition and emergence for higher office is structured as a cost-benefit analysis. This theory maintains that officeholders are rational, progressively ambitious actors who will seek higher office when the costs incurred by running are low, they are comfortable with taking risks, and they see benefit in holding the higher office as opposed to maintaining the status quo. However, I maintain that these scholars leave out a necessary part of the equation. The current emergence calculus accounts for all of the deterrents and downfalls to a candidacy, but fails to account for the characteristics a candidate may hold which increase their probability of victory. Believing the candidacy will be a success may be enough to make an officeholder act on ambition, or such confidence may counterbalance one of the deterrents captured by the traditional emergence calculus. Either way, I aim to improve our understanding of the emergence calculus by adding these factors, thus capturing a more complete picture of what motivates progressively ambitious actions.

A general framework in the form of an emergence calculus can be used for all types of officeholders; however, the calculus itself will be comprised of factors unique to the individual officeholder and factors resulting from the office currently held or currently desired. In particular, characteristics indicating increased liabilities or conversely, viability, are largely dependent upon the requirements for obtaining the position or the expectations surrounding the type of officeholder envisioned by voters. For example, because our presidential elections operate under an Electoral College system, the number of Electoral College votes associated with a senator's home state is an important factor to incorporate when looking at what a senator considers when contemplating a bid for the White House. However, Electoral College votes have no bearing on state legislators or U.S. representatives. The same goes for factors indicating foreign policy experience. Experience with foreign affairs largely influences the viability of a senator eyeing the White House. However, such experience will not be as beneficial to state legislators running for the U.S. House because the role that the House plays in matters of foreign policy is not nearly as important as it is to the Senate.

Characteristics are also comparable throughout the various offices analyzed. These factors should influence acting on progressive ambition in a similar way for each type of officeholder and largely come in the form of political costs. Running two simultaneous campaigns or forfeiting accumulated power is a consideration every officeholder must account for regardless of the position they currently hold or seek.

The research questions addressed and the theory expounded upon in this dissertation aim to increase our understanding of progressive ambition among officeholders. In doing so, it makes a number of improvements to what is currently

understood about how ambition manifests itself. As mentioned above, theoretical improvements are made to the emergence calculus of officeholders. Currently, scholars have found costs, risk aversion, and the presence of liabilities to be influential in a candidate's decision to run for higher office. However, in utilizing this emergence calculus, scholars have overlooked one important piece of the puzzle: *factors that increase the probability of victory*. By accounting for these factors, ones that lead to increased viability and attractiveness as a candidate—in addition to characteristics found previously to influence ambition—we can better understand why people choose to run for higher office despite obvious costs or risks.

Additionally, the research design utilized here makes several necessary improvements to the existing data and applies a more systematic analysis of ambition. This study extends the period of time studied and utilizes more appropriate statistical models that account for potential duration dependence. Focusing on three offices where progressive ambition unfolds allows for comparison within a single, consistent study. Studying the timing of progressively ambitious bids has yet to be addressed by the field, despite the continual struggle to predict candidate emergence (especially at the presidential level). Hopefully, by adding the analysis of time here, we take steps closer to understanding why candidates run when they do. In the end, the data and methods used for this dissertation will result in a more comprehensive study of ambition.

Previous research on progressive ambition also fails to account for those former officeholders not currently serving in the U.S. Senate or U.S. House of Representatives.²

² For the analysis of current versus former officeholders, data will be restricted to representatives seeking the U.S. Senate and senators seeking the presidency. It is simply not feasible to collect information on former state legislators for all fifty states in the same capacity as I did for the other two analyses.

While scholars note the frequency in which former senators run for president, they cite the difficulty in creating the dataset as reason for their exclusion (Burden 2002; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976). This suggests that both former and current representatives are equally as likely to emerge for the U.S. Senate. In both chambers, former officeholders make up one-quarter of the candidates seeking a higher office.³ I maintain the inclusion of former officeholders is vital if we are to obtain a comprehensive picture of not only who runs for a higher office, but also how merely serving in a position such as the U.S. House or U.S. Senate facilitates progressive ambition. Given the sheer number of senators who run for the presidency, both current and formerly serving, relative to other types of officeholders, there appears to be a self-perceived inherent advantage stemming from their service in the upper chamber.

The same can be said for representatives, as they are overwhelmingly the largest group of senatorial candidates. Because of their two-year terms, House members often do not seek reelection to the House if they are going to make a forthcoming Senate bid. Because the senator or representative is no longer serving does not mean the added value stemming from holding the office disappears entirely. If anything, these former legislators appear to be some of the most ambitious of officeholders, as they are more likely than their currently serving counterparts to make repeated bids for higher office. By not incorporating formerly serving officeholders, any analysis run on candidate emergence faces a problematic selection bias against an entire subset of candidates.

³ From 1976-2008, there were 16 bids for the White House made by 14 former senators. Similarly, 62 out of the 240 bids for the U.S. Senate were made by former representatives.

This dissertation consists of three substantive chapters, each devoted to a rung of the progressive political ambition ladder. The first chapter analyzes all currently serving state legislators by employing a random events logistic regression to address the probability of emergence in U.S. House races held from 1992-2008. The second substantive chapter focuses on all current and former U.S. Representatives running in U.S. Senate elections held from 1976-2008. The analysis will be two-fold. The first set of analyses utilizes logistic and random effects logistic regressions to test the probability of initial and repeated senatorial bids. To test the rate of emergence among U.S. Representatives, a Cox proportional hazard regression will capture the speed in which House members run for the U.S. Senate. The third substantive chapter will run similar models for U.S. Senators, currently and formerly serving, seeking the White House from 1976-2008. In addition to the analyses on the probability and rate of emergence, a predictive model will suggest the most likely senators to emerge for the 2012 Presidential Election based on this new emergence calculus. The final chapter will conclude the dissertation with comparisons among the three levels, noting any significant similarities or differences.

The study of political ambition, and the various ways it influences the political landscape, makes this dissertation a worthy endeavor. Given that those running for office are seeking to represent the general population, constituents may be interested in their motives. Additionally, because ambition affects the decision to run for higher office, it subsequently affects the types of candidates we see emerging. If we are concerned with the competitiveness of our electoral races and seek to understand why some candidates run while others do not, ambition is an important piece of the puzzle. Finally, studying

ambition can help solve puzzles surrounding behavior once in office, specifically how ambitious aspirations clash with representation and policy choices. Before turning to the three substantive chapters analyzing progressive ambition through the political ladder, the first section in Chapter Two will provide greater detail on the general theories of progressive ambition applied across all three levels analyzed.

CHAPTER 2

STATE LEGISLATORS RUNNING FOR THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

History tells us we should not be surprised that a majority of the candidates for the 2008 Presidential Election came from the U.S. Senate. Nor should we be surprised that most quality challengers in U.S. House races arise from state legislatures. As mentioned in the introduction, there appears to be a trend in American politics where officeholders use lower political positions as stepping-stones for higher office. Previous studies of ambition have cited that officeholders utilize a self-reflective, or internal, emergence calculus as the gauge for deciding when to run for higher office, where the costs and risks of running are weighed against the probability of winning (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Rohde 1979). These studies have found that candidates who are risk-averse and facing perceived costs (giving up a safe seat), and liabilities (age or scandal), are less likely to emerge as a candidate for higher office. A more in depth discussion of the commonly accepted emergence calculus will follow.

The sum of ambition literature to date is disjointed both in its approach and its findings. There does not appear to be a consistent treatment of the variables across the various types of elections studied, with some variables always included regardless of the office sought and others omitted, either because of irrelevance or an inevitable result of numerous disjointed prior studies. This can be remedied by a coherent analysis of ambition over multiple levels of electoral politics, creating a research design with cohesive theories and variables. I approach the study of progressive ambition in a unique

way, looking at three types of elections simultaneously. This simultaneous approach allows me to draw conclusions about the shared factors influencing emergence regardless of office sought, as well as the unique factors affecting a particular officeholder's decision. This dissertation aims to do just that, as emergence will be studied across three different elected offices.

Theories of Candidate Emergence: Ambition and Rational Entry

To identify and understand factors contributing to a candidate's emergence, we must begin with an explanation as to why a politician would seek an office other than the one they currently hold. Almost all discussions of political ambition stem from Schlesinger's seminal book, *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*, where he asserted, "Ambition lies at the heart of politics. Politics thrives on the hopes of preferment and the drive for office" (1966, 1). Schlesinger identifies three distinct types of ambition that politicians embody: Discrete, static, and progressive. *Discrete* ambition is characterized by a politician seeking "office for its specific term" and refrains from seeking reelection for that or any other office (10). *Static* ambition is found when an office holder continually seeks reelection for the same office, "mak[ing] a long career out of a particular office" (10). *Progressive* ambition is seen when an officeholder continually seeks a higher office "more important than the one he now seeks or is holding" (10). It is this progressive form of ambition that has received the most scholarly attention and is at the theoretical heart of this endeavor.

Schlesinger's ambition theory also acknowledges an opportunity structure, where public offices are hierarchical in nature—with state and local offices at the bottom, lower federal positions, such as the House of Representatives, in the middle, and the presidency

at the top. Politicians with progressive ambition will continually move up this hierarchy, with their attempts at specific offices conditioned by the availability and likelihood of obtaining the office versus the costs incurred by running.

The theory of opportunity structure in combination with the concept of ambition in this sense was formalized by Black's rational entry model (1972). The rational entry theory, drawing its roots from rational choice, maintains that a candidate uses a form of cost-benefit analysis, weighing the probability of winning the election and the perceived benefits of holding the office against the costs incurred by running. Stated another way:

$$\textit{Probability} \times \textit{Benefit} > \textit{Costs} \qquad [2.1]$$

Candidates will strategically choose to run for office when the probability of winning and the benefits of holding office are greater, or outweigh, the costs of running. This general emergence calculus will be the framework of the analysis presented in the ensuing chapters. Each officeholder, regardless of the position they hold or the position they seek, is assumed to utilize an emergence calculus when determining whether to act on their progressive ambitious tendencies. This accepted calculus would seem to hold when looking across political offices: state legislators running for the U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. House members running for the U.S. Senate, and U.S. Senators running for president. While the specific components to the individual calculi may vary by office, state legislators, representatives, and senators will all weigh the costs and liabilities in running against their predicted success. It is only when their burdens are minimal and their odds of success great that we should anticipate a manifestation of progressive ambition.

Broken down at the broadest level, officeholders will consider four elements when contemplating a bid for higher office. The four include: costs incurred by running for higher office, the candidate's risk aversion, presence of liabilities, and the possession of characteristics that increase the likelihood of victory should the candidate decide to run for that office.

The first thing weighing on a potential candidate's mind are the *costs* incurred by running for the new position. Additional costs can be incurred by having to run for the two offices simultaneously, as was discovered when examining senators who decide to run for president (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich 1980; Burden 2002), which can negatively influence the emergence rates of officeholders. This effect is similar to those who serve as a party or political leader within the chamber.

Also relevant to a candidate's decision calculus is the level of *risk* they are comfortable with. Rohde (1979) fosters the idea that some politicians are more risk-prone than others. By paying particular attention to candidates' previous risk-taking behavior, we can deduce a lot about candidates' willingness to run for higher office. Rohde also assumes that all politicians hold progressive ambition, if the progression is costless and risk-less. Both contributions Rohde makes to the study of political ambition are maintained for this study.

$$\mathbf{Probability} \times \mathbf{Benefit} > \mathbf{Costs} + \mathbf{Risk} \mathbf{Aversion} \quad [2.2]$$

The benefits of running for higher office are relatively equal for each officeholder. They will all garner an increase in power and jurisdiction, as well as a more professionalized staff, and an ease in fundraising. While raising more money for campaigning for higher office is a reality, this task becomes easier as officeholders climb

up the political ladder. Most can expect to add to the number of potential contributors they can tap for funds. While the benefits for running are typically similar across officeholders, potential liabilities are not. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) discuss certain characteristics that can be seen as liabilities for candidates. Liabilities, such as being too old or young, tarnished by a scandal, or lacking experience, can lower the probability of winning and therefore must be accounted for in a candidate's decision calculus. Another liability noted by scholars is the potential for incongruence between an officeholder's policy positions and constituency preference on those policies. When seeking higher office, U.S. Representatives and state legislators, respectively, recognize the need for their actions in office to be aligned with the preferences of their constituency, as positions conflicting with public opinion signal potential problems for voters (Hibbing 1986; Maestas 2008). If they are out of line, they risk being seen as out of step with the constituency and will have a harder time convincing voters to support their candidacy.

Despite the calculus' current success in accurately predicting a number of candidacies, there are a substantial number that go unexplained. I maintain this is a result of failing to include an important element in the traditional emergence calculus: characteristics that can lead to increased candidate viability.⁴ The traditional calculus accounts for the potential "black clouds" that may hurt a candidate's chances of victory, allowing for scholars to anticipate when candidates will be less likely to emerge for higher office. However, excluded from the calculus are factors that positively affect the

⁴ To be clear, I am not using the term viability in the traditional presidential nomination sense. Rather, I use the term viability to mean both a viable candidate for the party nomination and electability in the general election.

probability of success and would increase the likelihood of emergence.⁵ Including these factors may help us create a more complete picture of candidate emergence. For example, it may be the case that despite a cost incurred by running or a political liability against them, the presence of a factor that increases the appeal of their candidacy might be enough to make them run.

Previous research depicts progressively ambitious office holders as strategic politicians. The strategic politician, espoused best by Jacobson and Kernell (1983) and Jacobson (1989), is a strong challenger (those candidates with prior experience) who calculates when determining whether to enter a race. Applied to ambition and rational entry theory, strategic politicians will seek “the best opportunity available that provides the greatest balance of benefits to costs in the light of the probability of success” (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987, 4). Officeholders have been seen as strategic in their decision to enter politics (Carson 2003; Fox and Lawless 2005; Gaddie 2003; Steen 2006, Lazarus 2006, Mezey 1970; Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone 2006), in their decision to exit politics (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Jacobson and Dimock 1994), and their simultaneous decision between seeking reelection, higher office, or retirement (Levin and Hyde 1977; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Carson 2005).

Testing a plethora of variables in a variety of electoral settings, studies have found that *federal* officeholders act strategically, utilizing a decision calculus comprised of likelihood of victory, current political conditions, and comfort with risk-taking when deciding whether to seek higher office (Copeland 1980, Jacobson 1989, Lublin 1994,

⁵ However, see Rohde (1979), who includes an indexed measure of “probability of winning” when assessing whether a representative will run for the Senate or a governorship. For the most part, variables capturing this increased viability have been omitted from analysis utilizing the emergence calculus.

Rohde 1979). Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) find that senators are strategic in their decision to run for president, taking into account the costs of running, the risks involved, and the liabilities they hold as candidates. Jacobson (1989) finds that quality challengers for U.S. House seats take into consideration national and local political conditions when assessing the likelihood of victory and the subsequent decision to run (see also Jacobson and Kernell 1983).

Even at lower levels, costs of running, liabilities, and political conditions at the state and national level influence candidate's progressive ambition, affecting office-seekers for different levels of the state legislature (Francis 1993) and governors (Swinerton 1968). It seems reasonable that strategic candidate decision-making at each of these levels would include a consideration of those positive factors that make an officeholder a more viable and successful candidate.

Theoretical Issues: Candidate Emergence and Characteristics Increasing Candidate Viability

To help validate the argument for the presence of characteristics increasing a candidate's probability of winning, several assumptions must be addressed. First, it is assumed there is a particular calculus of decision-making utilized by candidates (Mezey 1970, Rohde 1979). A pattern or calculus in use by candidates is a reasonable assumption based on the evidence provided above, as well as the success scholars have achieved in predicting candidate emergence in numerous types of races. Second, it is assumed that we can actually identify those who will act progressively ambitious (Rohde 1979). We base this on a set of candidate characteristics, such as tenure, positions held, and proclivity for risk. If we could not make this assumption, and could not distinguish

between those officeholders acting with ambition, the study would be in vain. Rather, it is believed that certain people, utilizing the patterns of behavior from previous successful candidates, will act in a manner that would enhance their chances of being elected (Fox and Lawless 2005). It is assumed that we will be able to identify these behaviors and that they will help predict the emergence of those candidates seeking higher office. Finally, it is assumed that officeholders are rational and act strategically when seeking to maximize their preferences. The earlier discussion on strategic politicians supports this assumption.

Studies on ambition have proven that costs, liabilities, and the propensity to take risks, all matter to officeholders when they are deciding whether to run for higher office. Scholars have even determined a set of factors that predict a decreased chance of winning, such as involvement in a political scandal, age, and serving a single term. Despite the consideration of these liabilities there are still cases where unexpected officeholders run, indicating there may be more to the story. What is missing from the current decision calculus are characteristics that *increase* a candidate's viability, or chances of winning. These factors capture an officeholder's attractiveness as a candidate for the elevated position (see, e.g., Stone and Maisel 2003). These so-called increased viability factors may even offset negative aspects of an officeholder's candidacy.

Characteristics that contribute to the strength of a candidacy amplify a candidate's viability in several ways. Examples of such characteristics vary by the office currently held and the office sought. Some senators might run if they hold an Electoral College advantage, come from a large state, swing state, or a state traditionally held by the opposition party. These characteristics indicate a strong and important electoral base, whether from their own state or a nationwide base. A strong electoral base allows a

candidate to show party elites and potential voters they have a lot of support for their candidacy and are therefore a viable candidate for the nomination (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976; Aldrich 1980). It is hypothesized that candidates possessing characteristics that increase viability will be more likely to emerge for higher office.

Certain characteristics also increase viability because they indicate greater name recognition. Name recognition is important, especially early in the nomination season, because it helps voters identify them as candidates even when information surrounding their candidacy is scarce. State legislators with great overlap between their current districts and a congressional district may see a more level playing field in both primary and general elections between themselves and an incumbent as a result of substantial constituency congruency (Carson et al. 2009, 2011). It is hypothesized that candidates holding characteristics that bolster name recognition will be more likely to emerge for higher office. Increased name recognition has proven to increase success in obtaining elective office, as it lessens the advantage incumbents have in voter familiarity (Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Mayhew 1974).

Adding to the attractiveness of one's candidacy is another effect of these increased viability characteristics. Attractiveness has many faces. A strong and far-reaching electoral base can make a candidate attractive because it advantages a candidate from the start of a campaign. Adding something new or different to the status quo is another way a candidate's appeal is enhanced. For a presidential race, each election cycle sees political parties and the candidates' campaigns devise an Electoral College strategy based on the perceptions of party dominance within states. Looking to previous elections, national conditions, and the make-up of state and local government, campaigns

place each state on a scale based on the strength of the party presence and the ability to hold or win the state (Shaw 1999). From election to election, these placements of states into “strong partisan,” “leaning partisan,” and “battleground” change only incrementally, with only a few states switching to or from battleground to leaning partisan. If a candidate currently representing a constituency that is traditionally a battleground or leaning state, or is from the party opposite of who usually holds the state, their candidacy immediately becomes more attractive. Strong candidates of the nontraditional party for a district or state, with a chance of winning, even have the potential to garner additional seats for their party. With the potential for newly acquired power comes an increase in attention, staffing, and funds from the political party, as parties realize the benefits of gaining a seat, in say, the House or Senate. For a candidate, this additional aid can mean the difference between winning and losing the election.

Overall, the influence these factors representing increased viability will have on a candidate’s decision calculus is largely unknown because of their omission from research designs to date. By including these factors in a model of rational entry, we can assess the impact they have both individually, and as an influence on the costs, liabilities, and risks inherent with every campaign. Fox and Lawless state “people, utilizing the patterns of behavior from previous successful candidates, will act in a manner that would enhance their chances” (2005, 644). Previous studies assessing the influence that age has on the likelihood of senators running for president would lead us to believe Senator John McCain or Senator Robert Dole would not have run for president (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich 1980; see also Brace 1984). However, running in a wartime election, where a central issue was foreign affairs, Senator McCain’s military and foreign

affairs' experience made him an extremely attractive candidate. Military experience helped President Eisenhower win the presidency, so it seems as though during times of war, the people look to those with relative experience and give greater importance to that experience. In Senator McCain's case, his service and leadership in the Senate might have made him attractive enough at the nomination stage that party members and voters were able to look past his age. By incorporating characteristics such as military experience and leadership positions, we might be able to explain why certain candidates run, despite having costs or liabilities factored against them.

State Legislators' Progressive Ambition for the United States House of Representatives

The first of the officeholders analyzed in this dissertation are those who are situated at the lowest rung of the American political hierarchy. State legislators, responsible for the lawmaking accomplished at the state government level, are the most frequent and successful type of candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives. Take, for example, the 2002 case of Florida's 5th congressional district. After the 2000 Census, the Republican-controlled state legislature responsible for redrawing the state's congressional districts saw an opportunity to pick up a seat for their party by crafting new district boundaries that excluded the Democratic stronghold Alachua County and replace it with Republican-concentrated parts of three surrounding counties. Coincidentally, the new district boundaries happened to virtually overlap with state senator Ginny Brown-Waite's 10th District. After a crowded primary and a contentious general election, the 10-year state legislator was able to defeat sitting incumbent Karen Thurmond by a 1.7% margin. No one denied the recent redistricting benefited Brown-Waite, including the

incumbent, who cited unfamiliarity with the 5th District's new voters as partial reason for her defeat:

"For those that don't know you and haven't had the experience of working with us, those kinds of things [negative and misleading campaign ads], after hearing it over and over again, it begins to sound believable, even though it isn't. I'm very, very proud that those who knew us voted for us."⁶

In the end, a seasoned legislator and campaigner in combination with a politically favorable district that was largely familiar with the challenger made Florida's 5th District one of four seats nationwide to see an incumbent defeated.

There are numerous reasons why state legislators make effective congressional candidates. They serve constituents of the state in a legislative capacity not unlike the U.S. Congress and they have experience organizing and running a political campaign. In fact, Jacobson and Kernell largely attribute state legislators' success in congressional campaigns to their understanding of how to wage an effective campaign (1983). In a time where electoral competition for U.S. House seats is sparse, with incumbents in the House currently succeeding in their reelection attempts 96 percent of the time (Jacobson 2009), understanding who runs and the motives behind those brave enough to contest for these entrenched positions is of the utmost importance. Additionally, they already represent voters in some capacity, garnering them name recognition and experience within the district much like an incumbent. Finally, as these offices are often believed to be at the bottom of the opportunity structure for politicians, where there is less to lose and much to gain, we would expect them to readily act on their progressive ambition at this level (Schlesinger 1966).

⁶ Jeffrey S. Solocheck, "How Brown-Waite Ousted Thurmond," *St. Petersburg Times Online*, November 7, 2002 (http://www.sptimes.com/2002/11/07/Hernando/How_Brown_Waite_ouste.shtml)

If we are to believe all officeholders are progressively ambitious, then seeing state legislators emerge to run for the U.S. House should be expected. Limited studies on progressive ambition and state legislators have found legislators are, in fact, progressively ambitious and are rather strategic in their decisions to act on ambition. Acting on ambition seems to be tempered by a few things. First, a state legislator must believe they should serve in the House and be successful in that elevated position (Fox and Lawless 2005). Districts and duties performed in the state legislature are often comparable to Congress, giving the legislator a sense that they can and should contest for a seat in the House. In addition to a belief in one's self, encouragement from others to attempt a bid at a higher office appears to encourage ambitious tendencies (Hernson 1988; Kazez and Thronberry 1990, Matthews 1990; Snowiss 1966).

For state legislators, personal belief and external encouragement from family and party leadership has created a sense that the U.S. House of Representatives is a natural career move to be made from the state legislative chambers. Seeking out a seat in the House has become so commonplace that scholars have concluded it is not so much a question of whether to seek higher office, but rather when is the best time to do so (Maestas et al. 2006). These observations can be confirmed by the sheer number of House candidates coming from state legislatures. In the past two decades, over 611 candidates for congressional primaries stemmed from state legislators. In 2004 and 2006 at least 68 candidates contesting in primary elections currently served in state legislatures (Carson et al. 2009).⁷

⁷ I must qualify the statistic with "at least" because six states were excluded in the analysis, from which more state legislators may have emerged. However, the statistic presented errs on the side of underestimation rather than inflating the number of state legislators as congressional candidates.

Operating under the assumption that state legislators are progressively ambitious political actors who readily seek out a position in the House of Representatives, the research questions addressed in this dissertation surround the influences on the probability of emergence. Specifically, what factors do state legislators hold that encourage a bid for the U.S House? What factors stifle the progressive ambition we assume them to hold?

If we are to believe that state legislators are progressively ambitious similar to other officeholders, we can utilize an emergence calculus to answer these questions. This emergence calculus should have the same general framework as the emergence calculus of others, where costs and liabilities, conditioned by the propensity for taking risks, are weighed against their probability of victory. However, Squire (1995) notes there are some inherent differences in the candidate emergence patterns of U.S. House and Senate races, and so the different types of elections will see similar emergence calculi, with differences stemming from institutional variation. In particular, state legislators will emerge to run for the U.S. House when their costs and liabilities are low, they are comfortable taking risks, and they hold characteristics that increase their viability as a House candidate. If the costs incurred by running for the U.S. House of Representatives are too great, we should expect them to refrain from acting on their progressive ambitions. Should they have a number of liabilities associated with their candidacy that they feel cannot be overcome, they may refrain from emerging. Alternatively, if they possess characteristics that increase their likelihood of victory, state legislators may be more willing to act on the progressive ambition. Next, I will turn to the specific

emergence calculus used to predict what factors, stemming from both the individual and the office, that effect state legislative emergence for U.S House seats.

The Emergence Calculus of State Legislators

The costs for state legislators are similar to all other officeholders: when seeking out a new office, is my current position in jeopardy? If success is unlikely, it is seemingly irrational to risk losing a secure position. Studies of candidates running for other elevated positions have found being up for reelection in their current position is a major deterrent when contemplating their entrance into an electoral contest (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich 1980; Burden 2002). A majority of state legislatures set their term lengths to two years for the lower chamber but roughly 75% have four-year terms for the upper chamber.⁸ Conceivably, these lucky legislators with longer terms could run for the U.S. House of Representatives without simultaneously facing reelection to their state legislative position. It is these state legislators who do not have to choose between continuing their service and running for higher office that I expect to be most likely to act on their progressive ambition.

The professionalism of the state legislature may influence a legislator's decision to leave and seek an elevated position. Squire (2007) created a measure, which considers staff and resources, term length, and salary, to place state legislatures on a scale of professionalism. States who have ample staffs, offices, and budgets, who meet on an annual basis, and who pay greater amounts in salary, are considered more professional legislatures. These legislatures are deemed more attractive as career positions, and therefore candidates' opportunity costs are lowered and less inclined to seek a change. As

⁸ Forty-four of the 50 state legislatures have two year terms for their lower chamber. In contrast, thirty-eight of the states' upper chamber have four year terms.

a result, the opportunity costs for these members are higher if they opt to run for higher office and their progressive ambition may be stifled (Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Canon 1990; Krasno and Green 1988).

Alternatively, a number of scholars believe the closer alignment of professional legislatures to the U.S. Congress prepares state legislators for a better congressional candidacy and would lead to greater rates of emergence tendencies (Francis and Kenney 2000; Squire 1988; Black 1972). Scholars in this camp believe these legislators must be more skilled in campaigning in order to obtain their current state legislative seat and have greater tools and experience to capitalize on their progressive ambition. Hogan (2003) finds that candidates serving in professional legislatures, in combination with the presence of an open seat, will be some of the most likely state legislators to emerge in congressional contests. However, I maintain that serving in a professional legislature, with its comparable salary and resources to the U.S. House of Representatives, increases the costs associated with running for higher office enough that we will see fewer emerge from these legislatures.⁹

One institutional factor that arguably influences a state legislator's emergence calculus is the presence of term limits. Term limits have been found to alter the career decisions of officeholders, as they lower the opportunity costs of seeking a new position (Carey, Mieni, and Powell 2000; Lazarus 2006; Moncrief et al. 1992; Powell 2000; Steen 2006). If a state legislator is term limited and will soon be out of a job, progressive ambition may be born out of necessity. For example, take an Ohio state senator, who is satisfied with his current position within the professionalized, well-paying legislature.

⁹ See Maestas et al. 2006 for the debate surrounding the influence of legislative professionalism and state legislators' career choices.

Suddenly, he is subject to term limits. He knows that once those term limits are enacted, he will be forced from his position whether he wants to leave or not. Upon looking at his options, the state senator realizes that now might be a good time to take that shot at the U.S. House of Representatives seat he had always thought about. He obviously does not need to worry about how his bid will affect his current position. It is not as difficult to give up a position you know you will be forced out of in the near future. Progressively ambitious state legislators may be more likely to take a risk and seek a seat in the U.S. House if they face term limits because they have less to lose, regardless of whether those term limits are imminent or immediate.

Liabilities included in a state legislator's emergence calculus are anything that would negatively impact his candidacy. Often, these liabilities are strong enough deterrents to make an officeholder refrain from acting on his progressive ambitious tendencies. One of the greatest advantages afforded a state legislator considering a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives is the name recognition and "personal vote" established with his current constituency.¹⁰ There is the potential for this same constituency to comprise the constituency associated with the congressional district housing the seat of interest. So, having less time to cultivate this added bonus may negate the advantage from the start. A cultivated personal vote, or the reputation an officeholder develops with his voters as a result of previous service, is at its smallest for first term officeholders, as they have not had the time to become familiar their constituency and vice versa. Because this advantage is not yet present, state legislators may refrain from emerging in an election regardless of how strong their progressive

¹⁰ The "personal vote" can be defined as the vote that incumbents receive as a result of the connection legislators facilitate with their constituents.

ambition is. Rather, they may choose to wait for an election or two to pass, develop an identity and following, and then emerge when able to carry voters from the state legislative position to the congressional race.

But, just as there are deterrents included in the emergence calculus of state legislators, there are also factors that capture increased viability as a U.S. House challenger. Largely, these characteristics deal with heightened opportunity and increased voter familiarity. Specifically, there are three characteristics that result from the institution in which they serve. The federalist system in which the states and federal government operate under allows states to configure their own state legislative and congressional districts.¹¹ This means that states can have as many or as few state legislative districts as they see fit. This impacts district demographics and state legislators seeking a position in the U.S. House may need to consider how these constituencies will help or hinder their candidacy.

For one, the amount of overlap, or congruency, between the state legislator's current set of voters and voters tied to the congressional district they seek to represent may factor into the emergence calculus. State legislators with greater constituent congruency enter into a congressional office similar to an incumbent congressman, already familiar and recognized by the voters. This initial advantage may be enough to entice a state legislator to act on their progressive ambition, as prior research has found state legislators with established homestyles receive higher levels of continued support from voters when making a bid for the U.S. House (Fenno 1978; Desposato and Petrocik

¹¹ The exception to this is any of the states requiring preclearance. Largely a result of the discriminatory practices of 1960s Civil Rights era, nine southern states and a handful of counties around the country must receive federal permission from the Justice Department to alter district boundaries.

2003). In studying redistricting and U.S. House races, McKee (2008) finds that prior service in a district breeds familiarity, as incumbents running in a redrawn district see less voter recall and recognition than incumbents whose districts remained unaltered. It appears that the more familiar voters are with a primary candidate from the beginning of a race, the more likely they are to turn out and vote for him.

High degrees of district congruency can aid a primary challenger in several additional ways. From the outset, state legislators with shared constituencies have previous experience with the congressional district, meaning they are familiar with voter preferences, the political players of the district, and the best approach to coalition building between the two. Because of this, many of the advantages afforded incumbents are possessed by state legislators with greater district overlap. In addition, operating under conditions of low saliency, low information, and a short time frame means House challengers have little time to resonate with voters. Having an established base coming into a primary election benefits a state legislator seeking a new office and negates the advantages inherent to incumbents. Carson et al. (2009, 2011) find that higher rates of constituency congruency directly leads to increased emergence and increased success in both primary and general congressional elections.

Additionally, states can influence the rate of emergence among state legislators, and subsequently the electoral competition within their congressional races, by the size of their state legislatures. As state legislatures grow in size, so too does the number of quality candidates advantaged in running for the U.S. House. Although it is difficult to unseat an entrenched incumbent, it is clear that those with the best shot at defeating a sitting representative or capturing a rare open seat are quality candidates (Jacobson and

Kernell 1983; Maisel and Stone 1997; Stone and Maisel 2003; Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004).¹² If a state decides to incorporate a large quantity of seats in their upper or lower chambers, the size of the candidate pool benefiting from holding a state legislative position is sure to increase. States that choose to limit the number of state legislative seats may limit the number of quality candidates for congressional races, but they will afford greater advantages to those state legislators that do hold a seat in either chamber. States with proportionally-equal state legislatures to congressional districts, states like Ohio or California, will not only have greater overlap between state legislative and congressional districts, but fewer candidates to contend for the same congressional seat.¹³ Legislators hailing from states with smaller state legislatures, where the initial advantage of established voter familiarity is limited to a few state legislators, recognize this advantage and are expected to be more likely to act on their progressive ambitious tendencies.

The presence of an open congressional seat should increase a state legislator's viability and subsequent emergence for the simple fact that they are more likely to win when they are not facing an incumbent. With reelection rates in the high nineties, open seat races are often the only shot congressional challengers have of obtaining a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. They are certainly the most competitive congressional races we see (Gaddie and Bullock 2000; Jacobson 2009), and therefore, have been the races most likely to see state legislator emergence (Bianco 1984; Banks and Kiewiet 1989; Carson 2005; Hetherington, Larson, and Globetti 2003; Wrighton and Squire

¹² Quality candidates can be defined as any candidate who has held elected office. They are considered to be a quality candidate because they have had a successful experience in running a campaign.

¹³ For example Texas has 181 state legislative districts to their 32 congressional districts (a ratio of .177). That is in stark contrast to North and South Dakota, whose 141 and 105 state legislative districts overwhelm their single congressional seat (ratio= .007 and .010, respectively).

1997). Quality candidates emerging in these open seat races are at a distinct advantage over their non-quality counterparts, as they are the only candidates with any name recognition or electoral base. Generally, in open seat races, the initial advantages afforded state legislators should position them as the electoral frontrunner. Given this frontrunner status, it is expected that state legislators would be most likely to emerge in a race they were more likely to win.

Together, these factors all contribute to a state legislator's decision on whether to act on the progressive ambition we assume they have. If their opportunity costs are lowered, whether due to not facing simultaneous elections or being forced out of the chamber, I expect state legislators to emerge in congressional races. If they have, not only the opportunity for a familiarity with voters, but an established one, I expect a state legislator to run for higher office. If they possess an advantage in terms of that voter familiarity relative to their legislative colleagues, I expect a state legislator to act on his progressive ambition. Finally, if the current political circumstances favor the state legislator, I anticipate candidate emergence.

Data

To determine the factors contributing to a state legislator's decision to run for the U.S. House of Representatives, I collected data on all currently serving state legislators, 1992-2008. To acquire the names, chamber and district, and political affiliation, I used Carsey et al. (2008) state legislative elections data for the years 1992-2003. For the remaining years, state legislator information was gathered from the Council of State Government's *State Directory of Elected Officials*. Legislators from the fifty states were

included, with the exception of states with no district numbers or who had unique legislative conditions or primary contests.¹⁴

The unit of analysis for this model is the state legislator-House election. This means for every U.S. congressional election held in a state from 1992-2008, there is an observation for any currently serving state legislator.¹⁵ For example, a state senator from Montana with a term length of four years, whose service started in 2000 and ended in 2008, was counted as an observation for every U.S. House race election from 2002-2008 held in Montana. This leaves a total of 56,864 observations.

This analysis addresses the central research question that asks under what circumstances do state legislators act on their progressive ambition and emerge as U.S. House candidates? As such, the dependent variable used to answer this question is whether or not a state legislator contested in a primary election for the U.S. House. I used a combination of Jacobson's U.S. House of Representatives election data, Brady's primary data, and individual data collection from America Votes and internet searches.¹⁶ Once a list of every primary candidate was compiled, I cross-referenced it with the Carsey data to determine who of the primary candidates was a state legislator.

The explanatory variables incorporated in the analysis are the factors comprising a state legislator's emergence calculus. Following the framework, which is employed at

¹⁴ MA, NH, and VT were excluded for missing districting information. NE was excluded from the analysis because of their unique nonpartisan, unicameral chamber. VA, UT, and CT have limited cases because in most cases they hold a convention over a primary to select their nominee. Because it is impossible to quantify all the candidates seeking the nomination in a convention setting, I only include races for these states when a primary was held.

¹⁵ While it would be ideal to include information on formerly-serving state legislators, it simply is not feasible to collect and test for all of that information.

¹⁶ The individual data was in large part collected by Stephen Pettigrew, graduate student at the University of Georgia. While I compiled a majority of the information on races held in the 1990s, he was responsible for creating the list of potential challengers and the information on races held in the 2000s, for which I will forever be indebted.

all three levels of this study, each independent variable is considered through the lens of a cost, liability, or increased viability characteristic. Additionally, by characterizing the variables in terms of institutional or individual factors, I can determine how much acting on progressive ambition is facilitated by the office of the state legislator, and how much is a result of the individual. The following is a brief discussion of the explanatory and control variables used in the emergence model.

The costs a state legislator must consider when looking to run for higher office are whether they are up for reelection, the professionalism of their state legislature, and the presence of term limits. If present, these costs indicate a state-level seat worth valuing and are likely to stifle progressive ambition because they make seeking higher office too pricey. If a legislator is up for reelection to his state seat in the same election cycle as the congressional election, it is less likely he will emerge to run in the U.S. House race. *Up for Reelection* uses data of initial service, plus term length, to determine the years in which the state legislator is faced with reelection.

The level of professionalism in the state legislature will also be a consideration for legislators, as the more desirable the state legislative position is, the higher the opportunity costs are for leaving it. High professionalism scores indicate the most lucrative state legislative positions, often the ones most comparable to the U.S. House. *Professionalism*, a measure created by Squire (2007), indexes the state legislatures by their level of professionalism. State legislators hailing from states with highly professionalized legislatures will be less likely to act on their progressive ambition. Another institutionally-driven cost for legislators is the presence of term limits, as state-imposed term limits force legislators out of office. If a state legislator knows his career in

the legislature will be involuntarily ended, he may be more likely to start looking at alternative career options. *Term Limits* accounts for any state that has enacted term limits in their legislatures.¹⁷

In this analysis there is one potential liability that state legislators must consider when reflecting on their career choices. Studies of U.S. representatives seeking reelection to their House seat have been found to have a higher vote share (compared both to their initial bid's vote share and the vote share attributed to the political party) in their reelection, namely a result of their ability to cultivate name recognition and personal vote through perks of the office (Holbrook and Tidemarch 1991). To account for those legislators unable to capitalize on this "sophomore surge" because they are still in their first years of service, I control for any state legislator who is currently in their *First Term* of service.

Factors that encourage acting on progressive ambition, or at least counter-balance the deterrents to emergence, are ones that influence a candidate to believe that they have a greater likelihood of electoral success. Such factors include institutionally-driven benefits like the district congruency and the size of the candidate pool. District congruency is a measure created to capture the amount of overlap between a state legislator's current district and the congressional district he seeks to represent. Higher overlap indicates greater familiarity with the district and heightened name recognition among congressional voters. Traditionally, research on the impact of district overlap relied on a measure of congruency based simply on the size of the legislative delegation,

¹⁷ This measure uses year of enactment over year of impact because research has shown that the mere presence of term limits, even among those state legislators eligible to seek reelection, lowers the opportunity costs for seeking reelection (Lazarus 2006).

or candidate pool, in the state (Canon 1990; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Squire 1989b). While advancements have been made, replacing the size of the candidate pool for large geographic units such as the county or precinct (Carson, Crespin, Finocchiaro, and Rohde 2007; Engstrom 2006; Hood and McKee 2009; Rush 1992, 1993, 2000), it was not until the inclusion of geographic information systems technology that we are able to get a precise measure of constituent congruency.

To create the district congruency measure, I used a GIS Correspondence Engine provided by the University of Missouri.¹⁸ Using the 2000 Census' population data, I was able to create an overlap percentage between the upper and lower chamber of each state legislature and U.S. congressional districts.¹⁹ In many states, legislative districts are not entirely contained within the confines of one congressional district. Instead, state legislative districts overlap with several different congressional districts. Considering this, but also acknowledging that state legislators can theoretically choose to run in any district, I selected the highest overlap percentage for each state legislator as the measure for *District Overlap*.²⁰

An additional concern with using the GIS data is that it is only available for the 2000 Census. This means that I can only apply the statistic to congressional races held in 2002-2008. For races held from 1992-2000, I created a ratio of the number of U.S. House districts allotted to the state relative to the number of state legislative districts in

¹⁸ See <http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html>.

¹⁹ This engine uses the block group data from the 2000 Census as the geographic unit for measuring population. For an application of this technique, see Crespin (2005). For an application of the district congruency measure as operationalized here, see Carson et al. (2011).

²⁰ The research question asks under what conditions will a state legislator emerge, and it is my belief they will emerge when they have a higher district overlap. I make no claims in this analysis about which district they will emerge in, just that higher district overlap equates to higher rates of emergence.

the entire state.²¹ This more traditional measure of the *Candidate Pool* is less precise, but a good proxy for the unavailable data.²² By using the ratio, I can account for both the potential seats for which to seek, as well as the number of similarly-situated quality candidates. Measures simply using the size of the congressional delegation fail to account for the number of quality candidates who could potentially contend for the seat. Take for example the states with the two largest state legislature delegations are New Hampshire (424 members) and Pennsylvania (253 members). Despite having an extremely large candidate pool, New Hampshire only has three congressional seats. Alternatively, Pennsylvania has twenty congressional seats for their 253 members to contend for. Certainly, the initial odds of success, based solely on likely opposition, are much better at the higher ratio of .079 (PA) than .007 (NH).

Characteristics specific to the individual accounted for in the model include the presence of an open seat. Open seats present the best electoral opportunity for challengers, as there is no established incumbent to compete with. State legislators would likely take advantage of this situation and act on their progressively ambitious tendencies. *Open Seat* is a dichotomous measure that controls for any congressional race that does not see an incumbent running for reelection.

In addition to these variables of interest, I include three control variables. The first is the *Party Identification* of the state legislator. For this variable, there is no expectation that one party's state legislators will emerge at a greater rate than the other.

²¹ It is anticipated that the smaller the candidate pool, meaning the larger the variable's value, the more likely emergence will occur. For example, there are two hypothetical states. Both have four congressional districts, but State A has a state legislature with 100 members while State B has a state legislature of 40 members. A state legislator from State B is more likely to emerge because his ratio is .1, while the legislator from State A has more competition to account for (ratio is .04) and will be less likely to run. In reality, this variable ranges from Montana (.0067) to California (.4417).

²² The District Overlap and Candidate Pool variables correlate at .772.

Party Identification is used because its availability for the entire data range.

Alternatively, I was able to run the 2002-2008 model using a variable that controlled for whether the state legislator was the same party as the incumbent, from a different party, or whether there was no incumbent present. Representing a different party than the incumbent (*Different Party*) is expected to encourage emergence. I also include a control for the *Chamber* in which the state legislator serves. State senates (coded “1”) traditionally have longer term lengths and fewer members than state houses (coded “0”), both of which should encourage emergence.

Results and Discussion

To examine the factors that are influential to a state legislator’s emergence calculus, I ran a logistic regression of all currently serving state legislators. The results are presented in Table 2.1. Included in Table 1 are three separate models, a result of data limitations. The first model looks at all state legislators serving for the full length of the study, 1992-2008. The second model only analyzes state legislators from 1992-2000, and uses the candidate pool measure as a proxy for the unavailable district overlap data. The third model, state legislators serving from 2002-2008, utilizes the district overlap data as well as the district’s previous presidential vote share conditioned by the party of the state legislator and whether the state legislator is from the same political party as the incumbent.²³ Overall, 611 state legislators emerged to run in U.S. House of Representative primaries. Despite being the most frequent and successful type of congressional candidate, this number, which corresponds to 1.08% of the total

²³ The variable, *Democratic Presidential Vote Share*, could not be included in the models studying earlier years because it relies on the GIS’s district overlap measure to know what state legislative district corresponds to which congressional district and subsequent presidential vote share. The same holds for the *Different Party* variable.

observations, shows how infrequently congressional races are contested by quality candidates. The following is a discussion of the comprehensive model's findings, as well as the different results found among the two time periods.

Table 2.1 Logistic Regression of the Probability of State Legislators Emerging for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1992-2008

<i>Variable</i>	<i>1992-2008</i> <i>Coef. (Std.Error)</i>	<i>1992-2000</i> <i>Coef. (Std.Error)</i>	<i>2002-2008</i> <i>Coef. (Std.Error)</i>
<i>Costs</i>			
Up for Reelection	-0.33 (0.10)***	-0.50 (0.12)***	-0.01 (0.18)
Professionalism	1.45 (0.37)***	1.57 (0.43)***	1.02 (0.59)*
Term Limits	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.12)	0.16 (0.15)
<i>Liabilities</i>			
First Term	-0.45 (0.11)***	-0.50 (0.13)***	-0.45 (0.20)**
<i>Increased Viability</i>			
Candidate Pool	2.19 (0.63)***	1.93 (0.76)**	
Overlap			0.02 (0.01)***
Open Seat	1.66 (0.08)***	1.50 (0.11)***	2.00 (0.14)***
Dem. Pres. Vote Share			-0.01 (0.01)*
Chamber	0.71 (0.09)***	0.56 (0.11)***	0.70 (0.18)***
Party Identification	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	
Different Party			0.46 (0.17)***
Constant	-5.48 (0.12)***	-5.16 (0.15)***	-6.67 (0.36)***
Number of Observations	55, 955	32, 012	23, 090
Log Likelihood	-3013.0438	-1894.6322	-1060.7557
Wald χ^2	710.27***	430.69*	347.52***
% Correctly Classified	98.92	98.81	99.09%

Note: Dependent variable is whether representative emerged in a U.S. Senate Election.

*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 two-tailed test.

On the whole, the data suggests that costs, liabilities, and characteristics that increase a candidate's viability play a role in the decision to emerge as U. S. House candidates. Being up for reelection and serving in a first term both lower the likelihood

of emergence, while highly professionalized state legislatures, smaller candidate pools, and presence of an open seat all encourage emergence.

More specifically, the cost of having to face reelection in the same year as the U.S. House election decreases the odds of emergence by 28%. Given that a majority of state representatives face reelection every two years, and that congressional elections are held every two years, the costly nature of running simultaneous campaigns may account for the low rate of emergence mentioned previously. On the other hand, we should expect that state senators with four-year terms should be most likely to emerge. The significance and positive direction of the *Chamber* control variable appears to support this conclusion. Besides longer terms, another reason supporting a positive effect for *Chamber* is the larger districts these positions typically have, meaning the potential for a broader established electoral base.

Another institutionally driven cost that state legislators consider is the level of professionalism of their legislature. The odds of a state legislator serving in the most professionalized legislature (.659 in New York) emerging for higher office are over three times greater than for a state legislator serving in the least non-professionalized legislature (.051 in North Dakota) when moving from the minimum to maximum professionalism score. Risking reelection to a seat in a chamber that is somewhat comparable to a congressional seat has deemed this as an added cost; however this cost seems to be one state legislators are willing to overlook.

Table 2.2 lists the five states with the highest and lowest average professionalism scores. The lowest single year professionalism score is .051 and the highest is .659. The average annual score among the fifty states is .196. Clearly, states with higher levels of

professionalism, meaning greater salary, benefits, and resources, see a greater percentage of their state legislators emerging than do states with lower levels of professionalism. From 1992-2008, California had forty-three state legislators emerge to contest for one of their fifty-three congressional districts. In the same period of time, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Utah each had two state legislators emerge for their lone congressional district despite having similar-sized candidate pools.

Table 2.2 Percent of State Legislators Emerging as Candidates for U.S. House by Level of Professionalism, 1992-2008

<i>Five Highest Professionalized State Legislatures</i>		<i>Five Lowest Professionalized State Legislatures</i>	
California (.59821)	4.0%	Utah (.05607)	0.2%
New York (.54886)	0.9%	North Dakota (.06136)	0.2%
Michigan (.51786)	1.2%	South Dakota (.06993)	0.2%
Wisconsin (.40071)	1.1%	Wyoming (.07086)	0.3%
Pennsylvania (.31014)	1.2%	Alabama (.09386)	1.2%

Note: Professionalism score (Squire 2007) in parentheses is the average score for the state from 1992-2005.

Currently, there is a debate in the literature surrounding the impact of legislative professionalism and the propensity for state legislators to run for higher office. One side of the debate maintains serving in a professionalized legislature stifles emergence because the opportunity costs are greater. However, the other side believes these state legislators will be more likely to emerge because their campaign and job experience is comparable to congressional service and therefore make them a more competitive candidate. The findings here seem to support the latter argument.

Liabilities also appear to influence the likelihood of a state legislator emerging. Transitioning from the first term in a state legislature to subsequent terms increases the predicted probability of emergence by .008. If the benefits of serving in the state legislature when vying for a seat in the U.S. House are increased experience and name recognition, state legislators clearly feel only serving one term does not provide these advantages.

Just as much as costs and liabilities deter emergence, individual legislators possessing characteristics that increase their viability as congressional candidates are encouraged to seek out the U.S. House of Representatives. Whether using the district overlap measure or its proxy, size of the candidate pool, it is evident that the benefits of being familiar to voters and having less competition among other quality candidates encourages state legislators to act on their progressive ambition. As the ratio of state legislative districts to congressional districts increases from its minimum ratio (.007 in Montana) to its maximum ratio (.442 in California), the odds of a state legislator serving from 1992-2000 increase by nearly six times. Using the more accurate measure of voter familiarity due to previous service and district overlap, we still find a positive effect on emergence.

The presence of an open seat also encourages state legislators to act on their progressive ambition. State legislators, who we assume are progressively ambitious, will take this as their best opportunity to achieve higher office, and therefore be more likely to run. Unless the state legislator has 100% district overlap, which none of them do, they will never have completely comparable voter familiarity to incumbents. If the incumbent is not seeking reelection, then whichever quality candidate contesting for the seat with the

greatest district overlap seems to be the most advantaged. Overall, the odds of a state legislator emerging for a congressional election increase by 348% when an incumbent is not present.

To help explain the relative influence of these costs and increased viabilities, Figure 2.1 depicts the probability of a state legislator emerging to contest for a U.S. House seat depending upon whether they are facing reelection and whether or not the incumbent congressman is seeking reelection. The blue line is the probability of emergence when the state legislator is up for reelection and the incumbent congressman is seeking reelection. The red line is the probability of emergence for a state legislator not faced with two simultaneous campaigns and an open congressional seat is available. It is clear that probability of emergence for the second situation, not up for reelection and an open seat, is much higher. State legislators are more likely to emerge when the costs incurred by themselves are lower and the likelihood of victory if they do emerge is greater. Additionally, this figure indicates that a smaller size candidate pool positively increases the likelihood of emergence, regardless of circumstance. This leads to the conclusion that despite increased costs or lowered chances of victory (when an incumbent is present), characteristics that increase a candidate's viability, such as size of the candidate pool, can have a negating effect on emergence. That said, the effect of the candidate pool is much more pronounced for state legislators already more prone to run. In total, Figure 2.1 demonstrates the expected findings: costs lower the likelihood of emergence while characteristics of increased viability increase the likelihood of emergence.




Figure 2.1 Probability of Emergence by Up for Reelection, Presence of an Incumbent, and Size of the Candidate Pool, 1992-2008

However, when the data are divided into two time periods, and more accurate factors, such as district overlap, are included in the emergence calculus, a few findings stand out. First, it appears that the added cost of being up for reelection is no longer a factor in state legislator's emergence calculi. In combination with the encouraging effect of acting on progressive ambition when serving in a professionalized legislature, these results indicate that costs may not be a significant component to a state legislator's emergence calculus. This means that state legislators, at least of late, are much less likely to consider the costs associated with seeking higher office. Rather, it appears they feel like there are no incurred costs involved when acting on progressive ambition.

Second, it is not simply a smaller candidate pool that influences emergence decisions. Rather, it is also the amount of overlap, and subsequent established voter familiarity, that plays a role. The amount of district overlap for each state legislator varies greatly by the state in which he serves. With a district overlap of .7%, three state legislators from the 80th House District in Maine had the smallest amount of maximum overlap with a congressional district in their state. In contrast, four members who served in California's 32nd Senate District had a maximum district overlap of 99.4% with the 43rd Congressional District. We would expect (and the model shows) that it is much more probable that a representative in the latter situation would emerge in a congressional race than the state legislator with a smaller percentage of district overlap. Specifically, as the amount of district overlap increases, the odds of a state legislator emerging increases by about twenty percent. In combination with the presence of an open seat, these are two of the most influential factors in a state legislator's emergence calculus.

Figure 2.2 depicts the probability of a state legislator running in a U.S. House primary when no incumbent is running. Additionally, it takes into consideration the amount of overlap between the state legislative and congressional district. The blue line depicts the probability of emergence when an incumbent is defending his seat in the House of Representatives, while the red line depicts the probability when the seat is open. From the outset, it is clear that the probability of entering a congressional contest is lower when the House incumbent will also be in the race. However, when the amount of district overlap is included, we see a dramatic effect on the probability of emergence. As the district overlap increases from 0 to 100 percent (again, we know this isn't possible,

but for hypothetical sake), the probability that a state legislator emerges to contest for a U.S. House seat increases by over .1. Additionally, we can see that if there is great amount of district overlap, we will even see increased emergence probability in races where an incumbent is present. It appears that in the eyes of state legislators, having a cultivated knowledge of and familiarity with voters of a congressional district will encourage a state legislator to act on his progressive ambitious tendencies, even in circumstances where the odds of victory are less likely.




Figure 2.2 Probability of Emergence by Presence of an Incumbent and Percent of District Overlap, 2002-2008

Another way to look at the results presented here is to consider the specific case of the primary election of Georgia's 6th congressional district in 2004. When Republican

incumbent Johnny Isakson decided to seek retiring senator Zell Miller's seat, a rare open seat became available in the heavily Republican district encompassing the northern suburbs of Atlanta. The district had such a Republican proclivity that no Democrat emerged to run for the seat. Three of the six Republicans who emerged were St. Sen. Chuck Clay (R-37), St. Sen. Ray LaMutt (R-21), and St. Sen. Tom Price (R-56). All three candidates were experienced Georgia legislators, with LaMutt and Price serving four terms to Clay's six terms in the Georgia State Senate. Additionally, out of all the state legislators in the General Assembly and State Senate, Clay, LaMutt, and Price had three out of the four highest overlaps between their senate district and the 6th Congressional district, 23%, 15.6%, and 18.7%, respectively.²⁴

From the analysis above, the fact that these three acted on their progressive ambition is not surprising. While the professionalism of Georgia's legislature is rather low (averages .11636) and their state senate term lengths are two years, meaning all three would have been facing reelection to their senate seat, someone has to emerge to run. This is especially true if the congressional seat is open. While there may have been more candidates had the institutions in Georgia been a more professionalized legislature and included 4-year term lengths, it is not surprising that these three did emerge. All three had cultivated years' worth of name recognition. In addition, the name recognition cultivated was applicable when choosing to run in the 6th District. While Price and LaMutt edged out Clay in the primary, and Price ultimately succeeded in the runoff election, all three state senators took advantage of the absence of an incumbent and their

²⁴ Charlie Tanksley (R-32) had 20% district overlap with the 6th Congressional District. Additionally, it should be noted that state house members either had a district overlap of 7.2% or 4%, significantly lower than most state senators.

initial advantages in name recognition and acted, as expected, on their progressive ambition.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. REPRESENTATIVES RUNNING FOR THE U.S. SENATE

When looking for the proving ground for most senatorial candidates, many point to the U.S. House of Representatives. And it is for good reason. In Senate elections held from 1976 to 2008, U.S. Representatives made over two hundred bids for a seat in the upper chamber. During the past decade, 61 House members have emerged as senatorial candidates. In the recent 2008 Senate Elections, six congressional seats saw U.S. Representatives as general election challengers.²⁵ For retiring Wayne Allard's seat in Colorado, the general election pitted former 4th District Representative Bob Schaffer (R), who also ran for Colorado's other Senate seat in 2004, against Colorado's 2nd District Representative Mark Udall (D). Udall was the eventual victor, riding the tides of a pro-Obama, anti-Republican wave that swept the country in 2008. In a similar situation, New Mexico's senior senator Pete Domenici's retirement pitted two representatives against each other in the general election: the 3rd District's Tom Udall versus the 2nd District's Steve Pearce. In all, three of the eight new members in the U.S. Senate were representatives, solidifying the lower congressional chamber as the political office most likely to act as the senatorial incubator.

While these numbers appear relatively small, there is good reason for potential challengers to refrain from emerging. First, the chance of actually winning a Senate election is slim and often comes at a high price. Incumbents in the Senate rarely lose

²⁵ The 2008 general election challengers from the U.S. House include: Schaffer (R-CO), M. Udall (D-CO), T. Udall (D-NM), Pearce (R-NM), Zimmer (R-NJ), LaRocco (D-ID), Slattery (D-KS), and Allen (D-ME).

reelection and are serving for longer periods, making it extremely difficult for senatorial challengers to succeed in their electoral contests. Reelection rates among incumbent U.S. Senators have averaged around 85%, and have reached as high as 96% in 2004 (Ginsberg, Lowi, and Weir 2009). Additionally, the amount of money necessary to run a legitimate campaign has risen dramatically over recent years, with the advantage in fundraising going to the incumbent. Open Secrets, an organization that tracks campaign fundraising and expenditures, finds that the average U.S. senator raises \$8.3 million per election cycle compared to challengers' \$850,000. Nevertheless, the most probable explanation for such seemingly irrational behavior is ambition or more specifically, progressive ambition. When representatives emerge to run for the Senate, we witness the manifestation of their progressive ambition. And while few will emerge, they are the most frequent type of challenger in U.S. Senate elections because they are ambitiously-minded politicians whose offices within the House of Representatives afford them electoral advantages over other types of candidates.

Ambition and opportunity condition the probability that a representative emerges for higher office. They also condition the rate in which a representative decides to run. Factors that encourage emergence should also encourage faster emergence. Factors stifling ambitious tendencies should cause representatives to hesitate before running, possibly waiting until conditions are more favorable. Several studies have attempted to understand the probability of acting on ambition in relation to House members and provide a good base for discovering the inner workings of representatives' progressive ambition. Nevertheless, we do not yet fully understand both why and when these individual members of Congress ultimately decide to run (see e.g., Brace 1984; Copeland

1989; Rohde 1979). This dissertation addresses both questions, increasing the explanatory power of the emergence calculus and how congressmen use such a calculus to determine when in their career to seek a higher office.

U.S. Representatives' Progressive Ambition for the U.S. Senate

The factors included in representatives' emergence calculi, both institutional and individual in nature, are similar to ones used in other types of officeholders' emergence calculus. In terms of the specific factors used, the calculus is most similar to the calculus used by senators running for president, and therefore much of what is covered in this section is applicable to the following chapter. Similar to the other officeholders analyzed here, my general hypothesis maintains that representatives with a greater number of opportunity costs and liabilities against their candidacy will be less likely to emerge as a senatorial candidate than those representatives with lower costs and who are without liabilities. House members with characteristics that increase their viability will be more likely to emerge than representatives that hold no such characteristics. However, the ensuing analysis finds the factors encouraging a representative to act on progressive ambitious tendencies are most analogous to those encouraging state legislators. For both office holders, the most influential factor taken into consideration is the presence of an open seat.

With respect to the timing of progressive ambition, the same factors influencing the decision to emerge should influence the rate of emergence. Through the application of the strategic politician theory, factors that weigh positively on a candidacy should encourage emergence at a faster rate, as the present time offers the best odds of winning (Jacobson 1989; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). Likewise, factors deterring a bid for higher

office should also slow down the rate in which a candidate emerges, as they may need more time to combat or erase the negative aspect(s) of their candidacy. The following is a discussion on the factors that comprise the emergence calculus, how they influence not only the probability of emergence, but also the rate in which representatives do emerge.

The Emergence Calculus of U.S. Representatives

Running for the Senate is extremely costly; if it were not, we would see the number of candidates running increase substantially. Making a bid for the U.S. Senate means candidates will have to expend a tremendous amount of time, energy, and resources—much more than they would for their secure House seats. Because of the representative's term length, they will always be up for reelection when deciding whether to emerge. This means they must choose between seeking reelection to an overwhelmingly safe position or running for an extremely risky office. Former representatives have the luxury of not having to make this costly decision and may be more willing to emerge and assume the costs of waging a competitive Senate campaign. However, not being a current representative could make such candidates politically irrelevant to the electoral state and national landscape and a run for elective office may be viewed as risky. Representatives who are no longer serving because they lost reelection to their seat are less likely to run for higher office because they are seen by voters as unable to adequately represent their current constituents, much less a state-wide constituency.

A potential cost associated with the races analyzed is whether the elected official serves in a leadership position or as a committee chair. To date, scholars have viewed these positions as added costs candidates must weigh when determining whether to run,

as a failed bid may mean not only losing a safe seat, but relinquishing a great amount of power within their current chamber (Aldrich 1980; Copeland 1989). Additionally, members holding leadership positions or chairmanships often show lower levels of progressive ambition (more likely exhibiting static or intra-institutional ambition) and refrain from seeking higher office (Copeland 1989; Herrick and Moore 1993), as these roles often go to long-serving, career officeholders. If an elected official invests the time necessary to secure a position of leadership or committee chair, it is doubtful he or she will be eager to leave the post.

In observing the career decisions of U.S. House members, Rohde (1979) asserts that some candidates are inherently more comfortable with taking risks than others and that this comfort level should directly impact their willingness to seek higher office. A number of other studies on emergence and progressive ambition have confirmed Rohde's inclusion of risk to the emergence calculus, finding that risk propensity influences ambitious politicians at all levels of elected office (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Brace 1984; Riker and Ordeshook 1973; Shepsle 1972).

A candidate's liabilities are any characteristics that they hold which may lower their probability of winning. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) acknowledge such liabilities for senators running for president as first-termers, age, minority, and past political actions. While a short tenure in the Senate may deter senators from acting on their progressive ambition, strategic emergence theory indicates House members may not be as constrained by tenure, rather running when a seat opens or whenever they view an incumbent as vulnerable (Rohde 1979). Age, however, is believed to be a liability for candidates seeking a seat in the upper chamber. As a representative ages, he may have a

tougher time convincing voters he is not “too old” to hold the office, especially since the term lengths are much longer than in the House. Copeland finds that representatives are less likely to run the older they become (1989). Additionally, the older a representative is, the more likely it is that they have spent more of their time serving in the House, an indication of static rather than progressive ambition. It is doubtful that Rep. Ralph Hall (R-TX), at eighty-eight years old, could convince voters he was capable of serving a six year term in the Senate.

Being a member of a minority group is believed to deter running for any office, namely because being from a minority group has been prove to greatly effect voter choice. Matsubayashi and Udea (2011) find that voters who know a candidates race or ethnicity will use these characteristics as vote cues.²⁶ Similarly, Lublin (1997, 1999) finds that minorities have a hard time soliciting support for their congressional candidacies outside of majority-minority districts. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) see this racial polarization as a liability. This especially holds true when looking at the composition of the U.S. Senate, where in the data analyzed only 12 minority group members held office.²⁷ Work done on political ambition for other offices seems to confirm their belief. Fox and Lawless (2005) found through a survey of potential office-seekers that status as a member of a group historically excluded from politics makes it

²⁶ Matsubayashi and Udea (2011) also present a good summary of the two sides of the debate on the influence race plays on the preferences of voters.

²⁷ Four African Americans have held a seat in the senate since 1976: Edward W. Brooke (R-Massachusetts), 1967-1979, Carol Moseley-Braun (D-Illinois), 1993-1999, Barack Obama (D-Illinois), 2005-2008, Roland Burris (D-Illinois), 2009; four Asian Americans: Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), 1963-, Samuel I. Hayakawa (R-California), 1977-1983, Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii), 1977-1990, Daniel K. Akaka (D-Hawaii), 1990-; three Hispanic Americans: Ken L. Salazar (D-Colorado), 2005-2009, Melquiades R. Martinez (R-Florida), 2005-2009, Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey), 2006-; and one Native American: Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colorado), 1993-2005.

less likely they will run. This holds true for female candidates as well. Lawless and Pearson find that men comprise almost 84% of the U.S. Congress (2008, 1) and Burden finds from 1960-1996, 92% of the U.S. Senate is comprised of people that are white, Christian, and male (2002, 98). It is hypothesized that House members representing minority groups will be less likely to emerge than representatives who are white males.

Ideological extremity is an additional liability for progressively ambitious members of the House. Research shows that senators representing the ideological extremes of their party have a hard time appealing to the general population (Burden 2002). Using this logic, any representative seeking to increase the breadth of the constituency they serve by running for a state-wide office would potentially need to embody a more centrist position than the one adopted for a smaller, more concentrated population. Reps. George Miller (D-CA) and Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) may have the constituency within their district to support their extreme voting behavior, but they may run into trouble trying to convince a statewide electorate to vote them into office.

There are several characteristics that contribute to the strength of a representative's candidacy. While some authors maintain previous unsuccessful attempts will make it harder for officeholders to garner support for future attempts (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987), others note previous attempts may have awarded them name recognition and visibility, as well as garnering experience in running a state-wide campaign (Burden 2002; Jacobson 1989; Taylor and Boatright 2005). The successful second tries of then representatives, now senators, John Thune, John McCain, and John Ensign seem to confirm this belief.

Until this point, characteristics discussed have been applicable to officeholders seeking either the U.S. Senate or the presidency. However, there are a number of factors specific to running for the Senate or the presidency that are largely a result of the position being sought and the uniqueness of the election. The following factors are specific to U.S. House members seeking a seat in the Senate. Characteristics pertaining solely to U.S. Senators running for the White House will be detailed in Chapter Four.

Not having to face an incumbent dramatically increases a representative's likelihood of victory. Open seat races are substantially different from races where an incumbent and her "looming shadow" practically guarantee victory. In the former case, challengers face a more level playing field and therefore tend to emerge at greater rates given the increased chance of victory absent an incumbent. Furthermore, these races are generally more competitive, either between the two parties or within a party (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). I expect representatives to be more likely to emerge in open seat races since these races garner the best chances for electoral success.

Other characteristics increase viability because they indicate increased name recognition. Analyzing his personal bid for Congress, Maisel (1982) noted that his chances of winning were faint from the beginning, primarily because he did not have the name recognition to survive the first contest. He notes that in primaries, a traditionally low salience race, name recognition with voters means just about everything, and without it, a candidate did not stand a chance. Candidates deciding whether to make a bid for Congress must take into account their current level of name recognition among voters and the amount of resources they possess early in the election season. Increased name recognition has proven to increase success in obtaining elective office, as it lessens the

advantage incumbents have in voter familiarity (Carson et al. 2011; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Mayhew 1974).

When analyzing state legislators emergence for U.S. House of Representatives seats, the level of constituency congruency between the state legislative and congressional districts is an indicator of the amount of personal vote a state legislator can expect to carry with him in an election for higher office. While not always the case, in most races for the U.S. Senate, a representative's constituency congruency is roughly equal to every other representative using his office and personal vote as an increased viability trait.

Despite not having an initial advantage over his fellow representatives due to district overlap, a number of scholars have found the size of the candidate pool influences a representative's decision to run for the Senate (see, e.g., Adams and Squire 1997; Kiewet and Zeng 1993; Lublin 1994; Squire 1989, 1992). This research finds a representative from a smaller state is more likely to win a Senate seat compared to a representative from a larger state. This results from the congruency between his current House district and the desired Senate seat. A representative from a larger state has the potential for more competition, as his district is one of many that intersects with the Senate district. Additionally, less intersection means the representative is familiar with a much smaller percentage of his potential Senate constituents (Squire 1989, 1992). Hypothetically, Rep. Denny Rehberg (R-MT) has a much greater shot of fending off potential challengers and succeeding in a Senate election than Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) for the sheer fact he is Montana's sole representative while Meeks is one of twenty-nine.

Along with name recognition, voters evaluate senatorial candidates based on their levels of experience. Previous service in a state office increases both name recognition and experience for House members. Service in a state-level position, such as in the state legislature or in a constitutional office position like Attorney General, is just another way representatives can become visible to voters (especially those voters not currently in their House district) and can claim credit for political experience. Mike Crapo (R-ID) had the advantage of serving as his state's Senate Pro Temp prior to his service in the U.S. House. Upon making a bid for the statewide federal position, Crapo relied on this tie with voters to help secure votes from outside his district.

The support and approval of a representative's political affiliation/party appears to influence his likelihood of success. While there has been research to support the influence of local partisan forces, such as normal district vote and the party holding the seat (Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997), most evidence indicates that national conditions and the strength of the party as a whole influence the decision to run. These studies find that positive views of the party and/or sitting president indicate that a member of that party is more likely to emerge (Bianco 1984; Canon 1990; Carson et al. 2011; Jacobson 1989; Jacobson and Kernell 1983). In their study of repeat primary challenges, Taylor and Boatright (2005) found that challengers in an open seat rely more on broader partisan trends when determining whether to run again, unlike those challengers facing an incumbent, who base their emergence decisions on personal desires and abilities. I maintain that a representative will be more likely to emerge for a senatorial contest if the national political conditions favor their political party.

The Rate of Emergence

A secondary analysis, both in studying this level of progressive ambition and the progressive ambition of U.S. Senators, deals with questions surrounding the rate of emergence. To answer these questions, I turn to the same emergence calculus used to assess the probability of emergence. I maintain that factors included in the emergence calculus which increase or decrease the likelihood of acting on progressive ambition can also be used to gauge how fast or slow a bid is made in an officeholder's career.

Specifically, those factors that increase the probability of emergence, such as characteristics that increase viability, will encourage a representative or senator to run earlier in their career. If conditions appear to favor a successful bid, why not go ahead and emerge. Especially when remaining in the current position furthers entrenchment and provides a longer legislative history within the chamber, which can be used against an officeholder when finally deciding to act on their progressive ambition. Ask Sen. John Kerry if his record in the Senate was brought up more during his first presidential bid in 1988 or in his second in 2008.

Similarly, those factors included in the emergence calculus that stifle an officeholder's ambition can be expected to delay him seeking higher office. The politician may wait for these deterring factors to alter themselves or dissipate from voters' minds. In 1994, freshman representative Eric Fingerhut (D-OH) failed to win reelection to his 19th District seat. Biding his time for a full decade in the Ohio State Senate, Fingerhut emerged to challenge incumbent senator George Voinovich in 2004. It is clear Fingerhut had political aspirations to serve in the U.S. Senate; why else would he choose to run with an entrenched incumbent present. It may have been he felt that voters

had erased his congressional defeat from their mind, focusing instead on his successful tenure in the House and Ohio State Senate. If officeholders have a substantial proclivity towards progressive ambition, they *are* going to run for higher office. Therefore the question is not whether politicians act on ambition, but rather *when* they act on their ambition.

Research Design and Data

To determine the factors contributing to a representative's decision to run for the U.S. Senate, I collected data on all representatives, sitting or former, since 1976. This year—1976—is a logical starting point because it was the first election where we saw major legal changes to campaigns and elections. Changes to campaigns, affected by the 1974 Federal Elections Campaign Act, switched the importance of the political party to the individual candidate, making the decision to run much more about personal ambition (see Cohen et al. 2008 for a discussion of additional impact of the legislation).

The unit of analysis for both analyses is the representative-senatorial election. This means for every senatorial election held in a state, 1976-2008, there is an observation for any representative currently serving, or who had served in the position and was still eligible to run for office.²⁸ For example, a representative whose service started in 1980 and ended in 1986 was counted as an observation for every senatorial election from 1982-2008 held in his or her state.²⁹

²⁸ Being eligible to run for the Senate is conditioned in this study by three things: constitutional requirements surrounding who can be a senator (age and citizenship requirements), federal charges prohibiting them from elected service, and death. Candidates not meeting any of the conditions and subsequently being barred from being a senator are excluded from the analysis.

²⁹ In this example, the representative would not be in the dataset for the 1980 senate election because he acquired the House seat in that election, not taking office until January 1981. Because of the class system that the U.S. Senate operates under, a representative was only able to run in two out of every three senate elections.

Any representative who acquired office as a result of a vacancy and sought subsequent reelection is included in the dataset. Those who inherited a seat and only served out the remainder of the term, not seeking reelection to a full term, are excluded. It was clear they had no original intention of being a representative, and therefore run counter to the assumptions made about rational and progressively ambitious representatives. Also excluded from the analysis are any House members unable to serve in the Senate due to constitutional requirements, such as age or citizenship. Independents and third party candidates are also excluded because they do not fit into the scope of the major two-party study performed here. Finally, any former representative who successfully sought and served in the Senate is excluded from the analysis. Data on the individual representatives, their biographical information, previous election information, election terms, and results was collected from the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*. There are a total of 10,054 observations.

The analysis in this chapter addresses two central research questions. First, under what circumstances do representatives emerge as senatorial candidates? Secondly, which of these circumstances affect the speed in which representatives emerge as senatorial candidates? All representatives, current and former, will be utilized to answer the questions and will be tested in two models. The first model, which addresses the probability of an initial emergence, uses a logistic regression to analyze the factors hypothesized to have an effect on acting on progressive ambition. To account for the

For this dataset, “currently serving” is any representative who currently serving at the time of the election or was serving in the years leading up to the Senate election (so anyone who was a current representative since the last Senate election), and “formerly serving” is any senator who had stepped down from Senate service (voluntarily or involuntarily) but who has not died or become constitutionally ineligible. For example, Representative A from Georgia started serving in 1970, lost reelection in 1982, and died in 1990. Senator A would be in the analysis as a currently serving representative for the 1978 and 1980 senatorial election. He would be classified as a former representative in the 1984 and 1988 senatorial election. He would not be in the dataset for the 1990 election forward.

potential for duration dependency, a simple logistic regression is run by accounting for Binary Cross-Section Time-Series (BTSCS) data (Beck, Katz, Tucker 1998).³⁰ This method acknowledges the potential for serial correlation as a result of duration dependency, and so includes two splines, which essentially are smoothed temporal dummy variables. These splines take up fewer degrees of freedom, as well as provide more information about the baseline hazard as it relates to time.³¹ The dependent variable in the first model is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the representative emerged to run for the senatorial election. A senator is coded as emerging if he or she ran in the primary election held for that state's senate seat. Information on primary emergence was collected from *Congressional Quarterly's* Voting and Elections Database.

A second analysis tests which of the factors influencing the probability of emergence calculus factors influence the *rate* of emergence. Here, I fit a Cox proportional hazard model to address which factors speed up or slow down a representative acting on their progressive ambition. The rate of emergence models accounts for the survival time of the representatives being analyzed, meaning that each congressman has a unique time measurement associated with their observation. For this study, the individuals are U.S. Representatives and the event of interest, also called a failure, is whether the representative emerged as a candidate in a presidential election. The survival time is comprised of the number of senatorial elections the representative

³⁰ Duration dependence can be defined as the extent to which the conditional hazard of the event of interest occurring is influenced by time. If the event is subject to duration dependence its occurrence will increase or decrease over time. For more information on duration dependency, see Zorn (2000).

³¹ For a more technical discussion of splines and the BTSCS method, see Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).

could have emerged in from the start of their service in the House and continues to count elections until the representative is censored.³²

Generally, I hypothesize any cost, aversion to taking risks, or liabilities associated with a campaign will cause a senator to deter his emergence until later in his political career. If a candidate possesses any characteristic that increases his viability as a presidential candidate, and therefore is more likely to emerge in the first place, I believe he will run earlier in his career. Both models have the same explanatory and control variables, and generally, can be classified as either a cost, risk, liability, or increased viability. I will briefly describe the variables and their operationalizations before turning to the analysis.

Due to the addition of *Former* House members to the data set, I include a variable that indicates whether a representative is currently serving. I classify it as a cost, given a representative would have to spend a large amount of campaigning for the U.S. Senate and subsequently not spending as much time on their current office. However, even with the added luxury of time to campaign, former representatives may struggle to remain politically relevant and refrain from acting on their progressive ambition. I include the measure of *Current*, but have no hypothesized direction for its effect. *Leadership Position* is coded dichotomously as any representative who is serving as Speaker of the House, Majority or Minority Leader, or Majority or Minority Whip. Similarly, any representative currently serving as a *Committee Chair* in the year leading up to the Senate election will be accounted for.

³² A senator is censored for a number of reasons including emerging as a presidential candidate, becoming older than the age cut off of 75, dying, or staying in the data set until 2008, when the study is terminated.

Following Rohde (1979), and all scholars studying emergence since his study, I control for the risk propensity of the current or former House member (*Risk*), as indicated by whether they challenged an incumbent representative to obtain their current House seat. Those House members considered to be “risk takers” are hypothesized to emerge to run for Senate, as they are believed to be the most progressively ambitious.

Turning to the potential liabilities associated with a representative’s candidate, several influences are included. Due to the negative stigma attached to unsuccessful reelected bids, it is predicted that former representatives who involuntarily left the House (*Lost Reelection*) will be less likely to run for the Senate. To account for the *Ideological Extremity* of each representative, I employ Poole and Rosenthal’s (2007) first dimension DW-NOMINATE scores. For this study, *Age* is measured as the age of the representative. It is hypothesized that the older a member of the House is, the less likely she is to emerge as a candidate for the Senate.³³ However, because of the inclusion of former representatives, which includes representatives who have retired due to age, I exclude any former senator over the age of 75.³⁴ To test the impact of minority status, *Nontraditional* will dichotomously measure any House member who represents a racial, ethnic, or gender-based group.

Open Seat is a dichotomous measure of any Senate election where an incumbent is not seeking reelection and should encourage both the probability and rate of emergence. To assess the anticipated added bonus of name recognition and number of

³³ This variable was also coded as *Age* and *Age*² to account for a nonlinear relationship, indicating that age might be a liability if a senator is too old or too young. The results were not significant and a linear effect of age was confirmed.

³⁴ This exclusion was made to prevent the *Age* variable from being biased towards old age negatively effecting the decision to emerge. Using work done on progressive ambition of U.S. Senators (Wanless 2010) and state supreme court justices (Wanless, Vining, and Wilhelm 2010), and the lack of emergence after the age of 75, I created a cutoff of 75 for this research. There were no cases of representatives running for the Senate after the age 75, and just 5 emerging after the age of 70.

potential challengers, I include a variable (*Candidate Pool*) to control for the number of House of Representative seats present in the state. I anticipate that as the number of seats in the House increases, the less likely emergence in a Senate race will be.

In addition to the explanatory variables listed above, I also employ two control variables. The first is a simple account for *Party Identification*. The second control, *Nature of the Times*, acknowledges that current political conditions could influence a representative's propensity for emergence. If a representative is of the party of a popular president (popular president gauged by an approval rating of 50% or higher), or is of the opposite party of an unpopular president, the political climate is in their favor and I anticipate emergence. If they are of the party of an unpopular president or of the opposite party of a popular president, I maintain emergence will be less likely. Given that candidates must declare their candidacy prior to the primary contest, and because the filing deadlines for these primaries vary, using the percent of first approval rating for the year creates a consistent, yet applicable gauge of what representatives are contemplating when deciding to emerge.³⁵

Results and Discussion

Analysis One: Probability of Emergence

To address the probability that a congressman runs for the U.S. Senate, a BTSCS logistic regression tests the emergence of both current and former U.S representatives. In total, there were 240 attempts for the Senate made by representatives, with twelve coming as a repeated attempt. Of particular interest, 62 former representatives made a

³⁵ I chose presidential approval over congressional approval because of the historically low and negative view of both political parties in Congress. Additionally, studies have traditionally used presidential approval as a proxy for party approval (Bianco 1984; Canon 1990; Carson et al. 2011; Jacobson 1990; Jacobson and Kernell 1983)

bid for the White House, or 26 percent of all emergencies. The results, displayed in Table 3.1, indicate representatives act strategically when making bids for the Senate, considering not only the potential costs incurred and the liabilities their candidacies hold, but also characteristics that increase their viability as a successful presidential candidate. Also evident from this model is the weight representatives give to factors stemming from their current office, such as the service within the chamber or number in their respective candidate pools. Additionally, we see representatives acting similar to state legislators when acting on their progressive ambition, being largely influenced by the opportunities presented to them.

Somewhat surprising is that the only cost that representatives seem to let influence their decision to emerge is whether they serve as a committee chair. Unlike serving in a leadership position, which appears to have no effect on a representative's emergence calculus, the odds of a committee chairman emerging are 61% less than a representative who holds no such power. This makes theoretical sense because chairmanships in the House garner significant power within the chamber. This is especially true when drawing comparisons to the Senate, where fewer members equals more people serving as chairmen, meaning the relative influence over other members is diminished. Barney Frank (D-MA), chairman of the Financial Services Committee, epitomizes this result. Rep. Frank declined from running for the late Ted Kennedy's Senate seat because, among other reasons, he liked his status as "one of the most powerful members of Congress" according to the *New York Times*, and did not want to start his seniority over again.³⁶ It appears that serving as a committee chair may give

³⁶ "A Way with Words." *The New York Times*, May 13, 2008.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/washington/13barneybox.html>

enough power within the lower chamber to make emergence significantly costly, but does not give enough beneficial name recognition (like a person in a leadership position) to overcome such added costs.

Influential liabilities, or negatives associated with a candidacy, appear to have impact on whether a representative chooses to act on their progressive ambition. For former members of the House, how they left office and how long they have been out seems to limit the likelihood of emergence. For every year out of office, the odds of a representative running for the U.S. Senate decrease by 6.8%. The probability that a representative runs for higher office while currently serving is .025. For the average length of time out of office, seven years, this probability drops the likelihood of emergence in half. If the representative has been out of office for the maximum amount of time allowed by the data—46 years—the probability of emergence is less than .001.³⁷ It appears that being out of the limelight and current political arena indicates to candidates that they may have a hard time reminding voters of their previous service and experience.

³⁷ Hugo Sims (D-SC) was 27 when elected to his one term in the House of Representatives in 1948. He remained in the data set until 2004, when he died at the age of 75. Eighteen other representatives were included in the data set for forty or more years after their service in the House.

Table 3.1 BTSCS Logistic Regression of the Probability of U.S. Representatives Emerging for the U.S. Senate, 1976-2008

<i>Variable</i>	<i>U.S. Representatives Coef. (Std. Error)</i>	<i>Change in Pred. Probability</i>
<i>Costs</i>		
Current	0.12 (0.25)	
Leadership Position	-0.54 (0.84)	
Committee Chairman	-0.93 (0.42)**	-.0019
<i>Risks</i>		
Risk Taker	0.28 (0.19)	
<i>Liabilities</i>		
Time Since Held	-0.07 (0.03)***	-.0143
Lost Reelection	-0.62 (0.30)**	-.0024
Ideologically Extreme	-0.18 (0.37)*	
Age	-0.06 (0.01)***	-.0420
Nontraditional	-0.12 (0.23)	
<i>Increased Viability</i>		
Open Seat	1.29 (0.14)***	.0050
Candidate Pool	-0.04 (0.01)***	-.0044
Previous Experience	-0.21 (0.13)	
Nature of the Times	-0.00 (0.14)	
Party Identification	0.35 (0.27)	
Spline 1	0.01 (.00)**	
Spline 2	-0.02 (0.01)***	
Constant	-0.38 (0.49)	Baseline
		.0227
Number of Observations	10,029	
Log Likelihood	-924.16765	
Wald χ^2	244.9***	
% Correctly Classified	94.06	

Note: Dependent variable is whether representative emerged in a U.S. Senate Election.

*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 two-tailed test. Changes in predicted probability are +/- 1/2 s.d. for continuous variables and 0-1 for dichotomous variables.

Similarly, having left office as a result of failing to win reelection will deter a former representative from running for higher office. Of the sixty-two senatorial bids made by former representatives, fifteen of them came from representatives who lost reelection. All fifteen of them lost their senatorial bid, and for the most part, lost them

badly.³⁸ The probability that Republican congressman Larry LaRocco would emerge in Idaho's 1998 Senate election was .047. After losing reelection in 1994, and being out of elected office for fourteen years, Larry LaRocco emerged in the 2008 U.S. Senate race in Idaho. For this election, the probability that he would emerge plummets to .012. It appears, for the most part, former representatives have learned from the likes of Rep. LaRocco and understand leaving a bad taste in voters' mouths, especially for an extended period of time, will likely kill any chances they have of being successful in their bids for higher office. While not being any less ambitious, representatives in these situations know losing reelection and being out of office are liabilities too great to overlook.

One final liability that has a major influence over the decision to seek office is the age of a representative. The average age of those representatives in the data set that emerged to run for the U.S. Senate is 49 years old. The older a representative gets, the less likely he will emerge. In fact, the odds of emergence decrease by almost 6% for every year older a representative is. This effect may be two fold. In one regard, the older a representative gets, the less viable they look to voters. This is especially so given the lengthy term lengths accompanying a seat in the U.S. Senate. Similar to senators running for president, the stigma of "being old" is an individual characteristic that representatives must convince voters is not a problem. Alternatively, the increasing age among currently serving representatives equates to prolonged service in the House. Lengthy tenure within one chamber often is cited as an example of static, rather than progressive ambition (Schlesinger 1966).

³⁸ Those fifteen representatives include: Jim Jontz, Donald Bailey, Bill Grant, Andrew McGuire, Eugene Johnston, John Schmitz, Leslie Byrne, Larry LaRocco, David Towell, John W. Cox, Gary Franks, Charles Porter, Sherman Lloyd, Frank Cremeans, and Eric Fingerhut.

Figure 3.1 depicts the effect of age on the probability of emergence, conditioned by whether or not a representative has lost reelection to his House seat. The red line is the probability of emergence if the representative lost reelection, while the blue line represents the probability if they are currently serving or left the lower chamber voluntarily. The probability that representatives who have lost reelection to their House seat is about half that of those representatives who have not lost reelection and increasing age furthers this decline. The younger the congressman, the higher his probability of emergence becomes. As they move from the minimum age in the data set to the maximum (30 to 75), regardless of having lost reelection, their probability of acting on progressive ambition declines. However, one thing Figure 3.1 does tell us is that the advantages of *not* losing reelection are diminished as age increases, so that regardless of if they have left the House, or how they left it, age will deter acting on ambition. So much so that a sixty-five year representative who has never lost reelection has almost the same probability of emergence as a sixty-five year old who failed to retain his elected office.




Figure 3.1 The Probability of Emergence by Age of and Losing Reelection

Just as representatives consider liabilities when determining whether to emerge in a senatorial election, they also appear to take note of the characteristics specific to their candidacy that increase their viability as a Senate candidate. While not a surprise, the presence of an open seat largely encourages a senatorial bid. Similar to state representatives seeking a seat in the U.S. House, an open seat is a rarity that yields unrivaled success. Indeed, congressmen left with the option of running for the Senate when a seat is open have over twice the odds of emerging than a representative who would have to face an incumbent (262% increase in the odds). It appears from the weight given to open seats, U.S. representatives largely condition their acting on progressive ambition around whether the opportunity for greater success exists. While this calculation is similar to state legislators, I will show how it is different than U.S. Senators

who seek the White House. For these members of Congress, and less so for representatives, the decision to emerge appears to largely be influenced by what the senator can add to his candidacy personally, and not the opportunity presented to him.

One additional characteristic of increased viability that positively influences the acting on progressive ambition is the size of the candidate pool. As hypothesized, the benefits of name recognition among voters and experience in working in the federal government are negated when there are more similarly situated potential candidates. For every additional representative in the congressman's congressional delegation, the odds of emergence decrease by 3.5%. Looking at the more extreme cases, a congressman serving as his state's only representative has a .037 probability of emergence, while a congressman with fifty-two fellow representatives (i.e., California), only has a .0063 probability. Figure 3.2 depicts these statistics. Again, the red line indicates having lost reelection and has a lower probability of emergence than the blue line, which includes representatives currently serving or who left voluntarily. However, if one adds in the size of the candidate pool, a significant effect is discovered. Even if a representative is in good graces with his constituency, whether by retaining their congressional seat or retiring from the House, his probability of emergence decreases dramatically when the number of fellow congressmen moves from one to twenty. The effect on representatives who have already been booted out of office carries less weight, but still decreases the likelihood of emergence.




Figure 3.2 The Probability of Emergence by Size of Congressional Delegation and Losing Reelection

It is apparent, that much like state legislators, U.S. representatives know that the advantages achieved by holding their offices are diminished when the number of potential competitors with comparable qualities are present. It can also be inferred from the findings in Chapter 2 that because size of the candidate pool has nearly identical effects on emergence as district overlap, an increase in the candidate pool size could indicate to representatives that voters will be less familiar with their candidacy because he has represented fewer of them in the past.

Of note, the splines in this model are significant, indicating use of the BTSCS model was warranted. Significant splines indicate there is duration dependency present, meaning that the probability of emergence is conditioned by time. Upon review of the

data, it becomes evident that the probability of emergence is decreasing as time progresses. Fewer senatorial bids have come from the U.S. House of Representatives as the years in the data set proceed. Reasons for this decline are not a specific focus of this dissertation, but potentially influential factors include growing strength of the incumbency advantage, a more desirable career in the U.S. House, and increased costs (financially and temporarily) associated with a Senate bid.

One of the claims made by this dissertation is that we can better understand and predict the progressively ambitious actions of U.S. House members by including factors that indicate to a candidate that they are more likely to succeed if emergence is attempted. To test this claim that the emergence calculus, as a theory, is improved by the addition of these increased viability characteristics, a Likelihood Ratio Test was run. A Likelihood Ratio Test analyzes the predictive value of two nested models and gives a chi-squared statistic to indicate whether the non-nested, or improved model is significantly able to better predict the event of interest. In this case, the nested model includes all of the costs, liabilities, risk-levels of the candidate, and controls. The non-nested model adds the increased viability characteristics and the results indicate that the emergence calculus utilizing the increased viability calculus is statistically better at predicting emergence than the traditional emergence calculus (110.8226***).³⁹

A secondary question that stems from a discussion on the merit of the model is how accurately it predicts actual cases of emergence. The percent of cases correctly classified is 97.73%, which is a significantly high percentage. Additionally, the false

³⁹ The results of the Likelihood Ratio Test were not displayed in a table, as the use of clustered required a hand calculation of the test. The Log-Likelihood of the nested model was -978.87708 and the Log-Likelihood of the improved model was -923.46575, with six degrees of freedom.

positive rate is zero and the false negative percent is 2.27%. However, it should be acknowledged that a substantial amount of the predictive value of the model stems from its ability to accurately predict cases where emergence does not occur. Given this occurs in 97% of the observations, it appears the significance of the model is stifled. However, using the traditional cutoff of significant prediction (.5) may not be accurate in cases of emergence, as the rareness of the event and the difficulty in quantifying a characteristic so intrinsic to a person's nature will always limit any model's predictive value. Rather, it may be more helpful to look at the model's real world application and success in predicting actual cases of emergence. Consider, for instance, the 2008 Senate Elections. In ranking the representatives by size of their predictive probability, we see that the model accurately predicted two out of the top ten representatives with the highest predicted probability actually emerged to run in the 2008 Senate elections: Heather Wilson (R-NM) and Bob Schaffer (R-CO).⁴⁰

The findings derived from the BTSCS regression model indicate most representatives act strategically when making a bid for the U.S. Senate, considering not only the potential costs incurred, the liabilities their candidacy holds, but also characteristics that increase their viability as a successful senatorial candidate. Additionally, we discover the opportunists who realize when it is the right time to act on ambition, and in the case of former representatives, when it is not.

⁴⁰ There predicted probabilities for emerging in 2008 were .1825876 (3rd) and .1083836 (9th). Nebraska Republicans Lee Terry (.215978) and Adrian Smith (.2147461) were the first and second highest predicted cases of emergence. Tom Udall (D-NM) was the 12th most predicted case and the worst predicted case, Dick Zimmer (-NJ) ranked 266 out of 434 cases in the data for 2008.

Analysis Two: The Rate of Emergence

The second analysis focuses on the factors influencing the speed in which representatives emerge, in both initial and repeated events. From the first analysis, the factors responsible for encouraging or stifling emergence were observed. Extending upon this, the same factors are used to determine when a representative will choose to act ambitiously. Utilizing a Cox proportional hazard model, the results are reported in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Regression of the Rate of U.S. Representatives Emerging for U.S. Senate, 1976-2008

<i>Variable</i>	<i>U.S. Representatives Coef. (Std. Error)</i>
<i>Costs</i>	
Current	0.35 (0.23)
Leadership Position	-1.37 (1.01)
Committee Chairman	-1.51 (0.42)***
<i>Risks</i>	
Risk Taker	0.31 (0.18)*
<i>Liabilities</i>	
Time Since Held	0.03 (0.02)
Lost Reelection	-0.51 (0.29)*
Ideologically Extreme	0.40 (0.33)
Age	-0.14 (0.01)***
Nontraditional	0.16 (0.23)
<i>Increased Viability</i>	
Open Seat	1.22 (0.13)***
Candidate Pool	-0.03 (0.01)***
Previous Experience	-0.07 (0.13)
Nature of the Times	0.03 (0.13)
Party Identification	0.22 (0.24)
Number of Observations	10,029
Log Likelihood	-1796.0979
Wald χ^2	515.15***

*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 two-tailed test.

As anticipated, those factors encouraging emergence in the first place are also largely responsible for the speed at which emergence occurs. Serving as a committee chair, a cost found to deter emergence, has an 88% smaller hazard. This means that the rate of emergence occurs at a slower rate when the representative serves as a chairman than if he were a rank-and-file member of the House. Of those committee chairs who did run for the Senate (6/549), the average tenure before a progressively ambitious move was six terms. A prime example of this delayed emergence was Rep. James Broyhill (R-NC), who waited twelve terms before running for the Senate.

Likewise, having lost reelection to their House seat not only deters emergence, but among those who did make bids for the Senate, they did so at a slower rate. Representatives who have lost reelection have a 40% smaller hazard ratio than those representatives who are currently serving or left voluntarily. Age also shrinks the size of the hazard ratio, or slows down the rate of emergence. For each year older a representative becomes, and with all the other variables held constant, the rate of emerging decreases by 13%.

Characteristics of increased viability not only encourage acting on progressive ambition, but they also speed up the time before the representative acts on ambition. Both the presence of an open seat and the size of the candidate pool are significant determinants on whether a representative will seek higher office. They are also significant determinants on when such bids for higher office will come in a representative's career. The hazard ratio of those representatives faced with an open seat is three times the size as those forced to face an incumbent. Theoretically, this makes sense, given the opportunistic behavior representatives have shown. Not only are they

significantly more likely to run when they do not have to face a sitting senator, but the odds of success are deemed so much greater that they are willing to run earlier than anticipated.

Also affecting the rate of emergence is the size of the candidate pool. As the number of fellow representatives in a state decreases by one, and everything else is held constant, the rate of emergence speeds up by 3.2%. This means that in 2008, if two representatives are equal in every regard, but one is from Pennsylvania (19 congressional seats) and one is from Delaware (2 congressional seats), the representative from Delaware should have an emergence rate 54% higher than the representative from Pennsylvania!

The risk taking variable had an unexpected result on the rate of emergence. Its effect on the speed in which a representative emerges is not surprising, as we would equate risk taking with not waiting to emerge in an election for higher office (size of the hazard increased by 36%). These risk takers have shown a propensity for running in highly competitive races, seemingly opposite of their non-risk taking colleagues who would rather wait for an open seat to arise than face an incumbent. Rather, it is surprising that that risk taker had an effect on the rate of emergence at all, as it played no role in the decision to emerge in the first place. It may be the case that a representative comfortable with taking risks gives no credence to an emergence calculus; they might be the type of candidates who will run no matter the presence or lack of influential variables. In addition to ignoring the emergence calculus, these representatives comfortable with risks appear to run earlier in their careers. Take Dan Quayle (R-IN) as an example. After defeating an incumbent to acquire his House seat, Quayle waited just two short years

before contesting in Indiana's 1980 Senate Election. An eventual vice president and presidential contender, it is no surprise an officeholder as prone to taking risks would ascend up the political ladder at such a rapid pace.

Taken as a whole, the analysis on the rate of emergence is something previously left unstudied by the field. However, important conclusions can be drawn from the findings reported in this chapter. Factors that encourage emergence also increase the speed in which candidate emergence occurs. By acknowledging this, it is possible to determine why a representative emerged after only one term, when the conclusions from Chapter 2 and the literature elsewhere suggests officeholders need to develop experience and prominence if they are to wage successful campaigns (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987). Take for example the case of Rep. Denise Majette (D-GA). Having defeated entrenched, five-term incumbent Cynthia McKinney for Georgia's 4th congressional district in 2002, Majette was an up-and-coming star in the Democratic Party. In addition, Georgia's 4th was a district largely drawn to benefit Democratic candidates. Despite holding an overwhelming "safe" seat in the House and only completing one term, Majette surprised almost everyone when she announced in 2004 her candidacy for retiring incumbent Zell Miller's (D-GA) U.S. Senate seat.

Why would Majette take the opportunity to run after only one term? Using the analysis presented above, the answer to the first part of the question would point to Majette's youth, lack of opportunity costs as a result of a short tenure, and relative few colleagues to contend for the position. However, the second part of the question, why did she run for the Senate so quickly in her congressional career can be explained by two things: risk-taking and presence of an open seat. Majette clearly demonstrated she was

comfortable in risky situations when she took on such a notable incumbent in Cynthia McKinney. Giving up a secure seat in the U.S. House to make an improbable bid at Georgia's U.S. Senate seat is certainly a risky choice.

However, even more influential was the fact that the senate seat had no incumbent running. The last time a U.S. Senate seat was open in Georgia was 1996 (Sam Nunn retired from the Class II seat) and the last time this particular senate seat (Class III) was vacant was in 1956. Clearly, Rep. Majette saw the limited opportunity she was faced with and knew that if she wanted an easier political battle, a result of not facing an incumbent, she would have to run after her first term and before she could cultivate desired name recognition. While maybe not the ideal time to run, the risk-taker in Majette saw the open seat as a now or never situation.⁴¹

⁴¹ Majette won the Democratic nomination, but ultimately lost to Republican John Isakson.

CHAPTER 4

U.S. SENATORS RUNNING FOR U.S. PRESIDENT

In January of 2003, junior Democratic senator John Edwards from North Carolina formed an exploratory committee to begin raising funds for his 2004 presidential bid, with a formal announcement made on September 15th of that same year. A traditional emergence calculus would not predict the Edwards candidacy, as he was a first term senator with no previous electoral or foreign policy experience. However, there were a number of factors that made his announcement less surprising. He was a young, charismatic Democrat with the potential to carry a Republican-leaning South. But more importantly, John Edwards was an ambitious politician, at one time admitting he had looked towards the White House since law school. In attempting to explain such unexpected candidacies, this chapter aims to improve the existing emergence calculus, as well as address a question not yet raised by the field: Which influential factors increase or decrease the rate in which senators emerge as presidential candidates?

It is no secret that historically the United States Senate has been a hotbed for presidential candidates. In presidential elections held from 1868-1972, 30.4% of major contenders last held offices in the Senate (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976). More recently, from 1960 to 1996, 36.7% of presidential candidates have come from the Senate (Burden 2002). In the three presidential elections since Burden's study, 46% of presidential candidates running in the Iowa Caucus have come from the U.S. Senate.⁴²

⁴² In 2008, presidential candidates coming from the Senate included Bayh, Biden, Boxer, Brownback, Clinton, Dodd, Edwards, Gravel, Lincoln, Obama, McCain, and Thompson; In 2004, the presidential candidates from the Senate were Edwards and Kerry; In 2000, presidential candidates from the Senate were Bradley, Gore, McCain, and Hatch.

In the open 2008 Presidential Election, twelve senators, constituting over half of the major two party candidates, filed candidacy reports with the Federal Election Commission and both major party presidential nominees came from the Senate.

U.S. Senators' Progressive Ambition for the Presidency of the United States

What is it about particular senators, such as John Edwards, that encourages them to run for president when most do not? From the outside looking in, it would seem these legislators already have cushy jobs, with high rates of reelection, lengthy terms, and significant influence over the national agenda. Additionally, the chance of actually winning the presidency is slim and often comes at a high price. Nevertheless, the most likely reason senators are willing to risk it all is ambition—more specifically, progressive ambition. Again, progressive ambition is defined here as the desire to obtain a higher position and is an observable political behavior that occurs when office holders emerge as candidates for higher offices. The U.S. President is the highest office in the country, if not the world, and so those seeking it are considered to be the most ambitious. The difficulty in studying ambition among politicians is that no one wants to admit they are progressively ambitious. Several studies have attempted to understand this behavior through the application of an emergence calculus, and while these studies provide a good base for discovering the inner workings of senatorial progressive ambition, we do not yet fully understand both why and when these individual senators ultimately decide to run (see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich 1980; Burden 2002; Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976).

The Emergence Calculus of U.S. Senators

The variables in this dissertation are the characteristics that make up a candidate's emergence calculus. Most of the costs, risks, and liabilities have been discussed in earlier chapters, as they are similar deterrents regardless of the office sought. That said, there may be different reasons why they are influential factors, separate from the rationale used in explaining state legislator or representative emergence, and so they will be analyzed specifically in relation to senators running for the presidency. Additionally, there are a number of factors that are unique to those senators seeking the presidency. Those individuals who are the more viable presidential candidates need to be addressed. However, to reiterate the general theme, it is hypothesized that senators with increased costs, who are risk-adverse, and who have characteristics presenting their candidacy with liabilities will be less likely to emerge as a presidential candidate than those senators with lower costs, who have a propensity for risk-taking, and lack liabilities; senators with characteristics that increase their viability will be more likely to emerge than senators that hold no such characteristics. Similarly, senators who hold characteristics increasing the probability of emergence, will also emerge earlier in their career. Characteristics stifling emergence will delay a senator acting on his progressive ambition.

Making a bid for the presidency means candidates will have to expend a tremendous amount of time, energy, and resources, more so than they would for their otherwise secure Senate seats. Scholars such as Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987), Aldrich (1980), and Burden (2002) find being up for reelection for their Senate seat plays a significant role in whether a senator emerges to run for the White House. Running for a higher office takes time away from their current seat and constituency, which has the

potential to be even more costly if the senator is electorally vulnerable. Seeking a higher position may also require an officeholder to forfeit established leadership positions within the chamber (Copeland 1989; Herrick and Moore 1993). Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS), a former Majority Leader, and Sen. John Edwards (D-NC) can testify to the costs a senator assumes when deciding to run for president.

Comfort with taking risks should play a role in the decision to seek the presidency, as the probability of success in winning not only the political party's nomination, but the general election is very small. Senators like Dan Quayle and Rick Santorum are obviously risk-takers on top of being ambitious, as both challenged incumbents for their House and Senate seats. Those senators most comfortable with taking risks are the ones most likely to emerge as presidential contenders.

Liabilities are characteristics that have the potential to lower a senator's probability of winning either the nomination or the general election. One of the great advantages the office of the U.S. Senate lends a candidate is national visibility, or name recognition. Any senator having a liability, or negative characteristic, associated with their potential presidential bid would damage these inherent benefits stemming from service in the upper chamber of Congress (Burden 2002). Having to overcome these liabilities may also slow down the rate of emergence if a candidate feels confident he can rise above or remedy them. Examples of potential liabilities include ideological extremity (Burden 2002; Truel 2009), past political actions such as scandals (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Jacobson and Dimock 1994), and previous presidential bids (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987). Involuntary characteristics such as age, gender, or race are also potential liabilities (Burden 2002; Fox and Lawless 2005). Senator John

McCain is a good example. In 1989, he was associated with the Keating Five scandal, which ended the careers of three of the senators involved. McCain, a repeat challenger for the White House, has proven his willingness to act on his progressive ambitious tendencies. However, both of his bids came over ten years after the problematic scandal. While being associated with a scandal can be detrimental to one's career, if played right and sufficiently removed from the forefront of voters' minds, it may be something that presidential candidates can overcome.

Missing from the prior research on candidate' emergence calculi are characteristics that *increase* a candidate's chances of winning. An ability to alter the traditional landscape of the Electoral College, as well as certain experiences in and outside of the Senate, can increase the viability and attractiveness of a candidate (see, e.g., Stone and Maisel 2003). This so-called increased viability may even offset negative aspects of a senator's candidacy.

By including these factors in a model of rational entry, we can assess the impact they have on individuals, and on the costs, liabilities, and risks inherent with every campaign. Fox and Lawless (2005, 644) state, "people, utilizing the patterns of behavior from previous successful candidates, will act in a manner that would enhance their chances." Previous studies assessing the influence that age has on the likelihood of senators running for president would lead us to believe Senator John McCain would not have run for president (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Aldrich 1980; see also Brace 1984). However, Senator McCain's military service and experience garnered from service on the Foreign Relations Committee made him an extremely attractive candidate in a wartime election such as 2008. In Senator McCain's case, his military service and

leadership in the Senate might have made him attractive enough at the nomination stage that voters were able to look past his age.

Characteristics that contribute to the strength of a candidacy amplify a senator's viability in several ways. First, these characteristics indicate a strong and advantageous electoral base, which allows a candidate to show party elites and potential voters they have significant support for their candidacy and are therefore a viable candidate for the nomination given the Electoral College context we operate under (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976; Aldrich 1980).

Secondly, characteristics increase viability because they indicate increased name recognition and experience. Name recognition is important, especially early in the nomination season, because it helps voters identify senators as candidates even when information surrounding their candidacy is scarce. Increased name recognition has proven to increase success in obtaining elective office, as it lessens the advantage incumbents have with respect to voter familiarity (Carson et al. 2011; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Mayhew 1974). Indicating to voters that a senator has experience in the issues a president must deal with also increases viability as it eases concerns about senators' preparation for the role of president. For example, if a senator had also served previously as a governor, he or she can make claims about their executive experience and the ability to be a successful head of state. In addition to these increased viability characteristics improving the likelihood that an officeholder will emerge, they should increase the *rate* in which they emerge. Senators with campaigns encompassing one or more of these factors will find political conditions more conducive or find the presence of costs or liabilities less detrimental.

Data and Research Design

Previous studies of ambition have excluded formerly-serving senators from their analysis. The inclusion of former senators is vital if we are to obtain a comprehensive picture of not only who runs for president, but also how service in the Senate facilitates progressive ambition. Given the sheer number of senators who run for the presidency, both current and formerly serving, there appears to be a self-perceived inherent advantage stemming from their service in the upper chamber. Simply because the senator is no longer serving does not mean the added bonuses stemming from the office entirely disappear. In fact, this dataset finds that former senators made roughly a quarter of all presidential bids coming from senators, past or present.

To determine the factors contributing to a senator's decision to run for president, I collected data on all senators, sitting or former, since 1976. This year—1976—is a logical starting point because it was the first presidential election where we saw major legal changes to campaigns' and elections' procedures. Changes to campaigns, affected by the 1974 Federal Elections Campaign Act, switched the importance of the political party to the individual candidate, making the decision to run much more about personal ambition (see Cohen et al. 2008 for a discussion of additional repercussions of the legislation).

The unit of analysis for both analyses is the senator-presidential election. This means for every presidential election, 1976-2008, there is an observation for any senator currently serving, or who had served in the position and was still eligible to run for office, for that presidential election.⁴³ For example, a senator whose service started in 1980 and

⁴³ Being eligible to run for president is conditioned in this study by three things: constitutional requirements surrounding who can be president (age and citizenship requirements), federal charges prohibiting them

ended in 1986 was counted as an observation for every presidential election from 1984-2008.⁴⁴ However, to account for the impact of an incumbent president running, only senators of the opposite party of the incumbent president were counted for that election.⁴⁵ For the 1976, 1984, 1992, and 2004 Presidential Elections, only Democratic senators are included in the analysis, and for the 1980 and 1996 Presidential Election, only Republican senators and governors are included. For the 1988, 2000, and 2008 open seat Presidential Elections, where no incumbent president was running, both Republican and Democratic senators are included in the analysis. This leaves us with a total of 907 observations.

Any senator who inherited the office due to a vacancy and sought subsequent reelection is included in the dataset. Those who inherited a seat and only served out the remainder of the term, not seeking reelection to a full term, are excluded. Data on the individual senators, their biographical information, previous election information, election terms, and results was collected from the *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress*.

To test my expectations, I fit two models of candidate emergence, focusing the first on the factors influencing senators' decisions to run for president. Data on all senators' initial presidential bids, regardless of whether they are a currently and formerly

from elected service, and death. Candidates not meeting any of the conditions and subsequently being barred from being president will be excluded from the analysis.

⁴⁴ In this example, the senator would not be in the dataset for the 1980 Presidential Election because he acquired the senate seat in that election, not taking office until January 1981.

⁴⁵ The presence of an incumbent president is widely known to limit the field of potential candidates from the same party. To include senators from both parties in every election, regardless of the incumbency status, would bias the results. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) found their model, which excluded potential candidates from the incumbent party, gave a correct negative prediction in 99.5% of the cases studied. For this dataset, only Sen. Ted Kennedy's 1980 presidential bid was excluded.

serving, is collected to answer questions surrounding the probability of emergence.⁴⁶ As with emergence in U.S House races, we assume duration dependency, treating the data as Binary Time Series Cross-Section (BTSCS) data, and run logistic regression to determine the factors contributing to their emergence calculus while accounting for the influence of time.⁴⁷

The dependent variable in this model is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the senator emerged to run for the presidential election. A senator is coded as emerging if he or she filed a finance report with the Federal Election Commission. Previous research defined emergence as anyone who participated in at least one primary other than the one in her home state (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987; Taylor and Boatright 2005). Unfortunately, these definitions limit the candidates seen as emerging. Given the era of perpetual campaigning, candidates are declaring their intent to run earlier than was the case in the past. This causes some candidates to enter early and exit early, as there is more time for poor national conditions, a scandal, or some other unforeseen event to arise. This is in contradiction to House or Senate primaries, where we do not see a significant number of candidates emerge and drop out before the actual contest. Due to this phenomenon, several authors subjectively qualify “serious” contenders (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rohde 1976) or “fully-invested” candidates (Burden 2002). However, this may not be the most appropriate to indicate who has emerged: either they decided to run

⁴⁶ Due to the limited number of emergences made by former senators, the analysis could not be broken into type of senator, current or former. However, given the lack of statistical significance of the Current Senator variable, the comprehensive model, while not ideal for comparing the two types of senators, is the best alternative available.

⁴⁷ To account for those senators considered to be the most ambitious, ones who make repeated attempts at the White House, I also ran a random effects logistic regression. This type of regression allows for repeated events thought to be conditional on the first event’s occurrence. The results of the random effects model were indistinguishable from the BTSCS logistic regression, so for the sake of parsimony, they are not reported here.

or they did not. Those candidates who did not last until the first primary are no less ambitious. Rather, their bid was just unsuccessful. Excluding certain candidates because they fail to make it to the first primary might result in a selection bias. As such, I am attempting to capture ambition by emergence, not ambition as seen through successful campaigns.⁴⁸

The second model test the factors influencing the rate of emergence, with survival analysis used to measure the time until an event occurrence.⁴⁹ Specifically, a Cox proportional hazard model similar to the one used to test the rate of emergence among U.S. representatives, allows me to account for the potential of multiple failures while focusing on the failure of interest.⁵⁰ This model's ability to account for repeated emergences allows me to incorporate all bids made by senators, regardless of whether it is an initial or subsequent bid. Again, the failure of interest is emergence and the number of elections before emergence is the survival time used to understand how rate of emergence is influenced by various explanatory variables.

For each type of candidate, current and former, a number of factors contributing to the emergence calculus are included in the analysis. Generally, it is hypothesized that

⁴⁸ To be sure, there are varying degrees of seriousness associated with each presidential candidacy. By using the FEC filing as the dependent variable it is possible to include those contenders with no real intention of running for president, as indicated by a total lack of fundraising. However, I maintain that a candidate had to volunteer to file and this is the truest expression of ambition for higher office. It may have been the case that they decided a presidential bid would be unsuccessful or should be postponed and that is why they abstained from fundraising. The minute a candidate starts raising money, the media is sure to start anticipating and speculating. A candidate can back out of running if the circumstances are not conducive but they cannot even contemplate their ambitious desires and test the water if they decline to file.

⁴⁹ In this case, time-to-event is the number of possible elections a representative could have emerged in before he actually ran for office.

⁵⁰ The potential failures that could be experienced by representatives are continued service without emergence (censored if still in the data set but not emerged by 2008), emergence with success (meaning excluded from the data from then on) or emergence and failure, with the possibility of emerging again in the future. The failure of interest is the decision to emerge, regardless of whether that emergence was successful or not.

senators with increased costs, who are risk-adverse, and who have characteristics presenting their candidacy with liabilities will be less likely to emerge as a presidential candidate than those senators with lower costs, who have a propensity for risk-taking, and lack liabilities; senators with characteristics that increase their viability will be more likely to emerge than senators that hold no such characteristics.

More specifically, the costs in the emergence calculus for current senators are whether they are up for reelection to their current senate seat (*Up for Reelection*), and whether they hold a party leadership position (*Leadership Position*) or a committee chairmanship (*Committee Chair*). If any of these conditions are present, it is hypothesized that a senator will be less likely to emerge. Given former senators do not face any of these additional costs, no such variables were included in their model. Following Rohde (1979), and all scholars studying emergence since his study, I control for the risk propensity of the current or former senator (*Risk*), as indicated by whether they challenged an incumbent senator to obtain their current Senate seat. Those senators considered to be “risk takers” are hypothesized to emerge to run for president, as they are believed to be the most progressively ambitious.

Previous literature on candidate emergence has found a number of potential liabilities, and while some enjoy scholastic consensus, others have received more mixed support. For example, one of the great advantages the office of the U.S. Senate lends a candidate is national visibility, or name recognition (Burden 2002). However, once leaving office, former senators may struggle to retain their name recognition and relevance to the current political climate. *Time Since Service* will measure the number of

years a former senator has been out of office and it is hypothesized that as the number of years increases, the likelihood of emergence decreases.

The way a senator has approached their career may have an effect on whether they are willing to act on ambitious tendencies. If a former senator lost reelection to his Senate seat, he is seen as less viable in the eyes of voters and should be less willing to run in an even more trying campaign (*Lost Reelection*). An additional deterrence against emergence is any senator whose Senate career has been characterized as ideologically extreme. Using Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores as a proxy, I maintain any senator viewed as extreme (*Ideologically Extreme*) will have a tougher time garnering necessary support from the median voter, and therefore, will be less likely to emerge.

What a senator has done in the past is sure to influence his results at future bids for office. Association with a scandal indicates to office holders their unelectability in the eyes of voters and has deterred emergence and encouraged strategic retirements (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Jacobson and Dimock 1994). It is hypothesized that involvement with a scandal (*Scandal*) will lower the likelihood that a senator will run for president.⁵¹ Most authors maintain previous unsuccessful attempts will make it harder for senators to garner support for future attempts (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1987).

Other potential liabilities include involuntary characteristics that a senator will not have much control over. Senators John McCain, and Bob Dole, as well as Governor Ronald Reagan all dealt with the issue of their advanced age on the campaign trail, often

⁵¹ Scandal is defined as any disgraced event surrounding an officeholder in which the Ethics Committee issued a statement, report, or formal action like censoring (see Thompson 1995 for similar definition), if outside criminal charges were brought forth against the officeholder, or the officeholder resigned from office as a result of such event.

times diverting attention away from their respective messages. It is clear by the attention age garners in campaigns that it is a liability, and so *Age* will be measured as the candidate's age in years.⁵² It is hypothesized that with every year old a senator becomes, the less likely emergence will be.⁵³

Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde (1987) consider being a minority as a liability, given the almost complete lack of attempts at the White House made by this group. Fox and Lawless (2005) found through a survey of potential office-seekers that status as a member of a group historically excluded from politics makes it less likely they will run (see also Lawless and Pearson 2008). *Nontraditional* will code any senator who is a woman or racial/ethnic minority (not white), and I posit members of these groups will be less likely to emerge.

The variables of importance for this research design are the ones that indicate increased viability. Given the structure of the Electoral College, and the need for 270 votes to win the presidency, senators coming from a state garnering a large number of Electoral College votes give them an immediate advantage (Garand 1988; Rosenstone 1983). Examples of senators running from large states include Senator Bentsen (D-TX) in 1976, Senator Cranston (D-CA) in 1984, and Senator Gramm (R-TX) in 1996. It is hypothesized that senators hailing from states with a larger number of *Electoral College*

⁵² This variable was also coded as *Age* and *Age*² to account for a nonlinear relationship, indicating that age might be a liability if a senator is too old or too young. The results were not significant and a linear effect of age was confirmed.

⁵³ In order to prevent old age from skewing the effect of age by leaving in every senator in the data set until they die, I eliminated senators who were 76 years or older. While unfortunately eliminating 259 cases, the exclusion of anyone over the age of 75 only eliminated one senator who emerged—Mike Gravel (D-AK) was 78 when he ran in 2008. Given the candidate's repeated comments to the media about only emerging to bring up certain issues and not about a personal desire to be president, I feel confident his exclusion is not hurting a study on political ambition.

votes will be more likely to emerge as presidential candidates than senators from smaller states.

Similar to coming from a large state, senators who represent a swing state are at an advantage. Swing states are important to win, as they are often the only states influenced by candidates and their campaigns and often, are the deciding factor in the election's outcome. Hailing from a swing state, and having the loyalty of the voters within that state (by way of the "favorite son phenomenon"), puts a senator at an advantage from the start by taking these states off the table. Senators representing perceived swing states, such as Senator Glenn (D-OH) in 1984 and Senator Graham (D-FL) in 2004, are hypothesized to emerge more frequently than their colleagues. *Swing State* is classified as any state whose previous presidential election vote margin was less than 5 percent.

Just as there are swing states in every presidential election, there are states that traditionally vote for only one party in presidential elections. States consistently held by the opposite party are often considered out of play in presidential campaigns (Shaw 1999). However, many states have senators of different parties representing them, so it is possible that a candidate of the "out" party could represent a state that traditionally supports the other party in presidential elections. An officeholder in this situation may be encouraged to run because capturing a seat not traditionally held by their party is beneficial to not only the candidate, but the party as a whole, as they are seen as electable to a broader constituency. This situation might result in increased support from the party and voters, both in the actual state and neighboring states (Garand 1988; Rosenstone 1983). Additionally, it might be the case that these senators are more electorally

vulnerable given the discord with their constituency, and the greater probability of losing their current position makes it less costly to reach for the brass ring. It is believed that senators representing the state's out party (*Opposite State*) will run for higher office more often than a senator who represents a state following conventional party lines.⁵⁴

Other characteristics increase viability because they indicate increased name recognition and experience. Name recognition is vital to success in both the nomination and general election seasons, where voters may not be familiar with the candidate. Sitting on certain senatorial committees can increase both the name recognition and experience of a senator considering running for president. Additionally, we know that some senators step down from their current positions to invest fully in a bid for the presidency. Several senators have forfeited their seat in order to run for higher office and, subsequently, lost that attempt or later became a vice presidential candidate (Burden 2002). Senators who are no longer serving as a result of past, unsuccessful attempts at the White House are not necessarily less ambitious. In fact, it appears that those senators with previous attempts are often the ones most likely to run for president, and therefore will be controlled for accordingly (*Post Senate*).⁵⁵ Former senator John Edwards (D-NC) is a prime example. After a forfeiting his Senate seat to run on the 2004 Democratic ticket, Edwards spent the next four years cultivating a grassroots following to aid in a second attempt at the White House in 2008.

⁵⁴ *Opposite State* will be operationalized dichotomously, 1 for officeholders coming from the "out party" in a state or district, 0 otherwise, with a state's traditional party of support derived from the party affiliation of the state's two incumbent senators. If the state's senators are divided, the majority party of the state's House delegations is used. If the House delegation is split, the party controlling the state legislature is used.

⁵⁵ *Post Senate* is coded as a dichotomous variable, 1 for any former senator who left the senate to run for or hold a governorship, a cabinet position, or the presidential or vice presidential ticket, 0 otherwise.

Experience of a senator is measured two ways. *Foreign Relations Committee* is a dichotomous measure discerning those senators serving on the Foreign Relations committees from those who do not. Because voters generally look for presidential candidates with experience in areas of foreign relations, it is anticipated that service on this committee will increase the likelihood of emergence for president. Serving as a governor (*Governors*), either before or after a senator's service in the Senate, allows for a senator to claim executive experience. Additionally, governors make the most frequent type of presidential candidate, and so this variable should capture any effect holding this office has on anyone who has served in both capacities.

Two control variables are included, one of which discerns years where challengers would not face an incumbent president (*Open Seat*). A second variable, *Presidential Approval*, controls for the current political climate, with the belief that if an incumbent president is unpopular, it is less likely members of that party will emerge and more likely members of the out party will.⁵⁶

Results and Discussion

Analysis One: Probability of Emergence

To address the probability that a senator will run for president, a BTSCS logistic regression tests the emergence of both current and formerly serving senators. In total, 54 senators emerged to run for president a total of 68 times, with 15 of them having more than one attempt. Senator Robert Dole led the pack with three attempts made over his

⁵⁶ Presidential Approval is coded as the average presidential approval rating from Gallup surveys for the three months prior to the year before the election (September, October, November). This three month time framed was picked to incorporate a measure of presidential approval around the same time candidates would be making their decisions about running, but not so specific of a time to skew the rating from isolated events. In years where an incumbent is running, their average approval rating is used. In years where there is an open seat, approval ratings are used for senators of the out party and disapproval ratings are used for senators of the incumbent's party.

career. Of particular interest, 16 bids for the White House came from former senators, or 24% of all senatorial emergencies.

The results of the BTSCS logistic regression, displayed in Table 4.1, indicate senators act strategically when making bids for the White House, considering not only the potential costs incurred and the liabilities their candidacies hold, but also characteristics that increase their viability as a successful presidential candidate. Also evident from this model is the weight senators give to factors stemming from their current office, which benefit their presidential aspirations. Unlike the other officeholders analyzed in this dissertation, those expressing ambition for the White House do not appear to wait for opportune circumstances to come to them. Rather, the ever-risky presidential bid comes when the senator himself seeks to profit from the benefits the U.S. Senate provides. Finally, it should be noted that unlike the emergence of representatives in senatorial elections, the probability of a senator running for the White House is not related to time. The statistical insignificance of the two splines included indicates this model does not suffer from duration dependency.

Table 4.1 BTSCS Logistic Regression of the Probability of U.S. Senators Emerging for U.S. President, 1976-2008

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Current Senators Coef. (Std. Error)</i>	<i>Change in Pred. Probability</i>	
<i>Costs</i>			
Current	0.16 (0.65)		
Up for Reelection	-0.58 (0.42)		
Leadership Position	1.45 (0.57)**	.0041	
Committee Chairman	0.49 (0.60)		
<i>Risks</i>			
Risk Taker	0.10 (0.30)		
<i>Liabilities</i>			
Time Since Held	-0.14 (0.06)**	-.0349	
Lost Reelection	-2.08 (0.90)**	-.0178	
Ideologically Extreme	-0.76 (0.42)*	-.0311	
Scandal	1.62 (0.56)***	.0083	
Age	-0.07 (0.02)***	-.1122	
Nontraditional	0.81 (0.45)*	.0038	
<i>Increased Viability</i>			
Electoral College	0.03 (0.01)**	.0456	
Swing State	-0.29 (0.42)		
Opposite State	0.21 (0.36)		
Post Senate	2.34 (0.79)***	.0087	
Foreign Relations	0.86 (0.31)***	.0069	
Past Governor	0.43 (0.45)		
Open Seat	-0.38 (0.34)		
Presidential Approval	-0.01 (0.02)		
Spline 1	0.00 (0.00)		
Spline 2	0.00 (0.00)		
Constant	1.34 (1.40)	Baseline	.061
Number of Observations	892		
Log Likelihood	-165.80651		
Wald χ^2	84.76***		
% Correctly Classified	94.06		

Note: Dependent variable is whether senator emerged. *p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 two-tailed test.

Changes in predicted probability are +/- 1/2 s.d. for continuous variables and 0-1 for dichotomous variables

Current senators do consider the additional costs incurred by seeking higher office, just not as expected. Holding a leadership position is statistically significant, but with a positive coefficient. Serving as majority or minority leader or whip makes a senator three times more likely to emerge than senators not serving in such a capacity. While running counter to the hypothesis that holding positions of increased power are too costly to give up, the results are not terribly surprising given the valuable name recognition, exposure, and leadership experience gained while holding a position of power in the Senate. Senators like Robert Dole (R-KS), Alan Cranston (D-CA), and Howard Baker (R-TN) all utilized the recognition afforded them from their service as Minority Whip, Minority Leader, and Majority Leader in the early stages of their presidential campaigns. It could be that when attempting to appear presidential, holding a leadership position makes the senators feel they can claim more of an executive role than one of one hundred. In addition, given the norm of individualism in the Senate, leadership positions do not garner the same amount of power as the leaders in the House of Representatives, where a hierarchical structure is followed. Given the lack of increased power within the chamber, leaders in the Senate may have less to lose by acting on their progressive ambition.

Similar to the other officeholders analyzed in the dissertation, comfort with risk does not appear to positively influence a senator acting on his progressive ambition. However, most of the liabilities seem to factor into a senator's emergence calculus. Particular to formerly serving senators, the amount of time that has transpired affects the probability of emergence, in that for each year that passes out of the Senate, the odds of emergence decrease by 14%. It is not just the time removed from office that deters

emergence, but the way in which the senator left office that matters. Those senators who have lost reelection to their Senate seat have nearly 90% lower likelihood of emerging than senators who are currently serving or who left in good graces. Think about the case described at the beginning of this dissertation. Rick Santorum is not a surprising candidate for the 2012 election because of his age, experience, or political beliefs. In fact, all those things appear to be beneficial to his candidacy. What is remarkable is his emergence after his poor performance in the 2006 Senate Elections. This election result led him to give up the 2008 presidential aspirations everyone knew he had.

Figure 4.1 depicts the effect of losing reelection and the time out of office on the probability of emergence. The red line denotes the probability that a senator who has lost reelection will emerge. It is evident that the probability of simply losing reelection to the Senate severely lowers the probability of emergence, as the blue line indicating not having lost reelection, is over .04 higher. What is especially interesting is the impact being out of office has on emergence of those who left the Senate voluntarily. Even though they left in good standing, a senator out of office ten years, for whatever reason, is dramatically less likely to emerge in a presidential election. Being out of direct political context has such an influence on emergence, that once a senator has been gone for twenty years, it does not appear to matter whether they lost reelection or not. For those having lost reelection to the Senate, the effect of years out of office is much less pronounced. However, it does appear that even those senators who left in defeat have a small window where their likelihood of emergence is greater. With his 2012 bid coming in the proximate presidential election, just six short years after his senatorial defeat and failed

2008 presidential attempt, former senator Rick Santorum is a prime example of a candidate operating under this limited time frame.




Figure 4.1 The Probability of Emergence by Time Since Senate Service and Losing Reelection

A senator's behavior while in the upper chamber also appears to influence their likelihood of emergence. Similar to results found elsewhere (Treul 2009, Maestas 2008), senators appear to recognize the effect their voting record has on presidential bids. The results from this analysis find that being ideologically extreme decreases the odds of emergence by 53% when moved from the minimum value (a moderate position) to the maximum value (an extremist point of view). Take, for example, Lowell Weicker whose

most extreme DW-NOMINATE score while in the data set was -.139.⁵⁷ Clearly, if ideological extremity is a deterrent, Weicker would be most likely to emerge, which he did in 1980 (with a DW-NOMINATE score of -.004). What is also of interest is that Treul's findings hold up and presidential hopefuls become less extreme in their voting patterns. Consider, for example, 2004 Democratic presidential hopeful Sen. Russ Feingold of Wisconsin. In the congressional session prior to the 2004 election, Feingold's DW-NOMINATE score was -.895. While on the extreme side, the score was not as high as it was after he lost the nomination, where his ideology score was the most liberal in the Senate (-1.027).

Senators, much like voters, appear to view their old age as a liability. Holding all of the other independent variables at their means, the predicted probability that a senator runs for president drops by .23 when he is 75 (the oldest senator in the senate for the dataset) versus 35 years old. This means that for each year older the senator becomes, the odds of him emerging to run for president decrease by 7%. As has been well documented, the candidacies of Sen. Dole and McCain have made it clear to fellow senators that running for president as an "older" statesman is an uphill battle.

A liability thought to deter emergence was involvement in a political scandal. However, the analysis computed here finds that senators involved in a scandal are *more* likely to emerge for the White House. I believe two factors are at work here. One, there are only a small number of senators classified as being involved with a scandal. In total, only twenty-five of the almost 300 senators included in the dataset had involvement with

⁵⁷ To put this in perspective, the DW-NOMINATE scores for the senators included in this analysis range from -1.027 (Russ Feingold in 2008 had the most liberal score) to .89 (Tom Coburn in 2008 had the most conservative score).

a scandal. Secondly, I believe the way scandal is coded could lead to misleading results. As it stands, simple allegations leading to an Ethics Committee investigation classifies a senator as having attachment to a scandal. However, when looking at the senators who emerged despite having a scandal in their past, only one scandal was severe enough to cost a senator their seat. It was the intention of this variable to only capture any ill effects resulting from a situation in which a senator was politically reprimanded as a result of a scandal.⁵⁸

Another surprising result, but one that makes a bit more sense given the most recent presidential election, is the positive influence minority status has acting on ambition. Nontraditional candidates, females and members of racial or ethnic groups have odds that indicate they are over twice as likely to emerge as their white, male counterparts (124% more likely). While this result may have been surprising if only using the earlier years of this study, recent elections of minorities—especially women—to the Senate means there are more minorities who can claim credit for experience in the upper chamber. Additionally, presidential ambitions as of late have seen an increase in the number of minority candidates. In the 2008 presidential election alone, the Democratic Party had five out of their nine contenders from a minority group. To get to the level of the Senate, a minority, who faces increased struggles with credibility and discrimination, has to be extremely ambitious. In addition, being a minority may increase your viability of certain segments of the population, facilitating the assembling of a multi-ethnic coalition. Take, for example, Senator Hillary Clinton, who was extremely

⁵⁸ The senators emerging as presidential candidates despite involvement with a scandal are McCain (R-AZ), Hatch (R-UT), Gramm (R-TX), Laxalt (D-NV), and Moseley-Braun (D-IL). Only Moseley-Braun lost reelection to her Senate seat as a result of her involvement with a scandal.

successful in soliciting the votes of women. Given that over half of the American population is female, deciding to run because of the likelihood of capturing the female vote, might just be enough for a senator to act on their progressive ambition.

In terms of the variables of interest, characteristics that increase viability, several are influential to the emergence calculus. Positively influencing the probability of emergence is the number of Electoral College votes attached to a senator's state. For every additional Electoral College vote, a senator's odds of emergence increase by 3%. Large states such as California, Texas, and New York have frequently produced presidential candidates from their Senate delegations.⁵⁹ A candidate from these states knows that 55, 34, and 31, respectively, are almost guaranteed to be theirs should they capture their party's nomination. In a system where a president is selected by obtaining majority of Electoral College votes, this is an unparalleled advantage.

The model's results suggest that former senators seeking out other notable positions recognize the opportunities these offices provide and are more likely to emerge. These offices grant increased name recognition and experience, as well as keep former senators in the current political arena. A senator who has left office to serve as a vice president, governor, or cabinet member have odds of emerging nine times greater than a senator who has left public service altogether. Vice Presidents Dan Quayle and Al Gore, or Pete Wilson, the 36th Governor of California, all left the Senate to hold their new positions and then subsequently made bids for the White House. Additionally, we see some candidates leaving office to run on a presidential ticket. Former senators such as

⁵⁹ Barbara Boxer (2008), Pete Wilson (1996), and Alan Cranston (1984) have emerged as presidential candidates from California; Hillary Clinton (2008) emerged from New York, and Lloyd Bentsen (1976, 1988) and Phil Gramm (1996) have emerged from TX.

John Edwards (D-NC), were unsuccessfully in their presidential bids, but relied heavily on the experiences they could draw from their tenure in the Senate. Additionally, they have the added bonus of having run a presidential campaign and can use that experience in a second attempt. The traditional approach to studying progressive ambition would not have included these cases, despite these candidates still using their experiences in the Senate to increase their viability as a presidential candidate.

Serving on the Foreign Relations committee has a positive coefficient, indicating the experience garnered from service encourages emergence. Service on the Foreign Relations committee, and the additional experience it affords senators, positively influences emergence in presidential races. Senators who can credit claim foreign policy experience have emergence odds twice that of their counterparts without such experience. In fact, 18 of the 54 initial bids made by senators came from senators who have served on the Foreign Relations Committee. In 2008 alone, Sen. Biden (D-DE), Obama (D-IL), Dodd (D-CT), Boxer (D-CA), and Brownback (R-KS) were all sitting members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Figure 4.2 depicts the advantages senators perceive certain experiences will have and the subsequent increase in emergence probability. The blue line indicates the probability of a senator emerging if he has never served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, nor held a notable position if no longer serving in the Senate. Note the significant lower probability of this hypothetical senator compared to a colleague with Foreign Relations Committee experience and a notable post-Senate career.




Figure 4.2 The Probability of Emergence by Number of Electoral College Votes and Experience Garnering Increased Viability

From the outset, having these experiences increases the likelihood of acting on progressive ambition by more than .2. Compounding these results is the number of Electoral College votes the senator can solidify from their home state. While the effect is minimal on those with no other characteristics of increased viability, those possessing such traits see a marked advantage as the number of Electoral College votes increase. A senator holding all the significant increased viability traits has a predicted probability of emergence nearly .6 higher. Clearly, these factors are influential to senators contemplating a bid for the White House.

Given the importance of these factors, how much of an improvement to the emergence calculus is the addition of the increased viability traits? To test the model's

strength, a Likelihood Ratio Test was conducted. As with the improved emergence model of U.S. House members, the emergence calculus used to study the progressive ambitious tendencies of U.S. Senators is improved with the addition of the increased viability characteristics.⁶⁰

But how well does the model do when predicting actual presidential bids made by U.S. senators? The percent of correctly classified cases is 94.06%, which is lower than the representatives' analysis, but still rather high. Looking to the percentage of false positives, the model reports incorrectly predicting 33% of the cases. With that said, I should note that predicting the extremely rare event of running for president is challenging and traditional levels of prediction (.5) may not be applicable. Looking to actual cases of emergence, and how the model handles them, may be a better way to look at the model's predictive value.

Table 4.2 lists the model's ten most likely senators to emerge, as ranked by their predicted probabilities, in the 2008 Presidential Election. Of note are the rather low probabilities. Again, this is partially a result of the rare nature of emergence, as well as unquantifiable characteristics associated with ambition and the decision to emerge. With that said, I believe the model does a successful job at predicting who does, in fact, emerge to run for president.

The emergence model correctly predicted five of the top ten most probable senators to emerge.⁶¹ Despite being out of office, the model correctly predicted the

⁶⁰ The Log-Likelihood of the nested model was -175.03369, while the improved model's Log-Likelihood was -165.80651 with six degrees of freedom.

⁶¹ The remaining contenders were ranked as follows: McCaskill (14), Dodd (27), Biden (32), McCain (35), Brownback (41), Bayh (44), and F. Thompson (63). The ranking was out of the possible 152 Republican and Democratic senators included in the data for the 2008 Presidential Election.

repeat presidential bid made by John Edwards. This is a notable finding, as the traditional method of studying progressive ambition and emergence would not have included John Edwards in their analysis. The predictions of Obama, Boxer, and Clinton were a result of their minority status, experience, and residency in a large state. For the Obama and Clinton findings, this is notable given the amount of attention allotted to the two Democratic hopefuls' status as minorities. A problematic result is the model's incorrect predictions of three female senators. However, given the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president, and political discussions surrounding "glass ceilings" being shattered, we should anticipate more minority candidates to emerge in future contests if for no other reason than to try and capture the electoral base of minority voters currently held by the incumbent president.

Table 4.2 Predicted Probabilities of Top Ten Senators Running for President in 2008

<i>Senator</i>	<i>Probability of Emergence</i>	<i>Actual Emergence</i>
John Edwards (D-NC)	.4910	1
John Corzine (D-NJ)	.4897	0
Barack Obama (D-IL)	.4493	1
Barbara Boxer (D-CA)	.4009	1
Hillary Clinton (D-NY)	.2928	1
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)	.2690	0
Russ Feingold (D-WI)	.2658	0
Maria Cantwell (D-WA)	.1953	0
Blanche L. Lincoln (D-AR)	.1833	1
Olympia Snowe (R-ME)	.1623	0

How does the model's predictive merit fare for the other presidential elections analyzed? By utilizing the predicted probabilities of each senator for that election, the model was successful in predicting presidential contenders, as roughly a third (24) of the bids made by senators were ranked in the top ten most probable emergences of all possible senators. Table 4.3 displays how well the model predicted actual emergences by presidential election. Using the average rank of actual emerged senators among all potential senatorial emergences for that election, the model most accurately predicted actual emergences by senators in the 2000 Presidential Election.

Table 4.3 Predictive Value of Model by Actual Senator Emergence

<i>Presidential Election Year</i>	<i>Average Probability of Emergence</i>	<i>Average Ranking Among Senators</i>
1976	.134	20 (72)
1980	.128	15 (60)
1984	.150	24 (79)
1988	.124	31 (152)
1992	.067	26 (80)
1996	.150	17 (86)
2000	.108	10 (159)
2004	.140	16 (68)
2008	.189	21 (152)

Note: Number of senators the rank is out of. This is the number of observations for each election.

However, in this highly competitive open election, the average probability or likelihood of emergence was one of the lower elections. Overall, the model has a more difficult time explaining the emergences in open seat races, with the exception of 2008, where the average probability of those senators actually emerging was the highest.

From 1976 to 2008, the model accurately predicts an actual bid as its most probable senator six out of the nine elections. Table 4.4 displays the most probable senator to emerge for each presidential election using their predicted probability of emergence for that election. The model’s most likely senator to emerge actually made a bid for the White House in every election but 1988, 1992, 1996. Both senators predicted the most likely to emerge in the 1988 and 1992 Elections—Alan Cranston and Ted Kennedy—had made previous presidential bids. So, while not accurate in those elections, their predictions do make theoretical sense as they have already displayed they are willing to act on their progressive ambition.

Table 4.4 Most Probable Emergence by Election Year

<i>Presidential Election Year</i>	<i>Senator</i>	<i>Predicted Probability</i>	<i>Actual Emergence</i>
1976	George McGovern (D-MN)	.2397	Yes
1980	Howard Baker (R-TN)	.3179	Yes
1984	Alan Cranston (D-CA)	.4450	Yes
1988	Alan Cranston (D-CA)	.4554	No
1992	Edward Kennedy (D-MA)	.4369	No
1996	Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX)	.2817	No
2000	Albert Gore Jr. (D-TN)	.2835	Yes
2004	John Kerry (D-MA)	.2811	Yes
2008	John Edwards (D-NC)	.4910	Yes

Upon looking at the actual emergence of U.S. senators, it appears that the improved emergence calculus, which utilizes increased viability characteristics, does a fairly good job of predicting who among the current and former senators will act on their progressive ambition. This makes sense, as these are the factors that would make their

candidacy stronger. Without including the Foreign Relations experience variable, the candidacies of Obama, Boxer, and Clinton would not have been as high. Taking into consideration how their candidacies were advantaged by Electoral College standings also helped boost their probability as candidates. It is agreed that traditional variables such as age and losing reelection are influential in the decision to emerge for president. But, the predictions surrounding who will emerge to run for president are most certainly strengthened when we take into consideration a complete emergence calculus, accounting for costs, risk-taking, liabilities *and* increased viability.

Analysis Two: Rate of Emergence

The second analysis tests which of the factors influencing the probability of emergence calculus factors influence the *rate* of emergence. Table 4.5 reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard regression. A general conclusion from the result is that studying the rate of emergence is an important way to approach the study of ambition. While earlier studies have discovered factors that contribute to a candidate's emergence calculus, to date, we have been unaware of how such factors affect the speed in which senators emerge for president. What we find is that although certain factors encourage emergence, they encourage a senator to wait before seeking higher office. Likewise, certain factors encourage senators to seek higher office earlier in their career and will help us explain unexpected cases like Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL), who ran for president after only one term in the Senate.

From the outset, it should be noted that although a number of factors in the emergence calculus influence the probability of emergence, fewer factors influence the rate of emergence. Holding a position of leadership in the Senate, as well as serving on

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, two factors that encourage acting on progressive ambition because of the name recognition and experience they provide, do not appear to have any weight on the rate of emergence. It may be that once these additional bonuses are added to the list of credentials a senator can use when making their case for why they are a noteworthy candidate, they are not lost on voters. Leaders in the Senate are by far the most recognizable members in the upper chamber and that impact lasts from the moment they take the position.

There are a number of factors that deter emergence but do not appear to speed up or slow down ambition. Losing reelection to the Senate will surely prevent many senators from attempting to move up the political ladder. However, once that sour taste of defeat has been left in the mouths of voters, it appears to make no difference whether a senator runs sooner rather than later. Similarly, the unchanging nature of most senators voting behavior means that it has little effect on the rate of emergence. If we were to see giant swings in ideological stances, a senator may be more prone to run during certain points in his career. Due to the advantages inherent in incumbency, a senator often has free reign to vote their preference on the ideological spectrum. Should they have to be more concerned with appealing to their general state constituency in the early years of their Senate tenure, we may see more senators run early on in their careers before establishing an overtly polarizing record. Involvement with a scandal also plays no part in the rate in which a senator emerges, but again, the previous result is problematic and so this finding is not significant.

Four factors speed up the rate of emergence for senators: being a member of a nontraditional group, the number of Electoral College votes allotted to the senator's home

state, what they have done with their post-Senate career, and whether or not they have been a governor. Members of the Senate representing a minority constituency have a hazard rate five times the size of traditionally serving members. This larger hazard rate, indicating they experience the event of emergence at a faster rate, is largely due to the likely support they are guaranteed because of who they are. Women voters are likely to view female candidates favorably, and racial minority voters are likely to view minority candidates favorably. Observe the overwhelming support African-American and Latino voters gave Barack Obama or women gave to Hillary Clinton. Knowing these constituencies will likely support your candidacy, despite potentially holding factors that would deter candidate entry, will encourage emergence to occur faster.

Table 4.5 Cox Proportional Hazard Regression of the Rate of U.S. Senators Emerging for U.S. President, 1976-2008

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Current Senators Coef. (Std. Error)</i>
<i>Costs</i>	
Current	0.33 (0.52)
Up for Reelection	-0.76 (0.35)**
Leadership Position	0.71 (0.57)
Committee Chairman	-0.18 (0.45)
<i>Risks</i>	
Risk Taker	0.29 (0.28)
<i>Liabilities</i>	
Time Since Held	-0.10 (0.06)
Lost Reelection	-1.72 (0.80)
Ideologically Extreme	-0.30 (0.37)
Scandal	0.41 (0.47)
Age	-0.14 (0.02)***
Nontraditional	1.23 (0.46)***
<i>Increased Viability</i>	
Electoral College	0.03 (0.01)***
Swing State	-0.16 (0.35)
Opposite State	0.09 (0.30)
Post Senate	1.63 (0.57)***
Foreign Relations	0.42 (0.28)
Past Governor	0.46 (0.46)
Open Seat	-0.02 (0.26)
Presidential Approval	-0.01 (0.01)
Number of Observations	907
Log Likelihood	-357.16126
Wald χ^2	144.69***

*p < 0.1, **p < .05, ***p < .01 two-tailed test.

Continuing with the Obama example, voters may not have been familiar with the first-term senator, as he only had four short years to cultivate his name nationally.

However, voters knew he was a minority and for many, that was reason enough to support him. Voters may not have been keen on his liberal voting record, but because he was a minority, they were willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and vote for him.

Candidates count on this type of support, and knowing it will be present in the face of other deterrents will lead them to emerge when they would otherwise wait. Sen. John Corzine (D-NJ) had served for just two years more than Barack Obama on the prominent Senate Foreign Relations Committee and he comes from a state with comparable Electoral College basis. Yet, not many voters supported this white male who had little voter familiarity. Unlike Barack Obama, Sen. Corzine needs to develop his name recognition and senatorial experience before running for the presidency.

Senators with a large Electoral College vote associated with their home state are found to increase the rate in which they emerge to contest in a presidential election. For each additional Electoral College vote a senator's state possesses, the rate of emergence increases by 4.9%, holding all other factors constant. A senator from a large state starts a presidential campaign with an advantage over candidates simply because the large states provide more Electoral College votes. This would play a role in their likelihood of emergence. However, coming from a large state also speeds up the *rate* of emergence because of other factors. Large states are traditionally large centers for mass media. The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the L.A. Times often dictate the political dialog in this country. If a senator can automatically ensure the support of these large media outlets from the beginning of their tenure in the Senate, the amount of coverage and framing of their stories could translate to positive name recognition across the country. Additionally, large states are traditionally diverse states. In order to win the presidency, candidates must appeal to at least half of the voting population. Running a successful campaign and being elected by a statewide constituency as diverse as the microcosm that is California indicates to voters nationwide, and candidates themselves,

the validity of their presidential candidacy. A senator from Mississippi would have to take time to convince voters in New Jersey that they are like-minded and would adequately represent their interests (which would probably not be particularly easy). A senator from California can use the support from a variety of constituencies within his own state to show voters he is a legitimate candidate. This characteristic goes into effect the moment that senator is elected, not after years of convincing. Senators from large states have some benefits afforded them, several of which lend them the ability to run sooner rather than later.

Senators holding an office of prominence after leaving the Senate have a hazard ratio nearly four times the size of senators who retire into obscurity. This means the rate of emergence of their presidential bids occurs four times faster. Staying politically relevant and acquiring a different set of credentials adds to the viability as a presidential candidate. Their possession of many factors typically desired in a presidential candidate, means they will receive greater support for their candidacies. Having a greater likelihood of support, and therefore a greater likelihood of electoral success, allows a senator to run earlier in their career. The alternative is spending years trying to prove to voters that they are (a) knowledgeable about the economy or foreign affairs, (b) they have familiarity with environmental or educational issues, or (c) they have executive experience. A prime example of this effect is Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID). Despite coming from the small, homogeneous state of Idaho, and despite being 61 years old, factors that we would anticipate to deter not only emergence, but also the rate of emergence, Sen. Kempthorne is currently exploring a 2012 presidential bid. Why might he emerge despite only serving for one term in the Senate? It could be that his tenure as the Secretary of the Interior

from 2006-2009, a cabinet-level position, has allowed him to stay relevant in today's political climate. As Secretary of the Interior, he has become known by a whole new set of constituents, not just the few that knew him from his service in Idaho. And as long as the environment is on the forefront of many voters mind, he could capitalize on his credentials as an environmental expert.

One additional advantage Kempthorne has is that he is a former governor. The results of the Cox model purport senators who have also served as governors have a hazard ratio almost 20% larger than those senators without such experience. Two factors seem to drive the increased rate in which senators also serving as governors emerge for the White House. First, they possess executive experience. While senators make the most frequent type of presidential candidate, governors make the most successful type. This success is largely attributed to their ability to claim executive experience, both in managing the state's economy and government (Burden 2002). Senators who can make this claim do not have to spend time convincing voters of their executive experience and can emerge at a faster rate. Additionally, senators who have served in a state executive capacity, as well as the U.S. Senate are essentially out of rungs on the political ladder, with the exception of the presidency. In Kempthorne's case, why would he not go ahead and run in 2012? He has been a mayor, a governor, a senator, and a cabinet member. Evan Bayh (D-IN) was governor of Indiana from 1988-1997 before serving in his father's Senate seat. Indiana law term limited him from seeking a third term, but there was a successful Democrat in the White House, with an heir-apparent in the wings, and so his logical move was to the U.S. Senate. In 2008, he emerged as a Democratic contender for the White House, touting his time in the state capital as much as his record in the Senate.

Being able to do so may have led him to emerge during a time when Washington insiders and need for effective leadership was desired by voters.

Just as factors encouraging emergence increased the speed of presidential bids made by senators, there are a number of factors in the emergence calculus that slow the rate of emergence. Three factors are of particular importance: Being up for reelection, time passed since serving in the Senate, and age all discourage emergence, confirming the hypothesis that factors of the emergence calculus influencing emergence are corollary to the factors that influence the rate of emergence.

Having to run two campaigns simultaneously, one for the current Senate seat and one substantial one for presidency is found to delay emergence. Specifically, senators up for reelection have a 49% smaller hazard ratio than senators who are not facing reelection the same year as a presidential election. This result is far from surprising, as senators will understandably wait to emerge when they are not facing an election to their current position. The class system in which the senators operate under means that senators are only up for reelection every six years and can easily postpone acting on their progressive ambition for a few more years. In 2008 Senators Chris Dodd (D-CT), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Sam Brownback (R-KS), John McCain (R-AZ), Evan Bayh (D-IN), Blanche Lincoln (D-AR), Hillary Clinton (D-NY), and Claire McCaskill (D-MO) all had two advantages in emerging in 2008 versus 2012: an open seat with no vice president heir-apparent and not being up for reelection. Senators John Edwards (D-NC), Joe Biden (D-DE), Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) really had to weigh their support from their state constituency and determine if they had the backing to run two candidacies at the same time. John Edwards found this task too difficult and eventually forfeited his senate seat.

Knowing that the result of running two campaigns could lead to the end of a Senate career appears to be enough of a deterrent for senators to hold off running for a few more years.

Just as being out of office for an extended period of time deters the probability of emergence, so too does its effect slow down the rate of emergence. Given the difficulty in staying politically relevant after leaving the senate, a senator may hesitate before throwing his hat in the presidential ring. Progressive ambition dictates these senators who are the most ambitious will run eventually. However, how quickly would we expect them to do it? As the number of years since holding office increases, the rate of emergence slows down by 20% if all other factors are kept constant. Senators who have been out of office may choose to run years after their Senate service is completed, because the political climate is conducive to their candidacy or some ideal circumstances prevail, such as an open seat or high job approval ratings for the incumbent. They may wait until a gaff from the past is erased from voters' memories and choose to emerge when they feel this liability is no longer relevant. After six years outside the Beltway and with a political party longing for a candidate to rally around, former senator Rick Santorum (R-PA) is counting on voters desire to overlook his inability to win reelection to his Senate seat and choose to support him for his conservative leanings. Given his failed presidential attempt in 2008, it was clear Santorum had the requisite ambition to be president. It was just a matter of how long after losing reelection he would have to wait before conditions became conducive to emerge again. Losing reelection deterred his ambition, but it did not eliminate it; it simply postponed it.

Age, a major deterrent against a senator's emergence, is equally as influential on the rate of emergence. For each year older a senator becomes, the rate at which they emerge decreases by 17%. Similar to time out of Senate service, becoming older will not eliminate a senator's ambition, merely slow its manifestation down. In 2008, the second presidential bid made by Joe Biden of Delaware came twenty years after his first presidential attempt in 1988. Despite initial concerns over his age (Biden was 66 at the time of the 2008 Election), Biden was able to successfully spin it into a discussion about his competitors' "youth and inexperience". An earlier failed presidential bid indicated he was willing to act on his progressive ambition. However, given his increasing age, he may have needed conducive conditions for him to act again. And in this case, his age was reason enough to make a bid successful enough to garner him a secondary spot on the ticket.

This second analysis focuses on the time until emergence, seeking to understand what encourages unforeseen senators running for president. While it is important to know what factors influence the probability of emergence, it is worthwhile to be able to predict not only the expected cases of emergence, but the unexpected ones as well. Understanding more about the emergence calculus, especially how factors comprising the calculus influence the rate of emergence helps us with our predictive ability. It is one thing to predict circumstances conducive to an emergence; it is another thing to predict when unfavorable circumstances can still lead a senator to act on their progressive ambition.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This dissertation focuses on a character trait we assume all political officeholders possess—ambition. Specifically, it addresses progressive ambition, or the desire to hold a higher, more important office than the position currently held (Schlesinger 1966). Borrowing from the likes of Schlesinger, Black, and Rohde, a theory of progressive ambition is developed to facilitate the study: all officeholders are progressively ambitious, should the attainment of a higher political office come without additional cost or risk. In addition, officeholders are rational-minded political actors who will utilize a general framework or emergence calculus, to guide them in their decisions to act on their progressive ambition, or what is hereto referred to as emergence.

The goal of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of officeholders' decisions to act on progressive ambition. With this as a general motive, three specific questions are raised to help better understand the thinking behind politicians' actions. First, what affects the probability that an officeholder acts on his progressive ambition? The analysis of this question focuses both on the characteristics included in an officeholder's emergence calculus and whether those factors increase or decrease the likelihood of seeking higher office. The goal of this inquiry is to better predict who out of a likely field of quality candidates is most likely to run for higher office.

The second research question builds on the conclusions drawn from the probability analysis, by utilizing the same emergence calculus to analyze the *rate* in

which a politician acts on their progressive ambition. Specifically, I seek to explain unexpected cases of emergence, where the emergence may be anticipated, but is not anticipated at that time.

The final research question uses the first two analyses to compare across different levels of officeholders. The purpose here is to determine if the office being held/sought has an effect on progressive ambition. By studying ambition both within and across types of officeholders, we can explore how the individual and the institution shape the manifestation of ambition.

To address these research questions, I looked to three different types of officeholders seeking three different rungs on the political ladder: (1) state legislators running for the U.S. House, (2) representatives running for the U.S. Senate, and (3) senators running for the presidency. For U.S. House and U.S. Senate members, I studied their emergence behavior from 1976-2008. Due to data limitations, I was only able to make observations on state legislators serving from 1992-2008. Both time periods are significantly longer than what previous studies have used (the exception being U.S. House members). In the case of representatives and senators, I also analyzed the actions of former officeholders. Historically, political scientists have excluded this type of candidate from their studies of progressive ambition and candidate emergence. I have found that these former officeholders make up roughly a quarter of all bids made by ambitious politicians. Given the rarity of emergence (in the three levels studied emergence rates were all below 2%), and the relative difficulty political scientists have in explaining actions of progressive ambition, including as many cases as possible seems prudent. It is understood that these former officeholders are different in that they no

longer serve in the chamber. Yet, they still reap the benefits from holding the office, namely the name recognition and experience afforded them by their tenure in office. Incorporating all officeholders, both current and former, can help understand how the office itself facilitates ambition. This would lend insight into the weight candidates place in merely having name recognition versus having name recognition and having current elective experience.

The results of the three studies generally conclude that a generalizable emergence calculus guides acting on progressive ambition, where all candidates, regardless of office, weigh certain factors against each other to determine if and when to emerge. While the framework of this emergence calculus—a combination of costs, risks, liabilities, and characteristics that indicate increased viability—are applicable across all offices analyzed, each office does exhibit factors unique to the position held or sought.

A review of the conclusions drawn from each separate analysis is beneficial before going any further into discussion on the findings of this dissertation. The probability of emergence analysis finds state representatives seeking a position within the U.S. House of Representatives mainly include liabilities and factors of increased viability in their emergence calculus. Liabilities include lack of tenure, which proves to lower the likelihood of emergence. Factors increasing a state legislator's viability, or attractiveness as a congressional candidate, include constituency overlap. Additionally, the presence of an open seat, while not an individually-driven characteristic, is a characteristic of a candidacy which increases the likelihood of victory and will encourage emergence. The significance of these characteristics increasing a state legislator's viability indicates progressive ambition manifests themselves through opportunity. While individual

attributes such as experience play a role in deciding whether to seek higher office, circumstances largely out of a state legislator's hands dictates their emergence.

Similarly opportunistic are U.S representatives seeking election to the U.S. Senate. In their emergence calculus, we do see the added costs of serving as a committee chair deters emergence; however, this only affects a relatively small number of representatives. Rather, if costs were that influential in a representative's emergence calculus, we would see more credence given to their current position.

Analogous to state legislators, factors indicating liabilities and or increased viability play a large role in the decision to emerge among representatives. However, it is here that we really see how negative factors associated with an officeholder's campaign can be negated if certain characteristics indicating increased viability are present. Stated differently, an officeholder will obviously consider the negative aspects of his candidacy, such as how he left office, his behavior while in office, or factors out of his control, such as demographic characteristics. But they will also seek out the positives surrounding their candidacy, factors that give them an electoral advantage, either with voters or within the system.

However, ambition among representatives is tempered much like state legislators: It is all about opportunity. Acting opportunistically is a requirement at both levels because of the paradoxical circumstances surrounding open versus incumbent-contested races. Because of high rates of reelection in the U.S. Congress, challenging and succeeding in an election with an incumbent present is a rarity. In this scenario, the presence or absence of an incumbent is essentially the only factor in an emergence calculus.

Yet, if an incumbent chooses not to seek reelection, a completely different playing field is unveiled. In open races, the likelihood of success is overwhelmingly positive, and there will be more officeholders acting on their progressive ambition. To determine when to run in these races, the emergence calculus becomes much more complex, weighing costs against liabilities and liabilities against increased viability.

Both of these officeholders' emergence calculi are in direct contrast with the emergence calculus of U.S. senators seeking the White House. Their decisions to emerge are much more personal, with senators weighing each and every liability against all the positives associated with their candidacy. The lack of incumbency advantage at the level of president could be one explanation. Or the Electoral College structure of presidential elections may present unique advantages and/or disadvantages for the individual senators. It is at this level that we see officeholders act the most self-reflective and strategic, only emerging when there are elements of their candidacy that make them stand out from the other challengers. We can conclude from the analysis that the emergence calculus plays a role in the probability of emergence. More importantly, we note the importance of including characteristics of increased candidate viability (this is especially true in all cases where there is an open seat).

Historically, the rate by which officeholders seek out higher office has never been fully addressed. This study confirms that the same calculus used to predict emergence is helpful when addressing the rate in which officeholders act on their ambitions. For representatives, the emergence calculus is an applicable way to study the rate of emergence, as most of the factors that positively influence the act of emergence also appear to influence the rate of emergence. Opportunistic House members will largely

determine when to run for higher office upon the presence of an open seat and the size and quality of the competition. If the increased “opportunity” for victory is not present, a representative will simply wait until such a time occurs when it is. It is interesting to note that should that opportunity come early in their career, at a time that we would not anticipate emergence, representatives are more than willing to take advantage.

A senator seeking the presidency not only has a more involved emergence calculus, but also uses more factors in determining *when* to run. Similar to representatives, senators recognize when opportunity presents itself, and will run earlier than anticipated if the likelihood of success is increased. However, it is important to highlight one notable difference between the probability and rate of emergence. For senators, there appears to be fewer factors influencing the rate of emergence than there are influencing the probability of emergence. Two conclusions are possible. One possibility is that when a senator runs for president, their motivation is more about the specific individual than a generalizable emergence calculus. Individual behavior is harder to predict. Second, fewer factors used to determine when to run. This is evidenced by the frequency of repeated bids in contrast with randomness in which a second bid occurs. Consider John McCain’s second bid at the White House, choosing to run again in 2008 when no Republican incumbent was contending. What made him emerge again so quickly given his defeat in 2000, when someone like Joseph Biden waited twenty years before a second emergence? This example suggests that multiple attempts at the White House are driven by ambition; those officeholders willing to act on their progressive ambition will run no matter the situation. However, the timing of senators’ repeat bids may be more a result of opportunity, similar to state legislators and U.S. representatives.

Despite the predictive value of the model, both in terms of studying the probability of emergence and the rate of emergence, a number of limitations should be noted. Lack of available data on former state legislators make it difficult to generalize results across all three levels presented here. While information about currently serving representatives and senators abounds, the exclusion of former state legislators was unavoidable. Over time, states in association with organizations such as the National Council of State Legislatures or the Council on State Government, may invest the time and effort to make this information available. This limitation would then be eliminated.

Predicting probability and/or rate of emergence is negatively impacted by the rarity of the event itself. Some might take issue with this study's "kitchen sink" approach, seeing flaws in throwing in a plethora of factors with the hope of capturing some sort of emergence pattern. Two circumstances support the approach used. First, the unquantifiable nature of ambition forces political scientists to create proxies for how to anticipate the manifestation of ambition. A greater investment in survey analysis, such as the Maestes et al. (2006) work that interviewed probable elected officials, would benefit this area of study. Understanding the intrinsic nature of ambition will certainly help future studies of ambition when attempting to capture actions of progressive ambition.

Second, the "kitchen sink" approach used here is an unavoidable side result of studying ambition across disjointed offices, time periods, and variables. Previous studies found that a multitude of variables exert significant influences on emergence, yet not on a consistent basis. Analyzing ambition, not only over a longer span of time, but across several types of officeholders adds value to the research base. In addition, it also

includes a broader, more accurate candidate pool by including former officeholders. Taking such an inclusive approach should create more valid conclusions about the influences on ambition.

Despite these limitations, both here and in the subfield at large, this dissertation's findings are valuable on several levels. It advances the way we approach the study of ambition by addressing new and previously unexplored questions. I improve the theory surrounding ambition and candidate emergence, and incorporate a more appropriate set of data and analyses. More importantly, it highlights the effect and subsequent importance of studying ambition.

The ways officeholders act on progressive ambitions have both electoral and legislative relevance. In an electoral context, ambition influences who runs in elections, the level of competition found in elections, and the outcomes of such contests. Ambition motivates people to run for a political office. And because running for political office is the ultimate manifestation of democratic participation, understanding what motivates emergence is a worthy endeavor. Additionally, if we are interested in the level of competition in our elections, or in most cases, the lack there of, studying ambition could help to understand when and why candidates emerge while a majority do not. For example, one conclusion drawn here is that state legislators and representatives are opportunists, who strategically wait to emerge only when an open seat becomes available. If increased competition among candidates is deemed desirable, this conclusion could be used to support the term limit argument of the 1990s. Alternatively, this finding could encourage more state legislatures to adjust their two-year term lengths to four, allowing their members to seek higher office without automatically relinquishing their current

position. Limiting the costs incurred by potential candidates would certainly increase the total number who emerge.

Similarly, to encourage greater levels of emergence, states could electorally advantage their state legislators by having fewer state legislative districts, and drawing the current district more congruent to congressional districts. If state legislators were on more comparable footing with incumbents, especially in terms of name recognition and the ability to cultivate a personal homestyle, they may be less hesitant to run against such advantaged officeholders.

From a legislative perspective, having progressively ambitious tendencies can affect a candidate's behavior while in office. A representative considering a move to the Senate may not be as ideologically extreme in his House floor votes if he knows he will soon be soliciting support from a more diverse state constituency. Similar behavior has been noted in senators seeking the White House. In determining that experiences obtained from serving in a chamber encourages emergence among officeholders, conclusions can be drawn about the motives behind officeholders' actions while in their current position. Not only will an officeholder alter his voting proclivity to be more mainstream, they may seek out certain committee placements to garner beneficial experience in matters important to the office they seek. Take, for example, how the officeholder works with others. When looking at representational behavior, politicians contemplating a bid for higher office, especially if that office has a state-wide or national constituency, may seek out fellow officeholders to work with in a show of bipartisanship. Understanding that officeholders view appealing to the median of a broad electoral base as a desirable trait, one that encourages them to act on their progressive ambition can help

explain why we see such acts of bipartisanship when polarization typically characterizes legislative behavior. Alternatively, this same progressively ambitious officeholder may seek to gain individual prominence within the chamber, choosing to sponsor certain bills or take controversial stands on issues. There is no question that ambition is a significant motivation for legislative behavior, comparable, if not proximate to the motivation for reelection.

Now that some conclusions have been drawn, and the importance has been noted, what usefulness does this information have? Predicting the emergence of candidates in future elections is one valuable application. To illustrate, a model to predict the most probable senators to emerge in the 2012 Presidential Election was created. Using an out-of-sample technique, I took every Republican senator in the database for the 2008 election and added any new members elected into the upper chamber as a result of the 2010 midterm elections or any special elections held. Because I do not want to exclude any potential emergences, I utilize a random effects logistic regression that accounts for the potential for repeated events. Using an emergence calculus similar to the one used to determine the probability of senators running for president in 1976-2008, I exclude any temporally sensitive variables whose values are unknown at the present time (Ideological Extreme and Presidential Approval).⁶² The results are displayed in Table 5.1.

⁶² The variable Scandal was also excluded due to the coding issues discussed in Chapter 4. I ran the regression with its inclusion and there were no significant differences.

Table 5.1 2012 Presidential Predictions

<i>Senator</i>	<i>Probability of Emergence</i>
Sam Brownback (R-KS)	.4477
Marco Rubio (R-FL)	.2639
Mike Lee (R-UT)	.2206
Lisa Murkowski (R-AK)	.1993
Mitch McConnell R-KY)	.1929
Kelly Ayotte (R-NH)	.1542
Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX)	.1310
Susan Collins (R-ME)	.1141
Olympia Snowe(R-ME)	.1101
John Cornyn (R-TX)	.0991

From the outset, one observation similar to 2008 is the strong presence of members of a nontraditional group. Given the significance placed on minority status in the 2008 Presidential Election, and the fact that the incumbent president is a minority, one should not be surprised if a woman emerges to run for president. By the time this dissertation was completed, Michelle Bachmann (R-MN) had already emerged to challenge for the Republican nomination. Her status as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives makes her non-relevant to this study, however.

The model predicts Sam Brownback, the former senator from Kansas, as the most probable candidate in 2012 and this has proven to be accurate. Sen. Brownback's progressive ambition is evident in that he was the only other Republican senator besides John McCain to emerge in the 2008 Election. Additionally, since leaving the Senate, he has gone on to serve as Kansas' 46th Governor. By this action, he is staying politically relevant while cultivating executive experience. Previous work on progressive ambition

would not even include former Sen. Brownback as a possible candidate despite holding multiple positions which would aid his claims of legislative and executive experience.

However, one thing this prediction does make apparent is an omitted variable that accounts for the success of the previous presidential bids. Sen. Brownback's initial attempt in 2008 had him withdrawn from the race before the Iowa Caucus. As a result, Brownback has repeatedly said he is quite content serving in his gubernatorial capacity. An extension of this dissertation will be a study on repeat presidential bids. It is puzzling to me that someone as strategic as a U.S. Senator would be willing to try repeatedly for the improbable chance of winning the presidency. I believe some real advancement in understanding ambition can be gleaned from studying such illogical emergence.

A case can be made for why each of the senators predicted here will emerge as candidates for the 2012 Republican nomination. Mitch McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, has the name recognition and leadership experience deemed attractive; however, he has stated on a number of occasions his satisfaction with remaining in the Senate. The level of attention he has received from media and political operatives at least suggests the model is effective at predicting what others are positing. Both Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe are moderate Republicans who have a strong likelihood of appealing to Independent and disillusioned Democratic voters. John Cornyn has the added benefit of serving a state that recently increased its Electoral College votes to 38.

However, Sen. Mike Lee from Utah and Marco Rubio of Florida are somewhat of a surprise. Lee was unexpected given the small state he represents and his lack of political experience (a first term senator). To his credit, he is the youngest member of the Senate at 40 years old, and he serves on the Foreign Relations Committee. The other

freshman senator sitting on the coveted Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Marco Rubio of Florida. What sets him apart from Lee is that the state he serves (Florida) is both a swing state and a state with 29 Electoral College votes. Should he emerge as a presidential contender, he can almost guarantee the 29 Electoral College votes for Republicans, as well as the increasingly important Latino vote. Seen as the Republican equivalent to unexplained fervor over Barack Obama in 2008, Rubio was touted as a frontrunner for the 2012 Election months prior to any candidate formally declaring. According to the predictive model, those waiting for him to emerge should continue their support.

As of the date of this dissertation, only one senator has emerged as an official candidate in the 2012 Presidential Election: Rick Santorum. Where did my model rank him in terms of probability of emergence? Fifty-ninth out of seventy-three. Clearly, my model would not predict that a senator who lost reelection to his Senate seat would choose to run for the highest office in the land. Santorum's actions just prove two final things. First, as calculating as officeholders are, their emergences are still unpredictable. Because of this, studying the rate of emergence is a worthy endeavor. Secondly, despite how successful the model is in predicting actual cases of emergence, there is always room for improvement. Future research on progressive ambition will hopefully take the science of prediction the emergence of candidates to the next level.

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