AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH: JAPAN'S PRIME MINISTER JUNICHIRO KOIZUMI'S CONTROVERSIAL VISITS TO THE CONTROVERSIAL YASUKUNI SHRINE

by

YUSUKE SHIRAI

(Under the Direction of Christopher S. Allen)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to identify the underlying conditions that account for Japanese Prime Ministers' controversial visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, employing Institutional approaches. This study will show how Institutional approaches explain Koizumi's continued visits. This study tries to contribute to theoretical arguments (Institutional approaches) as well as to empirical studies (Koizumi's continued Yasukuni visits). Conventionally, this issue has been explained in terms of Prime Ministers' individual beliefs and in terms of pressure on the Koizumi government from political interest groups. However, by focusing on 'ideas' embedded in the Japanese institutionalized politics called the 1955 political system, this study will shed light on the underlying structure of this issue. The declining power of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and changing power balance among factions in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) can be interpreted as the keys to his visits.

INDEX WORDS: New Institutionalism, Idea-episode, Japanese Politics, The 1955 Political System, The Liberal Democratic Party, The Japanese Socialist Party, Junichiro Koizumi, Yasuhiro Nakasone

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1. Statement of the Problem: The question of Koizumi's repeated visits

Junichiro Koizumi, the former Prime Minister of Japan, annually visited the Yasukuni Shrine during his office.[1] The visits provoked harsh criticism mainly from the Chinese and South Korean governments. His continued visits under such criticism were the first since the government of Yasuhiro Nakasone: No Prime Minister performed repeated visits to the shrine during the intervening 15 years.

Since 1945, Japanese Prime Ministers as well as the Japanese emperor, Hirohito, have visited the Yasukuni shrine, which is dedicated to the souls of the about 2.5 million Japanese men, women and children who have died in the name of their country since 1869 (Financial Times, Aug 16, 2006). After 14 Class A war criminals of the World War II began to be honored in 1978, the visits by Prime Ministers became international issues: Asian countries—especially Chinese and South Korean governments—have opposed the Prime Ministers' visits to the shrine. Since in Shinto (Japan's national religion), humans are transformed into *Kami* [deities] after their death and worshipped by their descendants, those countries see these visits as a sign of Prime Ministers' respect for the Class A criminals and political intent for militarism. Suspecting this, Asian countries have expressed dissatisfaction with Japanese Prime Ministers' visits and rebuked them.[2]

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[1] Yasukuni Shrine was founded in 1869 on the orders of Emperor Meiji. "Surrounded by war banners and military regalia, the Yasukuni *Kami* [deities] are venerated by hundreds of thousands of visitors who attend the shrine each year" (BBC. Aug 15, 2006. "Japan's Controversial Shrine").

[2] Before the class A criminals were enshrined, the visiting by Japanese political leaders and emperors were not an internationalized issue: China and South Korea did not see any political intent. Again, after them being enshrined there, however, these visits became a highly political issue.

Due to such criticisms, Japanese Prime Ministers after Nakasone did not visit the Yasukuni repeatedly. For example, Nakasone stopped his visits after his controversial 'official' visit in 1985 and Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was the only Prime Minister visiting the shrine between Nakasone and Koizumi, did not visit there more than once due to the growing discontent over his visit by the Chinese and South Korean governments. However, Junichiro Koizumi did not stop visiting the Yasukuni shrine, even though Japan faced severe anti-Japan movements in China and South Korea followed by official criticism by those governments. He did not change his mind.[3] Why did and could Koizumi visit the Yasukuni shrine repeatedly under harsh criticism, which implied the risk of deteriorating the relations with China and South Korea? What political situations enabled him to continue the visits? This study shall address these questions.

Conventional explanations for Koizumi's visits were formulated in terms of his own personal beliefs and interest groups who support his government. Asked his intent of visiting, he replied that "I did not go to pray for Class-A war criminals. I went to offer condolences to the many that died in war and with the resolve that (Japan) must not wage war again." (Kyodo News Service, Aug 15, 2006).[4] In addition to that, the support from political interest groups who encourage Prime Ministers to visit the Shrine also has been proposed as an explanation for his visits. However, these explanations leave some questions unanswered as briefly reviewed later in this chapter. This paper sees that Japanese institutional politics called the 1955 System provide us with the key to addressing this issue. More directly, the institutional change of the Japanese political system shall be seen as the answer to the questions this study proposes.

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[3] Asked why he visited the shrine, he stated that "I don't understand why I should stop visiting Yasukuni shrine" and "I will decide appropriate when to go" at the House of Representatives Budget Committee session (People's Daily. May 16, 2005. "Japanese PM hints at visiting Yasukuni Shrine again", see <http://english.people.com.cn/200505/16/eng20050516_185282.html>.)

[4] Along with this question, as discussed later in this chapter, he emphasized his personal pledge not to go into war again as his motivation to visit the shrine. See also BBC News. Aug 15, 2006. "Japan's Controversial Shrine." <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1330223.stm>

1.2. Conventional Explanations of Koizumi's Visits

"That is fine with me," Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi replied, given the cancellation by the Chinese foreign minister of his visit to the 2005 December summit in Japan. This cancellation was triggered by Koizumi's annual Yasukuni visits: it was seen as the expression of the Chinese government's dissatisfaction with Koizumi's visits. In 2006, Koizumi criticized the Chinese and South Korean governments for refusing to hold summit talks. They cancelled these talks because of the Yasukuni visit on the day of the 61st anniversary of the end of World War II. Asked about enshrinement of Class A criminals in the shrine, Koizumi replied "their enshrinement is a different issue from my visit. I am not paying homage for particular persons".[5] Also Koizumi said ""people criticizing me are telling me not to do anything to annoy China and South Korea, but I don't think that's necessarily right".[6] These reactions on this issue express his attitude toward Yasukuni Problem well. As another explanation, the pressure from political groups has been reported. Especially *Nippon Izokukai* (the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association) shows strong influence over the Diet on this issue (especially when election as vote-gathering group).

Nippon Izokukai was established in 1953 in order to seek "to boost state benefits for bereaved families and lobbied prime ministers and cabinet members to visit Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines the nation's war dead" (The Daily Yomiuri, May 24, 2005). This is the group that promotes Prime Ministers to visits the shrine. This association considers the Yasukuni shrine as the only memorial facility for the spirits of the war dead and it opposes

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[5] Kyodo News Service. August 15, 2006. "Koizumi raps China, S. Korea for refusing summits over Yasukuni".
[6] Agence France Presse. August 15, 2006. "Japanese PM visits war shrine on WWII anniversary".

establishment of any new facilities for the war dead in the future.[7] The strong channel of *Nippon Izokukai* to the LDP enables the group to make influence over the LDP.[8]   A senior member of Koizumi's LDP Koichi Kato recognized that the visits started by the request of *Nippon Izokukai* (Financial Times, June 13, 2005).

In sum, Koizumi's Yasukuni trips have been understood in terms of his personal pledge and the influence of political groups (*Nippon Izokukai*) according to mass media reports. The repeated visits have been seen as his renewing pledge for peace and the strong influence of *Nippon Izokukai* over the Koizumi government.

1.3. The 1955 Political System: Japanese Institutionalized Politics

From 1955 to 1993, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated Japanese politics as the majority party in the Diet (parliament) in every election; every Japanese parliamentary government has been an LDP government; and every Japanese prime minister was a LDP president. According to Pempel (1990), parties should "dominate the electorate, other political parties, the formation of governments, and the public policy agenda" to be the dominating party (Pempel 1990, 4). The LDP fits these criteria of a dominating party since the LDP "held unambiguous majorities in both houses of parliament, providing all the prime ministers and virtually all the cabinet ministers, from its formation" (Pempel 1990, 4).   This LDP's long dominance of the Diet from 1955 to 1993 was a unique political system (Fukui 1970; Kohno 1992; Curtis 1999; Pempel 1990). This becomes clear when compared with other countries'

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[7] See *Nippon Izokukai*'s web page for this official statement. < http://www.nippon-izokukai.jp/index2.html>

[8] The regional branches of the *Nippon Izokukai* function as vote-collecting machines for the party. Also before Presidential election in 2001, Koizumi visited the headquarters of the *Nippon Izokukai* for their support (The Daily Yomiuri. May 24, 2005. p.3).

political parties.[9] Under the 1955 System, the LDP retained power from 1955 to 1993 in the

House of Representatives and in the upper house (the House of Councilors) until 1989.

This single long dominance by the LDP can be characterized in terms of contestation for

power with the JSP and factional politics within the LDP. Factionalism played a fundamental

role in Japanese politics (Fukui 1978). The support from factions is imperative for candidates for

general elections especially under the single non-transferable votes (SNTV). Its support is

critical when a candidate run for the LDP's presidency election, because supports—votes—are

gathered mainly factional basis. In addition to this, the coalition of the LDP with the Japan

Socialists Party (JSP) is another characteristic of the system (Curtis 1999, 35). Management of

party politics with JSP is required for the LDP to keep its office (Kohno 1997, 116-121). For

this, the diet policy committee should be noticed. This committee is composed mainly of the

LDP and JSP played critical role in communicating with each other. The primary aim of the diet

policy committee for the LDP is to enable the LDP to avoid confusion with the JSP in Diet

proceedings. With communication through this committee, the LDP tries to dismiss the

uncertainty in Diet.

1.4. *Yasukuni Mondai* [The Yasukuni Problem]

Yasukuni, according to Harootunian (1999), is "*the* place of memory, principally because it

enshrined and deified the heroic spirits (*Eirei*) of the nation's war dead, those who gave service

and life to the emperor" (Harootunian 1999, 150, emphasis in original). In this context, unlike

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[9] A comparison with the Swedish Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy bring us a solid foundation for its statement. The Swedish Democratic Party had dominated the Diet from 1932 to 1976 and returned to power in 1982, but only in 1940 and 1968 could the party obtain a parliamentary majority. And although the Christian Democratic Party of Italy dominated the parliament in the post-Second World War period, they had had to make a coalition with other parties. (Kohno 1997)

other Shinto shrines, Yasukuni holds special meaning to Japanese people: Yasukuni shrine was a product of Japan's modernization and national formation in the nineteenth century" (Harootunian 1999,150).

Yasukuni shrine began to enshrine Class B and C criminals in 1959 and until 1970 it was completed.[10] As for Class A criminals, they have been added to the list of the shrine in 1978.[11] Since Yasuhiro Nakasone, who was 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Prime Minister in the period from 1982 to 1987, made 'official' visit to the shrine in 1985, this *Yasukuni Mondai* [Yasukuni Problem] became an internationalized issue among Asian countries such as China, Singapore and South Korea. Mass media in South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United States reported Nakasone' official visit with great concern (Takahashi 2005, 64).

This provoked huge reaction: Asian countries see the official visit as implying Japan's revival of pre war militarism.[12] Put simply, the official visits can be understood as changing understanding of the Japanese government of the war. For example, the Chinese government aggressively opposed Nakasone's visits that 'put Asian countries which were invaded during the war into fear' (Ishikawa 1999, 164). Since then, Prime Ministers after Nakasone barely visited the Shrine due to the risk of deteriorating relations with the Chinese and South Korean governments.[13] However, Koizumi continued to visit the shrine under such risk, posing that he

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[10] Fifty seven hundred people convicted as Class-B and -C war criminals for abusing prisoners of war and murdering civilians. Of the accused, 920 were sentenced to death and executed.

[11] Class A war criminals were convicted of against peace and other wartime atrocities in the planning and execution of wars of aggression in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also called Tokyo saiban [Tribunal]. Twenty eight Class A criminals included Hideki Tojo who was the general in charge of the Kwangtung Army in Manchuria at the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937. The incident escalated into the Sino-Japanese war, which lasted until 1945. Seven of these war criminals received death sentence, 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment and two were imprisoned.

[12] In Shinto, the dead is respected as 'god'. See footnote one for Shinto in Japan.

[13] 82nd and 83rd Prime Minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, visited the shrine in 1996 but stopped visiting there due to the risk of deteriorating relations with Asian countries.

seemed not to pay any attention to those countries.[14] Koizumi's visit of 2001 brought about the Yasukuni Problem.

The visits are also problematic in terms of the 'separation of religion and state' provision in the Japanese Constitution. Under the Constitution, Japanese officials are banned from doing any religious activity. Accordingly, visits by Prime Ministers (Official Person) are problematic in terms of Japan's constitution. However, Koizumi seemed not to pay attention to this. Koizumi has said that "everybody is free' to visit Yasukuni, whether he be prime minister, chief cabinet secretary or emperor" (The Nikkei Weekly, Aug 14, 2006). This statement expresses his ignorance of a great number of post war court cases that 'sought to determine whether a visit by an elected official to Yasukuni violates the 'separation of religion and state' provision in the Japanese Constitution (The Nikkei Weekly, Aug 14, 2006). Next, whether the visits are performed in official or private capacity has received attention. Koizumi answered "I'm both a public and private person,' to the question on whether these were made in a private or official capacity" (BBC, Aug 15, 2006). In his logic, he could defend his visits and criticized Chinese and South Korean governments for cutting off dialogue with Japan due to the dispute (Kyodo News Service, Aug 13, 2006).

The Yasukuni Problem holds two issues: the risk of deteriorating relations with Asian countries and the constitutional problems. Koizumi repeatedly visited the shrine; other Prime Ministers stopped visiting it.

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[14] To him, presumably some argue that his visits have the risk of deteriorating the relations with the Chinese and South Korean governments, irrespective of Koizumi's personal intentions (Japan Times. Aug 15, 2006. "Editorial: A time to learn from the past"), because every act a national leader commits in public reflects on his administration, whether intended or not like The Straits Times states (Kyodo News Service Aug 16, 2006l "Asian editorial excerpts") .

1.5. Temporal and Spatial Parameters

This study addresses Koizumi's Yasukuni visits within the institutionalized political system of Japan. The political system called the 1955 Political System starts in 1955 and ends in 1993. Instead of taking a look at the entire 38 years, this study examines Japanese politics during the Nakasone Government (1982-1986). Nakasone first made official visits to the Yasukuni that triggered huge criticisms from the Chinese and South Korean governments (Yasukuni Problem). Then, the Yasukuni Problem was internationalized. Since this study comprehends the Yasukuni Problem with the relations with Asian countries reaction of Prime Ministers' visits, it starts from Nakasone government. [15] The study addresses Koizumi's visits by taking a look at Japanese politics under the 1955 System [Time 1] and after the system [Time 2] (Figure 1.1).

1.6. Organization of this Study

This study is composed of five chapters. As seen so far, in the first chapter, the problem of this study was introduced. This chapter contains an explication of the problem of this study followed by conventional explanations to the issue, institutionalized Japanese politics, and the Yasukuni Problem. In the second chapter, the framework of this study will be presented. In the following chapters, the primary explanations to this issue are discussed (chapter three), alternative explanations driven by conventional explanations will be assessed (chapter four), and in conclusion, a discussion of this study and concluding remarks will be presented (chapter five).

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[15] Takahashi (2005) points out the controversy relating to the enshrining Class A criminals at Yasukuni shrine in the public opinion and to the law which has the risk to break Japanese constitution on 'separation of religion and state' (Takahashi 2005, 66).

Yasukuni Problem

1955   Nakasone   1993   Koizumi
             (1982-86)   (2001-2006)

Time-1   Time-2

Figure 1.1 Time Frame of this Study

CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

2.1. Institutionalism

2.1.1. Institutional Change: New Institutionalism

A great deal of institutionalist literature has discussed the relationships between political actors and the institutions to which they belong, and moreover, it addresses the questions of why institutions take particular forms, why the are needed, and why they survive (March and Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996). The Institutional approach, in Thelen and Steinmo's words, is "interested in the whole range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups" (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). In this sense, the institutional change provokes much discussion. In Krasner's 'punctuated equilibrium,' institutional change only occurs until an alternative becomes possible (Krasner 1984). To Kloppenberg, Institutions persist only if they are able to maintain their legitimacy (Kloppenberg 1995). The growing discussion on institutional change—"Why institutions take the form they do" in Thelen's words (Thelen 2004)—brings about a great deal of terminological confusion. Given this confusion, Hall and Taylor, in *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms*, presents new categories named the *New* Institutionalisms: Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996).

2.1.2. New Institutionalism: Rational Choice and Historical Institutionalism

The main purposes of these Institutionalists' discussions are to examine how institutions affect individual's behaviors and to understand how individuals affect the institutions to which they belong. Put simply, 'how institutions evolve' is the central argument. In order to address this, Hall and Taylor (1996) suggest two key concepts: "calculus approach" and the "cultural approach". The calculus approach assumes that human behavior is instrumental and based on strategic calculation. In this sense, institutions, to some extent, circumscribe the actor's behavior by offering information regarding the behavior of others (p.939). The cultural approach, on the other hand, presumes that human behavior is not always calculated and thus it is confined by "an individual's world view" (p.939). In this regard, Pierson and Skocpol (2002) see that historical *new* institutionalists trace the history of institutions. They see organizational and institutional configurations over a relatively long span, whereas Rational and Sociological Institutionalists see it in a short time period (Pierson and Skocpol 2002, 720).

The main point of the Rational Choice Institutionalists is to find coordination mechanisms to establish equilibrium. This approach is the product of rejection of *old* institutionalism, which focused on formal laws, rules, and administrative structures, in the 1950s and early 1960s. Instead of formal attributes of government institutions, this approach sees informal distribution of power, attitudes, and political behavior (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 4). As Margaret Levi puts it,

> The strength of rational choice in comparative and historical analysis is also evident in its capacity to spawn testable theory with clear scope conditions, its ability to make sense of a correlation or a set of evident by providing a plausible and compelling story that identifies the causal mechanisms linking the independent and dependent variable, and its universalism that reveals generalizable implications applicable to cases beyond those under immediate investigation. *Rationalists in comparative politics are committed to explanation and to generalization. ….The major task confronting comparative rationalists is how to offer explanations that compel both logically and empirically.*
>
> (Levi 2002, 20, emphasis added).

Levi argues that the power of rational choice theorists lies in parsimony and testability. Historical institutionalists see this assumption of rational choice institutionalists limit the possibilities of institutional approach (Steinmo et al. 1992).

Historical institutionalists think that a long-time framework allows us to see how institutions are created over time. Important to be noticed here is that Historical *New* Institutionalists do not deny "rationality" itself: they see that the established routine affects the actor's "rational" behavior. For example, Historical comparative analysis shows this well. Based on the critique from Rational Choice theorists that historical approach focus too much on norms and thus they are antitheoretical,[16] comparative historical analysis, one of the historical *new* institutional approaches, can addresses the skeptical question posed by rational choice theorists. Historical comparative analysis has evolved out of the following assumptions: (1) causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest; (2) historical sequences and the upholding of process over time; and (3) systematic and contextualized comparisons of similar and contrasting cases (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 25). Along with this line, this study explains Koizumi's Yasukuni repeated visits by focusing on historical sequences of Japanese

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[16] Rational Choice institutionalism successfully draws great attention due to their critique to Historical institutionalism. However, at the same time, they themselves realize that it is in the "infancy" in macro-comparative research (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 19).

institutionalized politics and comparing with Prime Ministers after the Nakasone government on

the Yasukuni Problem. More concretely, seeing Prime Ministers as political actors in institutions,

this study shall explain Koizumi's puzzling visits in terms of other Prime Ministers (why they

did/ did not visit the shrine).   Theoretically important to be noticed here is that both institutional

approaches share similar assumption on political actors within institutions: individual actors own

rationality when they make judgments. Accordingly, this study sees every Prime Ministers made

their judgment on the Yasukuni Problem based on their political context with rational decision.

2.1.3. Ideas in Institutionalism

In addition to individuals' rationality, the concept of ideas should be examined here. Ideas in

institutions enable both approaches to be unified. In Lieberman's words,

> Long dormant in the systematic study of politics, ideas have staged a remarkable
> comeback in the social sciences in the last 15 years or so. Indeed, the challenge
> of *bringing ideas back* in to political science and political explanation is one of
> the central issues now facing the discipline.
>
> (Lieberman 2002, emphasis added)

As he argues, ideas become a key element when we utilize the institutional approach: both

institutionalists address the question of ideas in order to understand how institutions shape

actors' political strategies and influence political outcomes. Kloppenberg (1995) states that

Institutions need to be "historized" in order to understand institutional change (Kloppenberg

1995). Put differently, the Historical Institutionalists think that the change of institutions cannot

be understood without tracing their histories: what George (1979) calls "process tracing". Along

this line, how ideas are constituted becomes an interesting argument, because the examination of

institutional change, critical juncture in other words, is one of the main interests shared with institutionalist (Fiorina 1995; Kloppenberg 1995). The Historical Institutionalists recognize that interest has been formed in a historical context (Kloppenberg 1995) and ideas, which define political actors' strategies, have also evolved in that context (Thelen 1999). In this sense, process tracing is the central argument for the historical institutionalist approach: historical institutionalists seek not only for *strategies* which rational choice theorists emphasize, but also for the goals that political actors pursue.

The rational choice theories, according to Fiorina, see the ideas as "simply given" and people as acting according to their interest (Fiorina 1995). Moreover, Robert Grafstein (1988) sees that individuals act in ways that are consistent with institutions because they find conformity within the given information (Grafstein 1988). For rational choice theorists, institutions pose constraints on choice of self-interested behavior. Accordingly, they focus on the actors who make choices within constraints to obtain their desired ends, whose decision rest on their assessment of the probable actions of others, and whose personal outcomes depend on what others do. According to Thelen and Steinmo, the "preference formation" is the core difference between historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Historical institutionalists see that institutions influence political actors not only in terms of their strategy but also in terms of their goal in the institutional context. On the other hand, the rational choice institutionalists deal with preferences at the level of assumption. In other words, by taking the goals, strategies, and preferences as something to be explained, we can see the core differences between historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism (Thelen and Steinmo, pp.8-9).

For Lieberman, Historical and Rational approaches tend to take ideas as an auxiliary explanation for the pre-existing problem within each research problem (Lieberman 2002). Accordingly, the institutional approaches lack the ability to examine substantial causes of change. Lieberman (2002) sees the new institutional perspective as the approach that "relegates ideas" (p.699). In this sense, he recognizes focusing on "ideas-episodes" can bridge the gap between them. Along with this line, there is no need to create equilibrated order to provide convincing accounts of political change.

Table 2.1 presents the Yasukuni visits as the idea in Japanese politics. Its Table shows the Yasukuni visits *before* the Yasukuni Problem has been internationalized: These visits had not been criticized from foreign countries. Since Naruhiko Higashikuninomiya,[17] fourteen out of twenty eight Prime Ministers have visited the shrine. Although every Prime Minister visited the shrine, some visited there at high frequency. Especially, Shigeru Yoshida, 48th Prime Minister, went there eleven times during his office. This was the highest number of visits after World War II (Nakasone visited there at the second highest number [ten times]). Also, only four out of eleven Prime Ministers from Higashikuninomiya to Nakasone did not visit the shrine.[18] They hold relatively short period of government: three of four had just one year (see footnote 18). Since most of prime ministers visited Yasukuni and those who did not had less than one year, the Yasukuni visits by Prime Ministers can be recognized as "ideas" embedded into Japanese politics.

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[17] Higashikuninomiya, 43rd Prime Minister, was from the imperial family and was the first Prime Minister after the end of World War II.

[18] The Prime Ministers who did not visit there are the following: Tetsu Katayama (1947-1978) from the socialist party, Hitoshi Ashida (1948-1948) from the Domestic party (later the LDP), Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-1956) from the Domestic party, and Tanzan Ishibashi (1956-1957) from the LDP.

2.2. Theory: Combined Institutionalism

Based on rational choice theories, political actors (Prime Ministers) after the institutional change (the end of the 1955 Political System) became freer than was the case under the system. The end of the system implies the end of the JSP as the competitor to the LDP and the factional politics within the LDP: Prime ministers take such pressure from them no longer. Important to be noticed here is the concept of 'ideas' which are embedded in institutions. According to idealists, a focus on ideas is the key to understand institutions after their change. Especially, Lieberman (2002) argues that the ideas which are embedded in institutions are taken over to the actors after the institutional change (Lieberman's 'ideas-episodes').

This study suspects that Koizumi's continuity is due to the change of Japanese institutionalized politics which can be characterized by changes in political power balance and also changes in factional politics within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This study recognizes repeated Yasukuni visits by Governmental Officials during the early post war period to turn Yasukuni visits by Prime Ministers into a 'norm' in Japanese politics. The decisions of the Prime Ministers are affected by the 'ideas' which are embedded into Japanese politics (Yasukuni visits as norm). Accordingly, this study theorizes that political actors (Prime Ministers) have been 'freer' to make their decision of going or not going to the Yasukuni after the change of the institution. However, their decisions are under the affect of normalized Yasukuni visits which has been embedded within the Japanese politics.

Focusing on the change of the Japanese institutionalized politics, this study will address how Koizumi achieved the continued Yasukuni trips. For the sake of this explanation, this study makes two primary hypotheses based on this institutional change and two alternative hypotheses

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based on conventional explanations.   After the dependent variable is operationally defined, those hypotheses will be clarified.

2.3. Hypotheses and Variables

2.3.1. Yasukuni Visits

The continuity of Koizumi's visits is puzzling because it has been done under harsh criticism by the Chinese and South Korean government. Put simply, the *continuity* is the operational definition of the Yasukuni visits (DV).   The study shows the continuity by considering the number of visits made by each Prime Ministers after the Nakasone government. More concretely, this study looks at *the number of visits of Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni shrine under harsh criticism by the Chinese and South Korean governments*.

2.3.2. Primary Explanations

2.3.2.1. Primary Hypothesis #1: Power balance among parties (IV)

Under the 1955 political system, contestations for power between the LDP and JSP restricted Prime Ministers' Yasukuni visits. This study hypothesizes that:

> **A) Primary Hypothesis #1: Power balance**
> Under the 1995 political system, Prime Ministers who are the representatives of the Liberal Democratic Party needed to pay particular attention to the contestation for power with the Japan Socialist Party, which was the major alternative party in the system, in order to keep their power.

2.3.2.2. Operational Definition: *Party Power in the Diet (The JSP in decline)*

This variable holds two concepts that are needed to be clarified: Party power and the Diet. First,

power can be defined according to Dahl (1961) in W. Phillips Shively (2002). Dahl sees power

as "whether one has participated in a decision" (Shively 2002, 37). Since this study holds 1955

Political System characterized competition particularly between the LDP and JSP, the word of

party power is defined as the competitions between the LDP and the JSP for securing a *decision*

in the Diet. Second, the Diet. The National Diet of Japan consists of two houses: the House of

Representative and House of Councilors. Based on those clarifications, this study takes look at

how the relations between the LDP and the JSP can be defined. More concretely, how the affect

of the JSP to the LDP has been in decline. For this, this study shall see *the number of seats*

which each party acquired in comparison to other parties and the percentage of votes for those

parties in each general election. By so doing, this study expects to see how the JSP has been

located in the power balance in the Diet.

2.3.2.3. Primary Hypothesis #2: Power Balance among the LDP's factions (IV)

The strong factional politics within the LDP is one of two characteristics of the 1955 system.

Focusing on this, this study hypothesizes that:

> **B) Primary Hypothesis #2: Faction power**
> Under the 1955 political system, political factions might have had influence over
> the behavior of the Prime Ministers who are representatives of the Liberal
> Democratic Party. Factions in the LDP might influence the political behavior of
> Prime Ministers.

2.3.2.4. Operational Definition: Power Balance among the LDP's factions

The number of factional members shall be observed after providing narrative explanations of factions in Japanese politics and categorizing them based on their ideologies. Ideological categorization allows this study to see the power balance of the pro-China factions in the LDP. For understanding their power shift, they will be examined on the basis of the 1955 System. By so doing, this study expects to see the transition of the pro-China and anti-China school in the 1955 System and in the Post 1955 System.

2.3.3 Alternative Explanations

2.3.3.1. Alternative Hypothesis #1: Individual Beliefs (IV)

Conventionally the Koizumi's Yasukuni visit has been explained in terms of his strong political beliefs:

> **C) Alternative Hypothesis #1: Individual Beliefs**
> Individual beliefs may enable Prime Ministers to ignore other political actors. In particular, when governments are supported at a high rate, Prime Ministers might recognize their own political beliefs as one of the reasons for the support.

2.3.3.2. Operational Definition: Individual Beliefs

Koizumi has been seen as a conservative politician: He expressed dissatisfaction with the criticisms from the Chinese and South Korean governments. Accordingly, his visits conventionally have been interpreted in terms of his strong individual political beliefs: the conservative beliefs to try to re-identify Japanese nationalism. For this, Yasuhiro Nakasone shall be compared with Junichiro Koizumi since Nakasone also is well known for his

conservative political ideas. Nakasone made official visits to the Yasukuni in 1985, which

triggered this Yasukuni Problem. *Their statements shall be examined. By that, this study expects*

to understand each Prime Minister's attitudes toward the Yasukuni problem. In order to

understand their statements, their governments shall be examined as its background. Also, the

'high rate support' shall be clarified by looking at public opinion data asking "do you support the

Nakasone/Koizumi government" conducted by Asahi shimbun and Yomiuri shimbun.

2.3.3.3. Alternative Hypothesis #2: Political Interest Groups (IV)

Under the parliament government, governments need to recognize the importance of their

supporters—political pressure groups—because they can be seen as the primary

supporters. When nationalistic movements are powerful, people tend to support their political

leaders' nationalistic behaviors. In this case in particular, one of the major supporter groups is a

politically orientated group. Accordingly, this group can have influence over the Prime

Ministers' political ideas, even if these ideas are unacceptable to other nations: their influences

over the Prime Ministers enable political leaders to act regardless of the opinions of other

countries.

> **D) Alternative Hypothesis #2: Political Interest Groups**
> The higher the degree of support those political leaders get from interest groups,
> the more restrictions they face.

2.3.3.4. Operational Definition: Political Interest Groups

The number of votes interest groups hold will be examined. Among various interest groups, the

groups which support the Prime Ministers Yasukuni visits are focused on. Relating to the

Yasukuni problem, there are four interest groups: (1) the Military Pension Federation (*Gunjin*

Onkyu Renmei), (2) the Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja honcho*), the Japan Conference (*Nippon Kaigi*), and (3) the Group to Honor the Souls of the War Dead (*Eirei Ni Kotaeru Kai*), (4) the Bereaved Families Alliance (*Nippon Izokukai*). Among them, the Military Pension Federation [*Gunjin Onkyu Renmeni*] (154,500 members) and the Bereaved Families Alliance [*Nippon Izokuka*] (110,200 members) shall be addressed because these two groups have enjoyed strong influence on the LDP.[19] By looking at the number of members through time, this study expects to see a transition in these groups.

2.4. Summary: A prospect of study

This study will examine four hypotheses for the Yasukuni visits. Table 2.2 summarizes each independent variable with its operational definition. It shows the logic of study. The two primary hypotheses will be supported when the legislative seats and votes the JSP secured has been in decline (Primary Hypothesis #1) and the factions that take the anti-China stance have been gaining its power (hypothesis #2). On the other hand, two alternative rival hypotheses will be discredited if this study proves that Junichiro Koizumi valued the relations with China and South Korea (Alternative Hypothesis #1) and the influence of political groups is not enough for Koizumi to visit the shrine with the risk of deteriorating relations with those countries (Alternative Hypothesis #2).

In the next chapter, primary hypotheses will be tested for their validity to explain the Yasukuni visits. The alternative explanations will be examined afterwards.

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[19] As the major interest groups in the LDP, there are groups by postal officers (239,600), building constructers (182,500), nurses (124,000), and medical doctors [Japanese Medical Association] (115,100) (Ibaraki Shimbun. Apr 18, 2001).

Table 2.1 Prime Ministers who visited the Yasukuni before 1975

Prime Minister	Year	Number of Visits	Date of Visits
Naruhiko Higashikuninomiya	1945.8 – 1945.10	1	1945 (Aug 18)
Kijuro Shidehara	1945.10 – 1946.5	2	1945 (Oct 23, Nov 20)
Shigeru Yoshida	1948.10 – 1958.12	5	1951 (Oct 18), 1952 (Oct 17), 1953 (Apr 23, Oct 24), 1953 (Apr 24)
Nobusuke Kishi	1957.2 – 1958.6	2	1957 (Apr 24), 1958 (Oct 21)
Hayato Ikeda	1960.7 – 1964.11	5	1960 (Oct 10), 1961 (Jun 18,Nov 15), 1962 (Nov 4), 1963 (Sep 22)
Eisaku Sato	1964.11 – 1972.7	11	1965 (Apr 21), 1966 (Apr 21), 1967 (Apr 22),1968 (Apr 23), 1969 (Apr 22, Oct 18), 1970 (Apr 22,Oct 17), 1971 (Apr 22, Oct 19), 1972 (Apr 22)
Kakuei Tanaka	1972.7 –1972.12	5	1971 (Jul 28), 1973 (Apr 23, Oct 18), 1974 (Apr 23, Oct 19)

Table 2.2 The four hypotheses in this study

	(1) Power Balance among Parties (Primary Hypothesis #1)	(2) Power Balance among Factions (Primary Hypothesis #2)	(3) Individual Beliefs (Alternative Hypothesis #1)	(4) Political Groups (Alternative Hypothesis #2)
Operational Definition	Legislative seats and votes the LDP and JSP secured will be compared	Number of affiliates of the pro-China and the anti-China factions	Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine will be examined	Number of groups' affiliates will be observed
Hypothesis	Koizumi could continuously visit the Shrine due to the declining power of the JSP	Koizumi could attempt the continued, with declining power of the pro-China factions.	His strong political beliefs enabled Koizumi to visit the Shrine annually	For the sake of promise he made and supports from political groups, Koizumi visited Yasukuni
Research Expectation	If the JSP lose its legislative seats and votes to its party, this hypothesis will be supported	If the pro-China factions lose its power in the relations with anti-China factions, this will be supported	If Koizumi valued the relations with China and South Korea, this explanation is discredited	If the number of affiliates in War Veteran and Bereaved Families Association has been in decline, this explanation will be denied

CHAPTER 3

PRIMARY EXPLANATIONS

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is to test the main explanation on Koizumi's continuity of this study: the institutional change in 1993 allows Prime Ministers to visit the Yasukuni shrine. As explained before, the Japanese institutionalized politics have been characterized as (1) party power politics and (2) factionalism in the LDP. Accordingly, explanations on his continuity based on those variables shall be examined after operationalization of the dependent variable (Koizumi's Yasukuni visits).

Koizumi performed Yasukuni visits under harsh criticism from the Chinese and South Korean governments. He promised these visits when he ran presidency election for the LDP. He visited the shrine annually from the inception of his governments. These repeated visits were the first to occur since 1985 when Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to the shrine, which was the starting point of the Yasukuni problem.

The JSP was the major opposition party to the LDP under the 1955 System. Although the JSP had not got the power all over the system, the JSP was a major political and ideological opponent to the LDP. Because the JSP owns ideological connection with the Chinese government, the decline of the JSP implies less pressure over Yasukuni visits by the LDP's leaders (Prime Ministers) since the JSP had tried to build "mutually supportive relationships" with the Chinese government and "to assume a positive role in communications and mediation" between those governments (Lee 1978, 275) "

(Lee 1978). Accordingly, this study suspects that the end of Japanese institutionalized politics (1955 Political System) explains the continuity by Koizumi (Prime Ministers after the 1955 System).

In that same line, the factionalism in the LDP should as well be a main explanatory variable. As Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) sees, the factions in the LDP are so autonomous that the LDP can be seen as a coalition of each faction (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 577). In addition to that, factions in the party can be categorized based on their attitude toward the Chinese government. Based on this, the current study expects that power decline of the pro-China school explains the lessened pressure on Prime Ministers.

3.2. Koizumi's Yasukuni Visits (DV)

Since this study tries to explain Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the number of visits held by him is clarified here. For this explanation, the Prime Ministers who did not visit the shrine should also be clarified. After Nakasone, Japanese politics held nine Japanese Prime Ministers: Noboru Takeshita (1987 to 89), Sosuke Uno (1989 to 89), Toshiki Kaifu (1989 to 91), Kiichi Miyazawa (1991 to 93), Morihiro Hosokawa (1993 to 94), Tsutomu Hata (1994 to 94), Tomiichi Murayama (1994 to 96), Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996 to 98), Keizo Obuchi (1998 to 2000), Yoshiro Mori (2000 to 01). There was nine year gap between Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982 to 87) and Junichiro Koizumi (2001 to 06). During that period, no Prime Minister visited the Shrine repeatedly.[20]

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[20] Ryutaro Hashimoto was the only Prime Minister who visited the shrine during the period. But he did stop his attempt after criticism by the Chinese and South Korean governments.

Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni since the first year of his government (Table

3.1). His visits were made annually (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006) and finally held

on August 15th in his final year 2006.[21] The visit on the War Anniversary (August 15th) was a

very symbolic visit for his understanding by Asian countries, especially China and South Korea.

He did not stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine even though it held the risk of deteriorating the

relations with China and South Korea. In the following sections of this chapter, the dependent

variable will be explained with two primary variables (party power balance in the Diet and

Power Balance among the LD).

3.3. Party Power in the Diet: The JSP in Decline (IV)

3.3.1. The JSP as Major Party

As the reaction to authoritarian regimes, liberal parties can set up the situation in which they can

enjoy majority party for the sake of 'zest' for liberalization and checking of conservative parties

(Pempel 1990, 26).   The Socialist Party (JSP), which was splintered in 1951 when the San

Francisco peace treaty was enacted, increased its Diet strength in the successive elections of

1952, 1953, and 1955. As for conservatives, after the end of the occupation, they were divided

into two parties; one was the Liberal Party led by Taketora Ogata and the other was the

Democratic Party headed by Ichiro Hatoyama.

The advance of the liberals put conservatives in fear of losing its government, because

the conservatives had faced their shrinking power in election after election. In 1955 the

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[21] August 15th is the symbolic day for Asian countries as well as Japan: on the day, Japan announced the
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in 1945. With this acceptance Japan surrendered the Allies in
World War II.

Democratic Party headed by Hatoyama Ichiro fell far short of a majority. On the other hand, the right and left wings of the Japan Socialist party merged. This consolidation made conservatives worry to lose their power in the government. In the following month two conservative parties—the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party—were joined and it became the LDP.

The rationale for the mergers clearly was above all the desire for political power and control for the government. Pempel (1986) states "[w]hen the Liberal Democratic party was formed in 1955, the conservative politicians could agree only on one aim—which was not to rule the nation. At its inception, the sole purpose of the Liberal Democratic party was to keep the opposition parties—the socialists, in particular—out of power" (Pempel 1986).[22] As Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 shows, the LDP successfully dominate both parliaments.

Table 3.2 and 3.3 present the percentage of seats the LDP secured from 1979 to 1993 in the House of Representatives and from 1980 to 1992 in the House of Councilors. During that period, the LDP secured half of majority (around 60%) in the House of Representatives (Table 3.2). Although the JSP only acquired half of the LDP's seats (around 20%), its party had been contested for power with the LDP (Table 3. 2). On the other hand, the JSP only could secure 5 percent in the House of Representatives (Table 3.2) and 5.5 percent in House of Councilors (Table 3. 3). As for Komei party, it attained about 10 percent in both House of Representatives (Table 3. 2) and House of Councilors (Table 3. 3).

Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 present the percentage of the votes each party acquired during the same period with Table 3.2 and 3.3. These tables also show the dominance by the LDP

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[22] There is explanation in terms of the outbreak of the Cold War. Pempel (1990) explains why then liberals in Japan as well as Germany and Italy could not enjoy its majority in parliament. Although liberals reemerged by the 'renewed zest of liberalization' after the end of war, U.S. policy was changed due to the outbreak of the Cold War. He sates "because of America's leading role, particularly its occupation of Germany and Japan but also its economic and strategic dominance of the agendas in Italy, Japan revitalized the right and weakened the left in all three" (Pempel 1990, 26).

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during that period and the JSP had been alternative parties in both parliaments. The LDP obtained around 48 percent of total votes in the House of Representative (Table 3.4) and around 34 percent of votes in the House of Councilors (Table 3.5). The JSP gained around 20 percent of votes in both the parliaments (Table 3.4 and 3.5). On the other hand, the JCP attained about 8 percent in the House of Representatives (Table 3.4) and about 9 percent in the House of Councilors (Table 3.5). As for Komei party, about 9 percent in House of Representative (Table 3.4) and 13 percent in House of Councilors (Table 3.5).

Graph 3.1 and 3.2 present the percentage of the legislative seats and the total votes cast of the LDP are nearly twice as much as those of the JSP are during that period; the LDP shows supremacy in those elections. However, during that period, the LDP was the sole and strongest conservative party. As for the Liberal party, the JSP, the Nihon Komei (NK), and the Japanese Communist Party (JPC) belonged to the Liberal/Reform party (Ishikawa, 1999). By comparing the row of "Cons" (the LDP) with "Liberal" (other parties including the JSP), it becomes clear that the party balance in the Diet had been impending. Accordingly, the LDP could not enjoy its "supremacy" during the period: they had to balance the party politics.

Then, let this study move on to the comparison with parities out of governmental power. As Table 3.2, Graph 3.3, and Graph 3.4 show, the JSP was a major opposition party to the LDP under the political system. The JSP had enjoyed the dominance among the parties out of power.

As seen so far, the LDP dominated in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors from 1979 to 1993: it had always secured half of majority and attained votes twice as many as the JSC did seats in both parliaments. Throughout the period, the JSP had been a 'major' party among other alternatives (the JCP and Komei party). The JSP as major alternative party to the LDP is shown here.

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3.3.2. The JSP in Decline

Ideological rigidity and Poor leadership

The Socialist party has never been in government, though it has been a major opponent of the LDP. To explain this, Giovanni Sartori's (1990) words "irresponsible opposition" precisely describes the Socialist party (Sartori 1990, 333). The JSP has been an alternative party rather than providing plausible policies which were supported by the public to get power. More concretely, Christensen (2000) analyzes its failures due to the rigid ideology or inflexibility of the opposition, the party leaders' lack of desire to take power, or their bad leadership, and the party's lack of resources. According to Hrebenar (1986), the JSP failed to acquire the power because "[m]any Japanese regard it as poorly organized, indifferently led, narrowly based, doctrinaire and irresponsible in policy, lacking in autonomy, poor in human talent, and overly prone to ideological and factional division" (Hrebenar 1986, 83). Christensen (2000) sees Hrebnar's analysis as the prevailing explanation and it has been accepted: the JSP's failure can be attributed to its poor leadership and ideological rigidity (Christensen 2000, 155). The poor leadership was a strategy of the SDP and it made the JSP be the second party in the parliaments. However, the JSP attempted to change its ideological rigidity.

Since 1984, the JSP has tried to issue 'realizable' policies: it changed from Marxism-Leninism ideology to social democracy. This enabled the JSP to hold possibilities to make a coalition with conservative parties (Ishikawa 1999, 167). However, the JSP faced a huge loss in the next general election held in 1986 (Table 3.2). Yet, this loss led the JSP to a huge win in 1989: Takako Doi was elected to the party leader right after its electoral defeat on in July, 1986.

She was the first woman party leader in the history of Japanese parties and brought about the victory of 1989 (Ishikawa 1995, 176).[23]

Ideological Antipathy

Moreover, there was the ideological limitation of the JSP in public. Put simply, Japanese people had not supported socialism. As stated before, the support for the JSP was the product of a renewed 'zest of liberalization', as the reaction to authoritarianism.[24] Accordingly, the JSP was supported by the working class instead of its ideology. This becomes clear when we focus on the supporters of the party. Table 3.6 presents a showing that the JSP was supported mainly by people who lived in medium and large towns.

Throughout 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese economy enjoyed rapid industrial development. Due to the shift of basic industries from agricultural to manufacturing industry, this industrialization provoked a huge urbanization: people who lived in rural areas moved to the urban area (Table 3.7 and 3.8). Rapid economic growth has resulted in a decline in the agricultural sector and the old middle class, an expansion of the blue and white collar wage earning classes, and a growing diversity of interests (Oguma 2002, 75).

Moreover, the antipathy toward the socialism can be noticed here. Table 3.9 presents the LDP supports in terms of public opinion: they show relatively favorable feeling toward the LDP—the average of their feeling thermometer indicates above the 50 (51.5). On the other hand, feeling toward JSP and JCP is far below 50 (31.4 for JSP and 29.1 for JCP respectively). This

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[23] The JSP's victory in general election of 1989 is the product of political distrust from publics to the LDP. Ishikawa (1999) identifies this as following reasons: (1) In 1988 the LDP introduced consumer tax; (2) insider stock dealing by the LDP's parliaments was accused in 1988 (called 'Recruit stock scandal'); and (3) Prime Minister, Sousuke Uno's scandals because of which he needed to resign his office in 1989. (Ishikawa 1999, 167-176).

[24] See Pempel's (1990) analysis for detail.

table shows that Japanese voters do not embrace favorable feelings toward socialism and communism parties after the political system.

3.3.3. After Institutional Change: Koizumi Governments

Then, let me move on to the examination of Koizumi government. The Koizumi government is not under the same system: the JSP is no longer a strong alternative party to the LDP. The LDP created a coalition with the New Komeito, which has got twice as many seats as the JSP has. Moreover, as Table 3.10 indicates, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has emerged as the strong alternative party to the LDP. The DPJ has occupied about 30 percent of the legislative seats in House of Representatives (Graph 3.5). At the same time, the decline of the JDP is catastrophic (Graph 3.6). The JDP can only occupy less than 2 percent of the total seats. Based on this change, this paper recognize that the pressure over Prime Ministers' behaviors (Yasukuni visits, in this study) become lower than it used to be.

3.3.4. Summary

Table 3.11 presents the institutional change of Japanese politics. Under the 1955 System, the JSP was the main opposition party to the LDP; it also shared interest with the Chinese government due to their ideological similarity. Yet, the end of the system shows change in party politics: Under the Koizumi government (post 1955 System) the JSP no longer was the major opposition party. The power of the JSP shows sharp decline and amounting in drastically low numbers of legislative seats (7 seats in the House of Representative and 5 seats in the House of

Councilors). Accordingly, this study concludes that the pressure from the JSP over the Yasukuni

Problem has become weaker.

3.4. Factions in the LDP (IV)

> "The legislative factions of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan are so
> autonomous that the LDP is typically viewed as a coalition of factions, rather than
> a unitary party."
>
> (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 577)

As Cox and Rosenbluth stated, the impact of factions of the LDP goes beyond the existing

framework of factions. They excise great influence over the intra-party process, no one can

grasp the dynamic of Japanese politics "without understanding how factions work" (Park 2001,

429).[25] Although 'factions in the LDP' is the very terms which are hardly defined clearly,[26]

'faction' can be defined here based on Beller and Belloni (1978)'s definition as "any relatively

organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political

faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part"

(Beller and Belloni 1978, 419). According to Koller, their definition on faction is 'valuable',

because (1) it can "encompass various types of party groups" and (2) it is free from explanations

based on cultural perspectives (Kollner 2004, 88). Accordingly, this study adopts Beller and

Belloni's definition of 'factions'.

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[25] Fukui (1978) also emphasizes the important of understanding of the LDP's factionalism (Fukui 1978, 44).

[26] The factions are not defined by law—unlike the political parties—however politicians, newspaper reporters, scholars, voters, and others generally understand references to factions without any need for clarification (Fukui 1978, 68).

3.4.1. Factions in Japanese politics

In both houses—a House of Councilors (upper house) and a House of Representatives (lower house)—there are factionalisms. Conventionally factions of the House of Representatives have a stronger influence than the House of Councilors do. Under the 1955 System especially, factional competition in the LDP had been promoted. That was for the sake of support when the LDP's candidates ran political campaign: without a support of the factions to which candidates belonged, it was hard for candidates to run elections. According to Thayer, the factions play five keys parts in Japanese politics. First, the leader is elected through the factions. Second, through the factions, the funds for elections are raised. Third, posts both in the government and in the party are assigned based on the decision of the factions. Fourth, individual candidates get the human resources as well as money resources through the factions to which they belong. Fifth, the factions meet the psychological needs of the Dietmen (Thayer 1996, 17). The first explanation will be the focus of this section because this study sees the factions in the LDP have been promoted by competition for the presidency of the party.

3.4.2. Incentive of Candidate for Factionalism

The electoral system in Japan from 1947 until 1994 was a system in which voters voted for a candidate in multi-seat districts (the SNTV). Typically five or six candidates would run in a three-seat district, and the three with the highest number of votes would go on to serve in the House of Representatives. The LDP usually had more than one candidate in the same district. The factions inevitably functioned in order for them to receive support. Then, candidates affiliated themselves with factions in order to distinguish themselves from other candidates who were running from the same LDP. Cox states that "the LDP candidates often

found that other LDP candidates, or independent candidates affiliated to an LDP faction, posed the gravest threats to their own electoral chances. That being so, individual LDP candidates had strong incentives to seek a competitive advantage over their co-partisan competitors" (Cox et al. 1999, 35).

Features of the factions of the LDP

Because the LDP dominated both parliaments during the 1955 System, the presidency of the LDP became the presidency of the government. According to Watanabe Tsuneo (1959), factions in the LDP serves three purposes: they provide (1) electoral support, including earning party nominations for its members and the mobilization of support; (2) cooperative political funds mobilization; and (3) a means for collective negotiations over portfolio distribution in times of a cabinet reshuffle (Watanabe 1959, 3). In other words, "the selection of who will lead Japan's government is the product of conflict and compromise among the LDP's factions rather than of any popular endorsement" (Park 2001, 429). In that sense, the factions of Japan's politics can be characterized in the process of conflicts and cooperation for the presidency.

Nathaniel Thayer refers to factions within the LDP as "formal political entities with a headquarters, regular meetings, known membership, an established structure, and firm discipline" (Thayer 1969a, 15). Accordingly, the factions can be seen as "not loosely connected informal groups but rather formally institutionalized organizations of politicians with declared membership identities (Fukui 1978, 78; Park 2001, 430). Factional fights over control of the party, regular meetings of the faction, factional balance in the making of a cabinet, factional distribution for political funds have been institutionalized in the context of Japanese politics.

The greatest stimulus to the growth of the factions in the present conservative party has been the party presidential elections.

3.4.3. Pro-China and Anti-China

In July 1971, Richard Nixon, U.S. president, visited China and normalized the relations with Chinese government. This normalization put huge impact on the foreign policy of Japanese government to Chinese government. Although the Japanese government had held the stand anti-Chinese government (pro-Taiwan stance) since 1951, the need of normalization with China had been increased (Wakamiya 1996, 108). Along with this line, ideological stance—pro-China or anti-China—factions took became major political issues when factions contested for the power (Wakamiya 1996, 123).

Four of the five major factions take pro-China stances (Tanaka, Ohira, Nakasone, and Miki factions) and one of them holds an anti-China stance (Kishi faction) (Wakamiya 1996, 108-146). In the process of electing the LDP's presidency, this ideology played important role. For example, in the presidency election held in 1972, Kakuei Tanaka (pro-China) defeated Takeo Fukuda (the anti-China) due to the support from other the pro-China factions (Miki faction and Ohira faction) (Wakamiya 1996, 123). Among pro-China factions, Tanaka faction can be noticed. In the next year after Nixon's China visits, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, the head of the Tanaka-faction, visited China and restored diplomatic ties between Japan and China.[27] This normalization, according to Junnosuke Masumi (1987), "opened a new dimension in then LDP and diplomatic policies by reestablishing relations with China within the framework of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty" (p.308).

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[27] Kakuei Tanaka—the leader of Tanaka faction—normalized the Japan-China relations in 1972. Accordingly, this study sees this Tanaka faction is the pro-China faction in the LDP.

Table 3.12 and Table 3.13 present the transition of five major factions in the LDP. These show the transition of major five factions' member in each general election by table 3.12 and transition of LDP's factions by table 3.13.[28] Bolded names of factions such as Tanaka, Ohira, Nakasone, and Miki mean that they take the pro-China stance. Tanaka faction has enjoyed its majority in the LDP (Table 3.12).

3.4.4. Regime Shift: Tanaka to Kishi

After the 1955 political system, the power balance of factions in the LDP also has been changing. More concretely, the pro-China stance factions have been losing their power. As Table 3.12 indicates, most of pro-China factions enjoyed majority in the LDP. In 1986, most pro-China factions—Tanaka (87), Ohira (59), and Nakasone (60) were superior to the Kishi faction (56). At that time, the Kishi faction was fourth out of five major factions. However, the member—power of the faction—has been increasing: in 2000 Kishi faction became third largest (39) and in 2003 one of the largest factions (51) in the LDP. Junichiro Koizumi did not belong to the Tanaka faction: he belongs to the Kishi faction.

This study calls this regime shift in the LDP: the change of power balance between the pro-China stance factions and the Kishi (anti-China). Table 3.14 shows the Prime Ministers from Nakasone to Koizumi from the LDP. Kishi faction has three Prime Ministers. This number of the Kishi is the same as that from the Tanaka faction. Table 3.15 present the regime shift under and post 1955 System. Under the system, Prime Ministers had been elected from each faction. However, in the post 1955 System, Prime Ministers have been from only the Tanaka or

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[28] Since there are various ways of names to one faction depending on newspapers or researchers, let this study name each factions based on the famous politicians in each faction.

Kishi factions. This implies an increasing influence of the Kishi faction in the LDP. The increasing power of the Kishi faction (anti-China) can be recognized as one of the explanations for Koizumi's continuity.

The case of Yoshiro Mori is not explained with this framework. He was the Prime Minister that shared the same faction with Koizumi: He is a conservative, and an anti-China politician.   From this study's point of view, he was supposed to visit there, but he did not visit Yasukuni during his office. For this case, two explanations are worthwhile to be noted: his short term and functionally equivalency. First, he held power for only one year (April 2000 to April 2001). Second, he performed other actions that were functional equivalent to Koizumi's Yasukuni visits. Mori made a very controversial statement called *Kaminokuni Hatsugen* [The statement of "emperor at its heart in the land of deities"]. This *Kaminokuni* statement implies that he has positive ideas regarding Japan's pre-war militarism (Mainichi Shimbun, May 17, 2000). His view regarding China and South Korea is central here: he did not worry about envoking negative reactions from these neighboring countries because of his action, in common with Koizumi. Thus, what Mori did can be comprehended as having functionally equivalency with Koizumi's visits.   However, again the framework this study proposes holds logical flaw in Mori's case.

3.5. Conclusion

As discussed so far, this chapter examined the main argument of this study: the institutional change allowed Koizumi to visit the shrine repeatedly (DV).   Japanese institutionalized politics can be characterized as the party power balance between the LDP and the JSP (IV) and factional

politics in the LDP (IV). This chapter tested if these independent variables can address the Koizumi's continuity to the Yasukuni.

As this study shows, the power of the JSP has been in decline: the JSP has lost its legislative seats (3.9% in 2000, 1.2% in 2003, and 1.4% in 2005 of all seats in House of Representatives). With this decline, this study concludes that the Junichiro Koizumi did not have to consider the JSP's influence in the parliament. The JSP is no longer the major opposition party to the LDP. This declining power of the JSP implies that the declining influence of Chinese government to the Prime Ministers' visit to the shrine. As the power of the JSP in the Diet shrank, the leaders of the LDP became freer to express their ideas without considering objections imposed by the JSP and the Chinese government. More concretely, Prime Minister Koizumi does not have to consider party politics as much as other prime ministers used to do. Koizumi was the Prime Minister who took less pressure from the JSP.

The regime shift should be noticed: Factions in the LDP have also changed since the 1955 political system. The change of power balance between the pro-China stance factions and the Kishi (anti-china) is the key to this shift. In the Post 1955 System, the pro-China School does not show superiority to the Kishi (anti-China) faction. Under the 1955 System Prime Ministers were elected from the Tanaka faction as well as other pro-China factions. But in the post 1955 System, Prime Ministers have been from only the Tanaka or the Kishi faction. From this number of Prime Ministers, this study sees the increasing influence Kishi faction in the LDP. Although the declining power of the pro-China faction is identified, Mori's behavior cannot be explained from this institutional approach. However, as far as Koizumi's Yasukuni visits with concern, this hypothesis is still supportive. Accordingly, even though this is no perfect explanation, the validity of this framework is still kept.

Table 3.1 Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine

2001(8/ 13)	2002 (4/ 21)	2003 (1/ 14)	2004 (1/1)	2005 (10/17)	2006 (8/ 15)

Table 3.2 The Percentage of Seat Distribution of Major Parties in the House of Representative from 1979 to 1993

General Election	LDP	JSP	JCP	Komei	Right-Wing parties in total	Left-Wing parties in total
1979 (35th)	**77**	20.9	8	11.2	52.3	47
1980 (36th)	**56.2**	20.9	5.7	6.5	59.7	40.3
1983 (37th)	**50.7**	22.3	5.3	11.5	52.6	47.4
1986 (38th)	**59.3**	16.8	5.3	11.1	60.9	38.5
1992 (39th)	**55.9**	27.1	3.1	9	56.8	51.87
1993 (40th)	**44.6**	15.1	2.9	10.2	N/A	N/A

Ishikawa (1995), pp. 230-235.

Table 3.3 The Percentage of Seat Distribution of Major Parties in the House of Councillors from 1980 to 1992

General Election	LDP	JSP	JCP	Komei
1980 (12th)	**54.6**	18.7	4.8	10.8
1983 (13th)	**55.0**	17.7	5.6	10.8
1986 (14th)	**57.5**	16.7	6.3	9.9
1989 (15th)	**44.0**	29.4	5.6	8.3
1992 (16th)	**43.3**	29.0	n/a	9.5

Ishikawa (1995), pp.254-262

Table 3.4 The Percentage of Votes Distribution of Major Parties in the House of Representative from 1979 to 1993

General Election	LDP	JSP	JCP	Komei	Right-Wing parties in total	Left-Wing parties in total
1979 (35th)	**45.85**	19.71	10.68	9.95	50.68	48.05
1980 (36th)	**48.38**	19.31	10.07	9.19	52.83	46.27
1983 (37th)	**46.98**	19.88	9.58	10.32	51	47.86
1986 (38th)	**50.3**	17.75	8.98	9.6	56.02	43.74
1992 (39th)	**47.27**	24.77	7.96	8.16	51.87	47.94
1993 (40th)	**37.42**	16.35	7.7	8.38	N/A	N/A

Ishikawa (1995), pp.230-235.

Table 3.5 The Percentage of Votes Distribution of Major Parties in the House of Councillors from 1980 to 1992

General Election	LDP	JSP	JCP	Komei
1980 (12th)	**42.49**	13.12	7.28	11.92
1983 (13th)	**35.33**	16.31	8.95	15.72
1986 (14th)	**35.38**	17.20	9.47	12.97
1989 (15th)	**27.32**	35.05	7.04	10.86
1992 (16th)	**33.29**	17.76	7.86	14.27

Ishikawa (1995), pp.254-262

Table 3.6 Distribution of Non-Conservative Votes By the Type of District, 1947 – 1955

Type of District	Non-Conservative percentage of total votes in election of				
	1947	1949	1952	1953	1955
Village (pop, less than 5,000)	47.5	34.6	28.6	27.6	30.4
Larger villages and small Towns (pop, 5,000-30,000)	47.8	36.5	29.4	31.1	31.4
Medium towns (pop, 30,000-150,000)	**50.1**	**40.6**	**35.0**	**36.9**	**39.8**
Large towns (pop, more than 150,000)	**53.6**	**46.1**	**44.1**	**44.9**	**44.9**

Source, Cole, Totten, and Uyehara, (1996, 420)

Table 3.7 The Percentage of Farmers

1950	1960	1970
45.2	30	17.9

Oguma(2002, 294)

Table 3.8 The Percentage of People who lived in urban area

1945	1970
2	72

Oguma (2002, 294)

Table 3.9 Antipathy toward socialism/communism

Q: Would you describe your attitude toward political parties on the scale from 1 to 100? (1=dislike, 50=neutral, 100=favor)

	LDP	JSP	JCP
0-49	23.7	59.1	62.9
50	41.5	33.6	28.8
51-100	34.8	7.3	8.3
Average	**51.5**	**31.4**	**29.1**

Public Opinion Survey by Yomiuri-shimbun in *Seorn Chosa Nenakan* (2003) (N=1862)

Table 3.10 The percentage of legislative seats in the Koizumi government

	LDP	JSP	JCP	DPJ	Komei	NCP
2000 (42nd)	48.5	3.9	4.1	26.4	6.4	1.4
2003 (43rd)	49.5	1.2	1.8	36	7	0.8
2005 (44th)	62	1.4	1.8	23	6.4	1.4

2003 General Election in *Nikkei*-shinbun (2003) and 2005 *General Election* in *Asahi-shinbun* (2005)[29]

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[29] Source: Asahi Shinbun <http://www2.asahi.com/senkyo2005/>
Sankei Web <http://www.sankei.co.jp/databox/election/2003/>

Table 3.11 The JSP over the 1955 Political System

The Japan Socialist Party[30]	
Under the 1955 Political System	Under the Koizumi Government
• The Main Opposition Party • Strong connection to the Chinese Government due to the ideology	• Its power has been declining: it negligible in the parliament. (7 in the House of Representative. 5 in the House of Councilors.) • Less influence over the government.

Table 3.12 Transition of major five factions affiliates in each general election

	Tanaka	**Ohira**	Kishi	**Nakasone**	**Miki**
1972	49	45	55	38	36
1976	43	39	53	39	32
1979	48	52	49	39	30
1980	53	54	45	43	31
1983	63	50	43	42	28
1986	**87**	**59**	**56**	**60**	**28**
1990	69	62	61	48	26
1993	29	55	56	52	21
1996	46	54	60	54	18
2000	61	45	39	36	12
2003	**51**	**11**	**51**	**30**	**13**

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[30] The JSP has name change in 1991. Then the party is called as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as of 2005.

Table 3.13 The transition of the LDP's factions*

1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s

Ikeda (1956-) → Ohira [42] (1971-) → Suzuki [54] (1980-) → Miyazawa [86] (1986-) → Tanigaki [16] (2005-)

Yoshida (1955-)

→ Niwa-Koga [50] (2006-)

Sato (1956-) → Tanaka [49] (1972-) → Takeshita* [87] (1987-) → Hashimoto [61] (2000-) → Tsushima [78] (2005-)

Kishi (1956-) → Fukuda (1962-) → Abe [56] (1986-) → Mori (1998-) → Machimura [87] (2006-)

→ Kamei (1999-) → Ibuki [33] (2005-)

Hatoyama (1955-) → Kohno (1956-) → Nakasone (1966-) → Watanabe [48] (1990-) → Yamazaki [36] (1998-) →

Miki/ Matsumura (1956-) → Miki (1962-) → Koumura [16] (2001-) →

* [ ]; shows affiliates of its faction at the time.

Table 3.14 Prime Ministers from the LDP and their factions

Year	Prime Ministers	Factions
1982-87	Yasuhiro Nakasone	Nakasone
1987-89	Noboru Takeshita	**Tanaka**
1989-89	Sousuke Uno	Kishi
1989-91	Toshiki Kaifu	Miki
1991-93	Kiichi Miyazawa	Ohira
1996-98	Ryutaro Hashimoto	**Tanaka**
1998-00	Keizo Obuchi	**Tanaka**
2000-01	Yoshiro Mori	Kishi
2001-06	Junichiro Koizumi	Kishi

Source Tsuchiya 2000

Table 3.15 Number of Prime Ministers under and post the 1955 System

Under 1955 System

Tanaka	Ohira	Kishi	Nakasone	Miki
1	1	1	1	1

Post 1955 System

Tanaka	Ohira	Kishi	Nakasone	Miki
2	0	2	0	0

Graph 3.1 Percentage of votes for the LDP and JSP (1978 to 1993)

Graph 3.2 The percentage of legislative seats of the LDP and JSP (1978 to 1993)

* The numbers show each general election.

1…35th General Election (10/7/1979).   4….38th General Election (7/6/1986)

2…36th General Election (6/22/1980) . 5….39th General Election (2/18/1990)

3…37th General Election (12/18/1983). 6….40th General Election (7/18/1993)

Graph 2.3 A Comparison among parties out of power under the 1955 system (JSP, NK, and JCP)

Graph 3.4 Percentage of votes the JSP, the NK and the JCP (the non-LDP parties) sucred.

* The numbers show each general election.
1…35th General Election (10/7/1979).   4….38th General Election (7/6/1986)
2…36th General Election (6/22/1980) .   5….39th General Election (2/18/1990)
3…37th General Election (12/18/1983). 6….40th General Election (7/18/1993)

Graph 3.5 Power Relationships between the LDP and JSP in Koizumi Government

*The number represent each general election.
1…. 42nd General Election.   2…43rd General Election.   3…44th General Election.

Graph 3.6 The Power Relationships among non-LDP parties (JSP, NK, NCP, and JCP)

*The number represent each general election.
1….42nd General Election.   2…43rd General Election.   3…44th General Election

CHAPTER 4

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter is to test if the arguments of the explanations conventionally done can be verified. Here, two variables—(D) the individual beliefs and (E) pressure from political group—shall be examined.

The first conventional explanation to be examined states that his political beliefs enabled Koizumi to visit Yasukuni repeatedly even though they were under harsh criticism by the Chinese and South Korean governments. His visits held the risk of deteriorating the relations with the Chinese and South Korean governments. As the media reports, Koizumi Junichiro has been seen as a conservative politician who carries anti-China views and his continuity in Yasukuni visits has been recognized as the product of his individual beliefs (Christian Science Monitor, Sep 29, 2005). However, this study doubts the validity of this explanation. For this, this study furthers the examination on Koizumi's individual (political) beliefs with a comparison with Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987. Their governments showed similarity in many points; they enjoyed high rate support from the public and they shared similar 'nationalistic' views to try to re-identify Japanese nationalism.

The second explanation to be tested for its validity in this chapter involves political pressure groups. The LDP has been supported by various interest groups such as the association by retired postal officers, medical doctors, and people who lost their families and relatives in wars. Since votes from those associations have been crucial especially when the LDP candidates

run for elections, Junichiro Koizumi promised Yasukuni visits were interpreted as a way to secure votes from the Bereaved Families Alliance when he ran the LDP's presidency election. Accordingly, conventionally his visits have also been explained in terms of his promise with the Alliance. However, this study also doubts the validity of this explanation. In the following sections, first the individual beliefs will be addressed and next the factions shall be examined.

4.2. Individual Beliefs (IV)

Based on the operational definition, this section will examine the Koizumi's and Nakasone's individual beliefs regarding on Yasukuni visits. Also, for understanding their individual beliefs and the reason for high rate support each government, their beliefs, their background shall be addressed first.

4.2.1. Background: Nakasone Governments

High Rate Approval

Nakasone Yasuhiro was the first Prime Minister who made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 since the Class A criminals were enshrined.[31] The visit brought about harsh criticism by Asian countries, especially from the Chinese and South Korean governments (Takahashi 2005, 66).   His government, like Koizumi's, was highly supported by the public. According to an *Asahi shimbun* survey (1985), almost fifty percent of people supported the Nakasone government (Table 4. 1). This high support rate was shared a propensity with

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[31] On August 15, 1945, the Showa Emperor officially announced Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration that dictated an unconditional surrender by its military after accepting the Declaration on August 14. The day, to Japan, is a day of institutionalized morning to the victims during the war (Financial Times. August 26, 2006. "National day, in triumph and in defeat").

Koizumi's government. He kept his government during the third longest period in post war history (1,803 days). He was a Prime Minister who could propose own ideas and address them based on high support from public. In the following sections, let me examine his political key concept—*Sengo Sokkesan* [the Conclusion of Postwar Politics]—and the reasons of his high rate approval from the public.

Economic Development and 'National Pride'

To Nakasone, occupation by a foreign country following the defeat of the war undermined Japanese national heritage. Economic development in the post war period enabled Japanese people to hold the belief that they needed to take on a new role in the international society, especially regarding the relations with Western countries (Pyle 1987, 255). A survey conducted in 1983 reveals such popular opinion. The Asahi newspaper's survey asked, "Compared with Westerners, do you think, in a word, that the Japanese are superior? Or do you think they are inferior?" In 1953, 20 per cent answered that the Japanese were superior. In 1983, 53 per cent answered that the Japanese were superior (Pyle 1987, 251-252). This survey implies increasing self-confidence and national pride, which were lost in the defeat of the war.

Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone had put forward his ideas in the context of increasing self-confidence and national pride. He insisted that Japan appreciate its own national interests. More concretely, he "appears to answer a felt need of the Japanese people in the mid-1980s to be at the center of the world stage rather than at the periphery" (Pharr 1986). More concretely, he insisted on the following points to be *the* global leader:

- A new vision of Japan's future: Japan should no longer play the part of follower nation.

- Global leadership by remaking Japan into an "international state": with increasing

  economic power Japan needs to rethink its role.

- Formulation of a new liberal nationalism in Japan.

He believed that Japan held the ability to play a critical role in international politics because of

Japan's special strengths, which are abilities to share cultures and traditions with other nations.[32]

He proposed 'Conclusion of Post-war politics' for the process of retrieving national pride and

self-confidence in international politics.

Sengo Sokkesan [Conclusion of Post-War Politics]

Japanese people started to feel that Japan is a "merchant" country in the international

community: Japan's economic development did not contribute to its political maturity at all.

People came to share the idea that Japan should not remain a passive country. Japan should

become a member of the international community. Japan was a reactive nation because the

Japanese political system is fundamentally incapable of taking the initiative to deal with

international criticism of its policies. The reasons why Japan is a reactive nation are (a) Japan's

modern history: as a late developer it accepted other skills of developed countries such as

Germany and the U.S.A, (b) Japan's complicated decision making process, and (c) Strategic

passiveness: it "was the product of a carefully constructed and shrewdly implemented foreign

policy" (Pyle 1987). Nakasone was the Prime Minister who spoke repeatedly about settling

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[32] This idea, which seems ethnocentric, was severely criticized by the opposition, especially by the JSP. They opposed his policy as pre-war style nationalism and militarism, with suspicion that he intended a revival of prewar nationalism (Nuramatsu 1987).

postwar accounts and overhauling the postwar socioeconomic framework of the nation to meet the challenge of the twenty-first century.[33]

Nakasone perceived that such feelings were shared among the Japanese people. He insisted that the Japanese acquire the capability for "world leadership, engaged in international political-strategic issues, participating in its own defense, possessing its own goals and values and objectives, and reshaping its institutions for the role of global leader" (Pyle 268). His strategy, at the same time, was his hope to establish a new national consensus in place of the Yoshida Doctrine, which consciously chose a dependent relationship with the United States. In this line, he tried to dismiss the conventional budget distribution to the self-defense force. The Japanese Diet only admits its budget within one percent of GNP. Based on a proposal from a private advisory body to Nakasone in December 1984, Nakasone finally achieved to distribute more than one percent of GNP (1.004 %) to the defense budget (Ishikawa 1995, 163).

Support for Conclusion of Post-War Politics?

However, the Public did not support Nakasone's idea. For this part, a survey from *NHK* (November 1983) shows interesting data (Table 4.2). According to *NHK*'s survey, not so much people agreed with Nakasone's political idea. For example, asked whether or not Japan should increase the capacity of Self-Defense force, only 14 percent of participants replied positively. 58 percent thought it should maintain the present level and 12 percent of people held the opinion of a gradual decrease. As for the defense budget (one of major issues in conclusion of post war), 43 percent thought that the budget should be within one percent of GNP (Should maintain status

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[33] Nakasone can be categorized as *Senchu ha* [Wartime generation], which is critical for the postwar materialism and criticizes the failure to draw any pictures of national ends in the process of economic development.

quo). The second most frequent answer (23 percent) was 'defense budget should be greatly

decreased'. Overall, people were on a cautious note on Nakasone's political idea: Asked if the

special treatment for the Self-defense force (increasing the budget of the force) is appropriate, 48

percent of the people thought that it was inappropriate.

NHK conducted another survey showing how Nakasone's political idea—conclusion of

post-war politics—was received among the public in 1986. This survey shows the same

tendency as the one previously referred to. Here, 67 percent of participants chose "to continue

the present stability", and only 14 percent showed positive attitude toward the idea. According

to this, Nakasone's political thought—"conclusion of post-war politics"—was not positively

supported by the public. Rather, as will be discussed in the following section, Nakasone's

governments were supported due to other elements.

(Table 4.3 about here)

Economic issues preferred

Then, what was the public interested in? *Yomiuri Shimbun* (October 1985) shows the political

issues the public wanted Nakasone to address (Table 4.4a and Table 4.4b). Table 4.4a shows

that the major interest held by the masses were economic issues ('Medical costs, pensions'

[53%]; 'Recession' [39%]; and 'Reforming the unfair tax system' [34%]). Table 4.4b shows a

similar tendency (Inflation/ recession policy [15%] and Tax reduction [10%]).. As for the

Yasukuni Problem, only 13 percent recognized the Yasukuni visits by Prime Ministers as a

major political issue (Table 4. 4a). From that, Nakasone's political thought was not supported by

the masses: Their major interests are economic and social welfare issues such as

inflation/recession policies (15 %), tax reduction (10%), and medical costs, pensions (53%) rather than his ideas such as 'Defense budget's ceiling (1% of GNP)' (23%).

Especially, Table 4.5 should be noted. It shows what political issues the public wanted Nakasone to refrain from doing. It says 21 percent of people do not want Nakasone to tackle 'War' and 'Increase in defense budget' issues. Accordingly, this result indicates the disapproval of 'conclusion of post-war politics', which was Nakasone's main political idea.

4.2.2. Background: Koizumi Governments

Koizumi's Popular Support

Given the deep political distrust cased by ex-Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, the Koizumi government enjoyed high support rates from the public since its inauguration. As Table 4.6 shows, the distrust for the Mori government was serious; 64 percent of participants did not support the government and, moreover, 54 percent wanted Mori to resign as soon as possible (Table 4.6).

The Koizumi government, succeeding the Mori government, enjoyed high support from the public. According to *Yomiuri Shimbun* (2001), 66 percent of people supported the government (24 % did not support) and 45 percent of them wanted Koizumi to keep the government 'as long as possible' (almost 90 % wanted him to keep the power more than one year) (Table 4.7). As the reason for the support the majority (54.2 %) replied 'because it is better than any other government' rather than his policy (34.9%) and his personality (21.5%)

(Table 4.8). This implies Koizumi could hold high support out of the high expectation shared in the public due to deep political distrust caused by the Mori government.[34]

4.2.3. Individual Beliefs: Yasuhiro Nakasone

Yasukuni Problem under Nakasone Government

The Yasukuni Problem was paid great attention by Japanese people. According to *Asahi Shimbun*'s survey (October 1985), 57 percent knew Tojo Hideki who led the war is enshrined at Yasukuni shrine (Table 4.9). Moreover, asked if you are interested in the fact that members of the Nakasone government (including Nakasone himself) and other bureaucrats visit the shrine, 55 percent of the participants replied they were interested ('Very interested' and 'Somewhat interested'). 44 percent were not interested ('Not very interested' and 'Not at all interested'). From this survey, this study observes that the Yasukuni problem was recognized in public and the officials' visits to the shrine was seen as problematic.

A *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s survey (September 1985) shows that 36 percent of people think the visits by Nakasone and his governments was 'appropriately done' regarding to 'separation of religion and the state' (Table 4.10).   On the other hand, only 20 percent recognized that the visits themselves were unconstitutional. Accordingly, at this point, the visits held by Nakasone and his cabinet members were not seen as political issues domestically.

Whether or not Class A criminals were enshrined was not in focus even after Nakasone's visits.   60 percent of participants did not see Nakasone's visits as problematic ('appropriately done and should follow formal Shinto rituals') (Table 4.10). As for his policy, economic and social welfare issues had been the focus for the Japanese public rather than Nakasone's

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[34] On the contrary to Mori's government (54%), only 3.5 percent says 'Quit as soon as possible'.

'conclusion of post-war politics'. These public opinion data show that Japanese people supported the Nakasone government due to the expectation of economic policy, but not for his political thought that might lead Japan toward militarism.

Summary: Nakasone's Individual Beliefs

A survey conducted in October 1985 shows that Nakasone's public approval rating amounted to 60 percent.[35] The high support enabled Nakasone to confidently forge a leadership style that rested heavily on winning popular support. Then, how did Japanese people experience the first official visits of his since the Class A criminals were enshrined?

Table 4.11 presents how Japanese people reacted to the official visit made by Nakasone on August 15, 1985. Ninety-three percent of the participants knew about the official visit and 50 percent of people showed a positive attitude toward it (the visit was a 'good' idea). Twenty-three percent regarded the official visit as 'questionable'. With this data, the official visit seemed not to become a major political issue domestically: Rather, the majority supported the official visit.

The official visit was supported in domestic politics, but was *not* in international relations. High approval from the public for his government directed Nakasone too much on 'domestic' and he misread the support for him as support for his political ideas. As seen so far, the public support to him was not because they agreed with 'conclusion of post-war politics', his nationalistic idea. The reactions from Asian countries—especially from the Chinese and South Korean government—were less in his mind. As Muramatsu (1987) states, "[i]f he had had a firm grasp of China's and other Asian countries' leaders' feelings about Yasukuni, Nakasone

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[35] That was the highest figure since his government was formed (The Japan Times. October 3, 1985. p.1). Also see Table 4.1 for public approval for the Nakasone government.

probably would have decided against making the visit" (Muramatsu 316). Accordingly, he

stopped visiting the shrine after the upsurge of anti-Japanese sentiments, which might have

caused a serious damage to relations with those countries. He said he made no further visits out

of a desire to protect Japan's interests and preserve diplomatic relations (The Japan Times.

November 23, 2005).

He was surely supported by the publics who were getting 'confidence' due to the

economic development. Nakasone consulted his Chief Cabinet Secretary for his Yasukuni visit

and got confidence with the visit.[36] However, after the official visit in 1985, the situation soon

developed beyond his expectations: his visits held huge risk to deteriorate relation with the

Chinese government. Two days later, the Chinese Foreign Ministry criticized Nakasone,

accusing him of deeply damaging the feelings of the Chinese people by his visit to the shrine that

honors class A war criminals who are among the war dead enshrined there. Given such

criticism, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotouda issued official statement. It says;

> Nakasone visited the Yasukuni shrine in terms of domestic matter; Japanese
> nationals support his visits. His intent of the visit was not for the Class A
> criminals enshrined there, but for expression his mourn those who lost their lives
> under the name of Japan and his pledge for the peace Japan and other countries
> currently enjoyed.[37]
>   (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet; My translation)

Although his government explained his official visit was due to domestic matter, Nakasone

cancelled a plan to visit the shrine officially for a second time, because of the risk to deteriorate

the relations with the Chinese government. Asked why he stopped visiting there, he answered "it

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[36] A report from then Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fukunami's private advisory organ that an official
visit without taking part in a Shinto ceremony would be constitutional (Nakasone 1997).
[37] This statement was issued (in Japanese) in next year when Nakasone and his cabinet members visited
the shrine as official capacity.

was the primary purpose to try not to deteriorate the relations with China. I visited it for the sake of Japan, but deteriorated relations won't be good for Japanese national interest" (Wakamiya 1995, 154).[38]

In sum Nakasone decided on an official visit on August 15th expecting public support. However, he did not take into account the importance of this issue to China. As Wakamiya (1995) points out, he failed to pay much attention to the relations with Asian countries, because of the high rate support for him.

4.2.4. Individual Beliefs: Junichiro Koizumi

Under bitter criticism, Koizumi Junichiro, the 56th Prime Minister, repeatedly visited the shrine.[39] He stated that "I can't understand why foreign governments would intervene in a spiritual matter and try to turn it into a diplomatic problem," because the stated his purpose for the visits is to acknowledge the sacrifices the Japanese people made in the name of Japan and to pray for peace (Financial Times. August 16, 2006). From these statements, Koizumi seemed to be a narrow minded politician: he did not care about the relations with Asian countries. However, further examination of his individual beliefs shall reveal his ideas on Yasukuni shrine and the Yasukuni problem. For this, in the following section, Koizumi's statements on his own

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[38] My translation. Also, there is another explanation of this; he was afraid his visit would hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and it would put general secretary Hu Yangban who was pro-Japan in a difficult position. Nakasone himself was also afraid that pro-Japanese leaders such as Hu should fall from power because of domestic criticism from conservatives; it would be Japan's loss (The Japan Times. Nov 23, 2005. and Wakamiya 1996, 153).

[39] Takahashi (2005) sees that the Chinese and South Korean governments tries to solve this problem by narrowing this problem down to the enshrinement of Class A criminals. Put differently, the criticism by those governments implies that they do not rebuke Yasukuni shrine itself, they suspect Japan's neglect to war responsibility which might lead to militarism. In this sense, according to Takahashi, Chinese as well as South Korean governments do not criticize that Yasukuni enshrine Class A criminals. They criticize the 'political act' that Prime Ministers' visit the shrine, knowing Yasukuni enshrines Class A criminals (Takahashi 2005, 70-71).

beliefs shall be documented. These statements were issued annually when Koizumi attended

'Memorial Service for War Dead' on August 15th.

Koizumi's statements

These annual statements were issued by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. They express

Koizumi's pledge for peace, mourning to people who lost their lives for Japan, and wishes to

build friendly relationships with other countries (Table 4.12). For example, he expressed in 2002

his idea on relations with other countries as follows: "Firmly maintaining the nation's antiwar

pledge, I will make utmost efforts so that Japan further develops its friendly relations with

neighboring countries". As for ideas about peace, he stated in 2003 that "I will not let the lesson

learned from the tragedy of war fade with time and firmly maintain the nation's antiwar pledge,

dedicated to the construction of Japan as peaceful nation". In 2006 when he made the first visit

to the shrine on the day of anniversary for the end of World War II since Nakasone's official

visit in 1985, he emphasized his pledge for peace and the friendly relations between Japan and

the other countries.

His statements clarified his stance: he actually valued the relations with the Chinese and

South Korean and tried to prevent the disputes from deteriorating relations with the governments.

As explained in Chapter one, since 1945 Prime Ministers had visited the shrine. After Yasuhiro

Nakasone, however, no Prime Minister attempted repeated visits there. The risk for deteriorating

relations with those countries prevented them from visiting repeatedly. But Koizumi under such

criticism visited Yasukuni annually during his office (Refer to Table 2.1 and 'List of Prime

Ministers' Yasukuni Visits in Appendices). In sum, his repeated visits held annually did not

intend to deteriorate those relations. His acts, at least to him, purely means his expression of

'pledge for peace' and 'mourn' war dead in that period.

Yasukuni Visits and Apologies

Koizumi has repeatedly visited the shrine under the strong denouncements from the neighboring

countries such as China, Singapore, and South Korea (New York Time, Jun 22, 2005). Those

governments recognize his repeated visits as a neglect of Japan's war responsibility and

resurgence of militarism of Japan (Takahashi 2006 b, 155). The Ministry of Foreign affairs tried

to avoid deepening distrust among those countries: it issued the statement titled 'The Basic

Position of the Government of Japan" in October 2005. It states;

> "Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan's present peace and
> prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives
> in the war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to *mourn* and *offer his respec*t *and thanks* to
> those who had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will."[40]
> (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, emphasis added).

Koizumi had visited the shrine in order to respect and thank all those who lost their lives under

the name of Japan as well as mourning them sincerely. In this sense, he expressed dissatisfaction

with the criticism from the Chinese and the South Korean governments: it seemed to him that

they were intruding in his individual beliefs. Furthermore, he thought that the Chinese and South

Korean governments should stop interfering in "individual" deeds.

However, at the same time, he was not trying to worsen the relationships with those

countries. He sates that "[t]he task of further strengthening its relations with neighboring

countries and contributing to the peace and stability of the East Asian region is one of Japan's

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[40] For the complete document, see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/yasukuni/position.html>.

most important policy priorities" (Basic Position of the Government of Japan). Accordingly, he claims that there is no intention from him to deteriorate relations as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan published;

> *Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia.* This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region. Sincerely facing these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war.
> (Statement by Junichiro Koizumi, emphasis added)[41]

In his logic, by visiting Yasukuni, he tried to express his pledge to the prosperity Japan now can enjoy: by so doing, he thought that those who had to lay down their lives against their will can be respected and mourned. He reaffirmed the importance of this prosperity by annual visits. In sum, he did not try to forget the war responsibility by his annual visits: he, in fact, apologized the Japanese "mistaken national policy" in the war time. To him, his visits to the Yasukuni shrine were not of glorifying Japanese pre-war militarisms or ignorance for Japanese war responsibility, but of his 'pledge for peace' and mourning war dead: He apologized to Asian countries for acts held by Japanese pre-war imperialism. From his apologies, it is clear for him to share the same views on pre-war Japan with Asian countries.

4.2.5. Summary: Nakasone and Koizumi, Compared

Both Prime Ministers enjoyed high rate public approval and share strong political ideas regarding the Yasukuni shrine. Their views were attacked as the resurge of pre-war militarism

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[41] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan August 13, 2005.
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/state0108.html>

by China and South Korea. Yet, they explained that they did not intend to worsen the

relationships with China and the South Korea. Nakasone clearly expressed his attitude toward the

relations with those countries: he did not intend to deteriorate the relations.   Asked why

Nakasone stopped the visits, he replied

> "Since the shrine visit has become a diplomatic issue, I do not think it is
> appropriate as a proper action as a prime minister of the state. I will refrain from
> making the visit this year."
>
> (The Japan Times. November 23, 2005.)

For this, Nakasone cancelled the further visit after the criticism from China and South Korea.

Koizumi, on the other hand, did attempt continued visits even under harsh criticisms. For the

criticisms, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan of the Koizumi governments issued

following statements:

> "[T]he purpose of his visits to the shrine is to express respect and gratitude to the
> many people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not visit for the sake of
> the Class-A war criminals, and that Japan accepted the results of the International
> Military Tribunal for the Far East."[42]
>
> (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

As seen so far, both Prime Ministers to a great extent share similarities. They enjoyed high rate

approval from public. They did not try to deteriorate the relations with China and South Korea.

They recognized the importance of the relations. However, the result shows an important

difference: Nakasone did not visit the Yasukuni more than once; Koizumi did visit annually

during all of his office (six times in total). Based on this research, this conventional

explanation—political beliefs—cannot fully explain Koizumi's contiuity to Yasukuni.

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[42] See "Basic Position of the Government of Japan Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi's Visits to
Yasukuni Shrine" <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/yasukuni/position.html>

4.3. Political Pressure Group (IV)

4.3.1. Interest Groups in Japan

The fixed relations of parties to interest groups link to the successful dominancy in the parliament. In Muramatsu and Krauss' (1990) words, "dominant parties are parties that successfully use political strategy and their control over resources to build a permanent social coalition among some interest groups and exclude others" (Muramatsu and Krauss 1990, 284). Like Pempel (1990) states that "single dominant parties need to listen to what interest groups say to establish their parties' dominance over time" (Pempel 1990).

In this sense, the 1955 political system, the LDP's single long dominance during 38 years, can be seen as the product of management ability of Prime Ministers' with interests groups. More concretely, "the successful continuance of LDP dominance in Japan indeed lies in that party's flexible adaptation to change, and particularly to its ability to broaden its social interest various channels of influence to the opposition social coalition" (Muramatsu and Krauss 1990, 283). Along with this line, this study sees the LDP's long dominance could be achieved due to its ability to establish fixed relations with interest groups and its adaptability for changing interest.

Japanese parties hold various interest groups: some are economic interest groups such as the Japan Association of Cooperate Executives [*Keizai Doyukai*], the Japan Business Federation [*Nippon Keidanren*], and the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry [*Nippon Shoukou Kaigisho*], and some hold ideological orientations like Japan's teacher union [*Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai*]. Along with the Yasukuni Problem, there are four interest groups: (1) the Military Pension Federation [*Gunjin Onkyu Renmentokyu Renmei*], (2) the Association of Shinto Shrines

[*Jinja honcho*], the Japan Conference [*Nippon Kaigi*], and (3) the Group to Honor the Souls of the War Dead [*Eirei Ni kotaeru kai*], and (4) the Bereaved Families Alliance [*Nippon Izokukai*]. All of these pressure groups hold close relationships with the LDP (Shibuichi 2005, 200). Among them, the Military Pension Federation [*Gunjin Onkyu Renmentokyu Renmei*] and the Bereaved Families Alliance [*Nippon Izokukai*] shall be addressed because two groups show strong influence over the Prime Ministers as well as the LDP.

4.3.2. The Bereaved Families Alliance and its History

The Bereaved Families Alliance [*Nippon Izokukai*] was established in 1947 for bereaved families during World War II as the *Nippon Izoku Kosei Renmei* [Bereaved Families Welfare Alliance]. They have been politically active in demanding the official warship of Prime Minister and emperor, because it represents one million families who had relations who lost their lives for Japan from the Meiji period to the war (Takahashi 2006; Kyodo News. Jun 14, 2005). Since the votes they have amount to hundreds of thousands, no LDP leader or candidate can ignore the *Nippon Izokukai.*

In 1952, after the end of the American occupation of Japan, some rightist groups and the *Nippon Izokukai* launched a movement to rehabilitate the Yasukuni Shrine as a government-sponsored institution. This was severely criticized by the left in terms of Article 20 and 89 of the Japan's constitution. Article 20 guarantees the freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state, and Article 89 forbids the use of public funds for religious purposes. The proposal by them might have violated the constitution.

When Koizumi ran for the LDP's presidential election in 2001, he made a commitment to The Bereaved Families Alliance that he would make annual visits to the shrine. Presumably this

was because of his expectation of support from the group at the election. Conventionally, his repeated visits to the shrine have been interpreted in the terms of this commitment. In other words, the group can motivate Koizumi to visit the shrine, even though his visits entail the risk to deteriorate the relations with the Chinese and the South Korean governments.

Analysis in the Conventional Explanations

The Yasukuni visits by Prime Ministers are conventionally interpreted as the outcome of pressure from rightist political groups, especially the Bereaved Families Alliance. Actually, the number of Bereaved Families Members in the LDP has been in decline. Table 4.13 presents the decline of the number of votes from the Bereaved Families Alliance and the War Veterans in the LDP. In 1980, War Veterans and The Bereaved Families Alliance had 990,000 and 920,000 votes, respectively. However, in 2001, they have been decreasing their number to 154,000 and 110,000 votes, respectively. Given his decline, conventionally the presidency of the LDP has been free from pressure from those groups.

Along with this conventional explanation, Shibuichi (2005) presents his argument: he sees that Prime Ministers more or less are susceptible pressures from those groups and they also take the pressure within government due to close relations between the LDP and those groups (Shibuichi 2005, p.201). After examining Japanese interest groups in terms of their ideologies, he argues the rightist interest groups like the Bereaved Families Alliance hold strong influence to Prime Ministers over the Yasukuni visits. He concludes that rightist interest groups influence the decision of Yasukuni visits: the Prime Ministers who visited the shrine after Nakasone was Ryutaro Hashimoto who used to be the chairman of the Bereaved Families Alliance from 1993 to 1995 and Junichiro Koizumi (Shibuichi 2005, 213-215).

His argument seems to explain the Prime Ministers' Yasukuni visits. However, his argument like other conventional explanations still leaves critical questions unanswered: First, it cannot explain why other Prime Ministers from the LDP did not visit the shrine at all. As seen above, Prime Minister such as Noboru Takeshita, Sousuke Uno, Kiichi Miyazawa, and Keizo Obuchi did not make any Yasukuni visits.[43] According to the conventional explanation, they also could/ did visit there. Secondly, it cannot explain why Koizumi could/ did visit the Yasukuni repeatedly under harsh criticisms. More concretely, it cannot explain why Hashimoto who made the visits in 1996 did no further visits, although Koizumi did under the same pressure from those groups. Finally, if the support from that group had enabled Prime Minister to visit the shrine, Koizumi could not have visited the shrine, since influence of those groups has been in decline.

In sum, conventionally done explanations fail to explain (1) why other Prime Ministers did not visit; (2) why Koizumi could/ did visit repeatedly; and (3) the declining influence of political pressure groups.

4.4. Conclusion

Conventionally, Koizumi's Yasukuni visits have been explained in terms of his own individual beliefs and the influence from the political groups which support Prime Ministers' Yasukuni visits. As this chapter has discussed, these conventional explanations cannot justify the argument (individual beliefs) and fails to explain Koizumi's continuity (political pressure groups).

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[43] As for this, Shibuichi (2005) analyzes this in terms of the Cold War context. Due to the importance of the "alliance" with China against the Soviet Union, those Prime Ministers refrained from visiting the shrine. However, he fails to provide deep analysis on this: he merely states this "sounds reasonable", citing Nakasone's interviews (p.212).

This study examined Koizumi's individual beliefs—aggressive attitude toward criticisms by the Chinese and South Korean governments—in comparison with Nakasone's. Put simply, Koizumi's visits have been interpreted as his ignorance / little value of the relations with those countries. Both Prime Ministers to a great extent share similarity: they enjoyed high rate approval from the public and they expressed strong political ideas—as exemplified by Nakasone's *Sengo Sokkesan* [the conclusion of post-war politics]. However, this explanation cannot really explain Koizumi's Yasukuni visits. First, as documented in this chapter, Koizumi, like Nakasone did, actually valued the relations with China and South Korea. Second, this explanation has a logical flaw when both Prime Ministers are compared: Nakasone did not attempt further visits to the Yasukuni; Koizumi, on the other hand, did visit there annually during all of his office. Based on these two points, this explanation cannot fully address Koizumi's continuity.

In addition to the individual beliefs explanation, influence from political pressure groups conventionally also has been proposed as an explanation as follows: Prime Ministers are subject to pressures from political pressure groups due to close relations between the LDP and those groups. Accordingly, this study chose the War Veterans and the Bereaved Families Alliance, because these two groups have demanded official Yasukuni Visits of Prime Ministers. However, this conventional explanation fails to explain (1) why other Prime Ministers did not visit; (2) why Koizumi could/ did visit repeatedly; and (3) the declining influence of those political pressure groups.

Table 4.1 Support for Nakasone government

Q: Do you support or not support the Nakasone Cabinet?

Options	Jun 1985	Oct 1985	Dec 1985
Support	**45**	**46**	**43**
Do not support	25	29	27
Other/ no answer	30	25	30

Asahi Shimbun (December 1985) (N=2,388) in Index to International Public Opinion, 1985-1986, p.173.

Table 4.2 Public support for Nakasone's policy

Q: Should Japan increase or decrease the defense capability of its Self-Defense Army?

OPTIONS	%
Increase	**14**
Maintain the present level	58
Decrease gradually	12
Have no defense capability	5
Other/ don't know/ no answer	11

Q: If the defense budget continues to increase, it may exceed the 1% of the GNP in spite of the government's policy. What do you think about this?

OPTIONS	%
Should keep it within 1%	**43**
Exceeding 1% may be inevitable	16
Should increase beyond 1%	3
Defense budget should be greatly decreased	**23**
Don't know/ no answer	15

Q: How appropriate do you think it is that the defense budget receives special treatment –that is, it was increased much more than other budget items?

OPTIONS	%
Appropriate	6
Inevitable	36
Inappropriate	**48**
Don't know/ no answer	10

NHK (November 1983) (N=1,336) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1984-1985, pp.325-326.

Table 4.3 Support for 'Conclusion of post-war politics'?

Q: With which of the following opinion regarding the results of this election do you agree?

Options	%
The masses supported Prime Minister Nakasone's "conclusion of post war politics"	14
The masses did not consider the appropriateness of "conclusion of post-war politics", but chose to continue the present stability	67
Difficult to say	10
Don't know/ no answer	9

NHK (August 1986) (N=1,322) in Index to *International Public Opinion, 1986-1987*, p.403.

Table 4.4 Political issues Nakasone needs to address

a

Q: The following are some of the current political/ social issues. If elections for the senate and congress are held, which issues would be a major factor in helping you decide whom to vote for? (Multiple answers)

Options	%
Medical costs, pensions	53
Educational reform	31
Budget deficit	17
Recession	39
Division and privatization of Japan's railway	15
The Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine	13
Reforming the unfair tax system	34
Defense budget's ceiling (1% of GNP)	23
US/Japan's conflict	19
No answer	6

Yomiuri Shimbun (October 1985) (N=2,250) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.152.

b

Q: What do you want Prime Minister Nakasone to deal with most urgently? (Multiple answers)

Options	%
Inflation/ recession policies	**15**
Tax reduction	**10**
Educational issue	7
Political attitude	7
Social welfare	5
Administrative reform	4
Non-increase of defense budget	3
Peace, friendly diplomatic relations	3
Agricultural policy	2
Economic policies such as trade	2
Increase of defense budget	1
Other	5
None/ no answer	36

Yomiuri Shimbun (October 1985) (N=2,457) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.153.

Table 4.5 Unsupported Nakasone's policy

Q: What do you want Prime Minister Nakasone to refrain from doing? (multiple answers)

Options	%
War	**21**
Increase in defense budget	**9**
Political attitude	8
Increase in defense capacity	**7**
Increase in tax	5
Inflation, recession	4
Militarization	2
Other	6
None/ no answer	39

Yomiuri Shimbun (October 1985) (N=2,457) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.153.

Table 4.6 Public support for Mori government

Q: Do you support the Mori government?

OPTIONS	%
Yes	18
No	64
Other	18

Q: Do you want Mr. Mori to resign?

OPTIONS	%
Yes, as soon as possible	54
No, he has not to do so	34

Asahi Shimbun (2001) in *Seron chosa nenkan* [Public Opinion Survey Yearbook] (2001) (N=2094) (My Translation)

Table 4.7 Public support for Koizumi government

Q: Do you support the Koizumi government?

OPTIONS	%
Yes	**65.9**
No	23.9
Other	2.7
No Answer	7.6

Yomiuri Shimbun (2001) in *Seron Chosa Nenakan* [Public Opinion Survey Yearbook] (2001) (N=1886)

Q: How long do you want Mr. Koizumi keep the power? (%)

OPTIONS	%
As long as possible	**44.8**
A few years	**33.0**
One year	**10.2**
Quit as soon as possible	3.5
Other	1.2
No answer	4.8

Yomiuri Shimbun (2001) in *Seorn Chosa Nenakan* [Public Opinion Survey Yearbook] (2001) (N=1886)

Table 4.8 The reason for Koizumi support

Q: Why do you support the Koizumi government?

OPTIONS	%
Because of his personality	21.5
Because of its policy	34.9
Because it is better than any other government	**54.2**

Yomiuri Shimbun (2003) in *Seorn Chosa Nenakan* [Public Opinion Survey Yearbook] (2003) (N=1862)

Table 4.9 Yasukuni problem in public

Q: Do you happen to know that those who are honored at the Yasukuni Shrine include ex-Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, - Japan's leader during World War II?

OPTIONS	%
Yes	57
No	41
Other / No answer	2

Asahi Shimbun (October 1985) (N=2,457) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.315.

Q: How interested are you in the fact that Prime Minister Nakasone and other bureaucrats visited the Yasukuni shrine (shrine where the spirits of those who died in wars are honored) on August 15, 1985?

OPTIONS	%
Very interested	**22**
Somewhat interested	**33**
Not very interested	32
Not at all interested	12
No answer	1

Yomiuri Shimbun (September 1985) (N=2,257) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.333.

Table 4.10 Yasukuni visits

Q: Regarding the visit (Nakasone to the Yasukuni Shrine), the government explained that the visit was not unconstitutional because the government officials did not follow the formal Shinto rituals. Therefore, the visit had no religious meaning. What do you think about this?

OPTIONS	%
It was appropriately done	**36**
The government officials should have follow the formal Shinto rituals	24
The visit should not have been made because no matter how it was done, it was still unconstitutional	**20**
Other	3
No answer	17

Yomiuri Shimbun (September 1985) (N=2,257) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.333.

Table 4.11 The official visit by Nakasone

Q: Prime Minister Nakasone officially visited Yasukuni Shrine (a Shinto shrine in Tokyo where spirits of those who died in wars are honored) on August 15, 1985. Do you know about this?

OPTIONS	%
Yes	**93**
No	7
Other/ no answer	-

(If "yes"): Do you think Nakasone's official visit was a good idea, or questionable?

OPTIONS	%
Good idea	**50**
Questionable	23
Other/ no answer	20

Asahi Shimbun (October 1985) (N=2,457) in *Index to International Public Opinion*, 1985-1986, p.315.

Table 4.12 Koizumi's annual statements

Year	Koizumi's Statements
2001	I inscribe the many lessons of the war deep in my heart and vow anew to make my utmost efforts toward establishing a permanent world peace and realizing a society full of hope in which people are able to live fulfilling.
2002	Firmly maintaining the nation's antiwar pledge, I will make utmost efforts so that Japan further develops its friendly relations with neighboring countries…
2003	I will exert all my efforts so that Japan can further develop its friendly relations with countries all over the world, and actively contribute to establishing lasting world peace as amber of the international community.
2004	I will not let the lesson learned from the tragedy of war fade with time and firmly maintain the nation's antiwar pledge, dedicated to the construction of Japan as peaceful nation.
2005	Japan will, with all its countries and, as country that attaches utmost importance to peace, will seek to gain further trust from the world.
2006	We should never forget that friendly relations between Japan and other countries and regions around the world have provided Japan with stability in the post-war world.

Table 4.13 The Transition of votes

Organizations	1980	1999	2001
The War Veteran	990,000	170,000	154,000
The Bereaved Families	920,000	140,000	110,000

Souce: Kollner (2002), Michini Shimbun (Sep 9, 1999) and Ibaraki Shimbun (Apr 18, 2001)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1. Argument

This study finds that the institutional change in 1993 (the end of the 1955 Political System) can be the key to the Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine (Table 5.1). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, one of the primary hypotheses—power balance among the LDP's factions—dose not fully address Mori's case.

This study suggested the hypothesis to test whether the changing factional power balance can explain the Koizumi's continued visits. This study identified the declining power of the pro-China factions (Tanaka faction): the relative power increase of the anti-China faction (Kishi faction). Yet, at the same time, this cannot address Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's (Kishi faction) behavior. Although he comes from the anti-Chinese faction, he did not visit the shrine during his office. His case should also be explained in terms of this. There are two explanations for his case: his very short term might be the reason; what he did was functionally equivalent with Koizumi's Yasukuni visits. Why did not he visit the shrine? No explanation comes out of this approach. Along this, the hypothesis—declining power of the pro-China factions enable Prime Ministers to visit the shrine—cannot address the Mori's case. However, as long as Koizumi's Yasukuni visits concern, this explanation still holds its validity.

For the other primary hypothesis, the declining legislative seats and votes the JSP secured were examined. The power decline of the JSP was identified in this study. It is no longer the major alternative party to the LDP in the post 1955 political system. Based on this decline, this

study recognized that the JSP has lost the legislative power to enable its party to prevent Prime Ministers from the LDP from visiting Yasukuni.

This study deems the alternative explanations—Individual Beliefs and Political Groups—to be less convincing. Individual beliefs explanations cannot account for Nakasone's discontinuity: it fails to explain why Nakasone stopped visiting the shrine if it is true that strong political beliefs enabled him to visit there. This sees that strong Koizumi's beliefs enable him to achieve repeated visits. With examination of his statements, Koizumi's position on the relations has been clarified: Koizumi actually valued the relations with China and South Korea by issuing his statements. Accordingly, the strong political beliefs ideas tested in this study cannot be seen as the primary reason for Koizumi's continuity. Support from political groups to Koizumi has been proposed also been proposed conventionally to explain his visits. When Koizumi ran the presidency election, he promised annual visits to one of groups that is wishing Prime Ministers to visit the shrine. The promise has been understood in terms of its influence— the number of votes from the LDP members. However, this study identifies a decline of the political groups. The War Veteran Association and the Bereaved Family Alliance lost more than 700,000 memberships during these 20 years. With this significant decline, this study does not think this is the explanation for the continued Yasukuni visits.

Table 5.2 summarizes the causal relations in this study. The two primary hypotheses are relatively more supported than the conventional explanations. Even though the factional explanation cannot address the Mori's behavior, it is still supportive for Koizumi's continued visits. Individual beliefs and political support group explanations hold critical inexplicability for the Yasukuni visits. Koizumi's continued Yasukuni visits can be explained more adequately with the primary hypotheses of this study.

5.2. Causal Mechanism

This study identified the changing power of the JSP and factional power balance: These can be the keys to Koizumi's continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Table 5.3 presents the weak influence by the JSP and the factions in the LDP as the primary explanation for Koizumi's visit. Under the 1955 System, Prime Ministers could not visit repeatedly because of the tenser party politics and the huge influence from the Tanaka faction on the government. However, since the post-1955 System, those restrictions over the Prime Ministers have been loosening. That enabled Koizumi to keep visiting the shrine even if the Chinese and South Korea governments have rebuked the visits.

5.3. Significance and Limitation of this Study

The object of this study is to understand the controversial conventional explanations to Koizumi's Yasukuni visits within an institutional framework. Reviewed in Chapter two, the 'ideas' in institutions can be comprehended in a broader sense: ideas embedded in institutions play a critical role on decisions made by political actors after the change of institutions. Focusing on the Yasukuni visits performed by Prime Ministers before the Nakasone government (Table 2.1.), the visits are comprehended as institutionally embedded ideas. The Yasukuni visits are embedded in Japanese politics. After the institutional change, the idea—Yasukuni visits— still has been in effect in influencing Prime Ministers' decisions. In this regard, Koizumi's Yasukuni visits can be understood in this framework. In addition to this, this study was able to propose more persuasive explanations to this problem. In this regard, the significance of this study is a theoretical contribution to existing institutional scholarship as well as empirical findings on controversial issue.

This study is not free from limitations. The selection of ideas should be pointed out. The concept of ideas is very much in danger of bias since researchers trace history for finding 'ideas' to explain their research object. In the process of tracing institutionally embedded ideas, researchers might be biased when they identify the "idea": they can select "ideas" that can explain what they research for. In order to avoid this problem, this study tried to keep its objectivity: the data presented show the number of Yasukuni visits held by Prime Ministers under the 1955 system. However, this study still cannot exclude the possibilities that there might have been other 'ideas' that should be examined.

5.4. Implication of this Study

The aim of this study is to re-conceptualize prevailing explanations of the Yasukuni problem. Conventionally the Yasukuni problem has been interpreted and addressed in terms of Koizumi's own political beliefs and supports from political pressure groups. These explanations, however, cannot fully address Koizumi's continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine: Why Koizumi did and could visit Yasukuni under harsh criticism is left unanswered. This study tried to address this controversial issue with a social science frame work.

Driven from academic interest, this study tries to comprehend Koizumi's Yasukuni visits. The underlying condition of Japanese politics—ideas embedded in Japan's politics—was so strong that it cannot be grasped only with the conventional institutional frame works. Ideas last after institutional change. The framework proposed here will be useful for further research on this Yasukuni problem. This problem is on-going and whether Prime Ministers visit the shrine has been paid great attention.   This study expects this framework to hold continuing validity in addressing the Yasukuni problem into the future.

Table 5.1 The Institutional change

	Did They Stop Visiting After Criticism	
	Yes	No
The 1955 System (1955 to 1993)	Yasuhiro Nakasone (10)* (1982-1986)	
The Post-1955 System (1993 to 2006)	Ryutaro Hashimoto (1) (1996-1998)	Junichiro Koizumi (6) (2001-2006)

*Number of Yasukuni visits during their office

Table 5.2 Summary of this study

	(1) **Power Balance among Parties** **Primary Hypothesis #1**	(2) **Power Balance among Factions** **Primary Hypothesis #2**	(3) **Individual Beliefs** **Alternative Hypothesis #1**	(4) **Political Groups** **Alternative Hypothesis #2**
Hypothesis	• Koizumi could continuously visit the shrine due to the declining power of the JSP	• Koizumi could attempt the continued, with declining power of the pro-China factions	• His strong political beliefs enabled Koizumi to visit the shrine annually	• For the sake of a promise he made and support from political groups, Koizumi visited Yasukuni
Research Expectation	• If the JSP lose its legislative seats and votes to its party, this hypothesis will be supported	• If the pro-China factions lose their power in the relations with anti-China factions, this will be supported	• If Koizumi valued the relations with China and South Korea, this explanation is discredited	• If the number of affiliates in War Veteran and Bereaved Families Alliance has been in decline, this explanation will be denied
Research Result	• Power decline: Koizumi took less pressure from the JSP	• Relative power decline of the pro-China factions: Koizumi was relatively free from pressure from the factions • Inexplicability for PM Mori: why he did not visit Yasukuni cannot be addressed	• Beliefs did not play a critical role in Yasukuni visits	• These groups—War Veterans and Bereaved Family Associations—have losing influence to the LDP

Table 5.3 The Causal Relationships in a Prime Ministers' Visits in the 1955 System and Koizumi's Visits

Prime Ministers under the 1955 Political System

The JSP

↓ Pressure

| Ideas of the Yasukuni Visits | → | Yasukuni Visits | → | No Further Visits |

↑ Pressure

The Pro-China

Junichiro Koizumi: a Prime Minister in the Post 1955 System

The JSP

↓ Less Pressure

| Ideas of the Yasukuni Visits | → | Yasukuni Visits | → | The Continued Visits |

↑ Less Pressure

The Pro-China

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Koizumi's Annual Statements

2001

"On the occasion of the ceremony in the first year of the 21st century, once again *I inscribe the many lessons of the war deeply on my hear and vow anew to make my utmost efforts toward establishing a permanent world peace and realizing a society full of hope in which people are able to live fulfilling*"[44]

2002

"This year marks the fiftieth anniversary since the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect and Japan regained its sovereignty. *Firmly maintaining the nation's antiwar pledge, I will make utmost efforts so that Japan further develops its friendly relations with neighboring countries, and a member of international community, contributes to establishing everlasting peace and works toward realizing a society in which the lives of the people can be enriched*"[45]

2003

"Looking back on the past with humility, as well as firmly maintaining the nation's antiwar pledge never to repeat war, *I will exert all my efforts so that Japan can further develop its friendly relations with countries all over the world, and actively contribute to establishing lasting world peace as amber of the international community*"[46]

2004

"Looking back on the past with humility, *I will not let the lesson learned from the tragedy of war fade with time and firmly maintain the nation's antiwar pledge, dedicated to the construction of Japan as peaceful nation.* Japan will further develop its friendly relations with countries all over the world, and as a member of the international community, actively contribute to establishing lasting world peace. I will exert all my efforts so that Japan will gain further trust from the world as country that treasure peace"[47]

2005

[44] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2001. "Prime Minister attends the Memorial service for the war dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet.
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2001/08/15shusen_e.html>.
[45] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2002. "Prime Minister attends the Memorial service for the war dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2002/08/15shusen_e.html>.
[46] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2003. "Prime Minister attends the Memorial service for the war dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2003/08/15shusen_e.html>.
[47] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2004. "Prime Minister attends the Memorial service for the war dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet
<http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/08/15shusen_e.html>.

"During the war, Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. *I express the heartfelt feelings of mourning to all the victims, both at home and abroad, in the war.* Today, on this occasion marking the 60th anniversary of the war's end, I expressed once again in my statement as Prime Minister of Japan, the feelings of deep remorse for the past war, and, based on the path we have made in the sixty years in the post-war period, my determination to contribute to world peace and prosperity without ever again waging a war. *Japan will, with all its countries and, as country that attaches utmost importance to peace, will seek to gain further trust from the world*"[48]

2006
"..*we should never forget that friendly relations between Japan and other countries and regions around the world have provided Japan with stability in the post-war world*….Here today, based on its remorse over the war, Japan vows to uphold its pledge not to engage in war and to dedicate itself to the construction of Japan as a peaceful nation, while resolving to actively contribute toward the establishment of lasting world peace as a member of the international community. *As a country that attaches the utmost importance to peace, Japan will do all it can to gain further trust from the world.*" [49]

[48] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2005. "Prime Minister attends the Memorial service for the war dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet < http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2005/08/15syuusen_e.html>.

[49] Koizumi, Junichiro. 2006. "Address by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi at the 61st Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead". Emphasis Added. See Prime Minister of Japan and his cabinet <http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2006/08/15aisatsu_e.html>.

Appendix B: List of Prime Ministers' Yasukuni Visits

Prime Minister	# of visits	Date of visits	Political Issues	Reactions by Asians
Takeo Miki (1974.11 – 1976.12)	3	1975 (4/ 22)		
		1975 (8/ 15)	• **Visit as "private" capacity.** • A first visit by PM since the end of war on Aug 15.	
		1976 (10/18)		
Takeo Fukuda (1976.12 – 1978.12)	4	1977 (4/ 21)		
		1978 (4/ 21)		
		1978 (8/ 15)	Visit with public officers in public vehicles, but 'private' capacity.	
		1978 (10/18)	**Class A criminals were enshrined and honored on Oct 17, 1978.**	
Masayoshi Ohira (1976.12 -1979.11) (2nd Term: 1979.11 – 1980.6)	3	1979 (4/ 21)	The new that Class A criminals have been enshrined was published on Apr 19, 1979.	His visits did not become political issues due to his religious beliefs (Christianity).
		1979 (10/18)		
		1980 (4/ 21)		
Zenko Suzuki (1980.7 - 1982.11)	9	**1980 (8/ 15)**		His visits were never the target of protest of China, due to visit as 'private' citizen.
		1980 (10/18)		
		1980 (11/21)		
		1981 (4/ 21)		
		1981 (8/ 15)		

		1981 (10/17)		
		1982 (4/ 21)		
		1982 (8/ 15)		
		1982 (10/18)		
Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982.11 – 1983.12)	10	1983 (4/ 21)		
		1983 (8/ 15)		
(2nd Term: 1983.12 - 1986.7)		1983 (10/18)		
		1984 (1/ 5)	• Visit as "official" capacity.	Chinese governments start to protest against Yasukuni visits by PMs after this visit as 'official' capacity on 40th anniversary of surrender.
		1984 (4/ 21)		
		1984 (8/ 15)	Unconstitutional Judgment by Fukuoka High Court on Feb 28, 1992 and by Osaka High Court on Jul 30,1992	
		1984 (10/18)		
		1984 (1/ 21)		
		1985 (4/ 22)		
(3rd Term: 1986.7 – 1987.11)		**1985 (8/ 15)**	• A private advisory panel to Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami reported the visit as 'official' capacity is not unconstitutional. • *Official* **Visit by Nakasone and his 17 cabinet members.** • On 14 August 1986 (next year), no 'official visit' will be made, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Masaharu Gotoda	

			announced.	
Noboru Takeshita (1987.11 – 1989.7)	0			
Sousuke Uno (1989.7 - 1989.8)	0			
Toshiki Kaifu (1989.8 – 1991.11)	0			
Kiichi Miyazawa (1991.11 -1993.8)	0			
Morihiro Hosokawa (1993.8 – 1994.4)	0			
Tsutomu Hata (1994.4 - 1994.7)	0			
Tomiichi Murayama (1994.7 – 1996.1)	0			
Ryutaro Hashimoto (Jan 1996.1 – 1996.11) (2nd Term: 1996.11 – 1998.7)	1	1996 (July 29)	• Fist visit in post-1955 System (11 years since Nakasone's), but after strong Chinese and South Korean reaction does not visit again. • Unconstitutional Judgment by Supreme Court to six time donations to Yasukuni by public funds of Ehime Prefecture on Apr 2, 1997.	
Keizo Obuchi (1998.7 - Apr 2000.4)	0			
Tsutomu Hata (1994.4 – 1994.6)	0			
Tomiichi Murayama (1994.6 – 1996.1)	0			
Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996.1 -1996.11)	1	1996 (July 29)	• Fist visit in post-1955 System (11 years since Nakasone's), but	

(2nd Term: 1996.11 - 1998.7)			after strong Chinese and South Korean reaction does not visit again. • Unconstitutional Judgment by Supreme Court to six time donations to Yasukuni by public funds of Ehime Prefecture on Apr 2, 1997.	
Keizo Obuchi (1998.7 – 2000.4)	0			
Yoshiro Mori (2000.4 – 2001.4)	0		*Kaminokuni Hatsugen* [Comments of "divine country with an emperor at its core"]: It "drew widespread criticism for violating the spirit of the postwar Constitution guaranteeing a secure state. Shinto was the official religion of wartime Japan, and the emperor was regarded as a deity" (New York Time, May 18, 2000).	
Junichiro Koizumi (2001.4 – 2003.11)	6	2001 (8/ 13)	• Runs for Presidency election, pledging he will visit Yasukuni on Aug 15. • The Non-binding Unconstitutional Judgment by the Fukuoka District Court on Apr 7, 2004.	• Chinese President Jiang Zemin expressed councern with the Yasukuni-visit promise made by Koizumi on Jul 10, 2001 • The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jizxuan expressed his concern at international conference in Hanoi on Jul 24, 2001. • The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

				officially expresses 'regret' to Koizumi's visits on Aug 24, 2001.
		2002 (4/ 21)	On Dec 24, 2002, Private advisory panel to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda submits report advocating need for the establishment of state-run, secular permanent facility to pray for the war dead and peace.	
		2003 (1/ 14)	To visits of 2001, 2002, and 2003, Unconstitutional Judgment without binding force by the Osaka District Court on Sep 30, 2005.	Chinese students' demonstration against Japan in Beijing and Shanghai resulted in damage to Japanese embassy property in Apr 2003.
(2nd Term: 2003.11 – 2005.9)		2004 (1/ 1)		
(3rd Term: 2005.9 – 2006.9)		2005 (10/17)	Chairman of the Liberal Democratic party's Diet Affairs Committee Nakagawa, expresses his idea that Class As are honored separately.	
		2006 (8/ 15)	• On Apr 15, 2006, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe (PM later) reportedly visits Yasukuni. • With this visit, Koizumi finally keeps his promise that he will make the visit on Aug 15.	• Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing told ambassador Yuji Miyamoto: "The Chinese Government expresses strong protest towards this measure, which hurts the feelings of people in

			countries that were victims of Japanese militarists' war of invasion and wrecks the political basis for Sino-Japanese relations" • South Korea's Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says that all Koreans were "frustrated and angry" with Japan.