Management earnings forecasts as anticipatory impression management

The effects of impression management tactics are poorly understood when used inanticipation of events that trigger stakeholder reactions. I examine voluntary firm disclosures - management earnings forecasts - to determine whether they are used as anticipatory impression management tactics. I found that firms are more likely to announce surprise earnings when they disclosed management earnings forecasts in advance of the announcement. Salient stakeholders, such as institutional investors and analysts, influence the likelihood and candor of management earnings forecasts. I compare the effects of management earnings forecasts and the effects of a trigger - surprise earnings - on investor reactions, and test the impact of prior management forecasts on subsequent forecasts. Management earnings forecasts cause more abnormal investor reactions than surprise earnings, and those reactions are influenced by the frequency and accuracy of prior firm forecasts. The antecedents and consequence of management earnings forecasts in this study have interesting implications for impression management theory, managers, stakeholders and public policy.