

THE CONTRIBUTION OF STATES TO UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

A TWO-STAGE SYNTHETIC APPROACH

by

MOON-SEOK CHUN

(Under the Direction of Loch K. Johnson)

ABSTRACT

This thesis provides a comprehensive explanation of the UN (United Nations) human resource contribution by member states to UN peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) by employing Moravcsik (1997)'s two-stage behavioral theory of states. A statistical analyses of two independent models of states' contributions and the size of contribution between 2002 and 2006 by the UN member states shows several findings and implications: (1) Liberal ideas and institutional democracy do not always follow the same direction in foreign policy decisions; (2) member states consider trade relationships with the mission areas for deciding contributions of human resources; (3) the conventional wisdom that member states have a less developed economy send more human resources is supported by the statistical analysis.

INDEX WORDS: United Nations peacekeeping operation, foreign policy, contribution to peacekeeping operations

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MOON-SEOK CHUN

B.E., Republic of Korea Air Force Academy, Republic of Korea, 1997

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2009

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by

MOON-SEOK CHUN

Major Professor: Loch K. Johnson

Committee: Han S. Park  
Patricia Sullivan

Electronic Version Approved:

Maureen Grasso  
Dean of the Graduate School  
The University of Georgia  
August 2009

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge Dr. Loch Johnson for his tremendous supports and encouragements as well as critical feedbacks with respects of diversity in point of views. Without his gentle guides, I would have failed to finish my thesis. I also acknowledge many thanks to Dr. Han S. Park and Dr. Patricia Sullivan who have provided valuable comments for this study and special thanks to Dr. Ryan Bakker for his advices to pass over methodological huddles.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
LIST OF TABLES .....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES .....	viii
CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	7
3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES.....	15
Liberalism and Two-stage Synthesis .....	16
Substantial Theory and Hypotheses .....	21
4 RESEARCH DESIGN .....	32
Unit of Analysis and Spatial & Temporal Domains .....	32
Operationalization .....	33
Model Specification .....	39
5 RESULTS AND FINDINGS .....	43
Liberal Influence on Preference Shaping and Policy Adjustment.....	45
Institutional Considerations on Policy Adjustment.....	52
Realist Considerations on Policy Adjustment .....	54
6 CONCLUSIONS.....	56
REFERENCES .....	60

APPENDICES .....	67
A Summary Table of Hypotheses .....	67
B The UN Member States during 2002 to 2006 (Alphabetical).....	68
C The Summary of UN PKOs during 2002 to 2006.....	70
D Summary Table of Descriptive Statistics .....	71
E Correlation Analysis.....	72
F Regression Diagnostic Test Results of Model II.....	73
G Appendix G: Results Summary of Model III and IV .....	75

## LIST OF TABLES

	Page
Table 1: Results Summary of Statistical Analyses.....	44
Table 2: Results Summary of Liberal Hypotheses.....	52
Table 3: Results Summary of Institutional Hypotheses .....	53
Table 4: Results Summary of Realist Hypotheses .....	55

## LIST OF FIGURES

	Page
Figure 1: Two-stage Model of State Behavior (Moravcsik 1997, p.545) .....	21
Figure 2: Graph of Predicted Probabilities by the Liberal Norms Variable.....	46
Figure 3: Graph of Predicted Probabilities by the Trade Relationship Variable.....	50

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was implemented in 1948 as the first UN (United Nations) mandated ceasefire observer mission in the Middle East. Since then, UN PKOs (Peacekeeping operations) has experienced a dramatic increase in number of missions and in complexity of operations (Goulding, 1993; Mason, 2003). While UNTSO started with a relatively small number of military observers, some of the total 63 missions now have multi-dimensional goals for peace with vast amount of human and material resources under the blue flag of the UN (U.N., 2009). As of the end of the 2008, the total number of personnel who served on 18 on-going missions is 114,212, which include 91,382 uniformed military observers, civilian police, and troops (U.N., 2009). In terms of financing the missions, about \$ 7.1 billion were approved for those operations from July 2008 to June 2009 (U.N., 2009). Not surprisingly, a large number of countries, 120 out of 192 UN member states, contributed personnel to UN PKOs in 2008(U.N., 2009). Indeed, the UN charter, chapter VII, article 43, states that all members have an obligatory contribution for UN PKOs.<sup>1</sup> The UN as well as the UNSC, however, has not implemented substantial punishment for delay or failure to provide the assigned donations in place.

Nevertheless, some member states seem to feel more “obligations” than others in contributing their resources to peacekeeping missions. The UN charter and/or mandates do not

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<sup>1</sup> UN Charter, Chapter VII, article 43 states “All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”

apply equally to all member states. Along those lines, this study investigates what motivates the UN members to contribute human resources differently. In fact, the question of the motivation of contributions has been researched since the beginning of UN PKOs (Andersson, 2000, 2002; Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Krishnasamy, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Lebovic, 2004; Mulgan, 1995; Neack, 1995). Despite the number of empirical research studies, however, the dramatic changes of UN PKOs in quantity as well as in quality since the beginning places this study as a point of departure for greater understanding of this key issues. Indeed, as we can see in the capstone strategy of UN PKOs (U.N., 2008), the missions seem to cover a wide range of security problems that are highly complex, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and even peace enforcing. The purposes of UN PKOs focus not only on monitoring ceasefire or preventing armed conflicts but also on implementing peaceful regime change; building functioning government; protecting human rights; preventing diseases, and even conserving environmental concerns. UN PKOs appear to be a “silver bullet” for almost all kinds of security problems.

Despite UN PKOs’ strong international legitimacy, the UN faces practical difficulties in dealing with multidimensional objectives of UN PKOs and has admitted the necessity for several reforms.<sup>2</sup> One of the difficulties lay in the unstable recruitment of human resources, which is totally based on a member’s voluntary contribution. About two-thirds of member states, however, consistently contribute human resources.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, despite the number of contributors, most of the budget and troop contributions depend largely on a handful of countries. As of 2008, the top

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<sup>2</sup> It has been pointed out that UN PKOs have been overstretched with limited resources which member states contribute. Alain Le Roy, under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations addressed this matters in a foreword to the annual peacekeeping survey of the New York-based Center on International Co-operation (Morris, February 24 2009).

<sup>3</sup> As of 2009, the number of contributors has increased from about 100 to 120 since 2004 (U.N., 2009).

ten providers of assessed budget contributions provide over 83 percent of the entire peacekeeping budgets of UN PKOs.<sup>4</sup>

Understandably, a state's financial contributions to UN PKOs are assessed and allocated by the size of its economy. Shimizu & Sandler (2002) show that the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of countries are closely correlated with the current financial contributions of UN PKOs during the post-Cold war period. This financial process seems fair because the assessed budget allocations for UN PKOs to the members are decided by the General Assembly resolutions, and the budget allocation rates for contributions are based on the regular UN budget allocations, which are largely associated with the GDP per capita of member states.<sup>5</sup> Concentration in financial contributions is not surprising when we consider that only a handful of wealthy countries share most of the world's economy.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, the leading personnel contributors in 2008, in order, were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Nepal, Rwanda, Ghana, Jordan, Uruguay, and Italy. In contrast to the budget contributors, however, the leading military troop, observer, and police contributions show little relation to certain aspects of the country, such as economic size, military capability, size of the country, and the proximity to the mission area. Bobrow & Boyer (1997) point out that the troop contributors were not uniform in politics, level of economic development, or home region; rather, they were diverse. While we can find countries that have a large military force (such as India and Italy), we also find other countries that have relatively small military forces and military expenditures, which might restrict the capability of troop contribution. Further, despite

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<sup>4</sup> As of 2008, the top ten assessed budget contributors were: U.S., Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, China, Canada, Spain, and the Republic of Korea (DPKO, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Financing procedures of UN PKO since 2001 are based on series of UN charter, the UN General Assembly Resolutions, and the UN documents: the UN charter article 17, paragraph 2, General Assembly resolution 55/235, 55/236; Implementing documents of resolution 55/235 and 55/236 (A/58/157, A/C.5/55/38).

<sup>6</sup> As of 2007, more than 80 percent of the total GDP of all countries is shared by the top 15 GDP countries.

internal or external conflict of their own with a UN PKO, some countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Rwanda, send their peacekeepers not to their own mission but to the other parts of the globe. My research question has been developed by those empirical observations of groups of participants, especially contributors of uniformed personnel. Given the fact that the contribution for UN PKOs is a partly voluntary and partly obligatory action of the member states, what are common interests and/or possibly selfish motivations for contributing personnel to UN PKOs?

This question addresses the motivation of states' cooperation through international organizations, which has been long debated in the IR (international relations) scholarly literature (Baldwin, 1993). Although this study will not resolve all questions about a state's motivation for cooperation, it will produce useful evidence relating to both sides of debates on international cooperation through international institutions. Further, studies on foreign policy substitutability and alternatives (for example, Most & Starr, 1989) suggest that this study should not make a single law-like theory for a state's foreign policy decisions.<sup>7</sup> Rather, this study will shed light on the various circumstances and determinants that lead states to choose foreign policy options, such as whether to contribute personnel (and what amount) to UN PKOs, by employing factors in previous research as well as new determinants that have been overlooked by extant research. This study builds on available research that has been conducted to explain the motivations of member states. Moreover, by employing a synthetic two-stage theory (Moravcsik, 1997), this study can provide a comprehensive explanation of foreign policy decision-making with regard to the contribution of human resources to UN PKOs.

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<sup>7</sup> In Most and Starr (1989), foreign policy substitutability means that same foreign policy can generate multiple consequences. In contrast to substitutability, foreign policy alternative means that different foreign policies can generate the same consequence (Most and Starr, 1989). The implication of these concepts is that two types of multi-causality – from one factor to many consequences and many factors to one consequence – should be considered not only in theory building but also in raising inquiries and building theory.

Also, this study will contribute to contemporary knowledge by suggesting policy recommendations. Secretary Ban Ki-Moon recently exhorted all UN member states to provide peacekeepers to Darfur while he lamented their hesitance to provide peacekeepers to UN PKOs.<sup>8</sup> Also, a top policy maker of the UN PKO worried about the shortage of resources and the danger of overstretching UN PKOs beyond their capabilities for recruiting enough peacekeepers (Tisdall, 2009). Given the difficulties of the UN in recruiting peacekeepers, this study provides reasons why member states are hesitant to contribute and recommendations for how to mobilize more human resources among member states.

As for methodology, this study employs large-N analysis of 960 observations of member states' contribution to UN PKOs between 2002 and 2006. The study uses two independent equations model and the selection models to analyze contribution policy decisions of the member states, and the results reveal significant findings.<sup>9</sup> First, liberal ideas and institutional democracy do not consistently impact the foreign policy decision. While a state's level of sharing liberal norms toward individual freedom and/or human rights is positively associated with the choice of contributing policy (the preference stage of the two-stage theory) as well as with the amount of contribution (the adjustment stage of the two-stage theory), institutional democracy has a positive impact at the preference stage but a negative impact at the adjustment stage. Second, member states consider their relationship with the state and/or region where the UN PKO was implemented when they decide the contribution to UN PKOs. Third, the conventional wisdom

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<sup>8</sup> For more information on the situation in Darfur, refer to the news coverage on the Darfur; <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/world/11peacekeeping.html?ref=world>

<sup>9</sup> Two independent equations are (1) probit MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) to predict whether to contribute human resources to UN PKOs and (2) OLS (Ordinary Least Squared) regression to predict the amount of human resources to contribute to UN PKOs. The selection models means the Heckman two-stage selection model (Heckman, 1979). Chapter four provides details.

which holds that member states that have less developed economies send more human resources is supported by this paper's statistical analysis.

The remainder of this study consists of five sections. Chapter Two provides a detailed review of the literature that deals with the motivations behind contributions to UN PKOs by a UN member states. Next, Chapter Three sets forth an analytical framework for a two-stage synthetic model and a substantial theory of member states' motivation for contributions to UN PKOs, including working hypotheses. Chapter Four provides the methodology, which includes spatial-temporal domains, operationalization of variables, and model specifications. Chapter Five presents the analytical results and a discussion of the findings. Finally, Chapter Six presents a conclusion that includes implications and limitations of findings and suggestions for future research.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Previous research on UN PKO participating states shows that states contribute their human resources to realize various types of national interests, such as international recognition (Krishnasamy, 2001, 2003a, 2003b); money for peacekeepers' salaries for less developed countries (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002); promoting norms and values (Andersson, 2000, 2002; Lebovic, 2004); media and public opinion in terms of humanitarian concerns (Jakobsen, 1996); and maintaining *status quo* to secure regional interests (Neack, 1995). This literature cannot be easily categorized due to various types of definitions of national interest at stake. Thus, rather than focusing on the types of national interests in peacekeeping operations, this chapter adopts Shimizu & Sandler's (2002) approach for an analytical framework to review extant studies to understand what has or has not been researched, which regards outputs of peacekeeping operations as multiple or joint products. Shimizu & Sandler (2002) states:

A more general representation for peacekeeping is that it yields multiple outputs or joint products that are *purely public* to the global community, *impurely public* to some nations, or *private* (country specific) to the country engaged in the peacekeeping (p. 656)

The category of pure public good is available to almost all member states, but the category of private good is available to fewer member states. By using a conceptualization of range of member states that benefit from UN PKOs, this chapter categorizes and reviews empirical studies which address the same question as this study. Furthermore, the literature

review illustrates how this study connects with prior achievements of extant research and how this study contributes to the field.

In relation to research categorized to the UN PKO as a public good, the characteristics of public good in general, and in terms of UN PKOs, need clarification. Generally speaking, public good is not excludable and is a joint good for international society (Cornes & Sandler, 1996; Olson, 1971). From the standpoint of UN PKOs, peaceful status would be nearest to public good for international society because consumption of peace by one specific country does not diminish the total amount of peace and because no other countries can be excluded from enjoying the peace.

First, Andersson (2000, 2002) and Lebovic (2004) can be classified as near to purely public good. Andersson (2000, 2002) argues that countries that have a liberal democracy would be more likely to show their commitment to peacekeeping operations because democratic countries share liberal democratic norms and values. Although Andersson (2000, 2002) does not regard the output of peacekeeping operations as a public good, his argument is based on the presumption that democratic states promote peace and security in international society by contributing human resources to peacekeeping operations. His work contributes to normative democratic peace theory (Doyle, 1986) by broadening the boundary of application to a commitment to peacekeeping operations and/or international institutions. Furthermore, methodologically, the employment of two sets of measurements of democracy, the *Freedom in the World* survey index and POLITY III index, can be useful for rigorous testing (Andersson, 2000, 2002). Despite these valuable contributions, however, one deficiency is noteworthy of mention for further study. While testing his theory, Anderson (2000, 2002) does not control any

possible factors which might influence states' contributions to peacekeeping operations.<sup>10</sup> His studies might prevent the research from reflecting preexisting scholarly works from other schools of thought which might have had some impact on the state's decisions and should have been controlled when testing his hypothesis.

More recently, Lebovic (2004) uses the democratic peace proposition to explain peacekeeping operations in a manner similar to Anderson (2000, 2002), but the meaning of the peacekeeping operation output in terms of public good is a little different. Adding to a normative approach to UN PKOs like Anderson (2000, 2002), Lebovic (2004) also introduces the club good aspect of peacekeeping operations through democratic countries' exporting of democracy by contributing peace operations to enjoy more peaceful relationships between democratic countries. Lebovic (2004) states,

..., democratic leaders can export liberal practices and pursue humanitarian objectives because these are not easily separated from self-interest. Liberalism suggests that the spread of democracy is essential to realize a broader harmony of interest that all people share (p. 912).

Moreover, Lebovic (2004) detects not only the impact of the normative aspect of democracies but also that of the structural (institutional) aspect of democracies. Lebovic (2004, p.913) argues,

Democracies might be slow or unable to act as well because liberal principles by which power is widely distributed within a democratic system guarantee inefficiency and inertia in policy making. ... Once engaged, democratic leaders

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<sup>10</sup> Surely, it is absolutely not a problem not to employ a control variable if residuals are randomly distributed. It may not usually be the case, and Andersson (2000, 2002) does not mention it. Instead, Andersson (2000, 2002) adjusts the dependent variable (man-month contribution) by dividing several variables related to states' capabilities (such as populations, *GDP per capita*) which might generate biased estimates.

might sustain commitments, however, with help from a democratic public that rallies to support the use of force (Jentleson and Britton, 1998).

While Lebovic (2004) notices that the structural inefficiency of democracies impact positively on contributions to UN PKOs by sustaining commitments to UN PKOs, Lebovic (2004) overlooks inefficiency in making the decision whether to send human resources and how much to send. Moreover, the hypothesis of liberal democracies does not differentiate the normative cause from the structural cause of democracies (Lebovic, 2004). Indeed, democratic peace theories already differentiate the causal path of the normative aspect of democracies from that of the structural cause of democracies, and build up different hypotheses although the associations between democracies and peace are similar (Maoz & Russett, 1993). Thus, this study investigates the difference causal paths between normative and structural (institutional) aspects of democracies.

Secondly, we can conceptualize that the output of UN PKOs might produce impure public good or ‘club good’. Impure public good or club good means that the benefit of UN PKOs is excludable and/or not joint. Indeed, peace is a purely public good in a general sense, but in certain situations, some countries enjoy their own benefits by participating in the mission. In this point of view, the output of UN PKOs can be regarded as club good and Neack (1995) supports this notion. Neack (1995) basically argues that states participate in UN PKOs while seeking their own interest at UN PKOs. Neack (1995) assumes that UN PKOs provide two major benefits to “middle powers”: (1) international *status quo* which keeps “middle powers” in their status and (2) enhancement of reputation in international society and/or in international institutions. It is reasonable to think that there might be a group of states enjoying those club goods, but the question of who the “middle powers” are remains, although she lists a handful of countries, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belgium, and

Sweden (Neack, 1995). Also, a weak definition of “middle power” might bring about an ontological question; Do “middle powers” contribute to UN PKOs the most because they are “middle powers”? Or are those countries named as “middle powers” because they contribute to UN PKOs the most? Which one is not clear in her research as the criteria of “middle powers” against “great powers” or “small powers” are not shown in the research, though she relies on her previous study of clustering groups of countries (Neack, 1995). Also, subsequent questions include the ingredients of “middle powers”, and how those factors causally influence foreign policy decisions in terms of peacekeeping contributions.

Neack (1995) categorizes three groups of countries (“great”, “middle”, and “small”) through statistical clustering by five variables: population, military expenditures per capita, gross national product per capita, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate per thousand live births. Some realistic variables – population, military expenditure per capita, gross national product per capita – might correspond with Neack’s (1995) realistic approach. The remaining factors – infant mortality rate and literacy rate – however, may not follow the realistic approach toward “middle powers” and may bias the result that “middle powers” are more likely to contribute than others. Thus, the puzzling questions that are arisen from Neack (1995) push this study to develop more substantial arguments on causal processes that illustrate which factors of a certain country group (for example, “middle powers”) are considered when deciding human resource contribution to UN PKOs.

Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that UN PKOs provide country specific interests – “private good” that no other state but contributors can enjoy at the same time. Types of private goods of UN PKOs can different by country or by mission. Krishnasamy (2003) argues that India participates intensively to UN PKOs (1) to improve international image, (2) to have a new

permanent membership in the UNSC, (3) to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations with the country where the peacekeeping mission operates, and (4) to show superiority to their rival, Pakistan. In another study on Bangladesh, Krishnasamy (2003b) argues that Bangladesh has contributed relatively large numbers of troops to UN PKOs to receive greater economic assistance and foreign investments by enhancing its global image. Indeed, it has been a conventional wisdom that the countries, which suffer from economic shortages, have been eager to send their human resources to get more economic aid and receive salaries from the UN. Shimizu & Sandler (2002) suggest that:

Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Egypt often send many peacekeepers, because the flat payment per soldier from the United Nations exceeds what these governments pay their soldiers, so that supplying peacekeeping troops can be a source of foreign-exchange earnings (p. 654)

Another type of private goods is expressed as domestic political leverage. Both Mulgan (1995) and Jacobson (1996) focus on benefits not for the country but for political entities in domestic politics. Mulgan (1995) describes Japan's commitment to UN PKOs as a political attempt to change Japan's pacific constitutions into a more aggressive one and as an international political aspiration to become a permanent member of the UNSC. Jacobson (1996) argues that humanitarian concerns of public opinion, which was caused by so-called "CNN effect", changed the direction of U.S. contribution policy to UN PKOs. In a nutshell, the aforementioned empirical studies (Jakobsen, 1996; Krishnasamy, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Mulgan, 1995) imply that peace and/or *status quo*, major outputs of UN PKOs would not intrigue member states to contribute, but collateral benefits would appeal to them.

Although some countries enjoy private good from UN PKOs; however, whether the private goods might be attracting other potential contributors is not clear. Thus, at this point, it would be valuable attempt to generalize whether these private goods can be found in one of the motivations of states' contributions to UN PKOs. Moreover, none of the studies on the UN PKO contributions tests the relationship between salary benefits and the likelihood of personnel contributions – although the relationship is widely believed to be positive. Also, in addition to economic benefits, an improved reputation from participating to UN PKOs seems to be important not only for “middle powers” but also for relatively small and less developed countries. This literature review so far also suggests that private goods of UN PKOs can be club goods when the interests of groups of countries are met, such as “middle powers” or democratic countries. Thus, this paper will test whether economic benefits and reputational effects can be generalized to potential personnel contributors.

In conclusion, this review of the extant empirical research on this subject shows the multifaceted nature of outputs by UN PKOs. Pursuing multiple purposes is common aspect of foreign policy decision. Therefore, this paper does not argue that particular factors from specific approaches are the most relevant or dominant causes to explain contributions of states to UN PKOs. Rather, this study argues that different factors are linked by two-stage foreign policy decisions: (1) the policy preference stage and (2) the contribution level adjustment stage. In addition to the two-stage foreign policy decisions, this study also focuses on four goals to improve upon previous studies: (1) to build a comprehensive theory with different approaches (liberalism, realism, and institutionalism); (2) to build up separate causal paths of normative and structural democracies from monolithic concept of democracies; (3) to substantiate arguments about why countries are interested in institutional reputation, which is suggested by Krishnasamy

(2003a, 2003b) and Neack (1995); (4) to investigate the relationship between contributions of states and tangible economic interests, including salaries of peacekeepers held by conventional notion as argued in Krishnasamy (2003b) and Shumizu & Sandler (2002).

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

As I discussed in the literature review, national interests in contributing to UN PKOs exist in diverse forms that are categorized into pure public good, impure public good (club good), or private good. Due to this diversity, the construction of a comprehensive theory is difficult because different types of national interests are driven by theoretical approaches which might have conflicting assumptions and arguments. Thus, researchers often build a mono-causal theory which tests multiple causal paths one at a time. Yet, a mono-causality is not always the case in foreign policy decisions. Indeed, as Most & Starr (1995) point out, foreign policy substitutability and alternatives represent multiple causal paths in policy decision.<sup>11</sup> Despite the complexity in building a multi-causal theory, Moravcsik (1997) presents a theoretical approach to synthesize liberalism, institutionalism, and realism by combining them into a *two-stage model of state behavior*. This approach provides a theoretical basis and methodological framework for this paper. Moravcsik (1997) states:

If foreign policymaking is a process of constrained choice by purposive states, a view shared by realist, institutionalist, and liberal theory, there may well be cases in which a combination of preferences and constraints shapes state behavior. In such cases, a multi-causal synthesis, one that treats these theories not as substitutes but as complements, is required (p. 542).

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<sup>11</sup> Refer to footnote 5.

This paper adopts the conceptual *two-stage state behavior theory* that combines different approaches and makes it possible to analyze cases which seem not to have a single type of national interest throughout the cases. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section provides a condensed review of the liberalist approach and the two-stage states behavior model, which are presented in Moravcsik (1997). The second section builds a substantial theory upon the conceptual frame of two-stage state behavior model and derives testable hypotheses.

### **Liberalism and Two-stage Synthesis**

#### ***Liberal IR Theory***

Liberalism in the IR field has been criticized as being too idealistic and normative to explain adequately state behavior (e.g., Schmidt, 1998). In essence, however, liberal theories are not necessarily normative or idealistic; rather, liberal theories depend on the relationship between state and socio-economic configurations that decide states behavioral preferences. It is the configuration of state preference that matter the most and decide behaviors of states, not in the manner that realists regard configuration of capability, or that institutionalists regard configuration of institutions and information as determinants for the behavior of states (Moravcsik, 1997). More specifically, a liberalist approach considers that the preferences are coming from state-society relations shaped by domestic political institutions, by economic interdependence, and by ideas about national political and socioeconomic public goods provisions (Moravcsik, 1997). To be more theoretical, state-society relations shape preferences and a state's behavior can be restated in three set of assumptions, which will also be applied to this paper's substantial theory. For further review on liberal IR theory, this study focuses on core assumptions presented by Moravcsik (1997).<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The reason for reviewing core assumptions of liberalism rests on the Lakatos (1970): "we cannot prove theories and cannot disprove them either." Lakatos (1970) suggests that research program has hard-core assumptions and

### ***Assumption 1: Primacy of Societal Actors***

The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interest under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 516).

The above assumption enables the liberal IR theory not to regard a state as a single unitary actor that has exogenous types of national interests while choosing a foreign policy or preference in international relations. That is, national interests are achieved not only by a power-seeking behavior according to realism, or by reducing transaction costs according to institutionalism, but also by pursuing specific interests of various subsets of individuals and private groups, who are on average rational and risk-averse. Therefore, by employing a liberal approach to this paper, it is possible that various forms of national interests in contributing to UN PKOs can be described with a liberal approach. The resulting problem is how to group actors or agents and categorize them to generate consistent and reasonable explanations for a state's decisions on contributions to UN PKOs.

### ***Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences***

States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 518).

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protective auxiliary hypotheses to generate novel ideas (Lakatos, 1970). Therefore, it is necessary to focus on hard-core assumptions to evaluate research program. To see more detailed discussion on evaluating IR theories, refer to Elman & Elman (2003).

The second assumption is crucial for a liberal approach to turn into an IR theory because without this assumption, states might be treated as if they overwhelm domestic actors and groups and behave without regard for their interests. Due to this assumption, however, a state is an actor's tool for pursuing interests. In a more theoretical point of view offered by Moravcsik (1997, p. 518):

In the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state is not an actor but a representative institution... Representative institutions and practices constitute the critical "transmission belt" by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.

The notion above does not mean, however, that all individuals and/or groups are equally powerful enough to ignore the state institutional structure, but this assumption takes into consideration that every government can be biased toward a certain group or set of groups in society. Again, the assumption 2 is also employed in this study to explain states' contributing behavior as a preferred foreign policy by one or a set of individual or groups in domestic politics and institutions.

### ***Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System***

The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior (Moravcsik, 1997, p. 520).

The last core assumption of liberal IR theory completes a 'bottom-up' connection from primary actors to a state's behavior. As the first and second assumptions enable a demonstration of how states shape preferences among their possible behaviors, the third assumption buttresses logical consistency with a state's preferences and behaviors with an interdependent aspect. Furthermore, the third assumption makes liberalism to generate a liberal theory of international

affairs. Now, liberal IR theory provides not only a static explanation of preference shaping, but also a dynamic interaction between states' sets of preferences on cooperating as well as conflicting. Although this study does not capture interacting dynamics between states' foreign policy decisions, the third assumption should also be employed for logical consistency within the theory.

### *Two-stage synthesis*

Indeed, some previous studies (Andersson, 2000, 2002; Jakobsen, 1996; Lebovic, 2004) on the subject of contribution can be categorized as a liberalist approach and provide empirical validity of liberalism consistently. A single approach, however, might not fully capture the picture if a foreign policy decision is regarded as a combined product of preferences and constraints. It is possible to adapt a single approach by controlling other constraints by inserting variables from other perspectives into the model, but those control variables can seldom provide complementing explanations to the other approaches. Also, after reviewing the multi-faceted interests of UN PKOs, it would be helpful to build a synthetic theory to shed light on a state's complex considerations in deciding a foreign policy. The question is how to synthesize them.


Again, a liberal synthesis of Moravcsik (1997) provides a guideline for this paper. Moravcsik (1997) argues that liberal synthesis would be logical and liberalism should take the initiative:

Unless we know what these preferences are ..., we cannot assess realist or institutionalist claims linking variation in the particular means available to states on interstate conflict or cooperation. ... Variation in state preferences often influences the way in which states make calculations about their strategic environment, whereas the converse – that the strategic situation leads to

variation in states preference – is inconsistent with the rationality assumption shared by all three theories (p. 542).

Conclusively, the synthesis results into a two-stage theory. The reason for a two-stage synthetic analysis rests on different assumptions advanced by liberalism and realism and institutionalism. While the liberal approach explains states' behavior through a 'bottom-up' process from individual interests to a state's decision-making, the realistic and institutionalistic approach regards states as major actors and treats their preferences as exogenous sets. Thus, the explanation of three approaches (liberalism, institutionalism, and realism) cannot be performed in one analytical frame, either the liberal approach or the realistic and institutional approach, unless each releases its assumptions, which might hamper a theory's logical consistency. Also, it is reasonable for this study to make liberalism to have an analytical priority because realism and institutionalism seldom change the configuration of the preferences. Thus, this study follows Moravcsik (1997)'s two-stage theory as an analytical frame for explaining the states' contributing behavior. The conceptual frame of Moravcsik (1997)'s two-stage states' behavior theory is shown in Figure 1.

The conceptual frame of Moravcsik (1997) illustrates generalized states' interactive behaviors. States' contribution decisions, however, do not have multiple interactions with other states and/or international institutions. Thus, the substantial theory of this study follows generalized states' interactive behavior in a limited way. In Figure 1, the substantial theory starts from liberal factors which shape a state's preference to contribution, and via line '(b)', it ends at '(c)' where realist and institutionalist factors adjust the level of human resource contributions. Also, state preferences directly can influence strategic interaction between states through line '(a)'.



**Figure 1. Two-stage Model of State Behavior (Moravcsik, 1997, p.545)**

Due to the limited research question of this paper, the configuration of preference does not have multiple options but only the choice of whether to contribute human resources to UN PKOs. Due to this limitation, this study regards a state’s contribution as the only preference of a state and, henceforth, preference means to contribute (or not to contribute) human resources to UN PKOs. Consequently, the role of realistic and institutionalistic constraining factors in this study is to adjust the amount of human resource contributions to UN PKOs. Detailed reasoning and hypotheses are provided in the next section. The next section illustrates concrete explanations of states’ contributing behaviors in the next section with a focus on the overview that the liberal factors decide a states preference whether to contribute to UN PKOs, and then the realistic and institutionalistic factors adjust the amount of human resource contribution.

**Substantial Theory and Hypotheses**

Although Moravcsik’s (1997) two-stage frame is useful to explain states foreign policy behavior, two assumptions are required to build substantial theory related to contributing behavior. First, this study employs three assumptions from liberalism theory that were reviewed

in the previous part. Second, to generate substantial explanations, this study incorporates two additional assumptions. One regards the output of UN PKOs, and the other considers opportunity of states for contribution.

***Assumption 4: Set of goods in UN PKOs***

*UN PKOs provide joint and/or combined outputs of pure public good, impure public good (club good), and private good.*

As the literature review implies, the output of UN PKOs could be diverse and range from almost purely public good to private good. To synthesize different approaches, this study includes the joint and combined outputs of UN PKOs. This assumption can broaden the scope of factors that might influence decisions for contribution, as well as the level of contribution.

***Assumption 5: Contribution capability of member states***

*All member states are capable of contributing human resources to UN PKOs.*

When considering the situation that many peacekeepers from less developed countries are trained and sent on a mission, a state's power projecting capability may not hinder a state's preference for contributing human resources. Nevertheless, the notion above does not necessarily mean that power projecting capability is irrelevant to states' foreign policy decision making process. It just opens opportunities to all actors within member states.

***Liberal Influences on Preference Shaping and Policy Adjustment***

In the synthetic two-stage theory, the causal process of contributing to UN PKOs starts from shaping preferences. Based on core assumptions one and two, the liberal approach allows an individual and/or groups of individuals to influence on a state's preference in foreign policy decisions in regard to their interests at stake. The "bottom-up" processes of shaping preference enable a state to represent individual-oriented interests in aggregated forms. Thus, considering

that the idealistic motivation of mandating a UN PKO promotes human rights and international peace, states which shares liberal ideas will most likely favor UN PKOs. Indeed, this argument is directly supported and tested in Lebovic (2004) and Andersson (2000, 2002), and furthermore, empirical research that is based on normative democratic peace indirectly supports the previous notion (Doyle, 1986). In democratic states, more people would share their norms with UN PKOs, so that they prefer participating in UN PKOs. Normative democratic peace theory emphasizes that sharing liberal democratic norms would prevent conflict between democracies (Doyle, 1986). Thus, if UN PKOs would enhance democratic norms and human rights for democracy, the individuals in democratic states would prefer the mission.

Moreover, not only do the individual and groups of people in the society share their values, but also the government and leadership keep legitimacy by preferring UN PKOs. The government of a state in which liberal norms prevail among most of its citizens would rest its legitimacy largely on the liberal norms that most citizens share. Thus, the leadership and/or government of liberal norms would enjoy political support by showing commitments to UN PKOs that have enhanced liberal norms and values in international relations. Advantages of the leadership's and the government's showing their commitments to UN PKOs provide a substantial implication to the policy adjustment stage of how many personnel would be contributed to UN PKOs. That is, liberal norms would positively impact the policy adjustment stage, as well. Based on the above reasoning, this study derives a hypothesis of liberal preference and adjustment (HL).

**HL1:** *If a state shares more liberal norms of individual freedom, the state would be more likely to contribute to UN PKOs and send more human resources to the mission.*

The above hypothesis was already tested in extant research by Lebovic (2004) and Andersson (2000, 2002), but they do not differentiate democracy as democratic norms and ideas

from institutional democracy. Indeed, the institutional democratic peace argument has a different causal path from the normative democratic peace theory. While normative democratic peace theory argues that the peaceful ideas between states would prevent international conflict, institutional democratic peace theory argues that institutional factors of democracy – such as public opinion, policy credibility, and slow decision making processes – would prevent international conflict. The implication of an institutional democratic peace proposition to this study is that if a political institution is democratic, the political institution (such as government) is more likely to reflect people's preference in policy decision making. Thus, due to UN PKOs' public good aspect – promoting human rights and conflict resolution, individuals and groups of individuals generally prefer the peacekeeping missions. Consequently, the leadership and the government of institutional democracy are more sensitive to the preference of individuals and groups of individuals.

Institutional democracy, however, may work differently in the policy adjustment stage as it affects preference in the first stage. To prefer a foreign policy option and to choose the level of the policy might have different causal links. The difference between the two would be well explained by free-riding problems of public good. While all or most people enjoy the benefits of the good, taking the cost would be serious to individuals. UN PKOs are indeed risky. Since 1948 and until 2009, total fatalities of UN PKOs are 2,583. The number of fatalities of India which has the largest fatalities is 130. The number of fatalities may sound relatively small compared to bloodshed armed conflict where UN PKOs might be deployed. Considering the situations, however, that UN PKO usually deploys after the ceasefire is established and has limited rules of engagement in combat situations, the number of fatalities seems high. Furthermore, the vulnerability of peacekeepers that arm only with limited equipment might provide worst case

scenarios for the policy makers. When we consider that democratic institutions are sensitive to the risks due to the impact of the public opinion, democracy would not send more troops to UN PKOs. Consequently, individuals and groups of people who share human rights would prefer more troops, while leadership group and government may be less enthusiastic to send more human resources to UN PKOs. Based on the above reasoning, a hypothesis of institutional democracy and the contribution behavior of states holds:

**HP2:** *If a state's political institution is democratic, the state would be more likely to prefer to contribute to UN PKOs but send fewer human resources to the mission.*

In addition, UN PKOs can provide tangible interests for individuals and/or groups of people. It is a trade relationship between potential contributors and the states in which the UN PKO is mandated. Regardless of the political institutions and the political ideology of a state, economic interests are universal to the individuals as well as to the leadership of the government. If an international conflict or civil conflict is severe, trades with states that suffer from an armed conflict can rarely be made. This means that the conflict can generate losses to those individuals who are related to the trade with the state(s) where the conflict is ongoing. Therefore, individuals and groups of people related to the bilateral trades with the mission area prefer UN PKOs, which might normalize the economic relationships.

As for the policy adjustment stage, trade relationships would work positively toward the level of contribution. Showing commitments to UN PKOs would enhance the trade relationship by increasing the bilateral trusts between the contributors and the states that host the missions. Thus, based on this reasoning, the hypothesis of bilateral trade relationships and the contribution behavior of states is stated:

**HP3:** *If trade interests rested on the mission area increase, the state would be more likely to prefer to contribute to UN PKOs and send more human resources to the mission.*

The last considerable interest is the salaries of the peacekeepers. Troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations are paid by their own governments according to their own national rank and salary scale. Countries volunteering military contingents and forming police units, however, are compensated by the United Nations.<sup>13</sup> Considering the compensation rate compared to the average wage in a certain country, more individuals and groups of people would prefer receiving the salaries for the peacekeepers given by the UN if the average income of the state is low.

Additionally, leadership and government would think that showing commitments to UN PKOs may have positive influence on receiving economic aids from the UN. As in the case study examining Bangladesh's contributions to UN PKOs (Krishnasamy, 2003a), the contributions give strong incentives for Bangladesh to receive economic support from the UN. Thus, regarding the policy adjustment stage, leadership and political actors of government would send more human resources to UN PKOs to receive their foreign economic support. Based on the above reasoning, the income level and contribution behavior of states are stated in hypothetical form:

**HP4:** *If the average income of a state decreases, the state would be more likely to prefer to contribute to UN PKOs and send more human resources to the mission.*

### ***Institutionalist Considerations on Policy Adjustment***

In the literature review, benefits from international institutions are enjoyed by “middle powers” (Neack, 1995) to maintain their status, or by small states (like Bangladesh) to be

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<sup>13</sup> The standard rates, approved by the General Assembly, are used to compensate for pay and allowances of all troops and supplementary payment for specialists. In addition, troop contributing countries are reimbursed for the usage of personal clothing, gear and equipment, including personal weaponry. The current rates of reimbursement paid by the UN to troop contributing countries per peacekeeper per month include: \$1,028 for pay and allowances; \$303 supplementary pay for specialists; \$68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; and \$5 for personal weaponry.

recognized for economic aid (Krishnasamy, 2003a). Although beneficiaries are different, both arguments rely on reputational interests in the international institutions. To understand the reputation seeking behavior in the UN and the UNSC generally, this paper starts from the institutionalist theory of international institutions. Rationalistic institutionalists argue that institutional cooperation is the behavior states adopt to reduce the cost of building credibility and of lowering the uncertainty in international affairs – informational benefits (Keohane, 1988; Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001).<sup>14</sup> Conversely, for good reason, international institutions should be able to reduce the costs of transacting information. Indeed, member states are more likely to achieve their goal through centralized and independent international organizations because centralization helps states reduce the transaction costs and independence increases the credibility of the information (Abbott & Snidal, 1998). Based on the above implications and arguments of institutional cooperation, it is critical to identify how the UNSC provides states the informational benefits and which member states would be anticipating those benefits.

The UNSC has operated as a key international institution that imposes substantive resolutions of international or internal conflicts, despite controversy over the efficiency of the UNSC's treatment of international crises (Berdal, 2003; Caron, Carr, & Claude Jr, 1993; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Glennon, 2003; Thompson, 2006). As for legal legitimacy, the UNSC operates for security problems relying on the UN charter from chapter V to chapter VIII that notes the UNSC's role, structure, limitations, and duty of the UNSC to resolve international disputes.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Generally, "Transaction costs refers to the costs of making an agreement and operating it, not of doing what the agreement is designed to do (for example, if two states agree to jointly build a dam, the costs of negotiating and administering the agreement are transactions costs, but the costs of building the dam are not)." (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001). In this paper, the transaction cost refers to the cost of making peaceful resolution in the UNSC and operating it if a member state has its security problem which is likely to be treated in the UNSC.

<sup>15</sup> To see composition, functions and powers, voting, and procedure rule, refer to the UN Charter Chapter V and rules of procedures 142.

Given the UNSC's legal legitimacy in international relations, the substantial measures of the UNSC are important to the related member states. Thus, due to the legal legitimacy and centralized resolution capability, states that have security concerns would prefer to signal their commitments to the conflict resolution so as to make the UNSC favorable to them in the security issues (Thompson, 2006). Moreover, given the fact that contribution of human resources is not obligatory, states' positive contributions to UN PKOs would enhance reputation in the UNSC. Thus, the informational costs to increase reputation would decrease through showing commitment to measurements by the UNSC such as UN PKOs (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; O'Neill, 1996). Based on the above reasoning, the first hypothesis of institutional constraints and the level of contribution (HI) is:

**HI1:** *If a state has security concerns, then the state would send more human resources to the UN PKO.*

A more direct and efficient way of reducing transaction costs is to be a member of the UNSC. Indeed, the centralized membership rule of the UNSC provides considerable incentives to the member states (Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009). The membership rule of the UNSC would reduce the signaling costs of the five permanent and the ten non-permanent members (O'Neill, 1996).<sup>16</sup> O'Neill (1996, p. 224) states,

The voting power of a non-veto member is already minuscule, and adding more members might reduce it even further. A non-veto seat on the Security Council might confer prestige, information, and involvement with decisions, but it is not worth seeking for pure voting power.

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<sup>16</sup> As for the membership rule, there are 15 regular members in the UNSC; five are permanent members (the U.S., Russia, France, the U.K., and China), and 10 are non-permanent members, which have two years in office. Every year, the UN General Assembly elects five new non-permanent members to replace the members finishing their two year term. To be elected in the UN General Assembly, candidate state must receive two thirds of the UN member votes at the election meeting.

Therefore, the UNSC's capability of resolving international affairs with membership rules attracts member states to membership in the UNSC. States are eager to be members of the UNSC, especially a permanent member if possible, to have greater influence on international issues (Hurd, 2002).

Ideally, to be elected to non-permanent member in UNSC, the state should be recognized by more than the two-thirds of the UN members.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the candidate states may try to act in a way that garners support from the other members in the General Assembly; consequently, they may contribute to the UN PKO in order to be elected to the UNSC (Malone, 2000). Furthermore, the regional group is particularly important because before General Assembly voting for non-permanent members, the regional group should agree that the member can be a candidate for election. Based on these reasons, this study derives the second and third hypotheses regarding contribution levels and institutional constraints:

**HI2:** *When states attempt to become members of the UNSC, they will send more human resources to UN PKOs.*

**HI3:** *If the UN PKO is operated in the same UN regional group to which states belong, the states would send more human resources to the UN PKO in order to enhance its UNSC membership candidacy.*

Building a reputation in contributing to UN PKOs might be achieved by contributing budgets to UN PKOs as well. In fact, the financial contribution rates are assessed and implemented by the UN General Assembly in terms of macro-economic indexes of member states, so member states have choice options (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002). In terms of cost and benefit calculation between contributed resources and reputational effects in the UNSC, however, a member state would not likely contribute both budget and human resources significantly to UN

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<sup>17</sup> The UN General Assembly rule of procedures 142 provides the details.

PKOs. If the member state can signal its peaceful commitment to UN PKOs only by financial contributions, there is no necessity in increasing the level of human resource contribution.

Therefore, the hypothesis of the contribution level and financial contribution would be:

**HI4:** *If a state contributes more finance to UN PKOs, then the state would send fewer human resources to the UN PKO.*

#### ***Realist Considerations on Policy Adjustment***

Finally, the realistic considerations on capability configuration of states provide two implications regarding the level of contributions to UN PKOs. First, a state's military capability would limit the level of human resource contributions. Given the fact that UN PKOs are becoming more complex in terms of mission objectives, a large number of skillful human resources are required to operate the missions. Therefore, this study derives the first hypothesis related to the level of contribution and realistic considerations (HR):

**HR1:** *If a state has larger military capability, then the state would send more troops to the UN PKO.*

In terms of security concerns, this study already mentioned that if the state has more security issues at stake, then it would be more likely to send more troops to UN PKOs to enjoy the institutional benefits from the UNSC. Then in a realist's point of view, however, the security concerns might reduce the level of contribution to UN PKOs. Sending more human resources means a reduction in the state's capability to react to its security needs. Thus, this study employs a countervailing hypothesis in terms of realistic consideration on security to investigate whether realistic or institutional constraints are considered more important by policy makers.

**HR2:** *If a state has its security concerns, then the state would send fewer human resources to the UN PKO.*

Furthermore, a realistic approach to security concerns enables this study to anticipate that the political relevance of the mission area greatly influences the level of contribution. The success of UN PKOs in the politically relevant area is a security issue itself. Thus, states would be more likely to take the burden of the mission. According to the realistic school of thought in military intervention, states would be more likely to intervene in the politically relevant area (Gartzke, 2007; Huth, 1998; Pearson, 1974; Regan, 1998). Therefore, the third hypothesis related to the contribution level and realistic constraints is:

**HR3:** *If a state is politically relevant to the mission area, then the state would send more human resources to the mission.*

As for a conclusion, the summary table of hypotheses is provided at Appendix A. The next chapter will present the methodology of this study.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESEARCH DESIGN

#### *Unit of Analysis and Spatial & Temporal Domains*

The unit of analysis for this study is country-year. Although the country-year unit of analysis is widely used in literature on this subject, the country-year unit of analysis has some limitation to capture states' foreign policy considerations related to UN PKOs. The country-year unit of analysis would not be the best unit of analysis for measuring the variables in country-mission-year unit (such as trade relationship, political relevance, and regional recognition). By the same reason, however, country-mission-year unit would not be the best for measuring the variables in country-year unit (such as liberal norms, institutional democracy, GDP per capita, security concerns, political aspiration, financial contribution, and military expenditure). Thus, this study chooses country-year unit of analysis and compromises country-mission-year differences by aggregating them into country-year unit.<sup>18</sup>

The spatial and temporal domains of this study are all UN member states and UN PKOs between 2002 and 2006. The choice of time span largely depends on researcher's limited resource for gathering data for the variables.<sup>19</sup> As for member states, 192 member states of the UN General Assembly during the period are investigated.<sup>20</sup> There have been secessions and changes in the name of countries between 2002 and 2006. This study regards them as different

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<sup>18</sup> See operationalization section later in this chapter for the detailed procedures.

<sup>19</sup> The UN department of peacekeeping operation (UN DPKO) uploads monthly summary of contributors, but country-mission level data are available from 2001 to 2008. Furthermore, the latest time for other data sources for explanatory variables is 2006. For example, Polity IV data, which are used for explanatory variables, are only available up to 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Refer to Appendix B for the list of the member states of this study.

countries if the country changes its name. As for UN PKOs, this study investigates 30 missions, which appear in the monthly summaries of personnel contribution, and are uploaded by the official website of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).<sup>21</sup>

### **Operationalization**

#### ***Dependent Variable – Human Resource Contribution***

The dependent variable of this study is *Human resource contribution*. *Human resource contribution* in this paper is defined as how many personnel are contributed to UN PKOs by a UN member state in a year. This study uses monthly summary data in the UN DPKO website which uploads information about personnel contributions.<sup>22</sup> Although the monthly summaries include three types of personnel: (1) military observers, (2) civilian police, and (3) military troops, this research assigns same value on each type of contributions. Thus, this study adds all three types of personnel-month contributions and averaged it by dividing the number of months for which peacekeepers had stationed in a year.<sup>23</sup> This study does not count NGOs and volunteers unofficially because the theory of states' preference and constraints does not account for NGOs and voluntarily working personnel. Finally, due to the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, this study transforms the dependent variable by logging it with basis of ten.

Additionally, for the first stage, the dependent variable is measured in dichotomized form, as well. The dichotomized dependent variable is measured as 1 if a member state sends at least one person to certain mission, as 0 otherwise. As for summary statistics, see Appendix D.

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<sup>21</sup> Refer to Appendix C for the list of UN PKOs of this study.

<sup>22</sup> Although those summaries are not official documents of the UN, the monthly summary webpage is maintained by the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the DPKO.

<sup>23</sup> Although more skilled and professional human resources may appear to be valuable contributions to UN PKOs, this study could not evaluate which kind of human resources are skilled due to the lack of detailed information in the first data.

### ***Explanatory Variables – Liberal, Realist, and Institutionalist variables***

*Democratic norms* variable represents how much the society of a member state shares the liberal democratic ideas. In this study, *Democratic norms* operates as a value that is commonly shared by individuals and groups of individuals of the society, so they eagerly support the UN PKO for the purpose of promoting human rights in that region. Thus, this study operationalizes *Democratic norms* as a liberal idea of the society.<sup>24</sup> To capture *Democratic norms*, this study adopts ‘civil liberties’ index that is contained in *Freedom in the world* index score (Freedom House, 2006). The *Freedom in the World* survey published by Freedom House provides an annual evaluation of *political rights* and *civil liberties*. Although the *Freedom in the World* index does not represent governmental performance, the *political rights* indicator represents institutional aspect of democracy to some extent. Thus, this study uses only *civil liberties* scores to capture the *Democratic norms* variable that represents social freedom in the society in general.<sup>25</sup>

The *Institutional Democracy* variable represents how the regime of a state operates institutionalized democracy in decision-making processes. This study uses ‘POLITY’ indicator in Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2007). The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the ‘AUTOC’ score (Institutionalized autocracy) from the ‘DEMOC’ score (Institutionalized democracy); the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to – 10 (strongly autocratic). The reason for using ‘POLITY2’ instead of ‘DEMOC’

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<sup>24</sup> Indeed, normative aspect of democracy in international relations theory has been controversial issue because democratic norms and values are difficult to be operationalized. One possible method of measuring democratic norm is to measure political violence and political cooperation and conflict (Maoz & Russett, 1993). This study could utilize Maoz and Russett (1993) method due to the limited source of data on political deaths, and political cooperation and conflict.

<sup>25</sup> The *political rights* index shares more institutional and governmental aspects of the democracy than *civil liberties*. However, the two indexes closely correlate with each other. Despite the correlation, this study abandons *political rights* index to avoid potential collinearity problems. To see specific survey questionnaires of *Freedom in the World* index, refer to the website: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15>

is that the theory of this study focus on the institutional aspect of decision-making process in the leadership and the government. Thus, two types of measurement for institutionalized regime types – ‘DEMOC’ and ‘AUTO’ – capture the institutionalized decision-making process of the leadership and the government properly. The operational indicators of ‘DEMOC’ and ‘AUTO’ are derived from the coding of (1) the competitiveness of political participation, (2) the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and (3) constraints on the chief executive (Marshall et al., 2007). Further, ‘DEMOC’ and ‘AUTO’ does not include coded data on civil liberties (Marshall et al., 2007).<sup>26</sup> A noteworthy attribute of Polity IV is the fact that the data set encompasses 162 contemporary countries in which the 2006 population exceeds 500,000 (Marshall et al., 2007). Due to this limitation, selection effects may occur in terms of systemic selection by the size of populations. As for this selection effect, this study considers the selection effect when interpreting the results regarding factors related to country’s contributing capability.

The *Trade Relationship* variable represents how much economic interest of individuals and groups of individuals of a state would be at stake in the mission areas of UN PKOs. To measure the *Trade Relationship*, this study considers the amount of trade flow between a potential contributor and the areas where the UN PKOs are operating in a given year. Thus, the *Trade Relationship* variables are measured by adding all trade flows of imports and exports between a contributor and every country in the mission areas where UN PKOs are on-going in millions of U.S. dollars. The data source is International Trade, 1870-2006(version 2.01) in COWs project (Barbieri, Keshk, & Pollins, 2008). Originally, the International Trade data set (v. 2.01) relies on the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics on CD-ROM (DOTS) that contains information of international trade flows. In the test models, this study

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<sup>26</sup> It does not necessarily mean that ‘DEMOC’ and civil liberties do not have collinearity problems. After diagnosing models for collinearity, however, the data do not have collinearity problems. For diagnostic results, refer to appendix F.

transforms the *Trade Relationship* by logging it with base 10 due to the positively skewed distribution of *Trade Relationship* variable.<sup>27</sup>

*GDP per capita* variable represents how a state would receive salary benefits from contributing human resources to UN PKOs. The original source is United Nations Statistic Division, National Accounts Section, available from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database website (citation needed). The per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in US dollars is calculated by the Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat primarily from official national accounts statistics in national currencies provided by national statistical services. GDP is the total unduplicated output of economic goods and services produced within a country as measured in monetary terms according to the United Nations System of National Accounts (SNA). The exchange rates used for the conversion of national currency data into US dollars are the average market rates as published by the International Monetary Fund in the International Financial Statistics. Official exchange rates were used only when a free market rate was not available. For non-members of the Fund, the conversion rates used are the average of the United Nations operational rates of exchange. For international comparison, currency exchange rates applied to national accounts aggregates, provide an important but approximate measure of national economic output and may differ substantially from comparisons based on actual purchasing power. In the test models, this study transforms the *GDP per capita* by logging it with base 10 due to the positively skewed distribution.

The *Security Concerns* variable derives from the concept that states need to increase their political leverage in the UNSC when they face an international crisis. This study employs the ICB (International Crisis Behavior) project version 9.0 dataset for the *Security Concerns*

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<sup>27</sup> For the detailed shape of the distribution after logging the variable, refer to Appendix D: Summary of descriptive statistics of variables.

variable. Specifically, this study counts individual state's crises, which had been triggered by protracted conflict in past five years and those which had been triggered by non-protracted conflict in past three years. The 'protracted conflict' refers to conflict situations of extended duration, fluctuating interaction, spillover of hostility into all aspects of relations, strong forces tending to restore equilibrium, and indefinite continuation (Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997). Thus, this paper considers that if a crisis is triggered in the protracted conflict context, the impact of the crisis on the national security lasts longer for policy makers than a crisis in the non-protracted conflict context.

*Political Aspiration* will be measured by whether or not a state was candidate for UNSC membership in past three years. It could capture that if a state has any need to show its peaceful commitments to the international society, the state want to be a member in the UNSC to reduce transaction cost by having a non-permanent membership. Consequently, the state would run as a candidate for the non-permanent membership. I set up the minimum interval of running as a candidate for three years because the term of the office is two years and after the term, the state must be out of office for at least one year. Thus, the value is 1 if the state was a candidate for the UNSC seat at least once during the previous three years before the mission, and the value is 0 if otherwise. The data is from official UN documents on the General Assembly elections and various news sources through "LexisNexis" database.

The *Regional Recognition* variable captures the concept that a contributor shows peaceful commitments to the members of the UN regional group in which the contributor is affiliated by contributing to UN PKOs. By showing states' commitments to the UN PKOs in their own region, the states would reduce the transaction costs for signaling the states' peaceful resolutions when the contributors would like to run a candidate for a non-permanent membership.

Thus, this study measures the *Regional Recognition* by measuring the number of missions in the contributor's own UN regional group.

The *Financial Contribution* variable captures how much a member state contributes of the financial budget to UN PKOs. Based on the rational calculation of the reputation and the contribution as transaction costs, the state would avoid contributing both human resources and a financial budget significantly for building their reputation in the UN. Thus, this study focus on how much a state attributes to UN PKOs proportionally. Given the total budget of UN PKOs, this study measures what portion of the total financial budget a member state is assessed to contribute. The data rely on UN official documents of resolutions.<sup>28</sup>

The *Military Capability* variable is measured by the state's annual expenditure on the military. The *Military Capability* represents the idea that the state would be constrained by military capability when deciding to send their human resources to UN PKOs. The *Military Capability* is measured in millions of current U.S. dollars and data are from SIPRI military expenditure database. In the test models, this study transforms the *Military Expenditure* by logging it with base 10 due to the positively skewed distribution of the variable.

The *Political Relevance* variable captures how many UN PKOs are politically relevant to a contributor. This study uses Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1 (Stinnett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, & Gochman, 2002) and utilizes EUGene (Bennett & Stam, 2000) program to generate direct contiguity data between member states and UN PKOs region. The criterion for political relevance with a certain mission in this study is the contiguity level 3 – separated by 24 miles of water or less (but more than 12 miles). Besides, All major powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are always politically relevant to any UN

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<sup>28</sup> This study refers to the UN General Assembly resolutions A/RES/55/235 and A/RES/55/236. As for proportional data, this study refers to A/C.5/55/38, A/58/157, A/61/139.

PKO. Thus, this study consider that any member state that is contiguous to the mission area less than contiguity level 3 (separated by 24 miles of water or less) and all major powers are politically relevant to the UN PKO. Finally, this study measures the level of the *Political Relevance* by counting how many mission areas are politically relevant to the contributors.

This study employs the *Mission Strength* for a control variable. The concept of the *Mission Strength* is that as the size of the mission increases, the opportunity of contributing human resources increases. Thus, this study measures the total number of uniformed personnel in every UN PKO of this study in a year. The data is based on the monthly summary of contribution in the UN DPKO website. In the test models, this study transforms the *Mission Strength* by logging it with base 10 due to the positively skewed distribution of the variable.

### **Model Specification**

The two-stage theoretical arguments of this study imply that the method should adopt two-step analyses on (1) states' preference to contribution and (2) states' adjustments on the contributions (size of contribution). Firstly, this study employs the Heckman selection model (Model I). The Heckman selection model is often used for analyzing policy decision, such as foreign aid allocation (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998), arms transfers (Kinsella, 2002; Blanton, 1999), and even states' contributing to UN PKOs (Lebovic, 2004) where two decision stages are consequently connected. The purpose of two-step consistent estimation by the Heckman selection model, in fact, is to reduce bias in estimating coefficients of the second stage analysis on systematically censored data set (Heckman, 1979). Thus, through the Heckman selection analyses, Model I corrects the situation that the statistical analysis of the second stage (size of contribution) is biased by selecting the cases of contributions systematically.

As for the model specification of variables, all variables which are operationalized in previous section are included at the first stage (preference stage), and appear in the second stage (adjustment stage) in Model I as well. The theory of this study might imply that only the liberal variables should be included in the selection stage because theory argues the liberal variables initially shape the preference to contribute to UN PKOs. To test whether the liberal variables influence on the preference shaping more, however, other variables that may potentially influence the preference should be included. Thus, the first stage of Model I include all variables discussed in the theory section.

Furthermore, the ‘exclusion restriction’ of the Heckman selection model allows the second stage to include all variables or subset of the selection stage. Although the second stage is possible to exclude one or more variables of the selection stage, it is not so costly to include all variables in the selection stage and excluding variables of the first stages in the second stage would generate inconsistency if those are incorrectly excluded (Wooldridge, 2003).<sup>29</sup> More importantly, this study does not have any theoretical reason to exclude any variables of the first stage in the second stage. Thus, each stage of Model I includes all variables discussed in the theory part.

Second, this study also tests Model II which assumes the situation that the two stages in Model I are actually independent. That is, contribution cases are not systematically selected, but randomly chose given the variables in the selection stage. It does not necessarily mean that the variables in the selection stage have at best random effect. Rather, it suggests that two independent estimations on states’ contribution decision and the size of contribution would be

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<sup>29</sup> Wooldridge (2003) presents; “First, any element that appears as an explanatory variable in the main model should also be an explanatory variable in the selection equation. Although in rare cases it makes sense to exclude elements from the selection equation, including all elements of  $x$  in  $z$  is not very costly; excluding them can lead to inconsistency if they are incorrectly excluded. A second major implication is that we have at least one element of  $z$  that is not also in  $x$ . This means that we need a variable that affects selection but does not have a partial effect on  $y$ .”

appropriate to test the theory. Therefore, this study employs Model II that is designed to test firstly the states' contribution decision by employing a logit MLE (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) analysis and secondly the size of contribution by using an Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression analysis respectively. The set of variables in the first and second stage in Model II is same as Model I. Finally, based on previous illustrations, the models of this study can be expressed into mathematical equations and conditions.

$$\begin{aligned}
(1) \ y_1^* &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{\text{Liberal Norms}} + \beta_2 x_{\text{Institutional Democracy}} \\
&+ \beta_3 \log_{10}(x_{\text{Trade Relationship}}) + \beta_4 \log_{10}(x_{\text{GDP per capita}}) + \beta_5 x_{\text{Security Concerns}} \\
&+ \beta_6 x_{\text{Political Aspiration}} + \beta_7 x_{\text{Regional Recognition}} \\
&+ \beta_8 x_{\text{Financial Contribution}} + \beta_9 \log_{10}(x_{\text{Military Expenditure}}) \\
&+ \beta_{10} x_{\text{Political Relevance}} + \beta_{11} \log_{10}(x_{\text{Mission Strength}}) + e_1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
(2) \ \log_{10}(y_2) &= \beta'_0 + \beta'_1 x_{\text{Liberal Norms}} + \beta'_2 x_{\text{Institutional Democracy}} \\
&+ \beta'_3 \log_{10}(x_{\text{Trade Relationship}}) + \beta'_4 \log_{10}(x_{\text{GDP per capita}}) + \beta'_5 x_{\text{Security Concerns}} \\
&+ \beta'_6 x_{\text{Political Aspiration}} + \beta'_7 x_{\text{Regional Recognition}} \\
&+ \beta'_8 x_{\text{Financial Contribution}} + \beta'_9 \log_{10}(x_{\text{Military Expenditure}}) \\
&+ \beta'_{10} x_{\text{Political Relevance}} + \beta'_{11} \log_{10}(x_{\text{Mission Strength}}) + e_2
\end{aligned}$$

Where  $y_1^*$  = latent dichotomized human resource contribution,  $y_2$  = human resource contribution

Only for Model I, (3) and (4) are needed to perform the Heckman selection model analysis.

$$(3) \quad y_1 = \begin{cases} 1, & y_2 > 0 \\ 0, & y_2 = 0 \end{cases}$$

$$(4) \quad \begin{pmatrix} e_1 \\ e_2 \end{pmatrix} \sim N \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right)$$

Meanwhile, Due to variables which correlate with each other such as the *Institutional Democracy* variable and the *Liberal Norms* variable, test models might have collinearity problem. As for the collinearity problem, VIF (Variation Inflation Factor) statistics shows whether those variables should be concerned. Generally, a VIF value less than 15 is not so seriously considered, and VIF numbers of variables in the regression analysis of Model II are all less than 10. Including VIF numbers, diagnostic results are illustrated in Appendix F.

Finally, this study anticipates the *Institutional Democracy* would have negative association with the size of contribution while the *Liberal Norms* would have the opposite. Before testing Model I and II which includes those two variables, it is necessary to test a model that excludes either of the *Institutional Democracy* and the *Liberal Norms* to know whether Model I and II have better model specification. The test results for models without either of the *Institutional Democracy* variable and the *Liberal Norms* variable are shown in Appendix G. Without either of the two variables – *Institutional Democracy* and *Liberal Norms*, the remaining variable of the two have similar association with the dependent variable(s) in both stages.

## CHAPTER 5

### RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Statistical analyses on the data of states' contributions to UN PKOs are summarized in Table 2 below. The first column shows the results of the Heckman selection estimations of Model I. The independent equations test of Model I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two stages are independent; the test result of  $\rho = 0$  shows negligible selection effects in the second stage estimation.<sup>30</sup> The results of Model II are depicted in the second column.

The results of the two models are almost identical. Though the coefficient numbers are different, the theoretical interpretations do not change. Moreover, given the fact that the test results of two independent equations could reject the null hypothesis, Model II is more appropriate model than Model I. Thus, this study adopts Model II as a main model and uses coefficient numbers of it for predictive numerical and graphical interpretations.

As for the models that excludes either of the *Liberal Norms* variable or the *Institutional Democracy* variable, this study depicts the results at Appendix G. As this study expected, the Liberal Norms variable and the Institutional Democracy variable does not show difference in the direction of the association with the contribution decision and the size of contribution.

The following of this chapter provides numerical and graphical interpretations of (1) liberal variables on preference shaping and policy adjustment, (2) institutional considerations on policy adjustment, and (3) realistic considerations on policy adjustment.

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<sup>30</sup> The log-likelihood test of independent equations cannot reject the null hypothesis that  $\rho$  (rho) equals zero. Chi<sup>2</sup> number is 0.05 and the *p*-value is 0.8169.

**Table 1. Results Summary of Statistical Analyses**

<i>Tool</i>	<i>Model I</i>		<i>Model II</i>	
	<i>Selection Model</i>		<i>Probit</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	<i>Contribute (0/1)</i>	<i>Size of Contribution</i>	<i>Contribute (0/1)</i>	<i>Size of Contribution</i>
<i>Liberal Norms</i>	<b>-.5259355**</b> (.0944447)	<b>-.2159027**</b> (.0559924)	<b>-.5259613**</b> (.0944001)	<b>-.2220297**</b> (.0499765)
<i>Institutional Democracy</i>	-.0114515 (.022908)	<b>-.024347*</b> (.0137352)	-.0112332 (.0228838)	<b>-.0245252*</b> (.0138905)
<i>Trade Relationship</i>	<b>.6189948**</b> (.1440616)	<b>.5020573**</b> (.0950856)	<b>.6167821**</b> (.1437143)	<b>.5100856**</b> (.0897264)
<i>GDP per capita</i>	<b>-1.10624**</b> (.1861814)	<b>-.8378482**</b> (.1110275)	<b>-1.107731**</b> (.1860685)	<b>-.8494965**</b> (.1001587)
<i>Security Concerns</i>	-.0240329 (.0755685)	.0527819 (.0446312)	-.0249178 (.0754598)	.051654 (.0449308)
<i>Political Aspiration</i>	.2145673 (.227551)	.1126723 (.1000282)	.2075114 (.2255161)	.1140461 (.1011323)
<i>Regional Recognition</i>	<b>.0471363*</b> (.0270919)	.0017104 (.0156367)	<b>.0469275*</b> (.0270639)	.0019477 (.015804)
<i>Financial Contribution</i>	.5890502 (.4130621)	<b>-.0230747*</b> (.0125794)	.5724052 (.4018216)	<b>-.0233536*</b> (.0126813)
<i>Military Expenditure</i>	.2111656 (.1531552)	<b>.2589779**</b> (.0924516)	.2153623 (.1518383)	<b>.2611811**</b> (.0931259)
<i>Political Relevance</i>	.0046811 (.0492607)	-.0019406 (.0110559)	.0061096 (.0488767)	-.0016556 (.011127)
<i>Mission Strength</i>	<b>1.19925*</b> (.5121145)	.3458582 (.2793097)	<b>1.198864*</b> (.5123423)	.3558043 (.2795065)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.800864 (2.353435)	1.869659 (1.305634)	-1.797662 (2.353727)	1.841587 (1.316652)
<b>Observations</b>	642	471	642	471
	Log likelihood = -784.7129 Test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 0.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.8169		Log likelihood = -266.67225 Pseudo R2 = 0.2833	F(11, 459) = 20.55 R-squared = 0.3299

Note1: \* significant at 0.10 level, \*\* significant at 0.05 level

Note2: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors

### **Liberal Influence on Preference Shaping and Policy Adjustment**


The test results of liberal factors show statistical supports for the liberal hypotheses of preference shaping and policy adjustment except the *Institutional Democracy* variable. The statistical analyses on the *Institutional Democracy* variable cannot support the hypothesis in the preference stage, but support hypothesis of the adjustment stage when test criterion is at .10 level of significance. Overall, the probability of contributing to UN PKOs is .9041, holding all variables at mean or median value.

As for the specific influence of the *Liberal Norms* variable on the preference to contribution, if the *Liberal Norms* variable changes from “Not-Free” (6.0) to “Partly Free” (4.0), the probability of contributing to UN PKOs increases, on average, by .3660 while holding other variables in mean or median values.<sup>31</sup> The change of probability of contributing to UN PKOs is .1777 increase on average when the *Liberal Norms* variable changes from “Partly Free” (4.0) to “Free” (2.0). The Figure 2 below shows graphical interpretations of the effect of the *Liberal Norms* variable on the contribution foreign policy decision.<sup>32</sup> The label of the *Liberal Norms* variable on the graph is reversed for convenient interpretation because higher value of the *Liberal Norms* means that the country shares less liberal norms. Both the numerical and graphical interpretations show that the statistical tests on the *Liberal Norms* variable support the first half of hypothesis HP1 – if a state shares more liberal norms of individual freedom, then the state would be more likely to prefer to contribute to UN PKOs.

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<sup>31</sup> The *Freedom in the World* survey assigns each country and territory the status of “Free”, “Partly Free”, or “Not Free” by averaging their political rights and civil liberties ratings. Those whose ratings are 1 to 2.5 are considered “Free”, 3 to 5.5 “Partly Free”, and 5.5 to 7 “Not Free.” This paper arbitrarily picks the middle values of each category – 2 for “Free”, 4 for “Partly Free”, and 6 for “Not Free” to generate the changes of probabilities of contributing to UN PKOs.

<sup>32</sup> Due to the scale of the *Freedom in the World* index, the lower values mean more civil liberty in the country, and vice versa.



**Figure 2. Graph of Predicted Probabilities by the *Liberal Norms* Variable<sup>33</sup>**

Meanwhile, the test result of *Liberal Norms* at the adjustment stage – OLS analysis on the level of contribution to UN PKOs – also supports the HP1 hypothesis that if a state shares more liberal norms of individual freedom, the state would send more human resources to UN PKOs. Specifically, changes of *Liberal Norms* from “Partly Free” (4.0) to “Free” (2.0) are approximately associated with 44.40% more human resource contributions to UN PKOs.<sup>34</sup> In sum, shared liberal norms of individual freedom and human rights not only positively affect the preference to contribute human resources, but also increase the amount of human resources contributed to UN PKOs.

<sup>33</sup> The “In-Sample” represents the line of median spline which connects the median values of predicted probabilities at each value of the *Liberal Norms* in the actual data set. “m-spline” function of the STATA finds optimal curves to connect the median values in the two way scatter plot smoothly. The label “Out-of-Sample” represents the line between predicted probabilities and the *Liberal Norms* variables based on a simulated data set created by “prgen” command in “spost” package of STATA program that is designed for generating post-estimations of out of sample. Out of sample prediction provides more predictable results than the “In-sample” prediction because actual data set might not have sufficient observations at the theoretically important values. Also, out of sample prediction provides simpler prediction than “In sample” prediction.

<sup>34</sup> In the semi-log model ( $\ln Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X$ ), interpretation of  $\beta_1$  can be shown as  $\beta_1 = \frac{\delta Y/Y}{\delta X}$ . This means that the slope of the coefficient is the ratio of the proportionate change in Y to the absolute change in X. Thus, proportionate change in Y can be directly interpreted by coefficient number and change in X.

The test on the *Institutional Democracy* variable cannot reject the null in the preference stage of contribution. Given the high correlation (-.8832) with *Liberal Norms*, *Institutional Democracy* may not have enough information to explain the variance of preference to the contribution of human resources.<sup>35</sup> The implication of *Institutional Democracy*, however, is that institutional democracies may not necessarily support UN PKOs. Factors used for measuring institutional democracy – openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraint on chief executive, and political participation – may have neutral or even negative tendency to contribute human resources, while controlling the liberal norms embedded in institutional democracy. Thus, institutional democracies might favor contributing to UN PKOs conditionally based on the level of liberal norms possessed by citizens. For example, if a humanitarian issue moves opinion of majority of people even though leadership or the government is not interested in the issue area or region, then the leadership or the government of an institutionalized democracy would or should support contributions of human resources to UN PKOs. Indeed, the so-called “CNN effects” proposition supports the above implication of *Institutional Democracy*. Jacobson (1996) states,

Democratic governments face two main political constraints when using force.

...Secondly, and most importantly, the risk of casualties must be low. Since the risk of casualties weighs most heavily in these considerations, acceptable costs can be seen as a function of the number of casualties that governments believe the public is willing to accept in a given intervention (Luttwak, 1994, p. 207).

Although the “CNN effect” needs several conditions such as independent and trusted media, the underlying condition in terms of the government’s sensitivity of foreign policy decisions to

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<sup>35</sup> Refer to Appendix E for correlation analysis between variables.

public opinion is the institutionalized democracy that enables citizens to participate in domestic politics. Thus, previous reasoning could be a justification for the test result of *Institutional Democracy* variable that cannot reject the null hypothesis of the preference to human resource contributions.

Along those lines, however, this study anticipates that institutional democracies would send less human resources to UN PKOs – the adjustment stage of policy decision – due to the high risks in the mission area. Through the OLS analysis on the level of contributions of states, the test on the hypothesis of *Institutional Democracy* variable rejects the null at .10 level of significance ( $p$ -value is -1.77) as the theory of this paper expected. Although the test on the *Institutional Democracy* cannot reject the null at .05 level, this study provides predictive numerical interpretations for further arguments. The specific interpretation of the coefficient number is that one unit increase in the *Institutional Democracy* is associated with a 5.49% decrease in the human resource contributions, *ceteris paribus*.<sup>36</sup> Given the fact that the full scale of *Institutional Democracy* is 21, the hypothetical maximum variation of human resource contribution by *Institutional Democracy* is about a 45% decrease in the amount of human resources contributed to UN PKOs while holding everything else equal.

To put the *Liberal Norms* and the *Institutional Democracy* together, the results of both variables suggest important implications. Although liberal norms and institutional democracy are causally interdependent, the impacts of both factors work differently on foreign policy decisions about contributions of human resources to UN PKOs. While liberal norms of citizens support human resource contribution to UN PKOs, institutional democracies are cautious to contribute human resources to UN PKOs, or even reluctant to send more personnel to UN PKOs.

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<sup>36</sup> This interpretation should be expressed as a proportion because Y is logged. The change in Y associated with one unit change in X can be expressed by  $\log_{10} Y_2 - \log_{10} Y_1 = \beta$ . That is,  $\log_{10} Y_2/Y_1 = \beta$ . Thus, the proportion of  $Y_2$  to  $Y_1$  is  $10^\beta$ .


Institutional democracies, indeed, are biased in favor of the liberal norms held by the people when making foreign policy decisions regarding contributing to UN PKOs, but they may not be a consistent relationship due to the risk-averse attitudes of the leadership or the government of institutional democracies. The implication would be that as long as the domestic political supports are enough to bear the risk of sending personnel to dangerous UN PKOs, institutional democracies would support contributing human resources to UN PKOs. Further, the risk level of UN PKOs could be a conditional determinant of whether to contribute for institutional democracies.

As for the *Trade Relationship* variable, the results support both the preference stage and the adjustment stage of contribution decision-makings. In the preference stage, the marginal effect of logged *Trade Relationship* on the probability of preferring contribution is .1166 while holding other variables in mean or median.<sup>37</sup> Further, this study specifically focuses on the values around the first, second, and third quartiles (40, 200, and 1200) of the *Trade Relationship* variable to show the changes of probabilities of preferring contributions. The quartile change of the *Trade Relationship* from 40 (the first quartile) to 200 (the second quartile) million US dollars corresponds to a .1163 increase on average in the probability of preferring to contribute, holding other variables in their median or mean. Similarly, the latter quartile change of the *Trade Relationship* from 200 (the second quartile) to 1200 (the third quartile) is associated with a .0801 increase on average in the probability of preferring to contribute, while holding other variables in their median or mean.

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<sup>37</sup> This study transforms *Trade Relationship* by logarithm with base 10. Thus, one unit change of logged *Trade Relationship* means;  $\log_{10}X_2 - \log_{10}X_1 = 1$ . That is,  $\log_{10}\frac{X_2}{X_1} = 1$ . Thus,  $10 = \frac{X_2}{X_1}$ . The change between  $X_2$  and  $X_1$  is in proportion of 10 to 1. Due to the logged scale of *Trade Relationship*, however, one unit change of logged *Trade Relationship* means 10 times the change in *Trade Relationship* and 10 times the change may not provide intuitive numerical interpretation.

This implies that in the upper quartile range of trade flow, the change in probability is less than in the lower quartile range. As Figure 3 below shows, the highest change in probability of preference to contribute occurs at the point where the logged *Trade Relationship* is two (trade flow is 100 million US dollars).



**Figure 3. Graph of Predicted Probabilities by the *Trade Relationship* Variable**

As for the impact of *Trade Relationship* on the size of human resource contribution, the OLS test result supports the hypothesis that *Trade Relationship* is positively associated with the amount of human resource contributions in .05 level of significance. Specifically, a one percent increase in the *Trade Relationship* is associated, on average, with an approximate 0.51% increase in the amount of human resource contribution to UN PKOs in a year.<sup>38</sup> In sum, the test results shows that the trade relationship with mission areas would significantly and positively influence

<sup>38</sup> This types of interpretation is called “elasticity” by economists (Fox, 2008). Increasing X by 1% is equivalent to multiplying it by 1.01, which in turn implies that the log X increases by  $\log_{10}1.01 = 0.00432$ . The corresponding change in log Y is then  $.5100856$  (coefficient of *Trade Relationship*)  $\times 0.00432 = 0.002208$ . Adding 0.002208 to log Y is equivalent to multiplying Y by  $10^{0.002208} = 1.005096$ , that is, increasing Y by  $100 \times (1.005096 - 1) = .5096 \approx .5100$  (coefficient number of *Trade Relationship*). The approximation holds because the log function is nearly linear across the small domain of X-value between  $\log_{10}1$  and  $\log_{10}1.01$  (Fox, 2008, p.62-63).

foreign policy of contributing to UN PKOs at the preference to contributions as well as the amount of contributions. Therefore, this study concludes that the economic interests in terms of bilateral trade are a determinant of contribution policy of states to UN PKOs.

As for the *GDP per capita* variable, the statistical analysis thoroughly supports the hypothesis – as the *GDP per capita* decreases, the probability of preferring to contribute and the amount of contributions to UN PKOs increase. Specific numerical interpretations of the *GDP per capita* follow the way of the *Trade Relationship*. The marginal effect of logged *GDP per capita* on the probability of preferring contribution is -.3349 while holding other variables in mean or median.

The quartile change of the *GDP per capita* from 8600 (the third quartile) to 2400 (the second quartile) U.S. dollars corresponds to a .2014 increase on average in the probability of preferring to contribute, holding other variables in their median or mean. Similarly, the latter quartile change of the *GDP per capita* from 2400 (the second quartile) to 660 (the first quartile) is associated with a .1530 increase on average in the probability of preferring to contribute, while holding other variables in their median or mean. This implies that as the *GDP per capita* decreases, the probability of preferring to contribute would sharply increase in the first quartile range (around 600) compared to that of the third quartile range (around 8600). These results are predictable because the theory of liberal preference argues that more people who earn lower salaries than that of UN peacekeepers would want their county to participate in UN PKOs, and the leadership and the government also prefer to contribute to receive economic aid from the UN.

Meanwhile, as for the relationship between the *GDP per capita* and the size of contribution, the result of analysis on the *GDP per capita* supports the hypothesis that as the

*GDP per capita* decreases, the amount of human resource contribution to UN PKO increases in .05 level of significance. Specifically, a one percent increase in the *GDP per capita* is associated, on average, with an approximate 0.84% decrease in the amount of human resource contributions to UN PKOs in a year, *ceteris paribus*. The interpretation also implies that at the lower *GDP per capita* level, the change in amount of human resource contribution is more sensitive to the change of *GDP per capita* in absolute value than that in the higher *GDP per capita* level. Conclusively, the test results of the *GDP per capita* supports the widely accepted notion that the countries, which suffer from economic shortages, have been eager to send their human resources to get more economic aid and receive salaries from the UN, holding everything else constant.

**Table 2. Results Summary of Liberal Hypotheses**

Approach	Label	Summary			
		Explanatory Variable	Dependent Variable	Expected	Results
Liberal Factors	HP1	Liberal Norms	Preference to contribution	Positive	Supported**
			Amount of contribution	Positive	Supported**
	HP2	Institutional Democracy	Preference to contribution	Positive	Not Supported
			Amount of contribution	Negative	Supported*
	HP3	Trade Relationship	Preference to contribution	Positive	Supported**
			Amount of contribution	Positive	Supported**
	HP4	GDP per capita	Preference to contribution	Negative	Supported**
			Amount of contribution	Negative	Supported**

Note1: \* significant at 0.10 level, \*\* significant at 0.05 level

### **Institutionalist Considerations on Policy Adjustment**

Test results show that regression analysis on institutional variables poorly supports the hypotheses, although the *Financial Contribution* hypothesis is supported in .10 level of significance (*p*-value is -1.84). A specific interpretation of coefficient number is that a one unit increase in the *Financial Contribution* is associated with a 5.24% decrease in the human resource contributions, *ceteris paribus*. Given the fact that the *Financial Contribution* variable is the

assessed proportion of total UN PKO budget for member states, the hypothetical variation of human resource contribution by 10% of total UN PKO budget is about a 52.4% increase in the amount of human resources contributed to UN PKOs, *ceteris paribus*. Despite the large change in the amount of human resources, however, the impact of the *Financial Contribution* seems less practical considering that only a handful of states can afford to contribute about 10% of the total UN PKO budget.<sup>39</sup> Thus, overall impact of institutional considerations would be minor.

The reason why institutional aspects could not reject the null is hard to identify. The null hypotheses of institutional considerations may actually be true. Only a few member states may be interested in the benefits of increasing their reputations in the UN and the UNSC by contributing to UN PKOs. This study, however, regards the results of institutional variables as Type II error due to the less sensitive model with relatively small sample size to detect the difference.<sup>40</sup> Although careful investigations are required, the results of institutional variables suggest a future research direction that can show interdependence or causal relationships between the institutional considerations and liberal considerations.

**Table 3. Result Summary of Institutional Hypotheses**

<i>Approach</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Summary</i>			
		<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Expected</i>	<i>Results</i>
<i>Institutional Factors</i>	HI1	Security Concerns	Amount of Contributions	Positive	Not Supported
	HI2	Political Aspiration		Positive	Not Supported
	HI3	Regional Recognition		Positive	Not Supported
	HI4	Financial Contribution		Negative	Supported*

Note1: \* significant at 0.10 level, \*\* significant at 0.05 level

<sup>39</sup> Only six countries were allocated more than 5% of the total UN PKO budgets from 2002 to 2006: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. Only Japan and the U.S. were allocated more than 10%.

<sup>40</sup> Type II error is the error of failing to reject the null hypothesis given that the alternative hypothesis is actually true.

### *Realists Considerations on Policy Adjustment*

The results of analyses on realistic considerations show that only the hypothesis of the *Military Expenditure* variable is supported statistically. Specifically, one percent increase in the *Military Expenditure* is associated, on average, with an approximate 0.26% increase in the amount of human resource contribution to UN PKOs in a year, *ceteris paribus*. Due to the fact that dependent and independent variables are logged, the change in absolute value at the lower *Military Expenditure* level impacts the amount of human resource contribution more sensitively than the same change in the higher *Military Expenditure* level does.

Meanwhile, the *Political Relevance* hypothesis is not supported by the statistical analysis. Theoretical explanations of the *Political Relevance* in this paper rely on the realistic approach that supports the arguments that states are more likely to intervene militarily in a conflict area which is politically relevant. The result of analysis on *Political Relevance*, however, implies that states are no more likely to participate in UN PKOs – the UN mandated forceful interventions – even though the mission areas are politically relevant. Moreover, unlike institutional factors that are considered as having Type II error, this study cannot find any evidence that justifies Type II error while testing the hypothesis of the *Political Relevance* variable.

Among possible alternative explanations, this study conjectures that tendency of seeking relative interests of states in term of realist approach is the most persuasive. The implication of states' favoring relative interests suggests that states would enjoy public good of UN PKOs without costs as long as relative interests at contributing human resources are minor. Therefore, although the government and leadership would or should prefer to contribute to UN PKOs due to the liberal considerations, they would send less human resources to UN PKOs at politically

relevant area to enjoy relative interests unless the interests derived by liberal and institutional factors are private good.

Meanwhile, the counterfactual hypothesis of *Security Concerns* is supported neither by realist approach nor by institutional approach. This study assumes that informational benefits in terms of institutional approach and security concerns in terms of realistic approach may counteract each other. As discussed previously in the results of institutional considerations, however, liberal factors might enable to distinguish the subtle implications in *Security Concerns*; depending on the ways of controlling liberal factors in the models, Model I analysis shows that the result of *Security Concerns* supports hypothesis of institutional considerations (HI1), while Model II analysis cannot reject the null hypothesis.

**Table 4. Results Summary of Realist Hypotheses**

<i>Approach</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Summary</i>			
		<i>Explanatory Variable</i>	<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Expected</i>	<i>Results</i>
<i>Realistic Factors</i>	HR1	Military Capability	Amount of Contributions	Positive	Supported**
	HR2	Security Concerns		Negative	Not Supported
	HR3	Political Relevance		Positive	Not Supported

Note1: \*\* significant at 0.05 level

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

This study presents comprehensive explanations for the motivations of states for contributing human resources to UN PKOs. Due to the variety of interests in contributing human resources to UN PKOs – from pure public good to private good – this study is required to use a synthetic approach that garners liberal, institutional and realistic points of view and adopts Moravcsik’s (1997) two-stage model of states’ behavior as a framework for substantial explanations. To test the hypotheses of substantial theory, this study employs the Heckman selection model (Model I) as well as two independent equations of probit MLE and OLS (Model II). Finally, statistical analyses on contributions of states to UN PKOs from 2002 to 2006 generate several important findings and implications: (1) While liberal norms consistently support the policy of contribution to UN PKOs in the preference stage as well as the adjustment stage (amount of contribution), institutional democracies are no more likely to prefer to contribute and send even less human resources to UN PKOs; (2) economic interests in terms of trade relationships cause states to prefer to contribute as well as to increase the amount of contribution to UN PKOs; (3) The widely accepted notion that states send human resources to UN PKOs for the money paid to peacekeepers is supported by the statistical analysis, and these monetary interests cause states to prefer to contribute as well as to increase the amount of contribution to UN PKOs; (4) In contrast to the expectation of this study, states are likely to send no more human resources to UN PKOs in politically relevant areas than to UN PKOs in non-relevant areas.

The findings of this study provide two policy recommendations for the UNSC to recruit peacekeepers efficiently. First of all, promoting human rights definitely would result in consistent contributions by liberal states to UN PKOs. Indeed, results show that higher liberal norms cause states to send more human resources. Norms, however, change slowly. Thus, enhancing liberal norms would be a long-term policy for increasing stable recruitment of peacekeepers.

Secondly, given the finding that institutional democracies have a tendency to contribute fewer human resources, the efforts for reducing the risks in UN PKOs are crucial. Although liberal norms possessed by citizens may push policy makers to positively consider human resource contribution to UN PKOs, policy makers in the democracies are risk-averse. Risks from a severe conflict are hard for the UN, as well as the UNSC to reduce before dispatching peacekeepers. Risks from low readiness for the mission, however, can be reduced. Examples of risks from low readiness are: (1) insufficient training for peacekeepers, (2) difficulty in coordinating multi-national forces due to the lack of coherent military or police procedures, (3) possible lack of commitments for UN PKOs. Thus, prompt attempts to recruit peacekeepers for newly mandated peacekeeping missions may raise skeptical attitudes among states about security in the region because the region of a new peacekeeping operation may have just recently arranged a cease-firing. Thus, instead of patchwork efforts for recruiting peacekeepers, this study suggests standing forces for UN PKOs. Maintaining standing forces would maximize the readiness for peacekeeping and reduce the risks generated from low readiness. Consequently, as the risks due to insufficient readiness decrease, institutional democracies would be in favor of contributing standing forces for UN PKOs.

Academically, this study sheds light on the ambivalence of democracies in contributing to UN PKOs – consistent support of liberal norms and inconsistent support of institutional democracy – while extant literature on this subject so far has not distinguished the difference and argues that liberal democracies support contributing to UN PKOs (Andersson, 2000, 2002; Lebovic, 2004). Despite the issue of overlapping measurement of democratic norms and institutions, separating democracies into several working parts is a truly valuable attempt in this field. With the working parts of democracy separated, the theories of IR can explain not only “normal” cases that can be explained using a monolithic concept of democracy, but also extreme cases that cannot be explained. Indeed, the research of democratic peace theory distinguishes normative and institutional concepts of democracy. A few research efforts include two components of democracy – norms and institutions – in a unified framework (*e.g.* Owen, 1994). Following the precedent research of separating the conceptual variable of democracy into norms and institutions and joining them in one theoretical frame, this study introduces a way of approaching the subject of contributions of states to UN PKOs.

Another contribution of this study is that it confirms two determinants related to economic interests – trade relationship and salaries of peacekeepers. Although these determinants are already raised by empirical case studies (Krishnasamy, 2003a) and by the conjecture in a related study (Shimizu & Sandler, 2002), statistical analyses of this study generalize the empirical relationship cross-regionally.

Despite the previous policy recommendations and academic contributions, this study also has limitations. First, the study does not consider multilateral peacekeeping operations by regional organizations.<sup>41</sup> The relationship between UN and other regional organizations has been

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<sup>41</sup> Some regional organizations operate their own peacekeeping missions as well as hybrid peacekeeping missions with the UN. See (Daniel, Taft, & Wiharta, 2008) for further information.

a controversial issue (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2006). Due to states' commitments to non-UN entities, states might have divided their human resource contributions between UN and non-UN PKOs or they might have chosen one or the other to contribute limited human resources. A future research interest of this study would be an attempt to include non-UN PKOs and to shed light on how the determinants of this paper operate in non-UN PKOs.

Second, due to the unit of analysis, country-year, this study might not capture the bilateral relationships in *Trade Relationship*, *Political Relevance*, and *Regional Recognition* that are clearly captured in country-mission-year unit of analysis. The additional statistical analysis, however, shows that the errors induced by country-year unit of analysis might not be critical.

As a conclusion, this study supports theoretical pluralism. Often, researchers present empirical studies in which they argue for a particular liberal, realistic, institutional or other theoretical approach, claiming it has more empirical explanatory power than others based on how well empirical tests support the hypotheses of variables derived by the approach than others. I think that every theory and approach has some validity in empirical phenomena. It is true that rigorous tests on each approach and debates between competing theories are necessary for developments of the IR field. Every "independent" variable (explanatory variable), in fact, are not independent. It is just impossible. It means, every approach is not excludable but interdependent each other. This study tries to cooperate competing approaches following two-stage synthesis (Moravcsik, 1997), rather than compete approaches to argue validity of a particular approach. The IR field now needs some efforts to generate comprehensive explanations on empirical phenomena to solve the real world problems. Hopefully, this study would be one of those efforts.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Summary Table of Hypotheses

<i>Stage</i>	<i>Label</i>	<i>Hypothesis Summary</i>			
		<i>Associating Factors</i>	<i>Associated Factors</i>	<i>Expected Relationship</i>	
<i>Liberal Considerations</i>	HL1	Democratic Norms	Preference to Contribution	Positive	+
			Amount of Contribution	Positive	+
	HL2	Institutional Democracy	Preference to Contribution	Positive	+
			Amount of Contribution	Negative	-
	HL3	Trade Relationship	Preference to Contribution	Positive	+
			Amount of Contribution	Positive	+
	HL4	GDP per capita	Preference to Contribution	Negative	-
			Amount of Contribution	Negative	-
<i>Institutional Considerations</i>	HI1	Security Concerns	Amount of Contribution	Positive	+
	HI2	Political Aspiration		Positive	+
	HI3	Regional Recognition		Positive	+
	HI4	Financial Contribution		Negative	-
<i>Realistic Considerations</i>	HR1	Military Capability		Positive	+
	HR2	Security Concerns		Negative	-
	HR3	Political Relevance		Positive	+

## **Appendix B: The UN Member States during 2002 to 2006 (Alphabetical)**

Afghanistan	Cuba	Japan
Albania	Cyprus	Jordan
Algeria	Czech Republic	Kazakhstan
Andorra	Democratic People's Republic of	Kenya
Angola	Korea	Kiribati
Antigua and Barbuda	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kuwait
Argentina	Denmark	Kyrgyzstan
Armenia	Djibouti	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Australia	Dominica	Latvia
Austria	Dominican Republic	Lebanon
Azerbaijan	Ecuador	Lesotho
Bahamas	Egypt	Liberia
Bahrain	El Salvador	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Bangladesh	Equatorial Guinea	Liechtenstein
Barbados	Eritrea	Lithuania
Belarus	Estonia	Luxembourg
Belgium	Ethiopia	Madagascar
Belize	Fiji	Malawi
Benin	Finland	Malaysia
Bhutan	France	Maldives
Bolivia	Gabon	Mali
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Gambia	Malta
Botswana	Georgia	Marshall Islands
Brazil	Germany	Mauritania
Brunei Darussalam	Ghana	Mauritius
Bulgaria	Greece	Mexico
Burkina Faso	Grenada	Micronesia, Federated States of
Burundi	Guatemala	Monaco
Cambodia	Guinea	Mongolia
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Montenegro
Canada	Guyana	Morocco
Cape Verde	Haiti	Mozambique
Central African Republic	Honduras	Myanmar
Chad	Hungary	Namibia
Chile	Iceland	Nauru
China	India	Nepal
Colombia	Indonesia	Netherlands
Comoros	Iran, Islamic Republic of	New Zealand
Congo, Republic of the	Iraq	Nicaragua
Costa Rica	Ireland	Niger
Côte d'Ivoire	Israel	Nigeria
Croatia	Italy	Norway
	Jamaica	

Oman	Senegal	Togo
Pakistan	Serbia	Tonga
Palau	Seychelles	Trinidad and Tobago
Panama	Sierra Leone	Tunisia
Papua New Guinea	Singapore	Turkey
Paraguay	Slovakia	Turkmenistan
Peru	Slovenia	Tuvalu
Philippines	Solomon Islands	Uganda
Poland	Somalia	Ukraine
Portugal	South Africa	United Arab Emirates
Qatar	Spain	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Republic of Korea	Sri Lanka	United Republic of Tanzania
Republic of Moldova	Sudan	United States of America
Romania	Suriname	Uruguay
Russian Federation	Swaziland	Uzbekistan
Rwanda	Sweden	Vanuatu
Saint Kitts and Nevis	Switzerland	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Saint Lucia	Syrian Arab Republic	Viet Nam
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Tajikistan	Yemen
Samoa	Thailand	Zambia
San Marino	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Zimbabwe
Sao Tome and Principe	Timor-Leste	
Saudi Arabia		

Note1: The number of member states is 192.

Note2: On 4 February 2003, the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro.

Note3: In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia and Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro’s declaration of independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and declared itself independent from Serbia on 3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations Member State by General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/264.

## **Appendix C: The Summary of UN PKOs during 2002 and 2006**

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Full Name</i>	<i>Mission Type</i>	<i>Begin Year</i>
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	<i>Observer</i>	1948
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	<i>Observer</i>	1949
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	<i>Troop</i>	1964
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	<i>Troop</i>	1974
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	<i>Troop</i>	1978
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	<i>Observer</i>	1991
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	<i>Troop</i>	1991
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	<i>Observer</i>	1993
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>Police</i>	1995
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	<i>Observer</i>	1996
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	<i>Observer</i>	1997
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	<i>Troop</i>	1997
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo	<i>Troop</i>	1999
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	<i>Police</i>	1999
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	<i>Troop</i>	1999
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	<i>Troop</i>	2000
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	<i>Observer</i>	2001
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	<i>Troop</i>	2002
UNMA	United Nations Mission in Angola	<i>Observer</i>	2002
MINUCI	United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire	<i>Observer</i>	2003
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia	<i>Troop</i>	2003
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	<i>Troop</i>	2004
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi	<i>Troop</i>	2004
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	<i>Troop</i>	2004
UNOTIL	United Nations Office in East Timor	<i>Observer</i>	2005
UNMIS	United Nations Mission In Sudan	<i>Troop</i>	2005
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	<i>Troop</i>	2006
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	<i>Observer</i>	2006
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission In Timor-Leste	<i>Police</i>	2006

Source: UN DPKO website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>

Note1: All missions above are shown at the monthly personnel contribution summary of the UN website.

Note2: Among 30 missions that appears on the monthly summaries of personnel contribution, this study treats couple of missions identically because these missions succeeded the former mission without significantly changing the strength of the mission. Those missions are (1) UNTAET and UNMISET in East Timor, (2) MINUCI, UNOCI, and ONUCI in Côte d'Ivoire, and (3) UNAMSIL and UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone. Although UNOTIL and UNMIT are operated in the Timor-Leste, however, this study regards them as different missions. As UNOTIL is political mission with small number of observer group, UNMIT is integrated mission with troops and police.

## **Appendix D: Summary Table of Descriptive Statistics**

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Contribution(amount)*</i>	960	1.055798	1.184974	0	4.001063
<i>Contribution(dummy)</i>	960	0.536458	0.498929	0	1
<i>Liberal Norms</i>	954	3.348008	1.962118	1	7
<i>Institutional Democracy</i>	781	3.419974	6.543763	-10	10
<i>Trade Relationship*</i>	920	2.315295	1.063451	0	5.023161
<i>GDP per capita*</i>	955	3.410412	0.716395	1.917202	5.037737
<i>Security Concerns</i>	960	0.295833	0.853126	0	6
<i>Political Aspiration</i>	960	0.089583	0.285733	0	1
<i>Regional Recognition</i>	960	4.511458	3.413748	0	9
<i>Financial Contribution</i>	951	0.525873	2.619341	0.0001	27.2791
<i>Military Expenditure*</i>	703	2.70908	1.032408	0	5.70858
<i>Political Relevance</i>	960	0.942708	3.213607	0	20
<i>Mission Strength*</i>	960	4.717219	0.128882	4.544212	4.87701

Note 1: \* means the variable is logged by base 10.

## Appendix E: Correlation Analysis

	Contribution*	Liberal Norms	Institutional Democracy	Trade* Relationship	GDP per capita*	Security Concerns	Political Aspiration	Regional Recognition	Financial Contribution	Military Expenditure*	Political Relevance	Mission Strength*
Contribution*	1											
Liberal Norms	-0.021 0.635	1										
Institutional Democracy	0.0128 0.7759	-0.8832** 0.000	1									
Trade Relationship*	0.4354** 0.0000	-0.0563* 0.088	0.1935** 0.0000	1								
GDP per capita*	-0.0413 0.3497	-0.5507** 0.0000	0.3442** 0.0000	0.41** 0.0000	1							
Security Concerns	0.1916** 0.0000	0.1326** 0.0000	-0.07* 0.0504	0.1904** 0.0000	-0.0855** 0.0082	1						
Political Aspiration	0.1202** 0.0063	-0.0727* 0.0248	0.1069** 0.0028	0.2032** 0.0000	0.0844** 0.0091	0.0281 0.3852	1					
Regional Recognition	0.0783* 0.0758	0.5689** 0.0000	-0.5839** 0.0000	-0.114** 0.0005	-0.5333** 0.0000	0.0189 0.5589	-0.0524 0.1049	1				
Financial Contribution	0.1369** 0.0019	-0.1985** 0.0000	0.1993** 0.0000	0.3802** 0.0000	0.2946** 0.0000	0.33** 0.0000	0.1523** 0.0000	-0.147** 0.0000	1			
Military Expenditure*	0.1205** 0.008	-0.1425** 0.0002	0.1143** 0.0037	0.3406** 0.0000	0.2172** 0.0000	0.4087** 0.0000	0.0044 0.9079	-0.1515** 0.0001	0.8357** 0.0000	1		
Political Relevance	0.1567** 0.0004	0.0543* 0.094	0.0124 0.7288	0.357** 0.0000	0.0862** 0.0077	0.3283** 0.0000	-0.0421 0.1925	-0.0722* 0.0252	0.5103** 0.0000	0.5686** 0.0000	1	
Mission Strength*	0.0184 0.6762	-0.0421 0.1943	0.027 0.4506	0.1005** 0.0023	0.1002** 0.0019	-0.0262 0.4175	0.0035 0.9126	0.0869** 0.0071	-0.001 0.9748	0.0141 0.7097	0.013 0.6868	1

Note 1: \*\*:  $p$ -value  $< .05$ , \*:  $p$ -value  $< .01$

Note2: Numbers in the first row in the cells are pairwise correlation coefficient numbers.

Note3: Numbers in the second row in the cells are reports of the significance level of each correlation coefficient.

Note4: \* at variable names means those variables are transformed by logarithm with base 10.

## Appendix F: Regression Diagnostic Test Results of Model II


### (1) *Hetttest*

Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity	
Ho: Constant variance	
Variables: fitted values of contri12log10	
chi2(1)	= 4.21
Prob > chi2	= 0.0401


### (2) *Variation Inflation Factor*

<i>Variable</i>	<i>VIF</i>	<i>1/VIF</i>
<i>Military Expenditure</i>	7.5	0.133297
<i>Liberal Norms</i>	6.01	0.166513
<i>Trade Relationship</i>	5.33	0.18777
<i>GDP per capita</i>	4.58	0.21838
<i>Institutional Democracy</i>	4.36	0.229489
<i>Regional Recognition</i>	2.59	0.386049
<i>Financial Contribution</i>	1.86	0.537913
<i>Political Relevance</i>	1.81	0.553597
<i>Security Concerns</i>	1.54	0.650297
<i>Political Aspiration</i>	1.1	0.911064
<i>Mission Strength</i>	1.09	0.91901
<i>Mean VIF</i>	3.43	

### (3) *Residual versus Fitted value Plot (rvf plot)*



(4) Plot of hat-values, studentized residuals, and Cook's distances for OLS in Model III



## Appendix G: Results Summary of Model III and IV

<i>Tool</i>	<i>Model III</i>		<i>Model IV</i>	
	<i>Probit</i>	<i>OLS</i>	<i>Probit</i>	<i>OLS</i>
	<i>Contribute (0/1)</i>	<i>Size of Contribution</i>	<i>Contribute (0/1)</i>	<i>Size of Contribution</i>
<i>Liberal Norms</i>	<b>-.4479843**</b> (.0513605)	<b>-.1570606**</b> (.0321274)	-	-
<i>Institutional Democracy</i>	-	-	<b>.0956491**</b> (.012838)	<b>.0222813**</b> (.0092349)
<i>Trade Relationship</i>	<b>.6386253**</b> (.1271548)	<b>.4953788**</b> (.0835284)	<b>.6882048**</b> (.1391796)	<b>.5946318**</b> (.089453)
<i>GDP per capita</i>	<b>-1.164443**</b> (.1350095)	<b>-.7889722**</b> (.0918167)	<b>-.5593226**</b> (.1495076)	<b>-.6544941**</b> (.0918441)
<i>Security Concerns</i>	-.0492712 (.0729619)	.0650573 (.0438208)	-.0036343 (.0728825)	<b>.0803787*</b> (.0453597)
<i>Political Aspiration</i>	.2009403 (.2219031)	.1196525 (.1011448)	.2484522 (.2158519)	.133592 (.1030738)
<i>Regional Recognition</i>	.0320001 (.0241964)	.0095436 (.0153767)	.0428247 (.0267701)	-.0049871 (.0160438)
<i>Financial Contribution</i>	.5769308 (.3878023)	<b>-.0233525*</b> (.0126901)	<b>.7790524**</b> (.3951181)	-.0165078 (.0128411)
<i>Military Expenditure</i>	<b>.2951769**</b> (.1216921)	<b>.2380661**</b> (.0826074)	-.0230405 (.1415947)	.136031 (.0905529)
<i>Political Relevance</i>	.0038341 (.0499307)	-.0009469 (.0111042)	-.0589644 (.047522)	-.0109419 (.0111492)
<i>Mission Strength</i>	<b>.9995932**</b> (.4721499)	.3571524 (.2738026)	<b>.8828648*</b> (.4963608)	.2940005 (.2847889)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.224708 (2.192304)	1.373117 (1.280833)	<b>-3.96367*</b> (2.263374)	.6944045 (1.317116)
<i>Observations</i>	700	481	642	471
	Log likelihood = -303.45947 Pseudo R2 = 0.3023		Log likelihood = -283.35965 Pseudo R2 = 0.2385	
	Adjusted R-squared = 0.3216		Adjusted R-squared = 0.2859	

Note1: \* significant at 0.10 level; \*\* significant at 0.05 level

Note2: Numbers in parentheses are standard error

Note3: Model III is same as Model II without the Institutional Democracy variable.

Note4: Model IV is same as Model II without the Liberal Norms variable.