THE PRICE OF REPRESENTATION: PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO NONTRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES

by

JANNA LYNETTE DEITZ

(Under the Direction of Charles S. Bullock, III)

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the patterns of political action committee (PAC) contributions to nontraditional (women and minority) congressional candidates to assess their role in affecting the descriptive representation of Congress. I argue that the notion of PAC "discrimination" is an incomplete understanding of the dynamics of gender and race, and that a more nuanced understanding of these variables in analyses is needed. Specifically, the conditional effects of party, ideology, and candidate status need to be examined to accurately assess the complex influences of gender and race on PAC contributions.

Examining PAC contributions to all general election U.S. House candidates during the primary and general election cycles for 2000, I find that women and minority candidates are advantaged in attracting primary PAC contributions. Candidate ideology plays an important role in mediating the effect of gender or race. Women and minorities that were most likely to attract large PAC contributions were moderate to conservative in their ideological leanings.

The conditional effect of party can be beneficial to black Democratic candidates in attracting labor contributions, while the conditional effect of ideology works to the

disadvantage of women candidates in attracting corporate contributions. Democratic candidates are favored over Republican candidates in attracting liberal ideological PAC money, and Republicans are favored over Democrats in attracting conservative ideological PAC money. Additionally, within parties, women are advantaged in terms of attracting contributions from ideological PACs. Additionally, I find that more ideological PAC money goes to quality challengers in the primary. Nontraditional candidates, if not quality candidates, are not necessarily advantaged in attracting these contributions.

Notions of bias in the giving patterns of these groups may be too general—not all women and all black candidates are disadvantaged in seeking contributions from these sources, and under certain circumstances, some women and black candidates are advantaged. If the electoral environment favors moderate to conservative candidates, then moderate to conservative nontraditional candidates are likely to be benefited. The price of representation may be that as the party and ideological diversity of these candidates increases, electing more women and black candidates to Congress may not necessarily result in more liberal policy.

INDEX WORDS: Political Action Committees (PACs), congressional elections, women candidates, black candidates, campaign finance, labor PACs, corporate PACs, ideological PACs.

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CHAPTER 1

THE NEW PAC POWER IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS

In his 1984 book, *PAC Power*, Larry Sabato details the motivations, strategies, and growing strength of political action committees (PACs) in elections[1]. In the two decades following this descriptive account of PAC activities, much research has examined the effects of PAC giving on the electoral process and the legislative behavior of those elected with the help of such PAC contributions (see for example, Sorauf 1984, Wright 1985, Conway 1986, Grier and Munger 1986, Langbein 1986, Grenzke 1989, Hall and Wayman 1990, Jacobson 1990, Davis 1993, Austen-Smith 1995, Evans 1996, Hernnson and Wilcox 1999, Hojnacki and Kimball 2001). Currently, PAC contributions are featured less prominently in the media, primarily due to the emphasis that the general public and members of Congress have placed on those unregulated indirect contributions made to political campaigns, such as issue ads and outside expenditures—the focus of recent campaign finance reform efforts. Although not squarely in the media spotlight, the PAC environment has undergone a metamorphosis over this time period that has important implications for campaign finance, the electoral process, and legislative representation: a new PAC power has emerged.

According to a recent FEC press release, PACs contributed a total of $247.9 million to federal candidates running in the 2000 election cycle, $193.4 million of those contributions

[1] While this early work was descriptive in nature, empirical work primarily characterizes this topic of study, including examinations of the nature and degree of the legislative and electoral power of certain types of PACs, (e.g. Eismeier and Pollock 1986, Snyder 1990, Dark 1996, Rudolph 1999, Hart 2001), the strategy of their contribution patterns (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996, Cox and Magar 1999), as well as issues regarding accountability to donors (Souraf 1984).

going to candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives. Indeed, if "PAC power" rests in investing in candidates, then these investments are being diversified. In many ways, PACs today can be considered "mini-parties" (Willis 1999) raising funds for their preferred candidates, employing issue ads in campaigns, getting their issues on the national agenda, and getting the candidates who support these issues elected. Today's PAC power extends beyond the goal of legislative access to include a more active role in helping candidates win elections by shaping the nature of campaigns themselves.

The traditional business-labor divide of the PAC environment of the 1970s and early 1980s has been replaced by the introduction and marked proliferation of ideological or non-connected PACs, which represent more narrow, if not single, public policy issues. The sheer growth in the number of ideological PACs and the amount of money they are able to contribute to candidates in recent elections has been quite substantial. According to Federal Election Commission (FEC) records, ideological PAC giving has grown as a percentage of total PAC contributions from 6.1% in 1978 to 28.2% in 1998 (Jacobson 2001). The top four PACs on the FEC's list of PACs with the largest increase in receipts from 1998-2000, for example (the NRA Political Victory Fund, Elect Life, Conservative Leadership PAC, and Emily's List), are all ideological in nature. These types of PACs contributed over $13 million to candidates seeking office in 2000 (FEC "PAC Activity…"). As a result of their growing numbers and contributions to candidates, ideological PACs are now serious players in political campaigns.

While the ideological PAC category has witnessed much growth, corporate and labor PACs continue to be a strong presence in financing campaigns. The top 50 corporate PACs gave over $20 million directly to federal candidates running in 2000, and the top 50 labor PACs contributed over $45 million (FEC "PAC Activity…"). Those PACs contributing the largest

amounts of money to campaigns remain those associated with corporations, labor unions or trade associations. Although PAC contribution strategies suggest that corporate PACs would favor Republican candidates while labor PACs would favor Democratic candidates, the amounts of money these PACs contribute has paralleled the partisan shift in Congress benefiting Republican incumbents (Biersack et al 1999). Yet, these PACs do not confine their contributions only to those safest bets-- congressional incumbents--and in fact are extremely active in contributing to candidates in open seat elections, where their giving may have the greatest effect (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Corporate and labor PAC contributions still comprise the lion's share of contributions made to federal candidates.

This study examines the impact of patterns of PAC giving, in terms of descriptive representation—how campaign finance affects the composition of Congress. While previous work has focused largely on questions of PAC influence regarding substantive representation—the policies and agendas of members of Congress, I argue that PAC contribution patterns may affect *who* gets into office as well.[2] Few studies have examined the relationship of candidate characteristics and PAC contributions. Much of the existing work concludes that total PAC contributions are influenced mainly by factors like incumbency and open seat status, and fails to consider adequately other candidate attributes such as race and gender.

Congressional PAC Influence

The Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, and subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1976, legitimized PACs and their campaign activities (Sabato 1984). The purpose of these campaign finance reform efforts of the 1970s was to ensure that political money was used fairly, and to this end it established the bipartisan Federal Elections Commission (FEC) to

[2] The classic work of Hanna Pitkin (1967) defines descriptive representation as "standing for" members of a particular social group, and substantive representation as "acting for" those members.

oversee contributions made to federal candidates. To create a more level playing field, restrictions were placed on how much individuals, groups, and parties could contribute and a disclosure system was put in place whereby candidates would report their contributions and disbursements to the FEC.

An important implication of FECA reforms for PACs was that it granted corporations and labor unions the ability to organize, administer and raise funds for their own PACs and to cover operating expenses with funds raised for these organizations (Sabato 1984). Individual donors under FECA were limited to a $1,000 per candidate donation per election cycle; the total amount an individual could donate to political parties, PACs, or candidates could not exceed $25,000 per year. PACs were limited to $5,000 in donations to an individual candidate per election cycle.[3] However, unlike individuals, PACs had no yearly limitation on the amount of political money they could distribute. The importance of PAC contributions to federal candidates, therefore, grew.

Because the cost of the average congressional campaign continues to climb, PAC contributions remain an essential component of most candidates' bids for federal office. Congressional challengers and incumbents alike court these much-needed contributions, in their bids for office. At the same time, the increasing cost of campaigns presents opportunities for PACs to articulate their interests to Congress. The mutually beneficial nature of PAC contributions to both interest groups and candidates in an environment marked by the increasing importance of money gives little reason for PAC contributions and their role in funding congressional elections to decline. PAC influence in the congressional arena is here to stay.

[3] The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 has increased the amount of direct candidate contributions an individual can donate to $2,000 per election cycle. The BCRA, however, did not institute any changes regarding yearly limitations on the cumulative amount of direct or "hard money" contributions PACs could contribute.

Congressional Activity

Much attention directed at the role PACs play in the electoral process, however, focuses not on the pluralist concept of group representation, but on the claim of an influential relationship between PAC contributions and congressional activity. Many empirical studies of PAC contributions in congressional elections are concerned with how these contributions affect public policy by influencing the legislative process (Welch 1982, Frandeis and Waterman 1985, Wright 1985, Schroedel 1986,Grenzke 1989, Grier and Munger 1986, Hall and Wayman 1990, Romer and Snyder 1994, McCarty and Rothenberg 1996). In these studies, different aspects of legislative behavior have been examined, including roll call votes (Wright 1985), committee votes (Evans 1996, Wright 1990), bill introductions (Hall and Wayman 1990), and lobbying or other means of access (Austen Smith 1995, Grenzke 1989, Hojnacki and Kimball 2001). While scholars generally have found little evidence of any *quid pro quo* between money and votes in Congress, the extent to which money buys the legislative access that influences specific public policies, as well as how PAC contributions influence specific kinds of congressional incumbents (e.g. junior versus senior members), remains uncertain.

Studies of the link between PAC contributions and votes have focused most heavily on the legislative impact of campaign contributions on the voting behavior of entrenched incumbents. This research finds either small inconsequential impacts on certain narrowly defined policy issue areas (Regens et al. 1991, Welch 1982, Davis 1991) and specific industry PACs (Evans 1986, Welch 1992, Grier and Munger 1993, Hart 2000) or no impact on aggregate voting patterns at all (Wright 1985, Evans 1986, Grenzke 1989). Disagreement remains over the nature and extent of legislative influence PAC contributions produce.

Congressional Campaigns

Still, the popular perception of undue influence abounds, and is not confined merely to PAC influence inside Congress. Other charges of undue influence concentrate on the effects PAC contributions have outside the institution, on the field of congressional candidates. Because PAC contributions flow most directly to incumbents, the role PACs play in perpetuating the un-level playing field for those vying for seats in Congress has also received empirical attention (Burrell 1985, Grenzke 1989, Nelson 1994, Herrick 1996, Wilhite and Theilmann 1986, Theilmann and Wilhite 1991).

Empirical examinations of candidate attributes and PAC contributions have made distinctions among the type of candidate running in an election. In these studies, candidate type is generally operationalized as candidate status, either as an incumbent or a challenger. Some studies have gone beyond candidate status to include an examination of the effects of race and gender on affecting PAC contributions and conclude either little effect (e.g. Burrell 1985) or evidence of PAC discrimination against women and minority candidates (Wilhite and Theilmann 1986). The conflicting findings from these studies suggest the need for further research on the influence of race and gender on campaign finance.

Just as all candidates are not alike, all PACs are not alike as well; certain types of PACs follow predictable patterns of political giving, favoring certain types of candidates, while others do not. For instance, labor PACs have consistently demonstrated an overwhelming preference for Democratic candidates (see, e.g. Epstein 1980, Sabato 1984, Wilhite and Theilmann 1987); while corporate PACs traditionally favor Republican candidates (see, e.g. Eismeier and Pollock 1986a, 1988). Generally, PACs favor incumbents, but this is a generalization that does not hold for all PACs. In fact, while corporate and labor PACs heavily favor incumbents, ideological

PACs have been described as "pro-challenger" (Sabato 1984), making donations to those who run against incumbents, even if those candidates are considered "long-shots." Some PACs may hedge their bets for legislative access by giving to both candidates in an election, while other PACs for ideological reasons, would not. Studies of PAC behavior and influence must account for these differences in PACs, their motivations, and their strategies. The impact of PAC campaign contributions, therefore, is best studied by analyzing these different types of PACs separately to account for such differences.

The timing of PAC contributions is another aspect of campaign finance that has important implications for candidates. Some PACs give money only during the general election campaign, while others give much earlier in the campaign process, donating to candidates vying for their party's nomination in the primary. Some PACs have seemingly unlimited amounts of money, and can afford to support multiple candidates at many different points in time during the election cycle. Other PACs, however, are not as well funded, and must target their giving to fewer candidates, and may do so at the critical early stages of a campaign.

Contributions received during the early stages of an election are important for nontraditional candidates, including women and blacks, for they mostly run either as congressional challengers or as candidates in open seats. PAC contributions during the primary elections for these bids for office are especially important in proving the electoral viability of these candidates. This seed money is necessary, then, in helping these candidates be successful in the first stage of the election process: the party primary. The kinds of candidates that can attract this early money will affect the descriptive representation of Congress. Because of the importance of these early PAC investments in the candidacies of nontraditional congressional aspirants, these candidates may be more influenced by the policy agendas represented by these

organizations. Therefore, patterns of PAC contributions and the types of candidates they advantage have implications for substantive representation in Congress. Ultimately, if patterns of early PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates exist, then these PACs may have the potential through their contributions to affect the policies enacted by Congress.

PAC Contributions and Descriptive Representation in Congress

I offer another approach to exploring the question of PAC contributions and their influence on Congress—how these contributions affect the candidacies for nontraditional congressional aspirants. I argue that certain types of PAC contributions are especially important for the electoral success of certain types of candidates: those outsider or nontraditional candidates, who have difficulty raising large sums of money from more traditional sources, such as the corporate sector. Such candidates include women and black candidates, and these candidates will be an important focus of this study. The contribution patterns of different types of PACs, therefore, may produce unintended consequences for legislative representation, in that these giving patterns may give some kinds of candidates a competitive advantage, and others a disadvantage, limiting the descriptive representation of Congress.

Building on theories of PAC giving, candidate evaluation, and electoral positioning, I develop a theory of PAC contributions to nontraditional congressional candidates. As suggested by previous studies, I contend that race and gender do influence the amount of PAC contributions candidates receive, but that these effects cannot be described as PAC discrimination against women and blacks. While I find that race and gender condition the amount of PAC contributions received by congressional candidates, conservative women and black candidates, regardless of their status as challengers or incumbents, are advantaged

compared to liberal women and blacks. Specifically, the ideological position of conservative women and black candidates provides them with an expanded base of electoral support, making them more attractive investments to PACs. I argue that such electoral advantages and disadvantages help explain trends in PAC support for nontraditional candidates and that these trends may not necessarily constitute PAC discrimination in giving. Candidate gender and race provide ideological cues to voters; likewise, PACs may use these ideological cues as a source of policy relevant information regarding a candidate's perceived likelihood of taking PAC-preferred policy positions once elected. The effects of PAC contributions on nontraditional candidates are more pronounced for different types of PACs.

Contributions

Theoretically, this study combines research regarding gender and race, congressional elections, and interest groups in an attempt to move research on gender and race beyond the framework of discrimination. Examinations of PAC contributions and the congressional candidacies of nontraditional candidates must account for the different kinds of women and black candidates who are running in larger numbers today. Women and black candidates do not necessarily share the same party, ideology, life experience, and beliefs (see e.g., Dolan and Ford 1998); it follows therefore, that we should not expect their candidacies and fundraising efforts to be the same. To understand better the electoral fortunes of women and black congressional candidates, we need to understand more clearly which of these candidates are advantaged or disadvantaged regarding PAC contributions.

This is not to say that discrimination may not exist. To the extent that most women and blacks continue to run as liberal Democrats, then they will continue to be disadvantaged, at least

in the current political environment. If the ideological composition of the pool of these nontraditional candidates changes, however, then their fundraising experiences will change too. Conservative candidates in general are advantaged due to the current political environment, namely the Republican control of Congress (Biersack 1999). Changes in the political climate, such as a shift in the partisan control of Congress, would alter the types of candidates who are advantaged, and therefore the pool of nontraditional candidates. To understand how gender and race influence PAC contributions, the current political environment and the diversity of newer nontraditional candidates must be taken into account.

Just as there is variation among the party and ideological leanings of these nontraditional candidates, there is also much variation in the types of PACs that support these candidates, as well as the timing of their contributions. Different PACs operate under different motivations and strategies. Additionally, most work on PAC contributions has focused on giving during the general election, or on total amounts of PAC contributions received by candidates. This work, however, cannot accurately describe the source or amount of PAC contributions nontraditional candidates receive early in the election process. Research must address contributions received throughout campaigns, and in examining the campaigns of nontraditional candidates, in both the primary and general election cycles.

These theoretical contributions yield empirical contributions to this study as well. First, the need for exploration of race and gender effects on PAC contributions must take into account the different kinds of blacks and women seeking congressional office. The methodological treatments of race and gender variables in studies of congressional finance typically suggest that these variables produce singular effects on fundraising and the electoral fortunes of congressional candidates. However, I argue that it is the interaction of race, gender, party,

ideology and status that tell the full story of the effect of these immutable candidate characteristics in today's campaigns. I empirically account for these different variations by employing interaction terms in my explanatory models of PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates. We would not expect a black or female incumbent to be disadvantaged in attracting PAC funding. Similarly, we would not expect that corporate PACs would discriminate against conservative black or women candidates. Research must empirically account for these differences in types of nontraditional candidates.

The differences among PAC types and timing are empirically addressed in this work by running separate analyses for each type of PAC. Disaggregating PACs into separate PAC types refines our understanding of how these PACs advantage or disadvantage different kinds of nontraditional candidates with their contributions. The timing of PAC contributions is empirically addressed by employing Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) analyses to demonstrate the effects of these contributions on both the primary and general election cycles. These methods shed light on the different strategies employed by these PACs, and whether or not these strategies are discriminatory toward all nontraditional candidates.

The theoretical and empirical approaches taken by this study account for both the changing ideological composition of the nontraditional candidate pool as well as the changing political environment. Important implications for descriptive and substantive representation arise from the conclusions of this work, suggesting that the new PAC power has the potential to reshape Congress, the diversity of its members, agendas, and resulting policies. The price of representation may be that as more women and black candidates are elected to Congress, their diversity in terms of ideology and policy preferences mean that the traditional "liberal agenda" associated with these groups may not necessarily be advanced. A more complete theoretical and

empirical treatment of race and gender will paint a clearer picture of the fundraising dynamics of nontraditional congressional candidates in the current diverse political environment.

Organization of Chapters

This study examines the impact of PAC contributions on women and minority congressional candidates. Specifically, I examine PAC contributions made to all women and black general election congressional candidates for the 2000 election cycle and argue that different kinds of PACs advantage different types of candidates. Beyond the typical attributes of candidate gender, race, party, and quality, candidate party and ideology prove especially important for black and female candidates seeking congressional seats in 2000.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of the literature on financing congressional campaigns for women and minority candidates and argues that contributions received from PACs play an important role in advancing these candidacies for public office. Central to this description of the financial structure of female and black candidates' campaigns is the special role of ideological PACs, many of which are primarily concerned with the election of women and minorities to the U.S. Congress. These particular PACs are unique in their willingness to give to challengers and to make contributions during the early stages of an election cycle: these PACs help women and minorities prove their viability in the electoral arena.

Chapter 3 offers an explanation for patterns of PAC contributions to women and minority candidates that moves beyond the traditional structural focus of candidate status, such as incumbency and congressional leadership, as well as the behavioral focus of discrimination, and develops an alternative model for PAC contributions that takes into account the electoral position of women and minority candidates as derived from their political ideology. While theories of

PAC motivation and strategy have focused almost exclusively on incumbents and the relationship between contributions and legislative access, very little work has been done to explore the implication of these patterns of contributions on the descriptive representation of Congress via the candidate pool. The few attempts to examine PAC strategy in giving to nontraditional candidates have done so from a paradigm of discrimination. I argue that PAC giving to women and minority candidates is fundamentally governed by calculations of electoral fortune and that more nuanced understandings of the workings of race and gender (as conditioned by party and ideology) can lead to a more complete understanding of the electoral strategies of different kinds of PACs.

Chapter 4 presents results from an initial test of PAC giving to nontraditional candidates during the primary and general election stages of the 2000 general election cycle for the U.S. House of Representatives. Using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation on total PAC contributions to all general election candidates during these two periods of the election cycle, I find that while women and minority candidates are advantaged directly in attracting PAC contributions during the primary election, this advantage disappears in the general election. A candidate's ideology plays an important role in mediating the effect of their gender or race. For the 2000 election, those women and minorities that were most likely to attract large PAC contributions were moderate to conservative in their ideological leanings. In the partisan landscape of Congress, money flows to those with power. With a Republican controlled Congress, it comes as no surprise, then, that conservatives and Republican candidates are advantaged in terms of PAC contributions.

Chapter 5 disaggregates the previous analysis, focusing specifically on corporate and labor PAC giving. Findings from this chapter reveal that certain types of nontraditional

candidates do enjoy benefits in attracting corporate and labor PAC giving. Candidate ideology is an important influence that can work to the advantage of women candidates in attracting corporate contributions. Conservative women challengers receive greater amounts of corporate PAC contributions in the general election than do their more moderate to liberal counterparts. In addition, the combination of race and party can work to the advantage of black Democratic candidates in attracting labor contributions. The findings of this chapter reinforce the notion that the candidate characteristics of gender and race do not produce merely singular effects on the ability of nontraditional candidates to attract contributions from traditional sources such as corporate and labor groups. Furthermore, notions of bias in the giving patterns of these groups may be too general—not all women and all black candidates are disadvantaged in seeking contributions from these sources. Some nontraditional candidates are more disadvantaged than others, and certain nontraditional candidates are not disadvantaged at all.

Chapter 6 examines the effect of candidate characteristics and their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status on ideological PAC giving. Party is found to be a consistently significant influence on ideological PAC contributions. As expected, Democratic candidates are favored over Republican candidates in attracting liberal ideological PAC money, and Republicans are favored over Democrats in attracting conservative ideological PAC money. However, within parties, women are advantaged in terms of attracting contributions from these ideological PACs. Another interesting finding from this chapter has to do with the strategic nature of ideological PAC giving. While expectations point to the notion that these PACs are more willing to be risky in their candidate investments, I find that among general election candidates, more ideological PAC money goes to quality challengers in the primary. If nontraditional candidates are not quality candidates, they may not be advantaged in attracting

these contributions. Lastly, the ideological PAC category is argued to lack a unifying dimension, like corporate or labor PACs. Closer examination of the issue subcategories of these groups is warranted. When analyzing the effects of gender and race on these contributions, much can be learned from disaggregating this category of PAC contributions according to their liberal or conservative ideological leanings, as well as the specific issue around which these PACs are formed.

Chapter 7 concludes with a brief discussion of the major findings and presents other avenues for research in this area. Implications of these findings for the studies of gender and race, the descriptive and substantive representation of Congress, candidate attributes and campaign finance, as well as PAC decision making are discussed. Lastly, future avenues for research on this topic are also presented.

CHAPTER 2

FINANCING THE CAMPAIGNS OF WOMEN AND MINORITY CANDIDATES

The impact of money on congressional elections has a lengthy history of scholarly examination (e.g., Alexander 1972; Jacobson 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990; Malbin 1984; Sabato 1984; Sourauf 1988; Burrell 1985; Eismeier and Pollack 1986; Green and Krasno 1988; Magleby and Nelson 1990; Herrnson 1992; Biersack et al 1993; Krasno et al 1994; Epstein and Zemsky 1995; Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Goidel et al 1999; Magleby 2003). Scholars have noted that raising campaign funds is critical for candidate success (Jacobson 1980), and the amount of funds needed to run a successful campaign for public office continues to rise. According to a 2000 study by Common Cause, campaign resources raised by U.S. House candidates by September 30, 2000, totaled $525.9 million, a substantial increase over the previous election cycle total of $387.3 million (Common Cause 2000). Emblematic of the congressional "permanent campaign" (Blumenthal 1982, Ornstein and Mann 2000), fundraising remains a constant concern for political candidates in seeking and maintaining political office.

Nowhere is the incumbency advantage made more visible than in campaign fundraising. For instance, the vast majority of direct campaign contributions ("hard money") made in the first eighteen months of the 2000 election cycle to federal candidates went to support incumbents. Nearly two-thirds of these contributions came from individuals and PACs (Common Cause 2000). In fact, incumbents received on average 81% of their total contributions prior to September 31, 2000, from PACs (Common Cause 2000). Political action committees are an integral component of the financial structure of congressional campaigns.

Yet, because women and minorities are more likely to be challengers, this incumbent bias in PAC giving has important implications for the descriptive representation of these groups in Congress. Few studies have examined the role of PACs in the campaigns of women and minority candidates (Burrell 1985, Wilhite and Theilman 1986). These studies, while focusing specifically on nontraditional candidates, are in fact focusing indirectly on the fundraising plight of challengers as well. In order to understand better the fundraising challenges faced by nontraditional candidates, it is important to examine the particular obstacles faced by congressional challengers.

Dynamics of Political Fundraising for Incumbents and Challengers

Money alone does not determine the outcome of elections; it is the strategic use of money raised on the campaign trail that makes it necessary for success. Additionally, the efficacy of fundraising efforts also depends on timing, for money raised early in the election cycle has been described as planting the "seeds for [electoral] success" (Biersack et al 1993). These aspects of campaign fundraising—strategy and timing—differ for congressional incumbents and challengers, with important implications for the role money plays in their respective bids for office.

Incumbents raise more money for their campaigns than do challengers (Jacobson 1980). Studies of campaign contributors have found that donors tend to favor overwhelmingly electoral winners and this trend is especially true when an incumbent is present (Eismer and Pollack 1986). Incumbents are advantaged not only by their ability to raise large sums of money, but

also by having more flexibility in determining how these funds will be spent (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1992, Krasno et al 1994). Incumbents can strategically spend their campaign funds during times and in ways that best help their electoral fortunes.

Experienced candidates may employ short or long term strategies in their fundraising and spending efforts. Incumbents may choose to spend much of their campaign funds in the current election in order to secure victory. Jacobson (1997) however, notes that a high level of incumbent spending, especially early in an election cycle, may be evidence of a highly competitive race featuring a quality challenger. In fact, incumbents reach a point of diminishing returns in terms of the amount of electoral support they receive as a result of their spending (Jacobson 1980). When incumbents spend most of their campaign funds on their own campaigns, they are usually reacting to an uncertain, and therefore possibly unfavorable, electoral environment.

Additionally, incumbents can employ a longer-term strategy in the use of campaign money—a defensive strategy that protects their electoral success—preemptive fundraising and spending. Incumbents can amass large war chests of campaign funds early in the election cycle that can deter quality challengers from running against them (Box-Steffensmeier 1996)[4]. This deterrent effect may be difficult to assess accurately, however, because incumbents may assemble these large war chests to hide their electoral vulnerability (Epstein and Zemsky 1995). Not only can fundraising be a deterrent to challengers, but spending can be as well (Goldenberg et al. 1986). Although some scholars have argued that preemptive spending by incumbents has

[4] Work by Robert Hogan (2001) analyzes the deterrent effect of war chests on state legislative challengers in both primary and general elections and argues that amassing these funds may not be sufficient to deter challengers in professional legislatures. Further, he posits that this helps explain why war chests in congressional elections generally do not produce decreased levels of contestation, and argues for more nuanced measurements of challengers in these studies.

less deterrent effects on challenger entry than the previous vote margin of the incumbent and local political factors (Krasno and Green 1988), it appears that in practice, the belief that raising money deters quality challengers is firmly held among incumbents.

While incumbents certainly raise money in hopes of securing their future electoral fortunes, they may also raise money in order to further their own ambition within Congress. Thus, incumbents have another long-term strategy they may employ based on their own career ambitions. Indeed, incumbent fundraising has increasingly included efforts to raise money for leadership PACs as well as for incumbents' own campaign committees (Wilcox 1989, 1990; Currinder 2002). These leadership PACs (now more generally referred to as "member PACs"), which are associated with individual members of Congress, make contributions, much like other PACs, to preferred political candidates. With fundraising changes brought about by the BCRA, these leadership PACs are counted on as official fundraising sources for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Republican National Campaign Committee (RNCC). For the 2004 congressional elections, the DCCC is reportedly expecting its members to provide one-third of its target budget, which is around $80 million; House Republican committee chairmen are expected to donate $25,000 to the RNCC, whose budget as of June 30 was $113 million (Carney 2004). Like any other PAC, leadership PACs make assessments of the congressional candidates that they will support. Leadership PACs are often formed by members of Congress who aspire to positions of institutional and party leadership and believe that by helping their colleagues' fundraising efforts they may be helping further their own career goals.

Thus, money plays several different roles in the campaigns of incumbents. Incumbents may choose to spend all of the money they have raised when they are facing a close election,

they may amass large war chests to deter the entry of quality challengers, or they may raise large amounts of money and "share the wealth" with their colleagues in hopes of furthering their own congressional careers. Incumbents raise large amounts of money and can spend it virtually at will, depending on the needs of their campaigns.

For challengers, this picture of fundraising looks much different. First, challengers are generally at a fundraising disadvantage; it is difficult for challengers to keep up with the fundraising totals of incumbents. Second, challengers do not enjoy the flexibility incumbents have in terms of when and how the funds they raise are spent. Challengers have only short-term and no long-term strategies; they must raise money early and they must spend their money as they raise it in order to increase their chances of electoral success (Box-Steffensmeier and Lin 1992, Krasno et al 1994). Additionally, fundraising difficulties for challengers are exacerbated for those challengers who lack political experience (e.g., Maisel 1982).

Challengers must raise money early in the election cycle for several reasons. The amount of money raised early may signal to potential contributors, such as PACs and political parties, that a candidate is a good investment. Early fundraising efforts, then, can produce future contributions (Biersack et al 1993). Additionally, raising money early in the election cycle signals further proof of candidate viability as challengers use these resources to invest in their campaign infrastructure, hiring pollsters and media consultants (Herrnson 1992). Early money also helps provide the name recognition that is so important for challengers by paying for those political ads and media messages that make a candidate known to voters as well as funding the polling efforts that gauge the effectiveness of these ads as well as the candidate's overall electability (Thurber and Nelson 2000). Generally, this professionalization of congressional campaigns can predict electoral success and is especially important for challengers (Medvic

2000). Early fundraising buys all those things that challengers need to be competitive in the electoral arena; therefore, for challengers, early money can be a determinant of credibility itself.

PACs and Challengers

One route of traditional access to early money is by way of wealthy individuals: those individuals involved in investment banking, real estate development, insurance, stocks and bonds, and prestigious law firms (Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). Yet, challengers have difficulty raising money from these traditional sources, and most often collect smaller contributions. These professions do have their own industry PACs and are quite active in contributing to campaigns. In fact, corporate PACs account for more than 40 percent of all PACs and make between 35 and 37 percent of all total PAC contributions (Florence 1999).

Challengers cannot generally depend on traditional PACs for contributions. PACs do prefer incumbents and are less likely to support challengers (Sabato 1984). Additionally, two types of PACs that are very active in contributing to congressional campaigns, corporate and labor PACs, have not been found to be challenger-friendly (Sabato 1984, Wilhite and Theilman 1991). For instance, although allied with Democratic candidates, and although most women run under the Democratic Party label, organized labor, a large PAC contributor, was found to discriminate against women in its contribution patterns (Witt et al 1994). Yet, other work has suggested that non-connected or ideological PACs have a "pro-feminine" bias, favoring female candidates (Wilhite and Theilman 1991). The growth in this ideological PAC category suggests that challengers, including women and minority candidates, may have new PAC funding sources to aid their fundraising efforts.

Funding Women Candidates

Early evidence on women's fundraising efforts suggested that money, the so-called "mother's milk of politics," was not equally available to men and women (Caroll 1987; Mandel 1982; Lake 1984; Epstein 1981; Roberts 1983; Erenhalt 1982; Rosenberg 1982). These studies found that women aspiring to elective office were discriminated against financially because they lacked access to large sums of money, as well as to the "good old boy" networks that donated money for primary campaigns (Mandel 1982, Lake 1984, Epstein 1981). Conventional wisdom at this time suggested that women had to rely on many small contributors, whereas men could rely on fewer large contributors and party support. Indicative of conclusions reached by these studies, Epstein argues that "since they are not able to make the kinds of contributions that men make, women do not get political backing in return. Backing a woman for election to even a moderately important office is usually considered a poor investment" (1981: 139). In addition, the need for such large sums of money discourages women from running for office. Ruth Mandel, former Director for the Center for the American Woman and Politics (CAWP), interviewed potential female candidates regarding their concerns about running for office. She concluded that many women decided not to run for office, especially not for offices higher than the ones they held at the state and local level, because of their lack of access to large amounts of political funding (Mandel 1981).

More recent studies investigating the ability of female candidates to raise funds, however, have concluded that there is no bias against women in fundraising, because they raise the same amount of money as men (Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986; Herrick 1985; Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). The important variable that seemed to have been neglected in previous research was found to be that of incumbency. Early women candidates were at a distinct disadvantage with

respect to fundraising by their disproportionate status as non-incumbents (Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986). As women gained elective office, they too benefited from the incumbency advantage.

Yet, women holding political office still consistently cite fundraising concerns (Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). The basis for their concerns lies in the *source* of funding. Specifically, women cite a reliance on PAC contributions that is not noted by male candidates (Donovan 1993) and, along with minorities, women are vocal opponents of PAC reforms (Donovan 1993, 1995). Although many female U.S. House members come from somewhat affluent suburban districts, they share the problem faced by minority members in finding the contributors who can make the large contributions. According to research conducted by the Center for Responsive Politics, women House members raised the largest share of their total campaign funds (24 percent) from contributions of less than $200.

The Role of Women's PACs

Certainly, any examination of PAC sector contributions to female candidates must also consider the role of women's PACs, an example of an ideological PAC listed in reports of the Federal Elections Commission. An important change in the funding patterns for women's campaigns has been the creation of a base of financial support among women (Witt, Page, and Matthews 1994). A number of women's organizations focus on creating a donor base for women candidates that they can tap into early in their bids for office. The first two organizations created for this purpose were bipartisan in nature. The Women's Campaign Fund (WCF) was founded in 1974 specifically to raise money for female candidates. The National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), formed in 1971, provided the first mechanism for women to support women's

candidacies financially through state or local chapters (Witt, Page and Matthews 1994). The WCF and NWPC also helped identify professional associations that were sympathetic to women candidates, such as the American Nurses Association or the American Federation of Teachers. These two organizations provided the bulk of financial support to women candidates until the 1985 formation of the first partisan organization specifically for women candidates: EMILY's List.

An acronym for "Early Money Is Like Yeast" (it makes the dough rise), EMILY's List identifies viable pro-choice Democratic women candidates for key federal and statewide offices and provides the critical seed money female candidates need in order to attract future campaign support. During every two-year campaign cycle, each of EMILY's List's members makes a $100 contribution to the organization and agrees to contribute $100 to each of at least two candidates. Those individual campaign checks are sent to the national headquarters, which "bundles" them to the candidates. Although campaign finance laws limit a PAC's contribution to a maximum of $10,000 in each cycle, candidates supported by EMILY's List can count on well over $100,000 in contributions from the organization (Cohen 1996) because of their creative bundling practices whereby individual donations are "bundled" together and presented to a candidate. In 1998, EMILY's List's 50,000 members contributed a record $7.5 million to candidates during the two-year election cycle (EMILY's List Fact Sheet 1998). In its short history, EMILY's List claims to have helped 7 female senators, 49 female House members, and 3 female governors win election (EMILY's List Fact Sheet 1998). The WISH (Women in the Senate and House) List is the acronym given to the Republican counterpart of EMILY's List. The WISH list donated over $400,000 to pro-choice Republican women in 1998 congressional elections. Additionally, other ideological PACs such as the National Right to Life Organization,

as well as the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League are also active in supporting female candidates; these and other ideological PACs have been able to generate substantial funds for women candidates through the bundling practice.

The significance of women's PACs to the success of female candidates lies in the way in which they contribute to women's campaigns. Women's PACs are much less likely than other PACs to give to incumbents and much more likely to give to candidates for open seats or challengers to incumbents (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). This contribution pattern makes intuitive sense, for women are more likely to be challengers or candidates for open seats than incumbents. Another difference in the activities of women's PACs is that, unlike traditional PACs, they do not seek to buy access to candidates: Their main purpose is to get women elected. To accomplish this goal of election, the timing of women's PAC contributions is crucial. Women's PACs are therefore most heavily involved at the beginning stages of the campaigns of female candidates; their contributions during elections begin in the primary contests, unlike traditional PACs, which contribute mostly in the general election.

Oversights in the Literature on Gender and Campaign Finance

Examining the contribution behavior of PACs by sector has been one gap in studies analyzing gender differences in campaign finance. Indeed, studies that conclude that no gender bias exists in raising campaign funds typically aggregate all PAC funding into one monolithic variable for analysis. As such, any differences among PAC categories are masked by this singular treatment of PAC money. Barbara Burrell (1985) examined campaign receipts for male and female candidates for U.S. House seats from 1972 to 1982. Her analysis of the financial structure of these campaigns demonstrated that men and women relied equally on PAC contributions as an average percent of their overall campaign receipts. She concluded from these

findings that "the campaigns of men and women nominees are similarly structured financially" (1985: 263). Yet, Burrell does not divide PAC contributions by type in her analysis: a measure that may demonstrate gender differences in campaign finance structure.

Analyzing candidacies for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1980, Uhlaner and Schlozman also conclude no gender differences exist when comparing male and female campaign receipts. Similarly with other such studies, these authors compared total receipts from the political party, large contributions, and PACs, without any breakdown of PAC contributions by type. Importantly, Uhlaner and Schlozman conclude that their findings "do not permit us to infer that inadequate funding has no role in the underrepresentation of women in Congress. Our data allow us to draw no conclusion about the relative success of men and women in raising funds *prior to receiving a major party nomination* (italics added) (1986: 47)."

In their conclusion, Uhlaner and Schlozman discuss differences between equality of opportunity and equality of results and assert that from equal results, equal opportunity cannot be inferred. Focusing only on the "finish line" of elections, by examining only the final tally of campaign receipts among male and female candidates, ignores the differences that exist *during* the race that may affect who gets to the finish line. Research efforts into gender differences in campaign fundraising not only must analyze PAC sector contributions, but must also analyze the timing of these PAC contributions as well. These two variables may provide another piece of the puzzle as to why women raise as much money as men but are still underrepresented in national elective office.

Analysis of PAC contributions in primary elections by type may reveal important differences in PAC giving that may be muted in the general election. If women can indeed "win when they run," then research into their underrepresentation must not neglect the dynamics of

primary elections: For in order to increase the number of women running in the general election, more women must gain their party's nomination. Early funding is one important variable to primary success; thus, the type and timing of PAC contributions in women's campaigns merits closer inspection.

Funding Minority Candidates

Like many women running for office, black candidates also face fundraising challenges. Public Campaign's 1998 major study of fundraising and contributions to black candidates, "The Color of Money," was the first research effort to examine the groups of contributors that supported black political candidates. Many black candidates are from districts that are not affluent, and so their ability to raise funds from large individual contributions, is hampered. Black candidates, then, are often forced to look elsewhere for campaign funds.

According to the Center for Public Integrity, by June of the 2000 election year, blacks in Congress and challengers for House seats raised a combined total of $11.7 million, which represented less than one percent of the $1.2 billion total raised for all candidates in that election. Not only is the amount of contributions problematic for black candidates, but the number of contributions is as well. Black candidates receive far fewer contributions than their white counterparts for political office. Of the more than one million individual and PAC contributions made to political parties, congressional and presidential candidates, black candidates received slightly more than 15,000 contributions, about 1.5 percent of the total (Public Integrity 2000). Only six of the thirty zip codes that gave twenty contributions or more to black candidates were majority black. Residents of zip code 30311 in Atlanta, which had the highest percentage black population, gave a total of $20,700 (Public Integrity 2000).

Because of the challenges in raising large amounts of contributions from individuals, PAC contributions become especially important to black candidates. However, black candidates are often faced with challenges on this fundraising front as well, as can be illustrated by examining the contribution patterns of political party PACs. For the 2000 election, only $29,006 was given to black candidates from party PACs. Although the Republican Party has focused on increasing its outreach efforts to attract black voters to their party, the party hasn't given much in the way of funding black candidates. The National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee gave a total of only $477 to three of the twenty-two black Republican candidates in the 2000 election cycle. The Democratic Party, which enjoys the traditional support of black voters, did not do much better. The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee gave a total of $28,529, split among thirty-eight of the forty-four black Democratic candidates in 2000.[5] The PACs associated with political parties, therefore, have not greatly supported black candidates with direct contributions to their campaigns for federal office because they are not partisanly competitive districts.

Funding Sources for Black Candidates

Although black candidates face challenges in raising PAC money, that is not to say that they do not receive contributions from PACs. The PAC contributions they do receive, however, tend to be from certain types of PACs. Currently, labor unions provide the bulk of PAC contributions to black candidates (Public Integrity 2000). Labor has been historically associated with the Democratic Party, and since most black candidates run on the Democratic ticket, they

[5] Figures cited are amounts of "hard money" contributions given directly to black candidates by the parties, and do not include "soft money" contributions which may indirectly help black candidates through the funding of GOTV efforts. Additionally, party giving goes overwhelmingly to black incumbents, who rarely face serious challengers. Nevertheless, this bias towards black incumbents does little to help the efforts of black challengers.

are likely to receive labor PAC contributions.

The Congressional Black Caucus PAC is also a source of funding for black candidates. While this PAC does make direct, hard money contributions to black candidates, that amount is dwarfed by the soft money contributions and expenditures it makes.[6] While much of this money raised by the Black Caucus goes to support GOTV efforts, a substantial amount went to a newly formed Black Caucus think tank, the Policy and Leadership Institute, which was designed to protect Caucus members' seats during redistricting (Lardner 2001). This money is being targeted directly to help black incumbents, not challengers. A recent *Washington Post* article reported that one Black Caucus member, Representative Bennie Thompson (D-MS), expressed that he and other members are trying to distance themselves from their image as a "pro-union, liberal group hostile to corporate interests" (Lardner 2001) and are hoping to attract contributions from other groups that traditionally did not consider the Caucus as friendly to their issues. Thus, the Black Caucus is a fundraising resource, but one that is geared more towards black incumbents, concerned primarily with the retention of black seats in Congress.

One fairly new nonconnected PAC that provides financial support primarily to black challengers is Black America's PAC, or BAMPAC. Similar to the ideological bias in the contributions of EMILY's List to pro-choice Democratic women, BAMPAC contributes only to black conservative candidates. Founded in 1994 as an unaffiliated, non-partisan PAC, and chaired currently by Alan Keyes, BAMPAC claims over 122,000 donors. BAMPAC is not afraid of helping black challengers, even those facing fairly senior black incumbents. For example, BAMPAC provided black Republican candidates, Jennifer Carroll of Florida and Dylan Glenn of Georgia with $190,000 and $140,000 respectively in "direct and assisted

[6] Indeed, this soft money has become so important to black candidates that some Black Caucus members split with their party over proposed legislation that abolished these forms of campaign donations.

contributions." Both of these candidates were facing black Democratic incumbents. They were targeted, in BAMPAC's words, because "they faced entrenched incumbents and as such were selected for support to make a strong challenge." Like other ideological PACs, BAMPAC did not wait to help candidates in the general election, but provided them crucial early money needed for their primary elections as well. BAMPAC targeted twenty-two such black Republican congressional candidates in the 2000 election. Thus, this ideological PAC is an important resource for black Republican candidates.

Black Republicans are not the only minority subgroup seeking fundraising help through the creation of political action committees. Founded just last year, Women Building for the Future, or The Future PAC, is the first national black women's political action committee. The Future PAC boasts an impressive list of politically active black women in its membership: Dr. Dorothy Height, president emerita of the National Council of Negro Women; Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson of the Congressional Black Caucus; Donna Brazile, Democratic political consultant and Al Gore's presidential campaign manager; Minyon Moore, political strategist, consultant, and assistant to former President Bill Clinton; and Joy Atkinson, founder of the Los Angeles African American Women's Political Action Committee (LAAAWPAC) (Parker 2003).

These women are bringing together their political experience and expertise to form a PAC that will "aim to put in office African-American women who will develop policies and programs that will improve the lives of African-American people" (Parker 2003). This PAC, like BAMPAC, has an ideological bent: it supports only the candidacies of progressive black women. The Future PAC founders believe the PAC to be necessary for black women to become more politically empowered. While black women provide the most solid support for Democratic candidates, The Future PAC members argue that this loyalty has gone largely unrewarded. As

Brazile asserts: "We're not underrepresented in political office. Underrepresentation would signal we were in the pipeline. We're invisible." The Future PAC should begin contributing to the candidacies of Black Democratic women in the 2004 election cycle.

Oversights in the Literature on Race and Campaign Finance

The paradigm used by empirical studies investigating the position of minority candidates is generally one of discrimination or intentional bias. For example, in their 1986 study, Wilhite and Theilmann found, when analyzing candidate contributions in 1980 and 1982, that all types of PACs (corporate, labor, trade/membership, and non-connected) "discriminated" against black candidates. While the authors controlled for the ideology of the candidate, they did not account for the ideological leanings of the various PACs. Much PAC activity during the 1980s had a strong anti-incumbent quality, and since Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party at this time, there was much more activity by conservative-leaning PACs (Sabato 1984). The bias in this political atmosphere would most certainly disadvantage nontraditional candidates, especially those that ran as Democrats. As such, separating discrimination from electoral investment strategies of PACs becomes difficult.

This critique aside, in their conclusion, Wilhite and Theilmann argue that one solution to such "PAC discrimination" would be the establishment of PACs whose primary objective is to elect black (and female) candidates. Illustrative of much scholarly work on nontraditional candidates in the electoral arena, the authors make the implicit assumption that all black and female candidates are ideologically liberal. Indeed, the few research efforts that analyze bias in

PAC contributions by controlling for race and gender, do not account for newer, conservative variations of women and black candidates as well as their respective donor networks (Whilhite and Theilmann 1990).

Conclusion

Conclusions about race and gender discrimination in campaign finance are incomplete at best. A more accurate investigation of PAC bias would examine not only the effect of candidate race and gender, but the conditional effects of party and ideology as well. It is inappropriate to conclude that women and blacks are advantaged by certain patterns of PAC giving; it may be that certain PACs advantage *certain kinds* of women and black candidates. Thus, research into the type and timing of PAC contributions to candidates should provide a clearer picture of the nature of bias in the fundraising cycle, examining not only which candidates receive contributions, and how much they receive, but when they receive them as well.

The following chapter presents an explanation of PAC behavior in terms of contributing specifically to nontraditional candidates. Theoretical reasons for why these candidates may in fact be good investments for PACs are discussed and hypotheses are generated from this discussion.

CHAPTER 3

EXPLAINING PAC GIVING TO NONTRADITIONAL CANDIDATES

The previous chapter described the fundraising process for women and minority congressional candidates. To be certain, fundraising is a formidable challenge for most political candidates. Nontraditional candidates, however, are faced with even greater obstacles on the fundraising front since most of them run as challengers. Yet, the formation of donor networks targeted specifically at nontraditional candidates presents new fundraising opportunities for these candidates. Of particular interest is the fact that these newer donor networks for nontraditional candidates often specify the *type* of nontraditional candidate they will support. These PACs do not simply give to all black or female candidates running for Congress, but only to those of certain ideological leanings, underscoring an important focus of this chapter—the diversity of nontraditional congressional candidates.

Most women and minority candidates have been elected to Congress under the Democratic Party label and have generally been supportive of liberal policy agendas (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994; Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994**)**. While this statement remains true for the current Congress, there is evidence within the candidate pools of these groups that their relative partisan and ideological homogeneity is changing. In the 2000 congressional elections, for example, the diversity of women candidates was quite evident. According to the Center for American Women and Politics, there were 122 women candidates seeking seats in Congress in 2000. Eighty of these women candidates ran as Democrats and 42 ran as Republicans. Of the 52

candidates that were incumbents, 37 were Democrats and 15 were Republican. Twenty-two of the 54 women challengers were Republican. Like men running for Congress, women congressional candidates differ with respect to political party and ideology--women candidates are politically diverse.

Similarly, political partisanship and ideology vary within the current pool of black congressional candidates. Of the 67 black congressional candidates in 2000, 23 were Republican, according to the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. While there was only one black Republican incumbent (J.C. Watts-OK) at the time, the number of quality black Republican challengers is increasing. The success of Black America's PAC (BAMPAC) in recruiting politically experienced black Republican candidates to challenge black Democratic candidates and incumbents provides evidence of this growing diversity among black congressional candidates. Thus, the pool of black candidates is also undergoing change in its partisan and ideological composition.

While this trend toward increasing diversity among women and black congressional candidates has been recognized in practical politics, scholars examining the relationship between candidate attributes and PAC contributions have largely neglected this important nontraditional candidate characteristic. As such, research examining the relationship between candidate characteristics and contributions paints an incomplete and possibly distorted picture of bias. Without controlling for the interactive effects of partisanship and ideology among these types of candidates, we are not able to discern the real dynamics of any bias that may be at work in affecting their bids for office and increasing the representative quality of Congress. Importantly,

different combinations of candidate characteristics for women and minority candidates may produce different advantages or disadvantages within the candidate pool of these nontraditional candidates specifically in terms of attracting PAC money.

Combining relevant theoretical frameworks and research findings in the areas of interest groups, gender and race, candidate positioning, and candidate evaluation, this chapter proposes hypotheses that specifically address the dynamics of PAC giving to nontraditional candidates. Theoretically grounding these research questions in this integrative manner produces interesting hypotheses regarding the effects of gender and race within the current political context, suggesting that these attributes may not necessarily be an obstacle for candidates in attracting PAC contributions. As opposed to treating race and gender as variables that yield a singular effect on a candidate's fundraising ability, these hypotheses allow for a more rigorous and nuanced examination of the influence of nontraditional candidate status on attracting PAC contributions. This chapter presents hypotheses that take into account the status, party, and ideology of nontraditional candidates that are derived from the literature on candidate characteristics and campaign contributions; the following chapters empirically test these hypotheses.

Which Candidates Attract PAC Contributions?

The literature suggests that PAC contributions may be influenced by many factors. Because PAC contributions reflect strategic decisions (Sabato 1984), candidate status, aspects of the election, as well characteristics of the district, influence who receives PAC money. For example, PACs have limited resources, so they must choose which candidates they will

contribute to. Many PACs prefer close elections, where their contributions are more likely to make a difference, as well as districts where they have an organizational chapter. Some of the different factors influencing PAC contributions are described below.

Scholars have repeatedly confirmed the types of candidates that attract PAC contributions. Generally, these are candidates who have the best chances of winning election, and therefore being in positions to influence public policy of concern to contributing PACs. In the PAC quest for legislative access, money flows to those with power. It follows therefore, that PACs reward and invest in those candidates running for re-election, as opposed to those seeking office for the first time. In meeting their goals of legislative access, PACs are drawn to those candidates who will be able to exert influence in policy areas of concern to them. In order to exert this influence, therefore, a candidate must first get elected to office. Thus, incumbent congressional candidates present the safest bet for PACs.

Incumbency

Part of the incumbency advantage enjoyed by members of Congress is the overwhelming advantage they have in raising funds. PACs, which like to bet on sure winners, consistently favor incumbents (Sabato 1984, Jacobson 1990).[7] Many scholars argue that PACs buy legislative *access* (Gopoian 1984, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Grenzke 1990, Hansen 1991, Austen-Smith 1995)[8]. Because most incumbents are reelected, PAC motivations in guaranteeing such continued legislative access helps explain their incumbent bias in political giving. Challengers, on the other hand, have no record on which to run, and therefore represent an

[7] Because of the advantages they enjoy, such as name recognition, incumbents have little difficulty raising campaign funds and they spend less money than do challengers in order to be reelected. For incumbents, additional spending beyond a minimum yields a smaller return in the number of votes received (Jacobson 1980). Excessive spending on the part of the incumbent is generally a signal that the incumbent is facing a strong challenger (Jacobson 1980).

[8] Recent work, based on an experimental design of congressional staffers, argues that this connection between PACs and legislative access should be considered in relation to constituency (Chin, Bond, and Geva 2000).

unknown and potentially risky investment for PACs. Moreover, challengers win less than ten percent of the time. Thus, PACs prefer the safe investment strategy of contributing to incumbent reelection campaigns.

While many nontraditional candidates run for congressional office as challengers or as candidates in open seats, a sizeable number of these candidates already hold office. Therefore, we would expect them to enjoy all the benefits that are available to incumbents, including advantages in fundraising. The PAC bias toward incumbents is expected to be transferred to these nontraditional candidates. Therefore, the first hypothesis takes into account the status of the nontraditional candidate:

H_1: Nontraditional candidates who are incumbents will attract more PAC money than nontraditional candidates who are challengers.

Leadership Position and Majority Party Status

Additionally, incumbents are advantaged in terms of their service within the chamber as well. Incumbents may hold leadership positions within the chamber or within committees whose policy jurisdictions are relevant to PACs. Much work has analyzed the effects of leadership and committee positions on attracting PAC contributions (Grier and Munger 1986, Romer and Synder 1994; Wright 1985, 1990; Hall and Wayman 1990). Some studies have found that some kinds of PACs are likely to change the contribution behavior as committee memberships change (Romer and Snyder 1994), and others have found that there is indeed a connection between receiving PAC contributions and possessing power in Congress (Grenzke 1989). Money tends to follow power, flowing disproportionately to the majority party and patterns of PAC giving reflect this bias (Cox and Magar 1999). For example, the shift to Republican control of Congress in

1994 paralleled a shift in corporate and business PAC giving to Republican candidates (Herrnson and Wilcox 1999, Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Thus, power and leadership can be important determinants of PAC contributions.

H_2: Nontraditional incumbents in leadership positions will attract more PAC money than nontraditional incumbents who do not hold leadership positions.

H_3: Nontraditional incumbents of the majority party will attract more PAC money than nontraditional incumbents of the minority party.

Aspects of the Election: Close Races and Open Seats

Characteristics of individual elections themselves are also important when examining PAC contributions. Close races, where an incumbent faces a strong challenger, attract heightened media attention, resources from the national parties, and much PAC funding (Jacobson 2001). Therefore, PAC money flows to those close contests where their contributions are likely to influence the outcome.

Additionally, in the absence of an incumbent, elections are more likely to become competitive, fueling general interest in the campaign and increasing candidates' fundraising abilities. These open seats produce an opportunity for PACs to influence congressional newcomers. Such contests are often expected to attract the greatest competition, so the greatest amount of money is needed (Gaddie and Bullock 2000). Both close races and open seats present electoral opportunities where PAC contributions are more likely to make a real difference in the outcome.

H_4: Nontraditional candidates who run in open seats or close races will attract more PAC money than nontraditional candidates who face an incumbent or run in an otherwise noncompetitive race.

District Characteristics

Characteristics of the individual congressional districts that legislators represent may also influence PAC contributions. If a PAC has an organizational chapter within a congressional district, it is likely it will contribute. These organizational chapters may in fact coincide with constituency interest: the UAW, for instance is more likely to have organizational chapters in certain congressional districts where the auto industry employs large percentages of the population. Additionally, demographic characteristics of congressional districts, such as partisan and racial composition as well as the percent of the district that is rural or urban, may also affect PAC contributions to congressional candidates. While these hypotheses will be articulated in more detail in the following chapters, the general notion is that certain district demographic characteristics are associated with attracting certain PAC contributions and that this advantage is conferred on the candidate running in that particular district regardless of the gender or race of the candidate.

H_5: Nontraditional candidates competing in districts with demographic characteristics that align with particular interests will attract contributions from PACs that represent those interests.

For example, nontraditional candidates in districts with large percentages of manufacturing jobs should be advantaged in attracting labor PAC contributions. Later chapters will examine three distinct sets of interests--labor, corporate, and ideological—and patterns of giving to nontraditional candidates by PACs that represent these interests.

Likely Winners

Lastly, because PACs are additionally concerned with influencing public policy, they tend to support the likely winners in congressional elections. PAC contributions can be considered as a means to influence public policy, a concept described as the "campaign contribution contract" (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996.) When contributing groups enter into such contracts with members of Congress, the hope is that when relevant issues arise, the contributing groups will be consulted. Additionally, if the interest group has a particular concerns or request for casework, then the member of Congress would respond favorably; however, empirical treatment of the enforcement of such contracts has not supported the existence of a credible commitment contract (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996.) Nevertheless, the access that PAC contributions buy may ultimately affect the content of policy. Among candidates, likely winners are most likely to be in positions where such access and its corresponding potential for policy influence are likely to matter.

Therefore, in addition to incumbents, likely winners may be those who have a substantial fundraising advantage over their opponents, are politically experienced, are shown to be ahead in the polls, and/or are good ideological fits with voters in their districts (see e.g. Johannes and McAdams 1981; Erikson and Wright 1983; Brady et al 1996; Ansolabehere, Sndyer and Stewart 2001.) In fact, much research has focused on the electoral costs to incumbents who stray too far

ideologically from their district. Constituent ideology is a consideration, in gaining as well as maintaining congressional office. Thus, district ideology is equally important to the campaign strategies of both challengers and incumbents (Brady, Canes-Wrone and Cogan 2000; Erikson and Wright 2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001.) Successful congressional candidates are those who understand their constituent ideology and position themselves accordingly.[9]

The Median Voter Theory (Downs 1957, Black 1958) provides the theoretical rationale behind the notion of optimal candidate positioning. In this spatial theory of voting, policies exist in a one-dimensional ideological space. Each voter has her own ideal point or placement along this ideological dimension. Points closest to ideal points are most preferred; points far away are least preferred. The implication of this theory for candidates is that they will tend to converge around the ideal point of the median voter so as to maximize their electoral support. Thus, there is strategic electoral advantage to the ideological placement or position of candidates.[10] We would expect more conservative candidates to come from more conservative districts and more liberal candidates to come from more liberal districts. However, regardless of the ideological skewness of particular districts, a main implication of this theory is that candidates are expected to benefit from their moderation.[11]

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[9] The degree to which U.S. House candidates historically have reflected district ideology has waxed and waned (Ansolabehere, Snyder, Stewart 2001); particular decades of heightened ideological congruence (1940s and 1970s) resulted from constituency pressure. Recent work (see, e.g. Canes-Wrone et al. 2002) confirm the notion that being "out of step" with one's district results in lower vote shares.

[10] Optimal electoral positioning may not always be beneficial for candidates. Several important works on representation and congressional elections, for example, have focused on the sometimes competing influences of constituency and party (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1978).

[11] Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) find that competitive congressional districts are more likely to produce moderate candidates.

While ideological moderation is important for all candidates, it is especially important for nontraditional candidates. For incumbents, ideological placement is relatively easy to discern: the standard measure is based upon their legislative voting patterns. Yet, many nontraditional candidates run as challengers, and as such, their ideological position will be defined by the campaign and more importantly, inferred by voters and PACs in deciding whom to support. Voter perceptions or stereotypes regarding gender and race may make it more difficult for these candidates to package themselves as moderate. I argue that for nontraditional candidates, gender and race serve as ideological cues for policy-relevant information and that PACs use this information in making their decisions to contribute.

PAC giving to women and minority candidates, especially the purported disadvantage that they may have in this area, may be less the result of overt discrimination on the part of these interest group donors than it is a strategic calculation of the candidates who can best support their preferred policy agenda. If nontraditional candidates are perceived by PACs as they are by voters--of being "too liberal"-- then they are less likely to be well-positioned electorally and therefore, less likely to win. Consequently, PACs are less likely to support these candidates.

H_6 The ability of nontraditional candidates to attract PAC contributions will be determined by the liberal ideological signals of gender and race.

Race and Gender Stereotypes as Policy Relevant Electoral Cues

Substantial research has demonstrated that demographic group membership serves as a heuristic for voters (Conover and Feldman 1989, Williams 1990, Rahn 1993, McDermott 1997, Koch 2000), particularly in low-information environments such as congressional elections.

While the popular meaning of the term "stereotype" is negative, the body of work on the use of these cognitive shortcuts views this term as having a more neutral connotation; research has found that group stereotypes can serve useful political purposes[12]

For instance, candidates who are members of these groups tend to attract substantial media attention that heightens their awareness among voters and can help their competitive advantage (Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). Additionally, these cues have been found to supplement the standard cue of party identification for voters (Rahn 1993). Group membership stereotypes provide policy specific information beyond the general assumptions made by knowing a candidate's party ID; voters may use these stereotypes to ascribe specific political priorities and to understand the types of groups and issues that are likely to benefit from the election of these candidates (Golebiowska 2001). Yet, the assumption is that women and minority candidates fit with these group stereotypes. What happens when they do not?

Numerous experimental designs have found that women and black candidates are consistently perceived as more liberal than they actually are (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, Leeper 1991, Rossenwasser and Seale 1988, Sapiro 1982) and this finding has been confirmed using NES data (McDermott 1997). More recently, Koch (2000) employed data from the SES (ANES Pooled Senate Election Study) in testing the use of gender stereotypes and found that even after accounting for voters' own ideological orientations, candidate gender still produced "substantial effects" on voters' perceptions of candidate ideology. The candidate demographic characteristics of race and gender appear to signal ideological positions to voters. In the current

[12] Huddy and Terkildsen (1993a) distinguish between two types of group stereotypes: belief and trait stereotypes. Belief stereotypes are those that include a candidate's political ideology and political priorities. Trait stereotypes are those personal qualities that voters may infer about candidates based on their group membership. Stereotypes for the purpose of this research will be used to mean belief stereotypes—candidate ideologies that would affect their political beliefs.

political environment this perception on behalf of voters can decrease the electability of these nontraditional candidates, which may ultimately harm the descriptive representation of Congress.

Because ideological positioning is so important to candidate success, the ideological signal associated with the gender and race of a nontraditional candidate may work to their benefit or to their detriment. Huddy and Terkildsen (1993a) found that gender stereotypes have negative implications for women candidates who run for national office. They further found that even though they manipulated candidate traits like ambition in their experimental study, respondents still inferred female traits upon hypothetical candidates. Ambitious women were still viewed as "caring" and "sensitive." Competency on male issues did not reduce traditional feminine expectations for these candidates. Gender itself sent an active signal in candidate evaluations and persisted beyond the manipulation of candidate traits. Oxley and Fox (2000) analyzed state level executive offices from 1978-1998 and found that female candidates are more successful when they seek offices that emphasize "female" issues, like the Superintendent of Education, but that this is only true among Democratic women**.** These types of offices fit well with traditional gender stereotypes of women. When male issues are emphasized, they found that Democratic women candidates tend to be disadvantaged.

This is not to say that the gender ideological cue acts only to the detriment of women candidates; women can take advantage of this cue as well. King and Matland's research (1998) found an electoral advantage for women candidates that was attributed to voter stereotyping. Notably, however, this advantage was found to be mediated by party. In their experimental study, Republican voters consistently evaluated Republican candidates as more liberal than comparable Republican male candidates. While this could make it more difficult for these women to win primary elections, King and Matland note that women would be advantaged in

general elections due to the cross-over support they are likely to receive. When the liberal ideological cue of gender is paired with a conservative party cue (Republican), a moderating effect is produced, optimally positioning those candidates in terms of electoral success. The authors note that this advantage for Republican women does not appear for Democratic women. This finding is again consistent with the liberal ideological cue of gender. When the liberal ideological cue of gender is paired with a liberal party cue (Democrat), the effect is not one of moderation but of ideological extremity—those candidates are unable to optimally position themselves, and may be less likely to win.

In a similar view, Oxley and Fox (2000) "unexpectedly" find that Republican women are more successful than Republican men at all levels of state elective office, and devote attention to discussing this "mystery of Republican women." While they report that Republican women are more likely to run in Republican leaning districts, candidate positioning may provide another explanation. The authors pose the question: "Why do Democratic women face more hostile electorates than Republican women? (2000, 8)" One answer may lie in the different abilities of women candidates to position themselves moderately. Because of the liberal ideological cue of gender, Republican women will be more easily able to moderate than Democratic women.

Additionally, Herrnson, Lay and Stokes (2001) find that women are more likely to campaign on gender-related issues and appeal to supportive social groups than are men, and that women candidates "reap electoral rewards" from this approach to campaigning. Women candidates are more likely to call upon social groups that advocate for certain public policies, which supports research that finds this connection between women candidates and supportive

groups to be part of the foundation of the gender ideological cue (Golebiowska 2001) In summary, the gender cue can be either an advantage or a disadvantage for women seeking office; the overall effect of the liberal ideological cue of gender will be mediated by party.

The demographic cue of race has also been shown to signal candidate ideology, although the body of research in this area is less extensive. Using data collected from a quasi-experimental Los Angeles Times Poll, McDermott (1998) found that race does act as an informational cue to voters in low information elections. In this survey regarding hypothetical presidential candidates, voters stereotyped black candidates as being more liberal than white candidates. Additionally, black candidates were viewed as having greater competency in dealing with issues of poverty and minority rights—policy issue traits that did not appear in the absence of racial cues (1998).

These survey results confirm earlier findings regarding candidate evaluation and race. Work by Williams (1990) found that both black and white survey respondents were more likely to describe hypothetical black candidates as "liberal" than white candidates, and they were more likely to attribute liberal issue positions to black candidates as well. McDermott concludes that voters evaluate candidates based on how well the ideological and issue stereotypes they attribute to black candidates match their own ideological and issue positions. She further notes that these candidates should be advantaged when their stereotyped views match those of the electorate. Therefore, similar to the ideological cue of gender, the racial cue also can be an advantage or a disadvantage to nontraditional congressional candidates.

I argue that voters aren't the only ones who make use of these demographic cues: PAC behavior may be influenced by them as well. PAC decisions to contribute may be directly and indirectly affected by the ideological cues of race and gender. First, most PACs are primarily

concerned with issues of electability, so even if they themselves are not assessing candidate ideology based on demographic stereotypes, they are aware of voters' assessments of candidates, which factor in to PAC calculations regarding whom to support. Second, PACs themselves may directly reach conclusions similar to voters. PACs want to know which candidates are likely to support their causes and are likely to advocate for their preferred policy positions and may reach these conclusions by relying on the same stereotypes of race and gender employed by voters.. Direct or indirect, the ideological cues of gender and race supply PACs with policy relevant information about which candidates they should support.

Different Strategies for Different Types of PACs

Not all PACs, however, are alike. Different types of PACs will be more or less likely to support nontraditional candidates based on the stereotyped information provided by the ideological cues of gender and race. To understand how these cues differentially affect nontraditional candidates in receiving contributions from these different PACs, one must first understand the strategy and motivation behind the giving patterns of PACs. This study focuses on the contribution patterns of three types of PACs to nontraditional candidates: corporate, labor and ideological.

Corporate

Corporate PACs consistently display an incumbent bias in their giving patterns, primarily due to their emphasis on seeking access and influence with Congress (Smith 2000, Jacobson 2001). These PACs have been found to operate strategically in a defensive manner (Sabato 1980, Matasar 1986) in order to maintain this access to and influence with members of Congress.

While these PACs may look for an ideological match among candidates seeking office, there must be a strong chance for candidates to win in order for corporate PACs to invest in their campaigns. These PACs make sure to bet on winners; corporate PACs are pragmatic in their approach to contributions.

Aside from incumbents, corporate PACs are also biased toward supporting members of Congress in positions of institutional leadership (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Smith 2000). They have been found to decrease incumbent support in favor of members of Congress on specific influential committees regarding tax policy, appropriations, or business regulation (Matasar 1986). The pragmatism of corporate PAC giving extends to decisions among which incumbents to support.

Early work described corporate PACs as being less partisan than labor union PACs, due to their emphasis on an access strategy (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), yet predictions were made that this dampened partisanship might increase if Democrats lost control of Congress. On the other hand, some have argued that it was incorrect to assume no partisan bias among corporate PACs. In her study of Fortune 500 affiliated corporate PACs, Matasar (1986) found that in one-third of these PACs, members were permitted to earmark their contributions for specific candidates. Thus, ideological considerations can enter into the contribution decisions of corporate PACs. However, the general bias toward incumbents does not mean that these PACs do not pursue other strategies. While corporate PACs will give to both Democrats and Republicans creating the impression that they are primarily pragmatic actors, incumbents still view corporate PACs as a threat because they are usually well-funded enough to be able to engage in risky, ideological based behavior if they wish, pursuing long-term rather than short-term goals (Matasar 1986).

In their book, *After the Revolution: PACs, Lobbies, and the Republican Congress*, Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox (1999) conduct interviews with PAC leaders and find that corporate business PACs benefited greatly from the partisan change in congressional leadership. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) and the Business Industry PAC (BIPAC) in particular changed their strategies to reflect the more favorable partisan composition in Congress. NFIB gained greater access to leadership and BIPAC was afforded opportunity to focus on protecting the seats of vulnerable Republicans as opposed to unseating Democrats (1999). Democrats lost on average 19% of their corporate PAC contributions after the Republican Revolution (Jacobson 2001). Due to partisan changes in Congress, corporate PAC contributions have been able to become more partisan in their approach to giving.

H_7: Because of the conservative and access-oriented bias of corporate PACs, it is expected that conservative women and black nontraditional candidates, particularly incumbents, will attract more corporate contributions than their liberal nontraditional counterparts.

Labor

PACs associated with labor unions have long been closely allied with the Democratic Party, with over 90% of their money going to support Democratic candidates in most elections (Rozell and Wilcox 1999). Their strategy of giving can be described as partisan or ideological in nature, yet in addition to this strategy, these PACs also engage in access strategies. Hurd and Sohl (1992) found evidence of multiple strategies in their study of individual labor PACs, although the majority of labor PACs did pursue an electoral or ideological approach. Labor PACs seek access from members of Congress, especially those members of Congress who serve on relevant committees or hold positions of institutional power (Grier and Munger 1993). So,

while labor PACs will support Democratic candidates in general, they will especially devote support towards re-electing powerful incumbent Democrats. Research has shown that labor PACs may even use short-term punishment strategies against Democratic "defectors" who support the anti-labor position on legislation (Engel and Jackson 1998).

In addition, labor PACs also exhibit electoral strategies, protecting vulnerable Democratic incumbents and supporting the campaigns of promising Democratic challengers. In 1982, labor gave over half of all their total contributions to the campaigns of Democratic challengers, while in 1984 , labor switched its focus to protecting Democratic incumbents vulnerable to the electoral forces of a popular president with strong coattails (Rozell and Wilcox 1999). The giving strategy of labor PACs is primarily partisan and ideological in nature and should benefit Democratic candidates in general.

While Democratic candidates on the whole are advantaged, this advantage may be especially extended to nontraditional candidates. Again, the liberal ideological demographic cues of race and gender should influence the contribution decisions of these PACs. Although in the case of corporate PACs, these cues diminished the abilities of nontraditional candidates, particularly liberal women and black candidates, who were therefore perceived as being "too liberal" to attract contributions, in the case of labor PACs, such labeling would serve to increase contributions. Because the liberal ideological cues of gender and race fit with the ideological bias of labor PACs, certain nontraditional candidates should be benefited.

H_8: Because of the liberal and electoral strategy of labor PACs, it is expected that liberal women and black nontraditional candidates, especially incumbents, will attract more labor contributions than their conservative nontraditional counterparts.

Ideological

Ideological PACs are an especially important financial resource for nontraditional challengers. These PACs exhibit an offensive strategy and are therefore much more likely to support the campaigns of challengers than incumbents. Ideological PACs have been described as "adversarial" (Eismeier and Pollock 1986) and therefore the amount of money they spend in an election may depend on their own particular perception of the current political environment. Motivated not only to change the composition of Congress by supporting the elections (or encouraging the defeat) of their most preferred (and least preferred) candidates, ideological PACs also seek "to influence the terms of debate (Latus 1984)." These PACs actively work to "maximize the representation of their views" in Congress in hopes of advancing legislative support for their ideological positions (1984). The national electoral environment may cause ideological groups to adopt an offensive strategy (supporting challengers) or a defensive strategy (protecting incumbent seats). While not all of these ideological groups are consistent in their partisan support, many have allied themselves with one of the two main political parties (Jacobson 2001).

H_9: *Because of the electoral strategies of ideological PACs, it is expected that nontraditional candidates who match the ideological leanings of these particular PACs will attract contributions from these groups.*

Challengers, PAC Types, and Early Giving to Nontraditional Candidates

In addition to the diversity of motivations and strategies employed by different types of PACs, there are also differences regarding when PACs are likely to contribute to candidates. . Money alone does not determine the outcome of elections; however, the strategic use of money

makes fundraising critical to candidate success. Money that is raised early in a campaign provides the name recognition that is so important for challengers, and discourages other competitors from entering the contest. Early money is also important to fund polling efforts to gauge one's electability. Indeed, early money can be a determinant of credibility itself, and therefore is an important variable to account for in analyzing the success of nontraditional candidates' abilities to attract PAC contributions.

While there has been a mix of aggregate and individual level analysis in these legislative impact studies, with conflicting findings, the scope of these studies has often been too specific to generalize to different policy areas or different PAC types. Additionally, early PAC giving, while focused mostly on incumbents, remains largely an unstudied aspect of the electoral success of challengers. Certain PACs, those primarily ideological in nature, exhibit patterns of giving that are in fact favorable to challengers in congressional elections, first by giving, and second, by giving early. These aspects of the study of PAC contributions also have important implications for the electoral success of nontraditional congressional candidates.[13]

Another important empirical aspect of this research project, therefore, will examine primary and general election PAC contributions in order to analyze the role of early money for nontraditional congressional candidates. Early money is especially crucial for nontraditional challengers who lack name recognition and perceived political viability. Early money allows these candidates to get past the first electoral hurdle---their party's primary. Thus, analysis of both PAC giving during both the primary and general election cycles will enable conclusions to

[13] The timing of campaign contributions has been analyzed using duration and event history models (see e.g., Box-Steffensmeier 1996) My particular analysis is not well suited to such models for several reasons. First, the argument here is that the immutable characteristics of race and gender will have different effects in the primary and general election, not that they will produce different effects across weeks of the election cycle. Additionally, these models require that there be sufficient value changes in variables across time points in the data set; and for many of the variables in this analysis, no such change occurs. References to "timing" in this discussion refer specifically to the early time period of the primary election and the late time period of the general election.

be drawn regarding the kinds of candidates that are advantaged and disadvantaged in attracting this source of "seed money." Studies of the timing of giving have focused mostly on the importance of early campaign contributions from the perspective of the incumbent, who uses these "war chests" to ward off quality challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996). Analyzing the dynamics of how early PAC contributions may affect later contributions, therefore contributing to the overall electoral success of nontraditional candidates, will help further our understanding of these bids for office.

Importantly, different PAC sectors have different "timing biases" that may help or hinder some candidates in their attempts to gain party nominations. Corporate PAC giving also is important in terms of timing. Generally, corporate PACs do not contribute during congressional primaries and therefore miss the opportunity to influence the party nomination. Their contributions generally occur in the general election contest as they are better able to gauge the likely winner (Matasar 1986). Corporate PACs favor incumbents not only by contributing to them more often but also by giving money to challengers too late in their campaigns (p 61). Labor PACs generally also give support during the general election cycle for their preferred candidates. However, they may be willing to give early to candidates in primaries who support their policy positions, in attempts to help "the right kind of Democrat" make it into the general election. Ideological PACs, on the other hand, are much more likely not only to support challengers in general, but to give this support at crucial early stages of elections. Ideological PACs, which focus on electioneering strategies, are more likely to support candidates during primary elections. Of course, these PACs, if resources allow, will continue to support their preferred candidate in the general election. For ideological reasons, however, these PACs are

more likely to engage in the risky behavior of "early giving" in hopes of having early electoral influence. Therefore, the timing biases of different types of PACs may also affect the candidacies of nontraditional candidates.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has presented expectations regarding nontraditional candidate's abilities to attract PAC contributions that account for differences among party, ideology and candidate status. Derived from theories of interest group influence, candidate evaluation and positioning, as well as theories regarding the demographic cues of gender and race, specific hypotheses were presented that will be tested in the Chapters Four through Six. I argue that PACs make use of the demographic cues of gender and race, which provide policy-relevant information, in making their decisions about which candidates to support. It may not be the case that all PACs discriminate against all nontraditional candidates. It may be the case that some nontraditional candidates are advantaged, and some are disadvantaged, but that this difference may be based on information signals "sent" by candidate attributes of race and gender.

CHAPTER 4

TOTAL PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO NONTRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES

The impact of fundraising in congressional elections has been thoroughly studied (Jacobson 1978, 1980, 1985; Mandel 1981; Sabato 1984; Sourauf 1988; Burrell 1985; Welch 1980; Magleby and Nelson 1990) and is known to be critical for candidate success (Jacobson 1980). A substantial source of much-needed campaign funds comes from political action committees (PACs). According to the Federal Elections Commission, PACs contributed 23 percent more during the 1999-2000 election cycle than they had previously, for a total of about $580 million to all federal candidates. A record level of these contributions, $193 million, went to candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives (*CQ Daily Monitor* 5/31/01), with most going to congressional incumbents. In fact, on average, PAC contributions comprised 42% of overall campaign funds raised by incumbents in that election (Center for Responsive Politics).

If the permanent campaign for fundraising is necessary for incumbents, it is the critical element in defining the competitiveness of challengers.[14] Although there remains an incumbent bias in PAC giving, challengers must seek out this potential source of campaign funding. Some challengers, however, may have more difficulty attracting PAC contributions than others. Nontraditional candidates, those from underrepresented social groups in Congress like women and minorities, may find it particularly difficult to attract contributions from the traditional PACs

[14] See Blumenthal (1982) for a discussion of the permanent campaign for congressional incumbents and Ornstein and Mann (2000) for the democratic implications of the permanent campaign for politics and government more generally.

like corporations and unions that exhibit strong incumbent biases (Sabato 1984, Jacobson 1990). Scholars assert that PACs buy legislative *access* (Gopoian 1984, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Grenzke 1989, Hansen 1991, Austen-Smith 1995) and therefore sitting incumbents are viewed as safe investments. Because women and minorities are more likely to be challengers or candidates in open seat elections, such an incumbent bias in PAC giving may have important implications for the descriptive representation of Congress.

Race and Gender in Studies of PAC Contributions

Early studies examining the patterns of fundraising in the campaigns of women and minority candidates, while emphasizing the normative need for increased representation, have suffered from certain biases in their approach, which may be artifacts of the reality of descriptive representation in Congress two decades ago. Generally, studies have presumed (1) that patterns of PAC giving are discriminatory and unfavorable to women and minority candidates, (2) that all women and all minority candidates share the same party and ideology, and (3) that looking at the amount of money these candidates have raised at the "finish line"—the general election—is sufficient in exploring overall funding patterns for these candidates. Each underlying assumption of these studies neglects important dynamics of fundraising for the current generation of women and minority congressional candidates and is discussed below.

A Focus on Discrimination

Much anecdotal evidence from women congressional candidates pointed to fundraising difficulty as a barrier for women seeking elected office (Witt, Paget and Matthews 1994). Several empirical studies tested the idea that women candidates were experiencing

discrimination in their fundraising efforts. Yet, many of these studies found that no bias or discrimination existed, for women candidates raised amounts of money similar to men; incumbency status was the main determinant of receiving PAC contributions (Uhlaner and Scholzman 1986; Herrick 1985; Darcy, Welch and Clark 1994). Examining campaign receipts for men and women candidates from 1972-1982, Barbara Burrell found that after controlling for incumbency, men and women relied equally on PAC contributions as an average percent of their overall campaign receipts (Burrell 1985). These conclusions are echoed in a similar study of 1980 U.S. House candidates (Uhlaner and Scholzman 1986). Once women were elected, they too would benefit from the fundraising advantage of incumbency.

In their1991 book, *Discrimination and Congressional Campaign Contributions,* John Theilmann and Al Wilhite also examined the role of PACs in the fundraising efforts of women and minority candidates, and argued that they do in fact face discrimination by certain types of PACs. While they found that trade/membership/health PACs do discriminate by giving less money to black candidates, they also found evidence that black and women challengers are favored by the biases of some types of PACs. They argued that although PACs did exhibit a "tendency to discriminate on the basis of race and sex, the direction of this differential depended on candidate status" (1991: 152). Labor and non-connected PACs favored black challengers, in the years of their study; women were also advantaged by non-connected PAC contributions (Theilmann and Wilhite 1991). They conclude that these "unexpected funding differentials" demonstrate evidence of PAC *support* for non-incumbent women and minority candidates, (1991). Studies that focused on exploring the dynamics of discrimination in PAC giving, therefore, have generally found that women and minority candidates are not at an overall disadvantage and in fact, in some instances may be favored.

Nontraditional Candidates as Liberal Democrats

Studies of PAC contributions to women and minority candidates are also based on the implicit assumption that both types of candidates are liberal Democrats. Indeed, while this assumption was largely true for the years of these studies, the increasing numbers of nontraditional candidates have exhibited increasing diversity, both in terms of party affiliation and ideology. Examinations of PAC contributions to women and minority candidates must take into account the different *kinds* of women and black candidates that are currently running for Congress.

According to the Center for American Women in Politics, there were 122 women candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2000; fifty-two of those women were incumbents. Of these 122 women candidates, forty-one ran as Republicans—fifteen of them as incumbents. Women candidates can no longer be assumed to have liberal preferences or Democratic Party affiliations. Even among Democratic women, there is evidence of more ideological moderation in terms of operative preferences in campaigns for various levels of office.[15] The recent Democratic gubernatorial primary election in Massachusetts highlights this use of moderate ideology by women candidates. Shannon O'Brien won her Democratic gubernatorial primary, as analysts described, "partly because of her ability to portray herself as a centrist candidate" (*New York Times* 9/18/02).

No longer is it sufficient to include gender alone as a control variable in empirical analyses of PAC giving. Additional interactions of gender with candidate status, party, and ideology should be added to empirical models and will provide more appropriate and detailed descriptions of patterns of PAC contributions to different kinds of women candidates.

[15] Rohde (1991) defines operant preferences as the preferences that govern the vote choice, as opposed to a legislator's own personal preferences.

Similar to women, changes among types of black candidates in terms of party and ideology also highlight the need for a more complete treatment of minority candidates in empirical analyses. Of the sixty-six black congressional candidates in 2000, for instance, forty-four ran as Democrats and twenty-two ran as Republicans, one being an incumbent. Black Republican candidates across the country are beginning to challenge incumbent black Democrats. The 2000 U.S. House elections provide many examples: Representatives Sanford Bishop of Georgia, Corrine Brown of Florida, Maxine Waters of California, and James Clyburn of South Carolina--the Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus---were all challenged by black Republican candidates (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies). Black candidates, therefore, are running in larger numbers as Republicans.

Not only are changes evident in the increase of black Republican candidates, but these changes are evident among the types of black Democratic candidates running as well. In Georgia, Representative Cynthia McKinney lost her primary election in 2000 to African-American Denise Magette, who portrayed herself as the more moderate Democratic candidate. *The Washington Pos*t reported that one Congressional Black Caucus member, Representative Bennie Thompson (D-MS), said that he and other members are trying to distance themselves from their image as a "pro-union, liberal group hostile to corporate interests" (Lardner 2001) in hopes of attracting political contributions. Ideological moderation, therefore, is also occurring among some black candidates. Studies regarding PAC bias must account for these changes among black and women candidates, investigating not only the effect of candidate race and gender, but also the influence of candidate status, party, and ideology in conditioning the effects

of race and gender. It may be inappropriate to conclude that women and black candidates are either helped or hurt by patterns of PAC giving; it may be that certain PAC contributions help or hurt certain *kinds* of these nontraditional congressional candidates.

A Focus on Campaign Fundraising Totals

A last assumption seen in previous work on PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates concerns timing. Previous studies examining PAC bias analyzed the total amount of money raised by candidates at the time of the general election. This focus ignored the important role money plays at early stages of election cycles, especially in the campaigns of challengers. Money raised early in a campaign provides the name recognition that is so important for challengers and helps fund polling efforts to gauge one's electability. Early money is indeed a measure of candidate credibility, and must also be considered in studies of PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates.

PAC biases related to the decision of when to make contributions are not evident by examining candidates' total PAC receipts. In fact, some PACs may be less prone to make contributions until the general election, whereas other PACs may readily support candidates for their primary nomination bids. Some PACs have seemingly unlimited amounts of money and can afford to support multiple candidates at many different times during the election cycle. Other PACs, however, are not as well funded, and must target their giving to fewer candidates, and may do so at times earlier on in the election cycle. Some PACs may "hedge their bets" for legislative access by giving to both candidates in an election, while other PACs for ideological reasons, would not. Studies of PAC behavior and influence must consider these differences in PACs, their motivations, and their strategies.

There has been virtually no research examining the impact of PAC giving during the primary election cycle. Studies of the timing of giving have focused mostly on the importance of early campaign contributions from the perspective of the incumbent, who uses these "war chests" to ward off quality challengers (Box-Steffensmeier 1996). Other studies that have examined congressional challenger fundraising have focused solely on the general election. Burrell's 1985 study concluded that the campaigns of "men and women *nominees* are similarly structured financially [emphasis added]" (1985: 263). Analyzing candidacies for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1980, Uhlaner and Schlozman also find no difference in campaign receipts by gender. Importantly, these authors conclude that their findings "allow us to draw no conclusion about the relative success of men and women in raising funds *prior to receiving a major party nomination* [emphasis added] (1986:47). Focusing only on the "finish line" of elections—examining only the final tally of campaign receipts among nontraditional candidates—ignores the differences that exist during the race that may affect who gets to the finish line. In order to increase the number of women and minority candidates in Congress, more of these candidates must first gain their party's nomination, and early funding is one important element of primary election success. Thus, research on differences in campaign fundraising must also consider the timing of PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates.

Understanding the Effects of Race and Gender

I argue that in order to understand how PAC contributions influence who gets elected, we must empirically examine the roles of gender, race, and their interactions with candidate status, party and ideology. A more complete analysis of PAC contributions will allow for finer distinctions to be made among the various types of women and minority candidates now running

in larger numbers. Moving beyond the singular treatment of gender and race should provide a clearer picture of the contributing behavior of PACs to the campaigns of nontraditional candidates. These interactions would also allow for a more focused discussion of whether bias exists in PAC giving, as well as the ways in which these contributions may help or hinder the campaigns of nontraditional candidates.

Additionally, I argue that the timing of PAC contributions must also be considered in analyses. Nontraditional candidates, who are most likely to run as challengers, are quite dependent on early contributions to their campaigns in order to demonstrate their electoral viability. An unexamined source of PAC bias may exist in terms of early giving. PAC contributions from the primary as well as the general election should also be included in analyses in order to understand more fully the role of these contributions throughout the course of an election.

This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three. It is expected that total PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates will vary based on their individual characteristics of ideology, party, and candidate status. The model presented below tests the effects not only of gender and race in attracting PAC contributions, but the interactions of gender, race, party, ideology, and candidate status in order to create a more complete picture of PAC giving to nontraditional candidates. Further, it is expected that these trends may differ from the primary to the general election, and therefore, both cycles are analyzed. Specific aspects of the research design are described below.

Data and Measures

This analysis will examine total PAC contributions made to all general election candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives in the year 2000. The unit of analysis is the individual candidate receiving these PAC contributions. The amount of PAC contributions to these congressional candidates was obtained from the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and includes all filing reports completed by each candidate as of December 31, 2000. These PAC contributions will be examined during both the primary and general election cycles. In effect, there are two dependent variables, the amount of total PAC contributions received during the general election and the amount of total PAC contributions received during the primary election.

Because virtually the same independent variables will be used in modeling both of these equations, a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) will be employed. SURE analysis is useful in instances where regressions using similar independent variables are thought to have standard errors that are correlated. The results of a SURE analysis are the same as estimating separate regression analyses, but provide a way in which to perform joint tests of models, even when the models are nested. So, in this instance, the dependent variable in the second equation, total PAC contributions received during the primary election, becomes an independent variable in the first equation, determining the total PAC contributions received during the general election. Coefficients produced by this SURE technique are interpreted in the same manner as OLS coefficients.

Because the primary and general election models do not contain the exact same variables (the general election model includes the primary election contributions variable), this seemingly unrelated regression estimation procedure is also beneficial in producing more efficient estimates as well as standard errors. In this case, if the primary and general election equations were run

separately, the coefficients would be slightly different, but the size of the error terms would be much larger (Zellner 1962, Greene 1997). Additionally, running two separate OLS models would also prohibit any comparisons across these two models. In this particular case, examining the primary and general election cycles for all general election candidates does not present a situation for employing simultaneous equation methods, instead they can best be described as "nested" models. Similarly, because of the overlap of variables between the primary and general election, this data is not well-suited for a 2 Stage Least Squares analysis in which variables exogenous to the model must be identified that uniquely affect each equation. For these reasons, SURE, was deemed the appropriate method for analysis.

The main independent variables for this analysis are race, gender, as well as their interactions with candidate status, party, and ideology. These interactions allow for testing whether or not candidate status, party and ideology condition the impact of race and gender on PAC contributions. In other words, are certain *kinds* of nontraditional candidates (liberal/conservative African-Americans, liberal/conservative women) advantaged or disadvantaged by PAC giving in congressional elections? Specific data sources for these independent variables are discussed below.

The Center for American Women and Politics identifies all women candidates running for Congressional office in 2000. This listing serves as a guide in coding gender ("1"= female; N = 122). Candidate race ("1" = African American; N = 66) will be identified using the candidate listings of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. This organization tracks the status of black candidates' bids for various levels of elective office and indicates candidate status and party affiliation.

Other candidate characteristics are also included in these models of primary and general election PAC contributions. Candidate party (coded "1" for Democrat and "0" for Republican), and ideology are expected to affect a candidate's prospects of attracting PAC contributions, and it is expected that these two variables when interacted with race and gender respectively, will demonstrate that the impact of race and gender vary among different types of candidates. For example, Democratic women candidates may be advantaged if much of the early PAC giving is biased towards candidates who support more liberal agendas. The financial support of EMILY's List advantages pro-choice Democratic women. In this instance, liberal Democratic women candidates may be advantaged, even over other women candidates. The interaction between party and gender as well as party and race should produce a more complete understanding of the influence of race and gender.

Whereas the political party of a candidate is straightforward to measure, ideology can prove more difficult to obtain, particularly for challengers who have not yet held office. While NOMINATE scores are widely used and acceptable measures of incumbent ideology, these scores do not exist for congressional challengers. Fortunately, for challengers, ideology can be derived using a computation technique recently developed (see Burden 2000) which, based on the incumbent's vote share and the percent presidential vote in the district, can place multiple candidates along the same ideological metric, resulting in a unique spatial position or ideological score for each candidate.

Deriving the ideological position using this technique begins by setting the Democratic presidential candidate's position to 0 and the Republican presidential candidate to 1. The percent of the popular vote for the Republican presidential candidate represents the liberal or conservative preference of each congressional district. Additionally, for an incumbent, it is

assumed that her presidential support score would represent how close she is to the president's position. Knowing the president's position, the incumbent's position, and the ideological leaning of the district, the challenger's position can be calculated. The result, and indeed advantage, of this process is that it produces comparable ideology scores for all candidates, including challengers.[16] This technique is of additional value in that all candidates are placed on the same ideological metric, providing uniformity in measurement for the ideology variable.[17]

Specifically, this computation technique begins with the assumption that Democratic House candidates and the Democratic presidential candidate are placed at the 0 position and that both Republican candidates are placed at 1. Next, the overall left-right preference of the district can be determined by examining the percent of the vote captured by the Republican presidential candidate in the district. Thus, if presidential candidate George W. Bush won 60 percent of the vote in a district, then the district position on this metric would be fixed at 0.6. To determine the placement of candidates along this metric, presidential support scores are used.[18] An assumption

[16] To ensure reliability of the Burden ideology measure, computations for both challengers and incumbents were conducted. For incumbents, the resulting ideology measure was correlated with their NOMINATE scores (r=.84).

[17] There are alternative means of measuring candidate ideology. Project Vote Smart provides candidate ideology profiles for those candidates who take part in their National Political Awareness Test. However, not all candidates complete this survey. Political parties are now discouraging candidates from completing this survey because it may provide "too much" information to voters, possibly presenting them with issue positions on which they may disagree with the candidate. Results from a 2000 Candidate Ideology Survey (Burden 2001)are also available, but do not include information on all candidates running in the 2000 congressional cycle

[18] For incumbents, Burden uses the presidential support score for the preceding presidential election; for open seat candidates, he uses the presidential support score in the next election. Because his analysis is based on the 1988 election, he is able to use both 1984 and 1988 presidential support scores where the party of the president is consistent. Because my analysis examines candidates in 2000, the switch in party control of the presidency prevents the use of previous support scores. By using the support scores after the 2000 election, I am able to generate support scores for all winners, not just incumbents, and this provides consistency in the measurement across all winners. This computation is intended to measure ideology, and while there may be change in the scores for individual members of Congress year to year, the relative position should be similar.

is made with this technique that if a Republican member of Congress has a support score of 85 then that congressman is at least 85% of the way toward the president's position.[19]

Examples of candidate placement along this metric from the 2000 election may prove helpful in illustrating this procedure in general and in illustrating the relative placements of liberal, moderate and conservative candidates across this ideological scale. Republican Connie Morella (MD-8), is a liberal member of her party, with a presidential support score of 53. She represents a district in which George W. Bush received only 36% of the vote. Therefore, the moderate to liberal leanings of her district "push" her ideologically to the more liberal wing of her party. On the ideology scale that runs from 0-1, liberal to conservative, Congresswoman Morella scores a 0.37. By contrast, Republican Bob Barr (GA-7) scores a 0.96 on this scale. His district went 60% for Bush and his support score was a 91. Ray LaHood (IL-18) represents a more moderate member of the Republican Party. Although his presidential support score is fairly high at 74, he represents a district that only supported the Republican presidential candidate with 55% of the vote. His resulting ideology scores is a 0.62 on the scale.

Illustrative Democratic candidates also represent different ideological placements along this metric. Representative John Lewis (GA-5) is a liberal member of his party, as reflected in his presidential support score of 15. His Republican opponent did not fair well in his liberal leaning district, capturing only 23% of the vote. Congressman Lewis' ideology score on this scale is a liberal 0.16. By contrast, Congressman Bob Etheridge (NC-2) is a conservative member of the Democratic Party , with a presidential support score of 44. George W. Bush won

[19] Specifically, the formula for deriving the ideological position of congressional winners in 2000 would involve adding the winner's presidential support score to the difference of the Republican presidential vote in the district minus the Republican congressional vote. The computation for Republican losers would be 1 (the Republican candidate's starting position is equal to that of the Republican President) plus the difference of the Republican presidential vote in the district minus the Republican congressional vote. For Democratic losers, the computation is similar, except the Democratic candidate's starting position is assumed to be at position zero (the position of the Democratic presidential candidate), so the calculation is zero plus the presidential-congressional vote difference.

this district, getting 55% of the vote. Congressman Etheridge's resulting ideology score is a .58 on the Burden scale. Note, in fact, that Congressman Etheridge is more conservative than Republican Congresswoman Morella described in the above paragraph, reflecting the ideological variations across parties. Representative Darlene Hooley (OR-5) represents a Republican-leaning district, where Bush won 51% of the vote. Her presidential support score is a 36; her ideological score of 0.41 places her in the moderate range of Democratic Congress members.

While this measure may not be the best measure of ideology for incumbents, because it does not account for their legislative behavior once elected, its advantage lies in its ability to generate comparable scores for both incumbents and challengers—hence its specific utility in this research project. The ideology score for challengers facing a couple of the incumbents mentioned above are described here for illustrative purposes. Republican incumbent Bob Barr's (GA-7) opponent's ideology score, based on the performance of the Republican presidential and congressional candidates in the district is 0.07, meaning that the candidate is to the right of the ideological position of the Democratic presidential candidate. Democratic incumbent Bob Etheridge (NC-2) faced a challenger who scored a 1.14 on the ideology scale, due to the sizable difference in performance between the Republican presidential and congressional candidates in that district. Most candidates' ideology scores fall between the zero and one position, as representative of the somewhat artificial boundaries of the Democratic and Republican presidential candidate ideological placements respectively. Winning candidates were most likely to have ideological scores within this range, while losing candidates were most likely to have scores outside this range. The Burden ideological computation results in placements that are fairly representative of candidates' general ideological orientations and this measure is used as the main independent variable in the model.

Candidate status and experience are also likely to affect PAC contributions. Because most incumbents are reelected, PAC motivations in guaranteeing such continued legislative access help explain their incumbent bias in political giving. Challengers, on the other hand, have no record on which to run, and therefore represent an unknown and potentially risky investment for PACs. Open seat contests are perceived to be competitive and are therefore more likely to attract large contributions. Dummy variables for challenger status and for open seat candidates are therefore included in the models. Additionally, the quality of the challenger must also be considered and is operationalized using the Jacobson dichotomous measure of political experience ("1" = held political office and "0" = no previous elected office). For challengers, *CQ Almanac* and Project Vote Smart candidate profiles are used to determine previous political experience. The model must also account for certain types of incumbents that are likely to attract greater amounts of PAC contributions, namely those who hold either House leadership positions or serve on committees regarded as powerful within the chamber. A leadership position would include any of the following: speaker, minority leader, party whip, or conference chair. Powerful committees include Appropriations, Ways and Means, and the Rules Committee. Thus, the first set of control variables in the model account for various aspects of candidate characteristics.

The political environment in which candidates seek office must be considered as well. The level of party competition in a district is measured using the *CQ* index of district competitiveness. This index ranks congressional districts on a scale from –3 (safe Republican) to +3 (safe Democratic), with a score of zero indicating a perfectly competitive or "toss-up" election contest. Elections that are "sure things" for candidates may not attract as many contributions, for PACs are more likely to give the most when the competition is keen and they

believe their contribution will help make the difference in the outcome. Because this model is therefore concerned with the relative safety of the districts in which candidates run, and not the partisan leanings per se, the absolute value of these *CQ* index measures is employed in these models. So, the resulting measure of district safety ranges from a low of zero, indicating the most competitive district, to a high of three, indicating a safe seat.

Results and Discussion

The first model, presented in Table 4.1, estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with party on PAC contributions during the primary and general elections using seemingly unrelated regression estimation. Beginning with the primary election equation, candidate characteristics like party, candidate status, and challenger quality all exhibit statistically significant effects on the total amount of money congressional candidates receive from PACs. Democrats are favored at this stage and receive, on average, about $26,550 more than Republicans. Challengers are especially hurt during the primary, raising on average $202,990 less than incumbents in total PAC contributions. However, quality challengers are penalized less than their politically inexperienced counterparts. On average a quality challenger raises $160,280 less than an incumbent; while this is still a substantial deficit compared to incumbents it is nevertheless an advantage in comparison to low quality, inexperienced challengers. Incumbents who either hold leadership positions or sit on powerful congressional committees are further advantaged, receiving $60,160 more than those who do not, and this effect is highly statistically significant. Unlike the previous characteristics, candidate ideology has no significant effect on the amount of money candidates raise in the primary.

Characteristics of the election, like district competitiveness, may also have effects on the amount of PAC money raised by candidates in the primary election cycle. Candidates running in safe districts attract significantly less in PAC contributions as expected. Candidates running in the safest districts would receive about $35,530 less than candidates running in the most competitive districts. On the other hand, the coefficient for open seat status does not have a significant effect; candidates running in open seats do not receive significantly more PAC contributions during the primary election cycle.

While the coefficient for gender is not statistically significant, the interactions of gender with party and candidate status are significant.[20] This indicates that the impact of gender on PAC contributions in the primary is conditioned by party and candidate status. The effect of gender varies significantly for Democrats and Republicans and for challengers and incumbents. Given the complex relationships between gender, party, and candidate status, it may be helpful to examine predicted amounts of PAC contributions received by different types of men and women candidates. Table 4.2 illustrates the amount of average PAC contributions predicted for typical men and women challengers and incumbents of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 4.1. Typical men and women candidates are those who have mean or modal values on all the remaining independent variables in the model. The typical candidate is therefore white, is not running in an open seat, is running

[20] When dealing with interaction terms, there is an increased likelihood of multicollinearity, although this may not necessarily be problematic (Friedrich 1982). To check for the presence of multicollinearity, correlations between gender and its interactions as well as race and its interactions were estimated. The interaction terms were somewhat correlated with the component variables (race, gender, status, party, ideology). The highest of these correlations (r=.81) was between race and the race*party interaction variable. A high degree of multicollinearity (0.8 and higher) can produce inflated standard errors for the regression coefficients but still produce unbiased regression coefficients (Kennedy 2003). This collinearity makes it less likely that these coefficients would be statistically significant. When gender and its interactions or race and its interactions were not significant in a particular model, a joint test of statistical significance was conducted to determine if gender and its interactions or race and its interactions contributed any additional explanatory power to the model. These joint tests were not statistically significant.

in a district with a mean seat safety score of 2.6, has a mean ideology value of .36, and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful committee. In addition, the average challenger is politically inexperienced or of low quality.

As illustrated with predicted values in Table 4.2, women challengers of either party receive more PAC contributions than men in the primary election. This funding advantage for women, however, is much stronger among Republican women challengers. Among Democratic candidates, the typical woman challenger would receive an estimated $300 more in PAC contributions than the typical male challenger. This funding difference is more pronounced among Republican candidates, where the average Republican woman challenger would receive an estimated $21,310 more in PAC contributions than her average male counterparts. While gender advantages women challengers in raising PAC contributions, it is especially advantageous for Republican women challengers. For incumbents in Table 4.2, the effect of gender is somewhat different. The average Democratic woman would be predicted to raise less in PAC contributions than the average Democratic male incumbent (about $45,500 less). Republican women incumbents would be predicted to do better than their male counterparts, raising about $21,300 more from PACs. In terms of early PAC funding, women Democrats appear to be hurt by their gender while Republican women appear to be helped.

The coefficient for race is not statistically significant in the primary election model and, unlike gender; neither are its interactions with party or candidate status. Candidate race, therefore, appears to exert no significant influence on PAC contributions received by congressional candidates during the primary election and is not conditioned by political party or candidate status. One possible explanation why gender and race themselves did not produce significant direct effects on the amount of contributions raised could be that these nontraditional

candidates run in different types of seats than more traditional candidates. If these candidates are running in contests where their likelihood of winning is low, and they are more likely to be challengers, then that could explain why PAC money would not flow to these candidates at the same rate as to those candidates running under better electoral circumstances. Examination of the dataset, however, indicates that there is no substantial difference among the types of districts these two sets of candidates run in. For example, 18% of traditional challengers in this dataset ran in open seat contests, as compared to 20% for nontraditional candidates. While 73% of traditional challengers ran in the least competitive districts, the comparable percentage for nontraditional candidates was slightly lower at 68%. In fact, for the most competitive of seats, those scoring a zero on the competitiveness measure, 7% of traditional challengers entered these races as compared to 9% for nontraditional challengers. Characteristics of the electoral environment, including open seat opportunities and competitive districts, seem to be similar across nontraditional and traditional candidates.

Results for the general election equation are reported in the second column of Table 4.1. Challenger status, open seat status, and district safety all have statistically significant effects on the amount of PAC contributions a candidate receives during the general election. Challengers receive about $60,100 less than incumbents; this represents a much smaller difference in PAC contributions than that which exists for these types of candidates in the primary election cycle. PAC contributions, therefore, appear to flow a bit more evenly to challengers and incumbents once they have gained their party's nomination. If a candidate runs in an open seat, he receives on average $55,100 more than if the candidate ran in a district with an incumbent seeking reelection. As expected from the literature, PAC contributions are greater in these contests that are perceived by groups to be more competitive given the absence of an incumbent. Candidates

who run in the safest districts receive on average $58,900 less than candidates that run in the most competitive districts. Those incumbents who hold leadership positions or are members of powerful congressional committees, receive an additional $14,300 in PAC contributions, an effect that is statistically significant.

Additionally, the amount of PAC contributions a candidate receives in the primary is statistically significant (p=.000) and positively related to the amount of PAC contributions a candidate receives in the general election. The coefficient for primary PAC contributions estimates the effect of early money on generating general election campaign resources. For every $1,000 in contributions candidates receive in the primary, they receive an additional $230 during the general election. This demonstrates that early money does in fact produce fundraising momentum for candidates.

The coefficients for gender and race, as well as their interactions with party and candidate status, are not statistically significant in the general election equation. Unlike the primary election cycle, women and minority candidates are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged directly by their nontraditional status. However, given that gender, conditioned by both candidate status and party, does influence the amount of money candidates received from PACs in the primary and that this total itself has a significant effect on contributions raised in the general election cycle, gender does have an indirect effect in the general election.

The second model, presented in Table 4.3, estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with candidate ideology on the total amount of PAC contributions received by candidates. SURE analysis estimates are again produced for two equations representing the primary and general election cycles. In the primary election equation, the candidate characteristics of party, candidate status, and challenger quality all exhibit

statistically significant effects on the total amount of PAC contributions candidates receive. Democratic candidates are favored during the primary election, receiving on average $20,790 more than Republican candidates. Challengers are at a definite disadvantage in attracting PAC contributions during the primary election in this second model as well, receiving around $194,470 less on average than incumbents. However, challengers with prior political experience do fare a bit better than those challengers who are politically inexperienced, attracting about $42,380 more in primary election PAC contributions for a net loss of $152,090 compared to incumbents. Because challenger status is a part of a significant interaction term, however, its net effects are best described graphically; the conditional effects of challenger status are explained in more detail below. Again, those incumbents who hold leadership positions or are members of powerful congressional committees received $59,390 more than those who do not, and this effect is statistically significant.

Of the election characteristics variables, only the district safety measure exerts a statistically significant effect on total PAC contributions in the primary. Open seat status at this early stage in the election cycle does not appear to be a determinant of the PAC contributions that candidates receive. District safety, however, does produce significant effects on the dependent variable. Candidates who run in safe districts, ones that are the least competitive, receive on average, about $35,940 less in total PAC contributions than those candidates who run in the most competitive districts.

Candidate gender and its interaction with ideology are statistically significant in determining total PAC contributions received by candidates. This indicates that the effect of gender is significantly conditioned by ideology--the effect of gender varies significantly among conservative and liberal candidates. Again, due to the complex relationships between gender and

ideology it may be helpful to consider the following figure. Figure 4.1 depicts the predicted amounts of PAC contributions received by average or typical men and women challengers and incumbents over a range of ideological positions, calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 4.3.

The two lines at the bottom half of the graph in Figure 4.1 represent the average amount of PAC contributions received by average or typical men and women challengers. Note that as ideology increases and becomes more conservative, women challengers attract greater amount of PAC contributions in the primary election. For example, a typical female challenger with a mean ideology of .36 would receive around $18,500 in PAC contributions. Moving one standard deviation above the mean ideology in the more conservative direction, this female challenger would receive $30,600 from PACs, an increase of $12,100. On the other hand, men challengers receive less PAC contributions as they become more conservative, although clearly the amount of PAC contributions they receive is less responsive to ideology overall. An average male challenger with mean ideology would receive $31,800 from PACs, but if he were to move one standard deviation in the more conservative direction, he would suffer a $4,200 loss, receiving only $27,600. Thus, ideological position matters more for women than men challengers in attracting PAC funds during the primary election.

A similar pattern holds for incumbents, although the amount of total PAC contributions is much greater than for challengers. As women incumbents become more conservative, they also attract significantly more PAC contributions. The average woman incumbent with a mean ideology of .36 receives $240,000; a move in one standard deviation in ideology above the mean results in $267,000 in PAC contributions, an increase of $27,000. Like male challengers, male incumbents attract slightly less PAC funds as they have more conservative ideologies. The

average male incumbent with mean ideology would receive $226,000; a one standard deviation change in ideology above the mean produces $222,000. Again, the effect of gender on the amount of PAC contributions received by candidates during the primary election varies considerable among liberals and conservatives. Regardless of candidate status, conservative women are rewarded by PACs for their ideological positions and liberal women are not.

Candidate race and its interactions with ideology and candidate status also produce statistically significant effects on PAC contributions during the primary election. Black candidates receive $81,200 less than white candidates, but this effect is also further influenced by their ideology and candidate status. Because the race variable is part of interaction terms included in the model, direct effects, however, are difficult to interpret. Therefore, the conditional effects of race, accounting for its interactions with ideology and candidate status, are illustrated graphically in Figure 4.2.

Beginning with black challengers in Figure 4.2, it should first be noted that black challengers on average receive considerably more in PAC contributions than their white counterparts across the moderate to conservative levels of ideology. Similar to women, black challengers also receive more PAC contributions as they become more conservative. An average black challenger with mean ideology value receives $2,100 from PACs. A one standard deviation move in ideology above this mean yields $26,600 in PAC contributions, an increase of $24,500. White challengers receive greater amounts of PAC money and the same shift in ideology for them produces only a $4,200 decrease. The amount of PAC contributions for white challengers is less sensitive to changes in ideology. Like black challengers, black incumbents also fare significantly better than their white counterparts and are more advantaged the more ideologically conservative they are. An average black incumbent with mean ideology would

receive $278,200; a shift in ideology by one standard deviation in the conservative direction would produce $347,900---a significant increase of about $70,000. White incumbents receive less PAC contributions as they become more conservative, although their contributions are again much less responsive to their ideological positions; this same shift in ideology reduces their PAC contributions by only $4,000. Similar to the pattern observed for women, both black challengers and incumbents attract more PAC contributions as they become more conservative.

The second column in Table 4.3 reports the SURE results for the independent variables in the general election equation. The variables of candidate status, open seat status and district safety are all statistically significant as expected. Challengers receive on average, $58,260 less than incumbents during the general election. The funding gap between challengers and incumbents definitely closes substantially after the primary election. Additionally, although open seat status was not significant during the primary election, it is significant during the general election. Candidates running in open seat contests receive almost $55,560 more in total PAC contributions than do candidates running in other districts. Candidates in the safest congressional districts are also disadvantaged in terms of total PAC contributions, receiving about $58,860 less on average than candidates in the most competitive districts. Incumbents who hold leadership positions or sit on powerful congressional committees receive $14, 430 more than those who do not, and again, this effect remains statistically significant.

Finally, the amount of primary PAC contributions a candidate receives is significantly and positively related to the total amount of PAC contributions a candidate receives during the general election. For every $1,000 a candidate received in PAC contributions in the primary election, they will receive an additional $240 in the general election cycle. Again, while race and gender and the interactions with candidate status and ideology are not significant in the

general election, their effects in determining primary PAC contributions and the subsequent effect of primary PAC contributions on general election PAC receipts indicates that gender and race have at least an indirect effect on general election PAC contributions.

Conclusion

This examination of total PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates in both primary and general elections has produced interesting results with regard to the effects of party, ideology and candidate status on mediating the effects of gender and race in raising campaign funds. The results of this initial analysis do support the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three regarding the interaction of race, gender and candidate characteristics. The statistically significant effects of these interactions point to the need to further explore how and which nontraditional candidates are advantaged or disadvantaged by the contribution patterns of political action committees. Furthermore, a focus on the beginning of the campaign also demonstrates the importance of candidate characteristics in attracting PAC funding at early stages of the election cycle.

A next step in the analysis of PAC giving to nontraditional candidates is to disaggregate total PAC contributions by PAC type. Using the FEC categories of corporate, labor and non-connected PACs, I will examine the impact of PAC contributions from each of these different types of PACs on the campaigns of nontraditional candidates. This initial analysis indicates that further research efforts should examine the fundraising advantages and disadvantages of the different types of women and minority candidates. It may be that certain types of PACs favor certain kinds of women and minority candidates. Given that current discussions about campaign

finance reform often involve recommendations for different types of PACs, we need to understand these various patterns of bias in order to more fully understand the effect of such reforms on the descriptive representation of Congress.

Table 4.1. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Party on Total PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	21.31		12.55	
	(17.69)		(11.42)	
Race	9.10		-17.95	
	(24.10)		(15.52)	
Party	26.55	**	3.95	
	(8.91)		(5.78)	
Ideology	-6.08		17.30	
	(22.12)		(14.27)	
Challenger	-202.99	***	-60.10	***
	(9.65)		(7.79)	
Challenger Quality	42.71		5.34	
	(26.24)		(16.95)	
Open Seat	15.02		55.01	***
	(15.06)		(9.72)	
District Safety	-35.53	***	-58.09	***
	(5.45)		(3.61)	
Leadership/Power Committee	60.16	***	14.30	*
	(11.63)		(7.63)	
Race*Party	-46.33		-0.81	
	(31.53)		(20.36)	
Race*Party*Challenger	57.93		24.72	
	(44.32)		(28.61)	
Gender*Party	-66.83	*	-16.23	
	(26.09)		(16.90)	
Gender*Party*Challenger	45.77	*	3.30	
	(25.78)		(16.66)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		0.23	***
			(.02)	
(Constant)	301.31	***	230.26	***
	(17.34)		(13.18)	
R^2	0.52		0.58	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE).

Table 4.2. Predicted Primary PAC Contributions for Average Men and Women Candidates

	Men	Women
Challengers:		
Democrats	$30,300	30,600
Republicans	3,800	25,100
Incumbents:		
Democrats	233,300	187,800
Republicans	206,800	228,100

Note. Values in the cells are the total amount of PAC contributions received by average men and women candidates of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 1. The average candidate is white, running in a district with a mean seat safety score of 2.6, has a mean ideology value of .36 and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful congressional committee. In addition, the average challenger is not running in an open seat, and is a low quality challenger.

Table 4.3. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Total PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	-42.70	*	-2.55	
	(23.04)		(14.90)	
Race	-81.20	**	-9.99	
	(26.86)		(17.44)	
Party	20.79	**	3.46	
	(8.27)		(5.36)	
Ideology	-21.00		17.74	
	(23.00)		(14.86)	
Challenger	-194.47	***	-58.26	***
	(9.63)		(7.68)	
Challenger Quality	42.38	**	6.12	
	(26.20)		(16.93)	
Open Seat	16.41		55.56	***
	(15.02)		(9.70)	
District Safety	-35.94	***	-58.86	***
	(5.42)		(3.60)	
Leadership/Power Committee	59.39	***	14.43	*
	(11.64)		(7.64)	
Race*Ideology	369.51	**	-79.86	
	(137.28)		(89.03)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	-226.39	**	84.82	
	(114.83)		(74.31)	
Gender*Ideology	157.19	**	49.99	
	(92.40)		(59.75)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	-75.57		-46.81	
	(71.51)		(46.19)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		0.24	***
			(0.02)	
(Constant)	306.72		228.37	
	(17.52)		(13.35)	
R^2	0.52		0.58	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Figure 4.1. Ideology, Gender, and Candidates' Predicted Primary PAC Contributions



Figure 4.2. Ideology, Race, and Candidates' Predicted Primary PAC Contributions



CHAPTER 5

CORPORATE AND LABOR PAC GIVING TO NONTRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES

This chapter builds on the findings regarding the effects of candidate characteristics and PAC contributions found in Chapter 4. Specifically, this chapter disaggregates the data presented in the last chapter and analyzes two categories of PAC types: corporate PACs and labor PACs. Because of their traditional biases, corporate and labor PACs provide a good testing ground for the expected relationships between nontraditional candidate characteristics and PAC giving presented in Chapter 3.

There has been a great deal of work examining the patterns of these two categories of PACs, and therefore, expectations regarding the race and gender signals of candidate ideology should yield clear results. If the race or gender of a nontraditional candidate signals a more liberal ideology for that candidate, we would expect him to be advantaged with respect to labor PAC contributions. On the other hand, if the race or gender of a nontraditional candidate signals a more moderate or conservative ideology for that candidate, we would expect her to be advantaged with respect to corporate contributions. In other words, because these two categories of PACs have fairly predictable partisan and/or ideological leanings, they serve as appropriate testing grounds for the hypotheses developed previously. To understand how these hypotheses were developed, a brief survey of research findings regarding the contributing behavior of these PACs is presented below.

Determinants of Corporate and Labor PAC Giving

Corporate PACs place an emphasis on seeking access and influence within Congress and therefore, exhibit a strong incumbent bias in their giving patterns (Smith 2000, Jacobson 2001). In addition, in order to maintain this access and influence, corporate PACs may operate strategically in a defensive manner (Sabato 1984, Matasar 1986). The decisions of corporate PACs can be described as pragmatic, giving money to those candidates who are believed to win. This is not to say that corporate PACs do not seek out ideological matches among candidates seeking office; they do. However, the candidates they most often support are not only good ideological matches; they are also very likely to win. Corporate PACs favor winners; therefore, they overwhelmingly favor incumbents.

Additionally, corporate PACs exhibit strong support for members of Congress in positions of institutional leadership (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Smith 2000). Recent work has found that corporate PACs adjust their contributions as committee chairs change (Wilcox et al 2004). Corporate PACs have also been found to decrease incumbent support in favor of members of Congress on specific influential committees regarding tax policy, appropriations, or business regulation (Matasar 1986, Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994). Corporate PACs, therefore, are strategic even when deciding which incumbents to support.

Corporate PACs have also been described as nonpartisan in their giving strategies, due to their access-oriented approach (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). It was suspected, however, that the appearance of a nonpartisan strategy would disappear if Democrats lost control of Congress. In her study of Fortune 500 affiliated corporate PACs, for example, Matasar (1986) found that in fully one-third of these PACs, members were permitted to earmark their contributions for specific candidates. Partisan considerations did enter into the contribution decisions of corporate

PACs, and those partisan considerations favored Republican candidates (1986). While the overall incumbent bias of corporate PACs remains, that does not mean that these PACs do not pursue other strategies as well. While corporate PACs will give to both Democrats and Republicans creating the impression that they are primarily pragmatic actors, incumbents may view these PACs as a threat because they are usually well-funded and have the potential to make more "risky investments" in challengers, choosing to pursue a long-term rather than a short-term goal (Matasar 1986).

In a recent study, interviews conducted with corporate PAC leaders reveal that corporate business PACs benefited greatly from the partisan change in congressional leadership that occurred following the 1994 elections (Biersack et al. 1999). Several groups changed their contribution strategies to reflect the new partisan composition that was more favorable to their interests. The National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) gained greater access to leadership and the Business Industry PAC (BIPAC) was able to adopt a defensive strategy, protecting the seats of vulnerable Republicans instead of unseating Democrats (Shaiko and Wallace1999). Democrats lost on average 19% of their corporate PAC contributions after the Republican Revolution (Jacobson 2001). Partisan changes in the control of Congress, therefore, have allowed corporate PACs an opportunity to become more partisan in their approach to giving.

The models in this chapter analyze the role of candidate characteristics in determining corporate PAC contributions. Because of the conservative and access-oriented bias of corporate PACs, it is expected that certain nontraditional candidates will benefit while others do not. Conservative women and black nontraditional candidates, particularly incumbents, should attract more corporate contributions than their liberal nontraditional counterparts.

PACs associated with unionized labor have historically close ties with the Democratic Party; over 90% of labor contributions go to support Democratic candidates in most elections (Rozell and Wilcox 1999). Labor's giving strategy can best be described as partisan or ideological in nature. However, similar to corporate PACs, labor PACs also employ other access strategies as well. Evidence of multiple strategies has been found in studies of individual labor PACs, although the majority was found to pursue an electoral or ideological approach (Hurd and Sohl 1992). Labor PACs seek access to members of Congress in general, and members of Congress who serve on relevant committees or hold positions of institutional power especially (Grier and Munger 1993). Labor PACs, therefore, support Democratic candidates as well as the reelection bids of powerful incumbent Democrats. Research has shown that labor PACs may even use short-term punishment strategies (e.g. decreasing contributions or giving to an opponent) against Democratic "defectors" who support the anti-labor position on legislation (Engel and Jackson 1998).

Additionally, electoral strategies are also pursued by labor PACs. This strategy is intended to protect vulnerable Democratic incumbents while also supporting the campaigns of promising Democratic challengers. In 1982, labor gave over half of all its total contributions to the campaigns of Democratic challengers, while in 1984 , labor switched its focus to protecting Democratic incumbents vulnerable to the electoral forces of a popular president with strong coattails (Rozell and Wilcox 1999). The giving strategy of labor PACs is primarily partisan and ideological in nature and should benefit Democratic candidates in general. Therefore, like corporate PACs, labor PACs also employ electoral strategies to increase the number of members of Congress who are sympathetic to their cause.

The electoral strategies employed by labor also have implications for nontraditional candidates. While Democratic candidates on the whole are advantaged, this advantage should be greater for nontraditional candidates. The liberal ideological cues of race and gender should influence the contribution decisions of these PACs. Because these race and gender ideological cues fit with the ideological and partisan bias of labor PACs, certain nontraditional candidates should benefit. Liberal women and black nontraditional candidates, especially incumbents, are expected, therefore, to attract greater amounts of labor contributions than their conservative nontraditional counterparts. These expectations regarding corporate and labor PAC giving to nontraditional candidates are empirically tested in the models that follow.

Data and Measures

Similar to the analysis presented in Chapter Four, the analysis for this chapter will again examine PAC contributions made to all general election candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives in the year 2000, with the additional focus on corporate and labor PAC contributions. The individual candidate receiving these PAC contributions will again be the unit of analysis. The amount of corporate and labor contributions made to congressional candidates was obtained from the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and includes all filing reports completed by each candidate as of December 31, 2000. Again, to assess patterns across the election cycle, these contributions will be examined during both the primary and general election phases, using seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE); the results are interpreted similar to OLS. The two dependent variables in each model, therefore, are the amount of total corporate/labor PAC contributions received for the primary election and the amount of total corporate/labor contributions received for the general election.

The main independent variables for analyses in this chapter remain gender, race, and their interactions with candidate status, party, and ideology. With respect to the focus of this chapter, these interactions allow for testing whether or not candidate status, party and ideology condition the impact of race and gender on attracting corporate and/or labor PAC contributions. The models presented in this chapter, analyze whether certain types of nontraditional candidates are more likely to receive contributions from corporate or labor sources.

The general models presented here are quite similar to those presented in Chapter Four. Candidate characteristics, such as party, ideology, status, quality, and whether or not that candidate holds a leadership position or serves on a powerful committee, are included in the model. Additionally, characteristics of the electoral environment (whether or not a candidate is running in an open seat as well as the degree of safety of the district) are also included. Many of the control variables remain the same from the models presented in Chapter 4, predicting total PAC contributions.

However, this chapter has a narrower focus and therefore, additional control variables that are known to influence the contributions of corporate and labor PACs specifically, must also be included. For the first set of models presented in this chapter, those that deal with corporate PAC contributions, two additional control variables are included. The first of these is whether or not a candidate serves on the Energy and Commerce Committee in the U.S. House. The Energy and Commerce Committee deals with legislative proposals ranging from issues of environmental oversight of corporations, consumer and public health protection, to regulating telecommunications and the Internet. The importance of committee assignment in attracting contributions from groups interested in issues within the policy jurisdiction of particular committees has been generally confirmed in the literature. In particular, a strong relationship

between Energy and Commerce Committee service and attracting corporate PAC contributions has also been noted (Mutch 1999, Nelson 1998, Grier and Munger 1993, Matasar 1986). Information on this variable was obtained from *The Almanac of American Politics* and this dummy variable is coded "1" for those incumbents who do hold seats on this committee, and "0" for all others.

Aside from service on the Energy and Commerce Committee, an additional measure that captures the strength of corporate values in districts must also be included. Candidates from districts that include corporate headquarters or offices may be more likely to attract contributions from these corporate PACs. Corporate interests are most likely to be represented in more affluent districts, and therefore, the median income of a district is used in the model as a reasonable measure accounting for the presence of these interests. U.S. Census Bureau data provided the information for this variable.

For the second set of models presented in this chapter predicting labor contributions to congressional candidates, additional control variables were also included beyond the general model. The most relevant congressional committee to labor is the Committee on Education and the Workforce, and as such, service on this committee must be accounted for in the model. The Committee on Education and the Workforce covers issues dealing with employer-employee relations, employee wages and benefits, and occupational safety. Traditionally, this committee has provided a main avenue for union interests to influence the legislative process. Symbolically, after the Republican Revolution of 1994, the word "labor" was removed from the name of this committee and replaced with "workforce" to underscore the changing of the political guard in the U.S. House. The loss of a Democratic majority in the House was an especially important defeat for labor, which had traditionally been aligned with the Democratic

Party. Nevertheless, short of working towards a Democratic majority in the House, labor's primary way to influence legislation salient to its interests is through this committee. Thus, it is expected that Education and Workforce Committee members would be likely to attract labor PAC contributions. Again, committee membership information was obtained from *The Almanac of American Politics,* and this dummy variable is coded "1" for those incumbents who do hold seats on this committee, and "0" for all others.

In addition to service on the Education and Workforce Committee, the strength of labor interests in a district must also be taken into account. If a candidate is running in a district that has a strong union presence, then that candidate will likely get labor PAC contributions. U.S. Census Bureau data regarding percent manufacturing in the district was used for this independent variable for the labor models presented in this chapter.

Results and Discussion

There are two sets of results in this chapter: one for corporate PAC contributions and one for labor PAC contributions.

Corporate Contributions

The first model, presented in Table 5.1 estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with party on corporate PAC contributions during the 2000 primary and general elections. The first column of results includes the primary election equation and shows that candidate characteristics like party, ideology and candidate challenger status all produce statistically significant effects on the total amount of contributions congressional candidates receive from corporate PACs. Democrats are disadvantaged at this stage, raising about $11,380 less than Republicans, although because party is part of the interaction terms in

this model, the direct effects are difficult to assess. For every one unit of change in the more conservative ideological direction, a candidate receives $36, 630 less. Challengers, as expected, as especially disadvantaged during the primary cycle, attracting about $74, 050 less than incumbents in corporate PAC contributions; again challenger status is appropriately interpreted in conjunction with party, gender and race because of the interaction terms in the model. There is some slight advantage for quality challengers in attracting corporate money, for they appear to attract $72,520 less than incumbents. The difference between incumbents and quality challengers in this early phase of the election, however, remains substantial.

Characteristics of the election and committee membership may also have effects on the amount of corporate PAC money raised by candidates in the primary election. Candidates running in safe districts attract less corporate PAC money as expected. Candidates running in the safest districts would receive about $9,420 less than candidates running in the most competitive districts. Open seat status does not produce a significant effect; candidates running in open seats do not receive significantly more corporate PAC contributions during the primary election cycle. Committee membership does produce statistically significant results. Incumbents who hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful congressional committee receive $46, 800 more in corporate PAC money during the primary election than candidates who do not. The effect of serving on the Commerce Committee is even more beneficial to incumbents. Commerce Committee members receive $61, 240 more in corporate PAC contributions than do candidates who do not sit on this committee. The median income in the district does not significantly affect the amount of corporate PAC contributions a candidate receives in the primary election.

The coefficient for gender is not statistically significant in this model, however, its interactions with party and challenger status are. The impact of gender on corporate PAC contributions in the primary, therefore, is conditioned by the party and candidate status. The effect of gender varies substantially for Democrats and Republicans as well as for challengers and incumbents. Given the complex relationships between these variables and their interactions, it may be helpful to examine predicted amounts of PAC contributions received by different types of men and women candidates. Table 5.2 illustrates the amount of PAC contributions received by typical men and women challengers and incumbents of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 5.1. Typical candidates have mean or modal values on all the remaining independent variables in the model. The typical candidate is therefore white, is not running in an open seat, is running in a district with a seat safety score of 2.6, has a mean ideology value of .36 and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful committee in Congress. In addition, the average challenger is politically inexperienced or of low quality.

As illustrated in Table 5.2, regardless of gender or candidate status, Democratic candidates receive less corporate PAC contributions than do Republican candidates, as expected. Democratic women challengers receive around $1,930 less than Democratic male challengers. This pattern of female disadvantage, however, does not hold for Republican challengers. Republican women challengers receive $9,860 more than typical Republican male challengers. While gender disadvantages female Democratic challengers, it advantages female Republican challengers over their male counterparts. For incumbents in Table 5.2, this same pattern holds. Republican incumbents in general attract more corporate PAC contributions than do Democratic incumbents. The typical Democratic female incumbent raised $34,700 less in corporate PAC

contributions than her typical male counterpart. Republican women incumbents do better than their male counterparts, raising about $9,820 more from corporate PACs. In terms of early corporate PAC contributions, women Democrats appear to be hurt by their gender while Republican women appear to be helped.

The coefficient for race is not statistically significant in the primary election model and, unlike gender, neither is its interactions with party or candidate status. Candidate race, therefore, appears to exert no significant influence on corporate PAC contributions received by congressional candidates during the primary election and is not conditioned by political party or candidate status.

Results for the general election equation are reported in the second column of Table 5.1. A candidate's party affiliation does produce statistically significant effects on attracting corporate PAC contributions during the general election. Democratic candidates receive around $16,520 less in general election corporate PAC money than do Republican candidates, as expected from the literature, although, as part of the interaction terms in the model, direct effects are difficult to interpret. Additionally, candidate ideology is also statistically significant and positive. For every unit increase in the conservative direction along the ideology scale, a candidate receives $24,100 more from corporate PACs. Conservative ideologies and Republican party affiliations are rewarded by corporate PACs.

Challenger status, open seat status, and district safety all have statistically significant effects on the amount of corporate PAC contributions a candidate receives during the general election. Challengers receive about $35,550 less than incumbents; this amount is about half the difference in corporate PAC contributions that exists for these candidates in the primary election cycle. Challenger quality does not appear to matter to corporate PACs above and beyond

challenger status in terms of their contributing behavior in the general election. Similar to the overall results presented in Chapter 4, corporate PAC contributions flow a bit more evenly to challengers and incumbents only after they have become their party's nominee. Net effects of challenger status will be discussed below. If a candidate runs in an open seat, he receives around $20, 410 more in corporate PAC contributions than if the candidate ran against an incumbent. As expected from the literature, PAC contributions are greater in these contests that are perceived to be more competitive in relation to incumbent challenges. Additionally, candidates who run in the safest districts receive about $20,670 less in corporate PAC contributions than those who run in the most competitive districts. Corporate PACs appear to target those seats that they feel are most competitive and where their contributions may possibly influence the outcome.

Committee service in Congress, as well as attributes of the district, appear to also influence corporate PAC giving during the general election. If an incumbent holds a leadership position or serves on a powerful committee in the chamber, then he or she would receive $22,020 more than those candidates who do not; the effect of this variable is highly significant. Likewise, if an incumbent serves on the committee most relevant to corporate interest—the Energy and Commerce Committee—he or she is even more advantaged, attracting $27,930 more in corporate PAC contributions than those candidates who do not sit on this committee. In addition, district median income is also positive and significant. For every $1,000 increase in district median income, a candidate receives $250 in corporate PAC contributions in the general election.

The main independent variables of gender and race do not exert statistically significant influences on corporate PAC contributions in the general election. For race, the interactions with party and challenger status also do not reach statistical significance; however, the party

interaction with gender is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that the effect of gender is significantly conditioned by party; the effect of gender on attracting corporate PAC contributions varies depending on party affiliation. In the case of corporate PAC giving during the general election, the combination of gender and party disadvantages Democratic women in attracting these contributions.

Lastly, the amount of primary corporate PAC contributions a candidate receives is significantly and positively related to the total amount of corporate PAC contributions during the general election. For every $1,000 raised in primary corporate PAC contributions, $40 more corporate PAC contributions will be generated in the general election. Gender interactions with party and candidate status in the primary election do affect the amount of corporate primary PAC contributions received at this early stage, which is found to influence the overall amount received from corporate PACs in the general election. As such, gender does exhibit an indirect effect on general election corporate PAC contributions.

Table 5.3 estimates the effect of the same independent variables and the interactions with gender and race with candidate ideology on the total amount of PAC contributions received by candidates. In the primary election equation, political party, candidate ideology, and candidate status all exert statistically significant influences on the amount of corporate PAC contributions a candidate receives in the primary election. Democrats receive $14,200 less than Republicans from corporate PACs in this model. In addition, candidates are also advantaged the more conservative they become. Similar to the model examining political party, challengers are hurt in attracting corporate PAC contributions--$69,760 less than incumbents. Candidates running in safest districts receive $9,590 less than those running in the most competitive districts. Committee service again proves statistically significant in this ideology model. Candidates who

hold leadership positions or are on powerful committees in the House receive $46, 620 more than those who do not hold such positions. Additionally, incumbents who serve on the Commerce Committee receive $60,600 more than those candidates who do not.

The gender variable itself produces a negative statistical impact on corporate PAC contributions in the primary election; women candidates receive less money than male candidates at this stage of the election. The effect of gender, however, is also demonstrated to be conditioned by ideology. Among women candidates, conservative women are advantaged in attracting primary corporate PAC contributions and this effect is also statistically significant. Although race itself does not appear to produce any real affects on contributions at this stage, its interaction with ideology and candidate status do, producing a negative statistically significant result.

The second column of Table 5.3 presents the results of candidate characteristics and ideology on corporate PAC contributions for the general election. Party, candidate ideology, and challenger status all remain statistically significant. In the general election, Democrats receive $18,040 less in corporate PAC contributions than Republicans. Conservative candidates are advantaged; for each conservative unit increase along the ideology scale, a candidate receives $22,010 more in corporate PAC contributions. Challengers are again at a disadvantage, receiving $34,140 less from corporate PACs than do incumbents. Characteristics of the election are also significant influences on corporate PAC giving during this stage. Open seat candidates receive $20,720 more from corporate PACs than do those running in seats with an incumbent present. Additionally, candidates running in safe seats receive $20,390 less from corporate PACs than do candidates running in the most competitive seats.

Similar to results found in the party model (Table 5.1), leadership positions and committee service, as well as district median income, produce statistically significant effects on corporate PAC contributions in the general election. If an incumbent holds a leadership position or serves on a powerful committee in the House, she receives $22,100 more PAC contributions than those candidates who do not hold such positions. If an incumbent serves on the Commerce Committee, that candidate is even more advantaged, attracting $28,410 more from corporate PACs than do those candidates who do not serve on this committee. Corporate PACs, therefore, target congressional leadership, members who serve on powerful committees, and those who sit on the Commerce Committee. Additionally, candidates who run in affluent districts also attract more corporate PAC contributions.

The coefficient for gender also exhibits a negative statistically significant influence on corporate PAC contributions in the general election equation. Women candidates appear to receive $17,280 less from corporate PACs than do men candidates at this stage of the election cycle; however, the true effect of gender is further conditioned by ideology and candidate status. The net effects of gender need to be considered simultaneously with the other component variables of the interaction terms. The interaction between gender and ideology produces a positive and significant effect on corporate PAC contributions, while the gender interaction with ideology and candidate status produces a significant but positive effect. In order to understand better the complex relationships among these interaction variables and their net effects, a graphical representation is presented in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 depicts the predicted amounts of corporate PAC contributions received by typical men and women challengers and incumbents over a range of ideological positions, calculated using the results presented in the second column of Table 5.3. The two lines at the

bottom half of the graph represent the average amount of corporate PAC contributions received by typical men and women challengers during the general election. As ideology increases and becomes more conservative, women challengers attract greater amounts of corporate PAC contributions during the general election. For example, the typical female challenger with a mean ideology of 0.36 would receive about $24,930 in corporate PAC contributions. Moving one standard deviation above the mean ideology in the more conservative direction, this female challenger would receive $34,440 from corporate PACs, an increase of $9,510. Alternatively, men challengers, receive slightly greater amounts of corporate PAC contributions as they become more conservative, although it is clear from Figure 5.1 that the amount of corporate PAC contributions they receive are less responsive to ideology overall. A typical male challenger with mean ideology would receive $33,010 from corporate PACs, but if he were to move one standard deviation in the more conservative direction, he would receive $37,410. While, ideological position matters in attracting corporate PAC contributions for both men and women challengers in the general election, it matters most for women.

Turning to the top two lines on the graph in Figure 5.1, it can be noted that a similar pattern holds for incumbents, although the amount of corporate PAC contributions is much greater than for challengers. As women incumbents become more conservative, they also attract significantly more PAC contributions. The typical woman incumbent with a mean ideology of 0.36 receives $76,290; a move in one standard deviation in ideology above the mean results in $95,380 in corporate PAC contributions, an increase of $19,090. Typical male incumbents are also advantaged in attracting corporate PAC contributions as evidenced in the graph. Like male challengers, male incumbents attract slightly more corporate PAC money as they have more conservative ideologies. The typical male incumbent with mean ideology would receive

$67,150; a one standard deviation change in ideology above the mean produces $71,550, and increase of $4,400. This advantage for men incumbents is not nearly as great as it is for women. The effect of gender on the amount of corporate PAC contributions received by candidates during the general election again varies considerably among liberals and conservatives. Conservative women, regardless of candidate status, are rewarded by corporate PACs for their ideological positions and liberal women are not.

Lastly, the amount of corporate PAC contributions a candidate receives in the primary election positively and significantly affects the amount he or she receives in the general election. For every $1,000 a candidate raises from corporate PACs in the primary election, an additional $40 is generated from these sources in the general election. Gender and its interactions with ideology produce statistically significant effects on the amount of corporate PAC contributions raised in the primary, which produces subsequent significant effects in the general election. Therefore, gender and its interactions produce both direct and indirect effects in determining corporate PAC contributions raised by candidates in the general election.

Labor Contributions

Now we turn to the set of results examining the relationship between candidate characteristics and labor PAC contributions for congressional candidates in 2000. The first model in this set of results is presented in Table 5. 4, which illustrates the effects of candidate characteristics and party affiliation on labor PAC contributions. Results for the primary election equation are presented in the first column. Candidate characteristics of party, ideology, challenger status and quality all exert statistically significant effects on labor PAC contributions during the primary election. Democratic candidates, as expected, are advantaged in attracting labor PAC contributions. Democrats appear to receive $46,300 more in labor PAC money than

do Republicans; however, part of the direct effects of party are entangled in the interaction terms within the model and is described below when discussing the conditional effects of race.

Candidate ideology also matters in attracting labor contributions and as a candidate becomes more conservative they attract less money from this funding source. For every one unit increase along the ideological scale in the conservative direction, a candidate attracts $60,800 less in labor money. Challenger status is also significant; challengers receive $35,580 less in labor PAC contributions than do incumbents. However, the quality of the candidate can mitigate this disadvantage of challengers. Quality challengers receive only $9,970 less from labor PACs than incumbents in the primary election. Additionally, district safety also produces a statistically significant affect on the amount of labor PAC contributions a candidate receives in the primary election. Those candidates running in the safest districts receive $12,260 less than those candidates running in the most competitive districts.

The coefficient for race is also statistically significant in the primary equation. Black candidates are advantaged in attracting labor PAC contributions in the primary election. However, the effect of race is additionally conditioned by a candidate's party affiliation. Black Democrats appear to be disadvantaged in attracting labor PAC contributions in this early stage of the election. Table 5.5 illustrates this interaction variable, presenting the amount of labor PAC contributions received by typical black and white challengers and incumbents of both parties in the primary election cycle. The amounts presented in this table were calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 5.4. Typical candidates have mean or modal values on all the remaining independent variables in the model. The typical candidate, therefore, is male, is not running in an open seat, is running in a district with a seat safety score of 1.0, and has a mean ideology value of .36. The typical candidate also does not hold leadership position or serve on a

powerful committee in the House. In addition, the typical challenger is politically inexperienced or of low quality.

As illustrated in Table 5.5, incumbents, regardless of race or party affiliation, receive greater amounts of labor PAC contributions than do challengers in the primary election. As expected, among incumbents, Democratic candidates do better. Typical Democratic white incumbents receive $46,300 more from labor PACs than do their Republican counterparts. Black Democratic incumbents also raise more from labor PACs than do black Republican incumbents, around $18,660 more. White Democratic incumbents receive $8,030 more from labor than do black Democratic incumbents. Black Republican incumbents, however, receive $19,610 more than white Republican incumbents[21].

Labor PAC contributions to challengers, also overwhelmingly favor Democrats, as expected. These contributions are also fairly evenly divided among black and white Democratic challengers; white Democratic challengers receive $2,540 less than black Democratic challengers. For Republicans, the difference in these predicted amounts of labor PAC contributions is more pronounced. Black Republican challengers receive $19,610 more than white Republican challengers. Among black challengers, Democratic candidates receive $29,230 more than their Republican counterparts. Among white challengers, Democratic candidates receive $46,300 more than Republicans. In terms of attracting early labor PAC contributions, Democratic candidates, regardless of race or status, are advantaged by their party, where Republicans are not.

[21] This result is most likely attributable to the only, and a politically influential, black Republican incumbent in the dataset for 2000: J. C. Watts (R-OK).

Results for the general election equation are reported in the second column of Table 5.4. Challenger status, open seat, and district safety all have statistically significant effects on the amount of labor PAC contributions a candidate receives during the general election. Challengers receive about $16,100 less than incumbents, representing a much smaller difference in labor PAC contributions than that which exists for these types of candidates in the primary election cycle. Again, labor PAC contributions appear to flow a bit more evenly to challengers and incumbents once they have gained their party's nomination. If a candidate runs in an open seat, she receives on average $7,840 more than if the candidate ran in a district with an incumbent seeking reelection. As expected from the literature, labor PAC contributions are also more likely when the seat is competitive. Candidates running in the safest seats receive $18,020 less from labor than those candidates running in the most competitive seats.

Finally, the amount of labor PAC contributions candidates receive in the primary election has statistically significant effects on the amount of labor PAC contributions they receive during the general election. In this case, the effect is negative; for every $1,000 a candidate receives in labor contributions during the primary, they receive $20 less from this funding source in the general election. Labor appears to target candidates primarily in the general election; it may be less important to their strategy of regaining party control of the House that they choose among Democratic candidates seeking the party nomination. Because candidate race affects the amount of primary contributions received by candidates, and that amount influences the amount of general election labor PAC contributions a candidate receives, race can be said to have an indirect effect on labor contributions in the general election. Those candidates who received labor PAC money in the general election did not receive these contributions during the primary election phase. It appears that labor targets candidates in the general election, as opposed to the

primary, giving relatively small amounts in the early part of the election cycle.

Table 5.6 presents results estimating the effects of candidate characteristics and the conditional effects of ideology in attracting labor PAC contributions. The first column represents the results of the equation for the primary election. The candidate characteristics of race, party, challenger status and challenger quality are all statistically significant. Black candidates are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis white candidates at this stage of the election cycle, attracting less amounts of early labor PAC contributions than their white counterparts. Democratic candidates are advantaged, however, receiving $45,190 more from labor PACs than do Republican candidates. Ideology is statistically significant and in the negative direction, indicating that as candidates become more conservative, they receive less money from labor PACs. Specifically, for each unit increase along the ideological scale in the conservative direction, candidates receive $67,860 less than their more moderate to liberal counterparts. Challengers are once again at a disadvantage in attracting this potential source of early funding; challengers receive $35,560 less from labor PACs than do incumbents. However, quality challengers are not as disadvantaged. They receive only $10,590 less than incumbents during the primary election. District safety is another significant influence on early labor PAC contributions. Candidates running in the safest seats attract $12,230 less than candidates running in the most competitive districts.

While race itself has a direct effect on influencing primary election labor PAC contributions, its effect is further influenced by candidate ideology. The interaction term of race and ideology illustrates a positive and significant effect, indicating that the effect of race is significantly conditioned by ideology. Again, it be helpful to consider a graphical representation of this relationship to sort out the net effects of the component variables of this interaction term.

Figure 5.2 depicts the predicted amounts of labor PAC contributions received by typical black and white challengers and incumbents over a range of ideological positions, calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 5.6

The two lines at the bottom of the graph in Figure 5.2 represent the average amount of labor PAC contributions received by typical black and white challengers. Note that as ideology increases and becomes more conservative, white challengers attract far less labor contributions than do black challengers. For example, a typical white challenger with a mean ideology of 0.36 would receive about $60,010 in labor contributions. Moving one standard deviation above the mean ideology in the more conservative direction, this typical white challenger would receive $58,650, a decrease of $1,360. On the other hand, black challengers receive virtually the same amount from labor, regardless of their ideological position. A typical black challenger with mean ideology would receive $59,960 from labor PACs during the primary election, but if he were to move one standard deviation in the more conservative direction, he would suffer only a $100 loss, receiving $59,860. For labor PAC contributions in the primary election, ideological position matters more for white challengers than it does for black challengers.

A somewhat similar pattern holds for incumbents, depicted in the top two lines of the graph in Figure 5.2. As white incumbents become more conservative, they also attract significantly less labor PAC contributions than do their black counterparts. The typical white incumbent with a mean ideology of 0.36 would be expected to raise $90,960 from labor PACs. A move in one standard deviation in ideology above the mean results in $89,600, a loss of $1,360. Like black challengers, black incumbents attract slightly more labor PAC funds as they have more conservative ideologies. The typical black incumbent with mean ideology would receive $103,560; a one standard deviation change in ideology above the mean produces

$103,910, an increase of $350.[22] Race, as well as its interaction with ideology, does matter to labor PACs in supporting candidates for office.

The second model, presented in Table 5.6, estimates effects of candidate characteristics and the conditional effects of ideology on general election labor PAC contributions. Characteristics of candidates, as well as characteristics of the seats in which they run, exhibit statistically significant effects on the total amount of labor PAC contributions candidates receive in the general election. Democratic candidates receive $35,090 more from labor PACs at this stage than do Republican candidates. Ideology is also statistically significant; for each unit increase in ideology in the conservative direction, candidates receive $13,690 less from labor PACs. As expected, labor PACs do not reward conservative candidates with contributions. Challenger status is also statistically significant and negative; challengers receive $15,440 less from labor PACs than do incumbents. Challengers are at a greater disadvantage in the primary than in the general election in terms of attracting labor PAC contributions. Candidates running in open seats in the general election receive $7,710 more from labor PACs than do candidates running in seats where incumbents are seeking reelection. Additionally, candidates who run in the safest seats receive $18,230 less from labor PACs than do those candidates running in the most competitive districts.

Finally, labor PAC contributions raised in the primary election do determine the amount of these contributions a candidate will raise in the general election. The effect is statistically significant and in the negative direction, suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between

[22] It bears repeating that during the time period of this analysis, there was only one black Republican member of the House, J.C. Watts (R-OK), who also held a leadership position. However, because the results in Figure 5.2 do speak to predicted amounts of labor PAC contributions, if more black Republicans are elected to the House, they may also stand to benefit from patterns of labor PAC contributions, especially if their party controls the legislature.

these two variables. For every $1,000 a candidate receives from labor PACs in the primary election, that candidate will receive $20 less in the general election. Candidates in this dataset are restricted to those that won their primary elections. It is possible that these candidates who go on to win the general and were helped in the primary still receive support from labor, but slightly less than those candidates whom labor did not have to support in their primary contests.

Conclusion

This examination of corporate and labor PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates in both primary and general elections indicates that candidate characteristics, as well as their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status can condition the effects of gender and race in raising campaign funds from these sources. The results of the analyses presented in this chapter do support the hypotheses developed in Chapter Three. The statistically significant effects of these interactions demonstrate that certain kinds of nontraditional candidates are disadvantaged in attracting money from these PACs. Equally as important, the results also indicate that certain kinds of nontraditional candidates are advantaged in attracting corporate and labor PAC money. Focusing the examination of PAC contributions and candidate characteristics by PAC type has confirmed that gender and race do not necessarily always exert singular effects on contributions. More nuanced understandings of the effects of nontraditional candidate status on fundraising must take into account other considerations—namely party, ideology, and candidate status. Additionally, analysis of both election cycles indicates that the effects of gender, race, and their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status may exert indirect effects on the amount of money candidates raise in the general election. Both election cycles must be accounted for in models examining the determinants of PAC contributions.

The next step in analyzing patterns of PAC contributions to nontraditional candidates involves examination of ideological PACs. The findings in this chapter suggest that nontraditional candidate party and ideology do matter, especially in attracting PAC contributions from groups that are mostly aligned with conservative (corporate) and liberal (labor) interests. Ideological groups, it is expected, should exert even more pronounced patterns of giving. While some have argued that these ideological PACs work to the advantage of women and black challengers, this conventional wisdom may not match with reality in the PAC environment. As the partisan and ideological diversity among both nontraditional candidates and the ideological PAC community itself increases, it may again be the case that certain nontraditional candidates are advantaged in receiving certain types of ideological PAC contributions. These questions are tested empirically in the following chapter.

Table 5.1. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Party on Corporate PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	9.86		8.12	
	(8.17)		(6.26)	
Race	-5.49		-11.86	
	(11.15)		(8.55)	
Party	-11.38	**	-16.52	***
	(4.10)		(3.16)	
Ideology	-36.63	***	24.10	**
	(10.20)		(7.82)	
Challenger	-74.05	***	-35.55	***
	(4.65)		(4.27)	
Challenger Quality	1.53		0.54	
	(12.09)		(9.28)	
Open Seat	4.40		20.41	***
	(6.96)		(5.33)	
District Safety	-9.42	***	-20.67	***
	(2.51)		(1.98)	
Leadership/Power Committee	46.80	***	22.02	***
	(5.53)		(4.35)	
Commerce Committee	61.24	***	27.93	***
	(7.60)		(5.97)	
District Median Income	0.16		0.25	**
	(0.16)		(0.12)	
Race*Party	1.21		8.92	
	(14.54)		(11.15)	
Race*Party*Challenger	11.81		4.57	
	(20.49)		(15.71)	
Gender*Party	-44.56	***	-19.25	**
	(12.02)		(9.25)	
Gender*Party*Challenger	32.77	**	1.19	
	(11.88)		(9.12)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		0.04	**
			(0.01)	
(Constant)	84.18	***	82.19	***
	(10.97)		(9.08)	
R^2	0.50		0.44	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 5.2. Predicted Corporate Primary PAC Contributions for Typical Men and Women Candidates

	Men	Women
Challengers:		
Democrats	$9,450	$7,520
Republicans	20,830	30,690
Incumbents:		
Democrats	83,500	48,800
Republicans	94,880	104,740

Note. Values in the cells are the total amount of corporate PAC contributions received by typical men and women candidates of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 5.1. The typical candidate is white, running in a district with a seat safety score of 1.0, has a mean ideology value of .36, and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a power committee. In addition the typical challenger is not running in an open seat and is a low quality challenger.

Table 5.3. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Corporate PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	-28.65	**	-17.28	**
	(10.72)		(8.20)	
Race	-16.45		5.36	
	(12.61)		(9.65)	
Party	-14.20	***	-18.04	***
	(3.83)		(2.933)	
Ideology	32.90	**	22.01	**
	(10.66)		(8.13)	
Challenger	-69.76	***	-34.14	***
	(4.66)		(4.21)	
Challenger Quality	2.39		1.62	
	(12.13)		(9.26)	
Open Seat	4.74		20.72	***
	(6.98)		(5.33)	
District Safety	-9.59	***	-20.39	***
	(2.51)		(1.97)	
Leadership/Power Committee	46.62	***	22.10	***
	(5.57)		(4.36)	
Commerce Committee	60.60	***	28.41	***
	(7.66)		(5.98)	
District Median Income	0.19		0.25	**
	(0.16)		(0.12)	
Race*Ideology	103.27		-60.77	
	(63.79)		(48.78)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	-91.81	*	38.19	
	(53.32)		(40.72)	
Gender*Ideology	88.44	**	73.40	**
	(42.81)		(32.71)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	-40.43		-47.85	**
	(33.16)		(25.30)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		0.04	**
			(0.01)	
(Constant)	84.21	***	81.68	***
	(11.02)		(9.09)	
R^2	0.50		0.45	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 5.4. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Party on Labor PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	1.87		1.03	
	(6.45)		(4.26)	
Race	19.61	**	6.73	
	(8.74)		(5.76)	
Party	46.30	***	34.57	***
	(3.23)		(2.14)	
Ideology	-60.80	***	-14.78	**
	(8.03)		(5.30)	
Challenger	-35.58	***	-16.10	***
	(3.62)		(2.94)	
Challenger Quality	25.61	**	4.62	
	(9.52)		(6.29)	
Open Seat	1.91		7.84	***
	(5.47)		(3.61)	
District Safety	-12.26	***	-18.02	***
	(1.98)		(1.34)	
Leadership/Power Committee	-0.74		-0.93	
	(4.31)		(2.87)	
Education/Workforce Committee	1.80		0.39	
	(6.47)		(4.28)	
Percent Manufacturing in District	-0.35		0.09	
	(0.23)		(0.15)	
Race*Party	-27.64	**	-11.0	
	(11.46)		(7.56)	
Race*Party*Challenger	10.57		3.50	
	(16.12)		(10.64)	
Gender*Party	3.51		0.56	
	(9.49)		(6.23)	
Gender*Party*Challenger	-7.52		8.70	
	(9.36)		(6.19)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		-0.02	***
			(0.01)	
(Constant)	84.44	***	64.26	***
	(7.23)		(5.45)	
R^2	0.50		0.48	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 5.5. Predicted Primary Labor PAC Contributions for Typical Black and White Candidates

	Black	White
Challengers:		
Democrats	$58,620	$56,080
Republicans	29,390	9,780
Incumbents:		
Democrats	83,630	91,660
Republicans	64,970[a]	45,360

Note. Values in the cells are the total amount of corporate PAC contributions received by typical black and white candidates of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 5.4. The typical candidate is male, running in a district with a seat safety score of 1.0, has a mean ideology value of .36, and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a power committees. In addition, the typical challenger is not running in an open seat and is a low quality challenger.

[a] The predicted value in this cell should be interpreted cautiously as it is generated by only one entry in the data set. It is included primarily as a general point of reference; however, if more black Republicans were elected to Congress, this general pattern would be expected to hold.

Table 5.6. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Labor PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	-5.22		8.78	
	(8.35)		(5.53)	
Race	-18.12	*	-9.73	
	(9.79)		(6.50)	
Party	45.19	***	35.09	***
	(2.00)		(2.00)	
Ideology	-67.86	***	-13.69	**
	(8.35)		(5.52)	
Challenger	-35.56	***	-15.44	***
	(3.61)		(2.90)	
Challenger Quality	24.97	**	4.26	
	(9.49)		(6.28)	
Open Seat	2.17		7.71	**
	(5.45)		(3.61)	
District Safety	-12.23	***	-18.23	***
	(1.97)		(1.33)	
Leadership/Power Committee	-0.86		-0.825	
	(4.30)		(2.88)	
Education/Workforce Committee	2.66		0.76	
	(6.47)		(4.29)	
Percent Manufacturing in District	-0.32		0.08	
	(0.23)		(0.15)	
Race*Ideology	85.34	*	-27.43	
	(49.94)		(33.16)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	-22.33		0.23	
	(41.76)		(27.66)	
Gender*Ideology	22.44		-24.00	
	(33.50)		(22.19)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	-4.00		15.10	
	(25.91)		(17.14)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		-0.02	**
			(0.01)	
(Constant)	87.04	***	63.91	***
	(7.23)		(5.48)	
R^2	0.50		0.44	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Figure 5.1 Ideology, Gender, and Candidates' Predicted Corporate PAC Contributions (General Election)



Figure 5.2. Ideology, Race, and Candidates' Predicted Labor PAC Contributions (Primary Election)



CHAPTER 6

IDEOLOGIAL PAC GIVING TO NONTRADITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES

The focus of this chapter will be the effects of candidate characteristics and the interactions with party, ideology and candidate status on ideological PAC giving in the primary and general election cycles. Ideological PACs have been described as having a "pro-challenger" bias (Sabato 1984), which should work to the advantage of many nontraditional candidates who challenge incumbents for seats in Congress. It is essential, therefore, that this category of PACs be examined separately to test this assertion. Importantly, however, this category of ideological PACs is comprised of both liberal and conservative leaning groups, which support candidates who share their ideological leanings. The ideological PAC category, unlike the corporate and labor PAC categories, should be broken down into liberal and conservative groups, because of the ideological differences found in this category. Analyzing liberal groups separately from conservative groups should lend an explanation of the different types of nontraditional candidates who are most likely to receive support from these different types of ideological groups.

Liberal and Conservative Ideological PAC Giving

As described earlier, a bias exists in research regarding the effects of gender and race in attracting campaign contributions from PACs. Most studies make an implicit assumption that gender and race exert only a singular effect on the amounts of contributions candidates receive,

and fail to account for newer, conservative variations of women and black candidates as well as the newer donor networks that support them (e.g. Whilhite and Theilmann 1990).

While most women and minority candidates have been elected to Congress as Democrats and hold liberal policy views, the partisan and ideological diversity among these candidates is increasing. According to the Center for American Women and Politics, 80 of the 122 women congressional candidates in 2000 were Democrats and 42 were Republicans. Of the 67 black congressional candidates in 2000, 23 were Republican, according to the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. While there was only one black Republican incumbent (J.C. Watts-OK) at the time, the number of quality black Republican challengers is increasing, in part due to the efforts of groups like BAMPAC.

The issue of newer kinds of nontraditional candidates is especially important considering the relatively recent creation of ideological PACs that support these candidates. The Democratic EMILY's List has an opponent in the Republican Wish List. Additionally, Black America's PAC (BAMPAC) was created to support the candidacies of black Republicans. Aside from the ideological and partisan diversity of nontraditional candidates, studies of the effects of race and gender must also account for the interactions between these candidate characteristics and candidate status. Empirical consideration of these concerns regarding race and gender in analyses should produce more nuanced understanding of the influence of these two variables in attracting types of PAC contributions, especially liberal and conservative PAC contributions which are expected to benefit women and minority challengers.

The candidate demographic characteristics of race and gender have been found to send signals regarding their ideology. Numerous experimental designs have found that women and black candidates are consistently perceived as more liberal than they actually are (Koch 2000,

McDermott 1998, Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, Leeper 1991, Williams 1990, Rossenwasser and Seale 1988, Sapiro 1982). Some work has found that these signals hurt women candidates who run for national office (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a). While such signals may hurt women candidates with voters, however, these liberal ideological signals may not have the same negative effect on attracting certain types of PAC contributions. Liberal ideological groups, for example, may be especially supportive of these women candidates.

Just as the demographic cue of gender has been shown to signal candidate ideology, so too has race. Black candidates are stereotyped as being more liberal than white candidates in experimental studies (Williams 1990, McDermott 1998). In addition, black candidates are viewed as having greater competency in dealing with liberal policy issues (McDermott 1998). This work has also suggested that these candidates should be advantaged when their stereotyped views match those of the electorate (McDermott 1998). Therefore, similar to the ideological cue of gender, the ideological cue of race can also be an advantage or a disadvantage to nontraditional congressional candidates.

In this chapter I argue that the liberal ideological cues of gender and race will influence the amount of ideological PAC money a candidate receives. Gender and race should benefit nontraditional candidates in attracting ideological PAC contributions, as the stereotypes of these candidate characteristics match the liberal orientations of these groups. On the other hand, candidate gender and race may hurt nontraditional candidates in attracting money from conservative ideological PACs. Additionally, gender should work to the advantage of women candidates in attracting contributions from certain types of ideological PAC contributions—those dealing specifically with women's issues, such as women's rights, abortion, or those that support women running for office. Nontraditional candidates should also be advantaged in attracting

early money from these ideological groups, because ideological groups have been described as those more willing to engage in "risky" giving behaviors. Importantly, the interactions between gender/race and party, ideology, and candidate status are also expected to influence these ideological contributions. Challengers are expected to be favored over incumbents, and when the additional influences of party and ideology "fit" with the ideological leanings of the type of PAC, nontraditional candidates should benefit even more.

Data and Measures

The analysis for this chapter will examine ideological PAC contributions made to all general election candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives in 2000. The amount of ideological contributions made to congressional candidates was obtained from the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) and includes all filing reports completed by each candidate as of December 31, 2000. To analyze patterns across the election cycle, these contributions will once again be examined during both the primary and general election phases using seemingly unrelated regression estimation.

The dependent variables for this chapter are early and late liberal ideological contributions, as well as early and late conservative ideological contributions. In line with the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, it is expected that the relative advantage or disadvantage faced by nontraditional candidates in attracting ideological PAC money will be based in part on the ideological leanings of these groups. It is expected that Democratic women and black candidates would receive more from liberal ideological PACs than would their Republican counterparts. Conversely, Republican women and black candidates should be benefited in attracting PAC contributions from conservative ideological groups. Liberal and conservative

ideological PACs in this chapter, therefore, will be analyzed separately. This process of disaggregating ideological PAC contributions into liberal and conservative groupings produces four dependent variables for this chapter: early and late liberal ideological PAC money, as well as early and late conservative ideological PAC money. The procedure for coding these PACs is described below.

While PAC contributions from ideological groups were identified within the FEC data; the actual coding of liberal and ideological PACs began with the Open Secrets website (www.opensecrets.org) that is sponsored by The Center for Responsive Politics. This website groups PACs into different sectors for election cycles. For coding purposes, Open Secret's "ideological/single issue" sector was consulted. This PAC sector includes the following subcategories: Republican/Conservative, Democratic/Liberal, Leadership, Ideological/Single-Issue, Pro-Israel, Foreign and Defense Policy, Women's Issues, Human Rights, Environment, Gun Control, Gun Rights, Abortion Policy/Pro-Life, Abortion Policy/Pro-Choice, as well as a Miscellaneous Issues category, which includes groups devoted to animal rights, the support of law enforcement, or term limits, for example. Initially, liberal PACs were coded "1," conservative PACs were coded "2," and those PACs that did not fit into either of these categories were coded "0.[23]" For some PACs, this coding was fairly straightforward, as with the cases of Republican/Conservative, Democratic/Liberal, and Leadership PACs. For those PACs that were

[23] PAC ideology was coded based upon the central issue the committee was formed around, not necessarily the partisanship of the committee. For example, WISH List, a PAC that only gives contributions to Republican pro-choice women, was coded as a liberal PAC, because of their liberal position on abortion. If the issue did not lend itself well to the traditional liberal-conservative ideological spectrum, then the groups associated with that issue were coded as neither liberal nor conservative. For example, Pro-Israel PACs may attract Democratic and Republican support of the same issue for different reasons. Democrats may be supportive due to the belief in self-sovereignty, whereas Republicans may be supportive for reasons of bringing democracy to the Middle East. Furthermore, with this subcategory of ideological PACs in particular, there has been a new focus of strategy on supporting members of the majority party in Congress, following the Republican gains of the 1994 midterm elections (Jewish News Weekly, 1995). Therefore, this particular subcategory was coded as "0," neither liberal nor conservative.

less straightforward, their websites were consulted to gauge their liberal or conservative leanings. PACs coded "0" that did not fit into the liberal or conservative groupings were then dropped from the analysis. Therefore, dummy variables were created for liberal ideological groups (liberal =1) and conservative groups (conservative =1). Finally, contributions from each of these ideological groups were aggregated and then placed in to the full data set. Similar to the previous models, the aggregated amounts of liberal and conservative PAC contributions were then further divided based on the date of the primary election, into early liberal/conservative contributions and late liberal/conservative contributions, the dependent variables for analysis in this chapter.

The main independent variables for analyses in this chapter are once again gender, race, and their interactions with candidate status, party, and ideology. The interaction terms presented in the analyses of this chapter allow for testing whether or not candidate status, party and ideology condition the impact of race and gender in attracting liberal and conservative ideological PAC contributions. Results found in this chapter will build upon extant research of candidate characteristics and ideological PAC contributions, indicating the types of nontraditional candidates that are more likely to receive contributions from ideological PACs, once those ideological leanings have been taken into account.

Control variables in the two sets of models presented in this chapter follow the general model developed in Chapter 4. Candidate characteristics, such as party, ideology, status, quality, and whether or not that candidate holds a leadership position or serves on a powerful committee, are included, as are characteristics of the electoral environment (whether or not a candidate is running in an open seat as well as the degree of safety of the district). Unlike the models presented in the previous chapter dealing with corporate and labor PACs, the models for

ideological PACS do not introduce additional specific control variables that are known to influence their contributions. Thus, the following analyses follow the full model for total PAC contributions found in Chapter 4.

Results and Discussion

Again, there are two sets of results tables in this chapter: one for liberal ideological PAC contributions and one for conservative ideological PAC contributions. The first results table presented in Table 6.1 estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with party on liberal ideological PAC contributions during the 2000 primary and general elections. Beginning with the first column of results for the primary election equation, candidate characteristics like party, challenger status, and challenger quality all produce statistically significant effects on the total amount of contributions congressional candidates receive from liberal ideological PACs.

While direct effects are difficult to determine with the inclusion of interaction terms in the model, it appears that Democratic candidates receive $4,220 more than Republican candidates from liberal ideological PACs in the primary election, a result that is not too surprising. Challengers, similar to previous findings regarding corporate and labor PACs, are also at a disadvantage in attracting early funding from liberal ideological groups. The net effects of both party and candidate status are discussed in more detail below. This apparent disadvantage of challenger status, however, is mitigated somewhat by challenger quality. Quality challengers receive $4,500 more than challengers who lack political experience; quality challengers receive around $1,890 more than incumbents at this stage. It appears that liberal ideological PACs do exhibit some strategy in their early support of challengers. Additionally,

the electoral environment also produces effects at this early stage. Both district safety and whether or not an incumbent holds a leadership position or serves on a powerful committee affect early liberal ideological contributions. Those candidates running in the safest seats receive $3,970 less than those running in the most competitive districts. Incumbents who hold positions of leadership or serve on powerful committees attract $1,550 less in early liberal PAC money than do those that do not have such positions. Liberal PACs do not appear to favor these types of incumbents in the early stages of the election cycle.

Although the coefficients for gender and race are not statistically significant in this model, their interactions with party and challenger status are. The effects of gender and race on liberal ideological PAC contributions in the primary, therefore, are conditioned by party and candidate status. The effects of both gender and race vary substantially for Democrats and Republicans as well as for challengers and incumbents. Given the complex relationships between these variables and their interactions, it may be helpful to examine predicted amounts of PAC contributions received by different types of men and women candidates as well as different types of black and whit candidates. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate these differences using predicted values from the primary election results. Table 6.2 illustrates the amount of liberal ideological PAC contributions received by typical men and women challengers and incumbents of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 6.1. Typical candidates have mean or modal values on all the remaining independent variables in the model. The typical candidate is therefore white, is not running in an open seat, is running in a district with a seat safety score of 2.6, has an ideology value of .36 and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful committee in Congress. In addition, the average challenger is politically inexperienced or of low quality.

As illustrated in Table 6.2, regardless of gender or candidate status, Democratic candidates receive more liberal ideological PAC contributions than do Republican candidates, as expected. In addition, among Democratic candidates, women candidates are at an even greater advantage. Democratic women challengers receive around $16,220, $6,780 more than Democratic male challengers. This pattern of female advantage extends to Republican challengers, although it is not as pronounced. Republican women challengers receive only $1,060 more than typical Republican male challengers. While gender advantages female Democratic challengers, it also advantages female Republican challengers over their male counterparts.

For incumbents in Table 6.2, this same general pattern holds, although the advantage of Democratic incumbent women over Democratic incumbent men is much smaller. Democratic incumbents in general attract more primary liberal ideological PAC contributions than do Republican incumbents, regardless of gender. The typical Democratic female incumbent raised $1,120 more in liberal ideological PAC contributions than her typical male counterparts. Republican women incumbents also do better than their male counterparts, raising about $1,060 more from liberal ideological PACs. In terms of early liberal ideological PAC contributions, women Democrats appear to be helped most by their gender while Republican women appear to be helped as well, although by not as great a margin.

Similar to gender, race itself does not exert any significant effects on primary PAC contributions from liberal ideological groups, although its interaction with party and challenger status does. Table 6.3 demonstrates the amount of liberal ideological PAC contributions received by typical black and white challengers and incumbents of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 6.1. For the

calculations in this table, a typical candidate is male, is not running in an open seat, is running in a district with a seat safety score of 2.6, has an ideology value of .36 and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a powerful committee in Congress. In addition, the typical challenger remains a candidate who is politically inexperienced or of low quality.

As illustrated in Table 6.3, Democratic candidates receive more liberal ideological PAC contributions than do Republican candidates, regardless of race or candidate status. A typical black Democratic challenger would receive $13,870--$4,430 more than the typical white Democratic challenger. This pattern of advantage also extends to Republican challengers. Black Republican challengers receive only $1,790 more than white Republican challengers. While candidate race advantages black Democratic challengers, it also advantages black Republican challengers over their white counterparts.

For incumbents in Table 6.3, the pattern of advantage looks somewhat different. Again, Democratic incumbents, regardless of race, are advantaged in attracting liberal ideological PAC contributions with respect to Republican incumbents. Yet, typical black Democratic incumbents would actually receive $630 less than typical white incumbents. Candidate race appears to make only a small difference among Democratic incumbents. The typical black Republican incumbent raised $1,880 more in liberal ideological PAC contributions than his typical white Republican counterparts. The liberal ideological cue of race may mitigate partisanship in this case, creating candidates that liberal groups feel may still be able to represent their causes. In other words, of Republican incumbents, liberal groups may feel that they have the best chance of issue representation with black Republicans, although they clearly prefer Democrats to Republicans. Again, while Representative J.C. Watts (R-OK) is the only black Republican in the dataset for 2000, these predicted values control for incumbency and leadership position. Although he was

the only black Republican at that time, if other Republicans were elected with more conservative ideologies, the same relationship should hold. White Democratic incumbents do better than their Republican counterparts, raising about $4,220 more from liberal ideological PACs. Clearly liberal ideological PACs prefer Democratic candidates. Yet, within the pool of Democratic candidates, they contribute most to black challengers and give similar amounts to black and white incumbents.

The second column of results in Table 6.1 demonstrates the effect of candidate characteristics on liberal ideological PAC giving in the general election. Here, the candidate characteristics of gender, party, challenger status and challenger quality are found to be statistically significant. Women candidates are significantly advantaged by liberal ideological PAC giving in the general election, receiving $8,140 more than their male counterparts. As expected, Democratic candidates are also advantaged, receiving $7,030 more from liberal ideological PACs than Republican candidates. Challengers are disadvantaged at this stage, attracting $5,700 less than incumbents. However, among challengers, quality challengers do better, raising only $4,500 less than incumbents. Additionally, candidates running in the safest seats are especially hurt at this stage, raising $16,710 less than those candidates running in the most competitive districts. Clearly, liberal ideological PACs are also strategic, giving contributions where they think it will matter the most to the outcome of the election.

Finally, the amount of liberal ideological PAC money a candidate raises in the primary election is positively and statistically significant in determining the amount of liberal ideological PAC money they raise in the general election. For every $1,000 raised from this source in the

primary election, a candidate can count on an additional $1,030 more from this same source in the general election. EMILY may have been right after all--at least with respect to "growing" liberal ideological PAC money across the election cycle.

Table 6.4 estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with party on conservative ideological PAC contributions during the primary and general elections. In the primary election equation, party, ideology, open seat, and district safety are all significant. Democrats receive $6,530 less than Republicans from conservative ideological PACs in the primary election, as expected. Candidates running in open seats are advantaged, receiving $2,310 more from conservative ideological PACs than those candidates running in a district where an incumbent is seeking reelection. Also as expected, candidates running in the safest seats receive $4,960 less from conservative ideological PACs than do those running in the most competitive seats. These significant variables produce the expected effects on conservative ideological PAC money in the primary election.

The ideology variable, however, does not produce the expected outcome. While it is significant, it is also in the negative direction, seemingly indicating that as candidates become more conservative, they attract less money from conservative ideological groups. This finding does not make substantive sense. Ideology seemed to matter in previous analyses dealing with total PAC contributions as well as analyses with corporate and labor PAC contributions. The preceding model presented in this chapter illustrates that party does exert statistically significant effects on conservative ideological PAC contributions, so it would appear that ideology should work the same way with ideological PACs. It does not, however. Closer inspection of the role of ideology in influencing this particular type of group's giving behavior is merited. Additional focus on the role of ideology is presented in later models in this chapter. It may be that the cue

of party is sufficient for these groups to consider contributing to congressional candidates. Party may in fact capture the essence of these groups' policy preferences, while ideology may not exert any real affect.

General election results are found in the second column of Table 6.4. Again, party is statistically significant; Democratic candidates receive $14,760 less from conservative ideological PACs than Republicans. Challengers are also at somewhat of a disadvantage, received $3,750 less than incumbents. Those candidates running in open seats receive $10,910 more from conservative ideological PACs in the general election than do those running in seats with an incumbent seeking reelection. As expected, candidates running in the safest seats receive $16,890 less than candidates running in the most competitive districts. Conservative ideological PACs, therefore, do consider the political environment in supporting candidates in the general election. The interaction of race and party is also significant. Black Democratic candidates are somewhat advantaged here, relative to other members of their party, for they receive $1,660 less than Republicans, while Democrats overall receive $14,760 less than Republicans. Finally, the amount of early conservative PAC money a candidate receives in the primary election does determine the amount of money he or she will receive from this source in the general election. For every $1,000 raised in the primary, a candidate will receive an additional $1,180 in the general election.

The next two tables presented in this chapter are the ideology models. The first of these tables, Table 6.5, estimates effects of the independent variables and the interactions of gender and race with ideology on liberal ideological PAC contributions during the primary and general elections. Party, challenger status and quality, district safety, and leadership position or powerful committee service are all statistically significant in this model, and their effects are in the

expected direction. For example, liberal ideological PACs favor Democratic candidates, giving them $4,740 more than Republican candidates. Challengers are at a disadvantage attracting this money in the primary election, but this disadvantage is mitigated somewhat if they are quality challengers. Additionally, liberal ideological PACs appear to focus their primary election contributions in the most competitive of districts, and these PACs give less money to those incumbents who hold leadership positions or serve on powerful committees The candidate characteristics of gender and race are not statistically significant in the primary election. Neither is candidate ideology, nor its interactions with race and gender. It appears that ideology does not have an effect on liberal ideological PAC giving at this stage of the election.

The second column of results in Table 6.5 demonstrates the effects of these variables on liberal PAC contributions during the general election. Again, party, challenger status, and district safety all exert the statistically significant influences that are expected from the literature. Primary PAC contributions also produce statistically significant and positive effects on the amount of general election contributions received from these sources. While ideology is not significant at this stage, its interactions with gender and challenger status are. It appears from this model that female conservative candidates are advantaged in attracting liberal ideological PAC contributions during the general election. Additionally, the interaction of gender, ideology and challenger status produces a statistically significant, and negative effect. The effect of the gender/ideology interaction does not make substantive sense and does not match with expectations. Again, the ideology variable and its interactions do not produce intuitive results.

Similarly, Table 6.6 illustrates the effects of candidate characteristics and ideology on conservative ideological PAC contributions. Again, counterintuitive findings regarding the effect of ideology emerge, although the effects of other variables, such as challenger status,

challenger, open seat, and district safety, produce results consistent with previous models. Additionally, the party variable in both the primary and general election equations produces effects consistent with expectations—Democratic candidates receive less in contributions from these conservative sources than do Republicans—but the ideology variable does not. In both the primary and general election, conservative candidates appear to attract less money from conservative ideological PACs than do their moderate to liberal counterparts and this effect has no reasonable explanation. It may be necessary to examine more closely the role of candidate ideology in attracting contributions from ideological PACs.

There are some reasons to suspect that the role of ideology across ideological groups may not be uniform. Some ideological PACs, whether liberal or conservative in nature, may in practice limit themselves, either formally or informally, to giving only to members of a certain political party. In addition, there are a few cases where the partisan bias of a PAC's giving strategy does not match the ideological bent of the group itself. For example, WISH List gives only to pro-choice Republican women. The pro-choice position is coded liberal in this dataset, as most would consider this issue position to be liberal in nature, although the group itself only supports Republicans. Because ideology worked well with labor and corporate models, it may be safe to assume that the problem of these counterintuitive findings lies not with the measure of candidate ideology itself, but with the nature of the ideological PAC grouping. Groups that make up this category may not have a common set of concerns that connect them; in fact, many of these groups are single issue groups. These groups may care less about the relative ideology of a candidate, as long as the candidate shares their position on a particular issue or set of issues. The ideology models for both the liberal and conservative ideological PACs presented in this chapter do not perform particularly well.

It may be that analyses of the "liberal" and "conservative" types are too broad; it is possible that these categories need to be disaggregated even further into issue-specific groupings. For example, the Women's Issues category employed by the Center for Responsive Politics would present one subset of the liberal grouping that could be examined. On the other hand, the Pro-Life category could provide a good test of conservative ideological giving to conservative candidates. In sum, ideology may not work in the full model because it may work differently among the subcategories of liberal and conservative ideological PACs.

To explore the importance of ideology to subcategories of the ideological PAC group, the ideology model was analyzed each for women's issues PAC contributions and for pro-life PAC contributions. Again, the Center for Responsive Politics' Open Secrets website was used to identify PACs in each of these categories. Women's Issues PACs include such groups as EMILY's List, Wish List, and the National Organization for Women—groups whose issue positions are liberal in nature.[24] Pro-life PACs include the various state organizations of Right to Life as well as other pro-life organizations like the Susan B. Anthony List.[25]

Table 6.7 reports the results of the first analysis, examining candidate characteristics and the effects of ideology on women's issues PACs. The results for both the primary and general election equations are quite similar. As expected, gender is positive and significant; women in the primary election receive $2,630 more than men, $2,080 more than men in the general

[24] Other groups in this category are Alabama Solution, Minnesota Women's Campaign Fund, National Women's Political Caucus, Women For, Women in Leadership, Women Under Forty PAC, Women's Action for New Directions, Women's Campaign Fund, and Women's Political Committee.

[25] The complete list of pro-life PACs in the 2000 cycle include Allen County Right to Life, American Right to Life, California Right to Life, Christians & Jews for Life, Elect Life, Human Life PAC, Kentucky Pro-Life PAC, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, National Pro-Life Alliance, National Right to Life, New Jersey Committee for Life, New Jersey Right to Life, New York State Right to Life, Ohio Right to Life Society, Oregon Right to Life, Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation, Pro-Life Citizens for a Better Society, Pro-Life Campaign Committee, Republican National Coalition for Life, Rhode Island State Right to Life, Right to Life of Greater Akron, Right to Life to Michigan, South Carolina Citizens for Life, South Dakota Pro-Life Committee, Spring Lake Pro-Life, Susan B. Anthony List, Wisconsin Right to Life.

election. Party is also significant and positive across both cycles of the election. In the primary election, Democratic candidates receive around $170 more from women's issues PACs than do men. This difference is almost doubled in the general election; women receive $330 more than men in that particular phase of the election cycle. District safety also has a significant, yet, negative effect in both the primary and general election equations. Women's issues PACs are strategic in their contributions at this early stage; they do not support candidates running in the safest districts at the same rate they support candidates running in the most competitive districts. Primary PAC contributions received from these sources also produce statistically significant effects on the amount of these contributions a candidate would receive in the general election.

It should be noted that the ideology variable is not statistically significant in either the primary or the general election cycles in this model. Apparently, the party cue is more relevant to women's issue PACs in deciding whom to support. However, the interaction of gender and ideology at the primary stage, and gender, ideology and challenger status at the general election stage, is significant. In the primary and general election women conservative candidates do worse than their moderate to liberal counterparts. However, when interacted with challenger status, the effect is significant but positive. Once candidates prove themselves in the primary election, therefore, it appears that women's issue groups are more likely to support challengers.

Figure 6.1 graphically depicts the effect of these various interactions for men and women candidates of incumbent and challenger status. The bottom two lines demonstrate the levels of women's issues PAC funding for men challengers and men incumbents. As Figure 6.1 clearly shows, men, regardless of their status or ideology, receive fewer amounts of contributions than female challengers from these groups. As men incumbents and challengers become more conservative, it appears that they receive somewhat more money from these groups; however,

the increase is very small, only about $300 as male candidates move from the most liberal to most conservative positions. Women challengers and incumbents are represented in the top two lines of the graph. As women challengers become more conservative they do receive less money from women's issues PACs (the most conservative women challengers gets about $500 less than the most liberal women challenger.) Women incumbents, on the other hand, are highly sensitive to conservative changes in ideology; these women receive much less money from these groups as they become more conservative, and indeed, even more moderate. Note that at the most liberal end of the ideological spectrum, women incumbents receive more in contributions from women's issues PACs than women challengers; however, over the bulk of the ideological spectrum typical women challengers receive more from these PACs than typical women incumbents do. It appears that across ideology, these PACs are willing to help challengers over incumbents.

Table 6.8 reports the results of the second analysis, examining candidate characteristics and the effects of ideology on pro-life PAC contributions. Primary election results reported in the first column indicate that several variables are significant in this equation. Gender is not statistically significant at this stage; candidate gender does not seem to matter in attracting early pro-life contributions. The party of the candidate is negative and statistically significant; Democratic candidates receive $310 less than Republican candidates from pro-life PACs in the primary election. Challengers receive $140 more from these PACs than do incumbents, indicating a pro-challenger bias at least in the primary election. Among challengers, quality challengers are especially advantaged, receiving $350 more than non-quality challengers. Candidates running in open seats attract $500 more from pro-life PACs than those candidates running against incumbents; additionally, candidates running in the safest districts attract $140

less than those candidates running in the most competitive seats. Pro-life PACs, like women's issues PACs, are strategic in determining which candidates to support in the primary election.

Candidate ideology is significant in this stage of the election and so are its interactions with gender and challenger status. The ideology variable itself is in the negative direction, indicating that as candidates become more conservative, they attract less money from these PACS. Again, this variable does not yield results that are consistent with expectations. The gender/ideology interaction is positive, suggesting that female conservative candidates are advantaged in attracting pro-life PAC contributions as expected. The interaction among gender, ideology, and challenger status, however, is negative suggesting that this particular combination of candidate characteristics is not beneficial in attracting this PAC money.

Figure 6.2 demonstrates the effects of these interactions on women and men challengers and incumbents across different ideological values. The top two lines of the graph indicate the predicted amount of pro-life contributions received by women incumbents and challengers of varying levels of ideology. As both types of women become more conservative, they receive more money from these groups. At the most liberal range of ideological values, women candidates receive very little, if any, money from these groups, although men at this liberal end of the ideological scale actually receive slightly more than women. Women incumbents are the preferred recipients of these contributions across the moderate and conservative end of the ideology scale; this difference in the amount of pro-life PAC contributions represents a statistically significant difference at any point along the ideological scale. A typical woman challenger with mean ideology would receive $990; a one standard deviation increase in ideology toward the conservative end of the scale would produce $1,470 from these pro-life

groups. A similar pattern exists for the typical woman incumbent. A women incumbent with mean ideology would receive $930, and the more conservative ideology would attract $1,460, an increase of $530.

The bottom two lines on the graph indicate the levels of pro-life giving for men challengers and incumbents. Men incumbents are preferred to challengers, although both types of men candidates receive substantially less than both types of women candidates; this difference is also statistically significant. This pattern fits with other findings that women, regardless of party or ideology, are more likely to be responsive to abortion legislation (Luker 1984). Pro-life PACs appear to view women, whether challengers or incumbents, as more able to address these policy issues. While men incumbents and challengers receive less money from these groups as they become more conservative, changes in ideology for men candidates produces less of an effect than it does for women. For example, average men challengers with mean ideology receive $200 in pro-life PAC contributions, but a one standard deviation increase in their ideology score results in $130 from pro-life groups, a decrease of only $70. For men incumbents, the results are similar. Average men incumbents with mean ideology scores would be predicted to receive only $60 from pro-life PACs in the general election. A one standard deviation increase in their ideology in the conservative direction would result in a $60 loss.

General election results are presented in the second column of Table 6.8. Gender is significant in this model; women attract $800 more from pro-life sources in the general election than do men. Party exerts a negative statistically significant influence on contributions. Democratic candidates receive $360 less than Republicans from these pro-life PACs. Challenger status does not seem to matter at this stage; however quality challenger status does. Quality challengers receive $1,940 more from pro-life PACs than do those inexperienced challengers.

Candidates running in an open seat are again advantaged, receiving $970 more than those candidates running against incumbents. Gender interactions with ideology and challenger status are also statistically significant. Finally, the amount of primary contributions received from pro-life PACs positively and significantly affects the amount of money raised in the general election from these sources. For every $1,000 a candidate receives in early pro-life PAC contributions, he or she receive $2,010 in the general election. These two subcategories of ideological PACs, women's issues and pro-life PACs, illustrate the usefulness of examining ideological PACs by their specific issue groupings.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the effect of candidate characteristics and their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status on liberal and conservative ideological PAC contributions. When analyzing the effects of gender and race on these contributions, much can be learned from disaggregating this category of PAC contributions according to their liberal or conservative ideological leanings. One consistent finding in this chapter is the importance of party, across both liberal and conservative models. For liberal PACs, Democratic candidates are advantaged over Republican candidates during the primary and general election stages in the party model presented in this chapter. Among Democratic candidates, however, typical Democratic women are predicted to receive more liberal ideological PAC money than typical Democratic men. In fact, Republican women are predicted to receive more money from liberal ideological PACs than Republican men. The liberal ideological signal of gender works to increase support from liberal ideological PACs. In the conservative PAC model, party is also important; Democratic candidates receive less support from these PACs.

A second finding of this chapter concerns the strategic nature of ideological PACs. While the literature suggests that these PACs are most likely to give early, the findings from this chapter point to a more strategic giving strategy. Nontraditional candidates are not necessarily advantaged in attracting contributions from these PAC due to their challenger status. The quality of a challenger is also an important determinant in receiving money from either liberal or conservative ideological PACs, as well as candidate status

Lastly, an important finding of this chapter points to the role of ideology among these groups. Ideology does not work well across the models presented in this chapter. In fact, in a couple of cases, the effect is in the opposite direction than what would be expected. It may be that the comprehensive measure of ideology used for candidates does not represent relevant information about policy issues that would influence contributions to congressional candidates from ideological PACs. In particular, the findings regarding ideology in this chapter point to the necessity of breaking down ideological groups even further, focusing on groups involved with particular issues. The issue-oriented analyses of women's issues and pro-life PACs demonstrate the utility in examining ideological PAC giving in this narrow, focused approach.

The analysis of corporate and labor PACs worked well in part because the PACs comprising these categories had much in common. This may not be the case for the ideological PAC category, especially since a substantial number of these groups are single-issue groups. Policy fit, as opposed to ideology per se, is the "litmus test" used by these groups when deciding which candidates to support. In sum, the effects of candidate characteristics on ideological PAC contributions cannot be described without accounting for the differences in ideology and issue focus among the groups comprising this category.

Table 6.1. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Party on Liberal Ideological PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	1.06		8.14	**
	(1.20)		(3.89)	
Race	1.88		-2.05	
	(1.63)		(5.30)	
Party	4.22	***	7.03	***
	(0.60)		(2.02)	
Ideology	-0.25		1.48	
	(1.50)		(4.87)	
Challenger	-2.61	***	-5.70	**
	(0.65)		(2.14)	
Challenger Quality	4.50	**	1.20	
	(1.77)		(5.79)	
Open Seat	0.41		-1.98	
	(1.02)		(3.31)	
District Safety	-3.97	***	-16.71	***
	(0.37)		(1.29)	
Leadership/Power Committee	-1.55	**	-0.39	
	(0.79)		(2.57)	
Race*Party	-2.51		-5.02	
	(2.13)		(6.94)	
Race*Party*Challenger	5.06	*	-15.31	
	(3.00)		(9.77)	
Gender*Party	0.06		-4.79	
	(1.76)		(5.74)	
Gender*Party*Challenger	5.66	**	6.13	
	(1.74)		(5.71)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		1.03	***
			(0.12	
(Constant)	11.89	***	49.35	***
	(1.17)		(4.06)	
R^2	0.32		0.44	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 6.2. Predicted Liberal Ideological Primary PAC Contributions for Typical Men and Women Candidates

	Men	Women
Challengers:		
Democrats	$9,440	$16,220
Republicans	5,220	6,280
Incumbents:		
Democrats	12,050	13,170
Republicans	7,830	8,890

Note. Values in the cells are the total amount of corporate PAC contributions received by typical men and women candidates of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 6.1. The typical candidate is white, running in a district with a seat safety score of 1.0, has a mean ideology value of .36, and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a power committee. In addition the typical challenger is not running in an open seat and is a low quality challenger.

Table 6.3. Predicted Liberal Ideological Primary PAC Contributions for Typical Black and White Candidates

	White	Black
Challengers:		
Democrats	$9,440	$13,870
Republicans	5,310	7,100
Incumbents:		
Democrats	12,050	11,420
Republicans	7,830	9,710[a]

Note. Values in the cells are the total amount of corporate PAC contributions received by typical men and women candidates of both parties in the primary election cycle calculated using the results presented in the first column of Table 6.1. The typical candidate is male, running in a district with a seat safety score of 1.0, has a mean ideology value of .36, and does not hold a leadership position or serve on a power committee. In addition the typical challenger is not running in an open seat and is a low quality challenger.
[a]This predicted value is based on one case in the data set; caution should be used in interpreting this value.

Table 6.4. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Party on Conservative Ideological PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	1.87		4.36	
	(1.55)		(3.86)	
Race	1.82		-10.26	
	(2.11)		(5.25)	
Party	-6.53	***	-14.76	***
	(0.78)		(2.03)	
Ideology	-5.24	**	-1.46	
	(1.94)		(4.85)	
Challenger	0.84		-3.75	*
	(0.85)		(2.11)	
Challenger Quality	1.24		-8.18	
	(2.30)		(5.72)	
Open Seat	2.31	*	10.91	**
	(1.32)		(3.29)	
District Safety	-4.96	***	-16.89	***
	(0.48)		(1.27)	
Leadership/Power Committee	0.73		-1.83	
	(1.02)		(2.54)	
Race*Party	-0.79		13.10	*
	(2.77)		(6.88)	
Race*Party*Challenger	-0.29		-0.78	
	(3.89)		(9.67)	
Gender*Party	-2.32		-5.72	
	(2.29)		(5.70)	
Gender*Party*Challenger	-2.35		-7.42	
	(2.26)		(5.63)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		1.18	***
			(0.09)	
(Constant)	20.58	***	61.93	***
	(1.52)		(4.20)	
R^2	0.28		0.56	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 6.5. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Liberal Ideological PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	2.47		3.41	
	(1.52)		(4.87)	
Race	-1.70		-7.21	
	(1.83)		(5.85)	
Party	4.74	***	7.57	***
	(0.56)		(1.86)	
Ideology	0.01		1.23	
	(1.55)		(4.97)	
Challenger	-2.25	**	-3.94	*
	(0.65)		(2.10)	
Challenger Quality	3.74	**	0.80	
	(1.76)		(5.64)	
Open Seat	0.38		-1.76	
	(1.02)		(3.27)	
District Safety	-4.09	***	-16.69	***
	(0.37)		(1.27)	
Leadership/Power Committee	-1.52	*	-0.30	
	(0..79)		(2.53)	
Race*Ideology	8.87		-9.39	
	(9.33)		(29.88)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	-3.68		26.51	
	(7.81)		(25.00)	
Gender*Ideology	-1.70		36.82	**
	(5.87)		(18.77)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	4.09		-37.78	**
	(4.58)		(14.67)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		1.06	***
			(0.11)	
(Constant)	11.76	***	48.25	***
	(1.19)		(4.04)	
R^2	0.30		0.45	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 6.6. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Conservative Ideological PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	-1.80		-3.33	
	(1.95)		(4.99)	
Race	3.64		1.94	
	(2.34)		(6.01)	
Party	-7.03	**	-16.20	***
	(0.71)		(1.94)	
Ideology	-5.31	**	-3.49	
	(1.99)		(5.13)	
Challenger	1.11		-4.16	*
	(0.83)		(2.14)	
Challenger Quality	1.05		-2.11	
	(2.26)		(5.77)	
Open Seat	2.21	*	11.98	**
	(1.31)		(3.36)	
District Safety	-4.88	***	-16.57	***
	(0.47)		(1.29)	
Leadership/Power Committee	0.68		-1.84	
	(0.47)		(2.60)	
Race*Ideology	-9.088		0.13	
	(11.98)		(30.67)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	3.40		-12.74	
	(10.03)		(25.66)	
Gender*Ideology	11.98		5.26	
	(7.53)		(19.30)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	-10.55	*	-1.30	
	(5.88)		(15.08)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		1.18	***
			(0.09)	
(Constant)	20.49	***	62.77	***
	(1.53)		(4.33)	
R^2	0.27		0.55	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 6.7. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Women's Issues PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	2.63	***	2.08	***
	(0.28)		(0.29)	
Race	-.023		-0.45	
	(0.31)		(0.33)	
Party	0.17	*	0.33	**
	(0.09)		(0.10)	
Ideology	0.19		0.32	
	(0.26)		(0.28)	
Challenger	-0.07		-0.09	
	(0.11)		(0.12)	
Challenger Quality	0.30		0.04	
	(0.30)		(0.32)	
Open Seat	0.09		0.18	
	(0.17)		(0.18)	
District Safety	-0.33	***	-0.27	***
	(0.06)		(0.07)	
Leadership/Power Committee	-0.01		-.003	
	(0.47)		(0.14	
Race*Ideology	0.09		0.66	
	(1.58)		(1.67)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	0.69		-0.31	
	(1.33)		(1.40)	
Gender*Ideology	-2.78	**	-6.13	***
	(1.00)		(1.06)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	0.29		5.24	***
	(0.78)		(0.82)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		0.74	***
			(0.04)	
(Constant)	0.75	***	0.47	**
	(0.20)		(0.22)	
R^2	0.28		0.57	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Table 6.8. Candidate Characteristics and the Conditional Effects of Ideology on Pro-Life PAC Contributions

	Primary Election		General Election	
Gender	-0.21		0.80	*
	(0.18)		(0.43)	
Race	0.19		0.25	
	(0.22)		(0.52)	
Party	-0.31	***	-0.36	**
	(0.07)		(0.16)	
Ideology	-0.35	*	-0.02	
	(0.18)		(0.44)	
Challenger	0.14	*	-0.21	
	(0.08)		(0.18)	
Challenger Quality	0.35	*	1.94	***
	(0.21)		(0.50)	
Open Seat	0.50	***	0.97	**
	(0.12)		(0.29)	
District Safety	-0.14	**	-0.13	
	(0.04)		(0.10)	
Leadership/Power Committee	0.10		-0.14	
	(0.09)		(0.22)	
Race*Ideology	-0.94		0.18	
	(1.10)		(2.64)	
Race*Ideology*Challenger	0.38		-0.49	
	(0.92)		(2.21)	
Gender*Ideology	2.99	***	-5.95	***
	(0.69)		(1.68)	
Gender*Ideology*Challenger	-.234	***	5.06	***
	(0.54)		(1.31)	
Primary PAC Contributions	---		2.01	***
			(0.09)	
(Constant)	0.64	***	0.63	*
	(0.14)		(0.34)	
R^2	0.14		0.51	
N	793		793	

Note: *Significant at .10, **Significant at .05, ***Significant at .000. Results generated using SURE.

Figure 6.1 Ideology, Gender, and Candidates' Predicted Women's Issues PAC Contributions in the General Election



Figure 6.2. Ideology, Gender, and Candidates' Predicted Pro-Life PAC Contributions in the Primary Election



CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: THE COMPLEX INFLUENCES OF GENDER AND RACE ON PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO NONTRADITIONAL CANDIDATES

Many studies of candidate attributes and PAC contributions have made distinctions among the types of candidates running in an election, but generally candidate type has been restricted to candidate status, either as an incumbent or as a challenger. This dissertation has argued that aspects of nontraditional candidate status must also be included in these analyses, particularly when examining the effects of race and gender on candidates' abilities to raise campaign contributions. While this dissertation focused specifically on the effects of these kinds of candidate characteristics on attracting contributions from political action committees, the findings of this study suggest the need for further research on the complex influences of race and gender on campaign finance more generally.

Aside from the focus on various influences of nontraditional candidate status in attracting PAC contributions, this research also examined different types of PACs, suggesting that notions of PAC discrimination may be better described as purposeful attempts to influence policy based on the ideological signals associated with a candidate's race or gender. Patterns of such bias as a result of the liberal ideological signals of gender and race differ for various PAC categories. Just as all candidates are not alike, all PACs are not alike. Some PACs follow predictable patterns of giving, favoring certain types of candidates, while others do not. While labor PACs consistently

favor Democratic candidates, for example, corporate PACs traditionally favor Republican candidates. The relative advantage or disadvantage of nontraditional candidates within these categories, therefore, relates to how well their ideological signal matches the ideological policy preferences of these groups. While corporate and labor PACs are thought to heavily favor incumbents, ideological PACs, on the other hand, are thought to be more likely to give to challengers, even if they do not have a good chance of winning. Some PACs may increase their chances of gaining legislative access by supporting both candidates in an election, while other PACs for ideological reasons, would not. Studies of the effects of nontraditional candidate characteristics on PAC contributions must account for these differences in PACs, their motivations, and their strategies. The influence of gender and race on PAC contributions, therefore, is analyzed separately by PAC type in this dissertation in order to account for such differences.

Additionally, when PAC contributions are given is another aspect of campaign finance that has important implications for nontraditional candidates. Some PACs make contributions only during the general election campaign, after candidates have cleared the initial hurdle of a primary election. Other PACs, however, may give much earlier in the campaign process, hoping to influence which candidate will be successful in gaining their party's nomination. The relative wealth of different PACs also influences their strategies; those with large amounts of money can afford to support multiple candidates throughout the election cycle. Those PACs with more limited resources, however, must pick and choose among candidates, and may have to concentrate their efforts on either the primary or the general election.

For nontraditional candidates who run as challengers, contributions received during the early stages of an election are especially important to their bids for office, as these candidates

work to prove their electoral viability. Ultimately the nontraditional candidates who are successful in attracting this early money are those who can advance to the general election, and if elected, may improve the descriptive representation of Congress. Because of the importance of these early PAC investments in nontraditional congressional candidates, they may be more influenced by the policy agendas represented by these organizations. Therefore, patterns of PAC contributions and the types of candidates they advantage have implications for substantive representation in Congress as well.

Summary of Findings and Implications

This examination of PAC contributions and candidate characteristics suggests that gender and race do not necessarily exert only singular effects on PAC contributions; the effects of gender and race may be conditioned by other influences as well. More nuanced understandings of the effects of nontraditional candidate status on fundraising must take into account the influences such as party, ideology, and candidate status. Analysis of both election cycles indicates that the effects of gender, race, and their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status may exert indirect effects on the amount of money candidates raise in the general election.

When analyzing the effects of gender and race on total PAC contributions during the primary and general election stages of 2000, this analysis has demonstrated that while women and minority candidates have an advantage in attracting total PAC contributions during the primary election, this advantage disappears in the general election. Furthermore, candidate ideology conditions the effect of gender or race; moderate to conservative women and minorities

attracted greater amounts of PAC contributions. Money flows to those with power and in the current Congress, conservative and Republican nontraditional candidates are advantaged in attracting PAC contributions.

Analyses for corporate and labor PAC contributions also reveal that certain types of nontraditional candidates are advantaged in attracting money from these groups. For women, ideology is an important influence that can help them attract corporate contributions. Conservative women challengers receive greater amounts of corporate PAC contributions in the general election than do their more moderate to liberal counterparts. For black candidates, the combination of race and party can work to their advantage in attracting labor contributions. Again, the candidate characteristics of gender and race produce not only singular effects but conditional effects in attracting contributions from traditional sources such as corporate and labor groups. Importantly, it is incorrect to conclude that all women and all black candidates are disadvantaged in seeking contributions from these sources. While some nontraditional candidates are disadvantaged due to their party, ideology, or candidate status, other nontraditional candidates are actually advantaged.

Lastly, the analyses of the effects of candidate characteristics and their interactions with party, ideology and candidate status on ideological PAC giving produced interesting findings. A significant influence on ideological PAC contributions is the political party of the candidate. As would be expected, Democratic candidates are favored relative to Republican candidates in attracting liberal ideological PAC money, and Republicans are favored relative to Democrats in attracting conservative ideological PAC money. Yet within both parties, women are advantaged over men in terms of attracting contributions from these ideological PACs. Not all nontraditional candidates are necessarily advantaged in attracting ideological contributions.

Ideological PACs, it appears, are in fact strategic in allocating their contributions, and variables such as candidate status are important determinants of this decision.

As a group, ideological PACs lack a unifying dimension, unlike corporate or labor PACs, that would suggest commonalities in their contributing behaviors. In order to understand the degree to which these PACs support the candidacies of nontraditional candidates, a closer examination of the issue subcategories of these groups is needed. When analyzing the effects of gender and race on these contributions, much can be learned from disaggregating this category of PAC contributions according to its liberal or conservative ideological leanings, as well as the specific issues around which these PACs are formed.

The crux of this research project was to analyze the notion that gender and race do not necessarily exert only direct effects on attracting campaign contributions. While much of the work in this area has found that these innate characteristics produce either no or only limited influence on campaign fundraising, this project has demonstrated that these variables do in fact matter under certain circumstances. When examining total PAC contributions, gender and its interactions with party and challenger status, as well as race and its interactions with ideology and candidate status, exert statistically significant effects. Gender and race, therefore, can be said to produce indirect effects on the amounts of money raised in the general election, by affecting the amounts of money raised in the primary. The role of indirect effects, as well as direct effects of these candidate characteristics, is one important conclusion from this study.

An additional conclusion from this study speaks to the importance of examining the conditional effects of gender and race. Not only may these variables indirectly affect the amount of PAC contributions candidates raise, but this effect may need to be understood in relation to candidate party, ideology, and/or candidate status. While gender or race itself may not produce

any statistically significant effects on the amount of contributions raised, the particular combination of race or gender with candidate party, ideology, or challenger status under certain circumstances may produce significant effects. Failing to account for these more nuanced effects of race and gender is one oversight in previous studies of candidate attributes and campaign fundraising.

The effects of nontraditional candidate status, while conditioned by other variables, also vary with respect to different types of PAC contributions. Gender and its interactions with party, ideology, and candidate status were found to exert statistically significant effects on the amount of corporate PAC contributions candidates received. When examining labor contributions, on the other hand, race and its interactions with party and ideology were significant. For certain types of ideological PACs, like women's issues and pro-life PACs, gender and its interactions were also significant. Therefore, not only should empirical work account for both the primary and general election, while employing interaction terms to capture the conditional effects of these variables, but a smaller focus on specific categories of PACs is also needed.

The implicit assumptions about nontraditional candidates, namely that all women and minority candidates are liberal, and that all women and minorityl candidates are helped by ideological PACs and are hurt by the more traditional sources of funding like corporate and labor groups were tested in this study. My results call into question these assumptions. Studies of gender and race need to move beyond the discrimination framework to a better understanding of the complex dynamics of the way gender and race function as variables in electoral politics. There needs to be more theoretical and empirical recognition that gender and race do not exert a unitary effect of gender and race for all women and minority candidates. This does not mean

that gender and race cannot produce either positive or negative effects on candidate fundraising—they can, but not all nontraditional candidates are hurt or helped by their gender or race.

Studies of candidate attributes and campaign finance need also to address not simple the direct effects of gender and race in affecting contributions in the general election, but also the indirect effects of these candidate attributes in affecting the amount of money these candidates raise in the primary election. The conditional effects of gender and race with additional candidate characteristics must also be examined. Lastly, there are implications from this work for studies of PAC decision making. Analyses of PAC decision making should account not only for the congruence of candidates' policy positions, but also how gender, race, and other candidate characteristics affect perceptions of candidate electability and how these perceptions affect PACs' decisions o contribute.

In conclusion, this study suggests important consequences for descriptive and substantive legislative representation. The new PAC power has the potential to reshape Congress, the diversity of its members, its agendas, and its policies. The price of representation may be that as more women and black candidates are elected to Congress, their diversity in terms of ideology and policy preferences may mean that the traditional liberal agenda associated with these groups may not necessarily be advanced. If the electoral environment advantages liberal nontraditional candidates, then that agenda may be advanced. However, if the electoral environment advantages more moderate to conservative nontraditional candidates, then simply increasing the numbers of nontraditional candidates elected to Congress may not result in more liberal policy agendas.

Suggestions for Future Research

Several research questions arise from this initial study of nontraditional candidates and campaign finance. First, while this study focused on general election candidates, many nontraditional candidates do not advance past the primary election. Studying the dynamics of fundraising during this early stage of the election cycle could also shed light in understanding which nontraditional candidates are most like to be successful in gaining their party's nomination, especially when running within a field of nontraditional candidates. An additional extension of this work would be to examine the legislative consequences of patterns of PAC support to certain types of nontraditional candidates—are these nontraditional candidates more beholden than other candidates to the interests that helped them get elected? Lastly, further research can be directed at examining the affect of gender and race on different issue-oriented ideological groups. While women's issues and pro-life groups were highlighted as examples in this work, other narrow or single-issue groups should be analyzed. One particular subcategory of ideological PACs, leadership PACs, should be examined to understand if and how nontraditional candidates, especially challengers, are supported by party leaders in Congress.

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