HUMANITARIAN CRISES: AN ANALYSIS OF NGO RESPONSE

by

SARAH DEAN DARVILLE

(Under the Direction of Abdulahi Osman)

ABSTRACT

The traditional understanding of NGO decision-making is based primarily on functionalist theory—aid goes where the need is most. However, this research builds on previous research and seeks to identify additional factors, other than need, that determine NGO response to humanitarian crises. These factors consist of the size of the NGO, the type of NGO (religious or secular), and type of crisis (complex emergency or natural disaster). The results of this study confirm that factors other than need do influence NGO decision-making in humanitarian crises.

INDEX WORDS: NGOs, Functionalism, Decision-making, Humanitarian Crises

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DEDICATION

To my parents

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are extremely influential actors in the present international world, involving themselves in everything from international and community development to relief work. In order for NGOs to operate, they must receive large sums of money from public and private donors alike, and as a result, "their numbers, influence, and reach are at unprecedented levels."[1] While the plethora of information and studies regarding non-governmental organizations in the policy world reflects the importance of NGO actors, there remains a gap in the scholarly literature. Though a few have ventured to conduct rigorous scholarly research on NGOs, there remains a need to examine NGOs as actors in the international arena, as well as the circumstances in which they act.

Much of the existing literature posits that NGOs act according to functionalist theory—that aid goes to the greatest need. Recently, however, media reports as well as scholarly literature, many in light of NGO funding issues, have suggested that there are other factors or issues that influence NGOs other than need. This research seeks to address this puzzle. While there are numerous factors that could potentially determine whether an NGO responds solely according to need, the focus of this research examines NGOs' bureaucracies, types of NGOs, funding sources, as well as the type of crisis to which they respond.

While the earlier functionalist writings have helped define the missions, historical contexts, and complexities of many NGOs, as well as laid the foundation for future research,

[1] P. J. Simmons, "Learning to Live with NGOs," Foreign Policy Autumn 1998: 83
Foreign Policy, No. 112 (Autumn, 1998) , pp. 82-96

there remains a gamut of research for inquiry. The current literature lacks a systematic analysis of NGO decision-making in humanitarian crises. Previous research, with a colleague, Jennifer White, presented in a paper entitled, "Where to Help: An Analysis of NGOs in Humanitarian Crises," found that although NGOs do respond in a functionalist manner, they do not respond to humanitarian crises based solely on need. In that research, the amount of resources and the type of regime (democratic or autocratic) were both significant at the .05 level in determining the level of NGO response. The research did not confirm, however, that NGOs responded to crises as a function of the percentage of bilateral or multilateral giving. However, it is possible that funding by multinational corporations could possibly play a role in determining response levels, due to high levels of giving by MNCs to humanitarian crises.

An NGO can be defined, according to a 1994 UN document, as a "non-profit entity whose members are citizens or association of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates."[2] Additionally, a humanitarian crisis is is an event or series of events, which severely threatens the safety, security or wellbeing of a large group of people.[3] Both natural disasters and complex emergencies (which implies conflict) are considered humanitarian crises.

This current paper is an attempt to build on previous research by adding additional variables and theoretical explanations in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of NGO decision making in humanitarian crises. Although this research does not consider or test all variables, the relevant literature concerning the traditional functionalist view of NGOs and issues

[2] P.J, Simmons 83.
[3] Wikpedia, The Free Encyclopedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanitarian_crisis

in NGO decision-making, such as funding sources, human rights concerns, the size of NGOs, the type of NGO, and the type of crisis will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

HUMANITARIAN CRISES: AN ANALYSIS OF NGO RESPONSE

Theoretical Background

Functionalism

The basic premise of functionalism rests in the assumption that governance forms because of essential, or functional, needs of people and the states. Furthermore, governance organizations will develop the capacities to meet those needs. Similar to neo-liberals, functionalists argue that cooperation on a systemic scale is possible, and "that international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for political cooperation and eliminating war."[4] In a sense, epistemic communities, or communities of technical experts, as a function of cooperation, will shift their allegiance away from states and deliver services according to need.

Realism and Neo-Realism

In realism, individuals and states seek power, acting rationally to protect their own interests and increase their own power. Neither rules nor norms can restrain a state's behavior. Non-state actors, including international organizations, are simply tools that states use to achieve their goals—"the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, and even increase it."[5] Though cooperation is possible, it is infrequent due to the lack of incentives.

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[4] Margaret Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2004) 40.

[5] John Mearsheimer. "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, 19, mo. 3 (1994-1995, Winter), 13.

In neo-realism, there is an emphasis on the structure of the international system as determined by anarchy or the absence of an overarching authority and distribution of power among states. Since states' actions are "driven largely by calculations about relative power" and capabilities, cooperation is infrequent.[6] International regimes and institutions, according to realists, are not important actors within the system.

Yves Beigbeder—A Functional Approach

Yves Beigbeder, writing in 1991, provides a comprehensive assessment of several large humanitarian relief organizations (e.g., the Red Cross, Oxfam, Médicins sans Frontiers), offering the conventional functionalist perspective of most early discussions of NGOs.[7] His work is representative of the general scope of such early literature on NGO involvement in humanitarian crises, contributing case studies either of individual NGOs or an overview of response in an individual crisis. In examining the function of NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance, Beigbeder highlights the practical appeal of NGOs in light of their grassroots connections to the societies they aim to help. This appeal exists by virtue of the non-political aspect of these NGOs:

> "As private voluntary organizations, NGOs are not subject directly to governmental or intragovernmental agencies' policies, rules, and regulations….NGOs' independence from government may allow them to help in situations and locations where governmental organizations are unable to intervene for political or other reasons."[8]

From a functionalist perspective, Beigbeder details the advantages of NGOs in crises: They are likely to respond more quickly to emergency situations and to gain access more readily

[6] John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York : Norton, 2002) 50.
[7] Yves Beigbeder. The Role and Status of International Humanitarian Volunteers and Organizations. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991. Much of the discussion on Beigbeder and the following literature is drawn from "Where to Help: An Analysis of NGOs in Humanitarian Crises," by Sarah Darville and Jennifer White.
[8] Yves Beigbeder 92.

to information than government agencies. He also contends that NGOs' smaller size (and hence, a smaller bureaucracy) makes them more flexible. However, Beigbeder also discusses the limitations of NGOs, most of which stem from a NGOs' inability to establish strategic direction or to dedicate resources to long-term planning, and the difficulty in *obtaining* sufficient funding. Yet, Beigbeder fails to mention the sources of funding for NGOs.

Issues and Challenges in Decision-making

As a result of the Ethiopian famine and Bob Geldorf's Band Aid appeal in the 1980's, most money donations were channeled through the NGOs, which were almost immediately "transformed from small scale charities into multi-million-pound institutions."[9] From the 1980's until the present and almost as a strategic goal, the exponential growth of NGOs has continued. However, donations by the public have not kept pace with the growth of NGOs. As a result, NGOs find themselves in a position that forces a dependence on government funding. While strict limits to government funding were previously in place, most limitations no longer exist. For example, CARE USA received 75% of its total operating budget from the United States government in 2004.[10] With this, the question of the NGO's independence arises. In fact, Melissa Labonte, in her discussion of the humanitarian principles of NGOs, brings to light the idea of "humanitarian marketplace," in which donors care more about the bottom line of delivery than the mission statement of a particular NGO.[11]

[9] Ian Brown. "This Fatal Compromise." The Guardian. (19 November 2004) Global Policy Forum. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/fund/2004/1119fatalcomp.htm
[10] Ibid.
[11] Melissa T. Labonte.. "How 'Universal?' Principles of Humanitarian Action and NGO Realities." Paper prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii and the panel entitled, "Universality – Is it in Jeopardy?" 9.

Given that donors may attach strings to their donations, Labonte suggests that NGOs adapt their missions and concepts of universality on a case-by-case basis. Larry Minear also emphasizes the necessity of NGO independence, stating that recipient governments often perceive NGOs to be extensions of Western influence which results from integration with International Governmental Organizations and the rising contributions made by government donors.[12] In light of realist thought, the increasing level of public resources suggests that NGOs, much like IGOs, are subject to the political pressures of the states that provide their funding. In addition, it is these funding issues and the areas in which NGOs work that provide a context to other variables that may influence NGO decision-making.

As governments downsize, NGOs are increasingly filling the gap. "Total assistance by and through international NGOs to the developing world amounted to about 8 billion in 1992—accounting for 13 % of all development assistance and more than the entire amount transferred by the UN system."[13] While Simmons acknowledges that NGOs have many advantages and can affect change quite successfully, he emphasizes the substantial problems of NGO involvement in humanitarian crises. There is a potential for national governments to undermine coordination and cooperation systems in large-scale emergencies, if they favor NGOs over multilateral corporations.

NGOs, in light of their funding and public opinion issues, can be rather political in nature. In fact, they "sometimes seize on issues that seem designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the public interest."[14] Increasingly, NGOs, according to Simmons, are dependent on needs of government, receiving a large amount of

[12] Larry Minear. "Humanitarian Aid and Intervention: The Challenges of Integration. Informing the Integration Debate with Recent Experience." Ethics and International Affairs. 18 no. 2 (2004): 53.
[13] P.J. Simmons 57.
[14] P.J. Simmons 90.

public sector funding, which accounts for around 40% of their budget.[15] Minear agrees by stating that many groups "are anything but nongovernmental in their revenue sources," yet they "retain their credentials as private institutions."[16] According to United States law, NGOs are able to receive as much as 80 percent of their resources from non-private sources. Due to this trend, NGOs run the risk of becoming increasingly obliged to national governments.

Public funding of NGOs is significant, especially from the United States government. Relief funding is higher than that of sustainable development; in 1989, USAID contributed $297 million to relief funding, but by 1993, it had risen to $1.2 billion. According to U.S. law, an NGO must raise at least 20% of its aggregate resources privately in order to apply for government funding. A few NGOs will not accept public sector money, but others receive between 60-70% of their income from donor governments. NGOs must use news and media coverage for fundraising; the efficiency rankings by Money Magazine and the Wall Street Journal affect the fundraising success, which puts a high premium on early and visible involvement in relief operations.

> "Fundraising around highly visible humanitarian crises raises more money at a lower cost than any other form of advertising or publicity…This distorts an organizations judgment on where to work and when, but it is not an easily addresses problem since without funding they cannot work at all."[17]

Essentially, accountability to contributors is more tenuous than that of the board.

Andrew Natsios, the former administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, stated that, in order to continue receiving funding, American NGOs must emphasize links to the United States administration. He even went so far as to describe those

[15] P.J. Simmons. 90
[16] Larry Minear. The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries. (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002) 70.
[17] Ibid. 302.

NGOs under contract as an arm of the U.S. government.[18] In addition, many funding agreements stated that all press calls for NGO relief efforts in Iraq must go through USAID. Specifically, the clause stated that USAID must approve and coordinate all NGO contact with the news media. As a result, Mercy Corps and Save the Children are objecting to conditions imposed by agreements for 7 million dollars each with USAID.[19]

In the past, there has been criticism of the United States for using aid as a policy tool, because the majority of foreign aid finds a channel of distribution through U.S. companies or NGOs. Despite Natsios' remarks, the United States has sought to alter its traditional image by introducing the Millennium Challenge Account, which directs aid towards countries in need rather than toward political allies. However, a recent cut of 1.8 billion in the foreign operations budget leaves many fearful that this will damage the MCA.[20]

A London based research group has recently published a report entitled "Uncertain power: The Changing Role of Donors in Humanitarian Action," in which they examined the trend of bilateralism. Governments, the group argued, are exerting greater influence over relief agencies. In fact, there has been a significant shift away from multilateral humanitarian action through the UN and other international organizations and towards NGOs. In addition, governments have increased earmarking of funds and the role of donors in coordination and issued tougher contracts to "scrutinize implementing partners and increase donor presence in the field."[21]

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[18] Alan Beattie. "NGOs Under Pressure on Relief Funds". Financial Times. (13 June 2003). Global Policy Forum. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/fund/2003/0610control.htm
[19] Richard Read. "Agencies Reject Money Due to Strings". Oregonian. (6 June 2003). Global Policy Forum. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/fund/2003/0610aid.htm
[20] Alan Beattie.
[21] Ruth Gidley. "Donor Inputs Into Aid Operations Growing." Alertnet (24 January 2003) Global Policy Forum. http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/fund/2003/0124donor.htm

Joanna Macrae, a researcher for the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute, states that there is "an increasing proximity of official donors to decision making and operations."[22] The United States, the largest donor, accounted for one-third of total humanitarian spending from 1998 to 2000. The United States increasingly earmarked funds for specific regions or areas of work. In fact, donor increased allocations for Afghanistan in 2001 resulted by reallocating funds that would have been earmarked for other regions or left unearmarked. The report also stated that many U.S. grants became contracts instead of grants. There is also an increase in the establishment of framework agreements, "which for some agencies consumed too much senior management time and were an intrusion of independence."[23] The research group stated that while it might make funding for NGOs more predictable, it might also sideline smaller organizations and leave the allocation of resources to a few NGOs. While donors have decidedly heightened their presence in the field, "it is an important yet unanswered question whether donors' capacity to appraise and monitor contracts has expanded sufficiently."[24]

Accountability and transparency are also other considerations facing NGOs. While difficult considering the complex and tenuous state of crises, NGOs are expected by the international community to be held accountable to the public and the recipients of aid for good humanitarian practices, which is what the mission statements of NGOs usually claim. Since NGOs are encouraged to provide services in line with the interests of the government donors, the recipient state's authority and sovereignty is often jeopardized. NGOs can begin work without notifying state authorities, thus creating a rather haphazard effort. In addition, there is no requirement to inform states of the plans and funding that the NGO has for the area, leaving officials somewhat at the NGOs mercy. In

[22] Ruth Gidley.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

addition, few NGOs make any information about their organization, funding, or expenditures public.[25] Tracking and gauging success of NGO operations, therefore, can be difficult.

Daniel Bell and Joseph Carens, in 2004, also discuss rather ethical challenges for NGOs, including the tension between "human rights principles and local cultural norms" and "[collaboration] with less-than-democratic governments."[26] If humanitarian aid were truly universal, it would require assistance to both parties of a conflict, even if "by so doing, [NGOs are] aiding members of groups whose actions feed […] violence"[27] and may create a complicate or exacerbate a crisis. Thus, it is evident that there are legal and human rights implications in the NGO decision-making process. As evident from the previous research of Darville and White[28], the capacity of the regime type of a recipient government influences an NGO's commitment level as intimated by Bell and Carens.

NGOs must also consider the situation "on the ground" with respect to the decision to commit resources towards humanitarian assistance. Jean-Baptiste Richardier states that NGOs must realize that their participation in a relief operation in a given state may only serve to aggravate what was already a fragile social order ante crisis.[29] In some cases, NGOs could conceivably introduce further instability that leads to conflict or, as Mary Anderson notes, in cases of on-going conflict, NGOs can serve to "exacerbate the local tensions and suspicions that underlie the violence of the

[25] Larry Minear. "Humanitarian Aid and Intervention: The Challenges of Integration. Informing the Integration Debate with Recent Experience." 246.
[26] Daniel A. Bell, and Joseph H. Carens. "The Ethical Dilemmas of International Human Rights and Humanitarian NGOs: Reflections on a Dialogue between Practitioners and Theorists." Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 300.
[27] Pamela Aal, Col. Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss. 2000. Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2000) 107.
[28] Sarah Darville and Jennifer White.
[29] Jean- Baptiste Richardier. "Humanitarian Aid Cannot Be Reduced to 'Trucking.'" In Responding to Emergencies and Fostering Development, ed. Claire Pirotte, Bernard Husson, and Francois Grunewald (New York: St Martin's Press, 1999), 26

societies they seek to help."[30] For example, as early as 1995, some questioned whether humanitarian aid to Sudan was only "supplying soldiers in the government garrisons rather than civilians in need."[31] As a means to guard against such pitfalls, Richardier concurs with Minear that NGOs should work to build greater ties to the indigenous civil society.[32]

Alex Bellamy, in his review of four separate books, highlights a rather realist approach to humanitarian intervention by the international community. Despite the fact that Bellamy only brushes over NGO response and focuses primarily on state action, his synopsis offers light as to the political nature, in general, of humanitarian intervention. Simon Chesterman, according to Bellamy, argues that norms, like the sovereignty of a nation, does not prevent the international community from responding to these crises, but it is simply the political will of NGOs, or lack thereof. Chesterman discusses the inconsistency of states in interpreting the relationship between human rights and recipient government's sovereignty, arguing for different actions in similar cases of intervention.

In addition, states contradict themselves between the "norm of non-intervention and the consistent interventionist practices of states"[33] Neta Crawford makes a case that it is the success of an argument, in particular the political factors surrounding that argument, that determines intervention. David Chandler provides a prime example of a more realist approach to humanitarian intervention, suggesting that it is the interests of the interveners that matter and not those of the victims. The deepening of humanitarian ventures, the selectivity of intervention, including that of NGOs, and aid conditionality are all examples of intervention as a Western tool.

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[30] Mary Anderson. "Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention." Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall. Managing Global Chaos. (US Institute of Peace: Washington DC, 1996) 347.
[31] Smock, David. "Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 4 July 1997. http://www.jha.ac/articles/a014.htm
[32] This paragraph is excerpted from "Where to Help: An Analysis of NGO Response" by Sarah Darville and Jennifer White.
[33] Alex Bellamy. "Power, rules, and argument: new approaches to humanitarian intervention." Australian Journal of International Affairs. 57 (November 2003) 502.

Chandler also mentions the numerous negative political consequences of intervention, such a "the legitimization of warlords, the provision of food, drugs, cash, vehicles, and other assets to the perpetrators"[34]

Although P. J. Simmons recognizes the positive aspects of NGOs, his discussion is also of quite a realist nature. P.J. Simmons proposes an additional way of understanding NGOs. While the most traditional view of NGOs is democratic and beneficial, Simmons suggests that NGOs are *sometimes* "decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the people they claim to represent."[35] He emphasizes their respective goals, membership, funding sources, and activities, such as function, area of operation, and targets. Simmons offers a "taxonomic approach to NGOs," and maintains that NGOs can affect national governments, multilateral institutions, and national and multinational corporations in four ways: setting agendas, negotiating outcomes, conferring legitimacy, and implementing solutions.

NGOs continuously face a plethora of constraining factors, dilemmas and even criticisms in the decision to provide assistance to humanitarian crises. Acknowledging the difficulty in obtaining funding, Karns and Mingst also note that NGOs face issues regarding the intrusion upon a state's sovereignty and the challenge to remain – and to appear to remain – universal. Melissa Labonte argues that the traditional tenets of the Red Cross may no longer fit the reality in which humanitarian NGOs now find themselves. Referring to a "humanitarian marketplace," in which donors care more about the bottom line of delivery than the mission statement of a particular NGO, the independence of NGOs are put into question.[36] This presents a realist perspective to NGO operations and places NGOs on an equivalent plane as international

[34] Alex Bellamy 510.
[35] P.J. Simmons. "Learning to Live with NGOs." *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1998) 83.
[36] Melissa Labonte. "How 'Universal?' Principles of Humanitarian Action and NGO Realities." Paper prepared for the 2005 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii and the panel entitled, "Universality – Is it in Jeopardy?" 9.

organizations, in that both are subject to the political pressures of the states that provide their funding. Larry Minear argues vehemently for the necessity of NGO independence and the development of closer ties to the communities that the NGOs serve.[37] Minear states that the perceptions that recipient governments hold of NGOs as extensions of Western influence result from integration with IGOs and the increasing contributions made by government donors.

NGOs also face issues with integration in regards to their work on the ground. After the crisis in Ethiopia in 1985, humanitarian NGOs are trying to integrate into their relief work developmental aspects such as agriculture, micro enterprise, primary health care, reforestation and road construction. These NGOs work in Relief and development at grassroots level, increasingly with indigenous NGOs, which is labor intensive from a staff perspective, both expatriate and indigenous. Many have large field staffs that allow them to conduct complex operations in remote areas. They have been quite successful in community based health care, primary and secondary education, agricultural extension work, water and sanitation projects, small scale enterprise typically through cooperatives or small loans, road and bridge construction, and environmental programs. The primary weakness of NGOs is their "reluctance to cede managerial or programme autonomy and integrate their work with other actors." [38]

NGOs: Does size matter?

Related to this problem of IGO integration is the increasing level of bureaucratization of NGOs.[39] Because NGOs are legitimate and well established, they "sometimes seize on issues that seem designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the

[37] Larry Minear "Humanitarian Aid and Intervention: The Challenges of Integration. Informing the Integration Debate with Recent Experience." Ethics and International Affairs. 18 no. 2 (2004): 53.
[38] Andrew Natsios. "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation." Paul F. Diehl, eds. The Politics of Global Governance, 2nd ed. (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc: Boulder, 2001) 398.
[39] Karns and Mingst 244.

public interest."[40] Karns and Mingst follow with this line of thought, stating that NGOs that are more involved in service delivery through IGO or government subcontracting, including gaining UN consultative status, are more likely to face the danger of bureaucratization. It may be that smaller NGOs – or networks of smaller NGOs – may be less likely to have governments as substantial donors and hence may have a better chance of protecting their independence, regardless of type of NGO (religious or secular).

While smaller NGOs may be better positioned to protect their independence, the availability of funding is not as high as larger NGOs. Simmons also highlights the political nature of NGOs by describing funding and public opinion issues. For instance, eight major groups control about 50% of the relief market, and as a result of the competition among NGOs, smaller players are crowded out. Therefore, only a small group of large international NGOs dominates most issue areas. These eight major NGO federations, including CARE, Oxfam, World Vision, Doctors without Borders, and Save the Children, control about half of the $8 billion relief funds.[41]

Larry Minear also discusses the difference in size and resources of various NGOs. In fact, he argues that heterogeneity may alter the routinization of humanitarian action.[42] While some NGOs are impromptu in their formation, for instance "the handful of women from Dortmund, Germany who traveled to Bosnia to establish counseling services for women, or the one-woman effort to transport Sarajeven children across active battle lines in central Bosnia to surgical facilities in Britain," others are multi-million dollar organizations whose resources far exceed host governments.[43] Minear argues further that while larger NGOs might have the capability and

[40] P.J. Simmons 90.
[41] Karns and Mingst 244
[42] Larry Minear. The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries, 128.
[43] Larry Minear. The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries. 128

proficiency to respond to major emergencies, the large bureaucracy can shroud the humanity needed in the situation.

Quite differently, the urgency of the crisis drives those ad hoc NGOs, but they are "short on the necessary wherewithal, savvy and staying power."[44] In fact, the women from Germany mentioned above left Bosnia soon after their resources were completely exhausted. Minear states that even the larger, more established NGOs have altered their funding priorities and unexpectedly and hastily transitioned to the next major crisis. In light of funding issues as well as other bureaucratic considerations, this research project will investigate NGO size (in terms of numbers of field and administrative staff) to test this hypothesis.

Religion as an issue

Melissa Labonte, in congruence to her discussion of NGO independence, proposes that faith-based NGOs are best positioned to remain truly independent and to operate universally, while other NGOs may need to adapt their missions and concepts of universality on a case-by-case basis, given the strings that donors may attach. According to Michael McGinnis, a faith-based organization includes

> "an agent's role … partially justifying one or more of their shared sense of community, rituals, beliefs, codes, or corporate structure to some supernatural being or force. If none of these aspects are religious in that sense, then the configuration is self-contained and the agents in question are motivated solely by practical matters."[45]

McGinnis references Stephen Carter's **The Culture of Disbelief,** which considers the power of religion where religious members claim complete allegiance, independence and obedience—"a religion speaks to its members in a voice different from that of the state, and

[44] Ibid. 128
[45] Michael McGinnis. Partners, Partisans, Proselytizers: Games Played by International Faith-Based Organizations. Presented at Midwest Political Science Association Conference. (Chicago: 20-23 April 2006) 4.

when the voice moves the faithful to action, a religion may act as a counterweight to the authority of the state."[46] In addition, the agents of faith-based organizations follow spiritual and religious goals that more than likely do not amount to non-tangible goals, such as political power, economic wealth, or social status in the world. These religious agents understand the behavior expected of them and conduct themselves accordingly.[47] However, McGinnis recognizes the context in which these religious organizations exist, whereby large faith-based Humanitarian Aid organizations are "co-opted into a global network financed by national governments and IGOs. Despite this issue, it will still prove beneficial to determine whether religion plays a significant role in humanitarian response.

While there has been significant research on religious and secular organizations, including schools and various other case studies, numerous questions remain. As stated by Mark Charves, the most pressing question is whether religion matters in organizational function. Charves argues that religious organizations could possibly differ from secular organizations for various reasons: they might be embedded in different institutional environments, and they might have different internal structures, they may or may not manifest religious content in their on-the-ground culture and practice.

Despite the lack of empirical foundation for the assumption that religious organizations perform differently than do secular organizations, religious organizations expected to be effective in reaching the hardest-to- serve populations. In addition to providing more holistic kinds of service, many argue that faith-based organizations are more flexible and responsive than secular organizations and government agencies. While religious NGOs are part of the political landscape as are secular NGOs, it is questioned whether religious NGOs act differently than do

[46] Mark Chaves. "Religious Organizations: Data Resources and Research Opportunities." American Behavioral Scientist. 45(June 2002) 1524.
[47] Michael McGinnis 4-5.

secular NGOs. An executive director of a religious nonprofit organization summarizes the logic behind these arguments in a statement:

> "Faith based programs work because they tend to the social, health, economic and spiritual needs of those we serve. For us it is not social services with a bit of religion sprinkled on the side like some sort of garnish. It is mandated by the very foundations of our faith that we deliver social services to the poor. It is this fact that makes faith-based programs more successful than their spiritually sanitized, government alternatives."[48]

McGinnis touches upon this perception as well, in that while religious and secular organizations face the same incentives for selfish behavior,

> "there is a fundamental disjuncture between the claims of religious faith and more tangible rewards of economic interest or political power. There appears to be something about a believer's experience of religious faith and behavior that remains distinct and separate, with believers unmoved by other forms of argument or inducement. Tangible rewards, in terms of money, status or power, retain some influence on their choices, but for believers there remains another realm of intangible rewards."[49]

A faith-based organization could behave differently for various reasons. Chaves discusses T. H. Jeavons, who identifies seven ways an organization can be religious, all of which could influence its functioning: formal self-identity; the religiosity of staff; extent to which its material resources come from religious sources; the religiosity of its goals, products or services; extent to which religious concerns inform organizational decision making; the extent to which religious concerns inform allocation and exercise of power within the organizations; and the extent to which other organizations with which it interacts are themselves religious organizations. Chaves,

[48] Chaves 1535.
[49] McGinnis, Michael 4.

while stating that it is possible that the religiousness of an organization could influence its functioning, no definitive study has concluded this fact. It is not the intent of this research to isolate the specific reasons, but to focus on whether faith-based humanitarian and relief organizations do indeed act differently than secular humanitarian organizations.

Crises: Man versus Nature

Larry Minear and Ian Smillie also address the issue of response to humanitarian crises, highlighting the relationship between donor funding and NGO response. Due to the lack of donor capability in funding for recovery and reconstruction work, NGOs are compelled to apply only for short term grants, which last from three to six months, and create inconsistencies in response. In fact, many NGOs leave a crisis area after the emergency is believed to be over.[50]

Minear and Smillie argue that the faster the onset of the emergency, the more donor attention an emergency will receive in comparison to others, at least initially. Again, it is the short-term considerations that drive humanitarian policy and donor response. Essentially, the longer the timeframe, the more difficult it becomes to ensure funding support. "Longer-term values and commitment are a hard sell, making the financing of extended emergencies and also of transitional programming to development difficult."[51] As a crisis continues, it becomes more challenging for NGOs to attain money, and attention and newer emergencies with higher profiles require a shifting of funds.

In addition, NGOs have a difficult time in obtaining funding for multi-year programs in parts of the world of lower profile. This comes as a result of the recent emphasis on terrorism, by

[50] Larry Minear, and Ian Smillie. Humanitarian Financing: Donor Behavior: Some Preliminary Observations For The Montreux Retreat, 26-28 Febreuary 2003. Tufts University. (19 February 2003) 4. http://hwproject.tufts.edu/pec/pdf/montreux.pdf

[51] Larry Minear, and Ian Smillie. Some Working Hypotheses on Donor Behavior Humanitarianism and War Project. Tufts University. (15 October 2002) 2. http://hwproject.tufts.edu/pec/pdf/hypo.pdf

which Minear and Smillie believe to obscure the objective evaluation of need. [52] Also, "risk aversion (rather than risk management) may see greater resources going to 'safer bet' emergencies (e.g. East Timor rather than Sierra Leone)."[53] Paul Spiegel goes as far as to suggest that natural disasters receive more attention than do complex emergencies due to the relative ease of response and lack of political risk.[54]

In general, it is easier for donors and NGOs to access the affected populations in natural disasters. However, if a natural disaster occurs in an area of conflict, the heightened animosity and tension complicate the delivery of effective aid. Speigel also argues that the most important first responders in disasters are the locally affected populations, including the Red Cross and local NGOs. However, in situations of conflict, the crisis ensues indefinitely in a chaotic manner, with international NGOs as the first responders. This, too, has become difficult, because international NGO aid workers have recently been targeted in conflict areas. Complex emergencies are "more political, complicated, and sullied; there is always someone else or another group to blame or hold accountable."[55] Governments and the UN, which provide funding to NGOs, usually take sides or consider the independence of states, respectively. In addition, NGOs must consider the fact that aid could only exacerbate a situation in a complex emergency, whereas that is not a consideration in a natural disaster.

[52] Minear, Larry, and Ian Smillie. "Humanitarian Financing: Donor Behavior: Some Preliminary Observations For The Montreux Retreat, 26-28 Febreuary 2003." 4
[53] Ibid. 4
[54] Paul B. Spiegel. "Differences in World Responses to Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies." JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association 293(20 April 2005) 4
[55] Ibid. 4.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1

The first hypothesis expects the size of an NGO to determine its level of response. The larger an NGO, the more resources and ability it has to respond to a given crisis. Large NGOs, like CARE or Save the Children, are usually more established organizations and frequently work in conjunction with International Governmental Organizations or governments themselves. Beigbeder believes NGOs to be smaller, and thus more flexible than governments; however, many large NGOs have a greater budget than small governments. Larger organizations usually have more staff, more world offices, and are more integrated with other organizations, which in turn, leads to a higher level of bureaucratization.

Despite the high level of bureaucratization, potentially retarding the ability to respond to crises, NGOs receive an exceptional amount of funding from governments and IGOs, which provides NGOs with the capability to respond at higher levels. In addition, economies of scale and the media usually tend to favor the larger NGOs, increasing their ability to obtain funds.[56] Though large NGOs may be less independent as a result of their integration with IGOs and governments, their probability for responding at higher levels is greater.

Eight major NGOs, consisting of CARE, World Vision International, Oxfam International, Medécins sans Frontières, Save the Children Federation, Eurostep, Cooperation

[56] Peter Hoffman and Larry Minear. NGO Policy Dialogue XII: NGO Relations with Funders Humanitarian Action. Tufts Univeristy. (11 December 2002) http://hwproject.tufts.edu/new/pdf/Report12.pdf

internationale pour le developpement et la solidarite (CIDSE), and Association of Protestant Development Organizations in Europe (APDOVE), control fifty percent of the humanitarian funding market, thus essentially crowding out the smaller NGOs competing for funding.[57] In addition, 75% of the funds allocated by the UN have been consumed by the twenty largest NGOs, "which does not always lead to aid going where it was needed most because the least well-known NGOs may be the ones working on the most neglected problems."[58] Essentially, smaller NGOs do not receive the substantial amount of funding that larger NGOs receive. While smaller NGOs have less bureaucratization, they also have less integration, which leads to low funding and a lower response. When an NGO does not receive government funding, it maintains more of its independence, but there is also a potential "cost of mounting smaller programs and less of a critical mass in the field."[59] Additionally, smaller NGOs do not have the capability or proficiency to adequately respond to major emergencies.[60]

Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis states considers the type of NGO, faith-based or secular, in determining the level of response. It expects faith-based NGOs to respond with higher level of resources in instances of humanitarian crisis. Religion has always been powerful, moving large groups of people to action. Thus, religion could serve as a definitive factor in organizational action in humanitarian emergencies. Melissa Labonte, as discussed earlier, suggests that religious organizations are more apt to act independently and universally, where as secular organizations may alter their concepts of universality depending on the context of the emergency and the strings attached by the donors.

[57] P.J, Simmons 90.
[58] Peter Hoffman and Larry Minear.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Minear. The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries. 128

The power of religion is in the obedience it demands and receives from followers. Believers are committed to the religious cause, willing to forgo earthly rewards for the promise of heavenly ones. It is their faith that calls them to action. Considering that delivering social services to the poor is a mandate of faith, religious organizations are usually extremely effective in reaching the hardest to serve populations.[61] The religiosity of an organization can depend upon how religious the staff, the origin of funding, and the goals are, as well as the extent to which organizational decision-making is affected by religious principles. As a result of strong commitment, religious organizations are less likely to act selfishly and are not as likely to be co-opted into compromising with donors.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis three states that the type of crisis will affect a NGOs level of response. An NGO is more likely to respond to a natural disaster than a conflict, and even more so, to a protracted conflict. Natural disasters lack much of the complications that are inherent in conflicts. For instance, natural disasters do not target one ethnic, social, or economic group over other groups. In conflict situations, access to the population affected is difficult due to the highly intense and violent situations. Not only is it difficult to adequately assist the affected population, but NGO staff are also at risk and in danger in these situations. Natural disasters are also easier to assess, especially in terms of the length of operations. With conflicts, it is more difficult to foresee the end of a conflict, not to mention whether the conflict will ease or deepen.

In conjunction with the inherent characteristics of natural disasters and conflicts, the funding market also places constraints on NGOs. Donors are usually more willing to give short-term grants, lasting from three to six months. Donors are also more likely to give short-term grants to natural disasters than conflicts—short-term considerations are inherent in natural

[61] Michael McGinnis 3.

disasters. In addition, it is more difficult to obtain funding for longer term considerations. It is challenging for NGOs to convince donors to fund an emergency with assurance of a conclusion. As Minear suggests, the faster the onset of an emergency the more attention the emergency receives, and thus the higher the response.[62] Donors are usually risk averse, donating more to emergencies that are "safer bets," i.e. natural disasters.[63]

In conflicts, donors also usually have an opinion, either siding with one group over another or invoking the target states independence. These donor tendencies add to the difficulty in NGOs obtaining funding for conflict situations. NGOs also have to consider whether they will exacerbate the situation on the ground, which is not a consideration with natural disasters. Overall, due to numerous factors, NGOs are more likely to respond to natural disasters than conflicts.

Possible Interactions

There are potentially some interaction effects among the independent variables in the regression. Hypothesis two suggests that a religious or faith-based NGO will respond to crises differently than a secular NGO. With that in mind, religious NGOs might respond differently according to need or the type of crisis than a secular NGO. Since religious NGOs are "called" to shelter the homeless, feed the hungry, and assist the poor, they may be more functional in their response, meaning that they will respond more according to need, as well as more willing to respond to complex emergencies than a secular NGO. There also might be some interaction between the type of NGO and the size of an NGO, in that most large NGOs are not faith-based; thus, an interaction term between NGO type and size will control for the possibility that the largest response will derive from large NGOs, which may also be secular. In addition, the size of

[62] Larry Minear. The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries. 128
[63] Ibid. 128.

an NGO might play a role in the response according to need or the type of crisis. Considering the availability of funding, personnel, and expertise, smaller NGOs may be less able to respond to complex emergencies or according to need. The larger the NGO, the more resources it will contribute toward crises with high levels of need. Also, there may be a possible interaction between the type of crisis and resources, in that conflict usually occurs where there are increasing amounts of resources. Thus, the regression will account for these six possible interactions.

Table 3.1

Summary of Hypotheses:

Hypotheses	Expectations
Hypothesis 1	The size of an NGO dictates the level of NGO aid response: Large NGOs will have a higher level of response to crises.
Hypothesis 2	The type of NGO dictates the level of NGO aid response: Faith-based NGOs will have a higher level of response to crises.
Hypothesis 3	The type of crisis dictates the level of NGO aid response: NGOs will respond more to natural disasters than complex emergencies, which usually involve conflict situations. In addition, NGOs are less likely to respond to crisis countries with a history of conflict.

** While the traditional view assumes that need alone determines NGO response to humanitarian crises, these hypotheses seek to establish if other factors are indeed significant in determining levels of NGO response.

Data and Operationalization

The data covers all humanitarian crises (reported by the Financial Tracking System) between the years 2000 and 2003, including all contributions (monetary, as well as values for

materiel and personnel) made by the following NGOs: CARE, Catholic Relief Services, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps International, Medécins sans Frontières, Save the Children, Lutheran World Relief, World Vision, and World Relief. Thus, the unit of analysis is the individual crisis, including the country and year of the crisis. If an NGO did not give to a particular crisis, the data point was recorded as missing. While recognizing the significant limitations of a smaller data set and potential selection bias, the lack of sufficient time and reliable data on funding and humanitarian crises restricted the data to three years and nine NGOs. NGOs have only begun reporting financial information within the past ten years, and those that do report do not always report in a consistent or reliable manner. While this is a limitation fully recognized in this research, there is no solution to combat this problem. The current research must rely on available data. In addition, some NGOs may report to the Financial Tracking Service and others may simply post general financial information on their individual website. Due to the confines of available data and time, the data set only includes three years. If one could obtain from each NGO a detailed account of financial giving to each individual crisis the data could be improved upon. However, NGOs themselves often do not have this information as they record only the region and country to which they give and not the specific crisis.

The dependent variable, NGO giving, is a scale of response from 1 (lowest response level) to 4 (highest response level). These levels were computed according to set percentages of their respective operating budgets (which includes only the total budgeted amount for crises) for each year in the analysis. The dependent variable was calculated as a percentage—the total amount given to the individual crises over the operating budget for the specific year of the crisis. Much of the financial data was drawn from Relief Web and the Financial Tracking System[64], which is managed by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and reports the

[64] www.reliefweb.int

amount and type of aid contributed to a given crisis. Financial data concerning World Relief and Lutheran World Relief was obtained from direct correspondence with the respective NGO. The independent variables are as follows:

- Crisis (emergency) year
- Level of need in the recipient country
- Polity of the recipient country
- Resources in the recipient country (measured as thousands of barrels of oil produced per day)
- Whether the NGO had responded to the recipient country within the past 12 months
- Size of NGO, whether it is large or small
- Type of NGO, religious or secular
- Type of crisis, Natural disaster or complex emergency
- History of Conflict, whether the emergency country has had a conflict since 1995

Level of need is computed as an index based on GDP per capita levels, the severity of the crisis (percent of the population affected by the crisis in the recipient country) in natural emergencies, and the under-5 mortality rate (the mortality rate of children under five years old) in complex emergencies (defined as conflict-related or caused by conflict and natural events).

Regime type is measured from the 20-point polity score of the PolityIV model, which has a range from -10 (lowest democracy, highest autocracy) to 10 (highly democratic, lowest autocracy). While variation in regime type may be small from point to point, substantive differences can be observed among the extreme values of polity. As a result, polity is included as a control variable. The indicator of resources is based on the number of barrels of oil (in thousands) produced in the country per day.[65] These resources hold particular strategic importance for governments in terms of economics and security, and governments, and thus those NGOs funded by governments, are expected to respond highly where high amounts of this resource exist. The variable, resources, is also included as a control variable. Given the impact of

[65] Taken from the CIA World Factbook, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

September 2001 and the Iraq Crisis in 2003 and the possible effects these events may have had on aid response, the year of the crisis is included as a control variable. The indicator, "history," accounts for whether an NGO has also responded to a crisis in the recipient country within the previous 12 months.

The size of an NGO will be measured according to operating budget for the crisis year, which was gleaned from each NGO's 990 Form.[66] Any NGO with an operating budget less than $115,000,000 was considered small; while NGOs' with greater operating budgets were considered large. There is an underlying assumption that the larger the budget, the more staff and the more bureaucracy an NGO has. Thus, International Medical Corps, Lutheran World Relief, World Relief, and Mercy Corps International are small; Save the Children, MSF, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision are large. The type of NGO, a dichotomous dummy variable, is measured according to a one or zero, indicating whether it is faith-based or secular respectively. Analyzing the NGO's mission state determined coding a faith-based or secular.

An additional independent variable, the type of crisis, is also measured as a dichotomous dummy variable of one or zero, indicating whether the crisis is a natural disaster or a complex emergency. In addition to the financial data, Relief Web also reports the type of crisis an NGO responds to—natural disaster or complex emergency. The traditional understanding of a complex emergency is "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/ or the ongoing United Nations country program."[67] Therefore, the complex emergency will account for the crises that occur because of conflict, which will in turn, provide a way to test for

[66] www.guidestar.com
[67] "OCHA Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies." Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs." August 1999. http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/ocha__orientation__handbook_on__.htm

hypothesis three. The variable, history of conflict, is included as a control variable, given that NGOs may consider whether the potential recipient country has previously been unstable in their decision making process. I scaled the history of conflict 1 through 0, according to no history of conflict, minor conflict, intermediate conflict, and war since 1995, respectively. The Uppsala Conflict Database maintained by Uppsala maintains the Uppsala Conflict Database and reports all conflict from 1989 to 2004.[68]

Since the dependent variable is ordinal, indicating that the categories are ranked but the distances between the categories are not equal, the data was tested according to an ordered logit model. While in principle, the dependent variable could have been measured on an interval scale, an ordinal variable is better suited to capture the non-linear results, considering the data. In addition, the graphical analysis provided by an ordered logit provides better explanatory value than would an OLS regression. The graphical results, which include the predicted probabilities, offer deeper insight into how NGOs respond to humanitarian crises. Though the dependent variable might be overly generalized into response categories, the advantages of an ordered logit model outweigh any possible methodological limitations. The formula used is as follows.

Formula 3.1

The Model for an Ordered Logit:

$$\text{(Level of NGO Response)} = \beta_1(\text{emerg\_year}) + \beta_2(\text{need}) + \beta_3(\text{polity}) + \beta_4(\text{resources}) + \beta_5(\text{history}) + \beta_6(\text{size}) + \beta_7(\text{hist\_con}) + \beta_8(\text{type\_crisis}) + \beta_9(\text{type\_ngo}) + \beta_{10}(\text{sizeXngotype}) + \beta_{11}(\text{ngotypeXcrisistype}) + \beta_{12}(\text{ngotypeXneed}) + \varepsilon$$

Table 3.2 summarizes the variables used in the study.

[68] http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/index.php

Table 3.2

Table of Variables included in the Ordered Regression:

Dependent Variable Independent Variables		**Description of Independent Variables**
Level of response (Scaled level of aid response, 1through 4 - including cash and values for in-kind services, materiel, and personnel)	**Emerg_year**	The year the crisis occurred
	Need	The level of need in the country as a result of the crisis
	Polity	Polity of crisis country government (indicator of government openness and democracy[69])
	Resources	A measure of the number of barrels of oil per day (in thousands_ produced in the crisis country
	History	Dichotomous dummy variable indicating if the responding NGO had also responded to the same country within the previous 12 months
	Size	Dichotomous dummy variable, based on operating budget, indicating a small or large NGO
	Type_NGO	Dichotomous dummy variable indicating a religious or secular NGO
	Type_crisis	Dichotomous dummy variable indicating a natural disaster or complex emergency
	Hist_con	Scaled variable, 0-3, indicating no conflict, minor, intermediate, or war since 1995
	SizeXNGOtype	Interaction effect between the size of the NGO and the type of NGO
	NGOtypeXcrisistype	Interaction effect between the type of NGO (religious or secular) and the type of crisis (natural disaster or complex emergency)
	NGOtypeXneed	Interaction effect between the type of NGO (religious or secular) and the level of need in that country

[69] Taken from PolityIV dataset, <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu>.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

Presentation of Results

The results of the ordered logit are presented in Table 4.1. This model performs fairly well, as its independent variables account for 15.59 percent variation in the data. Polity was not significant at this level. Further testing of polity should be conducted, however, since it was found significant in a previous regression model in Darville and White. The type of the NGO was individually interacted with size, crisis type, and need, none of which proved to be significant. However, a hypothesis test found that each variable was significant. Therefore, the hypothesis that the variables do not jointly have an effect equal to 0 on the level of NGO response is rejected, and they have a bearing on the outcome. A hypothesis test on this model in which the interaction terms, sizeXcrisistype, crisistypeXresources, and sizeXneed, indicated that these interactions were not significant in the regression, and therefore were excluded from the final regression.

Interpretation of Results

The first hypothesis examines the size of an NGO and its affect on the level of NGO aid response. Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which are shown below, illustrate the predicted probabilities of NGO response for small and large NGOs, respectively, according to need. Though ideally, the data for the analysis of this hypothesis would include only the individual crises that all nine NGOs contributed to, the available data does not allow for it. Many NGOs do not report all their

contributions. However, a cursory look of the data that allows a comparison of the individual response of the various NGOs to an individual crisis, illustrates that small NGOs give as much if not more than large NGOs. For hypothesis 1, future research should attempt to remedy the problem of NGO comparison within the data.

Figure 4.1 shows that small NGOs differ quite notably from large NGOs, especially considering the high level of response. The probability of small NGOs responding with a high

Table 4.1

Results from the Ordered Regression:

Level of Response	Coefficients	P-Values	
emerg_year	-.235947	(0.035)	
Need	0.2737993	(0.000)	
Polity	0.0160865	(0.386)	
Resources	0.000141	(0.027)	
History	.7481996	(0.001)	
Size	-2.80331	(0.000)	
Hist_con	.1880493	(0.044)	
Type_crisis	1.495662	(0.000)	
Type_ngo	-.0691438	(0.939)	
sizeXngotype	.9457238	(0.174)	
ngotypeXcrisistype	-.0843329	(0.852)	
ngotypeXneed	-.1429942	(0.157)	
		Confidence Intervals	
Cut 1	-473.4204	-912.2533	-34.58765
Cut 2	-471.9511	-910.757	-33.14516
Cut 3	-470.6075	-909.3834	-31.8354
$chi^2 < 0.0000$	pseudo-$r^2 = 0.1559$		n=386

level when the need is low is 50 percent and steadily rises to 90% when need reaches 8. However, the probability of a medium high response is significantly lower than the probability of a high response; when need is zero, the probability of a response is 30 percent, 20 percent lower than the high response, and decreases to approximately 10 percent, which is an exceptional 80 percent lower than the probability of a high response when need is high. Both the probability of a low response and a low- medium response are within 14 to 18 percent when need is low and actually decrease to a probability of approximately 0 percent when need is high.

While we might expect the probability of a low response and a low-medium response to decrease as need increases, which may in turn increase the probability of higher responses to high levels of need, we would not expect the probability of medium-high response to decrease as need increases. As stated before, when need is high, there is almost a 0 percent probability of small NGOs giving a low or low medium response and only a 10 percent probability of a medium high response. Thus, when need is high, small NGOs almost always respond with high levels of aid.

Large NGOs, illustrated in Figure 4.2, are fairly functionalist in responding to crises. As need increases, the probability of large NGOs responding with a high level or aid gradually increases from about 4 percent with no need to approximately 35 percent with the highest level of need. The probability of a large NGO responding to a crisis with a medium-high level increases about 19 percent when need increases from 0 to 8. Large NGOs have a 50 percent probability of responding with low levels when need is low, however, when need is high, the probability of a low-level response decreases significantly to 10 percent.

Whereas small NGOs (in Figure 4.1) begin with a probability of 50 percent of a high response when need is low and rise to a probability of 90 percent, large NGOs (in Figure 4.2)

Figure 4.1



Figure 4.2



begin with a probability of 4 percent and ends with approximately 35 percent when need is high. It appears that large NGOs distinctively alter their level of response as need varies, yet this does not appear to be the case with small NGOs in that they drastically alter their response according to need when giving a high level of aid. The probability of a high response for small NGOs begins with 50 percent, which implies that small NGOs give more in general and do not give small amounts of aid very frequently. However, large NGOs are more likely to give varying amounts of aid instead of consistently giving large amounts of aid like small NGOs. Though more in depth analysis is needed, it could possibly be that small NGOs give more large amounts of aid less frequently, and large NGOs give varying levels of aid more frequently.

The results indicate that size is significant in determining NGO response to humanitarian crises, which implies need is not the only factor in determining aid; however, the results do not support the expectation that large NGOs respond at a greater level than small NGOs. In fact, small NGOs do seem to respond at higher levels to crises regardless of need. While this is not what was expected, there are several potential explanations.

Small NGOs usually have specific areas to which they significantly give, and then give only a small amount to other sporadic crises; this could possibly hinder small NGOs from giving to a wide array of crises. However, because large NGOs have more staff, expertise, and headquarters in various locations, their access and ability to respond to a wide array of crises becomes easier. Since large NGOs, are responding to numerous crises, and not focusing on a few like small NGOs, then the probability of a high response is lower. Large NGOs may be more likely to give adequately to many crises whereas small NGOs may be more likely to give exceptionally to only a few crises.

In addition, as discussed before, NGOs are likely to alter funding priorities and hastily transition to the next major crisis. However, large NGOs may have more of an ability to make significant transitions because they have avenues of access, such as regional offices or previously established working relationships with people on the ground, to different regions due to the size of their organization.

Small NGOs, on the other hand, may not be able to successfully transition due to the difficulty in accessing the crisis country. Large NGOs, more than likely, receive more government funding than small NGOs, thus it may prove useful to examine the conditions under which government funding is granted in order to reveal if government funding inhibits a NGOs' ability to respond to a crisis at greater levels.

Hypothesis 2 expected faith-based NGOs to respond at a higher level of response than secular NGOs. However, the type of NGO was individually insignificant in the regression. The regression included three interaction terms, all of which included the variable, type of NGO, interacted with another variable: size, type of crisis, and need. While these interaction terms were not found to be significant, according to a hypothesis test they were essential to the regression. Thus, I rejected the null that size and the type of NGO, the type of crisis and the type of NGO, and the type of NGO and need, did not jointly have an effect equal to zero on the level of NGO response. Furthermore, these variables did have a bearing on the outcome and were included in the regression.

Since the type of NGO was not found to be significant, hypothesis two was not supported. Whether an NGO is faith-based or secular does not determine the level of NGO response to a humanitarian crisis. However, since the variables did have a bearing on the outcome, it might prove beneficial to further test this hypothesis. The current sample only

included nine NGOs: International Medical Corps, Lutheran World Relief, World Relief, Mercy Corps International, Save the Children, MSF, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision. While these cases provide significant data, increasing the number of NGOs may improve the regression model and provide more data to further test this hypothesis. In addition, an in-depth comparative, qualitative analysis, including a few case studies, may be a better method in testing this hypothesis. Since this quantitative study lacks any detailed examination of the bureaucratic inner workings of faith-based and secular NGOs in determining the level of response, further study is needed.

Hypothesis three suggests that the type of crisis, a natural disaster or a complex emergency, will determine the level of NGO response to humanitarian crises. When comparing NGO response to natural disasters and complex emergencies, as shown below in figures 4.3 and 4.4, the probabilities of response appear to be fairly functionalist. However, while NGOs do respond according to need, they respond differently in natural disaster situations than they do in complex emergency situations; thus, implying that need is not the only factor in determining NGO response.

In Figure 4.3, the probability of a low response to a natural disaster when need is low is 61 percent, yet decreases to approximately 15 percent when need is high; this illustrates a functionalist approach as we would not expect a high probability of a low response when need is high. Interestingly enough, the probability of a low medium response does not alter significantly according to need, beginning with 26 percent and ending with 29 percent when need is high. Need, thus, does not factor into the decision of a low-medium response in areas of natural disaster. However, with the probability of medium-high and high responses, NGO response is again functionalist, in that, it begins rather low and the probability increases as need increases.

An intriguing fact is observed in natural disasters with high amounts of need: the probability of a low-medium response, the probability of a medium-high response, and the probability of a high response all lie within 7 percent of one another. With this as the case, something other than need factors into a NGOs decision to respond and with what level of aid to response with.

Figure 4.3



NGOs respond to complex emergencies quite differently than they respond to natural disasters, evidenced in Figure 4.4. Even when need is 0, the probability of a low response to complex emergencies is 26 percent, compared to a larger 60 percent with natural disasters. Yet, the probability of a medium-high or high response when need is 0 is 24 percent and 15 percent,

respectively. Similar to the probability of a low-medium response to natural disasters, the probability of a medium high response does not alter markedly as need varies. In fact, the probability of response begins with 24 percent when need is zero, reaches approximately 30 percent when need is 4, and then falls again to 25 percent when need is highest. Thus, the probability of a medium-high response is not functionalist in nature. However, the probability of a high response to complex emergencies is decidedly functionalist—as need climbs from 0 to 8, the probability steadily increases from 15 to 60 percent.

Figure 4.4



In general, the probability of NGO giving is higher during instances of complex emergencies than instances of natural disaster. The probability of a medium-high and high response, combined, account for 13 to 57 percent as need increases during a natural disaster, compared to the 39 to 85 percent during complex emergencies. Though there is not much change in the probability of a low response when need is held constant at 8, shown in Figure 4.5, NGOs are 35 percent more likely to respond, with a high response, to complex emergencies than to natural disasters. When need is held constant at 2, shown in Figure 4.6, NGOs are 18 percent more likely to respond with high levels of aid and 16 percent more like to respond with medium-high levels of aid to complex emergencies than to natural disasters. While the initial expectation was that NGOs would respond with higher levels to natural disasters, the regression results did not support this hypothesis. The type of conflict is significant in determining NGO response, but NGOs respond in higher levels to complex emergencies than they do natural disasters. Although this was not expected, there are several possible explanations as to why this is the case.

Complex emergencies are usually more public than natural disasters, especially considering the frequency with which natural disasters occur. While complex emergencies have become more commonplace with the end of the Cold War, they do not occur more frequently than the hundreds of floods, landslides, and other natural disasters. There are anomalies, of course—the tsunami, for example, or the food crisis in southern Africa, but in general, complex emergencies may publicly reign in the international arena. Thus, the sheer publicity of complex emergencies could create higher levels of response. In addition, complex emergencies, which of course include conflict, are more political than natural disasters. National governments and the United Nations typically take sides in conflict situations; hence, they become more concerned with complex emergencies than natural disasters. Since many, if not most, NGOs receive funding

Figure 4.5



Figure 4.6



from governments, it may be easier to respond with high levels of aid because it may be easier to receive funding from governments for complex emergencies.

Another possible explanation revolves around the nature of organizational financing and budgeting. While it may be hard to obtain the initial funding for an emergency, once the conflict is "sold," it may not have to be revisited year after year. In fact, that specific conflict or area of interest may become automatically and consecutively budgeted for. However, while one or two complex emergencies are budgeted for at the beginning of the fiscal year, funding for a faster onset natural disaster may derive solely from reserved funds and "on the spot' fundraising. The budgeted funding may be larger than the reserved and fundraising funds, which could explain why the probability of a high response is higher with complex emergencies.

Hypothesis 3 provides another expectation in regards to the history of conflict in the crisis country: NGOs are less likely to respond to crisis countries that have had a significant history of conflict within their borders. However, the results of the regression do not necessarily support this expectation. When need is high and held at a constant of 8, as shown in figure 4.7, the increasing history of conflict only significantly influences the probability of a high response, leading to a change of 12 percent between "no history of conflict" and a "history of war" since 1995. Though the probability of a low, medium-low, and medium- high response do adjust slightly according to the history of conflict, they do not vary significantly. When need is held constant at a low level, as in Figure 4.8, the probability of the various response levels do not radically change. The greatest difference between "no history of conflict" and a "history of war" lies in the probability of a low response, and even then, the probability only results in a 10 percent change between "no history of conflict" and a "history of war". Figure 4.7 and 4.8 are shown below.

Figure 4.7



In an effort to see the significant change in the probability of response, there are four separate graphs that illustrate the lack of historical conflict, minor historical conflict, intermediate historical conflict, and the history of war, as each graph demonstrates varying levels of need. These figures are labeled 4.9 through 4.12. The probability of a high response in Figure 4.9, which is entitled "NGO Response: No History of Conflict," rises 21 percent as need increases from low to high, from 4 percent to 25 percent. However, if we compare the probability of a high response in crisis countries with no history of conflict to those countries with a history of war, as illustrated in Figure 4.12, the difference is colossal. In cases where there has been a war since 1995, even when need is 0, there is a 79 percent chance of an NGO giving a high level of aid. When need is 8, the probability increases 20 percent to a 99 percent probability

Figure 4.8



that an NGO will respond in a high capacity. When there is a history of minor conflict, shown in Figure 4.10, the probability of a high response jumps to about 15 percent with no need and 60 percent with a high level of need.

Thus, even with a history of minor conflict, the probability that NGOs will give high levels of aid is 35 percent higher than in a country with no history of conflict. When the conflict increases to an intermediate level, illustrated in Figure 4.11, the probability of a high level of response increases. If we were to overlay the four separate graphs, the four different probabilities of a high response would appear stair-stepped, from low to high beginning with the probability

of a high response in crisis countries with no history of conflict. Figures 4.9 through 4.12 are shown below:

Figure 4.9



This increase in the probability of response is quite similar to the larger probability of a high response to complex emergencies. First, it may simply be that areas that have a history of conflict are significantly budgeted for. In addition, if there has been a history of conflict, there has probably been a history of response by the NGO, which was a variable included in the regression. In regards to NGO decision-making, it may prove less difficult to respond to a crisis in a country to which the NGO has previously responded, considering the NGO more than likely

Figure 4.10



Figure 4.11



Figure 4.12



has extensive knowledge and experience with the region. In terms of the technical aspect of NGO response, if there has been a history of conflict and the NGO has previously responded, there is a significant likelihood of existing offices, supplies, and working relationships with the locals. In turn, this would make a higher response much more likely.

Although the variable, resources, was not pertinent to the hypotheses, it was included as a control variable. Since many NGOs receive considerable portions of their budgets from governments and there is an underlying assumption that governments are self-interested actors who may consider the amount of resources a country has when deciding whether to respond to a humanitarian crisis, the amount of resources a crisis country possessed was included in the

regression and found to be significant. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 illustrate the probability of NGO response with varying levels of resources based on low and high need. The graphs demonstrate that need does play a factor in determining the level of NGO response—there is a greater probability that NGOs will give at higher levels and a lower probability that they will give at low levels when need is greatest. However, resources do influence NGO decision making. With a probability of 72 percent, they are most likely to respond with high levels of aid when there is a high amount of need and a large amount of resources, as in Figure 4.13. In Figure 4.14, however, when need is low and resources steadily increase, so does the probability of a high level of giving. Thus, while need is a determinant in NGO response to humanitarian crises, so too are resources. This, in turn, could imply that governments considerably influence NGOs in their decision- making. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 are shown below.

Figure 4.13



Figure 4.14



CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Concluding Thoughts

According to the results of the regression, NGOs do respond to humanitarian crises according to functionalist claims. However, need is not the only consideration involved in NGO decision-making. While need is a factor, the size of the NGO responding, the type of crisis in the recipient country, the history of conflict in the crisis country, as well as resources, all play a role in the decision, whether it is to respond or in what capacity, of NGOs in humanitarian crises.

Though it was expected that large NGOs would respond in higher capacities than would smaller NGOs, and scholars seemed to support this claim, the reverse seems to be the case. In actuality, even when need is exceptionally low, smaller NGOs have a significantly higher probability of responding in a sizeable capacity. Initially, the literature seems to suggest that smaller NGOs are not funded as well as large NGOs, and additionally, do not have the "capability and proficiency" to respond as well as large NGOs.

Yet, the graphs illustrate that not only do smaller NGOs have a high probability of responding in a high capacity to humanitarian crises when need is high, but have a significantly low probability of even responding in a medium-high response, not to mention low-medium and low response. As suggested earlier, it may be that smaller NGOs have an established region or ongoing crisis that they consistently respond to, while large NGOs may be more likely to respond to various crises from year to year. This may be a result of the dependence of large NGOs on government funding and other donations. In any case, a further examination of NGO

size in determination of financial response should be explored. The implications of the different funding patterns of large and small NGOs could shed light on the efficiency and effectiveness of NGO response.

Considering the nature of the humanitarian market and the nature of varying crises, it was expected that NGOs, in general, would respond more heavily to natural disasters than to complex emergencies, which usually insinuates the inclusion of conflict. When an NGO decides to assist an area affected by a natural disaster, it does not have to consider political implications, the well-being and safety of their staff, or, unless it is a famine or drought, how long the natural disaster will last.

However, the general ease of assisting in a natural disaster does not appear to influence NGOs decisions. The probability of NGOs responding in a great capacity to complex emergencies is rather large in comparison to the probability of NGOs responding to a natural disaster. In fact, when need is high, NGOs have a 34 percent higher probability of a high response with complex emergencies than they do with natural disasters. The most plausible explanation is that while complex emergencies may be more difficult to respond to, they are "planned for." Most conflict situations do not occur for a few days, but continue on for months and even years. Though the fighting may not continue, the repercussions of the conflict will persist. Thus, complex emergencies may be budgeted for while NGOs cannot plan for specific natural disasters.

The history of conflict in a crisis country works much of the same way. Though the expectation was that the more intense the conflict was, historically, the less likely NGOs would be to offer aid. This was not the case either. From the graph of the probabilities, it is apparent that the shift from no history of conflict to the history of minor conflict significantly increased

the probability of a high response to the country, despite the level of need. While there could be an interaction with need, the regression did not find an interaction between the two significant. Thus, we must look for another explanation. If a country has a history of crisis, especially one that requires significant international response like conflict would, it is likely that NGOs will be familiar with the country and maintain technical expertise of the situation. More than likely, their staff has a working relationship with those "on the ground" and the ability to sustain the work there.

There was one hypothesis that was not supported by the regression—the type of NGO, faith-based or secular, will determine the level of NGO response to a humanitarian crisis. Despite the interactions with other variables, the type of NGO does not matter in the regression. While this finding is surprising, it could also prove very significant. Though more research and more data are needed to further confirm this finding, it implies, despite much of the research, that there is no difference between faith-based and secular organizations. Governments and donors, in general, will not have to concern themselves with whether a faith-based organization or a secular organization is more accountable or transparent or efficient.

Though the data is quite difficult to obtain and collect, the research analysis can be easily replicated if given the available data. Though any improvement upon the data would be welcomed, the replication of the ordered logit model would be quite simple. In regards to the generalizability, the research model is generalizable. While the data only includes three years and nine NGOs, it includes a significant number of individual crises and is thus large enough to make generalizations regarding these topics.

Humanitarian crises are not infrequent and continue with each passing year. While it is easy to quantify mortality rates and malnutrition and total people affected and the amount of

damage in dollars, the reality of the situation is that these crises drastically alter the lives of thousands and, sometimes even millions, of people around the globe. NGOs and governments claim transparency and accountability, and some, to the best of their ability, achieve it. Yet, many times one crisis receives assistance and another does not. Thus, it places on the shoulders of, not only academia, but also, humans to thoroughly search out ways to assist these people. This research illustrates that while need does determine a response to humanitarian emergencies, there are additional factors that do determine how and where funding is given. However, it is imperative that the study of humanitarian emergencies and the responses to those emergencies continue.

Suggestions for Further Research

The results from the regression, specifically the significance of the variable, resources, imply that governments influence NGOs a great deal in the decision-making process. In the beginning stages of this research, an early hypothesis was formed regarding the potential influence of governments on NGOs in situations of humanitarian crises. In particular, I intended to examine the various avenues by which the United States government granted or contracted funds to NGOs and furthermore, to explore the actual implications of grants and contracts between the Government and the NGO community.

The United States government uses grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements with individual NGOs to accomplish much of its international work. In fact, a report by the General Accounting Office stated that 'USAID relies heavily on USAID relies heavily on nongovernmental organizations to deliver foreign assistance," directing "about $4 billion of its $7.2 billion assistance funding to nongovernmental organizations, including at least $1 billion to

private voluntary organizations (charities) working overseas" in 2000.[70] Despite the large amount of assistance stemming from the U.S. Government, financing of humanitarian programs are not given to whomever, whenever. It is a competitive market in which NGOs struggle to obtain grants or contracts from the government. Once they have "won" the contract or grant, conditions of the legal agreement are expected to be upheld by the NGO.

Contracts are usually given with the understanding that USAID will maintain "substantial involvement and technical direction" in the services and goods provided by the NGO.[71] Grants, however, differ from contracts—they do not allow "substantial involvement in implementation."[72] According to the U.S. government, there is a considerably low amount of accountability established with grants. Cooperative agreements, however, lie somewhere between contracts and grants. While they allow less governmental involvement than contracts, they require more involvement than grants.

Several questions follow as to under what conditions these agreements are made and to what extent these agreements determine the level and quality of NGO response to humanitarian crises. The conditions of a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement could reveal additional factors that may affect a NGO's ability or willingness to respond to a crisis. The nature of the strings attached to various funds may also affect the level of NGO response. In addition, restricted funds and "substantial involvement" by USAID, more than likely, detracts from a NGO's decision-making ability. For instance, an NGO may not be able to respond to a crisis according to need, because the funding they received was restricted towards a specific area or

[70] "USAID Relies Heavily on Nongovernmental Organizations, But Better Data Needed to Evaluate Approaches." (Washington, D.C.,United States General Accounting Office: April 2002.) 16. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02471.pdf
[71] Ibid. 16.
[72] Ibid. 16.

crisis. Thus, NGOs may be able to respond at higher levels to crises when the funds they receive are unrestricted.

While numerous legal agreements are made each year, USAID does not have enough data to offer an analysis of USAID's "use of non-governmental organizations."[73] USAID maintains a list of contracts, cooperative agreements, and grants for the year 2002, and it also includes the country, as well as the organization, to which the funds were given. However, it does not include the project or reason the funds were given. It does not state whether the funds were given for international development or humanitarian emergencies. The lack of information leads to a lack of research in this critical area. The interaction between governments and nongovernmental organizations in instances of humanitarian emergencies is pertinent to the study of NGO response to crises. Since there is a lack of quantitative data, a more qualitative, case study approach is warranted. However, there may be limitations to a case study approach, since some of the information may be difficult to obtain or the government may deem some things "classified."

The influence of the media is another factor, along with the type of funding, that was not included in this regression, but which could potentially influence an NGO's decision on how to respond to a humanitarian emergency. Many sensationalized emergencies, like the South Asian tsunami in 2004, begin to publicly surpass other crises, which soon become "forgotten." The public responds to the media's fixation on these larger emergencies by over-donating and failing to donate to other emergencies that may be equivalent or worse in need. NGOs, who receive most of their funding from the public, are constrained by donations given solely for the sensationalized emergencies. This is another example of how restricted and un-restricted funds could affect NGO decision-making.

[73] Ibid. 9.

In addition, NGOs also receive a large amount of funding from multinational corporations (MNCs). One example of an MNC and NGO partnership lies in the relationship between CARE and Starbucks. While on the surface it seems quite philanthropic, which to some degree it probably is, it should be noted that Starbucks buys coffee from producers in Guatemala, Ethiopia, and Kenya, the countries in which CARE operates. There are several tensions between corporations and NGOs: tradeoff between social goals and profitability, contradiction of overlapping governance, style differences between corporate and non-profit cultures, difficulty of managing relationships that include both advocacy and operations, and a problem of not being able to manage a large number of complex private partnership relations because of limitations of time and money.[74] In addition to these tensions, MNCs also have strategic interests for which they expect NGOs to protect. There is an increasing potential that the significant MNC funding could also affect NGO decision-making in instances of crisis. Though this relationship between MNCs and NGOs needs to be further examined, NGOs are not required to report contributions from corporations, which would make the obtaining data rather difficult. Needless to say, if the data could be gathered, the results of further study could prove quite telling.

The current data only includes three years and nine NGOs and could become more comprehensive by additional NGOs and years. More information could possibly offer other potential explanatory factors in NGO response to humanitarian crises. Despite the improvements, some NGOs have made in self-reporting, it is not internationally required to report data to the Financial Tracking system. While the United States requires the organizations to make their financial information public, the reports usually only provide general information and not the

[74] Marc Lindenburg.. "Reaching beyond the Family: New Nongovernmental Organization Alliances for Global Poverty Alleviation and Emergency Response." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.* 30 (2001): 603-615.

detailed information required for a statistical analysis. In addition, those that do report to the Financial Tracking System may report one donation and not another. Any drastic improvement in the current data would require great lengths in order to obtain the vast amount of detailed information.

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