NOT ANOTHER CONSENSUS ANALYSIS: RACE, SOCIAL POSITION, AND CULTURAL CONSENSUS

by

CERENITY E COLLINS

(Under the Direction of Dawn T Robinson)

ABSTRACT

Research suggests that processes of meaning-making are affected by one's position within social structures. Nonetheless, researchers analyzing cultural meanings within the United States have routinely surveyed white, middle-class people – for convenience, and under the assumptions that they are valid reporters of U.S. cultural norms. This research investigates whether race, class, social positions, or the interaction of race and class affect reporting of fundamental sentiments toward cultural concepts. Using survey data collected from one quasi-representative sample and one convenience sample of U.S. adults, I conducted consensus analyses and regression analyses to investigate whether there is agreement on cultural meanings within the United States across race and certain indicators of social status. Results suggest a general consensus on cultural meaning but give some indication that race and class affect cultural meanings.

INDEX WORDS: Culture, Race, Stratification

NOT ANOTHER CONSENSUS ANALYSIS: RACE, SOCIAL POSITION, AND CULTURAL CONSENSUS

by

CERENITY E COLLINS

BA, University of Georgia, 2016

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

ATHENS, GEORGIA

2019

NOT ANOTHER CONSENSUS ANALYSIS: RACE, SOCIAL POSITION, AND CULTURAL CONSENSUS

by

CERENITY E COLLINS

Major Professor:	Dawn T Robinson
Committee:	Jody Clay-Warner
	Justine E. Tinkler

Electronic Version Approved:

Suzanne Barbour
Dean of the Graduate School
The University of Georgia
May 2019

DEDICATION

To my siblings. I love you all more than I can say.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to acknowledge the support of Army Research Office Grants W911NF1510180 and W911NF1710509 without which this work would not have been possible. I would like to thank my advisor, Dawn T. Robinson for being the best mentor I could ask for. Thank you for being patient, supportive, and kind and for always taking the time to talk things through and give me helpful advice. I would not be here without you and could not have gotten this finished without you. Thank you to my committee: Jody Clay-Warner and Justine Tinkler. I appreciate both of you for all of your time and helpful feedback at every stage of this process and for being on board with my goals for getting it done. Thank you to my adoptive cohort: Fernando, Ashley and Heather for always being there to convince me to keep going. Thank you to Holly and Ward for going above and beyond to make sure that I got to be "one of you". You two are the best. One down, one to go. Thank you to all of my parents for everything. I am grateful to have so many parents. Thank you to my mama, Alyssa, and my dad and hero trainer, Rhenardo, for helping me get to Oxford. Thank you to my dad and "bonus" mom, Charles and Tracy, for making sure that I got to take the GRE. Thank you to my mom, Carol. I could not possibly fit all my thanks to you on this page. Thank you for all of the sacrifices that you made for me over the years (and still make) and for making me homeschooled so that I was never taught to doubt myself. Love you to life. Finally, thank you to my Granna, May Alice, for always calling to ask if I have finished my thesis yet. It is finally finished! I hope that I make you all proud.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF TABLES

Page

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is easy to assume that people who live in the same country, because they share geographical space, also share culture. However, stratification by regional, racial, and demographic factors may create diverse cultures within the shared space of a nation. Thus, conceptualizing and studying culture at the national level may ignore important intra-national variations and result in incomplete understandings of culture.

If we think of culture as consensus about shared knowledge and consider how subjective culture is shaped by structure, then it is important to consider how differences in social position may lead to differences in cultural knowledge and create separate cultures. If these separate, information-based cultures exist, then interactions between members of separate cultural groups within the same nation must be viewed as cross-cultural interactions. This work is an attempt to discover the extent to which racial and class boundaries within the United States give way to distinct cultures and to discover whether race or social class is more consequential in these cultural divisions.

Since this research is focused on differentiating between cultures, it is important to begin by defining "culture." Thus, Chapter 2 is devoted to outlining previous views of culture and discussing the ways in which they differ from and relate to each other. In Chapter 3, I discuss the theory that I make use of in my measurement and analyses of cultural boundaries and situate the theory in relation to the previous conceptualizations of culture outlined in Chapter 2. I also discuss previous studies of culture making use of the

theory and introduce my first hypothesis. In Chapter 4, I review literature on race and social positions as they relate to social and structural factors that shape cultural meaning. I make use of this literature in developing and framing my remaining hypotheses which I introduce in that chapter. Chapter 5 outlines the data, measures, and analytic approaches I use to test my hypotheses and Chapter 6 reports the results of my analyses. Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss the implications of these results, the limitations of the research, and future directions for continuing research on this topic.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINITIONS OF CULTURE

I begin this chapter by briefly discussing an early conceptualization of culture that has largely fallen out of use. I use this definition of culture as a foundation for discussing the later conceptualizations that replaced it and the ways that these definitions differ from and build on the previous definition in a way that better specifies what is meant by "culture."

Culture as a Latent Variable/Culture-as-Values

Culture, when viewed as a "latent variable," (DiMaggio 1997), is not measured directly but is indicated by its effects on beliefs which are thought to influence behavior. This view of culture comes from Weber's idea that human behavior is motivated by "interests" and Parson's reinterpretation of these interests as overarching values (Swidler 1986). These values, which are learned through socialization, define what is good and bad, what people should and should not want, and what they should and should not care about. These ideas are thought to motivate people to behave in one way over another.

Culture as a Toolkit

Swidler (1986), in her critique of the culture-as-values perspective, makes the argument that neither individual interests nor culturally defined values can be used to effectively explain behavior given that people who share values often have wildly different patterns of behavior. She notes that these differences in behavior may not be due to differences in values but in access to the cultural tools necessary to realize certain

actions. She proposes the concept of culture as a "toolkit" as an alternative to the culture-as-values explanation. In this view, "culture is more like a style or a set of skills and habits than a set of preferences or wants" (Swidler 1986:275) and actions are not viewed as being chosen one at a time but as connected in "strategies of action."

DiMaggio (1997) proposed incorporating cognitive psychology into cultural sociology in order to understand *how* culture works to affect behavior. He stated that research in cognitive psychology supports the culture-as-toolkit perspective over the culture-as-values perspective and that culture operates primarily through what he called "automatic cognition." Unconscious or "automatic" cognition, relies on culturally available knowledge structures, called schemata, "that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information" (DiMaggio 1997:269). Schemata provide the "tools" in the cultural toolkit and organize the tools in a way that makes the most relevant tools for each situation the most readily accessible. They do this by making it easier to recall information that is "schematically relevant." This means that information is selected based on the contextual cues present in the environment (DiMaggio 1997).

Subjective Culture

The research proposed here focuses on subjective culture and the view of culture as consensus. The culture-as-consensus view is similar to the culture-as-values view in that cultural knowledge is gained through socialization and similar to the culture-as-toolkit view in that people vary in their knowledge of culture and their ability to access and report cultural knowledge. In this view, however, culture is not simply determined by overarching values or by variably distributed knowledge structures but a combination of

the two. Subjective culture is defined as, “the knowledge and motivational structures a society provides for its indigenes” (Heise 2010:3). The type of knowledge mentioned here refers to what D’Andrade calls “the culture pool” (D’Andrade 1981:179) which is an accumulation of cultural “programs” which are passed down from generation to generation by members of a cultural group and specify the cultural procedure for responding to objects within the culture. These programs consist of information about every object contained within a culture and define “what the object is… how to construct the object… and prescribes how the object is to be used” (D’Andrade 1981:180).

Culture as Consensus

Cultural Consensus Theory (CCT), in anthropology, is built on this notion that subjective culture consists of knowledge and that “knowledge can be inferred from consensus” (Romney, Weller, and Batchelder 1986). The theory suggests that to the extent that people have consensus with each other on knowledge, they can be said to share culture. In their formulation of the theory, Romney, Weller, and Batchelder (1986) based this assumption on Boster’s (1985) finding that informants who agreed with each other on culturally relevant information had more knowledge about that particular culture. Culture researchers use survey methods to uncover patterns of consensus that allow them to make inferences about whether the knowledge they obtain from informants is representative of a target culture and allows them to use consensus between informants to assess which informants are better at reporting cultural knowledge (Romney, Weller, and Batchelder 1986). Culture researchers in this tradition also make use of Q-analyses in determining levels of cultural consensus.

The theory assumes that informants within a culture are homogeneous in that they experience the same cultural reality, that each informant's answers are given independent of the answers of other informants and that each informant's cultural competence will be consistent across all questions. The first assumption simply means that we assume that each item in a cultural survey has a "correct" answer based on the target culture and that each respondent in the sample comes from that common culture. This assumption allows researchers to select any respondent from the target population and expect that they will be able to report cultural knowledge. The assumption that respondents' answers are independent implies that any correlation between respondent answers are indicative only of how closely each respondent's answers relate to the correct answers within the common culture. Finally, the last assumption implies that all questions are equally difficult and that individual respondents are equally efficient at responding to each question. That is, informants who are better at answering one subset of questions will also be better at answering another subset of questions (Romney et al. 1986). Operating under these assumptions makes respondents within a culture fairly interchangeable and is thought to allow culture researchers to collect accurate cultural information with surveys of only a few respondents. Here I have discussed some of the relevant conceptualizations of culture and the ways that these conceptualizations inform the methods used to study culture. In the following section, I give a brief outline of a theory which incorporates components of each of these conceptualizations and provides a tool with which to quantitatively measure cultural meaning and consensus.

CHAPTER 3

CULTURE AND CONSENSUS IN AFFECT CONTROL THEORY

Affect Control Theory is a sociological theory which makes use of the assumptions of Cultural Consensus Theory in its measurement of culturally defined affective meanings. The theory, which developed out of social structural symbolic interactionism, utilizes parts of William Powers' perception control theory and mathematical models to make predictions about emotions and behaviors in interaction (Heise 1979; MacKinnon 1994).

People have culturally defined, general feelings about all concepts included within a cultural pool of information. These general feelings are called *fundamental sentiments.* Heise (1979: 2) states that "people actively operate so as to keep their momentary feelings aligned with established sentiments, and they do this by acting so as to change what they are experiencing." When people enter into a situation, they form impressions of the situation through cognitive processes which interpret input from the environment and they alter their behavior accordingly. Consistent with the culture-as-toolkit view, the definition of the situation serves as a cognitive schema that limits what actors and behaviors could, reasonably, be involved in the situation (Heise 2007).

Measuring Culture

In Affect Control Theory, culture consists of sets of shared meanings and feelings (Heise 2007). The theory operates under an assumption that "all cognitions evoke quantitatively measurable affective associations which vary in intensity and direction

along several qualitatively distinct dimensions" (MacKinnon 1994). Affective meanings of concepts are measured on the universal dimensions of *evaluation*, *potency*, and *activity* (EPA) (Osgood, May, and Miron 1975; Heise 2007). *Evaluation* refers to goodness versus badness, *potency* refers to powerfulness versus weakness, and *activity* refers to activation or liveliness versus quietness or inactivity (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957: Osgood et al. 1975; Heise 2010).[1] Sentiments about culturally relevant concepts such as social identities, interpersonal acts, traits, status characteristics, emotions, and social settings are all rated on these dimensions using semantic differential scales like those employed by Charles Osgood and colleagues (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum 1957). Semantic differential scales are bipolar scales that are anchored on each end with opposing adjectives (e.g. *happy-sad* or *hot-cold*) and points between the adjectives corresponding to how well either endpoint describes the concept being rated. The center point of these scales corresponds to a neutral position between the adjectives while the first, second, and third points out from each side of the neutral point correspond to the degree quantifiers *slightly*, *quite*, and *extremely*, respectively (Osgood 1975). Semantic differential scales are anchored with opposing adjectives corresponding to the universal dimensions of affective meaning. The average ratings of a concept within a culture on each of these universal dimensions create that concept's Evaluation-Potency-Activity (EPA) profile.[2] These profiles are compiled in dictionaries of affective meanings or

[1] For example, in 1979, the EPA profile for babies (as reported in Heise 1979) was 1.6, -2.2, 2.5 which means that babies were culturally understood to be "very good (*evaluation*), very powerless (*potency*), and very active" (Heise 2010:57). This profile was created by calculating the average of survey respondents' ratings of "baby" on each dimension.

[2] For example, in 1979, the EPA profile for babies (as reported in Heise 1979) was 1.6, -2.2, 2.5 which means that babies were culturally understood to be "very good (*evaluation*), very powerless (*potency*), and very active" (Heise 2010:57). This profile was created by calculating the average of survey respondents' ratings of "baby" on each dimension.

sentiments. Concept ratings from these dictionaries can be plugged into mathematical models and used to make testable predictions about the behaviors and emotions of actors within a specified culture or used to make comparisons across cultures.

In *Surveying Cultures*, Heise (2010) notes that since the surveys used to collect sentiment data are concerned with *shared* meaning, collecting sentiment ratings from probability samples within a heterogeneous population is not ideal because it would only serve to maximize variation and conceal similarities instead of minimizing variation to reveal patterns of consensus. He argues that, for these types of cultural surveys, researchers should forego using random samples and, instead, sample from "actors who reproduce culture by making judgments of interest on a regular basis…those with the most experience and expertise" (Heise 2010:85) because sampling from people who are not ideal in this way would waste resources and contaminate the data with errors due to their inability to accurately report dominant cultural norms. For this reason, within the Affect Control Theory tradition, sentiment data for the sentiment dictionaries for the United States have, in the past, been collected primarily from homogeneous samples of predominately white, middle-class, college students. This practice is justified based on assumptions that middle-class cultural sentiments "sustain the basic social institutions of American society" and that college settings are places where this culture is reproduced (Heise 2010:122). Thus, cultural consensus within the United States is, effectively, measured as consensus around white, middle-class norms. While researchers acknowledge the existence of "sub-cultures" that consist of people who differ significantly in their sentiments about concepts that are particularly relevant to the subculture (Heise 1979; Thomas and Heise 1995; Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992),

differences in sentiments about concepts that should not be particularly relevant are typically explained as individual difference or error (Heise 2007; Heise 2010). The assumption that individual ratings tend to cluster around the dominant cultural norms, use of means as a measure of norms, sampling of homogeneous populations, and the treatment of most deviations as the result of individual idiosyncrasies or error ignore the question of whether consensus truly exists within the rest of the population.

Previous Consensus Studies using Affect Control Theory

Previous studies testing the assumption of consensus have found mixed results. Sewell and Heise (2010) analyzed data from a Black U.S. sentiment dictionary collected from young, black males in Chicago in the 1970s (Landis and Saral 1978) and found that white U.S. sentiments predicted less than half of the variance in Black sentiments on all three dimensions of affective meaning. In fact, white U.S. sentiments "predicted German sentiments better than they predicted U.S. Black sentiments" (Sewell and Heise 2010). Wisecup (2011) sought to further test the consensus assumption with a heterogeneous sample. She found that while there was some evidence that education affects variation in inculcation (the extent to which respondents have consensus with each other about meanings) and commonality (the extent to which their responses reflect the general sentiments of the target culture) and limited evidence that social network factors also have some effect, her results mostly supported the consensus assumption. Rogers (2018), using a sample from two universities with different racial and socioeconomic compositions, found evidence of general agreement but also noted differences in sentiments similar to those found in cross-cultural comparisons. She found that race was one of the most important predictors on all three affective dimensions and that parents'

marital status and indicators of social class such as parents' education also predicted differences in sentiments.

The results of Wisecup's (2011) analyses could suggest that Sewell and Heise's (2010) findings were a product of the time period and location in which the data were collected and that consensus in the United States may have increased since the early 1970s. However, Rogers' (2018) results suggest that this is not the case and provide some evidence that race and social class still affect sentiments. Differences in their findings may be due, in part, to their samples. While Wisecup (2011) used a heterogenous sample, Rogers' (2018) sample consisted of primarily Black and white college-aged students. Because Rogers (2018) sampled from a private Predominately White Institution (PWI) and a public Historically Black College/University (HBCU), race and social class, as she notes, are closely linked. Still, given that both Wisecup (2011) and Rogers (2018) found some associations between cultural consensus and sociodemographic factors such as age, education, income, and race, further tests are necessary.

The assumption of consensus employed in these cultural studies provides me with my first hypothesis (hereafter known as the "Consensus Hypothesis"): *cultural meanings are determined by a shared national culture within the United States.* The purpose of this project is to test the assumption of consensus with a larger and more diverse sample than those used in the previously mentioned studies to determine if and how race and social positions affect cultural consensus. In the next section, I review literature on race and social positions and the ways that they have been linked to structural differences between groups of people that may shape cultural beliefs.

CHAPTER 4

RACE, SOCIAL POSITION, AND MEANING-MAKING

Habitus as Meaning-Making

Bourdieu's (1984) concept of "habitus" provides an explanation for why cultural differences could be expected between people who live in the same geographical space. He notes that the distribution of both economic and cultural capital divides people into groups defined by their positions within social space. He defines habitus as "a structuring structure, which organizes practices and perception of practices, but also a structured structure…" (Bourdieu 1984; Grusky 1994:408). Considering how habitus is shaped by and shapes structure is useful for understanding how differences in social positions could affect lifestyles and lead to differences in cultural sentiments.

Qualitative studies on social status and meaning have found that social status shapes the way that people view themselves and others (Lehmann 2009; Stuber 2006). Quantitative studies have found similar results. Lynn and Ellerbach (2017) analyzed data from the occupational prestige module of the 1989 General Social Survey and found that degree status (used as a proxy for class and social status) shaped the ways that people of higher and lower statuses categorized occupations. They also found that higher status people had higher consensus in their ratings than lower status people which, they note, suggests a homogenizing effect of educational attainment. Related to Affect Control Theory, Ambrasat et al. (2016), conceptualizing habitus as "an individual-level pattern of meaning making…that is socially shared within stratified groups of individuals" (995),

used survey data to explore whether there were patterns of meaning-making that could be attributed to certain lifestyles. Using a sample of 3,438 German respondents, they collected sentiment ratings of 909 concepts and ratings of respondents' self-meaning on the universal affective dimensions of evaluation, potency, and activity. They also collected sociodemographic data such as age, education, income, household composition, and residential area. They found that social stratification, through its effects on living conditions, significantly affected sentiments about both general concepts and self-concepts. This study provides evidence that lifestyle differences are related to differences in cultural meanings even within a sample that is more racially and ethnically homogeneous. The findings of research on social position and meaning-making provide the basis for an alternative to the consensus hypothesis suggesting that, instead of having a general consensus, *cultural meanings vary by social position.* I chose to focus here on social class.

Considering how habitus is formed by structure and given that the United States is still, in many ways, stratified and segregated by race and ethnicity it is necessary to address the role that racial stratification has in shaping behavior and meaning-making. Sewell and Heise's (2010) findings suggest that there was a separate Black culture in Chicago in the 1970s and Rogers' (2018) findings show significant racial differences in data collected in 2011 and lead to a second hypothesis: *cultural meanings vary systematically by race*. Given that Sewell and Heise's (2010) initial consensus study focused on the cultural meanings of African Americans and that Rogers (2018) found differences between Black and white students, I focus my discussion mainly on how racial stratification could be related to African-Americans' cultural meanings.

The Black Middle-Class and the Declining Significance of Race

In *The Declining Significance of Race*, Wilson argues that structural changes in the nature of race relations in the United States have changed things so much that the life chances of Black people are now related more to their socioeconomic status than their race (Wilson 2012:1). When race, due to Jim Crow laws, was the biggest constraining factor in where one could live, work and go to school, middle-class, Black people were united with the rest of the Black population in their existence within a subordinate racial group and inability to cross into predominately white spaces. Wilson notes that, since the Civil Rights movement and subsequent implementation of policies such as affirmative action, opportunities for Black people to enter into predominately white, middle-class spheres have been granted overwhelmingly to Black people with the resources to enter them: the Black middle-class. As the major beneficiaries of the civil rights movement, the Black middle-class has been able to, in some ways, rise above others within their racial group while much of the Black population continues to lack opportunities due to class standing. He suggests that the rise of the Black middle-class has created an economic and cultural divide within a population historically defined largely by its shared racial status (Wilson [1978] 2012). Joseph (1981) states that, given their elevated social positions relative to the rest of the Black population, middle-class Black people are more likely to be located within middle-class, white spaces than their own middle-class spaces defined by a Black cultural identity. He implies that because of this they will not share much culturally with lower-class Black people but will be more likely to subscribe to the middle-class cultural ideals of the dominant, predominately white society.

Research on the Black middle-class provides a lens for hypothesizing about the relationship between race and social class specifically as it relates to Blackness as both structural and cultural. Kashefi (2011) finds that Black-white differences in work values are explained by differences in occupational status. He finds that Black-white differences become insignificant within high status occupational contexts. These findings provide support for Wilson's (2009) argument that culturally developed attitudes can be reshaped within high status contexts and his ([1978] 2012) argument that increased opportunities for Black people would make class more consequential than race for Black life outcomes and suggest a mediating relationship of social class on racial differences in habitus. This leads to the third hypothesis that *effects of race on cultural meanings are mediated by class.*

Consistent with the assertion that middle-class Black people would be alienated from other Black people due to their social class and frequent exposure to predominately white spaces, middle-class Black people sometimes report feeling rejected by other Black people for these exact reasons. Canham and Williams (2017) discuss the Black middle-class as the "object of two gazes": the "hegemonic white gaze" and the "policing Black gaze." The white gaze characterizes the Black body as deviant and inferior. It both denies and protects white privilege and imposes itself onto Black bodies, requiring Black people to constantly police themselves to conform to white standards. The Black gaze, on the other hand, serves to police presentations of Blackness based on symbolic boundaries that limit what it means to be Black (Canham and Williams 2017).

Consistent with the idea that the Black middle-class exists between two cultural realities, Harris' (2004) study of people who grew up Black and middle-class found that

Black middle-class parents sometimes focus more on class socialization than racial socialization and that the primary racial socialization given to middle-class Black children concerns the need to be overachievers. These children may then be underprepared when dealing with racialized experiences in white contexts and, due to their middle-class socialization, met with accusations of "acting white" in -predominately lower-class- Black contexts. Harris and Khanna (2010) report that Black-white biracials feel more accepted by the "Black community" than middle-class, Black "monoracials." This suggests that, within the Black community, having a higher social status and engaging with what is seen as white culture can be more damaging to one's acceptance as "Black" than having a white parent.

Within white contexts, members of the Black middle-class are tasked with navigating Blackness within spaces where they may be one of very few Black people or the only Black person within that space. As racial "tokens," they are challenged in positions of authority (Knight et al. 2003), have fewer network ties and less social support in their workplaces (Sloan, Evenson Newhouse, and Thompson 2013), and are subjected to informal rules that police their behavior and emotions in ways that whites are not (Wingfield 2010). On the other hand, within Black contexts, they are tasked with navigating Blackness within spaces where their portrayals of Blackness may not align with limited definitions of Blackness.

Potentially facing rejection by the Black community for their perceived "whiteness," incapable of truly passing over into whiteness, and faced with the challenge of being both too Black and not Black enough, one might expect the Black middle-class to be culturally situated somewhere between Black (lower-class Black) and middle-class

(predominately white) cultures. This is especially likely given that many middle-class Black people live among other lower-class Black people or in similar areas (Pattillo 1999) but work among whites and many upper middle-class Black people live among whites but seek out interaction with the Black community (Lacy 2007) and thus would be socially and structurally positioned between Black and white spaces. For this reason, I would expect race and social class to interact and create a hybrid culture based on white middle-class norms and (predominately lower-class) Black norms. This literature provides the basis for the hypothesis that *the effects of race on enculturation are moderated by social class*.

The literature reviewed here suggests multiple ways in which race and social status are related to social and structural differences between groups of people that lead to differences in life experiences which may go on to shape cultural meanings. These suggestions inform the following hypotheses:

H1 (Cultural Consensus hypothesis): Cultural meanings are determined by a shared culture within the United States

H2: (Social Class hypothesis) Cultural meanings within the United States vary by social class.

H3: (Separate Cultures hypothesis) Cultural meanings vary systematically by race.

H4 (Declining Significance hypothesis): The effects of race on cultural meanings are mediated by social class.

H5: (Hybrid Culture hypothesis): The effects of race combine with the effects of social class and create a unique hybrid culture.

In the next section, I review my methods and discuss the data I use, measures used to collect the data, data management, and analysis techniques.

CHAPTER 5

DATA, METHODS, AND MEASURES

There are multiple differences between the data and analyses presented by Sewell and Heise (2010), Wisecup (2011) and Rogers' (2018) that could have contributed to the differences in their findings. While they chose to focus their discussion on concepts related to the family, Sewell and Heise's (2010) data included ratings of various concepts such as social identities (e.g. "mother" or "uncle") and behaviors (e.g. "to marry") while Wisecup's (2011) and Rogers' (2018) surveys included only social identities. It is possible that respondents could have consensus on the meanings of some types of concepts but not on others. Wisecup (2011) and Rogers' (2018) results could have been affected by the nature of the concepts used in the survey. For this reason, my analyses include ratings of social identities, behaviors, emotions and social characteristics.

Sample characteristics may have also contributed to the differences in findings. Sewell and Heise's (2010) respondents were Black, high school boys living in a ghetto in, highly segregated, Chicago in the 1970s. Because there was no variation by age, region, gender or SES, the results are not generalizable to the overall U.S. Black population and fail to account for possible cultural differences between lower and middle-class Black people. Rogers' (2018) sample did not have much age variation and race and social class were closely related. Further, given that Wisecup (2011) failed to consistently find racial differences in sentiments in her analyses but did find weak support for differences based on education and income, it is possible that the racial differences in Sewell and Heise's

(2010) and Rogers' (2018) studies were really the result of differences in SES. It is necessary, then, to include a large enough sample of respondents who differ on relevant demographic characteristics to be able to disentangle their effects.

I use a data set made up of survey data collected online from two samples of U.S. adults. One was collected by Qualtrics Panels (N=1013) and is quasi-representative of U.S. adults on education and race and a second is a convenience sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers (N=190). My combined sample (N=1203) of respondents (here referring to respondents as cases) contains demographic data and sentiment ratings about 26 identities, 18 behaviors, 17 emotions, and social characteristics (see Table 1).

(Table 1 about here)

I chose this sample because it has a large enough sample of Black and white respondents to analyze whether there is consensus between the two racial groups. It also has information on respondents' education and their parents' education. I use information about education as a measure of social class to analyze whether there is consensus between people with different social statuses.

Following established protocols (Heise 2010), I excluded respondents if they had not lived in the U.S. for more than 70% of their lives before they were 18 years old or if English was not their first language. People with incomplete data on demographic variables were dropped from the sample. I also dropped people missing more than 20 percent of the concept ratings. Remaining missing values were imputed using the respondents' mean on the other stimuli for the corresponding affective dimension. This is the method that Heise (2010) used to deal with missing data for his consensus analysis in *Surveying Cultures.* My final sample size of respondents was 1047.

Demographics

The data set includes relevant demographic information on race, Hispanic ethnicity, age, education, mother's education, father's education, gender, religion, and region (see Table 2). I used the respondents' education and their parents' education to create a dichotomous social status variable indicating whether the respondent or either of their parents had received a bachelor's degree or higher. If the respondent or either of their parents had received a bachelor's degree or higher, they were coded as "higher social class" and if neither the respondent nor either of their parents had received a bachelor's degree or higher, they were coded as "lower social class." For example, a first-generation college student currently enrolled in a bachelor's degree program would be coded as "lower social class" while the same student would be coded as "higher social class" after they received a bachelor's degree. This was done because, as noted previously, parents' education has often been used as a measure of social status of children and adolescents. I extend this logic to college-aged young adults because they may still be considered dependents and also used respondents' own education as an indicator so that older respondents whose parents may be less likely to be college-educated would not be overwhelmingly placed into the lower status category. A little over half of the respondents were coded as "lower social status" (N=593) (see Table 3). The majority of respondents in the sample are female (N=699) and one person identified as gender non-binary[3]. About 68 percent of respondents are non-Hispanic white or Caucasian (N=712), 12.4% are non-Hispanic Black or African American (N=130), 4.2%

[3] Although there were not enough people in the sample who identified as non-binary to analyze differences between non-binary people and people who identified as male or female, I chose to keep this respondent in the sample so as not to erase people who did not fall on the gender binary.

are non-Hispanic Asian or Asian American (N=45) and 1.1% are non-Hispanic Native American or American Indian (N=11). There are also people in the sample who said that they were some other race (non-Hispanic) (N=13) or selected multiple races (non-Hispanic) (N=14). Approximately 11.7 percent of respondents in the sample are Hispanic/Latino of any race (N=122). My discussion focuses primarily on differences between white and Black people because most of the previous research on differences in cultural sentiments has primarily compared these groups. However, finding differences between Black and white ratings could provide evidence that race more generally affects cultural meanings. Moreover, including the ratings of Hispanics/Latinxs and members of other racial groups is important because it allows me to assess whether there is a general consensus within the United States across racial groups and to compare the sentiments of white and Black people to the mean sentiments of a sample closely matched to the larger United States.

(Table 2 about here)

(Table 3 about here)

Sentiments

The survey responses were gathered using Qualtrics and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All concepts were rated on Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. Responses could range from -4.3 to +4.3. Scales were anchored on each end with adjectives typically used in sentiment studies (Heise 2010). For Evaluation, the endpoints were labeled on one end with "bad, awful" and "good, nice" on the other. For Potency, "powerless, little" and powerful, big" and for Activity, "slow, quiet, inactive" and "fast, noisy, active." Points along the scale are anchored with neutral (0), slightly (-1/+1), quite

(-2/+2), extremely (-3/+3), and infinitely (-4.3/+4.3). For each question about identities, respondents were presented with the prompt: *a/an (identity concept) is* (e.g. "an accountant is"). For ratings of modifiers (i.e. emotions and social characteristics), respondents were presented with the prompt: *being (concept modifier) is* (e.g. "being handsome is") or *feeling (concept modifier)* is (e.g. "feeling amused is"). For ratings of behaviors, respondents were presented with the prompt: *to (behavior concept) someone is* (e.g. "to beat up someone is"). Respondent race, age and gender were measured by asking participants to answer the questions "What is your race? age? gender?" respectively. Education was measured by asking respondents to list the highest level of education they have attained (see Appendix A). Given that parental education is often used as an indicator of social class in children and young adults and that respondents' own education has also been used as an indicator of social class in adults, social class in these analyses are measured using a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent or either of their parents had earned at least a bachelor's degree. If neither the respondent nor either of their parents had a bachelor's degree, I coded the respondent as "lower social class", if the respondent or their parents had a bachelor's degree or higher, I coded the respondent as "higher social class."

Consensus Analyses: Inculcation and Commonality

In order to test the question of whether there is a general consensus on cultural sentiments, I performed Q-factor analyses on correlation and variance-covariance matrices for each affective dimension (i.e. Evaluation, Potency and Activity) and tested for inculcation and commonality.

Inculcation is a measure of how well cultural norms predict a respondent's sentiments. It reflects the extent to which individual respondents have consensus with each other. It is calculated by computing the variances and covariances of respondents' answers, finding the first principle component of the variance-covariance matrix in Q-factor analyses, then interpreting the component loadings of respondents as inculcation indices (Heise 2010:176). Inculcation weights of zero represent a lack of inculcation. Inculcation weights between zero and one mean that sentiments reflect cultural norms with some attenuation, likely due to individual idiosyncrasies or measurement error. Inculcation weights above one mean that sentiments exaggerate cultural norms while negative weights mean that sentiments systematically oppose cultural norms (Heise 2010:133-144).

Commonality is a measure of how reliably an individual respondent reports cultural norms. It reflects the extent to which individual respondents' ratings approximate the sample mean ratings on each concept. It is calculated by computing correlations of respondents' answers, finding the first principle component of the correlation matrix, then interpreting the component loadings of respondents as commonality indices. Commonality scores (correlations) range from negative one to positive one. Scores between zero and one reflect a combination of attenuated inculcation, individual

idiosyncrasies, and measurement errors. Negative commonality scores reflect the level of disagreement with cultural norms. Positive commonality scores indicate the level of agreement with cultural norms. Commonality scores of positive one reflect perfect reproduction of cultural norms while scores of negative one reflect total opposition to cultural norms.

Consensus Analysis: Socio-Structural Determinants of Consensus

To test the alternative hypotheses that race and social status affect cultural sentiments, I ran regression models for each affective dimension to determine if race and social status variables predict scores on inculcation and commonality. The first model regressed the inculcation and commonality indices on the control variables age, gender, and religion. The second model regressed the inculcation and commonality indices on social class, controlling for other demographic variables (i.e. age, gender and religion) to determine if social class significantly predicted enculturation. The third model regressed the inculcation and commonality indices on racial group, controlling for the other demographic variables, to determine if race significantly predicted inculcation and commonality. The fourth model tested whether effects of race on inculcation and commonality are mediated by social status. The fifth and final model tested whether social class moderates effects of race on inculcation and commonality.

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

To determine whether Black and white respondents in my sample differed in their ratings as much as Black and white respondents in the Sewell and Heise (2010) study, I first conducted analyses to test whether Black and white respondents differed significantly in their ratings of concepts on Evaluation, Potency, and Activity. I separated the data set by race[4] then calculated the means for each dimension. Then, I correlated the Black respondent means with the white respondent means on each dimension and across all of the concepts to determine how well the Black and white respondents' sentiments in this sample predict each other.

The correlation between Black and white respondents' ratings for *Evaluation* was .996 The correlation between Black and white respondents' ratings for *Potency* was .988. The correlation between Black and white respondents' ratings for *Activity* was .96. When I squared the correlations for each dimension, white ratings predicted 99.3 percent of the variance in Black *Evaluation*, 97.6 percent of the variance in Black *Potency*, and 92.2 percent of the variance in Black *Activity*. These findings suggest that Black and white sentiment norms (means) in my sample are virtually identical.

To determine whether there was a general consensus on cultural meanings within the United States, I first performed Q-analyses to determine if the majority of variance in respondent ratings could be explained by a single factor. Next, to determine if race and

[4] For these analyses, I only included Black and non-Hispanic white respondents in order to test the differences between these two groups similar to the method used by Sewell and Heise (2010).

social class impacted the level of consensus, I regressed the factor loadings I obtained in the Q-analyses on the race and social class variables. I discuss the results of these analyses in the sections that follow.

Inculcation: Q-Factor Analyses

I ran q-mode factor analyses on the variance-covariance matrices for Evaluation, Potency and Activity to obtain factor loadings on the first principal components to use as inculcation indices. The first component for Evaluation explained 77 percent of the variance in ratings. A scree plot showed that the first eigenvalue was drastically larger than the second and that the second did not differ much from subsequent eigenvalues, which were connected in a visibly flat line, providing evidence that a single factor shaped respondents' ratings on Evaluation. When I ran the principal component analysis on the variance-covariance matrix for *Potency*, the first component explained 50 percent of the variance in ratings. A scree plot showed that the first eigenvalue was much larger than the second, but this difference was not as large as the difference between the first and second eigenvalues for Evaluation. The second eigenvalue was visibly larger than the rest of the eigenvalues which were connected in a visibly flat line. However, the first component explained a majority of the variance suggesting that, at most, there were two factors influencing respondents' ratings on Potency. For Activity, the first component explained 22 percent of the variance in ratings. A scree plot showed that the first component was roughly twice the size of the second, the second was slightly over twice the size of the third and the fourth, and the eigenvalues leveled off around the fifth eigenvalue. These results suggest that, at most, two or three factors influenced respondents' ratings of Activity.

Inculcation: Competing Models

To test my hypotheses about how demographic factors relate to measures of enculturation, I ran OLS regression analyses using respondents' factor loadings on the first principal component for inculcation (the extent to which respondents have agreement with each other) and commonality (the extent to which respondents have agreement with cultural norms) on all three affective dimensions. Tables 4, 5 and 6 report the results of the regression analyses for Evaluation Inculcation, Potency Inculcation and Activity Inculcation, respectively. Each model included the control variables age, gender, and religion and the first model included only the control variables. The second model regressed inculcation on social class controlling for gender, age, and religion. The third model regressed inculcation on race controlling for gender, age, and religion. The fourth model tested the mediation of race by social status controlling for gender, age, and religion. The fifth model tested the moderation of the effect of race on inculcation by social status.

(Table 4 about here)

(Table 5 about here)

(Table 6 about here)

Control variables

Compared to being male, being female was a significant predictor ($p<.001$) of higher inculcation on Evaluation and Potency in all of the models (Tables 4 and 5). Gender was not a significant predictor of inculcation for Activity (Table 6). Compared with being between the ages of 18 and 25, being between the ages of 50 and 66 and being over the age of 67 were significant predictors ($p<.05$) of higher inculcation on Evaluation

in all models except for the second model where being over the age of 67 was insignificant and the fourth model where being over the age 67 was only significant at the $p<.1$ level. Being in any age category over the age of 35 was a significant predictor ($p<.01$) of higher inculcation on Potency in all models. For Activity, being between the ages of 36 and 50 was a significant predictor ($p<.01$) of lower inculcation in all models and being over the age of 67 significantly predicted lower inculcation at the $p<.05$ level in the first and third models. Having Islam as one's religion significantly predicted lower inculcation on Evaluation at the $p<.05$ level in the first and third models and at the $p<.01$ level in the second, fourth, and fifth model. Having no religion, or having some other religion compared to having Christianity as one's religion, significantly predicted lower inculcation on Evaluation at the $p<.01$ level on all models. For Potency, having no religion significantly predicted lower inculcation at the $p<.01$ level on all models. Religion was not a significant predictor of inculcation on Activity.

Social class model

The second model tested the hypothesis that *cultural meanings vary by social class*. For inculcation, the measure of the extent to which respondents have consensus with each other on cultural meanings, having higher social class significantly predicted lower inculcation on Evaluation and Potency and predicted higher inculcation on Activity at the $p<.01$ level. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{1,1035} = 28.172$, $p<.001$), Potency ($F_{1,1035} = 31.901$, $p<.001$), and Activity ($F_{1,1033} = 17.453$, $p<.001$), the *Social Class* model better fit the data than the control model. These results suggest that social class is an important factor in determining agreement with others about the affective meanings of cultural concepts.

Separate cultures model

The third model tested the hypothesis that *cultural meanings vary by race.* For inculcation, race was not a significant predictor of agreement on Evaluation. Identifying as Black or African American significantly predicted higher inculcation on Potency at the $p<.01$ level and identifying as Hispanic was a significant predictor of higher inculcation on Potency at the $p<.05$ level. Identifying with two or more races was a significant predictor of lower inculcation on Potency at the $p<.01$ level. Race was not a significant predictor of inculcation on Activity. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that for Evaluation ($F_{6,1030} = 0.346$, $p = .912$) and Activity ($F_{6,1028} = 1.1406$, $p = .336$), the *Separate Cultures* model did not fit the data any better than the control model. However, for Potency ($F_{6,1030} = 8.1935$, $p < .001$), the *Separate Cultures* model fit the data significantly better than the control model suggesting that social factors related to race are important in determining agreement with others about the Potency of cultural concepts.

Declining significance model

The fourth model tested the hypothesis that *the effects of race on social meaning are mediated by social class.* For inculcation, adding social class into the model did not change effects of race on agreement on Evaluation. For Potency, adding social class into the model *increased* the effect of identifying as Black or African American and the effect of identifying as Hispanic on agreement with others on cultural meanings which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that social class should mediate the effects of race on consensus. Adding social class into the model did decrease the effect of identifying with two or more races on agreement with others on cultural meanings. However, given that so

few people in my sample identified with two or more races, I am reluctant to interpret these results. Adding social class into the model did not change effects of race on agreement on Activity. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{1,1029} = 29.079$, $p<.001$), Potency ($F_{1,1029} = 34.78$, $p<.001$), and Activity ($F_{1,1027} = 17.29$, $p<.001$), the *Declining Significance* model better fit the data than the *Separate Cultures* model. However, given that adding social class to the model increased the effect of race on agreement with others, these results do not support the *Declining Significance* hypothesis that the effect of race is mediated by social class.

Hybrid cultures model

The final model tested the hypothesis that *the effects of race on cultural meaning is moderated by social class.* For inculcation, none of the interaction terms for Evaluation or Potency were significant. For Activity, the interaction between higher social class and identifying as Black or African American significantly predicted lower agreement with others on cultural meanings at the $p<.05$ level. This result provides limited evidence that black, middle-class people may have a hybrid culture impacted by the combination of their statuses as Black and as higher class. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{6,1023} = 0.6577$, $p = .684$), Potency ($F_{6,1023} = 0.2735$, $p = .949$), and Activity ($F_{6,1021} = 1.1182$, $p = .349$), the *Hybrid Culture* model did not fit the data any better than the *Declining Significance* providing no support for the *Hybrid Cultures* hypothesis.

Commonality: Q-Factor Analyses

I ran q-mode factor analyses on the correlation matrices for Evaluation, Potency and Activity to obtain factor loadings on the first principal components to use as

commonality indices. For Evaluation, the first component explained 76 percent of the variance in ratings within the sample. A scree plot showed that the first eigenvalue was substantially larger than the second and that the second did not differ much from subsequent eigenvalues, which were connected in a visibly flat line, providing evidence that a single factor shaped respondents' ratings on Evaluation. When I ran the principal component analysis on the correlation matrix for Potency, the first component explained 45 percent of the variance in concept ratings within the sample. A scree plot showed that the first eigenvalue was much larger than the second, but this difference was not as large as the difference between the first and second eigenvalues for Evaluation. The second eigenvalue was visibly larger than the rest of the eigenvalues which were connected, after a slight curve, in a visibly flat line. However, the first component explained a majority of the variance suggesting that, at most, there were two factors influencing respondents' ratings on Potency. For Activity, the first component explained 23 percent of the variance. A scree plot showed that, similar to the results for inculcation, the first component was roughly twice the size of the second, the second was slightly over twice the size of the third and the fourth, and that eigenvalues started to level off after the fourth factor. These results suggest that, at most, two or three factors influenced respondents' ratings of Activity.

Commonality: Competing Models

Tables 7, 8 and 9 report the results of the regression analyses for Commonality Evaluation, Commonality Potency and Commonality Activity, respectively. Each model included the control variables age, gender, and religion and the first model included only the control variables. The second model regressed social status on commonality

controlling for gender, age, and religion. The third model regressed race on commonality controlling for gender, age, and religion. The fourth model tested the mediation of the effect of race on commonality by social status controlling for gender, age, and religion. The fifth model tested the moderation of the effect of race on commonality by social status.

(Table 7 about here)

(Table 8 about here)

(Table 9 about here)

Control variables

Compared to being male, being female was a significant predictor ($p<.001$) of higher commonality on Evaluation and Potency in all of the models (Tables 7 and 8). Gender was not a significant predictor of commonality for Activity (Table 9). Compared with being between the ages of 18 and 25, being between the ages of 26 and 35, being between the ages of 36 and 50, and being between the ages of 51 and 66 were significant predictors of higher commonality on Evaluation at the $p<.05$ level in all of the models. Being over the age of 67 was a significant predictor of higher commonality on Evaluation at the $p<.01$ level in all of the models. For Potency, being between the ages of 36 and 50, being between the ages of 51 and 66, and being over the age of 67 were significant predictors of higher commonality at the $p<.01$ level in all of the models. For Activity, being between the ages of 36 and 50 was a significant predictor of lower commonality at the $p<.01$ level in the first and third model and at the .05 level in the second, fourth and fifth models. Being over the age of 67 was a significant predictor of lower commonality at the $p<.05$ level in the first model and at the $p<.01$ level in the third model. Having no

religion predicted lower commonality on Evaluation at the $p<.05$ level in all models. Having some other religion significantly predicted lower commonality at the $p<.01$ level in all of the models. For Potency, having no religion predicted lower commonality at the $p<.01$ level in all models. For Activity, having no religion predicted higher commonality at the $p<.01$ level in all models.

Social class model

The second model tested the hypothesis that *cultural meanings vary by social class*. Social class did not significantly predict commonality on Evaluation. For Potency, social class significantly predicted lower commonality at the $p<.01$ level. For Activity, social class significantly predicted higher commonality at the $p<.01$ level. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{1,1035} = 1.2963$, $p = .255$), the *Social Class* model did not fit the data significantly better than the control model. For Potency ($F_{1,1035} = 14.722$, $p<.001$) and Activity ($F_{1,1033} = 34.874$, $p<.001$), the *Social Class* model better fit the data than the control model. These results suggest that social class is an important factor in determining agreement with cultural norms about the Potency and Activity of cultural concepts.

Separate cultures model

The third model tested the hypothesis that *cultural meanings vary by race.* Identifying as Black or African American significantly predicted lower commonality on Evaluation at the $p<.01$ level. For Potency, identifying as Black or African American and identifying as Hispanic significantly predicted higher commonality at the $p<.01$ level and the $p<.05$ level, respectively. Identifying with two or more races significantly predicted lower commonality on Potency at the $p<.01$ level. For Activity, identifying as Black or

African American significantly predicted lower commonality at the p<.01 level. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{6,1030} = 1.7573$, $p = .1047$), the *Separate Cultures* model did not fit the data any better than the control model. For Potency ($F_{6,1030} = 7.751$, $p<.001$) and Activity ($F_{6,1028} = 2.2855$, $p<.05$), the *Separate Cultures* model better fit the data than the model including only the control variables. These results suggest that social factors related to race are important in determining agreement with cultural norms about the Potency and Activity of cultural concepts.

Declining significance model

The fourth model tested the hypothesis that *the effects of race on social meaning are mediated by social class.* For commonality, adding social class into the model slightly increased the effects of race on agreement with cultural norms on Evaluation. For Potency, adding social class into the model increased the effect of identifying as Black or African American and the effect of identifying as Hispanic on agreement with others on cultural meanings which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that social class should mediate the effects of race on consensus. Adding social class into the model did decrease the effect of identifying with two or more races on agreement with others on cultural meanings. However, given that so few people in my sample identified with two or more races, I am reluctant to interpret these results. Adding social class into the model increased the effects of identifying as Black or African American on agreement with cultural norms on Activity. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{1,1029} = 1.6638$, $p = .1974$), the *Declining Significance* model did not fit the data any better than the *Separate Cultures* model. For Potency ($F_{1,1029} = 15.694$, $p<.001$) and Activity ($F_{1,1027} = 36.568$, $p<.001$), the *Declining Significance* model better fit the

data than the *Separate Cultures* model. However, given that adding social class to the model increased the effect of race on agreement with cultural norms, these results do not support the *Declining Significance* hypothesis that the effect of race is mediated by social class.

Hybrid culture model

The final model tested the hypothesis that *the effects of race on cultural meaning is moderated by social class.* For commonality, none of the interaction terms for Evaluation, Potency, or Activity were significant at the p<.05 level. ANOVA tests for model comparisons showed that, for Evaluation ($F_{6,1023} = 1.0069$, $p = .419$), Potency ($F_{6,1023} = 0.7926$, $p = .576$), and Activity ($F_{6,1021} = 0.6233$, $p = .712$), the *Hybrid Culture* model did not fit the data any better than the *Declining Significance* model providing no support for the *Hybrid Cultures* hypothesis..

Overall, based on the results of the regression analyses and the supplementary analyses of the correlations between Black and white respondents' ratings, we can conclude that there is consensus in the United States on cultural sentiments. These results are provide evidence that social positions based on race and social class do have some effect on enculturation.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Results of the factor analyses testing the *Cultural Consensus* hypothesis showed that a common culture could explain the majority of the variance in respondent ratings for Evaluation and Potency. Although the first factor in the principal component analyses for Activity did not explain as much of the variance as the first factor in Evaluation or Potency, it was significantly larger than all other factors suggesting that much of ratings on Activity can be explained by shared culture. Overall, these results provide support for the consensus assumption and suggest that even in heterogenous populations there can be a significant amount of shared cultural meaning. In the next section I discuss the results of the regression analyses and the ways in which demographic factors predicted differences in cultural meanings.

Control Variables

Gender, specifically when comparing people identifying as female to people identifying as male, was found to be a significant predictor of enculturation on Evaluation and Potency but not Activity. These results suggest that people who identify as female both agree more with other members of the population and subscribe more to cultural norms about the valence and potency of concepts. Most previous studies have not found gender differences in meanings and those that have found limited differences (Kroska 2001). These results provide some evidence that gender shapes cultural meanings and

future research should further explore potential gender differences in ratings of affective meanings.

Consistent with the idea that what is measured in culture studies is the dominant culture and with previous studies comparing affective meanings between religious groups (Smith-Lovin and Douglass 1992), religion showed a significant effect on inculcation (consensus with others on cultural meanings) and commonality (agreement with cultural norms about meanings) on all three affective dimensions. Having a religion other than Christianity was consistently related to lower enculturation. Specifically, people who reported having no religion or having a religion other than Christianity or Judaism[5] scored significantly lower on inculcation for Evaluation and people with no religion scored lower on inculcation for Potency suggesting that non-Christians, especially the non-religious, have lower agreement with other members of the culture than Christians do. People who reported no religion or some religion other than the three Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) had lower commonality on Evaluation suggesting that people who believe in any of the Abrahamic religions more closely subscribe to cultural norms about what things are good and bad. These results potentially reflect differences in definitions of morality. People who had no religious beliefs had lower agreement with the cultural norms on Potency but higher agreement with the norms on Activity. Both of these results may reflect on atheists as a significantly different subculture. The negative findings on Potency suggest deviation from the norm on what is considered weak or powerful while the positive findings on Activity, considering how little of the variance was explained by the first principal component, may be indicating

[5] Note: Christianity and Judaism were separate categories. People who reported believing in Judaism did not differ significantly from people who reported believing in Christianity.

that people who had no religious beliefs were more likely to load on the first factor used to calculate the commonality measure for Activity. These findings are most likely driven largely by the sizable majority of Christians in my sample. However, given that Christianity is still the largest religion in the United States, these findings may approximate actual levels of consensus between members of various religious groups in the larger U.S. population. These findings are especially interesting because they suggest that religious differences may be more extreme than race-related or class-based differences.

Age also emerged as a significant predictor of inculcation and commonality with older people (over the age of 35) typically having greater enculturation into the dominant culture. These findings seem to contradict the idea that young, middle-class people are the best reporters of cultural knowledge and perhaps, suggest that future research should examine whether (traditional) college-aged people, especially college students, are significantly different from the general population. These findings also introduce the question of whether there are cohort differences in affective meanings and what ways structural differences and changes throughout the past century of U.S. history might impact these meanings.

Social Class and Culture

Regression analyses testing the *Social Class* hypothesis show some effects of being college-educated or having at least one parent who is college-educated on enculturation. The social class variable was negatively related to agreement with other respondents on Evaluation and Potency and positively related to agreement with others on Activity. The results on Evaluation and Potency are inconsistent with Lynn and

Ellerbach's (2017) findings that people of higher social class (using education as a proxy for social status) have higher consensus in their ratings than people of lower class and suggest that people of higher social class may be becoming more different from each other over time. Social class was also negatively related to agreement with the cultural norms on Potency suggesting that people of higher social class are more inaccurate reporters of cultural norms about powerful or weak actors, behaviors, emotions, or attributes. This is strange given that middle-class norms are thought to define dominant cultural meanings. The positive association of higher social class with inculcation (agreement with others) and commonality (agreement with the norms) on Activity may be related to scale usage. It is possible that the low factor loadings on Activity were caused by respondents being unsure about the meaning of the scale for Activity.

Race and Culture

Regression analyses testing the *Separate Cultures, Declining Significance, and Hybrid Culture* hypotheses show consistent effects of race on enculturation indices. Race was not a significant predictor of inculcation (agreement with others on cultural meanings) on Evaluation suggesting that, in general, there is consensus between members of different racial groups in the United States on assessments of valence. However, race was a significant predictor of commonality (agreement with cultural norms) on Evaluation with Black people having lower commonality than white people while no other racial group differed significantly on this dimension. These results suggest that there are racial differences between Black and white people in the extent to which they subscribe to dominant cultural norms about the valence of concepts. Identifying as Black or Hispanic had a significant positive association with commonality (agreement with

cultural norms) on Potency[6]. These results mirror the finding that lower class respondents had higher commonality on Potency. These results suggest that lower status people may be more inclined to subscribe to cultural norms about power so that they can effectively navigate their subordinate positions in society when interacting with powerful others whereas conforming to norms about power may not be as consequential for high status people who may be more likely to be in positions of power.

Overall, these results provide strong support for the consensus assumption and suggest that much of the culture within the United States is shared. However, I did find results suggesting that racial group and social class do play independent roles in influencing cultural sentiments suggesting that race in the United States is neither declining in significance or interacting with social class to create hybrid subcultures. Still, given that I found support for both the *Social Class* and *Separate Culture* hypotheses, future research should use different methods to explore the relationships between racial groups and social class and their effects on cultural meanings.

Limitations and Future Research

It is important to note that my analyses may have shown consensus because of the nature of the concepts in the study. While the use of very general concepts allows me to demonstrate that there is a general consensus, using concepts that may be especially relevant to some groups may have had different results. Future research should analyze ratings of concepts where racial and class groups may be expected to differ. If there is consensus on ratings of concepts where the groups are expected to differ, that would

[6] Interestingly, identifying with two or more races had a significant negative association with commonality on Potency but, given that only 13 respondents fit into this category, I refrain from interpreting this result.

provide more evidence for the consensus assumption and provide justification for the continued use of homogenous samples.

Because these analyses focused on consensus in the ratings across concepts, I could not determine what direction these differences exist in or whether differences are more extreme in ratings of identities, emotions and social characteristics, or behaviors. I plan on conducting further analyses on these data to explore whether there are patterns suggesting that the type of concept being rated affects differences in ratings.

One limitation of these data and analyses was that the measure of social class was not ideal. Although parents' education has been used as a measure of children's social class in other studies and respondents' own education has also been used as a proxy for social class, socioeconomic status is a variable that may require multiple measures to gain an accurate understanding of it.

Given that people who identified as female were shown to have higher inculcation and commonality on Evaluation and Potency but not on Activity and given that the results of the factor analyses suggest little consensus on Activity, the gender differences that I found may be the result of the fact that there were over twice as many female respondents than male respondents in the sample. The insignificant effect of gender on inculcation and commonality in Activity may be due to the limited consensus on that dimension given that the inculcation and commonality indices that I use are based on factor loadings on the first principal component. There may be too much variation within the sample on this dimension to interpret those results. Also, splitting respondents by their racial categories left some categories composed primarily of people who identified as female. This could have presented a problem considering that the results I found seem

to be affected by gender. Differing gendered beliefs within minority groups may lead to significant gender differences in sentiments within those groups that I was unable to test due to my overwhelmingly female sample.

Finally, while the results of my analyses and those of Wisecup (2011) seem to suggest that the findings of Sewell and Heise's (2010) study were a product of the age of the data, the method of data collection may also be responsible for these differences in findings. Differences in data collection efforts were due to differences in the purpose for collecting the data. When Landis and colleagues (Landis et al. 1976; Landis and Saral 1978) collected the data used in Sewell and Heise's (2010) study, they used the survey methods developed by Osgood and colleagues (1975) for collecting new sentiment dictionaries in different countries. Landis and colleagues (Landis et al. 1976; Landis and Saral 1978) used scales created specifically for measuring Black culture as a separate culture. The scales and anchors used in Wisecup's (2011), Rogers' (2018) and my analysis were those that had been previously validated for use in collecting data about the general United States culture. In Sewell and Heise's (2009) analyses, even when examining concepts that had not been translated to African American Vernacular English (AAVE), they still found significant differences but they also found slightly greater agreement between white and Black affective meanings. It is possible that if Black respondents had the same scales as white people that the concept ratings would have better predicted each other. It is possible that treating racial groups as separate cultures by creating Black scales and translating words to AAVE made respondents more likely to report different sentiments. Differences in ratings based on which scales are used may suggest that different ways of wording the measures activate different cultural frames in

Black people. Differences between Sewell and Heise's analyses and later analyses provide some evidence that this may be the case.

Future research should explore whether different survey procedures, such as the use of different adjective anchors, produce different results in otherwise similar respondents. Overall, my analyses provide strong support for the consensus assumption and some evidence that race and social status are linked to differences in cultural meanings. However, further analyses are needed to determine the full extent to which social positions based on race and social class affect cultural sentiments. Still, these results are promising because they provide some confirmation of the results of previous studies, provide some evidence that sampling from heterogenous populations does not significantly impact consensus, and suggest that in their understandings of cultural meaning, at least within the United States, people are more similar than they are different.

REFERENCES

Ambrasat, Jens, Scheve Christian, Schauenburg Gesche, Conrad Markus and Schröder Tobias. 2016. "Unpacking the Habitus: Meaning Making Across Lifestyles." *Sociological Forum* 31(4):994-1017.

Boster, James S. 1985. "Requiem for the Omniscient Informant": There's Life in the Old Girl Yet." *Directions in Cognitive Anthropology. Janet W.D. Dougherty, Ed.*:177-197.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Canham, Hugo, and Rejane Williams. 2017. "Being Black, Middle-class and the Object of Two Gazes." *Ethnicities* 17(1):23-46.

D'Andrade, Roy G. 1981. "The Cultural Part of Cognition." *Cognitive Science* 5(3):179-195.

DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. "Culture and Cognition." *Annual Review of Sociology* 23(1):263-287.

Grusky, David B. 1994. *Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective.* Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1994.

Harris, Cherise A. 2004. "In A Space No One Could Share: Race, Class, And Identity Among The New Black Middle-Class." PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Georgia.

Harris, Cherise A., and Nikki Khanna. 2010. "Black is, Black Ain't: Biracials, Middle-Class Blacks, and the Social Construction of Blackness." *Sociological Spectrum* 30(6):639-670.

Heise, David R. 1979. *Understanding Events : Affect and the Construction of Social Action.* Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979.

------. 2007. *Expressive Order: Confirming Sentiments in Social Actions.* Springer Science & Business Media.

------. 2010. *Surveying Cultures: Discovering Shared Conceptions and Sentiments.* John Wiley & Sons.

Kashefi, Max. 2011. "Structure and/Or Culture: Explaining Racial Differences in Work Values." *Journal of Black Studies* 42(4):638-664.

Knight, Jennifer L., Michelle R. Hebl, Jessica B. Foster and Laura M. Mannix. 2003. "Out of Role? Out of Luck: The Influence of Race and Leadership Status on Performance Appraisals." *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies* 9(3):85-93.

Lehmann, Wolfgang. 2009. "Becoming Middle-class: How Working-Class University Students Draw and Transgress Moral Class Boundaries." *Sociology* 43(4):631-647.

Lynn, Freda B., and George Ellerbach. 2017. "A Position with a View: Educational Status and the Construction of the Occupational Hierarchy." *American Sociological Review* (1):32.

MacKinnon, Neil J. 1994. *Symbolic Interactionism as Affect Control.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

Osgood, Charles E., George J. Suci and Percy H. Tannenbaum. 1957. *The Measurement of Meaning.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957.

Osgood, Charles E., William H. May and Murray S. Miron. 1975. *Cross-Cultural Universals of Affective Meaning.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975

Pattillo, Mary E. 1999. *Black Picket Fences : Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle-class.*Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Rogers, Kimberly B. 2018. "Sources of Consensus and Variegation in Cultural Affective Meanings." *Social Currents*.

Romney, A. K., Susan C. Weller and William H. Batchelder. 1986. "Culture as Consensus: A Theory of Culture and Informant Accuracy." *American Anthropologist* 88(2):313-338.

Sewell, Abigail A., and David R. Heise. 2010. "Racial Differences in Sentiments: Exploring Variant Cultures." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 34:400-412.

Sloan, Melissa M., Ranae J. Evenson Newhouse and Ashley B. Thompson. 2013. "Counting on Coworkers: Race, Social Support, and Emotional Experiences on the Job." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 76(4):343-372.

Smith-Lovin, Lynn, and William Douglass. 1992. "An Affect Control Analysis of Two Religious Subcultures." *Social Perspectives on Emotion* 1:217-247.

Stuber, Jenny M. 2006. "Talk of Class: The Discursive Repertoires of White Working- and Upper-Middle-Class College Students." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 35(3):285-318.

Swidler, Ann. 1986. "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." *American Sociological Review* (2):273.

Thomas, Lisa and David R. Heise. 1995. "Mining Error Variance and Hitting Pay-Dirt: Discovering Systematic Variation in Social Sentiments." *The Sociological Quarterly* (2):425.

Vaisey, Stephen. 2008. "Socrates, Skinner, and Aristotle: Three Ways of Thinking about Culture in Action." *Sociological Forum* (3):603.

Wilson, William J. 2009. *More than just Race : Being Black and Poor in the Inner City*.New York : Norton & Company, 2009; 1st ed.

Wisecup, Allison K. 2011. " Do we have Consensus?: Examining the Sources of Systematic Variation in Cultural Identity Meanings." PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Duke University.

Wingfield, Adia H. 2010. "Are some Emotions Marked" Whites Only"? Racialized Feeling Rules in Professional Workplaces." *Social Problems* 57(2):251-268.

Table 1. Concepts Rated

Identities	Emotions and social characteristics	Behaviors
accountant	beautiful	abduct
arsonist	cowardly	admire
auditor	credible	approve of
barber	determined	beat up
best friend	disappointed	confront
bisexual	divorced	cuddle
bridesmaid	handsome	dare
bulldozer operator	impulsive	denounce
colleague	knowledgeable	expose
cosmetologist	lustful	frighten
customs officer	mediocre	giggle
dairy farmer	resigned	need
dental hygienist	secure	order
genius	spirited	protect
hooker	spoiled	reward
maniac	thankful	strangle
marine corps enlistee	thoughtless	underestimate
minister		whine
mugger		
navy enlistee		
nurse		
optical engineer		
spectator		
stockholder		
suspect		
unemployed person		

Table 2. Sample Characteristics (before data cleaning)

	Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 190)	Qualtrics Panels (n =1013)
Independent Variables		
Race/Ethnicity	white (69.4%), Black or African American (5.6%), Hispanic (11.1%), Asian or Asian American (6.2%), Other (0.7%), Two or more races (6.9%)	white (67.8), Black or African American (13.5), Hispanic (11.7%), Native American or American Indian (1.2 %), Asian or Asian American (4%), Other (1.3%), Two or more races (0.4%)
Social Class	Lower class (36.1%), Higher status (63.9%)	Lower class (59.9%), Higher class (40.1%)
Controls		
Religion	Christianity (41%), Judaism (2.8%), No religion (50%), Other religion (6.2%)	Christianity (68.2%), Judaism (1.9%), Islam (0.2%), No religion (22.8%), Other religion (6.9%)
Age	18-25 (22.9%), 26-35 (45.8%), 36-50 (22.2%), 51-66 (8.3%), 67+ (0.7%)	18-25 (11.7%), 26-35 (17.4 %), 36-50 (29.3%), 51-66 (22.8%), 67+ (18.7%)
Gender	Male (55.6%), Female (44.4%)	Male (29.6%), Female (70.3%)
Total	190	1013

Table 3. Race by Class comparison (after data cleaning)

	Lower Class	Higher Class
white	429	283
Black/African American	59	71
Hispanic/Latinx	68	54
Asian or Asian American	17	28
Native American or American Indian	7	4
Two or More Races	6	7
Other	7	7
Total	593	454

Table 4. Regression of Evaluation Inculcation on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		-0.176***		-0.181***	-0.188***
		(0.033)		(0.034)	(0.041)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			0.022	0.049	0.061
			(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.073)
Native American or American Indian			-0.061	-0.070	-0.154
			(0.160)	(0.157)	(0.197)
Asian or Asian American			-0.004	0.038	0.051
			(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.128)
Other			0.053	0.078	0.273
			(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.213)
Two or More Races			0.105	0.116	-0.047
			(0.142)	(0.140)	(0.198)
Hispanic/ Latinx			0.057	0.060	0.032
			(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.068)
Class x Black					-0.019
					(0.101)
Class x Native American					0.230
					(0.326)
Class x Asian					-0.019
					(0.164)
Class x Other					-0.362
					(0.291)
Class x multi**r**ac**ial**					0.328
					(0.280)
Class x Latinx					0.064
					(0.103)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4. Regression of Evaluation Inculcation on Race and Social Class (continued)

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	0.217***	0.194***	0.217***	0.192***	0.187***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Gender nonconforming	0.162	0.261	0.151	0.229	0.240
	(0.524)	(0.517)	(0.527)	(0.520)	(0.522)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	0.051	0.068	0.052	0.067	0.070
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.056)
36-50	0.083	0.067	0.086	0.070	0.071
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)
50-66	0.117**	0.113**	0.122**	0.116**	0.116**
	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.058)
67+	0.137**	0.097	0.147**	0.105*	0.106*
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	-0.132	-0.075	-0.130	-0.070	-0.069
	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.116)
Islam	-0.893**	-0.970***	-0.903**	-1.002***	-1.015***
	(0.370)	(0.366)	(0.373)	(0.369)	(0.372)
No religion	-0.187***	-0.195***	-0.186***	-0.195***	-0.197***
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Other religion	-0.193***	-0.203***	-0.193***	-0.205***	-0.200***
	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Constant	2.099***	2.201***	2.085***	2.185***	2.191***
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047
R^2	0.082	0.107	0.084	0.109	0.113
Adjusted R^2	0.074	0.097	0.070	0.095	0.093
Residual Std. Error	0.522 (df = 1036)	0.515 (df = 1035)	0.523 (df = 1030)	0.516 (df = 1029)	0.516 (df = 1023)
F Statistic	9.304*** (df = 10; 1036)	11.241*** (df = 11; 1035)	5.923*** (df = 16; 1030)	7.437*** (df = 17; 1029)	5.657*** (df = 23; 1023)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5. Regression of Potency Inculcation on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		-0.350***		-0.361***	-0.378***
		(0.062)		(0.061)	(0.074)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			0.263***	0.317***	0.249*
			(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.134)
Native American or American Indian			0.321	0.303	0.151
			(0.292)	(0.287)	(0.360)
Asian or Asian American			-0.210	-0.125	-0.040
			(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.235)
Other			0.342	0.391	0.556
			(0.270)	(0.266)	(0.390)
Two or More Races			-1.379***	-1.358***	-1.335***
			(0.259)	(0.255)	(0.361)
Hispanic/ Latinx			0.240**	0.245***	0.220*
			(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.125)
Class x Black					0.128
					(0.184)
Class x Native American					0.415
					(0.596)
Class x Asian					-0.132
					(0.300)
Class x Other					-0.302
					(0.532)
Class x multi**r**ac**ial**					-0.041
					(0.512)
Class x Latinx					0.057
					(0.188)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5. Regression of Potency Inculcation on Race and Social Class (continued)

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	0.462***	0.418***	0.439***	0.391***	0.391***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Gender nonconforming	0.806	1.003	0.539	0.695	0.648
	(0.980)	(0.966)	(0.964)	(0.949)	(0.953)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	-0.127	-0.094	-0.143	-0.112	-0.110
	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.103)
36-50	0.412***	0.381***	0.419***	0.387***	0.385***
	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.097)	(0.098)
50-66	0.546***	0.537***	0.528***	0.514***	0.516***
	(0.108)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.105)
67+	0.565***	0.486***	0.569***	0.486***	0.486***
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.112)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	-0.404*	-0.291	-0.419*	-0.300	-0.301
	(0.217)	(0.215)	(0.214)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Islam	-0.254	-0.407	-0.461	-0.660	-0.599
	(0.693)	(0.683)	(0.683)	(0.673)	(0.680)
No religion	-0.372***	-0.388***	-0.350***	-0.368***	-0.367***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Other religion	-0.086	-0.106	-0.107	-0.133	-0.127
	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.120)
Constant	0.624***	0.826***	0.600***	0.800***	0.806***
	(0.103)	(0.108)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.109)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047
R^2	0.154	0.179	0.193	0.219	0.220
Adjusted R^2	0.146	0.171	0.180	0.206	0.203
Residual Std. Error	0.976	0.962	0.956	0.941	0.943
	(df = 1036)	(df = 1035)	(df = 1030)	(df = 1029)	(df = 1023)
F Statistic	18.858***	20.555***	15.350***	16.967***	12.559***
	(df = 10; 1036)	(df = 11; 1035)	(df = 16; 1030)	(df = 17; 1029)	(df = 23; 1023)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6. Regression of Activity Inculcation on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		0.186***		0.186***	0.247***
		(0.044)		(0.045)	(0.054)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			-0.066	-0.094	0.070
			(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.098)
Native American or American Indian			0.014	0.023	-0.053
			(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.263)
Asian or Asian American			0.131	0.087	0.092
			(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.171)
Other			0.203	0.177	0.145
			(0.196)	(0.194)	(0.284)
Two or More Races			0.328*	0.317*	0.360
			(0.188)	(0.187)	(0.264)
Hispanic/ Latinx			0.012	0.009	0.081
			(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.091)
Class x Black					-0.314**
					(0.135)
Class x Native American					0.215
					(0.435)
Class x Asian					-0.028
					(0.219)
Class x Other					0.044
					(0.388)
Class x multiracial					-0.104
					(0.374)
Class x Latinx					-0.169
					(0.137)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6. Regression of Activity Inculcation on Race and Social Class (continued

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	-0.062	-0.039	-0.056	-0.031	-0.031
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Gender nonconforming	-0.418	-0.522	-0.333	-0.415	-0.307
	(0.697)	(0.692)	(0.699)	(0.694)	(0.696)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	-0.005	-0.022	-0.002	-0.018	-0.020
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)
36-50	-0.186***	-0.169**	-0.186***	-0.170**	-0.162**
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.072)
50-66	-0.142*	-0.137*	-0.131*	-0.124	-0.133*
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
67+	-0.179**	-0.137*	-0.177**	-0.133	-0.132
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.082)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	0.236	0.175	0.225	0.163	0.157
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.155)	(0.155)	(0.155)
Islam	-0.599	-0.518	-0.534	-0.432	-0.569
	(0.493)	(0.489)	(0.496)	(0.492)	(0.496)
No religion	0.078	0.087*	0.070	0.078	0.077
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Other religion	-0.127	-0.117	-0.139	-0.126	-0.137
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Constant	0.748***	0.641***	0.738***	0.635***	0.612***
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Observations	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045
R^2	0.025	0.041	0.032	0.048	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.016	0.031	0.016	0.032	0.032
Residual Std. Error	0.694 (df = 1034)	0.689 (df = 1033)	0.694 (df = 1028)	0.689 (df = 1027)	0.688 (df = 1021)
F Statistic	2.658*** (df = 10; 1034)	4.041*** (df = 11; 1033)	2.090*** (df = 16; 1028)	3.015*** (df = 17; 1027)	2.522*** (df = 23; 1021)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7. Regression of Evaluation Commonality on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		0.006		0.007	0.007
		(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.007)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			-0.020**	-0.021**	-0.025**
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)
Native American or American Indian			-0.019	-0.018	-0.040
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.032)
Asian or Asian American			0.015	0.013	0.001
			(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)
Other			-0.031	-0.032	0.016
			(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.035)
Two or More Races			0.017	0.016	0.024
			(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Hispanic/ Latinx			0.0005	0.0004	0.004
			(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Class x Black					0.007
					(0.016)
Class x Native American					0.059
					(0.053)
Class x Asian					0.020
					(0.027)
Class x Other					-0.089*
					(0.047)
Class x multiracial					-0.016
					(0.046)
Class x Latinx					-0.008
					(0.017)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7. Regression of Evaluation Commonality on Race and Social Class (continued)

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	0.019***	0.020***	0.021***	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Gender nonconforming	-0.004	-0.008	0.015	0.012	0.009
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	0.021**	0.020**	0.021**	0.020**	0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
36-50	0.019**	0.020**	0.019**	0.020**	0.019**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
50-66	0.023**	0.023**	0.024**	0.024**	0.023**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
67+	0.039***	0.041***	0.040***	0.041***	0.042***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	0.017	0.015	0.019	0.017	0.016
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Islam	-0.068	-0.065	-0.051	-0.047	-0.043
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.061)
No religion	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.016**	-0.015**	-0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Other religion	-0.030***	-0.029***	-0.030***	-0.030***	-0.029***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Constant	0.837***	0.833***	0.838***	0.835***	0.835***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047
R^2	0.044	0.046	0.054	0.056	0.061
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.035	0.039	0.040	0.040
Residual Std. Error	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.084	0.084
	(df = 1036)	(df = 1035)	(df = 1030)	(df = 1029)	(df = 1023)
F Statistic	4.816***	4.497***	3.682***	3.566***	2.898***
	(df = 10; 1036)	(df = 11; 1035)	(df = 16; 1030)	(df = 17; 1029)	(df = 23; 1023)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8. Regression of Potency Commonality on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		-0.103***		-0.106***	-0.116***
		(0.027)		(0.027)	(0.032)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			0.083**	0.099**	0.043
			(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.058)
Native American or American Indian			0.225*	0.220*	0.136
			(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.157)
Asian or Asian American			-0.064	-0.040	0.032
			(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.102)
Other			0.086	0.101	0.157
			(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.169)
Two or More Races			-0.618***	-0.612***	-0.505***
			(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.157)
Hispanic/ Latinx			0.095**	0.096**	0.080
			(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.054)
Class x Black					0.103
					(0.080)
Class x Native American					0.227
					(0.259)
Class x Asian					-0.112
					(0.130)
Class x Other					-0.101
					(0.231)
Class x multiracial					-0.211
					(0.223)
Class x Latinx					0.038
					(0.081)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8. Regression of Potency Commonality on Race and Social Class (continued)

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	0.195***	0.182***	0.186***	0.172***	0.175***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Gender nonconforming	0.339	0.397	0.253	0.298	0.259
	(0.422)	(0.419)	(0.416)	(0.413)	(0.414)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	-0.055	-0.045	-0.065	-0.055	-0.054
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
36-50	0.186***	0.177***	0.187***	0.177***	0.176***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)
50-66	0.265***	0.262***	0.256***	0.252***	0.254***
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
67+	0.321***	0.297***	0.319***	0.295***	0.295***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	-0.148	-0.114	-0.150	-0.115	-0.116
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Islam	0.119	0.074	0.054	-0.004	0.047
	(0.298)	(0.297)	(0.295)	(0.293)	(0.295)
No religion	-0.153***	-0.158***	-0.145***	-0.150***	-0.149***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Other religion	-0.009	-0.015	-0.022	-0.029	-0.026
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Constant	0.257***	0.316***	0.252***	0.310***	0.312***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Observations	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047	1,047
R^2	0.171	0.183	0.207	0.219	0.223
Adjusted R^2	0.163	0.174	0.195	0.206	0.205
Residual Std. Error	0.420 (df = 1036)	0.418 (df = 1035)	0.412 (df = 1030)	0.409 (df = 1029)	0.410 (df = 1023)
F Statistic	21.444*** (df = 10; 1036)	21.091*** (df = 11; 1035)	16.833*** (df = 16; 1030)	16.992*** (df = 17; 1029)	12.751*** (df = 23; 1023)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9. Regression of Activity Commonality on Race and Social Class

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Higher Social Class		0.106***		0.109***	0.126***
		(0.018)		(0.018)	(0.022)
Race (white)					
Black or African American			-0.074***	-0.090***	-0.043
			(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.040)
Native American or American Indian			-0.031	-0.025	-0.053
			(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.106)
Asian or Asian American			0.067	0.041	0.056
			(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.069)
Other			0.037	0.022	-0.027
			(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.115)
Two or More Races			0.096	0.089	0.114
			(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.107)
Hispanic/ Latinx			-0.034	-0.035	-0.019
			(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Class x Black					-0.090*
					(0.054)
Class x Native American					0.078
					(0.176)
Class x Asian					-0.029
					(0.089)
Class x Other					0.087
					(0.157)
Class x multiracial					-0.053
					(0.151)
Class x Latinx					-0.038
					(0.055)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 9. Regression of Activity Commonality on Race and Social Class (continued)

	Controls	Social Class	Race/Ethnicity	Race Mediated by Class	Race Moderated by Class
Control Variables					
Gender (male)					
Female	-0.031	-0.017	-0.026	-0.012	-0.011
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Gender nonconforming	-0.046	-0.106	0.029	-0.019	0.012
	(0.285)	(0.280)	(0.285)	(0.280)	(0.281)
Age (18-25)					
26-35	0.014	0.004	0.017	0.008	0.008
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
36-50	-0.081***	-0.071**	-0.082***	-0.072**	-0.069**
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
50-66	-0.056*	-0.054*	-0.053*	-0.049	-0.050
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
67+	-0.082**	-0.058*	-0.087***	-0.062*	-0.062*
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Religion (Christianity)					
Judaism	0.117*	0.082	0.111*	0.075	0.074
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Islam	-0.280	-0.234	-0.220	-0.160	-0.200
	(0.201)	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.199)	(0.200)
No religion	0.077***	0.082***	0.072***	0.077***	0.076***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Other religion	-0.011	-0.005	-0.015	-0.008	-0.012
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Constant	0.426***	0.365***	0.434***	0.373***	0.366***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Observations	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045	1,045
R^2	0.045	0.076	0.058	0.090	0.093
Adjusted R^2	0.036	0.067	0.043	0.075	0.073
Residual Std. Error	0.284 (df = 1034)	0.279 (df = 1033)	0.283 (df = 1028)	0.278 (df = 1027)	0.278 (df = 1021)
F Statistic	4.893*** (df = 10; 1034)	7.764*** (df = 11; 1033)	3.938*** (df = 16; 1028)	5.986*** (df = 17; 1027)	4.577*** (df = 23; 1021)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix A: Relevant Demographic Survey Questions

What is the highest level of education YOU have attained?

- Did not graduate High School
- High School Graduate
- Some college or vocational school
- Associate's Degree
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Law degree (e.g., LLB, JD)
- Medical degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM)
- Business degree (e.g., MBA, CPA)
- Doctoral degree
- Multiple post-graduate degrees

What is your age?

- 18-25
- 26-35
- 36-50
- 51-66
- 67+

What is your race?

- White or Caucasian
- Black or African-American
- American Indian or Native American
- Asian or Asian American
- Other

Are you Hispanic?

- Yes
- No

What is your age in years?

Were you born in the United States?

- Yes
- No

What proportion of your life have you lived in the US?

- 0-10%
- 11-20%
- 21-30%
- 31-40%
- 41-50%
- 51-60%

61-70%
71-80%
81-90%
91-100%

Where in the US did you mainly live before age 18?
New England = ME VT NH MA CT RI
Middle Atlantic = NY NJ PA
East North Central = WI IL IN MI OH
West North Central = MN IA MO ND SD NE KS
South Atlantic = DE MD WV VA NC SC GA FL DC
East South Central = KY TN AL MS
West South Central = AR OK LA TX
Mountain = MT ID WY NV UT CO AZ NM
Pacific = WA OR CA AK HI
I did not mainly live in the US before age 18.

What is your first language?
English
Spanish
Portuguese
Chinese
Japanese
Korean
Arabic
Hindi, Urdu or Bengali
Russian
Other

What is the highest level of education your MOTHER has attained?
Did not graduate High School
High School Graduate
Some college or vocational school
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Law degree (e.g., LLB, JD)
Medical degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM)
Business degree (e.g., MBA, CPA)
Doctoral degree
Multiple post-graduate degrees
Don't know

What is the highest level of education your FATHER has attained?
Did not graduate High School
High School Graduate

Some college or vocational school
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Law degree (e.g., LLB, JD)
Medical degree (e.g., MD, DDS, DVM)
Business degree (e.g., MBA, CPA)
Doctoral degree
Multiple post-graduate degrees
Don't know

Which best describes your religion?

Christianity
Judaism
Islam
None
Other